READINGS  IN 
POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


SELECTED  AND  EDITED 
BY 

RAYMOND  GARFIELD  GETTELL 

AUTHOR   OF    "INTRODUCTION    TO    POLITICAL   SCIENCE" 


GINN  AND  COMPANY 

BOSTON  •  NEW  YORK  •  CHICAGO  •  LONDON 


COPYRIGHT,  191 1,  BY 
RAYMOND  GARFIELD  GETTELL 

ALL    RIGHTS    RESERVED 
911. 7 


GINN  AND  COMPANY  ■  PRO- 
PRIETORS •  BOSTON  •  U.S.A. 


PREFACE 

This  collection  of  "  Readings  in  Political  Science  "  is  designed  to  accom- 
pany the  editor's  "  Introduction  to  Political  Science,"  and  the  choice  and 
arrangement  of  material  have  been  influenced  by  the  plan  of  that  volume. 
At  the  same  time  it  may  be  used  to  accompany  other  manuals  that  cover 
the  general  field  of  political  science,  or  it  may  be  read  with  profit  by  all 
who  desire  an  introduction  to  the  body  of  literature  that  deals  with  the 
origin,  development,  organization,  and  activities  of  the  state. 

All  teachers  realize  the  necessity  of  having  their  students  read  more 
than  is  contained  in  the  textbook,  and  valuable  selections  of  material  to 
direct  such  reading  have  recently  appeared  for  the  students  of  history, 
economics,  sociology,  and  American  government.  As  yet,  however,  no 
book  of  readings  for  the  general  subject  of  political  science  has  been 
attempted,  and  the  editor  claims  the  indulgence  due  to  one  who  ventures 
into  an  untried  field. 

In  a  number  of  cases  contemporary  accounts  or  official  documents 
have  been  quoted,  but  no  effort  has  been  made  to  secure  material  from 
obscure  or  out-of-the-way  sources.  On  the  contrary,  extracts  have  been 
taken,  whenever  possible,  from  recognized  modern  authorities  —  from 
books  the  majority  of  which  will  be  found  in  every  well-appointed  college 
library.  In  this  way  it  is  hoped  that  students  will  be  led  to  read  further, 
using  this  volume  as  a  framework  around  which  their  reading  may  be 
organized.  Besides,  the  selections  in  this  book  may  serve  as  a  basis  for 
classroom  discussion,  the  case  system  of  instruction  being  particularly 
applicable  to  political  science. 

The  editor  wishes  to  acknowledge  his  indebtedness  to  the  authors 
whose  works  have  been  drawn  upon  for  material  in  this  volume,  and  to 
extend  his  thanks  to  the  various  publishers  for  their  gracious  permission 
to  reprint  this  material.  Invaluable  assistance  in  the  preparation  of  the 
manuscript  has  been  given  by  the  editor's  wife. 

RAYMOND  GARFIELD  GETTELL 
Trinity  College 
Hartford,  Connecticut 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

INTRODUCTION 
I.    NATURE  AND   SCOPE  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE       .     .     .        i 

I.    Scope  of  Political  Science i 

1.  The  Work  of  the  American  Political  Science  Association. 

F.  J.  Goodnow,  in  Proceedings  of  the  American  Polit- 
ical Science  Association  (1904),  Vol.  I,  pp.  37-43  .     .        i 

2.  Divisions  of  Political  Science.    J.  K.  Bluntschli,  The  The- 

ory of  the  State,  pp.  2-4.    (Oxford  University  Press, 

1901) 4 

3.  Outline  of  Political  Science.    Sir  F.  Pollock,  History  of 

the  Science  of  Politics,  pp.  94-95.    (The  Macmillan 
Company,    1890) 5 

II.    Relation  to  Allied  Sciences 7 

4.  Political    Science    and    Sociolog}'.    J.    H.   W.    Stucken- 

berg,  Introduction  to  the  Study  of  Sociology,  pp.  80- 
82.    (George  H.  Doran  Company.  1902) 7 

5.  Political  Science  and  Sociology.    F.   H.  Giddings,    The 

Principles  of  Sociology,  pp.  35-37.    (The  Macmillan 
Company.  1896) 8 

6.  Political    Science  and   Historj'.     James   Bryce,   in    The 

American  Political  Science  Review,  Februar)',  1909, 
Vol.  Ill,  No.  I,  pp.  3-4,  8-9 9 

7.  Political  Science  and   History.    Sir  J.  R.  Seeley,  Intro- 

duction to  Political  Science,  pp.  3-4,  13.  25-26.   (The 
Macmillan  Company,  1896) 10 

8.  Political   Science  and  Economics.     E.  R.  A.  Seligman, 

Principles    of  Economics,     pp.    30-32.     (Longmans, 
Green  &  Co.,    1905) n 

9.  Political  Science  and  Ethics.    John  Dewey  and  J.   H. 

Tufts,  Ethics,  pp.  434-436.    (Henry  Holt  and  Com- 
pany, 1908) 13 


vi  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

PAGE 
CHAPTER 

PART  I.   THE  NATURE  OF  THE  STATE 
II.    PRELIMINARY  DEFINITIONS  AND  DISTINCTIONS         .      15 

10.  Necessity    for    Definitions    and    Distinctions.     Sheldon 

Amos,  The  Science  of  Politics,  pp.  56-59.  (D.  Apple- 
ton  and  Company,  1S83) ^5 

I.    Nation:  Nationality '" 

11.  The  Essentials  of  Nationality.    W.  W.  Willoughby,  The 

Nature  of  the  State,  pp.  9-12.  (The  Macmillan 
Company,  1896) 'o 

12.  The    Idea   of    the    Nation.    J.    W.    Burgess,    Political 

Science  and  Constitutional  Law,  Vol.  I,  pp.  i-4- 
(Ginn  and  Company,  I S90J i? 

II.  State ^9 

13.  Definitions  of  the  State.    T.  E.  Holland.  The  Elements 

of  furisprudence,  p.  44  (loth  ed.);  J.  K.  Bluntschli, 
The  Theory  of  the  State,  p.  23  ;  J.  \V.  Burgess,  Polit- 
ical Science  and  Constitutional  Laiv,  Vol.  I,  p.  51  ; 
W.  W.  Willoughby,  The  Nature  of  the  State,  p.  3 ; 
T.  D.  Woolsey,  Political  Science,  Vol.  I,  p.  140; 
United  States  Supreme  Court,  in  Chisholm  v.  Georgia, 
2  Dallas,  456 19 

14.  The  Nature  of  the  State.    H.  Sidgwick,  The  Develop- 

?nent  of  European  Polity,  pp.  25-27.  (The  Mac- 
millan Company,  1903) 19 

15.  Essentials  of  the  State.    W.  W.  Willoughby,  The  Nature 

of  the  State,  p.  4 21 

16.  Characteristics  of  the   State.    J.  W.  Burgess,  Political 

Science  and  Constitutional  Law,  Vol.  I,  p.  52  .     .     .      21 

17.  The  Idea  and  the  Concept  of  the  State.    W.  W.  \\\\- 

\o\xghby.  The  Nature  of  the  State,  Y)"?-  ^A-^S    .     •     ■     22 

III.  Sovereignty 23 

18.  Definition  of  Sovereignty.    ].'\\ .  ^nrgtss.  Political  Sci- 

ence attd  Constitutional  Law,  Vol.  I,  pp.  52-53    .     .      23 

19.  The  Nature  of  Sovereignty.    T.  E.  Holland.   The  Ele- 

jnents  of  furisprudence,  pp.  47-48.  (Oxford  University 
Press,  1906) 23 


CONTENTS  vii 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

IV.    Government 23 

20.  Distinction    between    State    and    Government.    W.   W. 

Willoughby.    T/ie  Nature  of  the  State,  p.  8    .     .     .     23 

21.  Definition  of  Government.    J.  Q.  Dealey,  The  Develop- 

f/tent  of  the  State,  p.   119.    (Silver,  Burdett  &  Com- 
pany,  1909) 24 

III.  PHYSICAL  BASIS   OF  THE  STATE 25 

22.  Physical  Causes  that  act  in   History.    B.  A.  Hinsdale. 

How  to  Study  and  Teach  History,  chap.  x.  (D.  Apple- 
ton  and  Company,  1893) 25 

23.  The  Natural  Environment.    E.  R.  A.  Seligman,  Prin- 

ciples of  Economics,  pp.  36-42 33 

24.  Lines  of  Social  Movement.    A.  Fairbanks,  Int?oduction 

to  Sociology,   pp.    74-75.    (Charles  Scribner"s   Sons, 

1905) 38 

25.  Fertility  of  the  Soil.   J.  K.  Bluntschli,  The  Theory  of  the 

State,  pp.  232-235 38 

26.  Effects  of  Drjness  and  Moisture.    H.  Spencer,  Principles 

of  Sociology.  Vol.   I,  pp.  20-23.    (D.  Appleton  and 
Company,   1890) 40 

27.  The   General  Aspects  of   Nature.    H.  T.  Buckle,  His- 

tory of  Ciinlization  in  England,  \o\.  I,  pp.  85-87. 
(D.  Appleton  and  Company,  1873) 42 

IV.  POPULATION   OF  THE  STATE 45 

I.  Importance  of  the  Population 45 

28.  Human    Causes  that  act  in   History.     B.  A.   Hinsdale, 

How  to  Study  and  Teach  History,  pp.   127-134     .     45 

29.  The  Agents  of  Civilization.    L.  F.  Ward,  Applied  Soci- 

ology, pp.  132-134.    (Ginn  and  Company,  1906)    .     .     49 

II.    Race 51 

30.  Causes  of  the  Fixation  of  Ethnic  Traits.    D.  G.  Brinton, 

Races  and  Peoples,  pp.  40-44.    (David  McKay,  1901)     51 

31.  Race  Elements  of  the  L'nited  States.   A.  B.  Hart.  Actual 

Go7>ernment.    pp.    9-11.     (Longmans,   Green   &    Co., 
1905) 53 


viii  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE     . 

PAGI 
CHAPTER 

32.  Races  in  Austria-Hungary.    A.  L.  Lowell,  Governments 

and  Parties  in  Continental  Europe,  Vol.  II,  pp.  72-73i 
124-127.    (Houghton  Mifflin  Company,  1896)  .     .     .     54 

33.  The  Race  Problem  in  Modern  Colonial  Empires.    A.  C. 

Coolidge,    The    United  States   as   a    World  Power, 
pp.  61-63.    (The  Macmillan  Company,  1908).     .     .     55 

34.  The    Destiny   of    Races.     D.   G.    Brinton,    Races    and 

Peoples,  pp.  293-299 57 

III,  Nationality 59 

35.  Nationality  and  the  Formation  of  States.  J.  K.  Bluntschli, 

The  Theory  of  the  State,  ^^.  ()7-'i'^° 59 

36.  Nationality  in    Modern    Politics.    A.  C.  Coolidge,   The 

United  States  as  a  World  Power,  ^^.  i,\-\l     ...     61 

37.  Nationalism  in  Recent  Politics.    P.  S.  Reinsch,  World 

Politics,  pp.  3-7.    (The  Macmillan  Company,  1900)   ,     63 

IV.  Political  Genius  of  Various  Nations 64 

38.  Influences   that   affect   the   Natural  Ability  of  Nations. 

Francis     Galton,     Heredita?y     Genius,     chap.     xxi. 
(D.   Appleton  and   Company,   i88i) 64 

39.  National  Psychology.   A.  C.  Coolidge,  The  United  States 

as  a  World  Power,  pp.  87-88 66 

40.  Types  of  Statesmen.    James  Bryce,  The  American  Com- 

monwealth, Vol.  n,  pp.   195-196.    (The   Macmillan 
Company,   1889) 67 

V.    ORIGIN  OF  THE  STATE 68 

I.   General  Process  of  State  Formation 68 

41.  The  Origin  of  the  State.   J.  W.  Burgess,  Political  Science 

and  Constitutional  Law,  Vol.  I,  pp.  64-67  ....     68 

42.  The  Origin  of  the  State.   W.  W.  Willoughby,  The  Nature 

of  the  State,  pp.  25-27 7° 

II.   Forces  in  State  Building 72 

43.  Prominent  Forces  in  State  Building.    F.  W.  Blackmar, 

The  Elements  of  Sociology,  pp.  iio,  114-115.    (The 
Macmillan  Company,  1905) 72 

44.  Primitive  Social  Organization.    E.  Jenks,  A  History  of 

Politics,  pp.  8-14.    (The  Macmillan  Company,  1905)     73 


CONTENTS  ix 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

45.  Kinship  and  State  Origin.    Woodrow  Wilson,  The  State, 

pp.  2-3,  13-15.   (D.  C.  Heath  &  Co.,  1909)  ....     76 

46.  The  Family  and  the  State.    Sir  J.  R.  Seeley,  Introduc- 

tion to  Political  Science,  pp.  54-56 77 

47.  Religion  and  the  City  State.    Fustel  de  Coulanges,  The 

Ancient  City,  trans,  by  Willard  Small,  pp.  51-52,  167, 
220-221,  257-258,  298,  520.  (Lothrop,  Lee  &  Shep- 
ard  Company,  1901) 78 

48.  The  Struggle  of  Races.    L.   F.  Ward,  Pure  Sociology, 

pp.  205-208.    (The  Macmillan  Company,   1903)   .     .     80 

49.  War  and  State  Origin.    E.  Jenks,  A  History  of  Politics, 

pp.  73-77-     ., .     .     8i 

III.  Stagnation  and  Progress 82 

50.  The  Beginnings  of  Progress.    Walter  Bagehot,  Physics 

and  Politics,  pp.  212-222.  (D.  Appleton  and  Com- 
pany,  1873) 82 

51.  Social  Progress.    L.  F.  Ward,  Pure  Sociology,  pp.  549- 

551 .' 85 

VI.    EVOLUTION  OF  THE  STATE 87 

I.   The  Ancient  State 87 

52.  Transition  from  Tribal  to  Political  Organization.    F.  H. 

Giddings,  The  Principles  of  Sociology,  pp.  320-323     87 

53.  Summary  of  Greek  Political  Development.    H.  Sidgwick, 

The  Development  of  European  Polity,  pp.   1 31-134     89 

54.  Formation  of  the  Roman  Empire.   W.  M.  West,  Ancient 

///>/(?/j,  pp.  340-341.    (AUyn  and  Bacon,  1902)     .     .     91 

II.   The  Medieval  State 92 

55.  Similarities  among  Greek,  Roman,  and  Teutonic  Institu- 

tions. H.  Sidgwick,  The  Development  of  European 
Polity,  pp.  29-30 92 

56.  The  Feudal  State.    G.  B.  Adams,  Civilization  during 

the  Middle  Ages,  pp.  216-217,  222-224.  (Charles 
Scribner's  Sons,  1903) 93 

57.  Essential    Principles  of   the    Medieval    Empire.    James 

Bryce,  The  Holy  Roman  Empire,  pp.  380-381.  (The 
Macmillan  Company,  1875) 94 

58.  Individualism   in  the  Feudal  State.    Woodrow  Wilson, 

The  State,  pp.  583-585 95 


X  READINGS   IX  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  . 

PAGE 
CHAPTER 

in.   The  Modern  State 97 

59.  Rise  of  Monarchic  States.   W.  M.  West,  Modern  His- 

tory, ^^.  i2,2-i-^Z-    (Allyn  and  Bacon,  1903)    ...       97 

60.  Science  and  the  Spirit  of  Reform.    J.  H.  Robinson  and 

C.  H.  Beard,  The  Development  of  Modern  Europe, 

Vol.  I,  pp.  157-158,  167.  (Ginn  and  Company,  1907)       98 

61.  The  Eighteenth  and  Nineteenth  Centuries.    J.  H.  Rob- 

inson and  C.  A.  Beard,  The  Development  of  Mod- 
ern Europe,  Vol.  II.  pp.  373-376 99 

62.  The  Modern  National  State.    J.  W.  Burgess.  Political 

Science  and  Constitutional  Law.  \o\.  I.  pp.  38-39      10 1 

63.  The  Future  of  the  National^tate.    W.  W.  Willoughby, 

The  Xature  of  the  State,  "^1^.  \z-\\ 102 

64.  The  Newer  Democracy.  J.  Q.  Dealey.  The  Development 

of  the  State,  \)^.  2)0?>-Z''() 103 

65.  Political  Evolution  of  the  Future.    M.  Monod,  in  Revue 

Historique.    Quoted  in  G.  B.  Adams,   Civilization 
during  the  Middle  Ages,  Tp.  22j^,  noi& 104 

IV.   Summary  of  Political  Evolution 104 

66.  Aspects  of  the  State.   J.  O.  Dealey,  The  Development 

of  the  State,  pp.  45-47 104 

67.  Contributions  of  Nations  to  Political  Civilization.    Ibid. 

pp.  231-233 105 

VII.    THEORIES  OF  THE  STATE 107 

I.    Political  Theory 107 

68.  The  Value  of  Political  Theory.    W.  W.  Willoughby, 

Political  Theories  of  the  Ancient   World,  Preface, 

pp.  v-x.   (Longmans,  Green  &  Co.,  1903)  .     .     .     .      107 

II.   Ancient  Political  Theory 108 

69.  Political  Ideas  of  the  Hebrews,    i  Samuel  viii,  4-6 ;  x, 

24;  Deuteronomy  xvii,  8-10 ;  E.xodus  xxxii,  15-16; 

2  Kings  xxiii,  1-3 108 

70.  The  Republic  of  Plato.    Plato,  Republic,  trans,  by  J. 

L.  Davies  and  D.  J.  Vaughan,  pp.  60,  127,  136,  144, 

151-  3°57  306.    (The  Macmillan  Company,  1897)      .      109 

7 1 .  The  Politics  of  Aristotle.    Aristode,  Politics,  trans,  by 

B.  Jowett,  pp.  28.  29,  129,  130,  168,  169,  208-215, 

260,  267,  268,  276.    (O.xford  University  Press,  1905)     no 


CONTENTS  xi 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

72.  The  Comtnonwealth  of  Cicero.    Cicero.  De  Republica, 

trans,  by  C.  D.  Yonge,  pp.  303-309,  355,  360.  375. 
(Bohn's  Library,  1884) 112 

III.  Medieval  Political  Theory 113 

73.  Political  Theory'  of  the  Early  Church.    Matthew  xxii, 

21  ;  John  xviii,  36;   Romans  xiii,  1-7 113 

74.  Political  Theor>'  of  the  Popes.    O.  J.  Thatcher  and  E. 

H.  McNeal,  A  Source  Book  for  Mediceval  History, 
pp.  136-138,  155-156.  (Charles  Scribner's  Sons, 
1905)  J.  H.  Robinson,  Readings  in  European  His- 
tory. Vol.  I,  pp.  72-73.  347.    (Ginn  and  Company, 

1904) 113 

Tl.  Dante's  Conception  of  the  Imperial  Power.  Dante 
Alighieri,  De  Afonarchia,  trans,  by  Aurelia  Henr\', 
pp.   137-206  passim.    (Houghton  Mifflin  Company, 

1904) 114 

76.  The  Prince  of   Machiavelli.     Nicolo   Machiavelli,   The 

Prince,  trans,  by  W.  K.  Marriott,  pp.  1 21-123,  I33) 

134,  141-143.    (Everj-man's  Librarj-) 116 

77.  Puritan  Principles  of  Government.    John  Calvin,  Insti- 

tutes of  the  Christian  Religion,  trans,  by  John  Allen, 

Vol.  Ill,  pp.  515-551  passim 117 

IV.  The  Divine-Right  Theory 118 

78.  Speech  of  James  I  of  England,    ll'orks  of  fames  I, 

p.  556.  Cited  in  G.  C.  Lee,  Source  Book  of  English 
History,  pp.  336-337.  (Henry  Holt  and  Company, 
1901) 118 

79.  The  Theory-  of   Louis  XIV.    Bossuet,  Politique  tirie 

des  propres  paroles  de  I  ''Ecriture  Sainte,  trans,  in     • 
J.  H.  Robinson  and  C.  H.  Beard.  Readings  in  Mod- 
ern European  History.  \o\.  I.  pp.  5-7 119 

V.   The  Social-Contract  Theory 120 

80.  The  Leviathan  of  Hobbes.    T.  Hobbes.  Leviathan,  ed. 

by  Sir.  W.  Molesworth,  \o\.  III.  pp.  153-154.  159. 

161 120 

81.  The    Two    Treatises  of  Go^'ernment  of  Locke.    John 

Locke.  H'orks  (London,  1824^  Vol.  IV.  pp.  339-34°- 
389-390.415 120 


xii  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

PAGE 
CHAPTER  T      T.  -ri 

82.  The  Social  Contract  of  Rousseau.    J.  Rousseau,  I  he 

Social  Contract,  trans,  by   H.  J.   Tozer.     Cited    in 
Petin.  Trans,  and  Rps.,\o\.V\,^^^.\\-\(i    .     .     .     121 

VI.  The  Organic  Theory 122 

83.  Society  as  an   Organism.     H.  Spencer,   Principles  of 

Sociology,  Vol.  I,  pp.  436-453,  535-536.    (D.  Apple- 
ton  and  Company,  1890)       122 

84.  The  Organic  Nature  of  the  State.    J.  K.  Bluntschli,  The 

Theory  of  the  State,  Y>V-  ^^--~ ^-3 

VII.  Present  Political  Theory 124 

85.  English  and  Continental  Political  Theory.    Sir.  F.  Pol- 

lock, History  of  the  Science  of  Politics,  pp.  I  lo-i  1 8      1 24 

86.  Changes   in    Political   Tleory  in    the    United    States. 

C.  E.  Merriam,  American  Political  Theories,  pp.  304, 
332-333.    (The  Macmillan  Company,   1903)  ...      125 

VIII.    SOVEREIGNTY 127 

I.   Nature  of  Sovereignty 127 

87.  Meaning  of  the  Term  "  Sovereignty."    C.  E.  Merriam, 

History  of  the  Theory  of  Sovereignty  since  Rous- 
seau, pp.  224-225.  Colu7nbia  University  Studies  in 
History,  Economics  and  Public  Law,  Vol.  XII,  No.  4     1 27 

88.  Sovereignty    as    Unlimited    Power.    J.    W.    Burgess, 

Political  Science  and  Constitutional  Law,  Vol.  I, 


PP-   53-55 


128 


89.  Characteristics  of  Sovereignty.    J.  K.  Bluntschli,   The 

Theory  of  the  State,  pp.  493-495 1 29 

90.  Sovereignty  as   Supreme   Will.    W.   W.  Willoughby, 

The  Nature  of  the  State,  ^^.  \()\-\()(i 13° 

91.  Sovereignty  from    a    Sociological    Standpoint.     F.    H. 

Giddings,    Descriptive    and   Historical   Sociology, 

pp.    357-359.    (The    Macmillan    Company,   1906)  .      130 

92.  The  Limits  of  Sovereignty.    A.  L.  Lowell,  Essays  on 

Government,  pp.  215-216.    (Houghton  MifBin  Com- 
pany, 1889) 132 


II.   Location  of  Sovereignty 133 

93.    Sovereignty  of  the  People.    A.  B.  Hart,  Actual  Gov- 
ernment, pp.  357-359 133 


CONTENTS  xiii 

PTER  PAGE 

94.  Political  Sovereignty.    H.  Sidgwick,  The  Elements  of 

Politics^  pp.  604-605,  611.  (The  Macmillan  Com- 
pany, 1897) * 134 

95.  Ultimate    Political    Sovereignty.     D.    G.    Ritchie,    in 

Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political 
and  Social  Science,  Vol.  I,  p.  407 135 

96.  The  Legal  Sovereign.  J.  Q.  Dealey,  The  Development 

of  the  State,  pp.  209-212 135 

97.  Sovereignty    as    Total    Lawmaking    Power.    W.    W. 

Willoughby,  The  Nature  of  the  State,  pp.  302-307      137 

98.  Divisibility  of  Sovereignty.     United   States  Supreme 

Court,  in  Chisholm  v.  Georgia,  2  Dallas,  435; 
United  States  Supreme  Court,  in  Ware  v.  Hylton, 
3  Dallas,  232;  James  Madison,  Works,  Vol.  IV, 
p.  394;    N.  Chipman,  Principles  of  Government, 

P-  273 138 

99.  Delegation  of  Sovereignty.    Sir  W.  Markby,  Elements 

of  Law,  pp.  26-27.  (Oxford  University  Press,  1899)      139 

IIL    Modern  Concepts  of  Sovereignty 140 

100.  Present  Theory  of  Sovereignty.    C.  E.  Merriam,  His- 

tory of  the  Theory  of  Sovereignty  since  Rousseau, 
pp.  222-224.  Columbia  University  Studies  in  His- 
tory, Econotnics  and  Public  Law,  Vol.  XII,  No.  4     140 

10 1.  Criticism  of  the  Theory  of  Sovereignty.    S.  Leacock, 

Elements  of  Politics,  pp.  59-62.  (Houghton  Mifflin 
Company,  1906) 141 

102.  International  Law  and  Sovereignty.    C.  E.  Merriam, 

History  of  the  Theory  of  Sovereignty  since  Rous- 
seau, pp.  2 1 4-2 1 6.  Columbia  University  Studies  in 
Histoiy,  Economics  and  Public  Law,  Vol.  XII, 
No.  4    ....     ; 142 

103.  Sovereignty  in  Constitutional  and  International  Law. 

R.  T.  Crane,  TJie  State  in  Constitutional  and  Inter- 
national Law,  pp.  7-1 1,  73-74.  fohns  Hopkins 
University  Studies  in  Historical  and  Political 
Science,  Series  XXV,  Nos.  6-7 143 

IV.   Revolution 146 

104.  Moral  Right  of  Revolution.     H.  Sidgwick,  The  Ele- 

ments of  Politics,  pp.  618-623 146 


xiv  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

PAGE 
CHAPTER 

105.  Types  of  Revolutions.    8.  Amos,  The  Science  of  Pol- 

itics, pp.  430-431 ^^7 

106.  The  Right  of  Revolution.    Extracts  from  the  American 

Declaration  of  Independence 148 

107.  An  Ordinance  of  Secession.    War  of  the  Rebellion, 

Official  Records,  Series  I,  Vol.  I,  p.  no       .     .     .      148 

108.  Decree   for   suspending    Louis  XVI.     F.  M.  Ander- 

son, Constitutions  and  Documents  Illustrative  of 
the  History  of  France,  lySg-igoi,  No.  24.  (The 
H.  W.  Wilson  Company,  1904) 149 

IX.    INDIVIDUAL  LIBERTY 150 

I.   Nature  of  Individual  Liberty 150 

109.  Different  Meanings  of  Liberty.    J.  R.  Seeley,  Intro- 

duction to  Political  Science,  "p^).  126-128       .     .     .      150 
no.    Relation  of  Sovereignty  to  Liberty.    J.  W.  Burgess, 
Political  Science  and  Constitutional  Law,  Vol.  I, 
PP-  55-56 151 

111.  The    Idea   and    Source   of   Individual   Liberty.    Ibid. 

pp.    174-176 152 

112.  The  Rise  of  Individual  Liberty.    W.  W.  Willoughby, 

The  A'ature  of  the  State,  ■pp.  -^^i-^ti},       ■     ■     .     .      153 

1 13.  The  Evolution  of  Liberty.    G.  L.  Scherger,  The  Evolu- 

tion of  Modern  Liberty,  pp.  1-4.  (Longmans,  Green 

&  Co.,  1904) 154 

II.    National  Liberty 156 

114.  National  Independence.    F.  Lieber,  On  Civil  Liberty 

and  Self-Govern  men  t,  pp.  41-42 156 

1 1 5.  The  American  Declaration  of  Independence.    W.  Mac- 

donald,  Select  Documents  of  U.  S.  History,  No.  i      156 

116.  The    Acknowledgment   of    American    Independence. 

Speech   of    George    III,  Annual  Register,    1783, 

pp.  311-312 157 

117.  Recognition  by  the  Powers  of  Greek  Independence. 

Protocols  of  conferences  relative  to  the  affairs  of 
Greece.  Quoted  in  Robinson  and  Beard,  Readings 
in  Modern  European   History,  Vol.  II,  No.  345      157 

118.  Bulgarian    Proclamation    of    Independence.     Lotidon 

Weekly   Times,  October,   1908.    Ibid.  No.  351    .        158 


CONTENTS  ,  XV 

™-„  PAGE 

CHAPTER 

119.  Recognition  by  the  United  States  of  the  Independence 
of  Cuba.  United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  Vol. 
XXX,  pp.   738-739 ^59 


III.    Civil  Liberty '^° 

120.  The  Meaning  of  Civil  Liberty.    F.  Lieber,  Oti  Civil 

Liberty  and  Self-Govern7Hent,^^^.  zo-z\  .     ...      160 

121.  Liberty    and    Authority.     J.    S.    Mill,    On    Liberty, 

pp.    8-28 161 

122.  Civil  Liberty  in  the  United  States.    E.  McClain,  Con- 

stitutional Law  in  the  United  States,  pp.  292-294. 
(Longmans,  Green  &  Co.,  1904) 163 

123.  Civil  Liberty  guaranteed  in  the  Constitution  of  the 

United  States.    Constitution  of  the  United  States, 
Amendments  I-VIII '"4 

124.  Civil   Liberty  in    England.     S.    Amos,    The  English 

Constitution,  pp.    I3i-i35-    (Longmans,  Green  & 

Co.,   1895) 165 

125.  Magna  Charta.     The  Statutes  of  the  Realm,  Vol.   I, 

pp.   9-13 '^^ 

126.  Declaration    of    the    Rights    of    Man    and    Citizen. 

F.  M.  Anderson,    Constitutions    and    Documents, 

pp.  58-60 167 

127.  Civil  Liberty  in  Russia.    W.  F.  Dodd,  Modern  Con- 

stitutions, Vol.  II,  pp.  187-188.    (The  University 

of  Chicago  Press,  1909) 168 

IV.    Political  Liberty ^^9 

128.  Political  Rights.    J.  Q.  Dealey,  The  Development  of 

the  State,  pp.  294-296 169 

129.  Political  Liberty  in  Oklahoma.   F.  N.  Thorpe,  The  Fed- 

eral and  State  Constitutions,  Vol.  VII,  pp.  4278- 

4279 '71 

130.  Manifesto  summoning  the  First  Russian  Duma.    Lon- 

don Weekly  Times,  August  25,  1905.  Cited  in 
Robinson  and  Beard,  Readings  in  Modern  Euro- 
pean History, Vo\.\\,^o.  'hZ'^ ;     ■     ^''^ 

131.  Weakness  of  Democracies.    J.  Bryce,  The  American 

Commonwealth,\o\.\\,'PYi.A?,^-A2>7 ^73 


xvi  I^ADINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

PAGE 
CHAPTER 

X.    LAW ^74 

I.  Nature  of  Law '74 

132.  The  Meaning  of  Law.  J.  Q.  Dealey,  The  Development 

of  the  State,  ^^.z-hl -11^ '74 

133.  The  Concept  of  Law.    G.  C.  Lee,  Historical  Juris- 

prudence,   pp.    3-5.     (The    Macmillan    Company, 
1900) '75 

134.  The  Nature  of  Law.    W.  Wilson,  The  State,  p.  587      176 

135.  Law  as   Custom.     Sir  H.  Maine,  Early  History  of 

Institutions,  p.  380.    (Henry  Holt  and  Company, 

1875) '76 

1 36.  Positive  Law.    W.  W.  Willoughby,  Political  Theories 

of  the  Aticient  World,  Y>V-  2>(^-3^ '7^ 

137.  Definition  of  Law.    T.  E.  Holland,  The  Elements  of 

Jurisprudence,  p.  40 I77 

138.  Definition  of    Law.     Sir  W.   Markby,  Elements   of 

Law,  p.  3 1 78 

II.  Sources  and  Development  of  Law 178 

139.  The  Sources  of  Law.    T.  E.  Holland,  The  Elements 

of  Jurisprudence,  c\\3.Tp.  \' 178 

140.  Present   Sources  of   Law.    W.  W.  Willoughby,   The 

Nature  of  the  State,  pp.  150-159 178 

141.  The  Beginnings  of  Law.    E.  Jenks,  Law  and  Politics 

in  the  Middle  Ages,  pp.  295-299 1 79 

142.  The  Development  of  Law  in   Modern  Europe.    Sir 

W.  Markby,  Elements  of  Law,  pp.  53-61      ,     .      181 

143.  The  Spread  of  Roman  and  English   Law.    J.  Bryce, 

Studies  in  History  and  Jurisprudence,  pp.   121- 

123.    (Oxford  University  Press,  1901) 183 

144.  The  Diffusion  of  Law.    G.  C.  Lee,  Historical  Juris- 

prudence, pp.  9-10 185 

145.  Universality  of  Legal   Conception.    W.  Wilson,   The 

State,  p.  601 185 

146.  Scientific   Legislation.     J.   Q.    Dealey,    The  Develop- 

ment of  the  State,  pp.  260-263 186 

III.  Divisions  of  Law 188 

147.  Classification  of  Law.    W.  W.  Willoughby,  jy^^ATz/z/r^ 

of  the  State,  pp.  142-143 188 


CONTENTS  ,  xvii 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

148.  Divisions  of  Law.    T.  E.  Holland,  The  Elements  of 

Ju7-isprudence,  pp.  121-122,  160-161,  358    .     .     .      188 

149.  Nature  of  Administrative  Law.    F.  J.  Goodnow,  Com- 

parative Administrative  Law,   Vol.    I,   pp.  7-9, 
14-16.   (G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  1903) 189 

150.  The  Application  of  Law.    T.  E.  Holland,   The  Ele- 

ments of  Jurisprudence,  p.  397 191 

IV.    Law  and  Ethics 192 

151.  Distinctions  between  Law  and  Morality.    W.  Wilson, 

77/^  .S'/a/^,  pp.  602-603 192 

152.  Moral  and  Legal  Norms.    W.  Wundt,  Ethics:  The 

Principles  of  Morality,  pp.  162-163,  166-167, 
178-179.   (The  Macmillan  Company,  190 1)   .     .     .     193 

XL    RELATION  OF  STATE  TO  STATE 195 

I.   International  Relations 19S 

153.  The    World    Powers.    A.   C.   Coolidge,    The    United 

States  as  a    World  Power,  pp.    1-7 195 

154.  Advantages  of  International  Relations.    P.  S.  Reinsch, 

IVorld  Politics,  ^^.  2:^-26 197 

155.  Scope  of  International  Interests.    A.  C.  Coolidge,  The 

United  States  as  a  World  Power,  Y>V-  ^l-^  A      •     •      '9^ 

156.  Scope  of  International  Law.    G.  G.  Wilson  and  G.  F. 

Tucker,  International  Law,  pp.  4-5.    (Silver,  Bur- 

dett  &  Company,  1910) 199 

II.    History  of  International  Law 200 

157.  Development   of   the  Theory   of    International   Law, 

T.  D.  Woolsey,  International  Law,  pp.  29-31. 
(Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  1887) 200 

158.  The  Formation  of  International  Law.    G.  G.  Wilson 

and  G.  F.  Tucker,  International  Law,  pp.   13-19     201 

159.  Importance   of    the    Conception    of    Territorial    Sov- 

ereignty. T.  J.  Lawrence,  The  Principles  of  Inter- 
national Law,  pp.  36-37.  (D.  C.  Heath  &  Co., 
1906) 203 

160.  Influence  of  Grotius  on  International  Law.  G.  B.  Davis, 

Elements  of  International  Law,  pp.  16-20.  (Har- 
per &  Brothers,  1900  and  1908) 203 


xviii  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

CHAPTER  r.^i.E. 

i6i.    International  Law  since  1648.    T.  J.  Lawrence,  T/ie 

Principles  of  International  Law,  pp.  53-54   •     •     205 

162.  Influence  of  the  United  States  on  the  Development  of 

International  Law.  G.  G.  Wilson  and  G.  F.  Tucker, 
Ititernational  Law,  pp.  27-31 206 

163.  Present  Tendencies  in  International  Relations.    W.  W. 

Willoughby,  The  Natto'e  of  the  State,  pp.  404-409     207 

III.  Sources  of  Ixterxational  Law 208 

164.  Meaning  of  the  Phrase,  "Sources  of  International  Law." 

T.  J.  Lawrence,  The  Principles  of  International 
Law.  p.  91 208 

165.  Sources    of    International    Law.     G.    G.   Wilson    and 

G.   F.  Tucker,  International  Law,  pp.  37-42       .      209 

166.  Legal  Bases  of  International  Law.    Ibid.  pp.  9-10      .     210 

167.  Influence    of    Roman    Law    on    International    Law. 

W.  C.  Morey,  Outlines  of  Roman  Law,  pp. 
207-209.    (G.    P.    Putnam's    Sons,    1902)    .     .     .     210 

IV.  Nature  of  Interxatioxal  Law 211 

168.  Meaning  of  the  Term  "  International  Law."    T.  E. 

Holland,  The  Elements  of  furisprudence,  pp.  1 28, 
380-381 211 

169.  The  Nature  and  Origin  of  International  Law.    W.  E. 

Hall,  A  Treatise  on  International  Law,  p.  i. 
(Oxford  University  Press,  1904) 212 

170.  Nature  of  International  Rights.    W.  W.  Willoughby, 

The  Aatii re  of  the  State,  pp.  200,  203      .     .     .     .      212 

171.  International  Law  not  stricdy  Law.    W.  Wilson,  The 

State,  pp.  604-605 213 

172.  Municipal  Law  and  International  Law.    G.  B.  Davis, 

Eletnents  of  International  Law,  pp.  2-4       .     .     .     213 

173.  International  Law  and  Morality.     H.  Sidgwick,   The 

Elements  of  Politics,  pp.   280-283 214 

174.  International  Law  as  Law.    S.  Leacock,  Elements  of 

Political  Science,  pp.  102-103 215 

175.  The  Sanction  of  International  Law.    Elihu  Root,  The 

Sanctioti  of  International  Law.  Pamphlet  pub- 
lished by  the  Association  for  International  Concil- 
iation, No.  8 216 


CONTENTS  XIX 


PAGE 


CHAPTER 

XII.    CONTENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW 218 

I.  Independenxe  and  Equality 218 

176.  Nature  of  Intervention.    W.  E.  Hall,  A   Treatise  on 

I/iternaiiotial  Law,  Y>Y>-  -^A-~^S -'^ 

177.  Intervention  of  the  Powers  in  Behalf  of  Greek  Inde- 

pendence.   J.  B.  Moore,  Inteniatioiial  Law  Digest, 

Vol.  VL  pp.  4-5 -'^ 

178.  Reply  of  Japan  to  the  Intervention  of  Russia,  Ger- 

many, and  France.  Mikado's  rescript  withdrawing 
from  Manchuria,  quoted  in  A.  J.  Beveridge,  The 
Russian  Advance,  p.  468.    (Harper  &    Brothers, 

1903) -'9 

179.  American    Statements  of   Policy  regarding  Noninter- 

vention.   J.  B.  Moore,  International  Law  Digest, 

Vol.  VI.  pp.  12-32 220 

180.  Intervention  of  the  United  States  in  Cuba.    Foreign 

Relations,  1898.  pp.  764-765 221 

181.  The  Monroe  Doctrine.  A  merican  State  Papers,  Foreign 

Relations,  Vol.  V,  pp.  246-250 222 

182.  The    Olney    Doctrine.     House   Documents,    No.    i, 

pp.    545-562    (54th   Cong.    I  St  sess.) 222 

1 83.  The  Drago  Doctrine.  House  Documents,  No.  i ,  pp.  2-3 

(58th  Cong.  2d  sess.) 223 

184.  The  Theory  of  the  Balance  of  Power.   T.  J.  Lawrence, 

The  Principles  of  International  Law,  ^'^.  126-127     224 

II.  Property  and  Jurisdiction 224 

185.  Territorial  Waters  of  a  State.     H.  Wheaton,  Inter- 

national Law,  p.  242 224 

186.  The  Three-Mile  Limit.    41  and  42  Victoria,  c.  73  .     .     225 

187.  River  Boundaries.    8  Op.  Att.  Gen.,  p.  I75  •     •     •     •     --5 

188.  Acquisition  of  Territory  by  Discover^^    United  States 

Supreme  Court,  in  Johnson  7'.  Mcintosh,  8  Wheaton, 

r-,-,  226 

53o 

189.  Annexation  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands.    United  States 

Statutes  at  Large,  \o\.  XXX.  pp.   750-75I     •     •     --^ 

190.  The   Determination  of  Nationality.    F.   Snow,    Cases 

and  Opinions  on  International  Law,  pp.  213-214. 
(The  Boston  Book  Company,  1 893) 227 


XX  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

PAGE 


CHAPTER 


191.  Extradition  for  Political  Offenses.    J.  B.  Moore,  Intef- 

national  Law  Digest,  Vol.  IV,  pp.  332,  352-353     228 

192.  Immunities  of  Diplomatic  Agents.    Y.^xvosn,  Cases  and 

opinions  OH  I/dcniational  Law,  Y>?- 9^-99  •     •     •     229 

III.   Diplomacy 229 

193.  Importance  of  the  Diplomatic  Service.    Senate  Execu- 

tive Document,  No.  93  (32d  Cong,  ist  sess.)  .     .     .     229 

194.  Rank  of  Diplomatic  Agents.    J.  W.  Foster,  The  Prac- 

tice of  Diplomacy,  p.  16.  (Houghton  Mifflin  Com- 
pany, 1906) 230 

195.  Reception  of  Envoys.    Ibid.  pp.  55-56 230 

196.  Refusal  to  receive  Diplomatic  Agents.    J.  B.  Moore, 

International  Laiv  Digest,  Yo\.\V,Y>.  Ar^o   .     .     .     231 

197.  Privileges   and    Immunities   of    Consuls    in    Eastern 

Countries.    Ibid.  Vol.  V,  pp.  37-38 231 

198.  Exchange  of  Gifts  on  the    Ratification  of  Treaties. 

J.  W.  Foster,  T/ie  Practice  of  Diplomacy,  pp. 
260-261 232 

199.  The  Open  Door.  Department  of  State,  Correspondence 

concerning  American  Commercial  Rights  in  China 
(1900),  p.  16 232 

200.  The  Call  of  the  First  Peace  Conference.    F.  W.  Holls, 

The  Peace  Congress  at  The  Hague,  pp.  1 8  ff.  (The 
Macmillan  Company,  1900) 233 

201.  The  Work  of  the  Second  Hague  Conference.    J.  B, 

Scott,  The  W  "ork  of  the  Second  Hague  Conference. 
Pamphlet  published  by  the  Association  for  Inter- 
national Conciliation,  No.  5 233 

IV.   War 234 

202.  Reprisals.    J.  B.  Moore,  International  Law  Digest, 

Vol.  VII,  pp.  133-135 234 

203.  Kinds  of  War.    Ibid.  pp.  155,  159 234 

204.  Residence  in  Case  of  War.    United  States  Supreme 

Court,  in  The   Williatn  Bagalay,  5  Wallace,  408     235 

205.  Conquest  and   Private  Ownership  of  Land.    United 

States  Supreme  Court,  in  United  States  v.  Moreno, 

I   Wallace,  400 235 

206.  Treatment  of  Prisoners  of  War.    J.  B.  Moore,  Inter- 

national Law  Digest,  Vol.  VIII,  p.  218    ....     236 


CONTENTS  xxi 

CHAPTER 

PACE 

207.  The  Geneva  Convention.    G.  B.  Davis,  Ehmetits  of 

Jnternational  Law,  pp.  526-527    ....  2^6 

208.  Flags  of  Truce.    Convention  Respecting  the  Laws  and 

Customs  of  War  on  Land,  The  Hague,  July  29, 
1899,  32  Stat,  Vol.  II,  p.   1819 '237 

209.  Methods  of  carrying  on  War.    G.  B.  Davis,  Elements 

of  Intefnational  Law,  Y>V-  A99-AS° 217 

210.  Legal  Principles  observed  by  Prize  Courts.  J.  B.  Moore, 

International  Law  Digest,  Vol.  VII,  pp.  599-600     238 

V.   Neutrality  and  Neutral  Commerce 239 

211.  Neutralized  States.    Ibid.  Vol.  I,  p.  26 239 

212.  International  Position  of  the  Suez  and  Panama  Canals. 

Senate  Docinnents  No.  85  (57th  Cong,  ist  sess.)     .     239 

213.  Rules  of  Neutrality  applied   in   the   Geneva  Award. 

F.   Snow,   Cases  and  Opinions   on    International 
Law,  pp.  431-432 240 

214.  The  Rule  of  1756.    J.  B.  Moore,  International  Law 

Digest,  Vo\.\\\,^.-i%^ 240 

215.  The  Declaration  of  Paris.    G.  B.  Davis,  Elements  of 

International  Law,  Appendix  C 240 

216.  Policy  of  the  United  States  regarding  Neutral  Trade. 

F.  Wharton,  Comfnentaries  on  Law,  sec.  242    .     .     241 

217.  Method  of  exercising  the  Right  of   Search.     United 

States  Instructions  to  Blockading  Vessels  and 
Cruisers,  General  Orders,  No.  492,  June  20,  1898. 
Foreign  Relations,  1898,  p.  781 242 

218.  Kinds  of  Blockade.    J.  B.  Moore,  International  Law 

Digest,  Vol.  VII,  p.  783 242 

219.  Contraband  in  the  Declaration  of  London.    G.  G.  Wil- 

son and  G.  F.  Tucker,  International  Law,  Appen- 
dix XII       242 

XIII.    FORM  OF  THE  STATE  AND  OF  GOVERNMENT  .     .     244 
I.   Forms  of  the  State 244 

220.  Aristotle's  Classification  of  States.    Aristotle,  Politics, 

Book  III,  trans,  by  Jo wett 244 

221.  Four  Fundamental  Forms  of  the  State.  J.  K.  Biuntschli, 

The  Theory  of  the  State, -^p.  ■^2,^--i2>9        ....     244 


XXll 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

PAGE 
TER  ^     ,,^     ^ 

222.  Criticism  of  Bluntschli's  Classification.    J.  W.  Burgess, 

Political  Science  and  Co7istitutional  Law,  Vol.  I, 

p.  75 ^45 

223.  Classification  of  States  according  to  International  Law. 

J.  B.   Moore,  International  Law  Digest,  Vol.   I, 

pp.  21-27 246 

224.  Impossibility  of  classifying  States.  W.  \V.  Willoughby, 

The  Nature  of  the  State,  ^^.  2,S^-2>S~       ....     247 

II.  Forms  of  Government 247 

225.  Classification  of  Governments.    Ibid.  pp.  355-360  .     .     247 

226.  Forms  of    Democratic    Government."  J.    Br>-ce,    The 

American  Commonwealth,  Vol.  II,  pp.  225-226      .     248 

227.  Classification   based   on   the    Spirit   of    Government. 

J.    Q.    Dealey,    The    Development   of  the    State, 

pp.    1 21-122 249 

228.  Types  of  Government.    F.  H.  Giddings,  Descriptive 

and  Historical  Sociology,  ^T^.  ■i,6ii-2,()6      ....      250 

229.  Governments  classified  according  to  the  Character  of 

the    Chief    Executive.     W.    W.    Willoughby,    The 
Nature  of  the  State,  pp.  374-375 250 

230.  Forms    of    Government.    J.    W.    Burgess,    Political 

Science  and  Constitutional  Law,  Vol.  II,  pp.  1-13     251 

III.  Parliamentary  and  Nonparliamentary  Governments     254 

231.  Parliamentary    System    and    Congressional    System. 

A.  B.   Hart,  Actual   Government,  pp.  243-244  .     254 

232.  Defects  of  the  Presidential   System.    J.   Bryce,    The 

American   Commonwealth,  Vol.  I,  pp.  286-2S7    .     255 

233.  Presidential  and  Cabinet  Systems  in  Times  of  Crises. 

W.    Bagehot,   The  English   Constitution,  chap,  ii, 

sec.  9 256 

IV.   Modern  States 257 

234.  Varieties  of  Organization.    E.  Jenks,  History  of  Pol- 

itics, pp.  152-155 257 

235.  Classification  of  Modern  States.    S.  Leacock.  Elements 

of  Political  Science,  p.  120 259 

236.  Modern  Democratic  States.    J.  W.  Burgess,  Political 

Science  and  Constitutional  Law,  \^ol.  I,  pp.  81-82     259 


CONTENTS  xxiii 

CHAPTER  j,^(,g 

237.  Modern    National   Empires.     P.   S.   Reinsch,    ll'iuid 

Politics,  pp.    13-14 260 

238.  The    Government    of   the    Future.    J.    W.    Burgess, 

Political  Science  and  Constitutional  Law,  Vol.  II, 

pp.  38-40 261 

XIV.    FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT 263 

I.    Forms  of  Uxiox 263 

239.  Classification   of    Unions.    W.   W.   Willoughby,    The 

A'ature  of  the  State,  pp.   234-238 263 

240.  Degrees  of  Relationship  among  States.    R.  T.  Crane, 

The  State  in  Constitutional  and  International 
Law,  pp.  76-78.  /.  H.  U.  Studies  in  Historical 
and  Political  Science,  Series  XXV,  Nos.  6-7     .     .     264 

241.  Forms  of  Union.    J.  W.  Burgess,  Political  Science 

and  Constitutional  Law,  Vol.  I,  pp.  78-81      .     .     265 

242.  Nature  of  the  Union  between  Austria  and  Hungar}'. 

A.  L.  Lowell,  Governments  and  Parties  in  Con- 
tinental Europe,  Vol.  II,  pp.    177-179  ....     266 

II.    Nature  of  Federal  Goverxmext 268 

243.  Distinctions  between   Federation   and   Confederation. 

J.    Q.    Dealey,    The    Development  of  the    State, 

pp.    124-125 268 

244.  Distinguishing  Marks  of  a  Federal  State.    W.  Wilson, 

The  State,  p.  566 268 

245.  The  Nature  of  a  Federal  State.    W.  W.  Willoughby, 

The  American  Constitutional  System,  pp.  6-10. 
(The  Centur\'  Co.,  1904) 269 

III.     DlSTRIBUTIOX   of    POWERS 271 

246.  Development  of  the  Theorj'  of  the  American  Union. 

C.     E.     Merriam,    American    Political    Theories, 

pp.   302-304 271 

247.  Distribution    of    Powers    in    the    Ignited    States.     E. 

McClain,  Constitutional  Law  in  the  United 
States,    pp.    37-42 272 

248.  Continental  Theories  of  Federalism.    C.  E.  Merriam, 

History  of  the  Theory  of  Sovereignty  since  Rous- 
seau, pp.  219-220.  Columbia  University  Studies 
in  History^  Econotnics  and  Public  Law,  \o\.  XII, 
No.  4 273 


xxiv  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

CHAPTER  ^^^= 

249.  Powers   of   the    Imperial    Government  of    Germany. 

W.     F.     Dodd,    Modern     Constitutions^    Vol.     I, 

pp.    327-328 274 

250.  Powers  of  the  Federal  Government  of  Switzerland. 

Ibid.  Vol.  II,  pp.  258-276 275 

IV.   Advantages  and  Disadvantages  of  Federal  Govern- 
ment      276 

251.  Advantages    of    Federal    Organization.    Montesquieu, 

Spirit  of  Laws,  Vol.  I,  Book  IX,  chap.  i.    Quoted 

in  The  Federalist,  No.  IX 276 

252.  Weaknesses  in  Federal  Government.    J.  Bryce,  The 

American  Cominonwealth,  Vol.  I,  pp.  334,  341      .     277 

253.  Advantages   and    Disadvantages  of    Federal    Union. 

H .  Sidgwick,  The  Elements  of  Politics,  pp.  5 1 6-5 19     278 

254.  The     Weakness    of     the     American    Confederation. 

J.  Elliott  (editor),  Debates  on  the  Adoption  of  the 
Federal  Constitution,  Vol.  V,  pp.   207-210     .     .     279 

255.  Probable    Future  of  Federalism.     H.    Sidgwick,    The 

Developittent  of  European  Polity,  p.  439  .     .     .     280 

XV.    CONSTITUTIONS 282 

I.    Nature  of  Constitutions 282 

256.  Meanings  of  the  Term  "  Constitution."    A.  L.  Lowell, 

The  Government  of  England,  Vol.  I,  pp.  1-8. 
(The  Macmillan  Company,   1908) 282 

257.  Definitions  of  the  Term  "  Constitution."    T.  D.  Wool- 

sey,  Political  Science,  Vol.  I,  pp.  283-284;  J.  Q. 
Dealey,  The  Developtnenf  of  the  State,  pp.  207- 
208.    S.  Amos,   The  English   Constitution,  p.  xix     283 

258.  Classification  of  Constitutions.    J.  Bryce,  Studies  in 

History  and  furisprudence,  pp.   127-132    .      .     .      284 

259.  Written  and   Unwritten   Constitutions.    E.  McClain, 

Constitutional  Law  in  the  United  States,  pp.  1 1-16     285 

260.  The  Nature  of  the  English  Constitution.    S.  Amos, 

The  English  Constitution,  pp.  1-4 286 

II.   Requisites  of  Constitutions 287 

261.  The  Fundamental  Parts  of  a  Constitution.  J.  W.  Bur- 

gess, Political  Science    and   Constitutional  Law, 

Vol.   I,  pp.    137,   263-264 .      287 


CONTENTS  XXV 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

262.  Contents  of  Constitutional  Law.    T.  E.  Holland,  The 

Elements  of  Jurisprudence^  pp.  360-361  ....      288 

263.  The  American  Conception  of  a  Constitution.    A.  B. 

Hart,  Actual  Government^  P-  56 289 

264.  Preambles    to   Constitutions.    W.  F.   Dodd,  Modern 

Constitutions,  Vol.  I,  pp.  2,  33,  185,  325;  Vol.  II, 

pp.  257,  293 2S9 

III.  Creation  of  Constitutions 291 

265.  The    Constitution   and    State    Origin.    W.    W.    Wil- 

loughby,    The  Nature  of  the  State,  pp.   1 29-1 31      291 

266.  Adoption  of  Written  Constitutions.    S.  Leacock,  Ele- 

ments of  Political  Science,  ^p.  1 24-125    ....     292 

267.  English  Written  Constitutions.  Ch.  Borgeaud,  Adop- 

tion and  Amendjne?it  of  Cotistitutions  in  Europe 
and  America, -p^.  5-6;  Rise  of  Modern  Democracy 
in  Old  and  New  England,  pp.  38,  98.  Quoted  in 
M.  Hill,  Liberty  Documents,  pp.  111-112.  (Long- 
mans, Green  &  Co.,  1903) 293 

268.  Early  American  Constitutions.    A.  B.  Hart,  Actual 

Government,  pp.  46-48 294 

269.  The  Sources  of  the  American  Constitution.    C.  E.  Stev- 

ens, Sources  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  pp.  55-57.   (The  Macmillan  Company,  1894)     295 

270.  Adoption  of  the   Constitution  of  the  United  States. 

E.  McClain,  Constitutional  Lazv  in  the  United 
States,  pp.  32-33 296 

271.  The  Creation  of  the  French  Constitution.    J.  H.  Rob- 

inson and  C.  A.  Beard,  The  Development  of  Mod- 
ern Europe, No\.  II,  pp.  159-160 297 

272.  Scope  and  Character  of  French  Constitutional  Laws. 

W.  Wilson,  The  State,  pp.  218-219 297 

273.  The   Formation  of  the    German    Constitution.     Ibid. 

pp.  254-256 29S 

274.  The    Practical    Nature  of  the   German   Constitution. 

A.  L.  Lowell,  Governments  and  Parties  in  Con- 
tinental Europe,  Vol.  I,  p.  242 299 

IV.  Amendment  of  Constitutions 299 

275.  Methods  of  Amendment.    W.  F.  Dodd,  Modern  Con- 

stitutions, Vol.  I,  pp.  2S8,  351  ;  Vol.  II,  pp.  287- 
289,  305-306 299 


xxvi  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


CHAPTER 


PAGE 


276.  The  Difficulties  of  Constitutional  Amendment  in  the 

United  States.  H.  V.  Ames,  Amendments  to  the 
Constitution,  Annual  Report  of  the  American  His- 
torical Association  {i^()6),\'o\.  II   301 

277.  Interpretation  of  the  Constitution  of  the  XJnited  States. 

A.  B.  Hart,  Actual  Government,  pp.  63-64       .     .     302 

278.  The    Doctrine    of    Implied    Powers.     United    States 

Supreme  Court,  in  McCuUoch  v.  State  of  Mar>'- 
land,  4  Wheaton,  401-421 304 

PART  II.   THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  GOVERNMENT 

XV\.    THE  ELECTOR.\TE 30S 

I.  The  Electorate 3°5 

279.  The  Nature  of  Democracy.    H.  Sidgwick,   The  Ele- 

ments of  Politics,  pp.  582-587 305 

280.  Development  of  the  Electorate.    J.  O.  Dealey,   The 

Development  of  the  State,  pp.  215-216      .     .     .     306 

281.  The  Reform  Act  of  1832.    2  William  IV,  c.  45       .     .     307 

282.  Arguments  for  Woman  Suffrage.    Orations  of  George 

William  Curtis,  Vcl.  I,  pp.  182  ff.  (Harper  & 
Brothers,  1893) 308 

283.  Acquirement  and  Loss  of  Citizenship  in  the  United 

States.    A.  B.  Hart,  Actual  Government,  pp.  16-17     308 

284.  Results  of  the  Restrictions  on  Negro  Suffrage  in  the 

South.  A.  B.  Hart,  The  Realities  of  Negro  Suffrage, 
in  Proceedings  of  the  American  Political  Science 
Association  (igo^),Yo\.  11,  p.  164 309 

285.  An   Educational  Test.     F.  N.  Thorpe,  Federal  and 

State  Constitutions,  Yo\.   I,  p.   554 310 

286.  Restriction  on  the  Suffrage  of  Military  Forces.    W.  F. 

Dodd,  Modern  Constitutions,  Vol.  I.  p.  302       .      .      310 

287.  The  Exercise  of  the  Suffrage.    A.  B.  Hart,  Practical 

Essays  on  American  Government,  No.  2.  (Long- 
mans, Green  &  Co.,  1893) 311 

288.  The  Injustice  of  Equal  Voting.    W.  S.  Lilly,  First 

Principles  in  Politics,  pp.  1 81-183.  (G.  P.  Put- 
nam's Sons,  1899) 311 

II.  Control  of  Electorate  over  Government   .  .  .  .  312 

289.  The  Electorate  as  a  Governmental  Organ.  J.  Q.  Dealey, 

The  Development  of  the  State,  ■^■p.  2i']-2i()       .     .     312 


CONTENTS  xxvii 

PTER  PAGE 

290.  Evolution  of  Elections.  E.  Jenks.  History  of  Politics, 

pp.  136-138 313 

291.  Elections  under  the  Roman  Republic.    D.  C.  Munro, 

A  Source  Book  of  Romaii  History,  p.  63.    (D.  C. 
Heath  &  Co.,  1904) 314 

292.  The  Ballot  Act.    35  and  36  Victoria,  c.  33     .  .     .     314 

293.  Methods  of  influencing  \'oters  in  the  United  States. 

A.  B.  Hart,  Actual  Govern?nent,  pp.  104-105  .     .     315 

294.  Comparison   between   Greek  and   Swiss   Democracy. 

A.  L.  Lowell,  Governtnents  and  Parties  in  Conti- 
nental  Europe,  Yol  U,  pp.  2^3-334 315 

295.  Representative    Government.     A.    B.    Hart,    Actual 

Gover?itfient.  pp.   38-39 316 

296.  The  Recall.    Supplement  to  the  Code  of  Iowa  (1907)     317 

HI.    Initiative  and  Referendum 3' 7 

297.  The  Origin  of  the  Referendum  in  Switzerland.    A.  L. 

Lowell,  Gover/iJ/iefits  and  Parties  in  Continental 
^■w/r'/^.  Vol.  11,  pp.  238-246 317 

298.  Extension  of  the  Principles  of  Initiative  and  Referen- 

dum.   E.  P.  Oberholtzer.  The  Referendu?n  in  Afner- 

ica.  pp.  400-405.    (Charles  Scribner's  Sons.  190c)     31 8 

299.  Initiative    and    Referendum    in    the    United    States. 

C.  A.  Beard,  American  Government  and  Politics, 

pp.  461-465.   (The  Macmillan  Company,  1910).     .     319 

300.  Arguments  for  the  Referendum.     The  Arena,  May, 

1906 320 

301.  Arguments    against   the   Initiative    and   Referendum. 

C.  A.  Beard,  A?nencan  Government  and  Politics, 

pp.  466-469 321 

IV.   Minority  Representation 322 

302.  The    Nature    and    Conduct    of    Political    Majorities. 

F.  H.  Giddings.  Democracy  and  Empire,  pp.  183- 

195.    (The  Macmillan  Company.  1900)      ....     322 

303.  Necessity    for    representing    Minorities.    J.    S.    Mill, 

Considerations    on    Representative    Government, 

pp.    145-146 323 

304.  Objections  to  the  Principle  of  Proportional  Represen- 

tation.   J.  W.  Gamer.  Introduction  to  Political  .*v7- 
^;/iV.  pp.  468-469.   (American  Book  Company.  191 01     324 


xxviii  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

PAGE 
CHAPTER 

305.  Objections  to  Representation  of  Classes  or  Interests. 

J,  W.   Garner,  Introduction  to  Political  Science^ 

pp.  473-474 325 

XVII.    SEPARATION  AND   DIVISION  OF  POWERS      ...     326 
I.   The  Ordinary  Government 326 

306.  A  Broader  Definition  of  Government.   J.  Q.  Dealey, 

The  Development  of  the  State,  \)^.  \\\-\\S       .     .     326 

307.  Historical    Evolution   of   the    Separation  of  Govern- 

mental Powers.  W.  Bondy,  The  Separation  of  Gov- 
erujnental  Powers.  Cohimbia  University  Studies 
in  History,  Economics  and  Public  Law,  Vol.  V, 
No.  2,  pp.  7-10 327 

II.  Theory  of  the  Separation  of  Powers 329 

308.  Development  of  the  Theory  of  Separation  of  Powers. 

J.  W.  Garner,  Introduction  to  Political  Science, 

pp.  411-417 329 

309.  Montesquieu  on  Separation  of  Powers.    Ch.  Montes- 

quieu, 6)^/;7V  ^///^  Zawj,  Book  XI,  chap,  vi     .     .     330 

310.  Blackstone  on  Separation  of  Powers.    Sir  W.  Black- 

stone,  Cofnmentaries,  Vol.  I,  pp.  146,  269     .     ,     .     331 

311.  The  United  States  Supreme  Court  on  Separation  of 

Powers.    Justice  Miller,  in  Kilbourne  v.  Thompson, 

103  U.  S.  188 331 

312.  Checks  and  Balances  in  the  United  States  Govern- 

ment. E.  McClain,  Constitutional  Law  in  the 
United  States,  pp.  63-64 332 

III.  Criticism  of  the  Separation  of  Powers 333 

313.  True  Meaning  of  the  Theory  of  Separation  of  Powers. 

J.  W.  Garner,  Introduction   to  Political  Science, 

pp.  417-425 333 

314.  Modern  Theory  of  Separation  of  Powers.    F.  J.  Good- 

now,   Cotnparative  Administrative  Law,  Vol.   I, 

PP-   22-23 334 

315.  The  Two  Functions  of  the   State.     F.  J.  Goodnow, 

Politics  a/id  Administration,  pp.  9,  10,  22.  (The 
Macmillan  Company,  1900) 334 

IV.  Division  of  Powers 335 

316.  The  Theory  of  Division  of  Powers.    F.  J.  Goodnow, 

Comparative  Administrative  Law,  Vol.  I,  pp.  38-46     335 


CONTENTS  xxix 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

317.  Division  of  Powers  in  the  United  States.    A.B.Hart, 

Actual  Government^  pp.  54-55 336 

318.  Expansion  of  Federal    Power  in   the   United   States. 

W.  Wilson,  Congressional  Government,  pp.  52-55. 
(Houghton  Mifflin  Company,  1885) 337 

319.  Division  of  Powers  in  the  German  Empire.   B.E.How- 

ard, The  German  Empire,  pp.  21-25.    (The  Mac- 
millan  Company,  1906) 338 

XVni.    THE   LEGISLATURE 341 

L   Structure  of  Legislatures 341 

320.  Development  of  the  Lawmaking  Department.    J.  Q. 

Dealey,  The  Development  of  the  State,  pp.  1 88-1 91      341 

321.  General  Principles  of  Legislative  Organization.    J.  W. 

Burgess,  Political  Science  and  Constitutional  Laze, 
Vol.  H,  pp.  106-116 343 

322.  Advantages  of  the  Bicameral  System.    J.  W.  Garner, 

Introduction  to  Political  Science,  pp.  432-436  .     .     344 

323.  Apportionment  of  Representatives  in  the  United  States. 

United  States  Statutes  at  Large,  Vol.  XXXI,  p.  733      344 

324.  Advantages  and  Disadvantages  of  Indirect  Election. 

J.  W.   Garner,  Introduction   to  Political  Science^ 

pp.  44S-451 345 

325.  Results  of  Election  by  Majority  in  France.    W.  Wil- 

son, The  State,  pp.  221-222 346 

II.   Comparative  Power  of  the  Two  Houses 347 

326.  Relations  of  the  Two  Houses  in  the  LTnited  States. 

J.    Bryce,   The  American   Commonwealth,  Vol.   I, 

pp.   181-185 347 

327.  The  House  of  Lords  and  Money  Bills.    A.  L.  Lowell, 

The  Government  of  England,  Vol.  I,  pp.  400-402     348 

328.  Nature  of  the  German  "  Bundesrath."    A.  L.  Lowell, 

Governments  and  Parties  in  Continental  Europe, 

Vol.  I,  p.  264 349 

III.  Internal  Organization  and  Procedure 349 

329.  General  Method  of  Legislation.    J.  W.  Burgess,  Polit- 

ical Science    and    Constitutional   Laiu,    Vol.    II, 

pp.  127-130 349 


XXX  READINGS  IN   POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


PAGE 


CHAPTER 

330.  Procedure  in  the  House  of  Lords.    A.  L.  Lowell,  The 

Goveniment  of  England,  Vol.  I,  pp.  403-404    .     .     350 

331.  Seating   of    Members    in    the    House    of    Commons. 

W.  Wilson,   The  State,  pp.  394-395 35 1 

332.  The   French   Chamber  a  Tumultuous   Body.    A.    L. 

Lowell,  Governments  and  Parties  in  Continental 
Europe,  Vol.  L  PP-   17-19 35i 

333.  Interpellations  in   the  French  Chamber  of  Deputies. 

Ibid.  pp.  119-123 352 

334.  Organization  of  the  German  "  Reichstag."  W.Wilson, 

The  State,  pp.  266-267 353 

335.  The  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives.  C.  A.  Beard, 

Americati  Government  and  Politics,  pp.  280-281      353 

336.  Committees   in  the    House   of    Representatives.    W. 

Wilson,  The  State,  pp.  533-534 354 

337.  Results  of  the   Committee  System  in  the  House  of 

Representatives.  J.  Bryce,  The  American  Co?n- 
montuealth,  Vol.  I,  pp.   155-159 355 

338.  The  "  Previous  Question  "  in  the  House  of  Represen- 

tatives.   Ibid.  p.  130 356 

IV.    Functions  of  Legislatures 357 

339.  Proper  Functions  of  Lawmaking  Bodies.  W.  Wilson, 

Congressional  Government,  pp.  295-298  .      .      .      .      357 

340.  DifHculties    preventing    Intelligent     Legislation.     E. 

Freund,  The  Problem  of  Intelligent  Legislation, 
in  Proceedings  of  the  American  Political  Science 
Association  (1907),  Vol.  IV,  pp.  71-77     ....     358 

341.  The  Powers  of  Congress  in  the  United  States.    Con- 

stitution of  the  United  States,  Article  I,  sec.  8  .     .     359 

342.  Functions  of  the  German  "  Bundesrath."  W.  Wilson, 

The  State,  pp.  260-261 360 

343.  Danger    of    Overlegislation    in     the    United    States. 

J.  W.  Jenks,  Principles  of  Politics,  pp.  103-104. 
(Columbia  University  Press,  1909) 361 

344.  Impeachment.    F.  J.  Goodnow,  Comparative  Admin- 

istrative Law,  Vol.  II,  p.  296 361 

XIX.    THE  EXECUTIVE 363 

I,   The  Executive  Head 363 

345.  Forms  of  Executive  Organization.    S.   Leacock,  Ele- 

ments of  Political  Science,  pp.   191-192      .     .     .     363 


CONIENTS  xxxi 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

346.  Relation  of  the  Executive  to  Congress  in  the  United 

States.    W.  Wilson,  The  State,  p.  546 364 

347.  Classes  of  Presidential  Candidates  in  the  United  States. 

J.  Bryce,   The  Americati  Commonwealth,  Vol.  II, 

pp.  153-154 364 

348.  Utility  of  the  Crown  in  England.    A.  L.  Lowell,  The 

Government  of  England,  Vol.  I,  pp.  47-51   .     .     .     366 

349.  Position  of  the  President  in   France.    A.   L.   Lowell, 

Governments  and  Parties  in  Continental  Europe, 

Vol.  I,  pp.  28-30 367 

II.    Heads  of  Departments 368 

350.  Members   in    Modern    Cabinets.    Statesfnan's    Year- 

Book  (1910),  pp.  6-8,  353-354,   742-743,  824     .     368 

351.  Responsible  and  Irresponsible  Ministries.    J.  W.  Bur- 

gess,  Political  Science  and  Cotistitutional  Law, 

Vol.  II,  pp.  313-316 370 

352.  Development  of  the  Cabinet  in  England.    H.  D.  Tra- 

hill.   Central   Govern/nent,  pp.   23-25.     Quoted  in 

W.  Wilson,    The  State,  pp.  2>7^-2)77 37° 

353.  Nature  and  Functions  of  the  English  Cabinet.    A.  L. 

Lowell,    The    Govenmient    of   England,    Vol.    I, 

PP-  54-56 371 

354.  Power  of  the   Ministers    in    France.    A.    L.    Lowell, 

Governments  and  Parties  in  Continental  Europe, 
Vol.  I,  pp.  64-65 373 

355.  The   Imperial   Chancellor  in   Germany.    W.  Wilson, 

The  State,  pp.   268-270 373 

III.   The  Civil  Service 374 

356.  Importance  of  Subordinates  in  Government  Service. 

J.  W.  Jenks,  The  Principles  of  Politics,  pp.  1 24-1 25     374 

357.  The  Civil  Service  in  England.    S.  Leacock,  Elements 

of  Political  Science,  ^'^.  200-202 375 

358.  Patronage  of  Office  in  France.   W.  Wilson,  The  State, 

pp.  228-229 376 

359.  The   Spoils   System   at  its  Height.    Senate  Reports, 

No.   567  (47th  Cong.) 376 

360.  The  United  States  Civil  Service  Act.    Report  of  the 

United  States   Civil  Seinnce   Commission   (1908), 

PP-  43-45 377 


xxxii  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

CHAPTER  ^^^^ 

361.  Acceptance  of  Office.    F.  J.  Goodnow,   Comparative 

Administrative  Law,  Vol.  II,  pp.  23-25      .     ,     .     379 

IV.    Functions  of  the  Executive 379 

362.  The  Nature  of  Administration.    Ibid.  Vol.  I,  pp.  1-4     379 

363.  The  Executive  Power.    J.  W.  Gamer,  Introduction 

to  Political  Science,  pp.   547-548 S^o 

364.  Functions  of  the   German   Emperor.    A.   L.   Lowell, 

Governments  and  Parties  in  Continental  Europe, 
Vol.  I,  pp.  275-276 381 

365.  Powers  of  the  President  of  the  United  States.    Con- 

stitution of  the  United  States,  Article  II,  sec.  2     .     382 

366.  The  Veto   Power.    J.    W.    Garner,    Introduction    to 

Political  Science,  pp.   564-566 383 

XX.    THE  JUDICIARY 3^4 

I.   Evolution  of  the  Judicial  Department 384 

367.  The  Evolution  of  State  Justice.    E.  Jenks,  Law  and 

Politics  in  the  Middle  Ages,  pp.  100-108.    (Henry 
Holt  and  Company,  1898) 384 

368.  Evolution  of  Forms  of   Punishment.    J.    Q.    Dealey, 

The  Development  of  the  State,  pp.  183-186  .      .     385 

369.  The  People  and  the  Courts.    J.  W.  Jenks,  The  Pri?i- 

ciples  of  Politics, -p.  ^Al 3^6 

II.    Functions  and  Requisites  of  the  Judiciary   ....     387 

370.  The  Judicial  Function.    J.  Q.  Dealey,  The  Develop- 

ment of  the  State,  p.  168 387 

371.  Jurisdiction  of  Courts.     E.    McClain,    Constitutional 

Law  in  the  United  States,  p.  220 387 

372.  Methods  of   choosing   Judges  in  the  United   States 

Commonwealths.    C.  A.  Beard,  American  Govern- 
ment and  Politics,  ^'^.  551-552 388 

373.  Barristers  and  Solicitors  in  England.    A.  L.  Lowell, 

The  Government  of  England,  Vol.  II,  pp.  468-469     389 

374.  Importance  of  Lawyers  in  the  United  States.     J.  W. 

Burgess,  Political  Science  and  Constitutiottal  Law, 

Vol.  II,  pp.  365-366 390 

TIL   Relation  of  Judiciary  to  Executive 391 

375.  Necessity   of   Judicial    Independence.     H.    Sidgwick, 

Elements  of  Politics,  pp.   487-488 391 


CONTENTS  xxxiii 

CHAPTER  PAOE 

376.  Advantages  and  Disadvantages  of  Separate  Adminis- 

trative Courts.   J.  W.  Garner,  Introduction  to  Polit- 
ical Science^  pp.  586-588 302 

IV.   Relation  of  Judiciary  to  Legislature 393 

377.  The  Great  Writs.    C.  A.  Beard,  American   Govern- 

ment and  Politics,  pp.  302-304 303 

378.  Judicial  Power  over  Legislative  Acts.    J.  W.  Garner, 

Introductioti  to  Political  Science,  pp.  594-600  .     .     394 

379.  Disallowance  of  a  Colonial  Bill.     E.  B.  O'Callaghan 

(editor),  Docjiments  relative  to  the  Colonial  History 

of  the  State  of  New  York,  Vol.  VIII,  pp.  202-203     395 

380.  Declaring  Laws  Unconstitutional.  A.  L.  Lowell,  Essays 

on  Governme/it,  pp.  124-125 395 

V.    Organization  of  the  Judiciary 396 

381.  Influence  of  the  Justices  of  the   Peace  in  England. 

A.  L.  Lowell,  The  Government  of  England,  Vol.  II, 

pp.  270-271 396 

382.  Organization  of  Justice  in  Germany.    W.  Wilson,  The 

State,  pp.  274-275 397 

383.  Growing  Distrust  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  United 

States.    J.  A.  Smith,  Tlie  Spirit  of  American  Gov- 
ernment, pp.  110-116.    (The  Macmillan  Company, 

1907) 397 

384.  Defense  of  the  Supreme  Court.    Congressional  Record, 

Vol.  XLII,  Part  I,  p.  589 398 

385.  The  Supreme  Court  in  the  Future.    D.  J.  Brewer,  The 

Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States.    (Scribnefs 
Magazine,  March,  1903) 399 

XXI.    POLITICAL  PARTIES 401 

I.    Functions  of  Political  Parties 401 

386.  Functions  of  Political  Parties.    J.  Bryce,   The  Amet- 

ican   Commonwealth,  Vol.  II,  p.  45 401 

387.  Relation  of  Party  Strength  to  Governmental  Organi- 

zation.   F.  J.  Goodnow,  Politics  and  Administra- 
tion, ^'^.  133-136 401 

388.  The   Function  of  Third    Parties.    J.  W.  Jenks,   The 

Principles  of  Politics,  pp.   71-73 403 


xxxiv  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

CHAPTER  ^A^= 

H.   History  of  Political  Parties 404 

389.  Development  of  Parties  in  England.    H.  St.  C.  Feil- 

den,  A  Short  Consiituiional  History  of  England, 

pp.  147-149.    (Ginn  and  Company.  1897)       .     .     .     404 

390.  Origin  of  Parties  in  the  United  States.    John  Adams, 

Works,  Vol.  X,  pp.  22-23 405 

391.  Fundamental  Oppositions  in  American  Politics.  J.  Brjce. 

The  Ajnerican  Commo?iwealth,  Vol.  I,  pp.  649-650     405 

in.   Present  Political  Parties 407 

392.  Present  Tendencies  in  English  Politics.    A.  L.  Lowell, 

The  Govermnetit  0/ England,  Vol.  II,  pp.  1 18-120     407 

393.  Political    Parties    in    France.    J.    H.    Robinson    and 

C.  A.  Beard,  The  Development  of  Modern  Europe, 

Vol.  II,  pp.  172-175 408 

394.  Political  Parties  in  Germany.    W.  M.  West,  Modern 

History,  p.  494 409 

395.  Political  Parties  in  Hungary.    A.  L.  Lowell,  Go7>ern- 

mettts  and  Parties  in  Continental  Europe,  Vol.  II, 

pp.  160-161 410 

396.  Danger    of    Party   Divisions    on    Class    Lines.     Ibid. 

pp.  65-67 410 

397.  The  "  Ins  "  and  the  "  Outs."    J.  W.  Jenks,  The  Prin- 

ciples of  Politics,  pp.  70-71 411 

IV.    Party  Orgaxizatiox 411 

398.  Functions  of  Party  Organization.    A.  L.  Lowell,  The 

Government  of  England,  Vol.  II,  pp.  18-19       .     .     411 

399.  Primary  Elections  and  Party  Organization.    J.  Macy, 

Influence  of  the  Pri?nary  Election  upon  Party 
Organization,  in  Proceedings  of  the  American  Polit- 
ical Science  Association  (1907),  Vol.  IV,  pp.  1 75-1 77     412 

V.    Party  Ri^form 414 

400.  Beginnings  of  the   Spoils   System.    G.  Hunt,   Office- 

Seekingduring  fefferson''s  Administration,  m.  Amer- 
ican Historical  Review,  Vol.  HI,  pp.  273-274  .     .     414 

401.  Evils  of  the  Spoils  System.    C.  Schurz,  Civil  Service 

Reform,  in  Proceedings  of  the  Ahitional  Civil  Service 
Reform  League,  1 894 415 


CONTENTS  x.wv 

CHAPTER 


PACE 


402.  The  Machine  and  the  Boss.    B.  S.  Coler,  Municipal 

Govern rnoit,  pp.  189-194.   (D.  Appleton  and  Com- 
pany, 1900J ^,7 

403.  The   Nature  of  the  American   Boss.    J.  Bryce,   The 

American  Cofn/nonwea/fh,  Vol.   II,  pp.  80-82     .     41 S 

404.  Necessity    for    Party    Responsibility    in    the    United 

States.     F.    J.    Goodnow,    Politics   and  Adminis- 
tration,  pp.    197-198 ^20 

405.  Legal   Recognition  of  Political   Parties.    Preamble  to 

Statutes  of  the  State  of  Oregon  relating  to  Elec- 
tions (1907) ^21 

406.  Primary  Election  Reform.    J.  A.  Woodburn,  Political 

Patiies  and  Party  Problems  in  the  United  States, 

pp.  285-291.    (G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons,  1909)   .     .     .     422 

XXII.    LOCAL  GOVERNMENT 424 

I.    Relation  of  Local  to  Central  Government  ....     424 

407.  Local  and  Central  Government.    S.  Leacock,  Elements 

of  Political  Science.,  •^^.  293-295 424 

408.  Degrees  of  Centralization.    J.  Q.  Dealey,  The  Dei'el- 

opment  of  the  State,  Y>Y>-  165-167 424 

II.    Commonwealth  Governments 425 

409.  The  Swiss  Cantons  and  the  I'nion.    W.  Wilson,  The 

State,  p.  304 425 

410.  The    German    Empire    and    the     Individual     States. 

B.  E.   Howard,  The  German   Empire,  pp.   20-21      426 

411.  Variety  and  Unity  of  Commonwealth  Organization  in 

the    L'nited   States.    A.  B.  Hart,  Actual  Govern- 
ment, pp.    114-116 427 

III.    Rural  Local  Government 42S 

412.  Centralization  of  Local  Government  in  France.    A.  L. 

Lowell,   Governments  and  Parties  in   Continental 
Europe.  \o\.  I.  pp.  34-36 42S 

413.  Complex    Character  of    English    Local   Government. 

W.  Wilson,   The  State,  pp.  402-404       .     .  .     429 

414.  Rural     Local     Government    in    the    United    States. 

C.  A.    Beard.   American    Government   and  Poli- 
tics, pp.   63S-639 430 


xxxvi  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

PAGE 
CHAPTER 

IV.   Historical  Development  of  Cities 43 1 

415.  Definition  of  City.    J.  A.  Fairlie,  Mtmicipal  Adtnin- 

istmiion,  p.  vi.    (The  Macmillan  Company,   1901)     431 

416.  Causes  of  Cities.    F.  J.  Goodnow,  City  Government 

in    the    United   States,   pp.   9-12.    (The    Century 

Co.,   1904) 431 

417.  Results  of  the  Growth  of  Cities.    J.  H.  Robinson  and 

C.  A.  Beard,  The  Development  of  Modern  Europe, 

Vol.  II,  pp.  384-385 432 

418.  Political  Consequences  of  City  Growth.    L.  S.  Rowe, 

Problems     of    City     Government,     pp.     98-100. 

(D.   Appleton    and    Company,    1908) 433 

419.  The    Spirit  of    Modern    City  Life.     Ibid.  pp.  37-41      434 

V.  Municipal  Government 435 

420.  Character    of    Urban    Population.     F.    J.    Goodnow, 

Municipal  Government,  pp.  38-40.    (The  Century 

Co.,  1909) 435 

421.  Democracy  and  City  Life  in  America.    D.  F.  Wilcox, 

The  American    City,   pp.   4-10.    (The   Macmillan 
Company,    1904) 43^ 

422.  The   Position  of  the  Modern  City.    F.  J.  Goodnow, 

Municipal  Government,  pp.  91-92 437 

423.  The  Mayor  and  the  City  Council.    L.  S.  Rowe,  Prob- 

lems of  City  Government,  pp.  206-207     .     .     .     .     437 

424.  The  Biirgermeister  in  Germany.    W.  B.  Munro,  Gov- 

ernment of  European  Cities,   pp.   186-187.    (The 
Macmillan  Company,   1909) 438 

425.  The  Mayor  in  England.    Ibid.  pp.  253-255  ....     439 

426.  Need  of  Experts  in  City  Administration.    F.  J.  Good- 

now, Municipal  Govem7nent,  p.  387 439 

VI.  Municipal  Reform  in  the  United  States 440 

427.  Essential  Defects  of  City  Government  in  the  United 

States.    A.  B.  Hart,  Actual  Government,  pp.  210- 

212 440 

428.  Needs  of    City   Governinent   in    the    United    States. 

F.  J.  Goodnow,   City  Government  in  the  United 
States,  pp.  303-304 441 


CONTENTS  XXX  vii 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

429.  Merits  and  Defects  of  the  Commission  Plan.    W.  B. 

Munro,  The  Gah>eston  Plan  of  City  Governmettt, 
pp.  8-15.  Reprinted  from  the  Proceedings  of  the 
National  Municipal  League 442 

VII.    Municipal  Activities 444 

430.  Municipal    Functions.  •  F.    J.    Goodnow,    Municipal 

Government^  pp.  392-393 444 

431.  Difficulty  of  comparing  Municipal  and  Private  Owner- 

ship.   Ibid.  pp.  356-359 446 

XXIII.    COLONIAL  GOVERNMENT 448 

L  Importanxe  of  Colonial  Development 448 

432.  Importance  of  Colonial   Dependencies.     S.    Leacock, 

Eletnents  of  Political  Science,  pp.  258-259     .     .     448 

433.  Area  and  Population  of  Modern  Colonies.    H.  C.  Mor- 

ris, The  History  of  Colonization,  Vol.  II,  p.  318. 
(The  Macmillan  Company,  1900) 448 

434.  Importance  of  Colonization.    Ibid.  pp.  319-321       .     .     449 

435.  Consequences  of  National  Imperialism.    P.  S.  Reinsch, 

World  Politics,  pp.  68-70 450 

436.  Influence  of  Foreign  Interests  on  Home  Affairs.    Ibid. 

pp.  347-348 451 

437.  Colonies    and    the    Position    of    the    United    States. 

H.  C.  Morris,  Some  Effects  of  Outlying  Depend- 
encies upon  the  People  of  the  United  States,  in 
Proceedings  of  the  American  Political  Sciettce 
^jj<7t7V7//Vw  (1906),  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  207-208      .     .     .     451 

II.    Historical  Development  of  Colonies 452 

438.  Essential  Conditions  for  Colonization.    H.  C.  Morris, 

The  Histoty  of  Colonisation,  Vol.  I,  pp.  15-20      .     452 

439.  Phoenician  Colonization.    Ibid.  pp.  60-61,  66-67   •     •     454 

440.  Bonds     uniting     Greece    and     her     Colonies.     Ibid. 

pp.  120-123 455 

441.  Colonies  in  the  Middle  Ages.    Ibid.  pp.  143-144    .     .  456 

442.  Periods  of  Spanish   Colonization.     Ibid.  pp.   230-231  456 

443.  Independence  of  Spanish  Colonies  in  America.    Ibid. 

pp.  274-275 456 

444.  General  Nature  of  Dutch  Colonization.    Ibid.  p.  300     457 


xxxviii  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

445.  General  Nature  of  French  Colonization.    H.  C.  Morris, 

The  History  of  Colonization,  Vol.  I,  pp.  360,  416       458 

446.  Britons  as  Colonizers.    A.  W.  Jose,  The  Groivth  of 

the  Efnpire,  pp.  10-12.  (Charles  Scribner's  Sons, 
1907) 459 

447.  The  British  Empire  and  the  Roman  Empire.    A.  L. 

Lowell,  The  Government  of  England,  Vol.  II,  pp. 
386-387 460 

448.  Expansion  of  the  United  States.    W.  F.  Willoughby, 

Territories  and  Dependencies  of  the  United  States, 

pp.  3-4.    (The  Century  Co.,  1905) 460 

III.  Colonial  Policy 461 

449.  The    French   as   Colonizers.     P.    S.   Reinsch,    World 

Politics,  pp.   52-53 461 

450.  Criticism  of  the  French  Colonial  System.  W.  B.  Munro, 

Some  Merits  and  Defects  of  the  French  Colonial 
System,  in  Proceedings  of  the  Americati  Political 
Science  Association  (1907),  Vol.  IV,  pp.  48-56  .     .     462 

451.  German  Colonial  PoHcy.    P.  S.  Reinsch,   World  Pol- 

itics, pp.  50-52 464 

452.  The  Dutch  in  Java.    Ibid.  pp.  54-55 465 

453.  Russia  as  a  Colonizer.    Ibid.  pp.  48-50 466 

454.  Relation  of  England  to  Colonial  Enterprise.   A.  Calde- 

cott,  English  Colonization  and  Empire,  p.  266. 
(Charles  Scribner's  Sons,  1903) 467 

455.  Constitution  of  the  British  Empire  League.    British 

Empire  Series,  Vol.  V,  pp.  599  ff 468 

456.  Imperialists  and  Anti-imperialists  in  the  United  States. 

A.  C.  Coolidge,  The  United  States  as  a  World 
Power,  pp.  134-137 468 

457.  Instructions   to   the   Philippine    Commission.     Senate 

fournal  (56th   Cong.    2d  sess.),  pp.    11-12.      .     .     469 

IV.  Forms  of  Colonial  Government 471 

45 8.  Classification  of  Colonies.    H.  C.  Morris,  The  History 

of  Colonizatioi,  Vol.  I,  pp.  8-1 1 471 

459.  Spheres  of  Influence.    P.  S.  Reinsch,  Colonial  Gov- 

ernment, pp.  95-97.  (The  Macmillan  Company, 
1902) 472 

460.  Colonial  Protectorates.    Ibid.  pp.  iog-112     .      .     .     •      472 


CONTENTS  xxxix 

PAGE 

461.  The  Relation  of  the  United  States  and  Cuba.   Statutes 

of  the  United  States,  1 900-1 901,  pp.  897  ff.       .     .     473 

462.  Establishment  of  Crown  Government  in  India.  Annual 

Register,  1858,  pp.  258  ff 474 

463.  Self-governing    Colonies.     P.    S.    Reinsch,    Colonial 

Govermnent,    pp.    241-243 475 


PART  III.   THE  ENDS  OF  THE  STATE 

XXIV.    THE   PROVINCE   OF  GOVERNMENT 477 

I.    The  Aims  of  the  State 477 

464.  The  State  an  End  or  a  Means.    J.  K.  Bluntschli,  T/ie 

Theory  of  the  State,  ^"p.  loZi-2,06,  ■^20-121    .      .     .     477 

465.  The  Primary,  Secondary,  and  Ultimate   Purposes  of 

the   State.    J.  W.    Burgess,  Political  Science  and 
Constitutional  Law,  Vol.   I,  pp.  85-87  ....     478 

466.  The  Ends  of  the  State.    J.  W.  Garner,  Introduction 

to  Political  Science,  p'p.  2)'^6-T)i'j 479 

467.  The  Functions  of  the  State.    W.  A.  Lilly,  First  Prin- 

ciples of  Politics,  y>V-  54-58 48° 

II.     IXDIVIDUALISM 481 

468.  Anarchism.    E.  V.  Zenker,  Anarchism,  pp.  3-4,  6-7. 

(Methuen  &  Co.,  Ltd.,  1898) 481 

,469.    The  Individualistic  Theory.    W.  W.  Willoughby,  The 

A'ature  of  the  State,  Y>p.  2,20-2)^1 482 

470.  Functions  of  Government  according  to  Individualism. 

H.  Sidgwick,  Political  Economy,  p.  420  ....     482 

471.  Defense  of  the  Individualistic  Theory.    J.  W.  Garner, 

hitroduction  to  Political  Science,  pp.  282-288  .      .     483 

472.  Criticism    of  the   Individualistic    Theory.     Ibid.    pp. 

289-297 485 

III.    Socialism 487 

473.  Origin  of  Socialism.    C.  Seignobos,  History  of  Con- 

tetnporary    Civilization,    trans,    by   J.    A.    James, 

pp.  425-428.    (Charles   Scribner's   Sons.    1909)     .     487 

474.  Development  of  Socialism.    M.  Hillquit,  History  of 

Socialism  in  the  United  States,  pp.  16-18.    (Funk 

&  Wagnalls  Company,  1 9 10) 488 


xl  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

PAGE 
CHAPTER  . 

475.  The  Elements  of  Socialism.     R.   T.   Ely,  Socialism 

atid  Social  Reform,  pp.  9-19-    (Thomas  Y.  Crowell 

&  Company,  1894) 49° 

476.  The  Strength  of  Socialism.    J.  W.  Garner,  Introduc- 

tion to  Political  Science,  pp.  301-303     ....     491 

477.  The  Weakness  of  Socialism.    R.  T.  Ely,  Outlines  of 

Economics,  pp.  521-523.  (The  Macmillan  Company, 
1908) 492 

IV.   Socialism  in  Present  Politics 494 

478.  Growth  of  Socialism  in  Germany.    J.  H.  Robinson  and 

C.  A.  Beard,  The  Development  of  Modern  Europe, 

Vol.  II,  p.  206 494 

479.  Causes  for  Socialist  Losses  in  Germany  in  1907.    Con- 

temporary Review,  April,  1907 494 

480.  Program  of  the  French  Socialists.    F.  M.  Anderson, 

Constitutions  and  Documents  illustrative  of  the 
History  of  France,  lySg-igoi,  pp.  650-652   .     .     495 

481.  Program    of    the    Social-Democratic    Federation    in 

England.   R.  T.  Ely,  Socialism  and  Social  Reform, 
Appendix  III 497 

482.  Periods    of    Socialist    Development    in    the    United 

States.    M.  Hillquit,  History  of  Socialism  in  the 
United  States,  pp.   154-155 49^ 

483.  Platform  of  the  Socialist  Party  in  the  United  States. 

Ibid.  Appendix  I 499 

484.  Platform  of  the  "International."  Ibid.  pp.   178-179     5°° 

XXV.   THE  FUNCTIONS  OF  GOVERNMENT  ......     501 

I.   Classification  of  Governmental  Functions   ....     501 

485.  The  Actual  Working  of  Government.    A.  L.  Lowell, 

The  Physiology  of  Politics,  in  the  A  merican  Political 
Science  Review,  Vol.  IV,  No.  i,  pp.  2-6  ....     501 

486.  Analysis  of    Governmental   Functions.    W.  W.  Wil- 

loughby,   The  Nature  of  the  State,   pp.   343-345     502 

487.  Classification    of    State    Functions.    J.    W.    Garner, 

Introduction  to  Political  Science,  pp.  318-320      .     503 

II.   Essential  Functions •  •     5^4 

488.  Essential  Functions  of  the  State.   W.  W.  Willoughby, 

The  A'ature  of  the  State,  Y>^.  2,^o-T)ii       ....      504 


CONTENTS  xli 

lPTer  page 

489.  The  Constituent   Functions.    W.  Wilson,   The  Stale, 

pp.  613-614 504 

490.  Sovereignty  and  the  Essential  Powers.  J.  Q.  Dealey, 

The  Development  of  the  State,  pp.  63-64      .     .     .     505 

491.  Theory  of  State  Taxation.    C.  C.  Plehn,  Introduction 

to   Public   Finance,    pp.    13-14.    (The    Macmillan 
Company,    1900) 506 

492.  Modern  Military  and  Naval  Armaments.    J.  H.  Rob- 

inson and  C.  A.  Beard,  The  Development  of  Mod- 
ern Europe,  Vol.  II,  pp.  367-369 507 

493.  The  Preservation  of  Internal   Peace.    J.  Q.   Dealey, 

The  Development  of  the  State,  pp.  80-81  .     .     .     508 

III.   Optional  Functions 509 

494.  Evolution  of  Governmental  Ownership  of  Public  Util- 

ities.   E.  R.  A.  Seligman,  Principles  of  Econotnics, 

P-  565 509 

495.  Forms  of  Public  Industries.    R.  T.  Ely,  Outlines  of 

Economics,  pp.  597-599 510 

496.  The  United  States  Governments  in  Business.    A.  B. 

Hart,  Actual  Goiiernment,  pp.  503-504   .     .     .     .      511 

497.  Government  Regulation  of  Industry.    E.  R.  A.  Selig- 

man, Principles  of  Economics,  pp.  574-576  .     .     .     512 

498.  How  to  regulate  Trusts.    J.  B.  Clarke,  7)7/j-/.r,  in /"<?///'- 

ical  Science  (Quarterly  ( 1 900),  Vol.  XV,  pp.  1 8 7- 1 90     513 

499.  The  Problem  of  Railway  Regulation.    E.  R.  Johnson, 

American  Railway  Transportation,  pp.  420-422. 

(D.  Appleton  and  Company,  1903,  1904,  1908)    .     .     514 

500.  Real  Value  of  a  Protective  Policy.    E.  R.  A.   Selig- 

man, Principles  of  Economics,  pp.  513-515     .     .     515 

501.  Tariff  Outlook  in  Europe.    H.  R.  ^eag&r,  Introduction 

to  Economics,  p.  383.    (Henry  Holt  and  Company, 
1906) 516 

502.  Difficulties  in  the  way  of  a  Tariff  Reduction  in  the 

United  States.    R.  T.  Ely,  Outlines  of  Economics, 

P-  311 517 

503.  Reasons  for  the  Legal  Regulation  of  Labor.    H.  R. 

Seager,  Introduction   to   Economics,  pp.  412-413      517 

504.  Public  Education.    J.  H.  Robinson  and  C.  A.  Beard, 

The   Dci'clopment   of  Modern   Europe,   Vol.    II, 

pp.  3S0-381 518 


READINGS    IN 
POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

INTRODUCTION 

CHAPTER  I 

NATURE  AND  SCOPE  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

I.    Scope  of  Political  Science 

1.  The  work  of  the  American  Political  Science  Association. 
Since  the  systematic  study  of  political  science  is  comparatively 
recent,  it  is  necessary  to  indicate  clearly  the  general  nature  of 
its  field.  At  the  first  public  meeting  of  the  American  Political 
Science  Association,  held  at  Chicago,  Illinois,  December  28-30, 
1904,  the  presidential  address,  delivered  by  Professor  Frank  J. 
Goodnow,  outlined  the  objects  and  purposes  of  the  association 
and  indicated  the  scope  of  Political  Science. 

Political  Science  is  that  science  which  treats  of  the  organization  known 
as  the  State.  It  is  at  the  same  time,  so  to  speak,  a  science  of  statics  and 
a  science  of  dynamics.  It  has  to  do  with  the  State  at  rest  and  with  the 
State  in  action.  Inasmuch,  however,  as  it  is  the  State  in  acdon  which 
causes  the  phenomena  of  the  greatest  practical  concern  to  the  individual, 
what  will  hereafter  be  said  will  be  said  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
dynamics  of  Political  Science.  The  State,  as  an  object  of  scientific  study, 
will  be  considered  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  various  operations 
necessary  to  the  realization  of  the  State  will. 

In  order  that  the  State  will  may  be  realized  in  any  concrete  instance, 
it  is  necessary,  first,  that  there  be  organs  for  the  formulation  of  the  State 


2  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

will ;  second,  that  that  will  be  expressed  ;  and,  third,  that  the  will,  once 
expressed,  shall  be  executed.  Our  subject  naturally  divides  itself,  there- 
fore, into  three  pretty  distinct  parts,  viz. : 

I  st,  The  expression  of  the  State  will ; 

2d,  The  content  of  the  State  will  as  expressed,  and 

3d,  The  execution  of  the  State  will. 

In  the  first  place,  the  State  will  must  be  expressed.  In  order  that  it 
shall  be  expressed,  it  is  necessary  that  organs  shall  be  established  which 
are  capable  of  action.  The  problems  involved  in  determining  what  these 
organs  shall  be  and  how  they  shall  act  are  of  two  kinds.  They  are,  ia 
the  first  place,  theoretical  or  speculative  in  character,  and  they  are,  in  the 
second  place,  legal  or  expressive  of  existing  conditions.  The  theoretical 
problems  have  been  mentioned  first.  For,  however  contemptuous  may 
be  one's  belief  in  the  practical  value  of  the  study  of  political  theory,  it  is 
none  the  less  true  that  every  governmental  system  is  based  on  some 
more  or  less  well-defined  political  theory  whose  influence  is  often  felt  in 
minute  details  of  governmental  organization.  The  problems  connected 
with  the  organization  of  the  authorities  which  are  to  express  the  State 
will  have  to  do  naturally  with  the  special  disciplines  to  which  the  names 
of  political  theory  and  constitutional  law  have  been  attached.  .  .  . 

But  the  problems  of  political  theory,  so  far  as  that  confines  itself  to 
the  organization  of  the  State  and  constitutional  law  do  not,  by  any  means, 
embrace  all  the  problems  arising  in  connection  with  the  first  branch  of 
our  subject.  For  the  expression  of  the  will  of  the  State  is  in  some  cases 
directly  facilitated  by  methods  of  procedure  and  by  organizations  which 
are  not  commonly  regarded  as  parts  of  the  political  system.  There  are 
in  all  governmental  systems  extralegal  customs  and  extralegal  organiza- 
tions whose  influence  must  be  considered  if  we  are  to  obtain  an  idea  of 
the  actual  political  system  of  a  country.  .  .  .  Our  political  science  has, 
therefore,  to  do,  not  only  with  the  theoretical  and  legal  problems  of  State 
organization,  but  also  with  the  somewhat  more  practical  and  concrete 
problems  of  party  organization,  and  nomination  methods,  whether  these 
matters  are  regulated  by  law  or  not. 

One  of  the  peculiar  developments  of  American  political  practice  has 
been  the  attempt  to  separate  both  in  organization  and  action  the  sover- 
eign State  from  the  government.  The  organization  of  the  sovereign 
State  we  find  provided  for  in  constitutional  conventions  and  plebiscites ; 
its  will  is  recorded  in  written  constitutions  and  constitutional  amendments. 
Important  problems,  both  of  a  political  and  legal  character,  present  them- 
selves in  connection  with  these  subjects.   .   .   . 

I  have  said  that  constitutional  conventions  and  written  constitutions 
are  peculiar  to  American  development.    While  this  is  true,  it  is  also 


NATURE  AND   SCOPE  OF  POLITICAL  SCIP:NCE  3 

true  that  some  European  states  have  manifested  a  tendency  somewhat 
akin  to  that  to  be  noticed  in  the  United  States ;  while  in  America,  not 
content  with  giving  the  sovereign  people  its  opportunity  to  express 
its  will  on  matters  of  fundamental  importance,  we  have  called  upon 
it  to  act  on  many  less  important  matters.  We  find  here,  as  well  as 
elsewhere,  many  instances  of  the  referendum  and  initiative,  both  in 
state  and  local  affairs.  These  are  subjects  which  should  receive  atten- 
tion at  our  hands.   .  .   . 

So  far  we  have  considered  the  questions  of  who  shall  express  the 
State  will  and  how  shall  that  will  be  expressed.  The  second  branch  of 
the  subject  which  demands  attention  is  the  content  of  the  State  will. 

The  content  of  the  State  will  is  usually  regarded  as  the  law.  Unless 
we  conceive  of  all  law  as  a  part  of  Political  Science,  it  becomes  necessary 
then  to  differentiate  Political  Science  from  legal  science.  Strictly  speak- 
ing, of  course  all  law  which  does  not  affect  the  relations  of  the  State  and 
its  officers  is  to  be  assigned  to  legal  rather  than  to  Political  Science.  For 
the  science  of  the  private  law,  i.e.  the  law  affecting  the  relations  of 
private  individuals  one  with  another,  is  based  upon  social  rather  than 
political  considerations.  At  the  same  time  we  must  remember  that  the 
State,  in  either  its  central  or  local  organization,  is  a  subject  of  the  private 
law,  since  it  may  enter  into  almost  all  the  relations  into  which  a  private 
individual  may  enter.  .  .  .  For  these  reasons  the  American  Political 
Science  Association  has  included  among  the  subjects  which  are  not 
foreign  to  it  comparative  legislation  and  historical  and  comparative  juris- 
prudence, whether  that  legislation  or  jurisprudence  is  private  or  public. 
...  In  laying  this  emphasis  upon  the  necessity  of  the  study  of  public 
law  for  the  political  scientist,  I  would  not  be  regarded  as  depreciating 
the  importance  of  the  work  of  the  theorist.  Without  him  progress  would 
be  impossible ;  without  him  the  public  lawyer  becomes  a  mere  slave  of 
precedent.  Our  study  of  the  public  law  should  therefore  embrace  a  study 
of  what  it  is,  and  what  it  should  be. 

It  has  been  said  that  Political  Science  has  to  do  with  the  execution  of 
the  State  will,  once  it  has  been  expressed.  The  subject  of  the  execution 
of  the  State  will,  or  the  enforcement  of  law  is  one  which,  it  seems  to 
me,  has  never  been  accorded  the  importance  which  it  deserves.  ...  I 
cannot  let  this  opportunity  pass  without  attempting  to  emphasize  the 
importance  of  the  ascertainment  and  application  of  correct  principles  of 
administration.    I  cannot  accept  the  truth  of  the  saying, 

For  forms  of  government  let  fools  contest ; 
That  which  is  best  administered  is  best, 

for  there  is  no  one  who  has  endeavored  to  secure  some  change  in  existing 


4  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

governmental  organization  who  has  not  had  this  couplet  thrown  in  his 
face  so  often  that  he  has  come  to  regard  its  use  as  an  evidence  of  an 
absolutely  hopeless  condition  of  mind  in  the  one  who  uses  it.  A  study 
of  government  which  excludes  the  consideration  of  the  administrative 
system  and  actual  administrative  methods  is  as  liable  to  lead  to  error 
as  the  speculations  of  a  political  theorist  which  have  no  regard  for  the 
principles  of  public  law. 

2.  Divisions  of  political  science.  In  the  introduction  to  his  great 
work,  "'  Lehre  vom  modernen  Staat,"  Bluntschli  gives  the  divisions 
of  political  science  as  follows  : 

The  ancient  Greeks  applied  the  name  iroXiTLKri  to  all  political  science. 
We  (Germans)  distinguish  Public  Law  and  Politics  as  two  special  sciences. 
Alongside  of  these  we  put  many  special  branches  with  distinct  names,  e.g. 
Political  Statistics,  Administration,  International  Law,  Police,  etc. 

Public  Law  and  Politics  both  con:ider  the  State  on  the  whole,  but 
each  from  a  different  point  of  view  and  in  a  different  direction.  In  order 
to  understand  the  State  more  thoroughly,  we  distinguish  its  two  main 
aspects  —  its  existence  and  its  life.  We  examine  the  parts  in  order  more 
completely  to  comprehend  the  whole.  In  this  procedure  there  are  not 
only  theoretic  but  practical  advantages.  Law  has  gained  in  clearness, 
moderation,  and  strength,  since  it  has  been  more  sharply  distinguished 
from  politics ;  and  Politics  has  gained  in  fullness  and  in  freedom  by 
being  considered  separately. 

Public  Law  deals  with  the  State  as  it  is,  i.e.  its  normal  arrangements, 
the  permanent  conditions  of  its  existence. 

Politics,  on  the  other  hand,  has  to  do  with  the  life  and  conduct  of  the 
State,  pointing  out  the  end  toward  which  public  efforts  are  directed  and 
teaching  the  means  which  lead  to  these  ends,  observing  the  action  of 
laws  upon  facts  and  considering  how  to  avoid  injurious  consequences  and 
how  to  remedy  the  defects  of  existing  arrangements. 

Public  Law  is  thus  related  to  Politics  as  order  to  freedom,  as  the 
tranquil  fixedness  of  relations  to  their  complex  movement,  as  bodies  are 
related  to  their  actions  and  to  the  various  mental  movements.  Public 
Law  asks  whether  what  is  conforms  to  law :  Politics  whether  the  action 
conforms  to  the  end  in  view.  .   .  . 

Public  Law  and  Politics  must  not  be  absolutely  separated  from  one 
another.  The  actual  State  lives,  i.e.  it  is  a  combination  of  Law  and 
Politics.  Again,  Law  is  not  absolutely  fixed  or  unalterable;  and  the 
movement  of  Politics  has  rest  as  its  aim.  Law  is  not  merely  a  system, 
it  has  a  history ;  on  the  other  hand,  politics  has  to  do  with  legislation. 


NATURE  AND  SCOPE  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  5 

As  with  all  organic  beings,  the  influence  is  reciprocal.  The  difference  we 
have  recognized  is  not  thereby  set  aside,  but  is  better  explained.  The 
distinction  between  the  history  of  Law  and  political  history  is  just  this : 
the  former  has  only  to  point  out  the  development  of  the  normal  and  es- 
tablished existence  of  the  State  and  to  describe  the  rise  and  change  of 
permanent  institutions  and  laws :  the  latter  lays  stress  chiefly  on  the 
changing  fortunes  and  circumstances  of  the  nation,  the  motives  and  con- 
duct of  its  statesmen,  and  the  actions  and  sufferings  of  both  the  nation 
and  its  statesmen.  The  highest  and  purest  expression  of  Public  Law  is 
to  be  found  in  the  Constitution  or  enacted  positive  laws :  the  clearest 
and  most  vivid  manifestation  of  Politics  is  the  practical  conduct  or  guid- 
ance of  the  State  itself,  viz.  Government.  Politics  is  more  of  an  art  than 
a  science.  Law  is  a  presupposition  of  Politics,  a  fundamental  (though  not 
of  course  the  only)  condition  of  its  freedom.  Politics  in  its  course  must 
have  regard  to  legal  limits,  caring  as  it  does  for  the  varying  needs  of 
life.  Law,  on  the  other  hand,  requires  the  help  of  Politics  in  order 
to  escape  the  numbness  of  death  and  to  keep  step  with  the  develop- 
ment of  life.  Without  the  animating  breath  of  politics  the  corpus  juris 
would  be  a  corpse ;  without  the  foundations  and  the  limits  of  Law, 
Politics  would  perish  in  unbridled  selfishness  and  in  a  fatal  passion 
for  destruction. 

It  is  solely  for  the  sake  of  clearness  and  simplicity  that  before  these 
two  branches  of  the  Theory  of  the  State  —  Public  Law  and  Politics  — 
we  place  a  third,  or  rather  a  first,  division  of  Political  Science,  viz.  the 
Theory  of  the  State  /;/  general.  In  this  we  consider  the  State  as  a  ivhole 
without  as  yet  distinguishing  its  two  aspects  (Law  and  Politics).  The 
conception  of  the  State,  its  basis,  its  principal  elements  (the  people, 
the  country),  its  rise,  its  end  or  aim,  the  chief  forms  of  its  constitution,  the 
definition  and  the  division  of  sovereignty  form  the  subjects  of  the  Theory 
of  the  State  in  general,  and  this  in  turn  is  at  the  base  of  the  two  special 
political  sciences.  Public  Law  and  Politics. 

3.  Outline  of  political  science.  The  content  of  political  science 
has  been  analyzed  and  classified  according  to  numerous  points  of 
view.  A  good  working  outline  is  found  in  the  division  into  (i) 
historical  political  science,  —  the  origin  and  development  of  the 
state  ;  (2)  descriptive  political  science,  —  the  nature  and  organiza- 
tion of  the  state;  and  (3)  applied  political  science, — the  purpose 
and  functions  of  the  state.^  The  following  table,  based  on  a  fun- 
damental distinction  between  "'  the  general  theory  of  the  state  and 

1  R.  G.  Gettell,  "  Introduction  to  Political  Science,"  p.  15. 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


its  possible  forms"  and  "the  study  of  particular  institutions  and 
the  action  of  the  state  for  particular  purposes,"  aims  to  "  show 
the  range  and  variety  of  modern  political  science."  ^ 


Theoretical  Politics 

A.  Theory  of  the  state 
Origin  of  polity 

1.  Historical 

2.  Rational 
Constitution 

Classification  of  forms  of  gov- 
ernment 
Political  sovereignty 

B.  Theory  of  government 
Forms  of  institutions 

Representative    and    ministe- 
rial government 

Executive  departments 
Defense  and  order 
Revenue  and  taxation 
Wealth  of  nations 
Province  and  limits  of  positive 

law 

C.  Theory  of  legislation 
Objects  of  legislation 
General  character  and  divisions 

of  positive  law  (philosophy  of 
law  or  general  jurisprudence) 
Method  and  sanction  of  laws 
Interpretation    and    administra- 
tion 
Language  and  style 

D.  Theory  of  the  state  as  artificial 

Person 
Relations   to    other  states    and 

bodies  of  men 
International  law 


Applied  Politics 

A.  The  state 

Existing  forms  of  government 

Confederations  and  federal 
states 

Independence 

Protectorates  and  extraterrito- 
rial jurisdiction 

B.  Government 
Constitutional  law  and  usage 
Parliamentary  systems 
Cabinet  and  ministerial  respon- 
sibility 

Administrative  constitutions 
Army,  navy,  police 
Currency,  budget,  trade 
State  regulation  or  noninterfer- 
ence 

C.  Laws  and  legislation 
Legislative  procedure   (embodi- 
ment of  theory  in  legislative 
forms) 

Jurisprudence  of  particular  states 
Courts    of    jusdce    and     their 

machinery 
Judicial  precedence  and  authority 

D.  The  state  personified 
Diplomacy,  peace,  and  war 
Treaties  and  conventions 
International     agreements     for 

furtherance  of   justice,   com- 
merce, communications,  etc. 


^  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


NATURE  AND  SCOPE  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  7 

IL  Relation  to  Allied  Sciences 

4.  Political  science  and  sociology.  Stuckenberg,  who  considers 
sociology  "  the  general  social  science  of  which  the  special  social  sci- 
ences are  differentiations,"  thus  states  its  relation  to  political  science : 

The  science  of  politics  needs  differentiation  from  Sociology  and  the 
other  social  sciences,  in  order  that  its  own  peculiar  sphere  may  be  made 
more  distinct.  The  function  of  the  state  is  among  the  most  momentous 
problems  of  the  times ;  but  this  function  can  be  distinctly  brought  out 
only  when  contrasted  with  the  other  social  forces.  In  Russia  the  govern- 
ment aims  to  make  society ;  in  the  United  States  society  makes  the  gov- 
ernment ;  in  Russia  the  progress  of  voluntary  association  is  a  menace  to 
the  government;  in  the  United  States  independent  organizations  may 
ignore  the  very  existence  of  the  government.  Neither  theoretically  nor 
practically  is  there  agreement  respecting  the  limits  of  the  state  and  its 
relation  to  voluntary  associations. 

The  science  of  politics  confines  itself  to  the  state,  explaining  its  struc- 
ture and  functions,  marking  the  peculiarity  of  its  organization  as  distin- 
guished from  other  societies,  treating  of  the  relations  of  the  citizens  to 
one  another  and  to  the  state,  and  of  the  government  to  the  governed, 
the  constitution  and  laws,  and  all  that  belongs  to  the  domain  of  national 
life.  Some  have  questioned,  as  intimated  above,  whether  the  state  ought 
to  be  included  in  Sociology  or  treated  separately  as  outside  of  society. 
It  is  unquestionably  a  form  of  association,  and  therefore  within  the  scope 
of  Sociology ;  but  it  is  only  one  of  many  social  forms,  and  therefore 
polidcal  science  cannot  take  the  place  of  the  science  of  society.  The 
distinctive  elements  in  the  state,  the  peculiar  authority  it  exercises,  and 
the  vast  importance  of  the  subject  must  receive  full  recognition.  Its 
sphere  is  that  of  collective  authority  and  coercion  ;  the  sphere  of  other 
societies  is  that  of  cooperation.  Owing  to  the  importance  and  extent  of 
'  politics,  it  has  become  a  special  science.  It  is,  however,  a  social  science, 
which  indicates  its  intimate  relation  to  Sociology.  The  state  of  the  people 
is  society  in  a  truer  sense  than  when  the  state  is  treated  as  an  abstrac- 
tion, or  as  a  power  hovering  over  the  people,  to  which  unconditional 
submission  is  required.  We  can  indeed  distinguish  between  social  and 
political,  referring  the  latter  to  all  that  pertains  to  the  state,  and  the 
former  to  society  as  distinct  from  the  state  ;  but  reflection  shows  that 
political  action  is  social  action  as  organized  in  the  form  of  collective 
authority.  The  state,  whatever  its  particular  form  and  whoever  exercises 
the  authority,  is  sovereignty.  The  functions  and  limits  of  the  sovereignty 
are  among  the  most  important  questions  of  the  day.  .  .  . 


8  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

The  essence  of  the  matter  consists  in  the  fact  that  in  the  individuals 
of  a  nation  we  abstract  the  political  social  factor  from  all  other  social 
factors.  It  thus  becomes  evident  what  the  relation  of  Sociology  to 
political  science  must  be.  It  regards  the  state  as  social,  and  as  therefore 
a  part  of  the  general  social  organism,  determines  its  place  and  functions 
in  that  organism  (correlates  the  state  to  the  other  social  factors),  but  does 
not  take  the  state  by  itself  and  develop  the  science  of  politics.  This  work, 
and  all  particulars  about  the  state,  it  leaves  to  political  science. 

5.  Political  science  and  sociology.  Giddings  differentiates  the 
fields  of  sociology  and  political  science  as  follows  :  ^ 

In  like  manner,  in  political  science  as  it  has  been  written,  there  have 
been,  since  Aristotle's  day,  long  prefatory  accounts  of  the  origins  of 
human  communities,  usually  mere  elaborations  of  the  patriarchal  theory. 
But  the  greatest  step  forward  that  political  science  has  made  in  recent 
years,  has  been  its  discovery  that  it3  province  is  not  coextensive  with 
the  investigation  of  society,  and  that  the  lines  of  demarcation  can  be 
definitely  drawn.  In  his  important  work  on  "  Political  Science  and 
Comparative  Constitutional  Law,"  Professor  Burgess  has  not  only 
sharply  distinguished  the  government  from  the  state,  but  for  the  first 
time  in  political  philosophy  he  has  clearly  distinguished  the  state  as  it 
is  organized  in  the  constitution  from  the  state  behind  the  constitution. 
"  A  population  speaking  a  common  language  and  having  ideas  as  to  the 
fundamental  principles  of  rights  and  wrongs,  and  resident  upon  a  terri- 
tory separated  by  high  mountain  ranges  or  broad  bodies  of  water,  or  by 
climatic  differences,  from  other  territory,"  such  is  the  state  behind  the 
constitution.  It  "  presents  us  with  the  natural  basis  of  a  true  and  per- 
manent political  establishment."  It  is  "the  womb  of  constitutions  and. 
of  revolutions."  Political  science  studies  the  state  within  the  constitution 
and  shows  how  it  expresses  its  will  in  acts  of  government.  It  inquires  how 
this  state  within  the  constitution  is  created  and  molded  by  the  state  behind 
the  constitution,  but  beyond  this  political  science  proper  does  not  go.  The 
state  behind  the  constitution,  or  natural  society  as  we  should  otherwise  call 
it,  is  for  politics,  as  for  political  economy,  a  datum.  The  detailed  study  of 
its  origins  and  evolution  falls  within  the  province  of  sociology.  .  .  . 

How  is  it  with  the  theory  of  the  state  ?  Political  science,  too,  finds 
its  premises  in  facts  of  human  nature.  The  motive  forces  of  political 
life,  as  of  economic  life,  are  the  desires  of  men,  but  they  are  no  longer 
merely  individual  desires,  and  they  are  no  longer  desires  for  satisfactions 
that  must  come  for  the  most  part  in  material  forms.    They  are  desires 

1  Copyright,  1896,  by  Macmillan  and  Company. 


NATURE  AND  SCOPE  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE  9 

massed  and  generalized  ;  desires  felt  simultaneously  and  continuously  by 
thousands,  or  even  by  millions  of  men,  who  are  by  them  simultaneously 
moved  to  concerted  action.  They  are  desires  of  what  we  may  call  the 
social  mind  in  distinction  from  the  individual  mind,  and  they  are  chiefly 
for  such  ideal  things  as  national  power  and  renown,  or  conditions  of 
liberty  and  peace.  Transmuted  into  will,  they  become  the  phenomenon 
of  sovereignty  —  the  obedience-compelling  power  of  the  state.  Political 
science  describes  these  gigantic  forces  of  the  social  mind  and  studies 
their  action ;  but  it  concerns  itself  with  their  genesis  no  more  than 
political  economy  concerns  itself  with  the  genesis  of  individual  desires. 
It  simply  assumes  for  every  nation  a  national  character,  and  is  content 
that  the  political  constitution  of  the  state  can  be  scientifically  deduced 
from  the  character  assumed.  It  takes  the  fact  of  sovereignty  and  builds 
upon  it,  and  does  not  speculate  how  sovereignty  came  to  be,  as  did 
Hobbes  and  Locke  and  Rousseau.  It  starts  exactly  where  Aristotle 
started,  with  the  dictum  that  man  is  a  political  animal. 

6.  Political  science  and  history.  In  the  presidential  address  de- 
livered by  the  Right  Honorable  James  Bryce  before  a  joint  meeting 
of  the  American  Political  Science  Association  and  the  American 
Historical  Association,  held  at  Washington,  D.C.,  January  28, 
1908,  the  relation  of  political  science  to  history  was  discussed  as 
follows  : 

Now  let  us  see  what  the  materials  of  Political  Science  are.  They  are 
the  acts  of  men  as  recorded  in  history.  In. other  words  they  are  such 
parts  of  history  as  relate  to  the  structure  and  government  of  com- 
munities. Political  Science  takes  all  the  facts  that  histor}^  gives  us  on 
this  subject  and  rearranges  them  under  proper  heads,  describing  in- 
stitutions and  setting  forth  those  habits  of  men  and  tendencies  of 
human  nature  which  correspond  to  what  in  the  sphere  of  inanimate 
nature  we  call  natural  laws.  Thus  Political  Science  may  be  defined  as 
the  data  of  political  history  reclassified  and  explained  as  the  result  of 
certain  general  principles.  It  is  not  any  more  a  science  than  history  is, 
because  its  certainty  is  no  greater  than  the  certainty  of  history.  But 
whereas  history  takes  the  form  of  a  record  of  facts  and  tendencies  as 
they  have  occurred  or  shown  themselves  in  past  times.  Political  Science 
assumes  the  form  of  a  systematic  statement  of  the  most  important  facts 
belonging  to  the  political  department  of  history,  stringing  these  facts  (so 
to  speak)  upon  the  thread  of  the  principles  which  run  through  them. 
They  are  so  disposed  and  arranged  as  to  enable  us  more  easily  to  com- 
prehend what  we  call  the  laws  that  govern  human  nature  in  political 


lO 


READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


communities,  so  that  we  can  see  these  laws  as  a  whole  in  their  perma- 
nent action  and  can  apply  what  we  have  learned  from  history  to  the 
phenomena  of  to-day  and  to-morrow. 

Thus  Political  Science  stands  midway  between  history  and  politics, 
between  the  past  and  the  present.  It  has  drawn  its  materials  from  the 
one,  it  has  to  apply  them  to  the  other.  .  .  . 

From  among  the  maxims  which  might  be  laid  down  for  the  student 
who  wishes  to  turn  political  history  into  political  science,  I  select  three : 

He  must  be  critical :  must  test  his  sources  of  information :  never  get 
his  data  at  second-hand  if  he  can  (without  too  much  expenditure  of  time) 
get  them  at  first-hand. 

He  must  beware  of  superficial  resemblances.  So-called  historical 
parallels  are  usually  interesting,  often  illuminative.  But  they  are  often 
misleading.    History  never  repeats  itself. 

He  must  endeavor  to  disengage  the  personal  or  accidental  from  the 
general  causes  at  work.  By  the  personal  cause  I  mean  the  presence  of 
some  wholly  exceptional  man  who  so  much  affects  the  situation  as  to  dis- 
turb all  calculations.  People  are  wont  to  say  that  the  time  or  the  need 
produces  the  man.  That  is  not  true.  The  man  often  appears  quite  out- 
side what  people  call  the  natural  course  of  things  :  and  often  does  not 
appear  when  the  natural  course  of  things  seems  to  require  him.  He  is, 
not  indeed  in  reality,  for  there  is  no  chance  in  Nature,  but  so  far  as  our 
knowledge  goes,  an  accident,  i.e.  the  product  of  antecedents  altogether 
unknown  and  unknowable.  Only  in  a  broad  and  rough  sort  of  way  can 
we  say  how  much  is  due  to  the  presence  of  such  a  person  (or  group  of 
persons)  and  how  much  to  the  general  causes  at  work. 

7.  Political  science  and  history.  The  late  Sir  J,  R.  Seeley,  in 
his  lectures  on  political  science  before  his  students  at  Cambridge, 
was  accustomed  to  introduce  his  subject  by  showing  that  history, 
since  various  of  its  phases  were  being  shared  by  other  sciences, 
tended  to  be  limited  specifically  to  a  study  of  states,^ 

It  is  the  first  aphorism  in  the  system  of  political  science  which  I  am 

about  to  expound  to  you,  that  this  science  is  not  a  thing  distinct  from 

history  but  inseparable  from  it.    To  call  it  a  part  of  history  might  do 

some  violence  to  the  usage  of  language,  but  I  may  venture  to  say  that 

history  without  political  science  is  a  study  incomplete,  truncated,  as  on  the 

other  hand  political  science  without  history  is  hollow  and  baseless  —  or  in 

one  word:      ^..  .  ,  ,.  .    ,     . 

History  without  political  science  has  no  iruit ; 

Political  science  without  history  has  no  root.  .  .  . 
^  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


NATURE  AND  SCOPE  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE        1 1 

In  my  view  a  science  has  for  a  very  long  time  past  been  insensibly 
growing  up  by  the  side  of  historj^,  and  every  one  has  perceived  that  it 
has  some  connection  with  history,  and  must  draw  a  great  part  of  ma- 
terials from  history ;  this  is  political  science.  On  the  other  side,  within 
the  department  of  history  itself,  it  has  been  more  and  more  felt  that  the 
accumulation  of  facts  suggested  the  possibility  of  a  science ;  what  was 
to  be  done  with  them  if  no  generalizations  were  possible  which  might 
reduce  them  to  order  ?  But  all  this  time  it  has  been  overlooked  that  the 
science  which  lay  so  near  to  history  was  itself  the  very  science  which 
historians  were  calling  out  for.  .  .  . 

When,  twenty  years  ago,  Mr.  Buckle  succeeded  in  flashing  upon  the 
English  mind  the  notion  of  a  science  of  history,  he  threatened  us  with  a 
revolution  in  historical  writing.  We  were  to  read  henceforth  compar- 
atively little  about  governments  and  parliaments  and  wars ;  history  was 
to  resolve  itself  into  a  discussion  of  the  physical  environment  of  a  people, 
the  climate,  the  geography,  the  food.  The  view  I  present,  you  see,  is 
different,  and  it  is  not  at  all  revolutionary.  I  do  not  dispute  the  impor- 
tance of  those  physical  inquiries,  and  the  results  of  them  must  be  used 
by  the  historian  ;  but  his  own  province,  according  to  me,  is  distinct.  He 
is  not  an  anthropologist  or  an  ethnologist,  but  if  I  may  coin  a  word,  he 
is  a  politicist.  The  political  group  or  organism  —  the  state  —  is  his  study. 
On  this  principle  it  will  appear  that  historians  hitherto,  instead  of  being 
wrong  in  the  main,  have  been  right  in  the  main.  Their  researches  into 
legislation  and  the  growth  of  institutions  have  laid  a  firm  basis  for  the 
first  part  of  political  science,  which  is  concerned  with  the  classification 
and  analysis  of  states.  Their  investigation  of  wars,  conquests,  alliances, 
federations,  have  laid  a  basis  for  the  second  part,  that  which  is  concerned 
with  the  action  of  states  upon  each  other. 

8.  Political  science  and  economics.  Seligman  gives  the  follow- 
ing strong  statement  of  the  close  relation  existing  between  political 
science  and  economics  : 

The  study  of  politics  or  the  science  of  the  state  has  gone  through 
several  stages.  For  a  long  time  history  was  dominated  by  the  "great 
man  "  theory  of  politics ;  attention  was  centered  chiefly  in  the  kings  and 
the  battles,  the  court  intrigues  and  military  problems.  At  a  later  period 
more  emphasis  was  put  on  the  development  of  institutions  compared 
with  which  any  individual,  however  eminent,  was  insignificant.  Finally, 
it  was  recognized  that  political  life  itself  is  closely  intertwined  with  the 
economic  life,  and  that  the  forms  as  well  as  the  practices  of  government 
are  profoundly  influenced  by  the  conditions  of  production  as  well  as  by 


12 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


those  of  distribution.  Economic  facts  would  then  be  the  cause  ;  political 
phenomena  the  result. 

On  the  other  hand,  since  all  modern  economic  action  is  carried  on 
within  the  framework  of  the  state,  when  we  deal  with  any  practical 
economic  institution  no  final  solution  of  the  problem  can  be  reached 
until  the  effect  of  the  political  condition  be  weighed.  In  discussing  the 
economic  consequences  of  government  ownership,  for  instance,  the 
status  of  the  governmental  civil  service  is  a  potent  consideration.  Polit- 
ical facts  may  profoundly  modify  the  economic  conditions,  instead  of 
being  modified  by  them.  While,  therefore,  politics  deals  with  the  relation 
of  the  individual  to  the  government,  and  economics  with  one  aspect  of 
the  relations  of  individuals  to  each  pther,  there  is  almost  always  a  dis- 
tinct interaction  between  the  two.  It  is  a  necessity  for  the  publicist  to 
comprehend  the  economic  basis  of  political  evolution ;  it  is  the  business 
of  the  economist  to  remember  the  political  conditions  which  affect 
economic  phenomena. 

What  has  been  said  of  politics  applies  with  still  greater  force  to  juris- 
prudence. All  systems  of  law  are  in  the  main  the  crystallization  of  long- 
continued  social  usage.  Social  customs  are  coeval  with  the  origin  and 
growth  of  society  itself ;  the  mandatory  force  of  the  positive  law  comes 
at  a  later  stage  in  the  evolution.  The  unwritten  gradually  turns  into  the 
written  law,  until  the  positive  enactment  is  invested  with  the  sanction  of 
a  sovereign  command.  As  society  develops,  the  law  is  in  a  perpetual 
process  of  change.  No  code  is  final ;  it  always  represents  a  given  stage 
of  social  life.  The  law  is  the  outward  manifestation  ;  the  social,  and 
especially  the  economic,  fact  is  the  living  force.  The  formal  juristic 
conception  may  remain  the  same ;  its  content  must  be  modified  by 
every  change  of  economic  life.  Legal  history  is  really  a  handmaid  to 
economic  history  ;  legal  development  is  inexplicable  apart  from  economic 
forces.  The  economic  fact  in  this  sense  is  the  cause ;  the  legal  situation 
is  the  result. 

At  any  given  moment,  however,  economic  phenomena  take  place  within 
a  legal  framework.  The  elemental  forces  of  economic  life  cannot  indeed 
in  the  long  run  be  conditioned  by  legal  forms ;  but  the  law  may  for  a 
time  hold  in  check,  or  give  a  new  direction  to,  economic  forces.  Take 
as  an  example  the  English  law  of  primogeniture  and  of  entailed  estates 
as  compared  with  the  French  laws  which  have  led  to  the  system  of  small 
farms.  History  is  full  of  instances  where  the  law  has  for  good  or  for 
evil  affected  the  economic  environment.  Just  because  the  economic  life, 
however,  is  prior  to  the  legal  system,  there  is  always,  at  any  given 
moment,  the  danger  of  a  lack  of  harmony  between  the  two.  It  is  in 
the  interval  between  the  economic  changes  and  the  readjustment  of  the 


NATURE  AND  SCOPE  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE        13 

legal  facts  that  the  influence  of  law  upon  economics  is  keenly  felt.  Life 
indeed  consists  of  a  perpetual  adaptation  of  outward  forms  to  inner 
forces,  and  thus  the  economic  basis  of  a  legal  system  is  really  the  im- 
portant fact  to  the  social  philosopher.  In  practical  life,  however,  we  deal 
with  outward  forms,  and  thus  the  legal  shape  of  the  economic  relations 
must  never  be  lost  from  sight.  In  economics  and  jurisprudence  there  is 
continual  action  and  reaction. 

9.  Political  science  and  ethics.  The  following  paragraph,  en- 
titled The  Moral  Value  of  the  State,  suggests  the  important 
relation  of  political  science  to  ethics. 

If  then  we  take  modern  social  life  in  its  broadest  extent,  as  including 
not  only  what  has  become  institutionalized  and  more  or  less  fossilized, 
but  also  what  is  still  growing  (forming  and  re-forming),  we  may  justly 
say  that  it  is  as  true  of  progressive  as  of  stationary  society,  that  the  moral 
and  the  social  are  one.  The  virtues  of  the  individual  in  a  progressive 
society  are  more  reflective,  more  critical,  involve  more  exercise  of  com- 
parison and  selection,  than  in  customary  society.  But  they  are  just  as 
socially  conditioned  in  their  origin  and  as  socially  directed  in  their  mani- 
festation. 

In  rudimentary  societies,  customs  furnish  the  highest  ends  of  achieve- 
ment ;  they  supply  the  principles  of  social  organization  and  combination  ; 
and  they  form  binding  laws  whose  breach  is  punished.  The  moral, 
political,  and  legal  are  not  differentiated.  But  village  communities  and 
city  states,  to  say  nothing  of  kingdoms  and  empires  and  modern  national 
States,  have  developed  special  organs  and  special  regulations  for  main- 
taining social  unity  and  public  order.  Small  groups  are  usually  firmly 
welded  together  and  are  exclusive.  They  have  a  narrow  but  intense 
social  code :  —  like  a  patriarchal  family,  a  gang,  a  social  set,  they  are 
clannish.  But  when  a  large  number  of  such  groups  come  together 
within  a  more  inclusive  social  unity,  some  institution  grows  up  to  repre- 
sent the  interests  and  activities  of  the  whole  as  against  the  narrow  and 
centrifugal  tendencies  of  the  constituent  factors.  A  society  is  then  politi- 
cally organized ;  and  a  true  public  order  with  its  comprehensive  laws  is 
brought  into  existence.  The  moral  importance  of  the  development  of 
this  public  point  of  view,  with  its  extensive  common  purposes  and  with 
a  general  will  for  maintaining  them,  can  hardly  be  overestimated.  With- 
out such  organization  society  and  hence  morality  would  remain  sectional, 
jealous,  suspicious,  unfraternal.  Sentiments  of  intense  cohesion  within 
would  have  been  conjoined  with  equally  strong  sentiments  of  indifference, 
intolerance,  and  hostility  to  those  without.    In  the  wake  of  the  formation 


14  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


PART  I 
THE  NATURE  OF  THE  STATE 

CHAPTER  II 

PRELIMINARY  DEFINITIONS  AND  DISTINCTIONS 

10.  Necessity  for  definitions  and  distinctions.  Amos  gives  the 
following  reasons  for  the  misuse  of  political  terms  : 

There  are  some  special  reasons  why  language  is  peculiarly  subject  in 
political  speech  and  discussion  to  flux  and  vacillation  of  import,  and 
therefore,  why  the  processes  of  definition  and  explanation  are  peculiarly 
difficult.  In  the  first  place,  political  terms  are  largely"  in  use  among 
classes  who  either  are  habitually  inexact  in  their  use  of  language  or  who 
have  a  positive  motive,  —  good,  bad  or  indifferent,  —  to  be  inexact 
themselves  or  to  encourage  inexactness  in  others.  Popular  speech  is  at 
every  moment  handling  the  common  words  which  are,  of  necessity, 
pressed  into  the  service  of  political  speculation  and  debate.  These  words, 
therefore,  carry  with  them,  wherever  they  go,  the  looseness  and  varia- 
bility of  meaning  they  contract  in  the  market  place  and  by  the  domestic 
fireside.  .  .  . 

But  political  terms  do  not  merely  suffer  in  fixity  of  meaning  from  the 
abuses  common  to  words  in  familiar  popular  use.  They  are,  further- 
more, peculiarly  exposed  to  a  special  liability  to  abuse  from  the  practice 
of  rhetorical  argument  conducted  either  on  the  public  platform  or  in  the 
popular  legislature  or  in  the  columns  of  the  public  journal.  The  terms 
republic,  democracy,  aristocracy,  centralization,  liberty,  self -gov  ernmetit,  and 
the  like  are  all  capable  of  a  favorable  or  unfavorable  use,  and  it  can  only 
be  on  a  fair  examination  of  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case  to  which 
they  purport  to  apply  that  the  sense  in  which  they  are  employed  in  any 
special  case  can  be  determined.  It,  unfortunately,  is  often  for  the  ap- 
parent and  momentary  interest  of  the  speaker  or  writer  to  wrest  the 
meanings  of  political  terms  and  to  hide  from  the  hearer  or  reader  one 
of  its  undoubted  significations,  while  forcing  into  undue  prominence 
another.  .  .  . 

IS 


1 6  REL\DINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

In  the  second  place,  political  terms  are  liable  to  distortion  from  a 
cause  which  is  the  opposite  of  the  one  just  described.  For  legal,  diplo- 
matic, and  certain  administrative  purposes,  political  terms  are  often 
employed  with  an  inflexible  rigidity  of  meaning  which  is  at  once  diverse 
from  their  lax  popular  use  and  also  from  the  less  rigid  though  definite 
signification  needed  by  the  requirements  of  a  true  political  science.  .  .  . 
Thus  it  comes  about  that  while  the  terms  of  political  science  are  pecul- 
iarly exposed  to  abuse  and  vacillation  through  conversational  laxity,  they 
are  likewise  exposed  to  the  risk  of  ambiguities  owing  to  the  simultaneous 
functions  they  perform  in  the  technical  language  of  law,  diplomacy,  and 
administration. 

In  the  third  place,  political  terms  suffer  in  a  peculiar  degree  from  a 
cause  which  is  the  enemy  of  all  fixit)^  of  meaning  in  terms,  —  incessant, 
though  imperceptible,  changes  in  the  nature  of  the  things  and  facts 
which  they  are  used  to  denote.  History  is  full  of  illustrations  of  this 
phenomenon,  and  sometimes  the  consequence  is  even  widespread  mis- 
understandings. This  is  especially  the  case  when  the  people  of  one 
country  try  to  acquaint  themselves  with  the  political  condition,  wants, 
and  controversies  of  another  country. 

I.  Nation  :  Nationality 

11,  The  essentials  of  nationality.  According  to  W'illoughby, 
the  influences  that  create  a  spirit  of  national  unity  are  as  follows  :  ^ 

In  Germany  the  word  '''  People  "  has  primarily  and  predominantly  a 
political  signification,  as  denoting  a  body  of  individuals  organized  under 
a  single  government ;  while  the  term  '''  Nation  "  is  reserved  for  a  col- 
lection of  individuals  united  by  ethnic  or  other  bonds,  irrespective  of 
political  combination.  According  to  this  use  "  a  Nation  is  an  aggregate 
of  men  speaking  the  same  language,  having  the  same  customs,  and 
endowed  with  certain  moral  qualities  which  distinguish  them  from  aU 
other  groups  of  like  nature.  .  .  ." 

That  which  welds  a  body  of  individuals  into  a  national  unity  is  no 
rigid  political  control,  but  ethnic  and  other  factors  largely  sentimental  or 
psychological  in  character.  Now  when  we  say  that  it  is  these  influences 
of  race,  religion,  custom,  language,  and  histor}-  that  create  a  Nation,  we 
mean  that  from  these  sources  springs  the  feeling  or  sentiment  that  binds 
together  a  community  of  people,  and  constitutes  from  them  a  Nation. 
Each  of  these  factors  invites  the  formation  of  a  Nation,  but  no  one  of 
them  compels  it.  The  essential  principle  is  the  feeling  that  is  the  result 
^  Copyright,  1896,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


PRELIMINARY  DEFINITIONS  AND  DISTINCTIONS       17 


« 


of  one  or  more  of  these  factors.  Thus,  as  says  Renan  :  "  A  nation  is  a 
spiritual  principle,  resulting  from  the  profound  complications  of  history ; 
a  spiritual  family,  not  a  group  determined  by  the  configuration  of  the 
soil.  ...  A  Nation  is,  then,  a  great  solidarity  constituted  by  the  senti- 
ment of  the  sacrifices  that  have  been  made,  and  by  those  which  the 
people  are  disposed  to  make.  It  supposes  a  past ;  it  is,  however, 
summed  up  in  the  present  by  a  tangible  fact :  the  consent,  the  clearly 
expressed  desire  of  continuing  the  common  life.  ..."  According  to 
Mill,  "  a  portion  of  mankind  may  be  said  to  constitute  a  nationality  if 
they  are  united  among  themselves  by  common  sympathies  which  do  not 
exist  between  them  and  others  —  which  make  them  cooperate  with  each 
other  more  willingly  than  with  other  people,  desire  to  be  under  the  same 
government,  and  desire  that  it  should  be  government  by  themselves,  or 
a  portion  of  themselves,  exclusively."  ^ 

12.  The  idea  of  the  nation.  Numerous  recent  writers  have 
emphasized  the  idea  of  the  nation,  and  the  importance  of  national 
unity  and  the  influence  of  the  national  genius  on  political  ideas 
and  institutions.    Burgess  says  : 

Primarily  and  properly  the  word  nation  is  a  term  of  ethnology,  and 
the  concept  expressed  by  it  is  an  ethnologic  concept.  It  is  derived  from 
the  Latin  nascor,  and  has  reference,  therefore,  primarily  to  the  relations 
of  birth  and  race-kinship.  ...  As  an  abstract  definition,  I  would  offer 
this  :  A  population  of  an  ethnic  unit}',  inhabiting  a  territor)-  of  a  geo- 
graphic unity,  is  a  nation. 

There  is,  however,  an  objection  to  this  definition.  The  nation  as  thus 
defined  is  the  nation  in  perfect  and  completed  existence,  and  this  is 
hardly  yet  anywhere  to  be  found.  Either  the  geographic  unity  is  too 
wide  for  the  ethnic,  or  the  ethnic  is  too  wide  for  the  geographic,  or  the 
distinct  lines  of  the  geographic  unity  partially  fail,  or  some  of  the 
elements  of  the  ethnic  unity  are  wanting. 

Further,  the  definition  requires  explanation.  By  geographic  unity  I 
mean  a  territory  separated  from  other  territor)'  by  high  mountain 
ranges,  or  broad  bodies  of  water,  or  impenetrable  forests  and  jungles,  or 
climatic  extremes,  —  such  barriers  as  place,  or  did  once  place,  great 
difficulties  in  the  way  of  external  intercourse  and  communication.  By 
ethnic  unity  I  mean  a  population  having  a  common  language  and 
literature,  a  common  tradition  and  history,  a  common  custom  and  a 
common  consciousness  of  rights  and  wrongs.  Of  these  latter  the  most 
important  element  is  that  of  a  common  speech.  It  is  the  basis  of  all  the 
1  "  Representative  Government,"  chap.  xvi. 


1 8  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

rest.  Men  must  be  able  to  understand  each  other  before  a  common 
view  and  practice  can  be  attained.  It  will  be  observed  that  I  do  not 
include  common  descent  and  sameness  of  race  as  qualities  necessary  to 
national  existence.  It  is  true  that  they  contribute  powerfully  to  the 
development  of  national  unity ;  but  a  nation  can  be  developed  without 
them,  and  in  spite  of  the  resistance  which  a  variety  in  this  respect  fre- 
quently offers.  Undoubtedly,  in  earliest  times,  sameness  of  race  was 
productive  of  a  common  language  and  a  common  order  of  life ;  but  the 
early  mixing  of  races  by  migration,  conquest  and  intermarriage  elimi- 
nated, in  large  degree,  the  influence  of  this  force.  Territorial  neighbor- 
hood and  intercourse  soon  became  its  substitutes.  In  the  modern  era, 
the  political  union  of  different  races  under  the  leadership  of  a  dominant 
race  results  almost  always  in  national  assimilation.  Thus,  although  the 
nation  is  primarily  a  product  of  nature  and  of  history,  yet  political  union 
may  greatly  advance  its  development,  as  political  separation  may  greatly 
retard  it.  Sameness  of  religion  was  once  a  most  potent  power  in  national 
development,  but  the  modern  principle  of  the  freedom  of  religion  has 
greatly  weakened  its  influence. 

Where  the  geographic  and  ethnic  unities  coincide,  or  very  nearly 
coincide,  the  nation  is  almost  sure  to  organize  itself  politically,  —  to 
become  a  state.  There  can,  however,  be  political  organization  without 
this.  The  nation  must  pass  through  many  preliminary  stages  in  its 
development  before  it  reaches  the  political,  and  meanwhile  other  forces 
will  control  in  larger  degree  the  formation  of  the  state.  Some  forms  of 
political  organization  are  even  based  upon  national  hostility  between 
different  parts  of  the  population  subject  to  them.  .   .   . 

On  the  other  hand,  where  several  nations  are  embraced  within  the 
same  state,  and  the  national  feeling  and  consciousness  rise  to  strength  and 
clearness,  there  is  danger  of  political  dissolution.  The  mere  mixture  of 
a  variety  of  nationality  over  the  same  territory  will  not,  however,  neces- 
sarily have  this  effect.  This  more  frequently  leads  to  a  centralization  of 
government.  .  .  . 

Lastly,  a  nation  may  be  divided  into  two  or  more  states  on  account 
of  territorial  separation,  —  as,  for  example,  the  English  and  the  North 
American,  the  Spanish-Portuguese  and  the  South  American,  —  and  one 
of  the  results  of  this  division  will  be  the  development  of  new  and 
distinct  national  traits. 

From  these  reflections,  I  trust  that  it  will  be  manifest  to  the  mind  of 
every  reader  how  very  important  it  is  to  distinguish  clearly  the  nation, 
both  in  word  and  idea,  from  the  state ;  preserving  to  the  former  its 
ethnic  signification,  and  using  the  latter  exclusively  as  a  term  of  law 
and  politics. 


PRELIMINARY  DEFINITIONS  AND  DISTINCTIONS       19 

II.  State 

13.  Definitions  of  the  state.  The  following  definitions  of  the 
state,  given  by  leading  modern  authorities,  show  essential  identity  : 

Holland:  A  "  State  "  is  a  numerous  assemblage  of  human  beings, 
generally  occupying  a  certain  territory,  amongst  whom  the  will  of  the 
majority,  or  of  an  ascertainable  class  of  persons,  is  by  the  strength  of 
such  a  majority,  or  class,  made  to  prevail  against  any  of  their  number 
who  oppose  it. 

Bhintschli :  The  State  is  a  combination  or  association  of  men,  in  the 
form  of  government  and  governed,  on  a  definite  territory,  united  together 
into  a  moral  organized  masculine  personality ;  or,  more  shortly  —  the 
State  is  the  politically  organized  national  person  of  a  definite  country. 

Burgess :  Our  definition  must,  therefore,  be  that  the  state  is  a  par- 
ticular portion  of  mankind  viewed  as  an  organized  unit. 

Will 0  ugh  by :  As  a  preliminary  definition  of  the  State,  we  may  there- 
fore say  that  wherever  there  can  be  discovered  in  any  community  of 
men  a  supreme  authority  exercising  a  control  over  the  social  actions 
of  individuals  and  groups  of  individuals,  and  itself  subject  to  no  such 
regulation,  there  we  have  a  State. 

IVooIsey :  The  body  or  community  which  thus  by  permanent  law, 
through  its  organs  administers  justice  within  certain  limits  of  territory 
is  called  a  State. 

United  States  Supreme  Cou/i :  A  State  is  a  body  of  free  persons, 
united  together  for  the  common  benefit,  to  enjoy  peaceably  what  is 
their  own,  and  to  do  justice  to  others. 

14.  The  nature  of  the  state.  Sidgwick  anahzes  the  concept  of 
the  state  and  indicates  some  of  its  essential  attributes  as  follows  :  ^ 

I  have  spoken  in  the  summary  survey  above  given,  sometimes  of 
"  political  society  "  or  "  state,"  and  sometimes  of  "  nation."  Before  we 
proceed  further,  it  will  be  well  to  examine  more  carefully  the  meaning 
and  relations  of  these  terms.  As  I  have  already  explained,  I  generally 
use  "  state  "  and  "  political  society  "  as  convertible  terms,  except  that  I 
confine  the  term  "  state  "  to  societies  that  have  made  a  certain  advance 
in  political  civilization.  But  we  should  observe  that  the  word  "  state  "  is 
sometimes  used  in  a  narrower  sense,  to  denote  a  political  society  con- 
sidered as  being  what  jurists  call  an  "  artificial  person,"  and  as  such, 
having  rights  and  duties  distinct  from  the  rights  and  duties  of  the  indi- 
viduals comprising  it.  I  shall  allow  myself,  where  there  is  no  danger  of 
1  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


20  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

ambiguity,  to  use  the  word  in  this  narrower  sense  without  further  ex- 
planation :  and  I  think  we  may  define  the  degree  of  civilization  which 
a  political  society  must  have  reached  in  order  to  be  properly  called  a 
"state,"  partly  by  this  characteristic:  —  that  it  must  have  arrived  at  a 
clear  consciousness  of  this  fundamental  distinction  between  the  rights 
and  obligations  of  the  community  in  its  corporate  capacity,  and  those 
of  the  individuals  comprising  it.  In  the  primitive  "  tribal "  condition  of 
our  Germanic  ancestors  and  other  uncivilized  and  semicivilized  peoples, 
this  distinction  is  still  obscure. 

Further,  it  belongs  to  our  ordinary  conception  of  a  State  that  the 
political  society  so-called  should  be  attached  to  a  particular  part  of  the 
earth's  surface  :  and  should  have  a  generally  admitted  claim  to  determine 
the  leo-al  rights  and  obligations  of  the  persons  inhabiting  this  portion, 
whether  they  are  members  of  the  society  or  not.  This  is  so  much  the 
case  that  we  sometimes  use  the  word  "  state  "  to  designate  the  portion 
of  the  earth's  surface  thus  claimed. 

I  have  so  far  treated  the  "  unity  "  of  a  state  as  depending  solely  on 
the  fact  that  its  members  obey  a  common  government.  And  I  do  not 
think  that  any  other  bond  is  essentially  implied  in  the  conception  of  a 
state.  Still,  it  should  be  recognized  that  a  political  society,  whose  mem- 
bers have  no  consciousness  of  any  ties  uniting  them  independently  of 
their  obedience  to  government,  can  hardly  have  the  cohesive  force  neces- 
sary to  resist  the  disorganizing  shocks  and  jars  which  external  wars  and 
internal  discontents  are  likely  to  cause  from  time  to  time.  If  a  political 
society  is  to  be  in  a  stable  and  satisfactory  condition,  its  members  must 
have  —  what  members  of  the  same  state  sometimes  lack  —  a  conscious- 
ness of  belonging  to  one  another,  of  being  members  of  one  body,  over 
and  above  what  they  derive  from  the  mere  fact  of  being  under  one  gov- 
ernment ;  and  it  is  only  when  I  conceive  them  as  having  this  conscious- 
ness that  I  regard  the  state  as  being  also  a  "  nation."  According  to  the 
generally  accepted  ideal  of  modern  political  thought  a  state  ought  cer- 
tainly to  be  also  a  nation ;  still  we  cannot  say  that  the  characteristic  of 
being  a  nation  is  commonly  implied  in  the  current  use  of  the  term 
"  state  "  or  "  political  society."  What  is  commonly  implied  is  merely  (i) 
that  the  aggregate  of  human  beings  thus  denoted  is  united  —  if  in  no 
other  way  —  by  the  fact  of  acknowledging  permanent  obedience  to  a 
common  government,  and  having,  through  the  permanence  of  the  rela- 
tions between  government  and- governed,  a  corporate  life  distinguishable 
from  the  lives  of  its  members ;  (2)  that  the  government  exercises  con- 
trol over  a  certain  portion  of  the  earth's  surface  ;  and  (3)  that  the  so- 
ciety has  a  not  inconsiderable  number  of  members,  though  the  number 
cannot  be  definitely  stated. 


PRELIMINARY  DEFINITIONS  AND  DISTINCTIONS      21 

15.  Essentials  of  the  state.  The  essential  elements  of  the  state 
are  given  briefly  by  Willoughby  in  the  following  paragraph  :  ^ 

Without,  however,  further  multiplying  these  definitions,  or  more  par- 
ticularly explaining  them,  we  may,  at  this  preliminary  stage,  declare  the 
essential  elements  of  a  State  to  be  three  in  number.    They  are : 

(i)  A  community  of  people  socially  united. 

(2)  A  political  machinery,  termed  a  government,  and  administered  by 
a  corps  of  officials  termed  a  magistracy. 

(3)  A  body  of  rules  or  maxims,  written  or  unwritten,  determining  the 
scope  of  this  public  authority  and  the  manner  of  its  exercise. 

16.  Characteristics  of  the  state.  In  addition  to  the  essential 
elements,  —  population,  territory,  organization,  and  sovereignty, 
—  states  possess  certain  distinguishing  attributes.  Burgess  gives 
"the  peculiar  characteristics  of  the  organization  which  we  term 
the  state  "  as  : 

First,  I  would  say  that  the  state  is  all-comprehensive.  Its  organization 
embraces  all  persons,  natural  or  legal,  and  all  associations  of  persons. 
Political  science  and  public  law  do  not  recognize  in  principle  the  existence 
of  any  stateless  persons  within  the  territory  of  the  state. 

Second,  the  state  is  exclusive.  Political  science  and  public  law  do  not 
recognize  the  existence  of  an  imperium  in  imperio.  The  state  may  con- 
stitute two  or  more  governments  ;  it  may  assign  to  each  a  distinct  sphere 
of  action;  it  may  then  require  of  its  citizens  or  subjects  obedience  to 
each  government  thus  constituted  ;  but  there  cannot  be  two  organizations 
of  the  state  for  the  same  population  and  within  the  same  territory. 

Third,  the  state  is  permanent.  It  does  not  lie  within  the  power  of 
men  to  create  it  to-day  and  destroy  it  to-morrow,  as  caprice  may  move 
them.  Human  nature  has  two  sides  to  it,  —  the  one  universal,  the  other 
particular  ;  the  one  the  state,  the  other  the  individual.  Men  can  no  more 
divest  themselves  of  the  one  side  than  of  the  other ;  i.e.  they  cannot  di- 
vest themselves  of  either.  No  great  publicist  since  the  days  of  Aristotle 
has  dissented  from  this  principle.    Anarchy  is  a  permanent  impossibility. 

Fourth  and  last,  the  state  is  sovereign.  This  is  its  most  essential 
principle.  An  organization  may  be  conceived  which  would  include  every 
member  of  a  given  population,  or  every  inhabitant  of  a  given  territory, 
and  which  might  continue  with  great  permanence,  and  yet  it  might  not 
be  the  state.  If,  however,  it  possesses  the  sovereignty  over  the  popula- 
tion, then  it  is  the  state. 

1  Copyright,  1896,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


2  2  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

17.  The  idea  and  the  concept  of  the  state.  A  distinction  is 
sometimes  drawn  between  the  abstract  idea  and  the  concrete 
concept  of  the  state.^ 

Finally,  as  recognized  by  most  modern  publicists,  and  as  already  in- 
dicated, a  distinction  is  to  be  made  between  the  abstract  idea  of  the 
State  and  its  empiric  conception.  The  one  is  the  result  of  abstract  spec- 
ulation, the  other  of  concrete  thinking.  The  first  is  what  the  Germans 
designate  '' Staatsidee,"  being  the  idea  of  the  State  in  its  most  general 
forrn.  It  is  that  idea  which  embraces  all  that  is  essential  to,  and  which 
is  possessed  by  all  types  of  State  life.  It  is  the  State  reduced  to  its 
lowest  terms.  The  empiric  conception,  on  the  other  hand,  is  particular, 
and  has  reference  to  special  civic  types  as  historically  manifested. 

The  State  is  an  almost  universal  phenomenon.  Everywhere,  and  in 
all  times,  we  find  men,  as  soon  as  their  social  life  begins,  submitting  to 
the  control  of  a  public  authority  exercising  its  powers  through  an  organ- 
ization termed  Government.  In  no  two  instances  do  we  find  the  char- 
acter or  scope  of  this  public  authority  identical  or  exercising  its  functions 
through  precisely  similar  governmental  organizations.  We  recognize,  how- 
ever, that  no  matter  how  organized,  or  in  what  manner  their  powers  be 
exercised,  there  is  in  all  States  a  substantial  identity  of  purpose  ;  and  that 
underneath  all  these  concrete  appearances  there  is  to  be  found  a  sub- 
stantial likeness  in  nature.  If  now  we  disregard  all  nonessential  elements, 
and  overlook  inconsequential  modifications,  we  shall  be  able  to  obtain 
those  elements  that  appear  in  all  types  of  State  life,  whether  organized 
in  the  monarchical  or  republican,  the  despotic  or  limited,  the  federal  or 
unitary  form.  We  shall  thus  discover  those  characteristics  that  are  of 
the  very  essence  of  the  State's  life,  and  which  unfailingly  distinguish  it 
from  other  public  bodies. 

All  concrete  instances  of  State  that  are  historically  afforded  us  are  to 
be  considered  as  embodying  the  Staatsidee  as  their  principal  essence. 
Variations  in  governmental  organizations  and  administration  are  to  be 
considered  as  merely  differences  in  form  that  have  arisen  in  response  to 
demands  of  time,  place,  and  peculiarities  of  political  temperament  of  the 
people,  but  without  disturbing  the  State's  fundamental  nature. 

With  this  abstract,  general  conception  of  the  State  in  our  minds,  we 
will  be  furnished  with  the  criterion  for  distinguishing  between  mere 
variations  and  anomalous  formations  of  civic  life,  and  those  public 
bodies  that  resemble,  but  do  not  possess  this  essential  element,  and  are 
therefore  not  to  be  dignified  with  the  title  State. 

^  Copyright,  1896,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


PRELIMINARY  DEFINITIONS  AND  DISTINCTIONS      23 

III.  Sovereignty 

18.  Definition  of  sovereignty.  Sovereignty,  the  essence  of  the 
state,  is  thus  defined  by  Burgess  : 

What  now  do  we  mean  by  this  all-important  term  and  principle,  the 
sovereignty  ?  I  understand  by  it  original,  absolute,  unlimited,  universal 
power  over  the  individual  subject  and  over  all  associations  of  subjects. 
This  is  a  proposition  from  which  most  of  the  publicists,  down  to  the 
most  modern  period,  have  labored  hard  to  escape.  It  has  appeared  to 
them  to  contain  the  destruction  of  individual  liberty  and  individual 
rights.  The  principle  cannot,  however,  be  logically  or  practically  avoided, 
and  it  is  not  only  not  inimical  to  individual  liberty  and  individual  rights, 
but  it  is  their  only  solid  foundation  and  guaranty.  A  little  earnest  reflec- 
tion will  manifest  the  truth  of  this  double  statement.  Power  cannot  be 
sovereign  if  it  be  limited  ;  that  which  imposes  the  limitation  is  sovereign  ; 
and  not  until  we  reach  the  power  which  is  unlimited,  or  only  self-limited, 
have  we  attained  the  sovereignty. 

19.  The  nature  of  sovereignty.  Holland  distinguishes  the  in- 
ternal and  external  aspects  of  sovereignty  as  follows  : 

Every  state  is  divisible  into  two  parts,  one  of  which  is  sovereign,  the 
other  subject.  .  .  .  The  sovereignty  of  the  ruling  part  has  two  aspects. 
It  is  "  external,"  as  independent  of  all  control  from  without ;  "  internal," 
as  paramount  over  all  action  within.  Austin  expresses  this  its  double 
character  by  saying  that  a  sovereign  power  is  not  in  a  habit  of  obedience 
to  any  determinate  human  superior,  while  it  is  itself  the  determinate  and 
common  superior  to  which  the  bulk  of  a  subject  society  is  in  the  habit 
of  obedience. 

IV.  Government 

20.  Distinction  between  state  and  government.  This  distinc- 
tion, of  fundamental  importance  to  political  science,  is  neverthe- 
less of  recent  origin.  Several  American  writers  have  done  good 
service  in  insisting  upon  clear  thinking  on  this  point. ^ 

The  first  fundamental  distinction  that  must  be  made  is  that  between 
"  State  "  and  "  Government."  By  the  term  "  Government "  is  desig- 
nated the  organization  of  the  State,  —  the  machinery  through  which  its 
purposes  are  formulated  and  executed.    Thus,  as  we  shall  see,  while  the 

1  Copyright,  1896,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


24  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

term  "  State "  is,  when  strictly  considered,  an  abstract  term,  Govern- 
ment is  emphatically  concrete.  More  than  that.  Government  is  purely 
mechanical  and  governed  by  no  general  laws.  Its  varying  forms  are  in 
all  cases  determined  by  political  expediency,  and  the  examination  of  its 
essential  character  involves  no  such  philosophical  considerations  as  will 
interest  us  in  our  present  inquiry.  The  subject  of  Government  thus  lies 
almost  wholly  without  the  field  of  Political  Theory,  and  is  comprehended 
within  the  domains  of  descriptive  and  historical  politics. 

Simple  and  definite  as  is  this  distinction  between  the  State  and  its 
governmental  machinery  (corresponding  as  it  does  very  much  to  the 
distinction  between  a  given  person  and  the  material  bodily  frame  in 
which  such  person  is  organized),  we  shall  find  it  to  be  one  that  has  been 
but  seldom  made.  In  fact,  it  has  been  the  confusion  between  these  two 
terms  that  has  led  directly  or  indirectly  to  a  great  majority  of  the  erro- 
neous results  reached  by  political  philosophers  in  the  past. 

21.  Definition  of  government.  Dealey,  in  a  recent  book,  gives 
the  following  suggestive  definition  of  government : 

As  the  state  is  the  nation  organized  for  the  protection  of  life  and 
property,  there  will  evidently  be  in  every  state  a  definite  political  organ- 
ization authorized  to  exercise  the  sovereign  powers  of  the  state.  This 
organization  is  called  the  government,  and  may  be  defined  as  that  organ- 
ization in  which  is  vested  by  constitution  the  right  to  exercise  sovereign 
powers. 


CHAPTr:R  III 

PHYSICAL  BASIS  OF  THE  STATE 

22.  Physical  causes  that  act  in  history.  The  following  sug- 
gestive chapter  outlines  the  general  nature  of  the  relation  between 
the  natural  environment  and  political  development :  ^ 

The  reciprocal  influence  of  Man  and  Nature  is  one  of  the  hard  sub- 
jects with  which  modern  scientists  and  philosophers  are  called  upon  to 
deal.  The  action  of  Nature  and  the  reaction  of  man,  or,  as  some  might 
prefer  to  state  it,  the  action  of  man  and  the  reaction  of  Nature,  are  the 
questions  that  it  presents  for  answer.  While  it  is  not  necessary  that  the 
teacher  of  history  should  deal  with  these  questions  on  their  speculative 
side,  it  is  necessary  for  him  to  recognize  the  principal  physical  factors. 

Naturally,  the  first  of  these  factors  to  attract  attention  was  climate,  the 
influence  of  which  on  the  character  and  history  of  nations  was  recognized 
by  the  Greek  thinkers.  This  recognition  is  well  illustrated  by  the  pas- 
sage, hereafter  quoted,  in  which  Aristotle  points  out  the  contrast  be- 
tween Asia  and  Europe.  However,  the  Greek  writers  never  worked  out 
the  subject. 

Bodin,  who  died  in  1596,  was  apparently  the  first  modern  writer  to 
investigate  the  historical  influence  of  physical  causes,  as  well  as  the  first 
to  vindicate  the  claim  of  all  religious  confessions  in  a  state  to  equal 
political  toleration.  Dividing  nations  into  northern,  middle,  and  south- 
ern, he  investigated  with  much  fullness  of  knowledge  how  climate  and 
other  geographical  conditions  affect  the  bodily  strength,  the  courage,  the 
intelligence,  the  humanity,  the  chastity,  and,  in  short,  the  mind,  morals, 
and  manners  of  peoples ;  what  influence  mountains,  winds,  diversities  of 
soil,  etc.,  exert;  and  elicited  a  great  number  of  general  views,  some  of 
which  are  false,  but  some  also  true. 

In  the  Spirit  of  Laws,  published  in  1748,  Montesquieu  sought  to 
explain  how  laws  are  related  to  manners,  climates,  creeds,  and  forms  of 
government.  He  laid  great  stress  on  the  physical  factors  in  civilization, 
and  is  sometimes  said  to  have  originated  the  doctrine  of  climates.  Five 
of  his  books  bear  titles  that  indicate,  in  a  general  way,  the  range  of  his 
inquiries  :  Of  Laws  as  relative  to  the  Nature  of  Climate ;  In  what  manner 
1  Copyright,  1893,  by  D.  Appleton  and  Company. 
25 


26  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

the  Laws  of  Civil  Slavery  are  relative  to  the  Nature  of  the  Climate ; 
How  the  Laws  of  Domestic  Slavery  have  a  Relation  to  the  Nature  of 
the  Climate ;  How  the  Laws  of  Political  Servitude  have  a  Relation  to 
the  Nature  of  the  Climate  ;  of  Laws  in  the  Relation  that  they  bear  to  the 
Nature  of  the  Soil.  Although  he  trenches  upon  the  practical  denial  of 
the  freedom  of  man,  he  stills  checks  himself,  arguing  that  laws  also  bear 
a  relation  to  the  principles  which  form  the  general  spirit  of  the  morals 
and  customs  of  a  nation  — that  is,  the  principles  of  human  nature.  .  .  . 
Mr.  Buckle  pushed  the  naturalistic  theory  to  its  farthest  limit.  He 
denied  all  freedom  to  man,  and  made  climate,  food,  soil,  and  the  general 
aspects  of  Nature  the  supreme  and  ultimate  historical  causes.  For 
example,  he  attributed  the  superstition  of  Italy,  Spain,  and  Portugal  to 
earthquakes  and  volcanic  eruptions,  and  the  Calvinistic  theology  of 
Scotland  to  the  rocks  and  mountains  of  the  country  and  the  surrounding 

ocean  waste. 

Dr.  J.  W.  Draper  wrote  his  History  of  the  Intellectual  Development 
of  Europe,  Civil  Polity  in  America,  and  History  of  the  Civil  War,  on  the 
naturalistic  theory. 

M.  Taine  laid  great  stress  upon  soil,  sky,  sea,  climate,  and  food  as 
factors  in  the  intellectual  and  literary  history  of  England  ;  in  fact,  he 
wrote  his  History  of  English  Literature  on  what  he  called  scientific 
lines.  This  distinguished  writer  was  accustomed  to  refer  historical 
results  to  race,  environment,  and  the  time. 

The  distinguished  scholar  and  diplomatist,  Mr.  George  P.  Marsh, 
handled  the  subject  in  his  Man  and  Nature,  now  better  known  under 
the  title,  The  Earth,  as  modified  by  Human  Action.  He  undertook  to 
"  indicate  the  character  and  extent  of  the  changes  produced  by  human 
actions  in  the  physical  conditions  of  the  globe,  to  point  out  the  dangers 
of  undue  interference  with  the  spontaneous  arrangements  of  the  organic 
or  inorganic  world,  to  suggest  the  possibility  and  importance  of  the 
restoration  of  harmonies  that  have  been  disturbed,  and  incidentally  to 
illustrate  the  doctrine  that  man  is,  in  both  kind  and  degree,  a  power  of  a 
higher  order  than  any  of  the  other  forms  of  animated  life,  which,  like 
him, 'are  nourished  at  the  table  of  bounteous  Nature."  Without  dis- 
cussing his  subject  in  its  speculative  bearings,  Mr.  Marsh  accumulates 
a  mass  of  most  interesting  facts  showing  that  man  can  waste  and  repair 
Nature,  and  that  he  is  rather  her  master  than  her  slave.   .   .   . 

The  general  subject  has  not  been  introduced  for  discussion  on  its 
speculative  side,  but  merely  to  pave  the  way  for  some  examples  of 
physical  causation.  First,  however,  it  should  be  observed  that  Nature: 
exerts  upon  man  two  kinds  of  influence.  How  far  climate,  food,  soil,  and 
the  general  aspects  of  Nature  affect  his  mind  and  character  directly,  we 


PHYSICAL  BASIS  OF  THE  STATE  27 

have  no  means  of  determining ;  but  it  is  obvious  that  the  direct  effect  of 
such  agents  is  much  less  than  the  indirect  effect.  Through  the  social 
wants  and  activities  that  they  create  and  modify,  thrcnigh  man's  occu- 
pations and  pleasures,  through  his  general  habits,  they  exert  upon  him 
a  profound  influence  from  his  cradle  to  his  grave.  The  sum  total  of  such 
influence  is  known  as  environment. 

Professor  Bryce,  discussing  with  much  learning  and  acuteness  the 
relations  of  history  and  geography,  divided  the  general  subject  of  envi- 
ronment into  three  groups  of  factors,  all  closely  related  : 

I.  The  influences  that  are  due  to  the  configuration  of  the  earth's 
surface  —  that  is  to  say,  to  the  distribution  of  land  and  sea,  the  arrange- 
ment of  mountain  chains,  table-lands,  and  valleys,  the  existence  of  rivers, 
and  the  basins  which  they  drain.  Nothing  can  be  more  evident  than  that 
these  facts  almost  wholly  controlled  the  early  movement  of  races,  such 
as  migration,  and  that  they  powerfully  affect  military  operations,  the 
character  and  extent  of  conquests,  the  size  and  the  boundaries  of  states, 
the  location  and  character  of  cities,  the  direction,  kind,  and  abundance 
of  facilities  for  travel  and  transportation,  the  presence  or  absence  of 
harbors,  and  maritime  commerce,  growth  of  military  and  naval  power, 
the  development  of  special  industries,  and  many  other  things  of  the 
greatest  interest. 

Dr.  Draper  remarks  that  Europe  is  geographically  a  peninsula,  and 
historically  a  dependency  of  Asia.  The  plains  of  Central  and  Northern 
Asia  are  prolonged  through  Central  Europe  to  the  German  Ocean  and 
the  Baltic;  the  average  height  of  the  larger  continent  is  1,132  feet  above 
the  level  of  the  sea,  of  the  smaller  one  671  feet ;  from  the  Pacific  to  the 
Atlantic  Ocean,  north  of  the  great  central  east-and-west  mountain  axis, 
a  distance  of  more  than  6,000  miles,  an  army  could  march  without 
having  to  encounter  any  elevation  of  more  than  a  few  hundred  feet ; 
with  an  abundance  of  springs  and  headwaters,  but  without  any  stream 
capable  of  offering  a  serious  obstacle,  this  tract  has  a  temperature  well 
suited  to  military  operations;  it  coincides  practically  with  the  annual 
isothermal  line  of  fifty  degrees,  keeping  just  north  of  the  limit  of  vine 
production  —  in  which  physical  facts  Dr.  Draper  finds  the  reasons  why 
the  Oriental  hordes  have  again  and  again  poured  themselves  over  Europe. 

The  Spanish  Peninsula  has  a  marked  geographical  character,  as  any 
one  who  will  look  at  its  mountain  and  river  systems,  its  plains  and  for- 
ests on  a  map,  can  see ;  and  this  character  has  given  a  marked  individ- 
uality to  Spanish  warfare  from  the  earliest  times,  as  well  as  influenced 
its  history  in  many  other  important  ways.  Spain  is  a  hard  country  to 
subdue,  an  easy  one  to  defend  —  as  witness  its  history  in  the  days  of 
Hannibal,  of  Sertorius,  and  of  Napoleon  and  Wellington.   .  .   . 


28  READINGS  IxN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

The  position  and  configuration  of  England,  her  insular  character  and 
relations  to  the  continent,  the  distribution  of  her  river  valleys  and  up- 
lands, and  the  relations  of  these  features  to  one  another  and  to  the 
seashore,  have  had  a  prodigious  influence  upon  English  history  and 

character.  .  .  . 

II.  The  influences  which  belong  to  meteorology  and  climate,  meaning 
thereby  the  conditions  of  heat  and  cold  under  which  a  race  of  men 
develops  itself  with  the  amount  of  rain  and  the  recurrence  of  drought. 
The  winds  also  play  their  part.  These  agents  directly  affect  man's 
health,  strength,  and  mental  character ;  while  indirectly,  through  soil  and 
fertility,  with  which  they  are  so  closely  connected,  they  almost  wholly 
control  his  occupations.  It  is  no  accident  that  great  peoples  and  states 
have  never  appeared  beyond  the  polar  circles  or  within  the  tropics,  or 
that  the  main  historical  movement  has  been  confined  to  the  north  tem- 
perate zone.  The  Greek  genius  was  largely  indebted  to  the  physical 
influences  under  which  it  was  developed.  "  Mild  and  clement  is  our 
atmosphere,"  says  Euripides;  "the  cold  of  winter  is  for  us  without 
rigor,  and  the  arrows  of  Phoebus  do  not  wound  us."  .  .  .  Thucydides 
observed  that  thought  was  the  only  peculiarity  of  the  Athenians. 

III.  The  third  class  of  elements  that  make  up  environment  are  the 
productions  which  a  country  offers  to  human  industry.  Here  we  in- 
ventory mines,  quarries,  the  products  of  wells  and  springs,  field  and 
forest,  fisheries  of  all  kinds,  and  animals  both  wild  and  domesticated. 
Professor  Bryce  illustrates  how  a  narrow  range  of  productions  fatally 
restricts  progress  in  the  arts  and  refinements  of  life,  by  instancing  Ice- 
land. The  race  is  of  admirable  quality,  but  the  country  produces  nothing 
save  a  few  sheep  and  horses,  and  some  sulphur ;  it  has  not  even  fuel, 
except  such  driftwood  as  is  cast  upon  its  shores.  He  adds  that  if  the 
highest  European  races  were  placed  in  Central  or  Northern  Asia  they 
would  find  it  almost  impossible  to  develop  a  high  type  of  civilization  for 
want  as  well  of  fuel  as  of  the  sources  of  commercial  wealth.  Before 
entering  upon  that  industrial  stage  in  which  she  has  distanced  all  other 
countries,  England  had  reached  a  high  stage  of  agricultural  develop- 
ment ;  she  has  now  acquired  such  a  momentum  that  she  could  possibly 
survive  as  an  industrial  nation  the  exhaustion  of  her  mineral  wealth ; 
but  she  could  never  have  emerged  from  the  agricultural  state  and 
attained  her  present  industrial,  commercial,  and  financial  standing  with- 
out her  abundant  supplies  of  tin,  copper,  iron,  and  coal.  In  the  earlier 
period  the  center  of  her  population,  power,  and  wealth  lay  in  the  south, 
where  the  richest  agricultural  districts  are  found;  but  in  the  present 
period  this  center  has  moved  northward,  where  exist  the  sinews  of 
manufacturing  and  commerce.    Geological  maps  and  maps  showing  the 


PHYSICAL  BASIS  OF  THE  STATE  29 

distribution  of  population,  of  wealth,  and  even  of  political  parties,  are 
very  significant  when  studied  in  relation.  Eastern  Yorkshire  and 
western  Lancashire  are  strongly  conservative  in  politics ;  western  York- 
shire and  eastern  Lancashire  tend  to  radicalism ;  the  eastern  part  of  the 
one  county  and  the  western  part  of  the  other  are  mainly  agricultural 
districts,  where  the  influence  of  the  upper  classes  and  of  the  farmers  is 
decisive,  while  within  these  limits  lies  a  great  manufacturing,  mining, 
and  trading  population,  with  wit,  education,  and  radical  opinions. 
"  Those  who  examine  Lancashire  schools  are  struck,"  says  Professor 
Bryce,  "  by  the  difference  between  the  sharpness  of  the  boys  in  the  east 
Lancashire  hill  country  and  the  sluggishness  of  those  who  dwell  on  the 
flats  along  the  coast  between  Liverpool  and  Morecambe."  The  mines  of 
Lancashire  called  manufactures  into  being  and  created  trade ;  and  these 
factors,  with  all  that  they  imply,  have  changed  the  region  from  a  fast- 
ness of  Toryism  into  a  hive  of  Radicalism.  .  .  . 

Mr.  Buckle  points  out  that  the  growth  of  civilization  is  possible  only 
in  countries  having  a  class  of  men  who  possess  the  time,  the  disposition, 
and  the  means  to  observe  and  to  investigate  the  various  subjects  upon 
which  such  growth  depends,  as  the  facts  of  Nature  and  the  laws  of  the 
human  mind.  But  a  class  of  men  in  the  possession  of  leisure,  disposi- 
tion to  study,  and  opportunity  to  study,  can  exist  only  in  countries 
where  there  is  a  sufficient  accumulation  of  wealth  to  free  them  from 
the  necessity  of  constant  physical  toil.  Obviously,  if  every  man  is  in- 
tensely absorbed  in  the  struggle  for  physical  existence,  society  cannot 
move  forward.  The  accumulation  of  wealth  depends  upon  natural 
factors ;  soil  and  climate  condition  the  rewards  of  labor,  climate  con- 
ditions the  energy  and  constancy  of  labor.  Hence  those  countries  were 
sure  to  become  the  earliest  seats  of  civilization  where  Nature  provided 
good  opportunities  for  the  accum-ulation  of  wealth,  and  so  the  material 
possibility  of  study  and  mental  progress.  Finally,  he  remarks  that  such 
conditions  existed  in  Hindustan  and  in  Egypt,  in  Central  America,  in 
Mexico,  and  in  Peru,  countries  that  became  early  if  not  the  earliest 
seats  of  civilization  on  their  respective  continents.  Herodotus  called 
Egypt  the  gift  of  the  Nile.  The  Nile  Valley  is  a  thick  deposit  of  the 
richest  soil,  which  the  annual  overflow  of  the  river  constantly  replenishes  ; 
the  rainless  sky  and  the  equable  temperature  make  continuous  labor 
possible,  while  the  river  furnishes  the  source  of  natural  or  artificial  irri- 
gation. The  early  husbandman  was  assured  good  harvests  and  abundant 
food,  and  thus  the  first  condition  of  progress  was  secured. 

Greece  affords  one  of  the  best  illustrations  of  the  effect  of  environ- 
ment upon  historical  development.  The  psychological  effects  of  the 
sky  and  atmosphere  have  already  been  mentioned.  The  geniality  of  the 


30  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

climate  tends  to  moderation  in  eating  and  to  the  use  of  light  clothing, 
necessities  that  the  country  well  supplied;  as  a  result,  man  was  not 
compelled  to  undergo  grinding  toil  to  procure  the  means  of  material 
subsistence,  and  so  was  left  with  time  to  indulge  the  disposition  to 
investigate,  which  all  the  influences  that  played  upon  him  tended  to 
create.  The  country  is  a  peninsula,  or  rather  a  complex  of  peninsulas, 
the  whole  singularly  pierced  by  gulfs  and  bays,  as  well  as  crossed  and 
recrossed  by  mountain  ranges,  and  so  divided  into  a  great  number  of 
small  plains  and  valleys,  each  more  or  less  cut  off  from  the  others,  at 
the  same  time  that  it  lies  open  to  the  sea.  At  no  point  is  the  traveler  far 
from  the  seashore,  and  at  few  points  is  he  out  of  sight  of  the  great 
mountain  mass  of  Parnassus,  which  occupies  such  an  important  place  in 
Greek  history.  It  is  said  to  be  very  difficult  for  one  who  has  never 
visited  Greece  to  realize  the  diminutive  scope  of  its  geography.  Attica 
and  ^gina  together  contain  no  more  than  seven  hundred  and  fift}r 
square  miles  of  territory,  and  in  antiquity  they  never  had  a  population 
exceeding  half  a  million  people.  In  addition  to  this  remarkable  acces- 
sibility from  the  sea,  attention  must  be  drawn  to  the  larger  geographical 
relations  of  Greece  —  to  the  islands,  large  and  small,  that  surround  it  on 
all  sides  except  the  north ;  to  the  not  distant  shores  of  Thrace,  of  Asia 
Minor,  of  Africa,  and  of  Italy ;  to  the  Black  Sea,  to  the  Nile,  and  to  the 
Mediterranean.  In  these  factors  scholars  have  found  causes  of  the 
most  prominent  features  of  the  Greek  mind  and  life ;  the  wonderful 
mental  gifts  of  the  people,  their  seafaring,  trading,  and  colonizing  habits, 
their  free,  adventurous  spirit,  and  especially  their  political  institutions, 
and  the  whole  form  and  spirit  of  their  public  life.  In  her  early  history 
Greece  contained  about  as  many  independent  states  as  she  had  definite 
units  of  territory,  plain  or  valley ;  a  state  of  things  that  resulted  in  a  free 
and  vigorous  political  life,  marked  by  intense  patriotism  and  local  spirit, 
but  tending  to  division  and  strife,  to  the  lack  of  general  political  ideas, 
to  internal  war,  to  what  the  Germans  call  particularism,  and  Americans 
States-rights,  and  so  to  eventual  weakness.  The  final  result  was,  since 
these  divisive  and  separatist  tendencies  could  never  be  overcome,  that 
Greece  became  a  prey  to  internal  faction  and  external  force.  Environ- 
ment, first  by  contributing  to  the  creation  of  the  people,  and  then  to  the 
direction  and  control  of  their  activity,  certainly  had  much  to  do  with 
causing  the  brilliant  development  and  early  decadence  of  the  Grecian 
race.  It  was  no  miracle  and  no  accident  that  the  first  European  civi- 
lization, and  in  some  respects  the  greatest  European  civilization,  sprang 
up  in  Greece. 

As   a    rule,    the   location   of    cities   has    been    controlled    by    what 
Mr.  Mackinder  happily  calls  "geographical  selection."    Two  excellent 


PHYSICAL  BASIS  OF  THE  STATE  31 

examples  of  such  selection  may  be  borrowed  from  that  writer.  On 
the  northeast  of  the  Ganges  Valley  lie  the  vast  Himalayas,  practically 
impassable  to  man ;  on  the  northwest  is  the  Sulaiman  range,  pierced  by 
passes  through  which  numerous  conquerors  have  entered  India  from 
the  uplands  of  Iran.  Parallel  with  the  Sulaiman  is  the  Thar,  or  great 
Indian  Desert.  Between  the  desert  and  the  Himalayas  the  fertile  belt  is 
closely  contracted,  forming  a  pass  that  affords  the  only  approach  to  the 
valley  at  that  extremity.  Close  to  the  eastern  end  of  this  pass,  at  the 
head  of  the  Ganges  navigation,  stands  Delhi,  the  natural  center  of 
commerce  and  the  natural  base  of  military  operations  in  all  that  region. 
At  its  eastern  extremity  the  valley  is  very  inaccessible,  owing  to  the 
absence  of  natural  harbors  and  to  the  heavy  surfs  that  beat  upon 
the  shore.  But  the  mouth  of  the  river  is  a  great  water  gate  for  the 
interior,  and  here  on  the  Hooghly,  at  the  intersection  of  ocean  and  river 
transportation,  a  natural  base  of  naval  and  military  operations,  the 
British  have  built  up  Calcutta.  The  fertility  of  the  Ganges  Valley  is 
proverbial ;  at  its  extremities  are  found  the  two  gates  of  India,  and  it  is 
quite  in  the  nature  of  things  that  these  gates  are  held  by  the  cities  of 
Delhi  and  Calcutta. 

Alexander  located  the  city  that  bears  his  name  at  the  intersection  of 
the  Mediterranean  and  Nile  commerce,  having  particularly  in  view  the 
control  of  the  most  southern  of  the  old  lines  of  communication  between 
the  Indies  and  the  West.  For  many  centuries  Alexandria  was  the  grand 
depot  from  which  the  Indian  goods  were  distributed  throughout  the 
Mediterranean  basin.  Constantinople  is  the  gate  both  to  the  Black  Sea 
and  the  ^.gean,  both  to  southeastern  Europe  and  northwestern  Asia, 
according  as  you  approach  it  from  the  one  direction  or  the  other.  This 
city  also  sits  upon  one  of  the  old  channels  of  Eastern  commerce. 

Study  of  the  cities  of  Italy  is  peculiarly  interesting.  Rome  was 
probably  founded  by  shepherds,  who,  moved  by  volcanic  disturbances  or 
by  an  insufficiency  of  pasture  lands,  or  by  both,  descended  with  their 
flocks  and  herds  from  their  ancestral  seats  on  the  Alban  hills  into  the 
extensive  and  fertile  plain  watered  by  the  Tiber  and  encircled  by  moun- 
tains and  the  sea  that  has  long  been  known  as  the  Campagna.  Coming 
to  the  conspicuous  group  of  hills  and  ridges  near  the  river,  they  seized 
and  fortified  the  Palatine,  which  best  met  their  need  of  a  dwelling  place 
and  a  protection.  Livy  describes  Rome  as  situated  on  healthy  hills,  by 
a  convenient  river,  equally  adapted  to  inland  and  maritime  commerce, 
the  sea  not  too  far  off  to  prevent  a  brisk  international  trade,  or  so  near 
as  to  expose  it  to  the  danger  of  a  sudden  attack  from  foreign  vessels; 
a  site  right  in  the  center  of  the  peninsula  —  a  site  made,  as  it  were,  on 
purpose  to  allow  the  city  to  become  the  greatest  in  the  world.    No  whit 


32  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

inferior  were  the  military  and  political  advantages  of  the  site.  .  .  .  The 
great  change  in  their  circumstances  wrought  a  gradual  change  in  the 
character  of  the  primitive  shepherds  and  their  descendants.  They  took 
on  one  that  better  suited  their  new  position.  Planted  as  they  were  in  a 
meeting  place  of  nations,  brought  into  close  and  constant  competition 
with  the  strongest  peoples  of  Italy,  the  Romans  developed  those  prac- 
tical, industrial,  and  business  habits,  and  those  military  and  political 
virtues  that  finally  gave  them  universal  empire.  Rome  made  the 
Romans  quite  as  much  as  the  Romans  made  Rome.  Hidden  away  in 
some  out-of-the-way  place,  there  is  not  the  slightest  reason  to  think  that 
they  would  ever  have  made  a  name  in  history.  All  roads  led  to  Rome 
before  the  first  one  had  been  built. 

It  is  interesting  to  observe  the  relations  of  the  principal  cities  of 
Northern  Italy  to  the  great  valley  of  the  Po  on  the  one  side  and  to  the 
mountain  passes  that  connect  the  Peninsula  with  Central  and  Western 
Europe  on  the  other.  Turin  commands  the  approach  to  the  Mont  Cenis 
Pass  from  the  south.  Milan,  which  has  as  changeful  a  history  per- 
haps as  any  city  in  Europe,  stands  almost  in  the  mouths  of  the  Simplon 
and  St.  Gothard  passes.  Verona  is  at  the  opening  of  the  Brenner.  It 
is  difficult  to  imagine  a  state  of  things  in  Northern  Italy  other  than 
complete  barbarism  in  which  Milan  would  not  be  an  important  city.  At 
first  one  might  not  detect  the  hand  of  geographical  selection  in  the  case 
of  Venice.  Still,  under  the  extraordinary  circumstances  of  the  times  in 
which  it  was  founded  its  site  was  happily  chosen.  In  his  course  of 
destruction,  Attila  obliterated  many  towns,  including  the  colony  of 
Aquilia,  which  stood  at  the  head  of  the  Adriatic,  in  some  such  relation 
as  Trieste  stands  to-day.  The  homeless  inhabitants  of  Aquilia  sought 
refuge  among  the  islands  formed  by  the  detritus  brought  down  to  the 
gulf  by  the  network  of  rivers  that  rise  in  the  Alps  and  that  discharge 
themselves  on  that  shore.  This  immigration  was  the  beginning  of 
Venice.  Shut  in  by  the  sea,  cut  off  from  the  land,  protected  by  her 
inaccessibility,  favored  in  later  times  by  the  Eastern  Empire,  and  planted 
on  what  was  long  the  best  route  for  the  conveyance  of  the  rich  products 
of  Indian  commerce  to  Central  and  Western  Europe,  Venice  slowly 
raised  her  obscure  head  above  the  mud  of  the  lagoons,  developed  a  pop- 
ulation rich  in  practical  talents  and  in  genius,  and  won  and  long  held  a 
foremost  place  among  the  powers  of  the  world.  .   .   . 

Geographical  selection  is  easily  recognizable  in  the  location  of  the 
large  cities  of  our  own  country.  New  York  has  clearly  demonstrated  its 
superiority  to  all  other  points  on  the  Atlantic  coast  as  a  great  mart  of 
trade.  At  the  time  of  the  Revolution  both  Boston  and  Philadelphia 
had  about  the  same  population,  but  once  connected  with  the  \\'est  by  a 


PHYSICAL  BASIS  OF  THE  STATE  33 

great  line  of  internal  communication,  the  Erie  Canal,  its  extraordinary 
growth  began.  It  should  have  been  perfectly  apparent  from  the  first 
opening  up  of  the  Great  West  to  the  light  of  civilization,  that  whenever 
that  vast  region  should  become  the  seat  of  empire,  there  would  be  a 
great  center  of  population,  trade,  and  wealth  at  the  head  of  Lake 
Michigan,  at  or  near  where  Chicago  stands.  San  Francisco  is  only  the 
redemption  of  Nature's  pledge  that  a  great  city  would  spring  up  at 
the  Golden  Gate  whenever  the  Pacific  Slope  should  really  come  into 
the  possession  of  civilized  men. 

In  such  a  sketch  as  the  present  one  the  sea  calls  for  little  more  than 
casual  mention.  That  it  modifies  climate,  changing  temperature  and 
distributing  moisture,  and  so  bringing  fertility  of  soil ;  that  it  affects  the 
character  and  habits  and  the  pursuits  of  men  and  nations  ;  that  it  yields 
rich  harvests  of  wealth  to  the  industry  of  man  —  furs,  fish,  pearls, 
sponges,  corals,  ivory,  amber,  salt,  oil,  and  chemicals ;  that  it  furnishes 
the  great  highways  of  commerce  and  of  war,  and  opens  to  the  statesman 
and  jurist  a  whole  volume  of  questions  that  profoundly  affect  human 
progress  —  these  are  commonplaces.  The  influence  of  sea  currents,  of 
the  trade  winds  and  the  monsoons  upon  human  society,  is  suggested,  if 
not  worked  out,  in  every  book  of  physical  geography.  On  the  maritime 
and  naval  side  history  does  full  justice  to  the  theme.  .  .  . 

What  has  been  said  in  this  chapter  is  but  a  meager  treatment  of  a  ■ 
great  subject.  It  will,  however,  serve  to  explain  the  stress  that  his- 
torians place  on  environment,  and  also  emphasize  the  observations  of  a 
distinguished  living  scholar :  "  A  national  history,  as  it  seems  to  us, 
ought  to  commence  with  a  survey  of  the  country  or  locality  —  its 
geographical  position,  climate,  productions,  and  other  physical  circum- 
stances as  they  bear  on  the  character  of  the  people.  We  ought  to  be 
presented,  in  short,  with  a  complete  description  of  the  scene  of  the 
historic  drama,  as  well  as  with  an  account  of  the  race  to  which  the 
actors  belong.  In  the  early  stages  of  its  development,  at  all  events,  man 
is  mainly  the  creature  of  physical  circumstances  ;  and  by  a  systematic 
examination  of  physical  circumstances  we  may  to  some  extent  cast  the 
horoscope  of  the  infant  nation  as  it  lies  in  the  arms  of  Nature." 

23.  The  natural  environment.  The  influence  of  physical  con- 
ditions, with  special  emphasis  on  their  relation  to  economic  life, 
is  forcibly  stated  in  the  following  paragraphs  : 

Man,  like  all  animals,  is  indissolubly  bound  to  the  soil.  He  is  in  last 
resort  dependent  upon  nature  for  what  he  is  and  what  he  has  accom- 
plished.   This  is  especially  true  of  his  economic  life,  which,  as  we  have 


-^^  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

seen,  consists  ultimately  of  his  relations  to  material  things.  The  basis 
of  economic  activity  is  the  material  environment.  .  .  .  The  economic 
aspects  of  the  natural  environment  may  be  subsumed  under  the  four 
heads  of  the  climate,  the  geological  structure,  the  flora  and  fauna,  and 
the  geographical  location. 

Only  a  portion  of  the  globe  is  habitable.  The  uninhabitable  parts, 
moreover,  change  with  the  geologic  ages.  Large  sections  of  Northern 
Europe  and  America  which  are  now  the  homes  of  a  vast  population 
were  seons  ago  in  the  perpetual  embrace  of  the  ice  king.  On  the  other 
hand,  explorations  in  the  sandy  wastes  of  the  Asiatic  deserts  have 
brought  to  light  the  ruins  of  numerous  and  populous  cities.  Not  only 
economic  life,  but  all  life,  is  at  the  mercy  of  the  elemental  forces  of 
nature. 

Even  in  the  habitable  portions  of  the  globe  the  climatic  conditions  are 
of  the  first  importance.  At  the  ver/  outset  the  influence  of  temperature 
is  obvious.  The  rigor  of  the  arctic  regions  ai\d  the  bounty  of  the  trop- 
ical zone  are  alike  hostile  to  economic  progress.  Where  the  food  supply 
is  scanty  and  the  low  temperature  benumbing,  human  resources  are  taxed 
to  the  utmost  in  securing  the  bare  wherewithal  of  life,  and  no  surplus 
energy  is  left  to  accumulate  a  store  of  wealth.  Where,  on  the  other 
hand,  nature  pours  out  her  treasures  with  a  lavish  hand,  and  the  torrid 
heat  enervates  and  lulls  into  lethargy,  scarcely  any  activity  is  needed  to 
procure  subsistence,  and  little  is  ordinarily  exerted  for  other  purposes. 
Although  we  have  had  civilization  in  hot  countries,  the  real  home  of  the 
greatest  economic  progress  has  always  been  in  the  temperate  zones, 
where  man  is  goaded  out  of  his  natural  laziness  by  the  prick  of  want 
and  lured  on  to  effort  by  the  hope  of  reward. 

In  many  other  ways  does  climate  affect  economic  life.  The  alter- 
nations of  heat  and  cold,  both  seasonal  and  occasional,  are  of  command- 
ing importance.  The  character  and  length  of  the  seasonal  alternations 
condition  the  size  and  quality  of  the  harvest.  The  variations  of  intra- 
seasonal  temperature  with  its  sudden  oscillations  go  far  to  explain  the 
nervous,  active  American  temperament  and  its  economic  results,  as 
compared  with  the  comparative  stolidity  of  the  English,  due  to  an 
equable  climate.  Scarcely  second  to  the  influence  of  temperature  is  the 
significance  of  the  rainfall  and  the  humidity.  Insufficiency  of  moisture 
and  lack  of  sunshine  are  alike  inimical  to  economic  welfare.  Not  only 
will  differences  in  rainfall  affect  the  forestry  conditions,  as  well  as  the 
size  and  therefore  the  economic  utility  of  the  rivers,  but  in  addition  the 
laborious  contest  with  a  semiarid  region  will  create  in  the  individual 
stalwart  economic  and  political  qualities.  The  so-called  Anglo-Saxon 
individualism  is  largely  the  product  of  climatic  conditions.     When  the 


PHYSICAL  BASIS  OF  THE  STATE  35 

Englishman  leaves  his  moist  and  fertile  home  for  the  almost  riverless 
wastes  of  the  antipodes,  he  becomes,  if  not  a  socialist,  at  all  events  the 
next  remove  to  one.  In  Australia  we  accordingly  find  government 
railroads,  government  insurance,  government  steamships,  government 
frozen-meat  industry  and  many  other  examples  of  government  activity 
which  would  be  viewed  with  dismay  in  the  mother  country. 

In  the  same  way  the  individualist  theory  in  America  is  largely  the 
product  of  definite  economic  conditions,  resting  on  a  new  climatic  en- 
vironment. What  careful  interpreter  of  American  history  does  not  know 
that  the  arduous  struggles  with  a  rebellious  soil  and  an  inhospitable  climate 
caused  the  American  of  a  century  ago  to  turn  to  government  whenever 
he  thought  he  might  secure  help  ?  State  roads,  state  canals,  state  rail- 
roads, state  bounties,  state  enterprises  of  all  kinds  suited  to  the  needs 
of  the  settlers  were  the  order  of  the  day.  When,  however,  the  moun- 
tains had  been  crossed  and  the  fertile  valleys  of  the  Middle  West,  with 
abundant  rainfall  and  a  genial  climate,  had  been  reached,  there  came  a 
wondrous  change.  Conscious  of  their  new  opportunities,  the  citizens 
now  desired  only  to  be  let  alone  in  their  quest  for  prosperity.  Private 
initiative  replaced  government  assistance  and  the  age  of  corporations  was 
ushered  in.  Insensibly  the  theory  of  governmental  functions  changed, 
and  the  doctrine  of  laissez  /aire  carried  all  before  it.  The  theory  of 
individualism  was  a  natural  result  of  the  economic,  and  at  bottom  of 
the  climatic,  conditions  of  a  new  environment. 

While  the  climate  is  one  of  the  causes  that  influence  the  earth's  sur- 
face, the  economic  life  is  profoundly  affected  by  the  entire  geological 
formation.  In  the  first  place  we  have  the  fundamental  fact  of  altitude, 
including  the  distinction  between  mountain  and  valley,  coast  and  plain, 
with  their  varying  degrees  of  production.  Furthermore,  upon  the  chem- 
ical ingredients  of  the  soil  rests  in  last  analysis  its  original  fruitfulness. 
The  difference  between  the  soil  of  the  black  belt  and  the  hill  lands  of 
Alabama  explains  the  varying  aspect  of  the  negro  problem  there ;  and 
in  like  manner  the  contrast  between  the  arable  and  the  grazing  lands  of 
the  Far  West  enables  us  to  comprehend  the  economic  and  political  con- 
flicts between  the  farmer  and  the  ranchman. 

Of  still  more  importance  than  the  surface  of  the  earth  is  what  lies 
beneath  the  surface.  There  are  writers  who  interpret  the  entire  progress 
of  humanity  in  terms  of  the  metals.  While  this  is  assuredly  an  exaggera- 
tion, there  is  no  doubt  that  the  metals  have  played  a  dominating  role 
in  the  history  of  economic  progress.  In  more  primitive  times  the  ad- 
vance of  civilization  was  in  many  places  in  large  measure  bound  up 
with  the  copper  and  tin  deposits.  Even  at  present,  with  the  active 
interchange  of  commodities,  the  mineral  wealth  in  the  shape  of  copper 


36  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

and  iron  fields,  gold  and  silver  mines,  lead  and  tin  deposits,  goes  far  to 
explain  the  preponderance  of  the  fortunate  countries  or  sections  where 
they  are  found.  If  we  add  to  the  metals  the  coal,  the  diamond  and  the 
oil  fields,  we  shall  readily  recognize  the  enormous  influence  exerted, 
especially  in  modern  times,  by  the  existence  of  these  mineral  treasures 
in  such  places  as  Colorado,  Pennsylvania,  Western  England,  and  South 
Africa. 

The  character  and  extent  of  the  vegetable  and  animal  life  are  a  result 
of  the  climatic  and  geological  conditions  that  have  just  been  mentioned. 
Upon  the  union  in  proper  proportions  of  rain,  sun  and  chemical  ingre- 
dients of  the  soil  depends  the  possibility  of  raising  all  the  staple  crops 
like  hay,  wheat,  cotton,  rice,  tobacco,  sugar,  coffee  or  tea,  or  of  obtaining 
the  timber,  rubber,  cork  and  other  products  of  the  forest.  The  American 
Indian  civilization  was  built  up  to  a  large  degree  on  maize,  as  that  of 
the  Asiatic  Indian  largely  rested  on  rice.  If  cotton  was  king  in  the 
South  before  the  war,  wheat  and  hay  were  to  a  great  extent  the 
monarchs  in  the  North.  The  control  of  these  natural  resources  is 
responsible  for  many  of  the  mutations  of  nations.  To  give  only  two 
examples :  the  struggle  for  the  spice  islands  of  the  East  is  the  key  that 
unlocks  the  mysteries  of  the  European  political  contests  of  the  sixteenth 
and  seventeenth  centuries ;  the  sugar  situation  in  Cuba  led  to  the  revo- 
lution which  brought  about  our  recent  Spanish  war,  and  thus  indirectly 
the  expansion  of  the  American  republic  into  imperialism. 

Of  at  least  equal  importance  in  early  economic  progress  is  the  existence 
of  animals  that  can  easily  be  domesticated.  The  fact  that  the  horse,  the 
cow  and  the  sheep  were  found  in  Asia  rendered  possible  the  transition 
from  the  hunting  to  the  pastoral  stage  and  laid  the  foundation  of  the 
later  economic  edifice  of  the  more  advanced  Asiatic  and  European  races. 
For  these  animals  subserved  the  various  ends  not  only  of  food  supply 
and  provision  of  clothing,  but  of  means  of  locomotion  and  above  all  of 
beast  of  burden.  Their  absence  in  recent  geological  periods  in  America 
was  perhaps  the  chief  cause  of  the  backwardness  of  the  Indians.  Where 
a  relatively  advanced  civilization  was  reached,  as  by  the  Incas  in  Peru, 
it  was  in  great  part  due  to  the  existence  of  the  llama,  although  the  in- 
feriority of  this  animal  to  the  horse,  the  cow  and  the  sheep  explains  in 
large  measure  the  backwardness  of  the  South  American  civilization.  In 
Australia  there  was  not  even  this  resource,  for  the  kangaroo  could  not 
be  utilized  and  the  blackfellow  remained  a  savage. 

In  contrast  to  the  flora  and  fauna  which  are  of  importance  from  the 
first,  favorable  situation,  although  it  also  plays  a  role  from  the  outset, 
becomes  of  signal  importance  in  the  later  stages  of  economic  life  when 
commerce  has  developed.     Proximity  to  the  sea,  possession  of  a  safe 


PHYSICAL  BASIS  OF  THE  STATE  37 

and  ample  harbor,  location  on  a  river,  —  all  these  explain  the  maritime 
supremacy  on  which  so  much  of  past  civilization  has  rested.  It  is  no 
mere  accident  that  the  world's  progress  centered  for  many  centuries 
around  the  Mediterranean,  and  that  Egypt,  Greece  and  Rome  in  turn 
controlled  for  thousands  of  years  the  destinies  of  the  human  race. 
Passing  over  the  medieval  Italian  seaports  and  the  German  Hansa 
towns,  it  is  again  significant  that  the  two  greatest  metropolitan  centers  of 
the  world  to-day,  London  and  New  York,  have  attained  their  position 
chiefly  because  of  their  maritime  importance.  Some  writers  have  even 
gone  so  far  as  to  maintain  that  all  civilization  can  be  expressed  in  terms 
of  the  great  rivers  and  seas.  Of  the  twenty  largest  cities  of  the  United 
States,  nine  are  found  on  the  seacoast,  five  on  the  Northern  Lakes,  and 
five  on  the  Mississippi  and  Ohio  rivers. 

It  would,  however,  be  a  mistake  to  lay  too  much  stress  upon  mere 
water  communication.  Trade  conducted  on  terra  Jinna  has  played  a 
scarcely  smaller  role.  Many  a  populous  city  is  nothing  but  the  develop- 
ment of  a  crossroads  village,  become  the  busy  mart  of  transit  on  a  great 
thoroughfare.  The  centers  of  the  Babylonian  and  Assyrian  civilization 
of  old  were  largely  of  this  character ;  and  to  a  similar  favorable  inland 
situation  must  we  ascribe  the  prosperity  of  numerous  cities  in  all  parts 
of  the  worid  to-day,  such  as  Beriin,  Manchester  (England),  and  Denver, 
especially  where  the  rivers  are  few  or  small.  A  distinguished  French 
author,  Demolins,  has  even  ventured  to  explain  the  existence  of  the 
primary  social  types  of  humanity  by  the  land  routes  which  the  various 
nations  traversed  in  the  course  of  the  long  migrations  from  their  ances- 
tral home  to  their  present  abodes.  However  exaggerated  this  insistence 
upon  a  single  factor  may  be,  there  is  little  doubt  as  to  the  cardinal 
influence  of  location  upon  commercial  opportunities. 

With  the  further  development  of  economic  life,  commerce  becomes  a 
handmaid  not  only  to  agriculture  but  to  industry.  The  industrial  centers 
are  dependent  not  only  on  the  commercial  facilities  for  disposing  of  their 
products,  but  also  upon  the  ease  with  which  they  can  secure  the  raw 
material  and  cheap  power.  Contiguity  to  the  coal  and  iron  fields  explains 
the  growth  of  the  great  steel  industries.  The  presence  of  local  water 
power  made  possible  the  eariy  centers  of  the  textile  industries  in  New 
England,  as  well  as  the  rapid  growth  of  Minneapolis  in  milling.  The 
grain  fields  of  the  Middle  West  are  responsible  for  the  breweries  in  the 
western  and  the  distilleries  in  the  eastern  states  adjoining  the  Mississippi. 

The  slaughtering  and  meat-packing  centers  have  gradually  moved 
west  with  the  change  in  the  ranching  frontier,  and  the  incipient  industries 
of  the  Pacific  slope  are  still  largely  determined  by  their  propinquity  to 
the  forests,  the  orchards  or  the  river  fisheries. 


38  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

24.  Lines  of  social  movement.  The  contour  of  the  earth's 
surface  has  always  exerted  a  determining  influence  upon  the 
movements  of  peoples.  Other  things  being  equal,  migration,  col- 
onization, and  emigration,  as  well  as  routes  of  trade  and  commu- 
nication, follow  lines  of  least  geographic  resistance. 

Finally,  the  contour  of  the  surface  determines  the  lines  of  social 
movement.  Physical  forces  always  follow  the  lines  of  least  resistance. 
This  is  true  alike  of  the  projectile's  regular  curve,  and  the  lightning's 
jagged  path.  The  primitive  horde  gradually  forms  beaten  tracks  about 
its  abode.  These  tracks,  and  in  fact  all  intercourse  with  other  peoples, 
are  determined  by  the  easiest  courses,  and  necessarily  avoid  all  obstacles. 
Civilization  and  culture  follow  these  same  lines,  for  they  can  only  go 
where  social  and  economic  intercourse  have  preceded.  Caravans  still 
traverse  natural  courses  from  Egypt  into  Palestine,  and  from  Babylonia 
up  to  Syria.  These  ancient  avenues  of  civilization,  and  even  the  direction 
which  civilization  should  take,,  were  detennined  by  the  contour  of  the 
earth's  surface.  War  and  conquest  have  always  followed  lines  marked 
out  for  them  beforehand.  Ancient  and  modern  migrations  have  been 
similarly  directed.  Sometimes  the  course  of  an  ancient  horde  over- 
running a  part  of  Europe,  can  be  followed  in  detail,  and  each  deviation 
from  a  straight  course  is  explained  by  natural  obstacles,  or  by  the 
physical  strength  of  those  already  in  possession  of  the  soil.  To-day, 
emigration  is  from  some  crowded  quarter  to  the  spot  which  seems  to 
offer  opportunity  for  an  easier  and  richer  life.  Every  redistribution  of 
the  parts  of  society  has  its  physical  side,  and,  like  any  redistribution  of 
matter,  it  follows  the  lines  of  least  resistance.  "  The  final  and  highest 
truths  of  the  geographical  sciences  are  included  in  the  statement  that 
the  structure  of  the  earth's  surface,  and  the  differences  of  climate  de- 
pendent upon  it,  visibly  rule  the  course  of  development  for  our  race, 
and  have  determined  the  path  for  the  changes  of  the  seats  of  culture ; 
so  that  a  glance  at  the  earth's  surface  permits  us  to  see  the  course  of 
human  history  as  determined  (or,  one  may  say,  purposed)  from  the 
beginning,  in  the  distribution  of  land  and  water,  of  plains  and  heights."  ^ 

25.  Fertility  of  the  soil.  Bluntschli,  following  Buckle  in  the 
main,  emphasizes  the  disadvantages  of  extreme  fertility  of  soil  as 
well  as  those  of  sterility. 

Certainly  a  very  barren  soil  is  unfavorable  for  social  life :  for  man  is 
then  obliged  to  procure  his  food  from  a  distance,  by  means  of  commerce. 
1  Peschel,  "  Geschichte  der  Erdkunde,"  S.  xv. 


PHYSICAL  BASIS  OF  THE  STATE 


39 


In  such  cases  commercial  cities  may  rise  and  flourish,  as  did  Venice,  the 
daughter  of  the  unfruitful  sea.  But  the  peoples  as  a  whole  in  barren 
countries  can  only  live  poorly  and  painfully ;  the  population  is  sparse 
and  has  but  a  meager  growth.  A  fixed  home  is  hardly  possible ;  men 
live  a  nomadic  life  in  scattered  families  and  hordes.  Buckle  has  pointed 
out  that  the  Mongols  and  the  Tartars  made  little  progress  on  their  own 
barren  steppes,  only  developing  a  civilization  in  the  richer  soil  of  China 
and  India  :  and  that  the  Arabs  did  not  become  an  advanced  state  till  they 
left  Arabia  for  the  fruitful  lands  of  Persia  and  the  coast  of  the  Medi- 
terranean. 

A  very  fruitful  soil,  which  furnishes  sufficient  food  without  requiring 
labor,  is  better  than  an  unproductive  soil,  but  it  is  by  no  means  the  best 
basis  for  the  State,  for  these  reasons  :  — 

The  main  motive  to  human  effort  is  the  desire  for  subsistence.  If  this  is 
removed  by  the  bounty  of  nature,  men  work  little,  or  not  at  all ;  and 
generally  sink  into  indolence  and  sensuality.  Where  they  do  not  work, 
men  fail  to  develop  the  hidden  resources  of  their  nature,  and  society 
does  not  advance.  On  many  tropical  islands  the  people  live  a  happy 
sensual  life,  but  remain  uncivilized.  Naples  made  a  great  advance  when 
she  converted  her  idle  lazzaroni  into  industrious  laborers. 

Where  labor  is  not  needed,  labor  and  laborer  are  despised ;  the  life 
of  the  mass  of  the  people  counts  for  nothing.  Nowhere  is  human  life 
so  brutally  disregarded  as  in  the  negro  despotisms  of  Africa,  where  the 
soil  is  fruitful  without  tillage,  and  there  is  no  industry  to  ennoble  labor. 

Great  fertility  of  soil  promotes  an  unequal  distribution  of  property. 
We  find  a  few  rich  men,  living  in  superfluity,  hardly  any  middle  class, 
and  a  great  mass  of  poor  and  servile  population.  As  there  is  no  check 
on  population  in  such  countries,  it  increases  rapidly.  But  an  occasional 
famine  or  invasion  reduces  the  careless  population  to  miser)'.  Those 
few  who  have  had  the  providence  to  hoard  their  fruits,  compel  the 
masses  to  surrender  their  fruit  trees  and  their  land  in  return  for  food. 
Military  leaders,  in  return  for  their  protection,  exact  taxes  and  service : 
priests,  who  reconcile  the  gods  and  invoke  their  blessing,  receive  large 
estates  from  the  faithful.  Thus  there  gradually  arises  a  class  of  rich 
landlords  and  princes,  of  nobles  and  priests,  who  own  the  whole  country. 
They  attain  to  some  degree  of  civilization  and  to  great  material  wealth. 
They  exact  labor  from  the  subject  classes,  but  hold  them  cheap,  because 
there  are  plenty  of  laborers,  and  man,  as  such,  has  no  value.  The  masses 
become  poor,  despised,  and  completely  dependent :  they  live  a  dull  and 
brutal  life  of  service,  completely  cut  off  from  any  civilizing  influence.  .  .  . 

The  most  favorable  soil  then  is  one  of  moderate  fertility,  which 
requires  the  expenditure  of  serious  and  persistent  labor.    There  labor 


40  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

and  the  laborer  are  properly  valued,  but  they  are  not  overtasked,  and 
there  is  no  destitution.  Man's  powers  are  developed,  and  the  conditions 
of  life  perfected:  families  enjoy  a  secure  existence  in  moderate  pros- 
perity, and  wealth  is  so  distributed  that  the  middle  class  is  numerous 
and  well  to  do.  One  class  shades  off  gradually  into  another :  there  is  no 
danger  of  the  lower  classes  being  enslaved,  nor  of  the  higher  becoming 
a  privileged  caste.  There  is  a  great  diversity  of  occupations,  but  the 
people  form  a  coherent  whole,  animated  by  a  common  spirit. 

26.  Effects  of  dryness  and  moisture.  Spencer  points  out  im- 
poitant  results  of  differences  in  humidity,  as  follows  : 

Passing  over  such  traits  of  climate  as  variability  and  equability, 
whether  diurnal,  annual,  or  irregular,  all  of  which  have  their  effects  on 
human  activities,  and  therefore  on  social  phenomena,  I  will  name  one 
other  climatic  trait  that  appears  to  be  an  important  factor.  I  refer  to 
the  quality  of  the  air  in  respect  of  dryness  or  moisture. 

Either  extreme  brings  indirect  impediments  to  civilization,  which  we 
may  note  before  observing  the  direct  effects.  That  great  dryness  of  the 
air,  causing  a  parched  surface  and  a  scanty  vegetation,  negatives  the 
multiplication  needed  for  advanced  social  life,  is  a  familiar  fact.  And  it 
is  a  fact,  though  not  a  familiar  one,  that  extreme  humidity,  especially 
when  joined  with  great  heat,  may  raise  unexpected  obstacles  to  progress  ; 
as,  for  example,  in  parts  of  East  Africa,  where  "  the  springs  of  powder 
flasks  exposed  to  the  damp  snap  like  toasted  quills  ;  .  .  .  paper,  becoming 
soft  and  soppy  by  the  loss  of  glazing,  acts  as  a  blotter ;  .  .  .  metals  are 
ever  rusty ;  .  .  .  and  gunpowder,  if  not  kept  from  the  air,  refuses  to 
ignite." 

But  it  is  the  direct  effects  of  different  hygrometric  states,  which  are 
most  noteworthy  —  the  effects  on  the  vital  processes,  and,  therefore,  on 
the  individual  activities,  and,  through  them,  on  the  social  activities. 
Bodily  functions  are  facilitated  by  atmospheric  conditions  which  make 
evaporation  from  the  skin  and  lungs  rapid.  That  weak  persons,  whose 
variations  of  health  furnish  good  tests,  are  worse  when  the  air  is  sur- 
charged with  water,  and  are  better  when  the  weather  is  fine ;  and  that 
commonly  such  persons  are  enervated  by  residence  in  moist  localities 
but  invigorated  by  residence  in  dry  ones,  are  facts  generally  recognized. 
And  this  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  manifest  in  individuals,  doubtless 
holds  in  races.  Throughout  temperate  regions,  differences  of  constitu- 
tional activity  due  to  differences  of  atmospheric  humidity,  are  less  trace- 
able than  in  torrid  regions  :  the  reason  being  that  all  the  inhabitants  are 
subject  to  a  tolerably  quick  escape  of  water  from  their  surfaces ;  since 


PHYSICAL  BASIS  OF  THE  STATE 


41 


the  air,  though  well  charged  with  water,  will  take  up  more  when  its  tem- 
perature, previously  low,  is  raised  by  contact  with  the  body.  But  it  is 
otherwise  in  tropical  regions  where  the  body  and  the  air  bathing  it  differ 
much  less  in  temperature  ;  and  where,  indeed,  the  air  is  sometimes  higher 
in  temperature  than  the  body.  Here  the  rate  of  evaporation  depends 
almost  wholly  on  the  quantity  of  surrounding  vapor.  If  the  air  is  hot 
and  moist,  the  escape  of  water  through  the  skin  and  lungs  is  greatly 
hindered ;  while  it  is  greatly  facilitated  if  the  air  is  hot  and  dry.  Hence 
in  the  torrid  zone,  we  may  expect  constitutional  differences  between  the 
inhabitants  of  low  steaming  tracts  and  the  inhabitants  of  tracts  parched 
with  heat.  Needful  as  are  cutaneous  and  pulmonary  evaporation  for 
maintaining  the  movement  of  fluids  through  the  tissues  and  thus  further- 
ing molecular  changes,  it  is  to  be  inferred  that,  other  things  equal, 
there  will  be  more  bodily  activity  in  the  people  of  hot  and  dry  localities 
than  in  the  people  of  hot  and  humid  localities. 

The  evidence  justifies  this  inference.  The  earliest-recorded  civilization 
grew  up  in  a  hot  and  dry  region  —  Egypt ;  and  in  hot  and  dry  regions 
also  arose  the  Babylonian,  Assyrian,  and  Phoenician  civilizations.  But 
the  facts  when  stated  in  terms  of  nations  are  far  less  striking  than 
when  stated  in  terms  of  races.  On  glancing  over  a  general  rain  map, 
there  will  be  seen  an  almost  continuous  area  marked  "  rainless  district," 
extending  across  North  Africa,  Arabia,  Persia,  and  on  through  Tibet 
into  Mongolia ;  and  from  within,  or  from  the  borders  of,  this  district 
have  come  all  the  conquering  races  of  the  Old  World.  We  have  the 
Tartar  race,  which,  passing  the  southern  mountain  boundary  of  this 
rainless  district,  peopled  China  and  the  regions  between  it  and  India  — 
thrusting  the  aborigines  of  these  areas  into  the  hilly  tracts ;  and  which 
has  sent  successive  waves  of  invaders  not  into  these  regions  only,  but 
into  the  West.  We  have  the  Aryan  race,  overspreading  India  and 
making  its  way  through  Europe.  We  have  the  Semitic  race,  becoming 
dominant  in  North  Africa,  and,  spurred  on  by  Mohammedan  fanaticism, 
subduing  parts  of  Europe.  That  is  to  say,  besides  the  Egyptian  race, 
which  became  powerful  in  the  hot  and  dry  valley  of  the  Nile,  we  have 
three  races  widely  unlike  in  type,  which,  from  different  parts  of  the 
rainless  district,  have  spread  over  regions  relatively  humid.  Original 
superiority  of  type  was  not  the  common  trait  of  these  peoples :  the 
Tartar  type  is  inferior,  as  was  the  Egyptian.  But  the  common  trait, 
as  proved  by  subjugation  of  other  peoples,  was  energy.  And  when  we 
see  that  this  common  trait  in  kinds  of  men  otherwise  unlike,  had  for  its 
concomitant  their  long-continued  subjection  to  these  special  climatic 
conditions  —  when  we  find,  further,  that  from  the  region  characterized 
by  these  conditions,  the  earlier  waves  of  conquering  emigrants,  losing  in 


42  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

moister  countries  their  ancestral  energy,  were  overrun  by  later  waves 
of  the  same  kind  of  men,  or  of  other  kinds,  coming  from  this  region ; 
we  get  strong  reason  for  inferring  a  relation  between  constitutional 
vigor  and  the  presence  of  an  air  which,  by  its  warmth  and  dryness, 
facilitates  the  vital  actions.  A  striking  verification  is  at  hand.  The  rain 
map  of  the  New  World  shows  that  the  largest  of  the  parts  distinguished 
as  almost  rainless  is  that  Central  American  and  Mexican  region  in  which 
indigenous  civilizations  developed ;  and  that  the  only  other  rainless  dis- 
trict is  that  part  of  the  ancient  Peruvian  territory,  in  which  the  pre-Ynca 
civilization  has  left  its  most  conspicuous  traces.  Inductively,  then,  the 
evidence  justifies  in  a  remarkable  manner  the  physiological  deduction. 
Nor  are  there  wanting  minor  verifications.  Speaking  of  the  varieties  of 
negroes,  Livingstone  says  —  "  Heat  alone  does  not  produce  blackness  of 
skin,  but  heat  with  moisture  seems  to  insure  the  deepest  hue  "  ;  and 
Schweinfurth  remarks  on  the  relative  blackness  of  the  Denka  and  other 
tribes  living  on  the  alluvial  plains,  and  contrasts  them  with  "  the  less 
swarthy  and  more  robust  races  who  inhabit  the  rocky  hills  of  the  in- 
terior "  :  differences  with  which  there  go  differences  of  energy.  But  I  note 
this  fact  for  the  purpose  of  suggesting  its  probable  connection  with  the 
fact  that  the  lighter-skinned  races  are  habitually  the  dominant  races.  We 
see  it  to  have  been  so  in  Egypt.  It  was  so  with  the  races  spreading 
south  from  Central  Asia.  Traditions  imply  that  it  was  so  in  Central 
America  and  Peru.  Speke  says — "I  have  always  found  the  lighter- 
colored  savages  more  boisterous  and  warlike  than  those  of  a  dingier  hue.  " 
And  if,  heat  being  the  same,  darkness  of  skin  accompanies  humidity  of 
the  air,  while  lightness  of  skin  accompanies  dryness  of  the  air,  then,  in 
this  habitual  predominance  of  the  fair  varieties  of  men,  we  find  further 
evidence  that  constitutional  activity,  and  in  so  far  social  development,  is 
favored  by  a  climate  conducing  to  rapid  evaporation. 

I  do  not  mean  that  the  energy  thus  resulting  determines,  of  itself, 
higher  social  development ;  this  is  neither  implied  deductively  nor  shown 
inductively.  But  greater  energy,  making  easy  the  conquest  of  less  active 
races  and  the  usurpation  of  their  richer  and  more  varied  habitats,  also 
makes  possible  a  better  utilization  of  such  habitats. 

27.  The  general  aspects  of  nature.  No  writer  has  more  power- 
fully presented  the  materialistic  conception  of  history  than  has 
Buckle. 

It  now  remains  for  me  to  examine  the  effect  of  those  other  physical 
agents  to  which  I  have  given  the  collective  name  of  Aspects  of  Nature, 
and  which  will  be  found  suggestive  of  some  very  wide  and  comprehensive 


PHYSICAL  BASIS  OF  THE  STATE  43 

inquiries  into  the  influence  exercised  by  the  external  world  in  predisposing 
men  to  certain  habits  of  thought,  and  thus  giving  a  particular  tone  to 
religion,  arts,  literature,  and,  in  a  word,  to  all  the  principal  manifestations 
of  the  human  mind.  To  ascertain  how  this  is  brought  about  forms  a 
necessary  supplement  to  the  investigations  just  concluded.  For,  as  we 
have  seen  that  climate,  food,  and  soil  mainly  concern  the  accumulation 
and  distribution  of  wealth,  so  also  shall  we  see  that  the  Aspects  of 
Nature  concern  the  accumulation  and  distribution  of  thought.  In  the 
first  case,  we  have  to  do  with  the  material  interests  of  Man  ;  in  the  other 
case,  with  his  intellectual  interests.  .  .  .  The  relation  between  the  As])ects 
of  Nature  and  the  mind  of  Man  involves  speculations  of  such  magnitude, 
and  requires  such  a  mass  of  materials  drawn  from  every  quarter,  that  I 
feel  very  apprehensive  as  to  the  result ;  and  I  need  hardly  say,  that  I 
make  no  pretensions  to  anything  approaching  an  exhaustive  analysis, 
nor  can  I  hope  to  do  more  than  generalize  a  few  of  the  laws  of  that 
complicated,  but  as  yet  unexplored  process  by  which  the  external  world 
has  affected  the  human  mind,  has  warped  its  natural  movements,  and 
too  often  checked  its  natural  progress. 

The  Aspects  of  Nature,  when  considered  from  this  point  of  view,  are 
divisible  into  two  classes :  the  first  class  being  those  which  are  most 
likely  to  excite  the  imagination ;  and  the  other  class  being  those  which 
address  themselves  to  the  understanding  commonly  so  called,  that  is,  to 
the  mere  logical  operations  of  the  intellect.  For  although  it  is  true  that, 
in  a  complete  and  well-balanced  mind,  the  imagination  and  the  under- 
standing each  play  their  respective  parts,  and  are  auxiliary  to  each 
other,  it  is  also  true  that,  in  a  majority  of  instances,  the  understanding  is 
too  weak  to  curb  the  imagination  and  restrain  its  dangerous  license. 
The  tendency  of  advancing  civilization  is  to  remedy  this  disproportion, 
and  invest  the  reasoning  powers  with  that  authority,  which,  in  an  early 
stage  of  society,  the  imagination  exclusively  possesses.  .  .  . 

Now,  so  far  as  natural  phenomena  are  concerned,  it  is  evident,  that 
whatever  inspires  feelings  of  terror,  or  of  great  wonder,  and  whatever 
excites  in  the  mind  an  idea  of  the  vague  and  uncontrollable,  has  a  special 
tendency  to  inflame  the  imagination,  and  bring  under  its  dominion  the 
slower  and  more  deliberate  operations  of  the  understanding.  In  such 
cases,  Man,  contrasting  himself  with  the  force  and  majesty  of  Nature, 
becomes  painfully  conscious  of  his  own  insignificance.  A  sense  of  in- 
feriority steals  over  him.  From  every  quarter  innumerable  obstacles 
hem  him  in,  and  limit  his  individual  will.  His  mind,  appalled  by  the 
indefined  and  indefinable,  hardly  cares  to  scrutinize  the  details  of  which 
such  imposing  grandeur  consists.  On  the  other  hand,  where  the  works 
of  Nature  are  small  and  feeble,  Man  regains  confidence  :  he  seems  more 


44  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

able  to  rely  on  his  own  power;  he  can,  as  it  were,  pass  through,  and 
exercise  authority  in  every  direction.  And  as  the  phenomena  are  more 
accessible  it  becomes  easier  for  him  to  experiment  on  them,  or  to 
observe  them  with  minuteness;  an  inquisitive  and  analytic  spirit  is  en- 
couraged and  he  is  tempted  to  generalize  the  appearances  of  Nature, 
and  refer  them  to  the  laws  by  which  they  are  governed. 


I 


CHAPTER  IV 

POPULATION   OF   THE   STATE 

I.  Importance  of  the  Population 

28.  Human  causes  that  act  in  history.  The  relative  importance 
of  the  physical  environment  and  of  the  people  who  inhabit  it  is 
suggestively  treated  in  the  following  :  ^ 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  environment  alone  accomplishes  any 
historical  result.  Environment  acts  upon  and  through  man,  contributing 
to  the  formation  of  his  character  and  conditioning  his  activities.  In  the 
truest  sense,  Nature  is  not  an  historical  cause  at  all.  History  is  not 
primarily  a  study  of  circumstances,  but  of  the  human  agents  that  exist 
and  act  among  circumstances ;  not  a  study  of  environment,  but  of  what 
man  does  acting  under  environment.  .  .  . 

Human  nature  sums  up  the  main  historic  causes  and  agents ;  the 
native  and  universal  qualities  of  the  race,  the  complex  of  characters  that 
mark  man  off  from  inferior  creatures.  Sagacious  as  are  some  species  of 
animals,  we  have  no  difficulty  in  distinguishing  the  works  of  man  from 
their  works  —  the  ant,  the  bee,  or  the  beaver.  .  .  .  Although  hedged 
about  with  metes  and  bounds,  he  is  capable  within  certain  large  limits 
of  rising  above  circumstances  or  conditions  and  of  asserting  a  lordship 
over  Nature.    Man,  then,  is  the  starting  point  in  history.  .  .  . 

I.  How  far  race  character  and  national  character  are  due  to  native  in- 
herent qualities,  and  how  far  to  environment,  is  a  hard  question,  but 
fortunately  one  that  lies  outside  of  our  present  field.  Certainly  they  are 
among  the  most  potent  of  historical  causes.  In  a  celebrated  passage 
Aristotle  pointed  out  the  obvious  contrast  between  the  repose  of  Asia 
and  the  energy  of  Europe.  After  speaking  of  the  number  of  citizens  of 
a  state,  he  proceeds  to  speak  of  what  should  be  their  character :  "  This 
is  a  subject  which  can  be  easily  understood  by  any  one  who  casts  his  eye 
on  the  more  celebrated  states  of  Hellas,  and  generally  on  the  distribution 
of  races  in  the  habitable  world.  Those  who  live  in  a  cold  climate  and  in 
(northern)  Europe  are  full  of  spirit,  but  wanting  in  intelligence  and  skill ; 
and  therefore  they  keep  their  freedom,  but  have  no  political  organization, 
1  Copyright,  1893,  by  D.  Appleton  and  Company. 
45 


46  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

and  arc  incapable  of  ruling  over  others.  Whereas  the  natives  of  Asia 
are  intelligent  and  inventive,  but  they  arc  wanting  in  spirit,  and  therefore 
they  are  always  in  a  state  of  subjection  and  slavery.  But  the  Hellenic 
race,  which  is  situated  between  them,  is  likewise  intermediate  in  character, 
being  high-spirited  and  also  intelligent.  Hence  it  continues  free,  and  is 
the  best  governed  of  any  nation,  and,  if  it  could  be  formed  into  one  state, 
would  be  able  to  rule  the  world.  There  are  also  similar  differences  in 
the  different  tribes  of  Hellas ;  for  some  of  them  are  of  a  one-sided 
nature,  and  are  intelligent  or  courageous  only,  while  in  others  there  is  a 
happy  combination  of  both  qualities."  .  .  . 

The  national  character  of  the  Jews,  the  Greeks,  and  the  Romans  — 
the  first  religious,  the  second  philosophical  and  literary,  and  the  third 
practical  and  legal  in  their  genius  —  are  historical  factors  of  the  greatest 
value  and  consequence.  Such  factors  should  be  studied  both  with  refer- 
ence to  the  causes  that  produce  them  and  the  effects  that  they  them- 
selves produce.  .  .  . 

II.  To  analyze  the  genius  of  the  age  —  what  the  German  calls  the 
Time  Spirit  —  showing  what  it  is,  how  it  comes,  and  why  it  goes  —  is 
no  easy  task.  That  it  exercises  a  controlling  power,  subordinate  only  to 
race  and  national  character,  cannot  be  doubted.  Great  events  cannot 
be  accomplished  until  the  world  is  ready  for  their  accomplishment.  .  .  . 
At  one  time  the  dogmatic  spirit,  at  another  time  the  scholastic  spirit,  at 
a  third  the  spirit  of  classical  antiquity,  and  then  again  the  rationalistic 
or  modern  spirit  has  swayed  the  minds  of  men. 

The  Time  Spirit  creates  the  age.  Some  things  can  be  done  but 
once.  The  world  will  not  see  the  Crusades  repeated.  The  medieval 
cathedrals,  which,  as  has  been  said,  "  often  rose  out  of  towns  which 
were  then  little  better  than  collections  of  hovels,  with  but  small  accu- 
mulations of  wealth,  and  without  what  we  now  deem  the  appliances  of 
civilized  life,  and  that  also  mark  the  highest  ascent  of  man's  spiritual 
nature  above  the  realities  of  his  worldly  lot,"  cannot  be  duplicated.  We 
do  not  anticipate  new  migrations  of  nations  like  those  that  broke  up  the 
Roman  Empire,  and  a  second  age  of  maritime  discovery  is  impossible. 

The  spirit  of  the  age  is  not  the  creature  of  chance,  but  is  the 
product  of  causes  that  may  in  part  be  discovered.  For  example,  as  one 
has  observed,  every  great  change  of  belief  in  Europe  has  been  preceded 
by  a  great  change  in  its  intellectual  condition ;  the  success  of  any 
opinion  has  depended  less  upon  the  force  of  its  arguments  or  the  ability 
of  its  advocates  than  upon  the  predisposition  of  society  to  receive  it, 
while  this  predisposition  results  from  the  intellectual  type  of  the  age. 
Men  do  new  things  because  they  want  to  do  them,  and  they  cease  doing 
them  because  they  have  come  to  feel  more  interest  in  something  else. 


I'OI'II.A  riOX   OF  THE  STATE  47 

So  they  change  their  opinions,  not  so  much  because  they  are  convinced 
by  formal  arguments  of  the  unsoundness  of  the  old  and  of  the  soundness 
of  the  new,  as  because  they  grow  out  of  the  old  and  grow  into  the  new. 

III.  Individual  genius  is  an  historic  cause.  To  adjust  the  great  man 
and  his  time  is  almost  as  difficult  as  it  is  to  adjust  free  will  and  universal 
causation.  How  far  is  the  great  man  a  cause,  how  far  an  effect  1  At 
this  point  two  divergent  tendencies  of  thought  present  themselves. 

Carlyle  emphasizes  in  the  strongest  manner  individualities,  and  de- 
nounces the  opposite  tendency  as  machinelike  and  degrading.  He 
sneers  at  all  attempts  to  account  for  the  great  man,  as  to  show  that  he 
is  a  product  of  the  times,  and  maintains  that  universal  history,  ''  the 
history  of  what  man  has  accomplished  in  this  world,  is  at  bottom 
the  history  of  the  great  men  who  have  w^orked  here."  His  doctrine  is 
that  "  history  is  the  essence  of  innumerable  biographies." 

Mr.  Buckle  is  perhaps  the  best  representative  of  the  counter  tend- 
ency. He  makes  almost  nothing  of  individualities,  denies  the  fact  of 
free  will,  and  resolves  history  into  a  necessary  sequence,  the  action  of 
general  causes.  .  .  . 

The  truth  lies  between  these  two  extremes.  Both  individualities  and 
general  causation  play  important  parts  in  history.  Peter  the  Hermit 
must  preach  the  Crusade,  Luther  must  lift  up  the  banner  of  the  Refor- 
mation, Napoleon  must  lead  the  armies  of  the  Revolution ;  but,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  world  must  be  ready  for  Peter  the  Hermit,  for  Luther, 
and  for  Napoleon,  or  he  will  accomplish  litde  or  nothing.  Certainly  the 
mere  effervescence  and  fermentation  of  society  in  itself  leads  to  nothing 
useful  and  permanent.  The  crusading  spirit  did  not  preach  the  Crusade, 
mere  reforming  tendencies  did  not  nail  the  theses  to  the  church  door  or 
confront  Charles  V  at  Worms,  the  Revolution  as  a  Zeitgeist  did  not 
overrun  and  conquer  all  western  and  central  Europe.  Carlyle,  in  his 
hero  worship,  scouts  the  very  conditions  that  make  the  hero  possible ; 
Buckle,  in  his  devotion  to  history  as  a  science,  overlooks  the  hero 
altogether.  "  The  times,"  says  Carlyle,  "  have  indeed  called  loudly 
enough  for  the  great  man,  and  he  has  not  answered."  To  which  Mr. 
Buckle  might  reply  with  equal  truth,  "  The  great  man  has  indeed  called 
loudly  enough  to  the  times,  and  the  times  have  not  answered."  .  .  . 

Without  entering  further  into  the  speculative  discussion  of  the 
subject,  we  shall  altogether  miss  the  mark  unless  we  recognize  the  force 
and  value  of  the  leaders  of  mankind,  who  are  genuine  historic  causes  of 
great  potency.  The  history  of  no  country  more  forcibly  illustrates  the 
regular  and  orderly  flow  of  historical  causation  than  our  own ;  but  it  is 
impossible  to  conceive  what  our  history  would  have  been  without 
Washington,  Hamilton,  Jefferson,  Marshall,  Lincoln,  and  Grant 


48  READINGS   IN    POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

Among  the  potent  causes  that  act  in  history  — in  war,  politics,  re- 
ligion, industry,  and  trade  — ideas  and  sentiments  must  be  assigned  a 
high  rank.  Under  every  historical  movement  can  be  found  some  human 
factor  that  transcends  mere  physical  causation.  Even  the  most  repul- 
sive political  and  military  struggles  can  be  made  intelligible  by  referring 
them  to  human  motives.  Armies  have  sometimes  been  counted  the 
playthings  of  kings,  and  war  their  pastime.    But  the  lines  — 

But  war 's  a  game  which,  were  their  subjects  wise, 
Kings  would  not  play  at  — 

is  only  partly  true.  Ambitious  rulers  have  much  to  answer  for,  but  war 
has  not  often  been  mere  ruthless  slaughter,  killing  for  the  sake  of  killing  ; 
on  the  contrary,  state  policies  or  national  ideas  are  almost  always  more 
or  less  involved.  Rome  and  Carthage  contested  the  supremacy  of  the 
Mediterranean  Sea ;  they  represented  antagonistic  ideas  and  policies, 
and  the  best  interests  of  mankind  demanded  that  Rome  should  triumph. 
The  rule  of  England  in  India,  harsh  as  it  sometimes  seems,  promotes 
the  well-being  of  the  people,  and  autocratic  Russia  is  fulfilling  a  mission 
in  Central  Asia.  The  destroyers  Alaric  and  Attila  embodied  the  ideas 
and  the  passions  of  the  societies  that  produced  them,  and  from  which 
they  derived  their  power.  Napoleon  was  the  child  of  the  Revolution ; 
Emerson  says  of  him  that  he  succeeded  because  he  was  surrounded  by 
little  Napoleons,  who  saw  in  him  only  their  own  aims  and  desires. 
"  Generally  speaking,"  says  Count  von  Moltke,  "  it  is  no  longer  the 
ambition  of  monarchs  which  endangers  peace;  the  passions  of  the 
people,  its  dissatisfaction  with  interior  conditions  and  affairs,  the  strife 
of  parties,  and  the  intrigues  of  their  leaders  are  the  causes."   .   .  . 

The  relations  of  the  two  great  groups  of  historic  factors  are  very 
much  a  question  of  time  and  development.  "  With  each  advance  of 
intellectual  power,  the  dependence  (of  man)  upon  environment  becomes 
more  and  more  intimate,  for  with  that  intelligence  the  creature  seeks 
beyond  itself  for  opportunities  to  gratify  its  desires."  So  says  Professor 
Shaler.  Professor  Bryce  presents  a  different  view :  "  Man  in  his  early 
stages  is  at  the  mercy  of  Nature.  Nature  does  with  him  practically 
whatever  she  likes.  He  is  obliged  to  adapt  himself  entirely  to  her. 
But  in  process  of  time  he  learns  to  raise  himself  above  her.  It  is  true 
he  does  so  by  humoring  her,  so  to  speak,  by  submitting  to  her  forces. 
In  the  famous  phrase  of  Bacon,  Natura  non  nisi  parendo  vincitur, 
Nature  is  not  conquered  except  by  obeying  her ;  but  the  skill  which  man 
acquires  is  such  as  to  make  him  in  his  higher  stages  of  development 
always  more  and  more  independent  of  Nature,  and  able  to  bend  her 
to  his  will  in  a  way  that  aboriginal  man  could  not  do.     He  becomes 


L 


POPULATION  OF  THE  STATE  49 

independent  of  climate,  because  he  has  houses  and  clothes ;  he  becomes 
independent  of  winds,  because  he  propels  his  vessels  by  steam ;  to  a 
large  extent  he  becomes  independent  of  daylight,  because  he  can  pro- 
duce artificial  light."   .   .   . 

Thus,  in  his  savage  state,  man  is  a  feeble  slave,  cowering  at  the  feet 
of  Nature,  his  foster  mother ;  while  in  a  state  of  high  civilization  he 
obtains  a  mastery  and  lordship  over  her.  .  .  .  We  may  sum  up  in 
the  words  of  M.  Lavisse  :  "  Nature  has  written  on  the  map  of  Europe  the 
destiny  of  certain  regions.  She  determines  the  aptitudes  and  hence  the 
destiny  of  a  people.  The  very  movement  of  events  in  history  creates, 
moreover,  inevitable  exigencies,  one  thing  happening  because  other 
things  have  happened.  On  the  other  hand,  Nature  has  left  on  the  map 
of  Europe  free  scope  to  the  uncertainty  of  various  possibilities.  History 
is  full  of  accidents,  the  necessity  of  which  cannot  be  demonstrated. 
Finally,  there  exists  free  power  of  action,  which  has  been  exercised  by 
individuals  and  nations.  Chance  and  freedom  of  action  oppose  alike  the 
fatality  of  Nature  and  the  fatality  of  historical  sequence.  To  what 
extent  each  of  these  four  elements  has  influenced  history  cannot  be 
determined  with  exactness." 

29.  The  agents  of  civilization.  As  opposed  to  the  idea  that  the 
natural  environment  is  the  determining  factor  in  civilization,  may 
be  noted  the  following  paragraph  by  Ward  : 

Civilization  is  something  that  is  produced  by  some  kind  of  agency, 
and  we  have  seen  that  that  agency  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  physical 
surroundings  of  man,  which  are  passive  and  inert.  And  as  the  only 
elements  in  existence  are  men  and  things  the  agents  of  civilization  must 
be  men.  The  idea  that  they  consist  in  things,  although  it  passes  in 
some  quarters  for  the  scientific  view  par  excellence,  is  really  a  metaphys- 
ical conception  worthy  of  medieval  times.  It  arose  as  a  reaction 
against  that  form  of  hero  worship  which  deified  a  few  individuals  and 
ignored  the  mass  of  mankind  and  their  most  essential  activities.  Civili- 
zation is  the  result  of  the  activities  of  all  men  during  all  time,  struggling 
against  the  environment  and  slowly  conquering  nature.  .  .  .  This  much 
is  certainly  true,  that  the  agents  of  civilization  are  men,  and  the  question 
is  narrowed  down  to  that  of  determining  what  men,  and  in  what  man- 
ner they  have  brought  it  about. 

Even  a  cursory  glance  at  human  history  reveals  the  fact  that  there 
are  immense  differences  among  men  in  this  respect.  .  .  .  Whatever  the 
great  mass  may  have  done  in  the  way  of  preserving,  perpetuating,  and 
multiplying  copies  —  in  a  word,  through  imitation  —  the  number  who 


50  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

originate  and  invent,  who  investigate  and  discover,  is  surpassing  small. 
But  the  social  value  of  these  few  agents  must  not  be  underesti- 
mated.   If  it  is  foolish  to  worship  them  as  heroes,  it  is  equally  unwise 
to  ignore  their  true  significance  in  the  history  of  the  world. 

We  are  confronted  by  the  old  question  of  the  role  of  great  men.  We 
have  seen  that  by  certain  subtle  and  obscure  processes  of  nature  such 
rare  combinations  of  ancestral  qualities  are  occasionally  formed  in  the 
process  of  generation  in  the  human  race  as  to  produce  extraordinary 
minds.  It  is  such  minds  when  afforded  the  proper  opportunity  that  have 
produced  all  the  results  that  the  world  values.  How  many  such  minds 
there  may  be  at  any  given  time  it  is  impossible  to  determine,  because 
those  that  are  known  to  exist  are  only  such  as  have  been  permitted  by 
the  environment  to  assert  themselves.  Great  men,  then,  are  the  men- 
tally endowed  who  have  had  a  chance  to  use  their  talents.  There  is 
reason  to  believe  that  this  is  only  a  small  percentage  of  those  who 
possess  talents.  Opportunity  alone  can  show  what  the  true  number  of 
mentally  endowed  individuals  is  in  human  society.  But  the  few  that  we 
have  and  have  had  constitute  the  real  living  force  of  human  society. 
Human  achievement  is  due  to  them,  and  but  for  them  there  would  have 
been  no  achievement.  It  is  absurd  to  talk  about  civilization  as  the 
product  of  blind  natural  forces  and  general  environmental  conditions 
unless  the  men  who  have  chiefly  produced  it  are  included  among  such 
forces  and  conditions.  We  can  readily  conceive  of  their  absence,  but  we 
cannot  conceive  of  the  same  results  being  accomplished  in  their 
absence.  Without  them  there  would  be  no  results.  If  by  any  force  of 
circumstances  the  elite  of  any  country  were  to  be  removed,  that  country 
would  be  left  in  a  state  of  intellectual  stagnation.  Indeed,  history  has 
demonstrated  this  on  more  than  one  occasion.  When  Spain  killed  off 
and  drove  out  its  elite  it  fell  into  decadence  and  never  has  recovered  its 
vigor.  Italy  suffered  immensely  from  the  same  cause  and  is  to-day  far 
behind  the  leading  nations  of  the  world.  And  these  are  not  the  only 
instances.  On  the  other  hand,  the  brilliant  role  played  by  Switzerland  in 
the  history  of  science  is  chiefly  due  to  the  rich  recruits  which  that 
country  received  from  the  persecutions  carried  on  in  other  countries,  as 
de  CandoUe  has  so  fully  shown.  There  is  a  still  broader  aspect  to  the 
subject.  National  degeneracy,  while  it  might  be  produced  by  the  actual 
sacrifice  of  the  entire  elite  of  any  country,  is  usually  due  much  more  to 
the  more  or  less  voluntary  abandonment  of  such  countries  by  their  great 
men,  or  by  men  who  subsequently  become  great  in  the  land  of  their 
adoption.  This  need  not  necessarily  be  due  to  oppression.  It  may  be 
due  to  other  causes.  But  whatever  the  cause  may  be,  the  country  which 
cannot  retain  its  progressive  spirits  is  doomed  to  decay.    All  of  which 


POPULATION  OF  THE  STATE  5  I 

shows  in  the  most  convincinj^  maniiLT  that  the  agents  of  civilization  are 
the  great  men  and  the  strong  and  brilliant  minds  in  the  world,  and  not 
any  vague,  impersonal  environmental  conditions. 

II.  Race 

30.  Causes  of  the  fixation  of  ethnic  traits.  The  cause  of  the 
origin  of  races  is  a  much-disputed  question.  The  influences  that 
account  for  the  creation  of  physical  types  arc  stated  by  13rinton 
as  follows  : 

These  causes  are  mainly  related  to  climate  and  the  food  supply.  The 
former  embraces  the  questions  of  temperature,  humidity,  atmospheric 
pressure  (altitude),  malarial  or  zymotic  poisons,  and  the  like.  All  these 
bear  directly  upon  the  relative  activity  of  the  great  physiological  organs, 
the  lungs,  heart,  liver,  skin  and  kidneys,  and  to  their  action  we  must 
undoubtedly  turn  for  the  origin  of  the  traits  I  have  named.  On  the 
food  supply,  liquid  and  solid,  whether  mainly  animal,  fish,  or  vegetable, 
whether  abundant  or  scanty,  whether  rich  in  phosphates  and  nitrogenous 
constituents  or  the  reverse,  depend  the  condition  of  the  digestive  organs, 
the  nutrition  of  the  individual,  and  the  development  of  numerous 
physical  idiosyncrasies.  Nutrition  controls  the  direction  of  organic  de- 
velopment, and  it  is  essentially  on  arrested  or  imperfect,  in  contrast  to 
completed  development,  that  the  differences  of  races  depend. 

These  are  the  physiological  and  generally  unavoidable  influences 
which  went  to  the  fixation  of  racial  types.  They  are  those  which  placed 
early  man  under  the  dominion  of  natural,  unconscious  evolution,  like  all 
the  lower  animals.  To  them  may  be  added  natural  selection  from  acci- 
dental variations  becoming  permanent  when  proving  of  value  in  the 
struggle  for  existence,  as  shown  in  the  black  hue  of  equatorial  tribes, 
special  muscular  development,  etc. 

But  I  do  not  look  on  these  as  the  main  agents  in  the  fixation  of 
special  traits.  No  doubt  such  agencies  primarily  evolved  them,  but  their 
cultivation  and  perpetuation  were  distinctly  owing  to  conscious  selection 
in  early  man.  Our  species  is  largely  outside  the  general  laws  of  organic 
evolution,  and  that  by  virtue  of  the  self-consciousness  which  is  the 
privilege  of  it  alone  among  organized  beings. 

This  conscious  selection  was  applied  in  two  most  potent  directions, 
the  one  to  maintaining  t/ie  physical  ideal,  the  other  toward  sexual  prefer- 
ence. As  soon  as  the  purely  physical  influences  mentioned  had  impressed 
a  tendency  toward  a  certain  type  on  the  early  community,  this  was 
recognized,  cultivated    and    deepened    by  man's    conscious  endeavors. 


52  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

Every  race,  when  free  from  external  influence,  assigns  to  its  highest 
ideal  of  manly  or  womanly  beauty  its  special  racial  traits,  and  seeks  to 
develop  these  to  the  utmost.  African  travelers  tell  us  that  the  negroes 
of  the  Sudan  look  with  loathing  on  the  white  skin  of  the  European ; 
and  in  ancient  Mexico  when  children  were  born  of  a  very  light  color,  as 
occasionally  happened,  they  were  put  to  death.  On  the  other  hand  the 
earliest  records  of  the  white  race  exalt  especially  the  element  of  white- 
ness. The  writer  of  the  Song  of  Solomon  celebrates  his  bride  as 
"  fairest  among  women,"  with  a  neck  "  like  a  tower  of  ivory  ";  and  one 
of  the  oldest  of  Irish  hero  tales,  the  Wooing  of  Emer,  chants  the  praises 
of  "  Tara,  the  whitest  of  maidens."  Though  both  Greeks  and  Egyptians 
were  of  the  dark  type  of  the  Mediterranean  peoples,  their  noblest  gods, 
Apollo  and  Osiris,  were  represented  ''fair  in  hue,  and  with  light  or 
golden  hair." 

The  persistent  admiration  of  an  ideal  leads  to  its  constant  cultivation 
by  careful  preservation  and  sexual  selection.  Thus  the  peoples  who 
have  little  hair  on  the  face  and  body,  as  most  Chinese  and  American 
Indians,  usually  do  not  like  any,  and  carefully  extirpate  it.  The  negroes 
prefer  a  flat  nose,  and  a  child  which  develops  one  of  a  pointed  type 
has  it  artificially  flattened.  In  Melanesia  if  a  child  is  born  of  a  lighter 
hue  than  is  approved  by  the  village,  it  is  assiduously  held  over  the  smoke 
of  a  fire  in  order  to  blacken  it.  The  custom  of  destroying  infants 
markedly  aberrant  from  the  national  type  is  nigh  universal  in  primitive 
life.    Such  usages  served  to  fix  and  perpetuate  the  racial  traits. 

A  yet  more  powerful  factor  was  sexual  preference.  This  worked  in  a 
variety  of  ways.  It  is  well  known  to  stock  breeders  that  the  closer 
animals  are  bred  in  and  in,  that  is,  the  nearer  the  relationship  of  father 
and  mother,  the  more  prominently  the  traits  of  the  parents  appear  in 
their  children  and  become  fixed  in  the  breed.  It  is  evident  that  in  the 
earliest  epoch  of  the  human  family,  the  closest  interbreeding  must  have 
prevailed  without  restriction,  as  it  does  in  every  species  of  the  lower 
animals.  By  its  influences  the  racial  traits  were  rapidly  strengthened 
and  indelibly  impressed.  This,  however,  was  long  before  the  dawn  of 
history,  for  it  is  a  most  remarkable  fact  that  never  in  historic  times  has 
a  tribe  been  known  that  allowed  incestuous  relations,  unless  as  in 
ancient  Egypt  and  Persia,  for  a  sacrificial  or  ceremonial  purpose.  The 
lowest  Australians,  the  degraded  Utes,  look  with  horror  on  the  union  of 
brother  and  sister.  The  general  principle  of  marriage  in  savage  races  is 
that  of  "  exogamy,"  marriage  outside  the  clan  or  family,  the  latter  being 
counted  in  the  female  line  only.  This  strange  but  universal  abhorrence 
has  been  explained  by  Darwin  as  primarily  the  result  of  sexual  indif- 
ference arising  between  members  of  the  same  household,  and  the  high 


POPULATION  OF  THE  STATE  53 

zest  of  novelty  in  that  appetite.  Whatever  the  cause,  the  consequences 
will  easily  be  seen.  The  racial  traits  once  fixed  in  the  period  before 
this  abhorrence  arose  would  remain  largely  stationary  afterwards,  and  by 
exogamous  marriages  would  be  rendered  uniform  over  a  wide  area. 

This  form  of  conscious  selection  has  properly  been  rated  as  one  of 
the  prime  factors  in  the  problem  of  race  differentiation.  The  apparently 
miscellaneous  and  violent  union  of  the  sexes  in  savage  tribes  is  in  fact 
governed  by  the  most  stringent  traditional  laws,  and  their  confused  co- 
habitations are  so  only  to  the  mind  of  the  European  observer,  not  to 
the  tribal  conscience. 

31.  Race  elements  of  the  United  States.  The  following  sum- 
mary of  the  racial  composition  of  the  American  population  is  given 
by  Hart  : 

No  great  modern  country  has  been  so  much  affected  by  the  coming 
in  of  foreigners  as  the  United  States.  In  1900  about  10,500,000  of  its 
residents  were  born  outside  of  the  country :  of  these  nearly  3,000,000 
were  from  Germany  or  other  German-speaking  countries ;  about 
1,800,000  were  Irish  born;  England,  Scotland,  and  Canada  furnished  a 
total  of  1,800,000;  Norway,  Sweden,  and  Denmark,  about  1,000,000; 
Slavs  of  various  origin,  about  1,200,000;  France.  Italy,  and  Mexico 
together,  about  700,000.  In  forty  years  the  number  of  Irish-born 
Americans  has  been  stationary,  the  Germans  have  more  than  doubled, 
and  great  numbers  of  Latin  and  Slav  immigrants  have  come  in  from 
countries  unrepresented  in  i860. 

These  race  elements  are  erratically  distributed.  The  Irish  and  Slavs 
prefer  the  cities,  the  Germans  and  Scandinavians  the  open  country. 
Some  sections  of  the  United  States  have  almost  no  immigrants :  thus,  in 
the  Southern  states,  leaving  out  Texas  and  Missouri,  there  are  only 
about  400,000  foreigners,  —  less  than  are  to  be  found  in  the  single  city 
of  Chicago.  These  foreigners  have  furnished  laborers  and  workmen  for 
the  farm,  for  railroad  building,  and  for  the  factory,  and  they  have 
greatly  contributed  to  the  building  up  of  the  great  Northern  cities. 

In  addition  to  the  10,500,000  immigrants,  nearly  16,000,000  of  our 
countrymen  are  bom  of  a  foreign-born  father  or  mother  or  both  parents ; 
so  that  of  the  75,000,000  Americans,  26,000,000  are  chiefly  of  foreign 
origin,  9,000,000  are  negroes,  and  only  about  40,000,000  are  of  what 
may  be  termed  an  American  stock.  Hardly  in  the  history  of  mankind 
has  a  great  country  received  such  an  influx  of  mixed  population  from 
without ;  and  the  present  prosperity  of  the  republic  is  j^roof  that  this 
foreign  element   upon   the   whole  is   safe,   and   that   in   the  course  of 


54  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

time  most  of  the  descendants  of  foreigners  will  be  absorbed  into  the 
body  politic. 

The  negro  population  of  9,000,000  includes  nearly  every  person  who 
has  any  discoverable  admixture  of  negro  blood,  even  to  the  thirty-second 
degree.  That  population  has  a  large  birth  rate,  but  also  a  large  death 
rate,  and  hence  increases  at  a  ratio  a  little  less  than  that  of  the  neigh- 
boring white  population.  The  negro  population  is  not  altogether 
confined  to  the  Southern  states :  there  are  about  400,000  in  the  states 
from  Maine  to  Pennsylvania,  and  500,000  in  the  states  from  Ohio  to  the 
Dakotas.  In  two  of  the  states  in  the  Union,  Mississippi  and  South 
Carolina,  the  negroes  are  in  excess  of  the  white  population ;  and  in 
Alabama,  Georgia,  and  Florida  they  are  nearly  equal.  In  general  the 
negro  population  tends  to  concentrate  in  the  counties  in  which  there  is 
already  the  largest  number  of  negroes,  and  the  white  population  to  move 
slowly  into  other  parts  of  the  same  state. 

32.  Races  in  Austria-Hungary.  In  this  state  race  elements  are 
peculiarly  diverse  and  cause  grave  problems  in  politics. ^ 

This  curiously  shaped  state  [Austria]  is  divided  into  seventeen  prov- 
inces all  enjoying  extended  political  powers,  and  almost  all  the  theater  of 
struggles  between  two  or  more  of  the  different  races.  Some  idea  of  the 
number  of  distinct  races  in  the  Empire  can,  indeed,  be  gathered  from 
the  fact  that  on  the  assembling  of  the  Reichsrath,  or  parliament,  it  has 
been  found  necessary  to  administer  the  oath  in  eight  different  languages. 
Yet  these  include  only  a  small  part  of  the  tongues  and  dialects  that  are 
spoken  in  the  land.  Among  the  many  races  that  inhabit  Austria  there 
are,  however,  only  five  important  enough  to  have  a  marked  influence  on 
politics.  These  are :  first,  the  Germans,  who  comprise  scarcely  more 
than  a  third  of  the  population,  but  possess  a  much  larger  share  of  the 
wealth  and  culture.  They  are  scattered  more  or  less  thickly  all  through 
the  country,  and  predominate  along  the  Danube  and  in  the  provinces 
immediately  to  the  south  of  it.  Second,  the  Bohemians,  or  Czechs,  who 
are  the  next  most  powerful  race,  and  compose  a  majority  of  the  people 
in  Bohemia  and  Moravia.  Third,  the  Poles,  who  form  a  compact  mass 
in  Galicia.  Fourth,  the  Slowenians  and  other  Slavs,  living  chiefly  in  the 
southern  provinces  in  the  direction  of  Trieste.  And  fifth,  the  Italians, 
who  are  to  be  found  in  the  southern  part  of  the  Tyrol,  and  in  the  sea- 
ports along  the  Adriatic.  .  .  . 

There  are  four  leading  races  in  Hungary,  the  Magyar,  the  Slav,  the 
German,  and  the  Roumanian.    The  oldest  of  these  is  the  Roumanian, 

1  P)y  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 


POPULATION  OF  THE  STATE 


55 


which  claims  to  have  sprung  from  the  Roman  colonists  and  the  Roman- 
ized natives  near  the  mouths  of  the  Danube,  and  the  members  of  the 
race  certainly  speak  a  language  that  has  a  close  affinity  with  Latin. 
They  live  in  the  eastern  part  of  the  kingdom,  and  are  especially  numer- 
ous in  Transylvania.  .  .  . 

The  Slavs  are,  no  doubt,  the  next  most  ancient  race  in  Hungary, 
although  the  precise  time  of  their  migration  into  the  country  is  obscure. 
They  are  now  broken  up  into  two  distinct  branches,  that  of  the  Slowa- 
chians  in  the  north;  and  that  of  the  Croats  and  Serbs,  who  inhabit  Croatia, 
in  the  southwest,  and  extend  along  the  whole  southern  border  of  the 
kingdom.   .  .   . 

The  Teutonic  hordes  that  swept  over  Hungary  at  the  time  of  the 
downfall  of  the  Roman  Empire  of  the  west  have  left  no  permanent 
traces,  and  the  Germans  who  live  there  to-day  are  descended  from  the 
more  peaceful  immigrants  of  later  times.  They  are  found  in  consider- 
able numbers  in  the  cities  throughout  the  center  of  the  land  from  west 
to  east,  but  nowhere  do  they  form  the  bulk  of  the  population,  except  in 
certain  parts  of  Transylvania.  Here  at  the  end  of  the  twelfth  century 
a  large  colony  of  Saxons  was  established,  who  preserved  their  Teutonic 
culture,  and  were  allowed  to  govern  their  cities  after  their  own 
customs.   .  .    . 

The  Magyars,  who  live  chiefly  in  the  vast  plains  that  cover  the 
center  and  west  of  Hungary,  although  a  decided  minority  of  the  whole 
people,  are  the  most  numerous  and  by  far  the  most  powerful  of  the 
races.  They  have  ruled  the  country  ever  since  their  first  invasion  at 
the  close  of  the  ninth  century,  and  in  fact  they  regard  it  as  peculiarly, 
and  one  may  almost  say  exclusively,  their  own.  This  people  is  of 
Turanian  origin,  but  with  their  conversion  to  Christianity  under  Stephen, 
their  first  king  (997-1038),  they  acquired  the  civilization  of  the  west, 
and  lost  their  Asiatic  traditions.  The  fact  that  the  Magyars  are  not 
Aryans  has  probably  been  one  of  the  chief  causes  of  their  failure  to 
assimilate  the  other  races,  but  in  some  ways  it  has  been  a  source  of 
strength.  It  has  prevented  them  from  looking  for  support  and  sym- 
pathy, like  the  Germans  and  the  Slavs,  to  their  kindred  in  neighboring 
countries,  and  thus  by  making  them  self-dependent  has  increased  their 
cohesion  and  intensified  their  patriotism. 

33.  The  race  problem  in  modern  colonial  empires.  The  question 
of  racial  difficulties  that  must  be  met  by  modern  colonizing  states 
is  suggestively  treated  by  Coolidge  :  ^ 

^  Copyright,  190S,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


56  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

The  treatment  of  alien  races  gives  rise  to  complex  questions,  some  of 
them  of  infinite  difficult}'.  The  simplest  ones  relate  to  the  peoples  low- 
est in  the  social  scale.  It  is  comparatively  easy  to  rule  over  mere 
savages,  especially  if  they  are,  like  the  natives  of  tropical  Africa,  far 
enough  away ;  for  in  such  cases  firmness,  honest}-,  patience,  and  com- 
mon sense,  qualities  in  which  the  English  as  colonial  administrators  have 
been  preeminent,  are  the  chief  requisites.  It  is  another  matter  to 
handle  people  with  a  higher  grade  of  intelligence  and  with  a  history  and 
civilization  of  their  own,  such  as  the  Hindus,  the  Egyptians,  or  the 
^\rabs  of  Algeria  and  Tunis ;  for  the  more  that  is  done  to  educate  them 
and  to  improve  their  condition,  the  more  impatient  they  become  at 
being  kept  in  a  state  of  political  inferiorit}-. 

Every  nation  holding  colonies  will  have  to  face  such  problems  sooner 
or  later.  In  this  respect  the  Germans  have  least  to  trouble  them ;  for 
their  outlying  possessions  are  not  numerous,  and  the  few  they  have  are 
inhabited  by  peoples  who  are  in  such  a  low  state  of  civilization  that  it 
will  be  long  before  they  can  claim  self-government  of  any  kind.  Many 
Germans,  to  be  sure,  think  of  the  Poles  within  their  own  boundaries  as 
an  inferior  breed ;  but  this  inferiority  would  vanish  at  once  if  only  the 
Poles  would  consent  to  be  Germanized.  Greater  France  contains  more 
subjects  than  citizens,  and  the  British  Empire  has  some  six  inhabitants 
of  the  subject  races  to  one  of  the  ruling  people.  Both  empires  include  — 
one  in  north,  the  other  in  south,  Africa  —  possessions  of  the  kind  most 
difficult  to  manage  ;  namely,  those  where  the  native  population  is  in- 
creasing rapidly,  but  where  there  are  also  not  merely  a  few  officials  and 
merchants,  but  a  large  body  of  immigrant  colonists.  The  same  thing  is 
true  of  Japan  in  Korea.  It  is  in  such  cases,  when  conquerors  and  con- 
quered meet  in  every  walk  of  life,  that  it  is  hardest  to  establish 
good  relations  between  them.  The  arrogance  of  the  privileged  poor 
white  or  the  coolie  is  more  galling  than  the  domination  of  the  official ; 
and  the  task  of  the  home  government  in  reconciling  the  support  which 
it  is  obliged  to  give  its  colonists  with  its  duty  toward  the  natives  under 
its  rule  is  arduous  in  the  extreme.  France  and  Great  Britain,  however, 
enjoy,  like  Germany,  the  immense  blessing  of  having  no  race  questions 
in  their  home  countries,  no  populations  of  different  color:  whatever 
may  happen  at  a  distance,  house  and  home  at  least  are  secure  from  the 
horrors  of  race  war.  In  this  respect  Russia  is  less  favorably  situated,  for 
her  various  peoples  all  live  in  one  unbroken  block  of  territory,  though 
most  of  them  are  within  fairly  definite  separate  areas.  But  they  shade 
into  one  another  to  such  an  extent  that  it  would  be  hard  to  say  just 
where  the  inferior  peoples  begin.  From  top  to  bottom  there  is  no  such 
gap  as  there  is  between  the  American  and  the  negro. 


POPULATION  OF  THE  STATE  57 

Of  all  countries,  the  United  States  is  afflicted  with  the  most  com- 
plicated race  problems.  The  Filipinos  and  the  Hawaiians  are  indeed  far 
away,  and  America  could  get  along  pretty  well  without  them ;  but  inside 
her  own  borders  are  populations  whose  presence  brings  with  it  diffi- 
culties that  tax  all  the  wisdom  of  her  statesmen  and  make  every  demand 
on  the  self-control,  not  to  say  the  generosity,  of  her  citizens.  Of  these 
populations,  only  an  insignificant  fraction  represents  the  original  dis- 
possessed inhabitants ;  the  vast  majority  have  inherited  an  even  worse 
grievance,  for  they  are  the  descendants  of  imported  slaves.  The  proper 
treatment  of  these  people  is  a  matter  of  momentous  importance  for  the 
future  of  the  republic. 

34.  The  destiny  of  races.  Brinton  discusses  the  indications  that 
inferior  races  are  disappearing,  and  comments  on  the  rapid  increase 
of  the  Eurafrican  race. 

Beginning  at  home,  we  may  first  inquire  concerning  the  Am_erican 
race.  The  question.  Are  the  Indians  dying  out  ?  was  investigated  some 
years  ago  by  learned  authorities  at  Washington,  who  announced  the 
cheerful  result  that,  contrary  to  the  universal  opinion,  the  red  man  is 
not  decreasing  at  all,  but  increasing  in  numbers !  .   .   . 

My  own  studies  convince  me  that  the  American  race  is  and  has  long 
been  disappearing,  both  actually,  tribe  by  tribe,  and  relatively,  by 
admixture  with  the  whites.  .  .  .  Beginning  at  the  north  with  the 
Eskimos  we  find  their  number  steadily  diminishing.  .  .  .  The  same  is 
true  all  over  the  Continent.  The  American  Indian  as  such  is  destined 
to  disappear  before  European  civilization.  If  he  retains  his  habits  he 
will  be  exterminated  ;  if  he  aims  to  preserve  an  unmixed  descent,  he  will 
be  crushed  out  by  disease  and  competition  ;  his  only  resource  is  to  blend 
his  race  with  the  whites,  and  this  infallibly  means  his  disappearance 
from  the  scene. 

The  Island  World,  extending  from  Easter  Island  to  Madagascar, 
presents  the  same  spectacle.  .  .  .  This  extreme  fatality  has  received  the 
earnest  attention  of  philanthropists  and  scientific  physicians.  Its  causes 
are  visible.  They  are  the  introduction  of  new  epidemics,  as  measles, 
smallpox,  syphilis  and  consumption,  the  last  mentioned  peculiarly  fatal, 
and  now  recognized  as  eminently  contagious  under  certain  conditions ; 
an  increased  infant  mortality ;  drunkenness  and  its  consequences ;  and 
diminished  fecundity  in  the  women.   .  .  . 

Add  to  the  death-rate  the  considerable  percentage  of  children  who 
are  bom  of  unions  with  the  White,  the  Asian  or  the  African  races,  and 
are  thus  no  longer  representatives  of  the  ancestral  stock,  and  we  must 


58  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

acknowledge  that  these  insular  peoples  are  in  no  better,  even  a  worse 
case  than  the  American  Indians.  They,  too,  are  sitting  beneath  the 
Damocles  sword  of  extinction. 

We  have  been  taught  in  this  country  to  look  with  something  like 
terror  on  the  teeming  millions  of  China,  only  awaiting  the  chance  to 
overrun  the  whole  earth,  underbid  all  other  laborers,  profit  by  the  fruits 
of  our  more  liberal  governments  and  nobler  religions,  and  give  nothing 
in  return.  A  few  centuries  ago  a  still  more  dreadful  fear  haunted  the 
nations  of  Europe  that  some  other  Timurlane  or  Genghis  Khan  would 
lead  his  countless  hordes  of  merciless  Mongolians  from  the  steppes  of 
Siberia  across  the  cultivated  fields  of  the  Danube  to  wipe  out,  as  with  a 
sponge,  the  glorious  picture  of  renascent  European  culture. 

The  latter  fear  no  longer  disturbs  any  mind.  The  mightiest  of  the 
Tartar  powers  is  but  a  shadow,  maintained  by  the  mutual  jealousy  of 
Europeans  themselves ;  the  illimitable  steppes  of  Tartary  and  Mongolia 
acknowledge  the  suzerainty  of  the  Slavonian ;  and  the  nomadic  hordes 
of  the  steppes  and  tundras  are  steadily  diminishing  under  the  same 
baneful  influences  of  civilization  which  are  blighting  the  Australian  and 
the  American. 

Whether  this  is  true  also  of  the  Sinitic  stocks,  especially  of  the  Chi- 
nese, we  have  no  positive  information.  It  has  been  rumored  that  of  late 
years  repeated  periods  of  drought,  resulting  in  disastrous  famine,  have 
materially  reduced  the  population  of  the  interior  of  China,  many  perish- 
ing and  others  removing  nearer  the  coast.  As  it  is  only  near  the  coast 
that  foreigners  have  the  opportunity  to  observe  the  people,  it  is  likely 
that  they  bring  away  an  exaggerated  notion  of  the  density  of  population 
in  the  country  at  large.  It  is  at  any  rate  doubtful  if  the  Chinese  are 
more  than  stationary. 

Widely  different  is  the  vista  which  appears  before  us  when  we  contem- 
plate the  Eurafrican  race.  It  goes  forth  conquering  and  to  conquer, 
extending  its  empire  over  all  continents  and  to  the  remotest  islands  of 
the  sea.  Never  has  that  progress  been  so  rapid  as  to-day.  Two  centuries 
ago  the  whole  of  the  white  race  which  could  lay  claim  to  purity  of  blood 
numbered  not  over  one  hundred  millions,  or  ten  per  cent,  of  the  popula- 
tion of  the  world,  and  was  confined  to  the  limits  of  Europe  and  North 
Africa ;  now  the  European  branch  of  it  alone  counts  nearly  five  hundred 
millions,  or  one  third  of  the  whole.  In  the  year  1800,  the  nonresident 
whites  of  European  descent  were  ten  millions  ;  now  they  are  over  eighty 
millions.  Every  navy  and  every  army  of  any  fighting  capacity  belong  to 
the  European  whites  and  their  descendants.  No  nation  and  no  race  of 
other  lineage  dare  withstand  an  attack  or  disobey  an  order  from  a  lead- 
ing European  power.    Africa  and  Asia  are  dismembered  and  parceled 


POPULATION  OF  THE  STATE  59 

out  at  London,  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg,  and  no  one  dreams  of  asking 
the  consent  of  the  inhabitants  of  those  continents. 

This  astonishing  progress  is  not  due  alone  to  the  North  Mediterranean 
branch  of  the  Eurafrican  race.  The  representatives  of  the  South  Med- 
iterranean branch  are  for  a  large  part  in  it.  In  the  forefront  of  it, 
whether  in  the  great  capitals  of  Europe  or  in  the  pioneer  towns  of  the 
frontiers,  we  find  the  acute  and  versatile  Semite  full  of  energy  and  knowl- 
edge, guiding  in  councils,  his  master  hand  on  the  levers  of  the  vastest 
financial  schemes,  his  subtle  policy  governing  the  diplomacy  of  statesmen 
and  the  decisions  of  directors.  As  Professor  Gerland  has  well  said,  there 
is  something  in  the  Semitic  character  which  is  complementary  to  that  of  the 
Aryan,  and  it  is  not  without  significance  that  the  surprising  development 
of  the  latter  began  when  the  religious  prejudices  against  the  Jews  com- 
menced to  yield  to  more  enlightened  sentiments.  They  are  now  the  grow- 
ing people.  Statistics  show  that  in  Europe,  while  the  Aryac  population 
doubles  in  number  in  thirty-four  years,  the  Semites  double  in  twenty-five 
years,  having  more  children  to  a  marriage  and  less  infantile  mortality. 
When  bigotry  ceases  on  both  sides,  and  free  intermarriage  restores  the 
Aryo-Semitic  stock  to  its  original  unity,  we  may  look  for  a  race  of  nobler 
capacities  than  any  now  existing. 

Ill,  Nationality 
35.  Nationality  and  the  formation  of  states.    The  part  played 
by  the  spirit  of  nationality  in  the  formation  of  modern  states  is 
thus  stated  by  Bluntschli  : 

At  all  times  in  the  history  of  the  world  nationality  has  had  a  powerful 
influence  on  States  and  on  politics.  It  was  the  sense  of  national  kinship 
and  national  freedom  which  inspired  the  Greeks  in  their  struggle  with 
Persia,  and  the  Germans  in  their  conflict  with  the  Romans.  Differences 
of  nationality  were  at  the  root  of  the  division  of  the  Roman  world  be- 
tween the  Latin  and  Greek  emperors.  The  split  in  the  Frankish  mon- 
archy, and  the  separation  of  France  and  (jcrmany,  was  largely  due  to  the 
difference  between  the  Roman  and  German  languages.  Even  in  the 
middle  ages  differences  of  nationality  at  times  became  prominent.  But 
it  was  not  till  the  present  age  that  the  principle  of  nationality  was  asserted 
as  a  definite  political  principle.  During  the  middle  ages  the  State  was 
based  on  dynastic  or  class  interests,  and  was  rather  territorial  than 
national.  Later  centuries  saw  the  growth  of  the  great  European  peoples, 
but  the  State  did  not  as  yet  gain  a  basis  of  nationality  nor  a  national 
expression  :  it  developed  a  magisterial  character,  finding  a  center  in  the 
king  and  his  officials.   .   .   . 


6o  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

When  Napoleon,  at  the  beginning  of  this  century,  attempted  to  revive 
the  empire  of  Charles  the  Great,  and,  resting  on  the  French  people  as  a 
support,  to  erect  a  universal  monarchy  over  Europe,  he  found  a  stum- 
blingblock  in  the  other  peoples,  who  regarded  the  French  rule  with  dis- 
gust and  hatred.  In  spite  of  his  genius,  national  resistance  proved  too 
strong  for  the  Emperor  who  could  not  appreciate  nationality.  Even  then 
the  sense  of  nationality  was  only  imperfectly  developed.  Though  the  sen- 
timent was  at  work  among  the  unconscious  masses,  the  spirit  of  national- 
ity was  not  yet  aroused.  Even  the  stubborn  and  enduring  hatred  of  the 
English  for  the  French  was  not  so  much  based  on  a  desire  of  freeing 
nationalities  from  French  oppression,  as  on  the  hatred  of  the  English 
aristocracy  for  the  French  Revolution,  on  fear  of  French  preponderance 
in  Europe,  and  on  commercial  interests. 

The  English,  in  spite  of  the  heightened  political  consciousness  which 
springs  from  their  manly  pride  and  sense  of  law,  distrust  nationality  as  a 
political  principle.  They  know  that  their  island  kingdom  includes  differ- 
ent nationalities,  and  that  the  national  feeling  of  the  Celtic  Irish  has  more 
than  once  threatened  the  unity  of  the  State.  Their  Indian  Empire,  too, 
might  be  endangered  by  too  strong  an  insistence  on  nationality.  The 
Spaniards,  in  their  struggle  with  the  French,  felt  their  own  unity  as  a 
nation,  and  hated  the  French  as  foreigners  :  but  they  regarded  it  not  so 
much  as  a  struggle  for  nationality,  as  a  war  for  their  legitimate  prince 
and  the  Catholic  religion  against  the  fiends  of  the  Revolution.  The  Ger- 
mans, owing  to  the  differences  of  religion  and  the  disintegration  of  the 
empire  into  independent  dynastic  kingdoms,  had  lost  all  sense  of  national- 
ity in  politics,  and  only  a  few  educated  people  listened  to  the  inspiring 
words  of  Fichte  and  songs  of  Amdt,  when  they  tried  to  revive  it.  The 
Russians  went  to  battle  and  to  death  to  defend  their  Czar  and  his  holy 
empire  against  the  godless  West :  they  had  no  thought  for  their  claims 
as  a  nation.  The  French  Revolution  vaguely  proclaimed  the  principle  of 
the  independence  of  nationalities,  but  it  was  trodden  under  foot  at  the 
Restoration.  The  Congress  of  Vienna,  with  utter  disregard  of  national 
rights,  distributed  fragments  of  great  peoples  among  the  restored  dynas- 
ties. As  Poland  had  been  already  divided  among  Russia,  Austria,  and 
Prussia,  so  now  Italy  and  Germany  were  cut  up  into  a  number  of  sov- 
ereign states,  and  Belgium  and  Holland  pieced  together  into  one  king- 
dom, in  spite  of  conflicting  nationalities. 

The  fact  that  neither  the  statesmen  of  the  Revolution  nor  those  of  the 
Restoration  recognized  nationality  as  a  political  principle  makes  its  influ- 
ence on  the  political  history  of  to-day  more  marked  and  striking.  Science, 
especially  in  Germany  and  Italy,  had  already  pointed  to  the  idea  of 
nationality,  and  hinted  at  its  consequences  in  politics.     But  only  since 


POPULATION  OF  THE  STATE  6 1 

about  1840  has  the  natural  right  of  Peoples  to  express  themselves  in  the 
State  been  appealed  to  as  a  practical  principle.  The  impulses  to  na- 
tionality were  roused  more  strongly  than  ever  before,  even  among  the 
masses,  and  demanded  satisfaction  in  politics.  Peoples  desired  to  give 
their  union  a  political  form  and  to  become  Nations.  The  dynastic  system 
which  European  States  had  inherited  from  the  middle  ages  was  now 
threatened  by  national  demands  and  passions.  Austria  especially  was 
shaken  by  the  consequent  striving  for  independence  among  its  various 
nationalities.  The  foundation  of  a  united  Italy  and  of  the  German  Em- 
pire was  inspired  by  the  idea  of  nationality  which  gathered  the  scattered 
members  of  one  people  and  organized  them  in  one  State.  The  power  of 
this  national  impulse  is  unquestionable,  though  its  limits  are  not  so  certain. 

Nationality  clearly  has  a  closer  and  stronger  connection  with  the  State 
than  with  the  Church,  for  it  is  easier  for  the  Church  to  be  universal. 
The  State  is  an  organized  nation,  and  nations  receive  their  character  and 
spirit  mainly  from  the  peoples  which  live  in  the  State.  Hence  there  is  a 
natural  connection  and  constant  interaction  between  People  and  Nation. 

A  people  is  not  a  political  society ;  but  if  it  is  really  conscious  of  its 
community  of  spirit  and  civilization,  it  is  natural  that  it  should  ask  to 
develop  this  into  a  full  personality  with  a  common  will  which  can  express 
itself  in  act ;  in  fact,  to  become  a  State. 

36.  Nationality  in  modern  politics.  The  emphasis  placed  upon 
national  unity  by  modern  states,  and  their  efforts  to  secure  it  at  all 
costs,  is  clearly  brought  out  in  the  following  :  ^ 

In  spite  of  the  cosmopolitan  tendencies  of  modern  socialism,  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  the  spirit  of  nationality  in  one  form  or  another  is  still  a 
tremendous  political  force.  The  last  hundred  years  are  full  of  examples 
of  its  action  in  building  up  and  in  destroying.  By  welding  together  into 
national  communities  states  long  separated,  and  by  throwing  off  foreign 
dominion,  it  has  forged  modem  Germany,  Italy,  Roumania,  Greece,  Ser- 
via  and  Bulgaria.  It  has  nerved  the  resistance  of  Poles,  Finns,  Armeni- 
ans, and  others  against  the  attempts  of  alien  peoples  to  absorb  them. 
Under  its  influence,  Norway  has  separated  herself  from  Sweden,  Austria 
is  in  peril  of  going  to  pieces,  and  even  Great  Britain  is  weakened  by  Irish 
disaffection.  But  the  same  spirit  of  nationality  that  awakens  the  longing 
for  independence  also  leads  to  the  persecution  of  recalcitrant  minorities. 
Race  conflicts  to-day  are  as  intense  in  their  fierceness  as  the  religious 
ones  of  earlier  times,  and  are  even  harder  to  adjust  by  fair  compromise. 
When  favored  by  fortune,  the  oppressed  easily  become  the  oppressors. 
1  Copyright,  1908,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


62  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

Governments  and  nations  fear,  and  not  without  reason,  that  what  is  at 
first  harmless  pride  in  race  and  language  on  the  part  of  some  minority 
may  easily  take  the  form  of  political  sedition  dangerous  to  the  existence 
of  the  state.  If  the  American  republic  is  ever  threatened  with  the  forma- 
tion of  distinct  national  communities  within  its  borders,  its  unity  for  the 
future  will  cease  to  be  secure. 

One  difficulty  in  dealing  with  all  such  topics  as  this  is  the  looseness  in 
meaning  of  the  terms  we  have  to  use.  When  we  speak  of  a  nation,  we 
usually  have  in  mind  an  independent  people  with  a  common  language ; 
but  the  Swiss,  the  Belgians,  the  Austrians,  are  nations  and  each  com- 
posed of  several  nationalities  with  equally  acknowledged  rights.  Nor 
need  a  nation  be  all  of  the  same  race,  —  according  to  the  Fifteenth  Amend- 
ment to  the  Constitution,  the  people  of  the  United  States  are  not.  Nor 
is  it  always  politically  independent :  the  Poles  are  a  nation,  though  they 
are  under  several  governments  ;  and  the  term  is  sometimes  applied  to  the 
Jews,  who  have  neither  a  common  speech  nor  a  common  dwelling  place. 
Nevertheless,  as  the  history  of  the  last  century  has  shown,  the  tendency 
nowadays  is  for  nations  and  nationalities  to  correspond  as  nearly  as  may 
be,  and  for  the  idea  of  nationality  to  be  based  on  language  alone,  regard- 
less of  descent  or  of  the  preferences  of  those  concerned,  —  a  tendency 
which  the  French  have  experienced  to  their  cost  in  the  case  of  Alsace, 
which  was  taken  away  from  them  on  the  ground  that  its  inhabitants  were 
Germans,  whether  they  wanted  to  be  or  not,  and  hence  properly  belonged 
to  Germany.  The  movement  known  as  Pan-Germanism  is  a  logical  out- 
come of  the  same  theory.  The  earlier  nationalistic  movements  proclaimed 
the  right  of  peoples  to  determine  their  own  destinies ;  the  later  exten- 
sions have  tended  to  look  on  nationality  as  a  sort  of  higher  law  which  is 
as  much  justified  in  overriding  the  opposition  of  minorities  as  were  the 
Northern  States  of  the  Union  in  putting  down  the  rebellion  of  the  South- 
ern. Such  a  doctrine  may  easily  be  pushed  to  great  lengths  :  sweet  reason- 
ableness, not  to  say  common  fairness,  is  seldom  a  characteristic  of  ardent 
champions  of  nationality,  who,  as  a  rule,  calmly  overlook  the  most  obvious 
inconsistencies,  and  while  warmly  advocating  a  policy  for  the  assimilation 
of  all  alien  elements  at  home,  cry  out  oppression  if  the  same  treatment 
is  given  to  those  of  their  ilk  in  foreign  lands.  The  German  who  favors 
severe  measures  in  order  to  denationalize  the  Poles  in  Posen  is  sure  to 
be  full  of  indignation  at  the  way  in  which  the  German  language  is  dis- 
criminated against  in  Hungary  and  in  the  Baltic  provinces ;  and  many 
an  American  who  has  condemned  the  iniquity  of  trying  to  Russianize  the 
Finns  or  the  Armenians  believes  as  a  matter  of  course  that  the  English 
language  should  be  imposed  as  soon  as  possible  on  the  inhabitants  of 
Porto  Rico. 


POPULATION  OF  ITIK  STATE  63 

37.  Nationalism  in  recent  politics.  Reinsch  points  out  the  im- 
portance of  nationalism  and  the  dangers  of  its  exaggeration  :  ^ 

When  we  view  the  historical  development  of  the  world  since  the 
Renaissance,  we  find  that  the  one  principle  about  which  the  wealth  of 
facts  can  be  harmoniously  grouped  is  that  of  nationalism.  Ever  since  the 
world-state  ideals  of  the  Middle  Ages  were  left  behind,  this  principle  has 
been  the  touchstone  of  true  statesmanship.  The  reputation  of  a  states- 
man, as  well  as  his  permanent  influence  on  human  affairs,  depends  on 
his  power  to  understand  and  aid  the  historical  evolution,  from  out  the 
medieval  chaos,  of  strong  national  states.   .   .   . 

Especially  during  the  nineteenth  century  has  nationalism  been  a  con- 
scious influence  in  political  life.  The  nations  that,  at  its  beginning,  had 
partly  achieved  their  independent  political  existence,  have  since  been 
striving  for  the  attainment  of  completely  self-sufficing  life ;  while  those 
races  that  regard  themselves  as  unjustly  held  in  bondage  by  others  have 
been  engaged  in  a  stern  struggle  to  obtain  national  independence.  .  .  . 

It  has  thus  come  about  that  the  successful  nations  have  developed  a 
clearly  marked  individuality.  The  cosmopolitanism  of  the  Middle  Ages 
and  of  the  Renaissance,  the  dreams  of  world  unity,  have  been  replaced 
by  a  set  of  narrower  national  ideals  concerning  customs,  laws,  literature, 
and  art,  —  by  a  community  of  independent  states,  each  striving  to  realize 
to  the  fullest  its  individual  aptitudes  and  characteristics.  .  .   . 

It  will,  however,  be  difficult  to  preserve  a  balance  of  this  kind,  as  the 
nationalistic  principle  bears  within  it  the  possible  source  of  its  own 
destruction,  and  unless  carefully  guarded  against  exaggeration,  will  of 
itself  lead  to  a  disturbance  of  the  equilibrium  upon  which  the  diversity  of 
our  civilization  depends.  W'ithin  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, nationalism  has  been  thus  exaggerated ;  going  beyond  a  healthy 
desire  to  express  the  true  native  characteristics  of  a  people,  it  has  come,  in 
some  quarters,  to  mean  the  decrying,  as  barbarous  or  decadent,  of  every- 
thing originating  outside  of  the  national  boundary.  Within  the  state  itself, 
there  is  a  growing  tendency  to  enforce,  by  custom  and  law,  absolute  uni- 
formity of  characteristics.  Languages  and  literatures  peculiar  to  smaller 
communities  are  not  encouraged,  the  effort  being  rather  made  to  replace 
them  by  the  national  language.  In  international  politics  the  motives  of 
foreign  nations  are  being  constantly  misunderstood.  Each  nation  looks 
upon  itself  as  the  bearer  of  the  only  true  civilization.  .  .  .  Even  in  art 
and  science,  perhaps  the  most  cosmopolitan  of  all  pursuits,  this  national- 
izing tendency  has  left  its  mark. 

1  Copyright,  1900,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


64  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

IV.  Political  Genius  of  Various  Nations 

38.  Influences  that  affect  the  natural  ability  of  nations.  Galton 
points  out  certain  conditions  that  affect  national  ability : 

I  shall  have  occasion  to  show  that  certain  influences  retard  the  aver- 
age age  of  marriage,  while  others  hasten  it ;  and  the  general  character  of 
my  argument  will  be  to  prove,  that  an  enormous  effect  upon  the  average 
natural  ability  of  a  race  may  be  produced  by  means  of  those  influences. 
I  shall  argue  that  the  wisest  policy  is  that  which  results  in  retarding  the 
average  age  of  marriage  among  the  weak,  and  in  hastening  it  among 
the  vigorous  classes ;  whereas,  most  unhappily  for  us,  the  influence  of 
numerous  social  agencies  has  been  strongly  and  banefully  exerted  in 
the  precisely  opposite  direction.  .  .  . 

The  average  age  of  marriage  affects  population  in  a  threefold  manner. 
Firstly,  those  who  marry  when  young  have  the  larger  families  ;  secondly, 
they  produce  more  generations  within  a  given  period,  and  therefore  the 
growth  of  a  prolific  race,  progressing  as  it  does,  "  geometrically,"  would 
be  vastly  increased  at  the  end  of  a  long  period  by  a  habit  of  early  mar- 
riages ;  and,  thirdly,  more  generations  are  alive  at  the  same  time  among 
those  races  who  marry  when  they  are  young.   ... 

The  time  may  hereafter  arrive,  in  far  distant  years,  when  the  popula- 
tion of  the  earth  shall  be  kept  as  strictly  within  the  bounds  of  number 
and  suitability  of  race  as  the  sheep  on  a  well-ordered  moor,  or  the  plants 
in  an  orchard  house ;  in  the  meantime,  let  us  do  what  we  can  to  encour- 
age the  multiplication  of  the  races  best  fitted  to  invent  and  conform  to  a 
high  and  generous  civilization,  and  not,  out  of  a  mistaken  instinct  of 
giving  support  to  the  weak,  prevent  the  incoming  of  strong  and 
hearty  individuals. 

The  long  period  of  the  dark  ages  under  which  Europe  has  lain  is  due, 
I  believe  in  a  very  considerable  degree,  to  the  celibacy  enjoined  by 
religious  orders  on  their  votaries.  Whenever  a  man  or  woman  was  pos- 
sessed of  a  gentle  nature  that  fitted  him  or  her  to  deeds  of  charity,  to 
meditation,  to  literature,  or  to  art,  the  social  condition  of  the  time  was 
such  that  they  had  no  refuge  elsewhere  than  in  the  bosom  of  the  Church. 
But  the  Church  chose  to  preach  and  exact  celibacy.  The  consequence 
was  that  these  gentle  natures  had  no  continuance,  and  thus,  by  a  policy 
so  singularly  unwise  and  suicidal  that  I  am  hardly  able  to  speak  of  it 
without  impatience,  the  Church  brutalized  the  breed  of  our  forefathers. 
She  acted  precisely  as  if  she  had  aimed  at  selecting  the  rudest  portion  of 
the  community  to  be,  alone,  the  parents  of  future  generations.  She  prac- 
ticed the  arts  which  breeders  would  use  who  aimed  at  creating  ferocious, 


POPULATION  OF  THE  STATE  65 

currish  and  stupid  natures.  No  wonder  that  club  law  prevailed  for  cen- 
turies over  Europe ;  the  wonder  rather  is  that  enough  good  remained  in 
the  veins  of  Europeans  to  enable  their  race  to  rise  to  its  present,  very 
moderate  level  of  natural  morality. 

The  policy  of  the  religious  world  in  Europe  was  exerted  in  another 
direction,  with  hardly  less  cruel  effect  on  the  nature  of  future  generations, 
by  means  of  persecutions  which  brought  thousands  of  the  foremost 
thinkers  and  men  of  political  aptitudes  to  the  scaffold,  or  imprisoned 
them  during  a  large  part  of  their  manhood,  or  drove  them  as  emigrants 
into  other  lands.  In  every  one  of  these  cases,  the  check  upon  their  leav- 
ing issue  was  very  considerable.  Hence  the  Church,  having  first  cap- 
tured all  the  gentle  natures  and  condemned  them  to  celibacy,  made 
another  sweep  of  her  huge  nets,  this  time  fishing  in  stirring  waters,  to 
catch  those  who  were  the  most  fearless,  truth-seeking,  and  intelligent  in 
their  modes  of  thought,  and  therefore  the  most  suitable  parents  of  a  high 
civilization,  and  put  a  strong  check,  if  not  a  direct  stop,  to  their  progeny. 
Those  she  reserved  on  these  occasions  to  breed  the  generations  of  the 
future  were  the  servile,  the  indifferent,  and,  again,  the  stupid.  Thus,  as 
she  —  to  repeat  my  expression  —  brutalized  human  nature  by  her  system 
of  celibacy  applied  to  the  gentle,  she  demoralized  it  by  her  system  of 
persecution  of  the  intelligent,  the  sincere,  and  the  free.   .  .  . 

It  is  very  remarkable  how  large  a  proportion  of  the  eminent  men  of 
all  countries  bear  foreign  names,  and  are  the  children  of  political 
refugees,  —  men  well  qualified  to  introduce  a  valuable  strain  of  blood. 
We  cannot  fail  to  reflect  on  the  glorious  destiny  of  a  country  that 
should  maintain,  during  many  generations,  the  policy  of  attracting 
eminently  desirable  refugees,  but  no  others,  and  of  encouraging  their 
settlement  and  the  naturalization  of  their  children. 

No  nation  has  parted  with  more  emigrants  than  England,  but  whether 
she  has  hitherto  been  on  the  whole  a  gainer  or  a  loser  by  the  practice,  I 
am  not  sure.  No  doubt  she  has  lost  a  very  large  number  of  families  of 
sterling  worth,  especially  of  laborers  and  artisans ;  but,  as  a  rule,  the 
very  ablest  men  are  strongly  disinclined  to  emigrate  ;  they  feel  that  their 
fortune  is  assured  at  home,  and  unless  their  spirit  of  adventure  is  over- 
whelmingly strong,  they  prefer  to  live  in  the  high  intellectual  and  moral 
atmosphere  of  the  more  intelligent  circles  of  English  society,  to  a  self- 
banishment  among  people  of  altogether  lower  grades  of  mind  and  inter- 
ests. England  has  certainly  got  rid  of  a  great  deal  of  refuse  through 
means  of  emigration.  She  has  found  an  outlet  for  men  of  adventurous 
and  Bohemian  natures,  who  are  excellently  adapted  for  colonizing  a 
new  country,  but  are  not  wanted  in  old  civilizations ;  and  she  has  also 
been  disembarrassed  of  a  vast  number  of  turbulent  radicals  and  the  like, 


66  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

men  who  are  decidedly  able  but  by  no  means  eminent,  and  whose  zeal, 
self-confidence,  and  irreverence  far  outbalance  their  other  qualities. 

The  rapid  rise  of  new  colonies  and  the  decay  of  old  civilizations  is,  I 
believe,  mainly  due  to  their  respective  social  agencies,  which  in  the  one 
case  promote,  and  in  the  other  case  retard,  the  marriages  of  the  most 
suitable  breeds.  In  a  young  colony,  a  strong  arm  and  an  enterprising 
brain  are  the  most  appropriate  fortune  for  a  marrying  man,  and  again,  as 
the  women  are  few,  the  inferior  males  are  seldom  likely  to  marry.  .  .  . 

The  best  form  of  civilization  in  respect  to  the  improvement  of  the 
race,  would  be  one  in  which  society  was  not  costly  ;  where  incomes  were 
chiefly  derived  from  professional  sources,  and  not  much  through  inherit- 
ance; where  every  lad  had  a  chance  of  showing  his  abilities,  and,  if 
highly  gifted,  was  enabled  to  achieve  a  first-class  education  and  entrance 
into  professional  life,  by  the  liberal  help  of  the  exhibitions  and  scholar- 
ships which  he  had  gained  in  his  early  youth ;  where  marriage  was  held 
in  as  high  honor  as  in  ancient  Jewish  times ;  where  the  pride  of  race 
was  encouraged  (of  course  I  do  not  refer  to  the  nonsensical  sentiment 
of  the  present  day,  that  goes  under  that  name) ;  where  the  weak  could 
find  a  welcome  and  a  refuge  in  celibate  monasteries  or  sisterhoods,  and 
lastly,  where  the  better  sort  of  emigrants  and  refugees  from  other  lands 
were  invited  and  welcomed,  and  their  descendants  naturalized. 

39.  National  psychology.  Some  fundamental  contrasts  between 
Anglo-Saxon  and  Latin  political  psychology  are  stated  by  Coolidge 
as  follows  :  ^ 

Nations,  like  individuals,  are  often  inconsistent,  thereby  laying  them- 
selves open  to  the  charge  of  dishonesty  on  the  part  of  uncharitable 
neighbors.  This  is  particularly  true  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  peoples,  whose 
minds  are  not  so  uncompromisingly  logical  as  those  of  the  French  or  the 
Russians ;  it  explains,  for  instance,  why  the  English  have  so  often  been 
accused  of  hypocrisy.  When  the  Englishman  or  the  American  finds  that 
his  premises  lead  him  to  conclusions  that  he  dislikes,  he  is  pretty  sure  to 
kick  over  the  traces  and,  regardless  of  the  premises,  to  accept  other 
conclusions  that  suit  him  better.  He  never  allows  previous  logical  sub- 
tleties to  tempt  him  into  a  position  which  his  common  sense  condemns ; 
but  guided  by  a  sound  instinct,  he  acts  as  he  thinks  best  in  each  instance, 
careless  of  the  fact  that,  by  any  course  of  general  reasoning,  he  will  ap- 
pear inconsistent.  For  a  striking  example  of  the  difference  between 
Latin  and  Anglo-Saxon  political  conceptions,  we  have  but  to  compare 
two  well-known   sayings,  —  the   "  P^rissent   les   colonies    plutot  qu'un 

1  Copyright,  1908,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


POPULATION  OF  THE  STATP:  67 

principe  "  of  the  French  Revolution,  and  Cleveland's  famous  remark, 
"  It  is  a  condition  which  confronts  us,  not  a  theory."  It  is  highly  char- 
acteristic that  even  Jefferson,  perhaps  the  most  theoretical  of  all  Ameri- 
can statesmen,  accepted  without  hesitation  the  responsibility  of  the  pur- 
chase of  Louisiana,  although  he  believed  that  he  had  no  constitutional 
right  to  take  such  action. 

40.  Types  of  statesmen.  The  types  of  statesmen  required  in 
Europe  and  in  America  are  described  as  follows  by  Bryce  :  ^ 

In  such  countries  as  England,  France,  Germany,  and  Italy  there  is 
room  and  need  for  five  sorts  of  statesmen.  Men  are  wanted  for  the 
management  of  foreign  and  colonial  policy,  men  combining  the  talents  of 
a  diplomatist  with  a  wide  outlook  over  the  world's  horizon.  The  needs 
of  social  and  economic  reform,  grave  in  old  countries  with  the  mistakes 
of  the  past  to  undo,  require  a  second  kind  of  statesman  with  an  aptitude 
for  constructive  legislation.  Thirdly  there  is  the  administrator  who  can 
manage  a  department  with  diligence  and  skill  and  economy.  Fourthly 
comes  the  parliamentary  tactician,  whose  function  it  is  to  understand 
men,  who  frames  cabinets  and  is  dexterous  in  humoring  or  spurring  a 
representative  assembly.  Lastly  we  have  the  leader  of  the  masses,  who, 
whether  or  no  he  be  a  skillful  parliamentarian,  thinks  rather  of  the 
country  than  of  the  chamber,  knows  how  to  watch  and  rouse  the  feelings 
of  the  multitude,  and  rally  a  great  party  to  the  standard  which  he  bears 
aloft.  The  first  of  these  has  no  need  for  eloquence;  the  second  and 
third  can  get  on  without  it ;  to  the  fourth  it  is  almost,  yet  not  absolutely, 
essential ;  it  is  the  life  breath  of  the  fifth. 

Let  us  turn  to  America.  In  America  there  are  few  occasions  for  the  first 
sort  of  statesman,  while  the  conditions  of  a  Federal  government,  with 
its  limited  legislative  sphere,  are  unfavorable  to  the  second,  as  frequently 
changing  cabinets  are  to  the  third.  It  is  chiefly  for  persons  of  the  fourth 
and  fifth  classes  we  must  look.  Persons  of  those  classes  we  shall  find, 
but  in  a  different  shape  and  guise  from  what  they  would  assume  in  Eu- 
rope. American  politics  seem  at  this  moment  to  tend  to  the  production 
of  two  types,  the  one  of  whom  may  be  called  par  excellence  the  man  of  the 
desk  or  of  the  legislature,  the  other  the  man  of  the  convention  and  the 
stump.  They  resemble  the  fourth  and  fifth  of  our  European  types,  but 
with  instructive  differences. 

1  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


CHAPTER  V 

ORIGIN  OF  THE  STATE 

I.  General  Process  of  State  Formation 

41.  The  origin  of  the  state.  The  gradual  historical  process  by 
which  the  state  arose,  and  some  of  the  main  phases  in  its  primitive 
transitions,  are  indicated  by  Burgess  in  the  following : 

We  know  nothing  of  the  influences  and  the  conditions  under  which 
the  human  mind  first  awakened  to  the  consciousness  of  the  state,  and 
felt  the  impulse  to  exert  itself  for  *;he  objective  realization  of  that  con- 
sciousness. We  are  fully  warranted,  however,  by  the  status  of  human 
society  which  history  first  presents  us,  in  concluding  that  this  great  light 
did  not  come  to  all  at  once.  The  period  of  barbaric  liberty  and  self-help 
permits  and  promotes  the  development  of  the  few  mighty  personalities 
and  their  elevation  to  those  heights  of  superiority  over  their  fellows 
which  the  dawn  of  civilization  first  illumines.  These  few  great  personal- 
ities form  the  nuclei  of  political  organization.  They  are,  at  first,  priests 
rather  than  statesmen.  They  are  inspired  by  the  belief  that  what  they 
behold  in  themselves  is  divinity.  They  so  represent  it  to  the  masses  of 
the  uninitiated.  They  invent  the  means  to  impress  this  belief  upon  the 
masses.  They  establish  a  cult,  and  from  behind  its  power  and  influence 
they  govern  the  people.  The  religious  sanction  secures  obedience  to  the 
laws  of  the  state.  Religion  and  law,  church  and  state,  are  confused  and 
mingled.  They  are  joint  forces  in  the  period  when  the  human  race 
emerges  from  barbarism  and  enters  upon  its  course  of  civilization ;  but 
the  state  is  enveloped  by  the  church,  and  exists  only  by  the  moral  sup- 
port which  it  receives  from  the  church.  Under  this  form  the  people  are 
disciplined  and  educated.  The  consciousness  of  the  state  spreads  wider. 
Nonpriestly  personalities  begin  to  be  touched  by  its  light.  They  are 
forced  thereby  either  to  regard  themselves  as  priests,  or  to  reflect 
that  the  state,  in  its  subjective  character,  is  not  a  special  revelation  of 
the  divinity.  They  either  seek  entrance  into  the  ranks  of  the  priesthood 
or  begin  to  dispute  its  exclusive  political  powers.  The  resistance  of  the 
priesthood  to  these  movements  provokes  the  view  on  the  part  of  the 
newly  enlightened  that  the  existing  system  is  a  pious  fraud,  and  incites 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  STATE  69 

them  to  organization  about  one  of  their  number,  as  chief,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  forcing  the  priesthood  to  a  division  of  power.  The  struggle 
must  not  be  allowed  to  come  to  open  conflict.  The  newly  initiated  must 
not  declare  what  they  have  seen  to  the  masses,  lest  the  faith  of  the 
masses  be  shaken  and  the  supports  of  law  and  order,  of  civilization  and 
progress,  be  destroyed.  The  two  parties  must  compromise.  The  priests 
must  divide  their  powers  with  the  warriors.  They  must  also  support  the 
rule  of  the  warriors  by  the  power  of  religion.  The  despotism  results. 
In  spite  of  its  ugly  name,  it  marks  a  great  step  in  advance.  It  gives 
greater  exhibition  of  violence,  but,  at  the  core,  it  is  far  less  despotic  than 
the  theocracy.  It  leaves  a  larger  sphere  of  individual  activity  unre- 
strained. It  lightens  the  spiritual  oppression  and  depression  which  rest 
upon  the  souls  of  men,  subject  at  every  step  and  turn  to  the  immediate 
intervention  of  divine  command.  It  is  a  more  human,  if  not  a  more 
humane,  system.  It  tends  to  prevent  the  respect  and  obedience  for  law 
developed  by  the  theocracy  from  becoming  too  timorous  and  servile. 
It  raises  human  courage.  It  opens  the  way  for  a  more  general  exertion 
of  human  reason.  It  makes  it  easier  for  the  consciousness  of  the  state 
to  spread  to  still  wider  circles,  while  it  holds  fast  to  what  has  been  won 
in  political  piety  during  the  preceding  era.  It  prepares  the  forces  for 
the  terrible  struggle  of  the  succeeding  era,  to  whose  awakening  and  ex- 
citing power  we  owe  the  spread  of  the  consciousness  of  the  state  to  the 
masses.  The  conflict  in  principle  between  the  royal  organization  and  the 
priesthood  becomes  irrepressible.  The  king  loses  his  religious  support 
in  the  eyes  of  the  masses.  His  official  subordinates  learn  to  defy  him 
successfully,  and  by  the  help  of  the  priesthood  to  change  their  official 
agencies  into  more  or  less  independent  powers.  It  is  an  all-around  battle 
between  all  the  existent  directing  forces  of  human  society.  So  far  as 
these  forces  are  concerned,  it  is  not  only  irrepressible,  but  interminable. 
They  can  never  bring  peace ;  at  best  only  armistice.  A  new  and  still 
more  controlling  force  must  appear.  At  last,  through  the  educating 
power  of  the  terrible  antagonism,  a  large  proportion  of  the  population  is 
awakened  to  the  consciousness  of  the  state,  and  feels  the  impulse  to 
participate  in  the  work  of  its  objective  realization.  Animated  by  patri- 
otism and  loyalty,  by  the  sense  of  human  interests  and  by  rationality, 
they  gather  about  their  king,  as  the  best  existing  nucleus  of  their  power. 
They  give  him  the  strength  to  overcome  both  defiant  priesthood  and  re- 
bellious officials.  They  establish  the  objective  unity  of  the  state.  They 
bring  the  absolute  sovereignty  to  objective  realization.  They  subject  all 
individuals  and  all  associations  of  individuals  to  its  sway.  Apparently 
they  make  the  king  the  state.  Really  they  make  him  but  the  first  serv- 
ant of  the  state.    The  state  is  now  the  people  in  sovereign  organization. 


70  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

This  is  an  immense  advance  in  the  development  of  the  state.  It  is  the 
beginning  of  the  modern  political  era.  Under  its  educating  influence  the 
consciousness  of  the  state  spreads  rapidly  to  the  great  mass  of  the  pop- 
ulation, and  the  idea  of  the  state  becomes  completely  secularized  and 
popularized.  The  doctrine  that  the  people  in  ultimate  sovereign  organi- 
zation are  the  state  becomes  a  formulated  principle  of  the  schools  and  of 
political  science  and  literature.  The  jurists,  the  publicists  and  the  moral 
philosophers  lead  in  the  evolution  of  the  idea.  The  warriors  and  the 
priests  are  assigned  to  the  second  place.  The  sovereign  people  turn  their 
attention  to  the  perfecting  of  their  own  organization.  They  lay  hands 
upon  the  royal  power.  They  strip  it  of  its  apparent  sovereignty  and 
make  it  purely  office.  If  it  accommodates  itself  to  the  position,  it  is 
allowed  to  exist;  if  not,  it  is  cast  aside.  At  last  the  state  knows  itself 
and  is  able  to  take  care  of  itself.  The  fictions,  the  makeshifts,  the  tem- 
porary supports,  have  done  their  work,  and  done  it  successfully.  They 
are  now  swept  away.  The  structure  stands  upon  its  own  foundation. 
The  state,  the  realization  of  the  unive^'sal  in  man,  in  sovereign  organization 
over  the  particular,  is  at  last  established,  —  the  product  of  the  progressive 
revelation  of  the  human  reason  through  history. 

Many  are  the  races  of  men  whose  powers  have  been  expended  in  the 
process  of  this  development.  The  torch  of  civilization  has  been  handed 
from  one  to  another,  as  each  exhausted  bearer  has  ceased  to  be  the  rep- 
resentative of  the  world's  progress.  Many  are  the  races,  also,  which  still 
wait  to  be  touched  by  the  dawn  of  this  great  light.  Of  all  the  races  of 
the  world  only  the  Roman  and  the  Teuton  have  realized  the  state  in  its 
approximately  pure  and  perfect  character.  From  them  the  propaganda 
must  go  out,  until  the  whole  human  race  shall  come  to  the  consciousness 
of  itself,  shall  realize  its  universal  spiritual  substance,  and  subject  itself 
to  the  universal  laws  of  its  rationality. 

This,  in  many  words,  is  what  we  mean  by  the  proposition  that  the 
state  is  a  product,  nay,  the  product,  of  history.  It  contains,  certainly,  a 
nobler  conception  of  the  state  in  origin,  development,  and  ultimate  char- 
acter, and  of  the  relation  of  the  individual  to  the  state,  than  does  any 
other  doctrine  or  theory.  In  its  contemplation,  men  feel  the  impulse  to 
heroic  effort,  rejoice  in  sacrifice,  learn  to  know  true  liberty  and  to  de- 
spise fear.  If  it  makes  the  state  more  human,  it  makes  humanity  more 
divine. 

42.  The  origin  of  the  state.  In  discussing  the  origin  of  the  state, 
Willoughby  emphasizes  the  subjective  phase  — •  the  growth  of  a 
consciousness  of  political  unity  —  as  follows  :  ^ 

1  Copyright,  1896,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  STATE  7  I 

Though  we  may  not  be  able  to  obtain  the  ^acts  regarding  the  actual 
origin  of  the  State,  yet  we  may  be  able  to  obtain  from  history  and  an- 
thropology data  from  which,  in  combination  with  the  operation  of  the 
natural  and  physical  forces  working  in  societies  of  which  we  do  know, 
we  may  be  able  to  draw  valuable  conclusions  regarding  the  conditions 
of  early  political  society  and  the  early  stages  of  its  development. 

With  the  association  of  man  with  his  kind,  arise  by  necessity  social 
interests.  These  interests  not  being  in  all  cases  identical  with  individual 
interests,  and  selfishness  being  an  universal  trait  of  mankind,  there  early 
comes  the  necessity  for  some  means  whereby  the  common  welfare  may 
be  protected.  To  a  certain  extent  at  least  it  becomes  necessary  that 
there  should  be  some  means  whereby  the  actions  of  men  may  be  re- 
strained in  so  far  as  they  are  directed  to  the  satisfaction  of  individualistic 
desires  that  conflict  with  the  common  weal. 

In  addition  to  the  task  of  preserving  internal  order  is  soon  imposed 
that  of  maintaining  the  individual  autonomy  of  a  society  as  a  political 
unit.  Indeed,  it  is  probable  that  it  is  this  necessity  that  is  first  consciously 
felt.  With  communal  life,  and,  to  a  large  extent,  communal  goods,  there 
naturally  arises  in  the  mind  of  each  individual  a  feeling  of  interest  in  the 
welfare  and  continuance  of  the  social  unit  of  which  he  is  a  member. 
To  these  utilitarian  grounds  there  are  early  added  sentimental  feelings 
that  in  the  aggregate  constitute  what  is  known  as  Patriotism.  Thus  is 
begotten  in  the  minds  of  the  people  not  only  a  consciousness  of  their 
unity,  but  an  appreciation  of  the  necessity  for  some  sort  of  organization 
through  which  they  may  continue  their  existence  as  a  social  unit  against 
hostile  interests  from  without,  as  well  as  from  disintegrating  forces  from 
within.  As  has  been  said,  it  is  probably  this  necessity  for  a  militar)' 
organization  that  is  first  consciously  felt.  Afterwards,  when  social  devel- 
opment has  proceeded  further,  the  existence  of  this  armed  organization 
is  utilized  for  the  satisfaction  of  internal  needs  as  their  existence  is 
recognized. 

Whether  by  original  force  or  by  voluntary  recognition  and  establish- 
ment, whether  founded  upon  acknowledged  supremacy  of  personal 
prowess  and  sagacity  of  the  leader  selected,  or  whether  springing  from 
patriarchal  authority  the  public  authority  becomes  established,  cannot 
now  be  known  and  undoubtedly  differed  in  different  instances.  7?///  /io7c>- 
ever  originated^  a  public  authority  once  created,  the  State  becomes  an  estab- 
lished fact. 

With  the  permanent  settlement  of  tribes  upon  definite  areas  of  land, 
the  territorial  element  becomes  embraced  in  the  empiric  conception  of 
the  State,  and  is  henceforth  an  integral  part  of  its  life.  The  State  now 
becomes  a  people  politically  organized  in  a  particular  territory,  and  the 


72  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

bonds  of  kinship  and  tribal  relations  become  supplemented  by  geograph- 
ical unity.  The  duties  of  the  government  necessarily  widen  with  the 
cultivation  of  land,  and  with  the  growth  of  personal  property  arises  the 
necessity  for  increased  duties  of  protection  and  regulation.  Thus  as 
civilization  progresses,  pari  passu,  social  interests  become  greater,  and, 
by  necessity,  the  governing  powers  more  elaborately  organized  and 
endowed  with  more  extensive  jurisdictions. 

Together  with  this  increasing  elaboration  of  structure  comes  an  in- 
creasing definiteness.  The  powers  of  the  public  authority  become  more 
strictly  defined  and  their  scope  and  manner  of  exercise  more  and  more 
regulated  by  customs  that  have  crystallized  into  fixed  rules,  —  rules  that 
collectively  represent  the  jural  idea  of  the  given  society  at  its  then  stage 
of  development. 

II.  Forces  in  State  Building 

43.  Prominent  forces  in  state  building.  Blackmar  summarizes 
the  most  important  influences  that  tend  to  create  the  state,  as 
follow^s :  1 

The  origin  of  the  state  is  difificult  to  determine.  Like  other  insti- 
tutions it  has  arisen  from  many  sources  and  under  many  varying 
conditions,  and  like  them  it  came  into  being  gradually  and  almost 
imperceptibly.  Likewise,  its  evolution  has  not  been  uniform  or  con- 
tinuous. Its  development  cannot  be  traced  to  a  succession  of  forms 
continuously  merging  into  each  other,  but  rather  it  is  a  method  of  life 
working  through  all  forms.  Logically  and  chronologically  the  family 
precedes  the  formal  creation  of  the  state.  Yet  in  the  horde,  when  family 
grouping  is  uncertain,  or  in  the  patriarchal  family,  or  the  tribe,  elements 
of  the  state  frequently  appear.  For  wherever  there  is  concerted  action 
for  public  good,  wherever  there  is  an  expression  of  civic  life,  however 
faint,  there  are  the  beginnings  of  the  state.   .   .   . 

Among  the  several  influences  which  brought  about  the  state  we  shall 
find  that  of  the  kinship  very  strong.  It  was  the  foundation  of  the  ancient 
family  group,  and  when  the  family  government  became  too  unwieldy  and 
the  state  became  necessary  the  relations  of  kinship  formed  the  basis  of 
the  ethnic  group.  Religion  always  proved  a  strong  force  in  creating  the 
unity  and  solidarity  of  the  state,  for  the  family  religion  expanded  with 
the  development  of  the  tribe  and  in  the  transition  from  the  tribal  life  to 
the  state  a  national  religion  was  established.  Thus,  the  family  religion  of 
Abraham  became  the  national  religion  of  the  Hebrew  commonwealth, 

1  Copyright,  1905,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  STATE 


73 


and  so  the  expanded  religion  of  the  Aryan  household  became  the  national 
religion  of  the  Greeks.  But  more  powerful  perhaps  than  these  as  direct 
agencies  were  a  necessity  for  order  and  a  desire  for  protection  of  all 
members  of  the  group.  It  is  beyond  the  power  of  one  man  to  regulate, 
control,  and  deal  justly  with  a  large  body  of  people,  just  as  a  father  deals 
with  his  children.  The  social  life  becomes  too  complex  for  paternalism 
and  so  services  and  functions  must  be  delegated  to  others.  This  delega- 
tion makes  a  perpetual  differentiation  of  governmental  functions,  which 
is  the  process  of  state  building.  Also,  in  the  encroachments  of  foreign 
nations  and  tribes  it  becomes  essential  to  organize  a  whole  body  of  peo- 
ple for  defense,  and  the  idea  of  protection  became  a  strong  force  in  state 
building. 

44.  Primitive  social  organization.  The  following  is  a  brief  de- 
scription of  a  type  of  social  life  that  preceded  definite  political 
organization  :  ^ 

It  is  the  custom  to  speak  of  the  Australians  and  other  savages  as  liv- 
ing in  "  tribes."  .  .  .  The  primitive  "tribe"  appears  to  be  mainly  a  group 
of  people  engaged  in  hunting  together,  a  cooperative  or  communal  soci- 
ety for  the  acquisition  of  food  supply.  It  would  really  be  better  to  call  it 
the  "  pack  "  ;  for  it  far  more  resembles  a  hunting  than  a  social  organi- 
zation. All  its  members  are  entitled  to  a  share  in  the  proceeds  of  the 
day's  chase,  and,  quite  naturally,  they  camp  and  live  together.  But  they 
are  not  sharply  divided,  for  other  purposes,  from  other  "  packs  "  living 
in  the  neighborhood.  .   .  . 

The  real  social  unit  of  the  Australians  is  not  the  "  tribe,"  but  the  totem 
group.  .  .  .  The  totem  group  is,  primarily,  a  body  of  persons,  distin- 
guished by  the  sign  of  some  natural  object,  such  as  an  animal  or  tree, 
who  may  not  intermarry  with  one  another.  In  many  cases,  membership 
of  the  totem  group  is  settled  by  certain  rules  of  inheritance,  generally 
through  females.   .   .   . 

The  Australian  may  not  marry  within  his  totem.  "  Snake  may  not 
marry  snake.  Emu  may  not  marry  emu."  That  is  the  first  rule  of  sav- 
age social  organization.  Of  its  origm  we  have  no  knowledge ;  but  there 
can  be  litde  doubt  that  its  objed  was  to  prevent  the  marriage  of  near  rela- 
tions. Though  the  savage  cannot  argue  on  principles,  he  is  capable  of 
observing  facts.  And  the  evils  of  close  inbreeding  must,  one  would  think, 
have  ultimately  forced  themselves  upon  his  notice.   .  .   . 

The  other  side  of  the  rule  is  equally  starding.  The  savage  may  not 
marry  within  his  totem,  but  he  must  marry  into  another  totem  specially 

1  Copyright,  1900,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


74  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

fixed  for  him.  More  than  this,  he  not  only  marries  into  the  specified 
totem,  but  he  marries  the  whole  of  the  women  of  that  totem  in  his  own 
o-encration.  ...  Of  course,  it  must  not  be  supposed,  that  this  condition 
of  marital  community  really  exists  in  practice.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  each 
Australian  contents  himself  with  one  or  two  women  from  his  marriage 
totem.  But  it  is  a  fact  that  an  Australian  would  see  nothing  wrong  in  a 
man  living  as  the  husband  of  any  woman  of  his  marriage  totem,  provided 
she  were  of  his  own  generation.  And  if  an  Australian  is  traveling  from 
tribe  to  tribe,  he  will,  as  a  matter  of  course,  find  a  wife  waiting  for  him 
in  every  tribe  which  contains  women  of  his  marriage  totem.  ...  It  will 
be  obvious  that,  under  these  arrangements,  there  are  no  bachelors  or 
spinsters  among  the  Australian  savages;  but  that  .  .  .  marriage  is, 
among  them,  "  a  natural  state  into  which  both  parties  are  born." 

It  has  been  hinted  before  that  some  classification  is  necessary  to  dis- 
tinguish the  different  degrees  or  generations  within  the  totem  group  ;  and 
this  is  one  of  the  objects  of  the  mysterious  corroborees,  or  ceremonial 
gatherings,  which  play  so  large  a  part  in  the  life  of  the  savage.  ...  At 
these  ceremonies,  often  lasting  for  several  days,  the  youths  and  maidens 
who  have  attained  to  maturity  are  initiated  into  some  of  the  mysteries  of 
the  totem,  often  to  the  accompaniment  of  painful  rites,  such  as  circum- 
cision and  other  laceration.  It  is  possible  that,  on  such  occasions,  the 
initiated  are  subjected  to  tattooing,  with  a  view  of  establishing  their  iden- 
tity, and  of  allotting  them  to  a  certain  totem,  and  to  a  certain  generation 
within  that  totem. 

By  this  or  some  other  artificial  means,  the  curiously  simple  system  of 
Australian  relationship  is  constructed.  All  the  women  of  his  marriage 
totem  in  his  generation  are  a  man's  wives ;  all  their  children  are  his  chil- 
dren ;  all  the  members  of  his  totem  in  the  same  generation  are  his  brothers 
and  sisters  (whom  he  may  not  marry) ;  all  the  members  of  his  mother's 
totem  are  his  parents  (for  descent  is  nearly  always  reckoned  through 
females).  Parent,  child,  brother  and  sister  are  thus  the  only  relationships 
recognized.   .  .   . 

Whether  the  totem  serves  any  other  purpose  than  that  of  prohibiting 
intermarriage  of  near  relations,  and  what  is  the  precise  connection  which 
the  savages  believe  to  exist  between  themselves  and  their  totems,  are 
much-disputed  questions.  With  regard  to  the  latter,  it  has  been  sug- 
gested by  recent  observers  that  the  Australian  believes  himself  to  be,  in 
some  mysterious  way,  the  of  spring  of  his  totem.  There  can  also  be  little 
doubt  that,  in  some  cases  at  least,  the  totem  is  an  object  of  worship,  a 
fetich  which  will  deal  destruction  if  the  rule  of  the  intermarriage  is  not 
rigidly  observed.  And,  if  this  be  so,  we  get  an  interesting  glimpse  at  the 
rudiments  of  two  of  the  most  powerful  factors  in  human  progress  — 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  STATE  75 

Religion  and  Law.  It  has  been  said  that  tlic  progress  of  religious  ideas 
follows  three  stages.  In  the  first,  man  worships  some  object  entirely 
external  to  himself,  a  stone  or  an  animal.  In  the  second,  he  worships  a 
human  being  like  himself,  usually  one  of  his  own  ancestors.  In  the  third, 
he  has  risen  to  the  idea  of  a  God  who  is  both  divine  and  human,  unlike 
and  distinct  from  himself,  and  yet  like  to  and  connected  with  himself. 
The  Australian  totem  would  answer  to  the  first  of  these  three  stages. 
But  it  is  somewhat  significant  to  notice  that  the  savage's  view  of  his 
deity  is  usually  that  of  a  malevolent  Power,  dealing  disease  and  death, 
and  thirsting  for  human  blood.   .  .  . 

Closely  connected  with  this  view  is  the  savage's  rudimentary  notion 
of  Law.  With  him  it  is  a  purely  negative  idea,  a  list  of  things  which  are 
prohibited,  or  taboo.  The  origin  of  these  prohibitions  is  often  ludicrous, 
but  they  are  generally  found  to  be  connected  with  the  apprehension  of 
danger.  A  man  is  walking  along  a  path,  and  is  struck  by  a  falling  branch. 
Instead  of  attributing  the  blow  to  natural  causes,  he  assumes  it  to  be  the 
result  of  the  anger  of  the  Tree-Spirit,  offended  by  his  action  in  using  the 
path.  In  the  future,  that  path  is  taboo,  or  forbidden.  .  .  .  The  practice 
of  burying  alive  a  victim  in  the  foundations  of  a  house,  as  a  sacrifice  to 
the  Earth-Spirit,  whose  domain  is  being  invaded,  is  widely  spread  in 
savage  countries.  .  .  . 

Whether  the  totem  bond  also  serves  the  purpose  of  uniting  its  mem- 
bers together  for  offense  and  defense,  is  also  a  disputed  question.  There 
are  traces  of  such  a  state  of  things,  and  its  existence  would  certainly  ex- 
plain the  development  of  a  conspicuous  feature  of  the  second  or  patri- 
archal stage  of  society,  the  blood-fend  group.  But  the  relations  of  one 
group  of  savages  to  another  are  obscure  and  uncertain.  Doubtless  the 
members  of  a  group,  whether  it  be  the  "  tribe  "  or  hunting  unit,  or  the 
totemistic  marriage  group,  do  not  recognize  any  duties  towards  strangers. 
But  their  actual  attitude  is  probably  determined  by  the  state  of  the  food 
supply  and  the  amount  of  elbow-room.  If  game  is  abundant,  and  hunting 
grounds  large  in  proportion  to  the  population,  distinct  groups  of  savages 
may  exist  side  by  side  in  a  given  area  without  conflict.  But  if  game  is 
scarce,  and  the  land  thickly  peopled  (in  the  savage  state  the  two  things 
would  probably  go  together),  wars  and  murder  are,  probably,  frequent. 
Even  the  revolting  practice  of  cannibalism  probably  originated  in  hunger ; 
though  there  are  some  races  which  seem  unable  to  abandon  it,  even  in 
times  of  plenty,  and  plausible  reasons  are  invented  for  its  continuance. 
But  it  is  one  of  the  surest  laws  of  progress  that,  with  each  forward  step, 
the  same  area  is  able  to  maintain  an  ever-increasing  number  of  people. 
And  so  the  temptations  for  war,  or  at  least  the  excuses  for  war,  are 
happily  ever  diminishing. 


76  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

45.  Kinship  and  state  origin.  The  "patriarchal  theory"  of 
state  origin  is  set  forth  by  Woodrow  Wilson  as  follows  : 

What  is  known  of  the  central  nations  of  history  clearly  reveals  the  fact 
that  social  organization,  and  consequently  government  (which  is  the  vis- 
ible form  of  social  organization),  originated  in  kinship.  The  original  bond 
of  union  and  the  original  sanction  for  magisterial  authority  were  one  and 
the  same  thing,  namely,  real  or  feigned  blood  relationship.  In  other 
words,  families  were  the  original  units  of  social  organization ;  and  were 
at  first,  no  doubt,  in  a  large  degree  separate.  ...  It  was  only  by  slow 
stages  and  under  the  influence  of  many  changes  of  habit  and  environ- 
ment that  the  family  organization  widened  and  families  were  drawn  to- 
gether into  communities.  A  group  of  men  who  considered  themselves  in 
some  sort  kinsmen  constituted  the  first  State.  ...  , 

Government  must  have  had  substantially  the  same  early  history  amongst 
all  progressive  races.  It  must  have  begun  in  clearly  defined  family  disci- 
pline. Such  discipline  would  scarcely  be  possible  among  races  in  which 
consanguinity  was  subject  to  profound  confusion  and  in  which  family 
organization  therefore  had  no  clear  basis  of  authority  on  which  to  rest. 
In  every  case,  it  would  seem,  the  origination  of  what  we  should  deem 
worthy  of  the  name  of  government  must  have  awaited  the  development 
of  some  such  definite  family  as  that  in  which  the  father  was  known, 
and  known  as  ruler.  Whether  or  not  the  patriarchal  family  was  the  first 
form  of  the  family,  it  must  have  furnished  the  first  adequate  form  of 
government.  .  .  . 

When  society  grew,  it  grew  without  any  change  of  this  idea.  Kinship 
was  still,  actually  or  theoretically,  its  only  amalgam.  The  commonwealth 
was  for  long  conceived  of  as  being  only  a  larger  kindred.  When  by  nat- 
ural increase  a  family  multiplied  its  branches  and  widened  into  a  geJis^ 
and  there  was  no  grandfather,  great-grandfather,  or  other  patriarch  liv- 
ing to  keep  it  together  in  actual  domestic  oneness,  it  would  still  not  sepa- 
rate. The  extinct  authority  of  the  actual  ancestor  could  be  replaced  by 
the  less  comprehensive  but  little  less  revered  authority  of  some  selected 
elder  of  the  "  House,"  the  oldest  living  ascendant,  or  the  most  capable. 
Here  would  be  the  materials  for  a  complete  body  politic  held  together 
by  the  old  fiber  of  actual  kinship. 

Organization  upon  the  basis  of  a  fictitious  kinship  was  hardly  less 
naturally  contrived  in  primitive  society.  There  was  the  ready,  and  im- 
memorial, fiction  of  adopfiflfi,  which  to  the  thought  of  that  time  seemed 
no  fiction  at  all.  The  adopted  man  was  no  less  real  a  member  of  the 
family  than  was  he  who  was  natural-born.  .  .  .  Whether  naturally, 
therefore,  or  artifi^cially,  Houses  widened  into  tribes,  and  tribes  into 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  STATE 


n 


commonwealths,  without  loss  of  that  kinship  in  the  absence  of  which, 
to  the  thinking  of  primitive  men,  there  could  be  no  communion,  and 
therefore  no  community,  at  all. 

46.  The  family  and  the  state.  The  fundamental  change  that 
has  taken  place  in  the  relation  of  the  state  to  the  family  is  well 
stated  by  Seeley  as  follows  :  ^ 

The  primitive  7na?i  may,  no  doubt,  differ  from  the  civilized  man  in  a 
hundred  different  ways,  but  the  primitive  state — that  is,  the  political 
organization  of  the  primitive  man  when  compared  with  that  of  the  civi- 
lized —  always,  I  think,  differs  from  it  in  the  same  way,  viz.  that  it  is  far 
more  closely  connected  with  the  family.  Take  any  highly  civilized  state, 
whether  from  ancient  or  from  modern  history,  you  scarcely  perceive  any 
relation  or  affinity  between  its  organization  and  that  of  the  families  com- 
posing it.  In  modern  England  or  France,  in  the  Greece  or  Rome  of 
Demosthenes  and  Cicero,  the  family  has  ceased  to  have  any  political 
importance.  So  much  is  this  the  case  that  those  who,  in  the  seventeenth 
century,  speculated  upon  the  origin  of  states  often  show  themselves  un- 
aware even  that  in  their  origin  and  first  beginning  states  were  connected 
with  families.  The  very  tradition  of  the  connection  has  been  lost.  It  is 
supposed  that  a  condition  of  lawless  violence,  in  which  the  weak  were  at 
the  mercy  of  the  strong,  originally  prevailed,  and  that  this  was  brought 
to  an  end  by  the  invention  of  government,  that  is,  by  an  agreement  to 
surrender  to  a  single  strong  man  a  part  of  the  liberty  which  each  man 
originally  possessed,  in  return  for  protection.  This  theory  seems  to  con- 
ceive the  primitive  community  as  a  mere  unorganized  crowd  of  individu- 
als. But  the  beginning  of  political  organization  is  given  by  nature  in  the 
family  relation.  The  authority  of  the  paterfamilias  may,  or  may  not,  be 
primeval  and  universal ;  but  certainly  in  those  cases  where  we  are  able 
to  trace  the  history  of  states  furthest  back,  the  starting  point  seems  not 
to  be  a  condition  of  universal  confusion,  but  a  powerful  and  rigid  family 
organization.  The  weak  were  not  at  the  mercy  of  the  strong,  because 
each  weak  man  was  a  member  of  the  family,  and  the  family  protected 
him  with  an  energy  of  which  modern  society  can  form  no  conception. 
In  these  cases,  too,  we  are  able  to  trace  that  the  state  was  not  suddenly 
introduced  as  a  kind  of  heroic  remedy  for  an  intolerable  confusion,  but 
that  the  germ  of  organization  given  by  nature  was  developed  artificially ; 
that  the  family  grew  into  something  more  than  a  mere  family ;  that  it 
developed  itself  gradually  so  much,  and  acquired  so  much  additional 
organization,  as  to  disengage  itself  from  the  literal  family,  which  now 

1  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


-^8  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

reappeared  in  an  independent  form  within  it ;  and  that  at  last  the  con- 
ventional or  fictitious  family  acquired  a  character  of  its  own,  until  it  first 
forcrot  and  then  at  last  denied  and  repudiated  its  connection  with  the 

natural  family. 

Observe,  I  do  not  mean  to  assert  that  the  state  has  in  all  cases  grown 
up  in  this  way ;  only  that  in  the  most  conspicuous  instances,  where  its 
growth  can  be  traced  most  certainly,  it  has  gone  through  these  stages. 

47.  Religion  and  the  city  state.  Fustel  de  Coulanges  has, 
probably  more  than  any  other  writer,  emphasized  the  important 
part  played  by  religion  in  the  beginnings  of  political  life. 

The  members  of  the  ancient  family  were  united  by  something  more 
powerful  than  birth,  affection,  or  physical  strength ;  this  was  the  religion 
of  the  sacred  fire,  and  of  dead  ancestors.  This  caused  the  family  to  form 
a  single  body,  both  in  this  life  and  in  the  next.  The  ancient  family  was 
a  religious  rather  than  a  natural  association ;  and  we  shall  see  presently 
that  the  wife  was  counted  in  the  family  only  after  the  sacred  ceremony 
of  marriage  had  initiated  her  into  the  worship ;  that  the  son  was  no 
longer  counted  in  it  when  he  had  renounced  the  worship,  or  had  been 
emancipated  ;  that,  on  the  other  hand,  an  adopted  son  was  counted  a  real 
son,  because,  though  he  had  not  the  ties  of  blood,  he  had  something  better 
—  a  community  of  worship  ;  that  the  heir  who  refused  to  adopt  the  wor- 
ship of  this  family  had  no  right  to  the  succession ;  and,  finally,  that  re- 
lationship and  the  right  of  inheritance  were  governed  not  by  birth,  but 
by  the  rights  of  participation  in  the  worship,  such  as  religion  had  estab- 
lished them.  Religion,  it  is  true,  did  not  create  the  family  ;  but  certainly 
it  gave  the  family  its  rules ;  and  hence  it  comes  that  the  constitution  of 
the  ancient  family  was  so  different  from  what  it  would  have  been  if  it  had 
owed  its  foundation  to  natural  affection.   .   .   . 

The  tribe,  like  the  family  and  the  phratry,  was  established  as  an  inde- 
pendent body,  since  it  had  a  special  worship  from  which  the  stranger 
was  excluded.  Once  formed,  no  new  family  could  be  admitted  to  it.  No 
more  could  two  tribes  be  fused  into  one ;  their  religion  was  opposed 
to  this.  But  just  as  several  phratries  were  united  in  a  tribe,  several 
tribes  might  associate  together,  on  condition  that  the  religion  of  each 
should  be  respected.  The  day  on  which  this  alliance  took  place  the 
city  existed. 

It  is  of  little  account  to  seek  the  cause  which  determined  several  neigh- 
boring tribes  to  unite.  Sometimes  it  was  voluntary ;  sometimes  it  was 
imposed  by  the  superior  force  of  a  tribe,  or  by  the  powerful  will  of  a 
man.    What  is  certain  is,  that 'the  bond  of  the  new  association  was  still 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  STATE  79 

a  religion.  The  tribes  that  united  to  form  a  city  never  failed  to  light  a 
sacred  fire,  and  to  adopt  a  common  religion.  .   .  . 

Thus,  in  time  of  peace,  as  in  war  time,  religion  intervened  in  all  acts. 
It  was  everywhere  present,  it  enveloped  man.  The  soul,  the  body,  private 
life,  public  life,  meals,  festivals,  assemblies,  tribunals,  battles,  all  were 
under  the  empire  of  this  city  religion.  It  regulated  all  the  acts  of  man, 
disposed  of  every  instant  of  his  life,  fixed  all  his  habits.  It  governed 
a  human  being  with  an  authority  so  absolute  that  there  was  nothing 
beyond  its  control.  .  .   . 

These  provisions  of  ancient  law  were  perfectly  logical.  Law  was  not 
born  of  the  idea  of  justice,  but  of  religion,  and  was  not  conceived  as  go- 
ing beyond  it.  In  order  that  there  should  be  a  legal  relation  between  two 
men,  it  was  necessary  that  there  should  already  exist  a  religious  relation  ; 
that  is  to  say,  that  they  should  worship  at  the  same  hearth  and  have  the 
same  sacrifices.  When  this  religious  community  did  not  exist,  it  did  not 
seem  that  there  could  be  any  legal  relation.  Now,  neither  the  stranger 
nor  the  slave  had  any  part  in  the  religion  of  the  city.  A  foreigner  and  a 
citizen  might  live  side  by  side  during  long  years,  without  one's  thinking 
of  the  possibility  of  a  legal  relation  being  established  between  them. 
Law  was  nothing  more  than  one  phase  of  religion.  Where  there  was 
no  common  religion,  there  was  no  common  law.  .  .  . 

It  is  a  singular  error,  therefore,  among  all  human  errors,  to  believe 
that  in  the  ancient  cities  men  enjoyed  liberty.  They  had  not  even  the 
idea  of  it.  They  did  not  believe  that  there  could  exist  any  right  as  against 
the  city  and  its  gods.  .  .  .  The  government  was  called  by  turns  mon- 
archy, aristocracy,  democracy ;  but  none  of  these  revolutions  gave  man 
true  liberty,  individual  liberty.  To  have  political  rights,  to  vote,  to  name 
magistrates,  to  have  the  privilege  of  being  archon,  —  this  was  called  lib- 
erty ;  but  man  was  not  the  less  enslaved  to  the  state.  The  ancients, 
especially  the  Greeks,  always  exaggerated  the  importance,  and  above  all, 
the  rights  of  society ;  this  was  largely  due,  doubtless,  to  the  sacred  and 
religious  character  with  which  society  was  clothed  in  the  beginning.   .  .  . 

We  have  sought  to  place  in  a  clear  light  this  social  system  of  the  an- 
cients, where  religion  was  absolute  master,  both  in  public  and  private 
life ;  where  the  state  was  a  religious  community,  the  king  a  pontiff,  the 
magistrate  a  priest,  and  the  law  a  sacred  formula ;  where  patriotism  was 
piety,  and  exile  excommunication  ;  where  individual  liberty  was  unknown  ; 
where  man  was  enslaved  to  the  state  through  his  soul,  his  body,  and  his 
property ;  where  the  notions  of  law  and  of  duty,  of  justice  and  of  affec- 
tion, were  bounded  within  the  limits  of  the  city ;  where  human  association 
was  necessarily  confined  within  a  certain  circumference  around  a  pryt- 
aneum ;  and  where  men  saw  no  possibility  of  founding  larger  societies. 


So  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

48.  The  struggle  of  races.  Following  Gumplowicz  and  Ratzen- 
hofer  in  tracing  the  evolution  of  organized  society  through  the 
struggle  of  races,  Ward  discusses  the  origin  of  the  state  as  follows  :  ^ 

The  following  are  these  steps  arranged  in  their  natural  order :  i.  5«<^- 
y>/^'-(7//<9«  of  one  race  by  another.  2.  Origin  of  r^?^/^.  3.  Gradual  mitigation 
of  this  condition,  leaving  a  state  of  great  individual,  social,  and  political 
inequality.  4.  Substitution  for  purely  military  subjection  of  a  form  of 
law,  and  origin  of  the  idea  of  legal  right.  5.  Origin  of  the  state,  under 
which  all  classes  have  both  rights  and  duties.  6.  Cementing  of  the 
mass  of  heterogeneous  elements  into  a  more  or  less  homogeneous /<f^//^. 
7.  Rise  and  development  of  a  sentiment  oi  patriotism  and  formation  of 
a  nation.  .   .   . 

There  are  always  great  natural  differences  in  men.  In  civilized  societies 
everybody  knows  how  immensely  individuals  differ  in  ability  and  character. 
We  naturally  assume  that  with  savages  and  low  races  this  is  not  the  case, 
but  this  is  certainly  a  mistake.  The  natural  inequalities  of  uncivilized 
races  are  probably  fully  as  great  as  among  civilized  races,  and  they  prob- 
ably exert  a  still  greater  relative  influence  in  all  practical  affairs.  For  the 
complicated  machinery  of  a  high  civilization  makes  it  possible  to  cover  up 
mediocrity  and  to  smother  talent,  so  that  the  places  that  men  hold  are 
very  rude  indices  indeed  to  their  fitness  or  their  true  merits.  In  savage 
life  this  is  not  the  case,  and  a  chief  is  almost  certain  to  be  a  man  of  force 
and  relative  ability  of  the  grade  required  at  that  stage  of  development. 

In  a  conquered  race  such  individual  differences  are  likely  to  make 
themselves  felt.  The  assumption  all  along  is  that  the  races  considered 
are  not  primarily  widely  unlike.  The  issue  of  battle  depends  only  to  a 
small  extent  on  real  differences  of  mind  or  character.  It  may  be  merely 
accidental,  or  due  to  the  neglect  of  the  conquered  race  to  cultivate  the 
arts  of  war.  In  all  other  respects  it  may  be  even  superior  to  the  conquer- 
ing race.  The  latter  therefore  often  has  to  do  with  its  social  equals  in 
everything  pertaining  to  the  life  of  either  group.  The  difficulty  of  enforc- 
ing law  in  a  community  constituted  as  we  have  described  must  be  appar- 
ent. With  such  an  intense  internal  polarization  of  interests,  the  conquering 
race  would  find  it  difficult  or  impossible  to  frame  laws  to  suit  all  cases. 
It  could  not  understand  the  conquered  race  definitely  enough  to  be  suc- 
cessful even  in  securing  its  own  interests.  In  a  word,  the  conquering 
race  needs  the  assistance  of  the  conquered  race  in  framing  and  carrying 
out  measures  of  public  policy.  This  it  is  never  difficult  to  secure.  A  large 
number  of  the  members  of  the  subject  race  always  sooner  or  later  accept 

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ORIGIN  OF  THE  STATE  8 1 

the  situation  and  are  willing  to  help  in  establishing  and  maintaining  order. 
The  only  basis  of  such  order  is  the  creation  of  correlative  rights  and  duties 
under  the  law.  This  can  only  be  secured  through  concessions  on  the  part 
of  the  master  race  to  the  subject  race  and  the  enlistment  of  the  best  ele- 
ments of  the  latter  in  the  work  of  social  reorganization.  This,  in  fact,  is 
what  is  sooner  or  later  always  done.  The  conquering  race  may  hold  out 
doggedly  for  a  long  time  in  a  harsh  military  policy  of  repression  and 
oppression,  but  it  is  only  a  question  of  time  when  experience  alone  will 
dictate  a  milder  policy  in  its  own  interest,  and  the  basis  of  compromise 
will  at  last  be  reached.  The  two  principles  involved  are  both  egoistic, 
but  equilibrate  each  other  and  contribute  jointly  to  the  result.  These  are 
economy  on  the  part  of  the  governing  class  and  resignation  on  the  part 
of  the  governed  class.  These  produce  concessions  from  the  former  and 
assistance  from  the  latter.  The  result  is  that  form  of  social  organization 
known  as  the  state. 

49.  War  and  state  origin.  The  important  parts  played  by  war 
and  property  in  the  origin  and  development  of  the  state  are, 
perhaps  too  strongly,  stated  in  the  following :  ^ 

The  origin  of  the  State,  or  Political  Society,  is  to  be  found  in  the 
development  of  the  art  of  tvarfare.  .  .  .  Historically  speaking,  there  is 
not  the  slightest  difficulty  in  proving  that  all  political  communities  of 
the  modern  type  owe  their  existence  to  successful  warfare.  As  a  natural 
consequence,  they  are  forced  to  be  organized  on  military  principles, 
tempered,  doubdess,  by  a  survival  of  older  (patriarchal)  ideas.  .  .  . 

Although  we  cannot  speak  with  certainty  as  to  the  causes  of  this 
development,  it  is  not  difficult  to  suggest  one  or  two  facts  which  may 
have  led  to  it.  Foremost  comes  the  increase  of  populatioti,  with  its  con- 
sequent pressure  on  the  means  of  subsistence.  This  increase  is  always, 
under  normal  circumstances,  steadily  going  on ;  and  it  is  dealt  with  in 
various  ways.  Sometimes  a  pestilence  breaks  out ;  and  the  super- 
abundant population,  enfeebled  by  short  allowance  of  food,  is  swept 
away  by  disease.  Sometimes  wholesale  migrations  take  place  to  less 
thickly  populated  districts;  this  may  be  regarded  as  a  real  remedy, 
though  perhaps  only  a  temporary  one,  for  the  trouble.  Sometimes, 
again,  a  great  new  invention  enables  a  largely  increased  food  supply  to 
be  produced ;  the  changes  from  hunting  life  to  pastoral  life,  and  again 
from  pastoral  life  to  agriculture,  are  examples.  Finally,  war  may  break 
out  on  a  large  scale  ;  and  the  weaker  peoples  may  be  either  exterminated 
or  reduced  to  subjection  by  the  stronger. 

1  Copyright,  1900,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


82  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

Another  cause  may  have  been  the  great  increase  of  realized  wealth 
attendant  upon  successful  agriculture,  and,  still  more,  industry.  Pastoral 
wealth  has  this  advantage,  that  it  can  be  moved  about  with  tolerable 
ease.  A  weak  tribe  can  fold  up  its  tents,  and  drive  its  cattle  and  sheep 
out  of  harm's  way.  But  the  wealth  of  the  husbandman  cannot  be  so 
disposed  of.  His  wealth  is  in  his  fields,  which  he  has  patiently  cultivated, 
and  in  his  barns  and  presses  which  he  has  filled  with  corn  and  wine. 
He  has  built  himself  a  permanent  house,  and  he  will  not  leave  it  while  a 
chance  of  safety,  or  even  of  existence,  remains.  He  is  a  very  tempting 
bait  to  the  military  adventurer.  Still  more  is  the  craftsman,  with  his  rich 
store  of  wealth,  a  tempting  object  of  plunder.  The  sack  of  an  industrial 
town,  with  its  shops  and  its  stores  of  goods,  is  the  dream  of  the 
freebooter.  .  .  . 

Once  more,  it  is  natural  to  suppose  that  the  improvement  in  the  art 
of  working  in  metals  did  much  to  stimulate  the  military  spirit.  The 
superiority  of  iron,  still  more  of  steel  weapons  and  armor,  over  the  old 
wooden  bows  and  arrows  and  leather  shield  and  corselet,  would  give  a 
natural  impetus  to  warfare.  Above  all,  with  the  tendency  towards 
specialization  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  one  of  the  master  principles  of 
development,  this  improvement  in  the  means  of  warfare  would  tend  to 
produce  a  special  inilitary  class,  the  professional  warrior  of  the  modern 
world.  In  primitive  times  every  man  was  a  soldier ;  as  civilization  pro- 
gressed, the  bulk  of  people  became  interested  in  other  things,  and 
fighting  became  the  work  of  specialists.  This  fact  is  directly  connected 
with  the  origin  of  the  state.   .   .   . 

A  State  is  founded  when  one  of  these  host  leaders  with  his  band  of 
warriors  gets  permanent  control  of  a  definite  territory  of  a  considerable 
size.  And,  practically  speaking,  this  always  occurs  in  one  of  two  ways. 
The  host  leader,  after  firmly  establishing  his  position  as  ruler  of  his  own 
tribe,  extends  his  authority  over  neighboring  tribes,  until  he  becomes 
ruler  of  a  large  territory.  ...  Or  a  State  is  founded  by  the  successful 
migration  and  conquest  by  a  band  of  warriors  to  and  of  a  strange 
country. 

III.  Stagnation  and  Progress 

50.  The  beginnings  of  progress.  The  emergence  of  the  state 
bound  by  rigid  custom,  and  the  beginnings  of  change  and  prog- 
ress, are  brilliantly  worked  out  by  Bagehot  : 

The  progress  of  man  requires  the  cooperation  of  7Tien  for  its  devel- 
opment. That  which  any  one  man  or  any  one  family  could  invent  for 
themselves  is  obviously  exceedingly  limited.   .  .  .    The  rudest  sort  of 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  STATE  83 

cooperative  society,  the  lowest  tribe  and  the  feeblest  government,  is  so 
much  stronger  than  isolated  man,  that  isolated  man  (if  he  ever  existed 
in  any  shape  which  could  be  called  man)  might  very  easily  have  ceased 
to  exist.  The  first  principle  of  the  subject  is  that  man  can  only  make 
progress  in  "  cooperative  groups  "  ;  .  .  .  and  that  it  is  their  being  so 
which  makes  their  value  ;  that  unless  you  can  make  a  strong  cooperative 
bond,  your  society  will  be  conquered  and  killed  out  by  some  other 
society  which  has  such  a  bond ;  and  the  second  principle  is  that  the 
members  of  such  a  group  should  be  similar  enough  to  one  another  to 
cooperate  easily  and  readily  together.  The  cooperation  in  all  such  cases 
depends  on  a  felt  u?iio?i  of  heart  and  spirit ;  and  this  is  only  felt  when 
there  is  a  great  degree  of  real  likeness  in  mind  and  feeling,  however  that 
likeness  may  have  been  attained. 

This  needful  cooperation  and  this  requisite  likeness  I  believe  to  have 
been  produced  by  one  of  the  strongest  yokes  and  the  most  terrible 
tyrannies  ever  known  among  men  —  the  authority  of  "  customary  law." 
.  .  .  And  the  rule  is  often  of  most  childish  origin,  beginning  in  a  casual 
superstition  or  local  accident.  .  .  . 

The  necessity  of  thus  forming  cooperative  groups  by  fixed  customs 
explains  the  necessity  of  isolation  in  early  society.  As  a  matter  of  fact 
all  great  nations  have  been  prepared  in  privacy  and  in  secret.  .  .  .  And 
the  instinct  of  early  ages  is  a  right  guide  for  the  needs  of  early  ages. 
Intercourse  with  foreigners  then  broke  down  in  states  the  fixed  rules 
which  were  forming  their  characters,  so  as  to  be  a  cause  of  weak  fiber 
of  mind,  of  desultory  and  unsettled  action  ;  the  living  spectacle  of  an 
admitted  unbelief  destroys  the  binding  authority  of  religious  custom  and 
snaps  the  social  cord. 

Thus  we  see  the  use  of  a  sort  of  "  preliminary  "  age  in  societies,  when 
trade  is  bad  because  it  prevents  the  separation  of  nations,  because  it 
infuses  distracting  ideas  among  occupied  communities,  because  it  "brings 
alien  minds  to  alien  shores."  And  as  the  trade  which  we  now  think  of 
as  an  incalculable  good,  is  in  that  age  a  formidable  evil  and  destructive 
calamity  ;  so  war  and  conquest,  which  we  commonly  and  justly  see  to  be 
now  evils,  are  in  that  age  often  singular  benefits  and  great  advantages. 
It  is  only  by  the  competition  of  customs  that  bad  customs  can  be 
eliminated  and  good  customs  multiplied.  .  .   . 

Similarly,  the  best  institutions  have  a  natural  military  advantage  over 
bad  institutions.  The  first  great  victory  of  civilization  was  the  conquest 
of  nations  with  ill-defined  families  having  legal  descent  through  the  mother 
only,  by  nations  of  definite  families  tracing  descent  through  the  father  as 
well  as  the  mother,  or  through  the  father  only.  .  .  .  The  nations  with  a 
thoroughly  compacted  family  system  have  "  possessed  the  earth,"  that  is, 


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READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


they  have  taken  all  the  finest  districts  in  the  most  competed-for  parts ; 
and  the  nations  with  loose  systems  have  been  merely  left  to  mountain 
ranges  and  lonely  islands.  .  .  . 

I  cannot  expand  the  subject,  but  in  the  same  way  the  better  re- 
ligions have  had  a  great  physical  advantage,  if  I  may  say  so,  over  the 
worse.  They  have  given  what  I  may  call  a  cotifidejice  in  the  universe. 
And  more  directly  what  I  may  call  the  fortifying  religions,  that  is 
to  say,  those  which  lay  the  plainest  stress  on  the  manly  parts  of  morality 

upon  valor,  on  truth  and   industry  —  have   had   plainly  the    most 

obvious  effect  in  strengthening  the  races  which  believed  them,  and  in 
making  those  races  the  winning  races.  .  .  . 

The  first  work  of  the  first  ages  is  to  bind  men  together  in  the  strong 
bonds  of  a  rough,  coarse,  harsh  custom;  and  the  incessant  conflict  of 
nations  effects  this  in  the  best  way.  Every  nation  is  an  "  hereditary 
cooperative  group,"  bound  by  a  fixed  custom ;  and  out  of  those  groups 
those  conquer  which  have  the  most  binding  and  most  invigorating  cus- 
toms, and  these  are,  as  a  rough  rule,  the  best  customs.  The  majority  of 
the  "  groups  "  which  win  and  conquer  are  better  than  the  majority  of 
those  which  fail  and  perish,  and  thus  the  first  world  grew  better  and 
was  improved. 

This  early  customary  world  no  doubt  continued  for  ages.  The  first 
history  delineates  great  monarchies,  each  composed  of  a  hundred 
customary  groups,  all  of  which  believed  themselves  to  be  of  enormous 
antiquity,  and  all  of  which  must  have  existed  for  very  many  generations. 
.  .  .  Long  ages  of  dreary  monotony  are  the  first  facts  in  the  history  of 
human  communities,  but  those  ages  were  not  lost  to  mankind,  for  it 
was  then  that  was  formed  the  comparatively  gentle  and  guidable  thing 
which  we  now  call  human  nature. 

And  indeed  the  greatest  difficulty  is  not  in  preserving  such  a  world 
but  in  ending  it.  We  have  brought  in  the  yoke  of  custom  to  improve 
the  world,  and  in  the  world  the  custom  sticks.  In  a  thousand  cases  — 
in  the  great  majority  of  cases  —  the  progress  of  mankind  has  been 
arrested  in  this  its  earliest  shape ;  it  has  been  closely  embalmed  in  a 
mummy-like  imitation  of  its  primitive  existence.  I  have  endeavored  to 
show  in  what  manner,  and  how  slowly,  and  in  how  few  cases  this  yoke 
of  custom  was  removed.  It  was  "  government  by  discussion "  which 
broke  the  bond  of  ages  and  set  free  the  originality  of  mankind.  .  .  . 

As  soon  as  this  great  step  upwards  is  once  made,  all  or  almost  all,  the 
higher  gifts  and  graces  of  humanity  have  a  rapid  and  a  definite  effect 
on  "  verifiable  progress  "  —  on  progress  in  the  narrowest,  because  in 
the  most  universally  admitted  sense  of  the  term.   .   .  . 

But  there  is  no  need  to  expand  this  further.    The  principle  is  plain 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  STATE  85 

that,  though  these  better  and  higher  graces  of  humanity  are  impedi- 
ments and  encumbrances  in  the  early  fighting  period,  yet  that  in  the 
later  era  they  are  among  the  greatest  helps  and  benefits,  and  that  as 
soon  as  governments  by  discussion  have  become  strong  enough  to 
secure  a  stable  existence,  and  as  soon  as  they  have  broken  the  fixed 
rule  of  old  custom,  and  have  awakened  the  dormant  inventiveness  of 
men,  then,  for  the  first  time,  almost  every  part  of  human  nature  begins 
to  spring  forward,  and  begins  to  contribute  its  quota  even  to  the  nar- 
rovi^est,  even  to  "  verifiable  "  progress. 

51.  Social  progress.  The  essential  need  filled  by  the  state  in 
the  general  process  of  social  evolution,  and  the  changes  in  its  point 
of  view  due  to  changing  conditions  are  well  stated  by  Ward  :  ^ 

The  state  is  a  natural  product,  as  much  as  an  animal  or  a  plant,  or  as 
man  himself.  The  basis  of  the  state  is  law.  It  was  the  necessity  for 
general  regulation  to  take  the  place  of  the  wasteful  and  difficult  special 
regulation  incident  to  conquest  that  gradually  gave  rise  to  a  system  of 
law,  and  it  was  the  necessity  for  a  social  mechanism  capable  of  enforc- 
ing law  that  the  state  grew  up  and  took  definite  form.  It  was  shown 
that  until  the  state  was  formed  there  could  be  no  property.  Every  one 
must  keep  his  belongings  on  his  person  and  defend  them  at  every  step. 
No  matter  how  anything  may  have  been  acquired,  every  one  has  the 
same  right  to  it  and  may  seize  it  wherever  found.  There  is  no  such 
thing  as  right  outside  the  state.  If  property  cannot  exist  except  under 
the  protection  of  the  state  there  can  of  course  be  no  such  thing  as 
capital.  There  can  be  no  industry  in  the  economic  sense.  There  is  no 
use  accumulating ;  the  surplus  cannot  be  retained.  Wealth  is  only  pos- 
sible under  the  state.  The  more  we  reflect  upon  it  the  clearer  we  see 
that  while  the  state  itself  achieves  little,  it  is  the  condition  to  nearly  all 
achievement.  The  state  was  primarily  the  mediator  between  conflicting 
races.  Immediately  following  the  conquest  the  conquered  race  had  no 
status.  It  was  completely  under  the  dominion  of  the  conquering  race. 
Under  the  state  as  soon  as  formed  the  conquered  race  acquired  rights 
and  the  members  of  the  conquering  race  were  assigned  duties.  The 
state  thus  becomes  a  powerful  medium  of  social  assimilation.  The  ca- 
pable and  meritorious  of  the  subject  race  are  given  opportunity  to  exer- 
cise their  faculties.  The  members  of  the  superior  race  not  belonging 
to  the  nobility  or  the  priestly  caste  enter  into  business  arrangements, 
become  a  mercantile  or  capitalist  class,  and  control  the  finances  of  the 
people.    These    two    classes    blend    and    ultimately    form    the    "  third 

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86 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


estate,"  which,  on  account  of  its  activity  and  usefulness,  is  destined  to 
increase  in  influence.  .  .   . 

There  was  absolute  need  at  the  outset  of  regulation  and  restraint  to 
prevent  the  destruction  of  the  race,  and  the  first  collective  action  was 
taken  with  this  end  in  view.  At  the  stage  which  produced  the  state 
this  unrestrained  individualism  was  as  strong  as  ever  and  equally 
destructive  of  order.  However  natural  the  origin  of  the  state  may  seem 
when  we  understand  the  conditions  that  called  it  forth,  it  was,  in  the 
last  analysis,  the  result  of  a  social  necessity  for  checking  and  curbing 
this  individualism  and  of  holding  the  social  forces  within  a  certain  orbit, 
where  they  could  interact  without  injury  and  where  they  could  do  con- 
structive work.  .  .  .  The  state  was  the  semi-unconscious  product  of  a 
sort  of  group  sense  of  this,  organizing  the  machinery  for  the  protection 
of  the  physically  weaker,  but  socially  better  elements  calculated  to 
enrich,  embellish,  and  ultimately  to  solidify  and  advance  social  conditions. 

The  state  was  therefore  the  most  important  step  taken  by  man  in 
the  direction  of  controlling  the  social  forces.  The  only  possible  object  in 
doing  this  was  the  good  of  society  as  a  whole.  In  part  it  was  no  doubt 
a  sentiment  of  safety.  The  greatest  good  possible  would  be  its  salvation. 
But  this  ethical  sentiment  was  something  more  than  mere  race  ethics. 
There  was  mingled  with  it  some  idea  of  actual  social  benefit.  This  went 
still  farther  and  embraced  some  vague  conception  of  amelioration  and  of 
social  progress. 


CHAPTER  VI 

EVOLUTION  OF  THE  STATE 

I,  The  Ancient  State 

52.  Transition  from  tribal  to  political  organization.  The  most 
important  steps  in  the  process  by  which  primitive  ethnic  society  is 
transformed  into  definite  poHtical  organizations  are  stated  by 
Giddings  as  follows  :  ^ 

But  how  to  incorporate  in  a  tribal  state  a  heterogeneous  multitude  of 
unrelated  men,  is  a  question  which  the  practical  politician  .  .  .  does  not 
immediately  answer.  In  the  successive  attempts  of  Athens  and  of  Rome 
to  reorganize  the  commonwealth,  ...  all  were  suggested  by  the  forms 
through  which  social  evolution  had  passed  or  was  passing.  At  Athens, 
for  example,  there  was,  first  of  all,  the  attempt  which  is  associated  with 
the  name  of  the  legendary  hero  Theseus,  to  organize  society  by  classes, 
namely,  the  well-born,  the  husbandmen,  and  the  artisans.  ...  It  was 
an  attempt  to  destroy  utterly  the  tribal  system  in  the  interest  of  the 
feudal  system.  It  inevitably  failed  because  it  antagonized  the  conserv- 
ative instincts  of  a  majority  of  the  voters.  Next  was  made  the  attempt 
attributed  to  Solon,  to  organize  society  on  a  basis  of  property  and 
military  service.  In  this  plan  at  Athens,  as  afterwards  at  Rome,  all  free- 
men, though  not  connected  with  any  clan,  were  enrolled  in  the  army 
and  were  given  a  certain  voice  in  public  affairs.  This  scheme  also  failed 
because  it  left  the  line  of  demarcation  between  the  tribal  and  the  mis- 
cellaneous population  as  sharp  as  ever.  Not  until  the  time  of  Cleisthenes 
was  it  seen  that  the  most  simple  and  obvious  of  all  possible  plans  was 
the  only  practicable  one.  .  .  .  The  attempt  to  break  down  tribal  lines  was 
then  given  over.  Clans  and  tribes  had  long  been  localized.  Each  claimed 
jurisdiction  within  definite  territorial  limits.  Within  each  territorial  sub- 
division were  both  clansmen  and  strangers.  The  state  simply  decreed 
,  that  all  men  who  lived  within  the  boundaries  of  any  local  subdivision  of 
a  tribal  domain  should  be  enrolled  as  members  of  the  local  community 
which  dwelt  there ;  that  all  who  dwelt  within  the  domain  of  any  tribe 
should  be  enrolled  as  members  of  that  tribe.    Kinship  might  still  be 

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87 


88  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

traced  by  those  who  cared  about  it.  .  .  .  Thus  a  perfect  organization 
of  the  state  was  at  last  accomplished  with  the  least  possible  shock  to 
ancient  prejudices.  In  name  and  form  the  ancient  system  remained.  Its 
substance,  even,  remained  for  social  and  religious  purposes,  but  for  polit- 
ical purposes  its  content  was  entirely  changed. 

Thus  at  length  the  gentile  is  converted  into  the  civil  organization  of 
society.  Civic  association,  irrespective  of  kinship,  becomes  the  basis  of 
political  codperation.  Gradually  tribal  lines  are  more  or  less  artificially 
redrawn,  and  at  length  it  is  forgotten  that  local  boundaries  ever  marked 
tribal  domains  and  that  village  names  were  once  the  names  of  clans. 
The  tribal  confederacy  has  become  the  territorial  state. 

It  is  not  to  be  supposed,  however,  that  the  creation  of  the  territorial 
state  obliterates  the  thought  of  an  ethnic  unity.  It  only  subordinates  it 
to  a  higher  ideal,  in  which  the  conception  of  territorial  unity  is  given  a 
more  prominent  place  than  it  has  hitherto  held.  The  state  still  con- 
sciously strives  to  secure  the  ethnic  unity  of  its  population,  but  the 
attempt  is  not  now  to  preserve  the  purity  of  an  ancient  blood.  It  is 
rather  to  perfect  the  new  ethnic  unity  that  is  to  emerge  from  the  blend- 
ing of  many  elements.  .  .  .  The  possibilities  of  assimilation  are  per- 
ceived. It  is  realized  that  men  who  have  identified  their  interests  with 
those  of  an  ancient  race,  who  have  learned  its  language  and  have 
adopted  its  religion,  may,  by  these  means,  become  identified  with  it  in 
spirit,  and  ultimately,  through  intermarriage,  may  become  united  with 
it  in  blood.  Through  the  influence  of  this  idea  the  fiction  of  adoption  is 
preserved  in  the  law  of  naturalization  and  the  jus  sanguinis  long 
remains  as  the  law  of  nationality. 

Animated  by  its  enlarged  ideas  of  ethnic  and  territorial  unity,  the 
state  enters  upon  the  realization  of  a  positive  policy.  It  endeavors  to 
bring  under  one  sovereignty  all  related  peoples  that  speak  allied  languages 
and  that  have  like  interests.  It  endeavors  to  bring  under  one  adminis- 
tration all  fragments  of  territory  that  together  form  a  natural  whole 
for  purposes  of  commerce,  social  intercourse,  and  military  defense.  It 
attempts,  in  short,  to  establish  a  scientific  frontier. 

To  accomplish  this  purpose  it  enters  upon  a  career  of  aggression 
which  necessitates  a  perfect  internal  cohesion.  Every  interest  is  in  some 
degree  sacrificed  to  military  discipline.  Religion,  which  has  long  been 
a  medley  of  ancestral  faiths,  becomes  national  and  organic.  Family, 
gentile,  and  local  gods  are  thoroughly  subordinated  to  the  national  god, 
who  is  represented  by  the  king  and  a  centralized  priesthood.  The 
national  religion,  therefore,  by  its  sanctions,  upholds  the  authority  of 
the  central  administration.  Divine  qualities  are  imputed  to  the  king  and 
he  is  encouraged  to  assert  arbitrary  powers. 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  STATE  89 

Under  these  influences  political  integration  goes  irresistibly  forward. 
The  stronger  absorb  the  weaker  states,  until  the  resulting  civil  societies 
become  doubly  and  trebly  compound.  Moreover,  conquest  docs  not  end 
when  the  scientific  frontier  has  been  established.  Ambition  overleaps 
its  proper  bounds.  One  after  another,  visions  of  universal  empire  arise, 
before  the  eyes  of  Rameses  and  of  Sargon,  of  Cyrus  and  of  Alexander, 
of  Cassar  and  of  Charlemagne.  Distant  peoples  that  can  never  be  an 
integral  part  of  the  conquering  nation  are  subjugated  in  mere  wantonness 
of  power,  and  are  compelled  to  pay  tribute,  which  flows  in  broadening 
streams  of  wealth  to  enrich  the  capital  city.  Material  splendor  rewards 
the  military  success.  Palaces  and  temples  are  its  monuments.  Statues 
and  tablets  record  the  deeds  of  its  heroes. 

Such  are  the  achievements  of  the  nation-making  age,  of  the  military- 
religious  period  of  social  evolution.  They  contribute  to  civilization  two 
of  its  essential  elements ;  namely,  security  of  property  and  of  life,  and 
a  masterful  creative  activity  of  the  human  spirit,  expressing  itself  in 
political  and  religious  organization  and  in  a  rude  but  massive  and 
enduring  art. 

53.  Summary  of  Greek  political  development.  The  following 
brief  outline  of  political  history  in  Greece  indicates  a  number  of 
influences  that  affect  the  development  of  the  state,  and  gives  an 
illustration  of  the  so-called  '"  cycle  of  poHtical  evolution"  :  ^ 

First,  we  examined  the  "Primitive  Polity,"  to  be  called  monarchy  if 
anything,  but  where  it  is  interesting  to  note,  in  the  council  of  subchiefs 
or  elders  and  the  assembly  of  the  freemen  in  arms,  undeveloped  organs 
which  become  prominent  respectively  in  the  stages  of  oligarchy  and 
democracy.  Then  we  discussed  the  transition  to  primitive  oligarchy,  of 
which  the  most  prominent  aspect  is  the  reduction  of  the  power  of  the 
king,  and  ultimately  the  substitution  for  him  of  an  annual  magistracy. 
The  council  then  becomes  the  ruling  organ ;  the  assembly  was  probably 
preserved,  but  the  landowners  of  old  family  predominate  in  it.  We 
observed  different  causes  tending  to  give  the  assembly  an  oligarchical 
character,  namely,  conquest ;  growth,  especially  in  colonies,  of  new 
populations  without  political  rights ;  integration,  under  the  influence  of 
which  small  landowners  and  distant  tend  to  drop  out  of  the  assembly ; 
increase  of  inequalities  of  wealth  and  economic  servitude  of  poorer 
freemen.  The  next  phenomenon  considered  was  Tyrannis  —  "  irregular, 
unconstitutional  reversion  to  monarchy,"  probably,  as  in  Athens,  with 
constitutional  forms  preserved ;  and  we  distinguished  the  earlier  type 

1  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


90  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

developed  out  of  the  demagogue,  and  for  which  the  reaction  against 
early  oligarchy  gave  the  opportunity,  from  the  later  for  which  the  em- 
ployment of  mercenaries  was  a  favoring  condition.  We  noted  that 
Tyrannis  was  a  prevalent  type  at  certain  periods,  but  not  a  necessary 
stage  through  which  Greek  states  passed. 

Then,  when  the  earlier  Tyrannis  has,  speaking  broadly,  disappeared, 
the  brilliant  period  of  Greek  history  has  begun  which  is  generally  char- 
acterized by  a  drift  towards  democracy.  We  can  trace  the  progress  in 
the  democratic  direction  from  stage  to  stage  at  Athens,  where  a  stable 
democratic  constitution  is  finally  established  at  the  end  of  the  fifth 
century,  which  remains  substantially  unaltered  up  to  the  time  of  the 
subjugation  under  Macedonia.  And  elsewhere  in  Greece  the  same 
tendency  to  democracy  is  seen  —  though  it  does  not  by  any  means  pre- 
vail universally.  In  one  or  two  cases,  as  far  as  we  know,  the  oligar- 
chical form  of  polity  maintains  itself  throughout  this  period  ;  more  often 
we  hear  of  oscillation  between  oligarchy  and  democracy.  Also,  in  the 
later  part  of  the  time,  the  habit  of  employing  mercenaries  gives  a  new 
opportunity  for  Tyrannis.  Then  the  Macedonian  predominance  and 
empire  closes  the  period  of  effective  independence  of  the  city  states,  and 
we  come  to  the  last  noteworthy  product  of  the  fertile  inventiveness  of 
the  Greek  mind  in  the  department  of  political  construction :  the  Federal 
system,  of  which  the  remarkable  development  in  the  third  century  B.C. 
sheds  a  gleam  of  interest  on  the  last  stage  of  the  history  of  free  Greece, 
the  period  intervening  between  Macedonian  predominance  and  the  final 
absorption  of  Greece  under  Roman  rule. 

In  considering  the  causes  of  transition  from  one  form  of  government 
to  another,  we  have  so  far  directed  our  attention  chiefly  —  putting 
conquest  aside  —  to  internal  causes.  Among  these,  economic  causes  are 
very  important ;  e.g.  the  growing  inequality  of  wealth  tended,  as  we  saw, 
to  alter  the  primitive  polity  in  an  oligarchical  direction,  making  the  poor 
freeman  more  dependent  on  the  rich:  while  again  the  more  extensive 
use  of  money,  leading  to  borrowing  on  the  part  of  the  smaller  cultiva- 
tors, aggravated  this  inequality  into  a  felt  oppressiveness,  and  tended 
both  in  Greece  and  Rome  to  movements  against  the  primitive  oligarchy. 
Also  —  especially  in  colonies  and  commercial  cities  —  the  growth  of  new 
wealth,  outside  the  privileged  classes,  was  a  cause  making  for  change. 

But,  apart  from  economic  causes,  one  main  impulse  to  change  is 
doubtless  derived  from  the  spread  of  the  simple  conviction  that  "  one 
man  is  as  good  as  another  "  —  those  outside  the  group  politically  privi- 
leged as  good  as  those  inside ;  a  conviction  of  which  the  practical  effect 
would  be  continually  strengthened  by  the  openness  to  new  ideas  —  the 
weakening  of  the  force  of  mere  custom  and  habit  —  which  the  gradual 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  STATE 


91 


civilization  and  the  mutual  communication  of  so  many  independent 
communities  would  cause.  This  conviction  is  most  obviously  effective 
in  the  drift  to  democracy,  but  we  may  suppose  it  operative  in  earlier 
stages  in  a  more  limited  form.  .  .   . 

But  when  we  speak  of  the  efficiency  of  the  king  or  government,  we 
have  already  passed  the  line  separating  internal  from  external  relations 
of  the  community,  since  the  efficiency  of  the  primitive  king  was  largely 
estimated  with  a  view  to  war ;  in  fact,  as  we  saw,  the  introduction  of  a 
war  chief,  distinct  from  the  hereditary  king,  is  said  to  have  been  the  first 
step  in  the  process  of  change  to  oligarchy  at  Athens.  And  no  doubt 
more  generally,  war  was  sometimes  an  important  factor  in  producing  a 
change  in  the  form  of  government,  and  sometimes,  on  the  other  hand, 
a  source  of  stability,  when  the  established  government  proved  itself 
efficient.  We  have  noted  again  that  the  development  of  the  city  state  out 
of  the  more  primitive  group  of  village  communities  was  importantly 
favored  by  the  value  of  the  protection  of  the  walled  town  in  war. 

And  finally,  the  predominance  of  federalism  in  the  last  stages  of  the 
history  of  Greece  was  chiefly  caused  by  the  necessity,  after  the  Mace- 
donian conquest  of  the  Persian  empire,  of  having  states  larger  than  the 
old  city  state,  to  resist  Macedonia  and  the  large  states  formed  out  of  the 
fragments  of  Alexander's  empire.  I  may  add  that  the  necessity  of  greater 
strength  for  defense  in  war  has  been  the  cause  of  federalism  in  medieval 
and  modern  Europe  as  well  as  in  ancient  Greece. 

54.  Formation  of  the  Roman  Empire.  The  failure  of  the  Roman 
republic  and  the  causes  that  led  to  the  establishment  of  the  Empire 
are  concisely  given  in  the  following : 

Rome  had  left  no  state  able  to  keep  the  seas  or  guard  the  frontiers  of 
civilization.  It  was  therefore  her  plain  duty  to  police  the  Mediterranean 
lands  herself.  In  her  attempts  to  do  this,  she  was  drawn  on  from  con- 
quest to  conquest,  and  became  mistress  of  the  world  before  she  had 
learned  how  to  rule  it.  Formerly  she  had  devised  a  system  fit  for  a  free 
city  as  the  center  of  allied  Italy ;  but  now  she  failed  to  create  a  new 
system  fit  for  a  free  city  as  the  center  of  the  world.  The  reaction  of  her 
conquests,  too,  lowered  her  own  moral  tone  and  contributed  to  her 
decay,  economic  and  political,  until  she  could  no  longer  fulfill  her  old  task 
of  governing  Italy,  or  even  herself.  From  the  path  of  empire  there  was 
no  retreat ;  but  to  that  empire  the  city  commonwealth  was  to  sacrifice  its 
own  liberty. 

There  followed  a  miserable  century  of  plunder  in  the  provinces  and 
of  civil  strife  at  home.    The  internal  conflict  was  threefold :  in  Rome 


92  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

itself,  between  rich  and  poor;  in  Italy,  between  Rome  and  the  "Allies"; 
in  the  empire,  between  Italy  and  the  Provinces.  At  the  same  time,  the 
police  duty  itself  was  neglected ;  the  seas  swarmed  with  pirate  fleets,  and 
new  barbarian  thunderclouds  gathered  unwatched  on  all  the  frontiers. 

The  irresponsible  senatorial  oligarchy  proved  incompetent  and  indis- 
posed to  grapple  with  these  problems,  and  its  jealousy  crushed  individual 
statesmen  who  tried  to  heal  the  diseases  of  the  state  in  constitutional 
ways.  A  century  later,  the  situation  had  become  unbearable  within,  and 
the  Roman  world  seemed  on  the  verge  of  ruin  from  barbarian  assault  from 
without.  But,  after  all,  the  vigor  of  the  Italian  race  was  unexhausted ; 
and  the  breakdown  of  senatorial  rule,  and  the  danger  of  a  worse  mob 
rule,  bred  the  only  resource,  —  the  military  rule  of  Marius,  Sulla,  Pompey, 
and  Caesar. 

These  leaders  began  a  new  system.  We  call  it  the  Empire.  Its 
essence  was  to  be  the  concentration  of  power  and  responsibility.  It  was 
to  remedy  much.  For  centuries  it  guarded  civilization  against  attacks 
from  without,  while  it  secured  order,  good  government,  and  prosperity 
within.  Political  life  for  the  people  it  could  not  restore.  To  combine 
liberty  with  imperial  extent  was  to  be  left  to  a  later  race  on  a  new 
stage. 

II.  The  Medieval  State 

55.  Similarities  among  Greek,  Roman,  and  Teutonic  institutions. 

Sidgwick  points  out  certain  similarities  in  the  early  political  meth- 
ods of  Greeks,  Romans,  and  Teutons,  as  follovi^s  :  ^ 

At  the  outset  it  is  important  to  observe  that,  divergent  as  are  the  lines 
of  development  of  Greco-Italian  and  Teutonic  civilization,  they  yet  are 
not  so  far  apart  in  their  beginnings.  When  we  compare  the  earliest 
forms  of  political  society  in  Greece,  Rome,  and  Germany,  as  the  best  at- 
tainable evidence  shows  them,  we  find  —  among  important  differences  — 
a  certain  agreement  in  general  features.  Indeed,  according  to  Freeman, 
"  there  is  one  form  of  government  which,  under  various  modifications, 
is  set  before  us  in  the  earliest  glimpses  which  we  get  of  the  political  life 
of  at  least  all  the  European  members  of  the  Aryan  family.  This  is  that 
of  the  single  king  or  chief,  first  ruler  in  peace,  first  captain  in  war,  but 
ruling  not  by  his  own  arbitrary  will,  but  with  the  advice  of  a  council  of 
chiefs  eminent  for  age  or  birth  or  personal  exploits,  and  further  bring- 
ing all  matters  of  special  moment  for  the  final  approval  of  the  general 
assembly  of  the  whole  people.  ...    It  is  the  form  of  government  which 

^  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  STATE 


93 


we  see  painted  in  our  first  picture  of  European  life  in  the  songs  of 
Homer.  ...  It  is  the  form  of  government  which  tradition  sets  before 
us  as  the  earliest  form  of  that  ancient  Latin  constitution  out  of  which 
grew,  first  the  Commonwealth,  and  then  the  Empire  of  Rome.  It  is  no 
less  the  form  of  government  which  we  see  in  the  first  picture  of  our 
race  drawn  for  us  by  the  hand  of  Tacitus,  and  in  the  glimpses  given  us 
by  our  own  native  annals  of  the  first  days  of  our  own  branch  of  that  race 
when  they  made  their  way  into  this  island  in  which  we  dwell."  ^ 

56.  The  feudal  state.  The  conditions  in  western  Europe  that 
led  to  feudalism,  and  some  of  the  essential  features  of  the  system, 
are  given  by  Adams  as  follows  : 

We  have  endeavored  to  present  in  this  sketch,  as  fully  as  possible  in 
the  space  at  our  command,  the  rise  of  the  feudal  system.  Comparatively 
insignificant  practices,  of  private  and  illegal  origin,  which  had  arisen  in 
the  later  Roman  empire,  and  which  were  continued  in  the  early  Frankish 
kingdom,  had  been  developed,  under  the  pressure  of  public  need,  into  a 
great  political  organization  extending  over  the  whole  West,  and  virtually 
supplanting  the  national  government.  The  public  need  which  had  made 
this  development  necessary  was  the  need  of  security  and  protection. 
Men  had  been  obliged  to  take  refuge  in  the  feudal  casde,  because  the 
power  of  the  state  had  broken  down.  This  breakdown  of  the  state,  its 
failure  to  discharge  its  ordinary  functions,  was  not  so  much  due  to  a 
lack  of  personal  ability  on  the  part  of  the  king,  as  to  the  circumstances 
of  the  time,  and  to  the  inability  of  the  ruling  race  as  a  whole  to  rise 
above  them.  The  difficulty  of  intercommunication,  the  breakdown  of 
the  old  military  and  judicial  organization,  partly  on  account  of  this 
difficulty,  thus  depriving  the  state  of  its  two  hands,  the  lack  of  general 
ideas  and  common  feelings  and  interests,  seen  for  example  in  the  scanty 
commerce  of  the  time,  the  almost  total  absence,  in  a  word,  of  all  the 
sources  from  which  every  government  must  draw  its  life  and  strength, 
this  general  condition  of  society  was  the  controlling  force  which  created 
the  feudal  system.  The  Germans,  in  succeeding  to  the  empire  of  Rome, 
had  inherited  a  task  which  was  as  yet  too  great  for  the  most  of  them, 
Merovingian  and  Carolingian  alike.  Only  by  a  long  process  of  expe- 
rience and  education  were  they  to  succeed  in  understanding  its  problems 
and  mastering  its  difficulties.  This  is  only  saying  in  a  new  form  what 
we  have  before  said  in  other  connections,  that  the  coming  in  of  the 
Germans  must  of  necessity  have  been  followed  by  a  temporary  decline 
of  civilization.    This  was  just  as  true  of  government  and  political  order 

1"  Comparative  Politics,"  Lecture  II,  pp.  65,  66. 


94  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

as  of  ever>'thing  else,  and  the  feudal  system  is  merely,  in  politics,  what  the 
miracle  lives  and  scholasticism  are  in  literature  and  science.  .  .  . 

It  is  evident  that  a  system  of  this  sort  would  be  a  serious  obstacle  in 
the  reconstruction  of  a  strong  and  consolidated  state.  It  is  a  fact  still 
more  familiar  to  us  that  the  legal  and  social  privileges,  the  shadow  of  a 
once  dominant  feudalism,  which  the  state  allowed  to  remain  or  was 
forced  to  tolerate,  secured  for  it  a  universal  popular  hatred  and  condem- 
nation. But  these  facts  ought  not  to  obscure  for  us  the  great  work 
which  fell  to  the  share  of  feudalism  in  the  general  development  of 
civilization.  The  preceding  account  should  have  given  some  indication, 
at  least,  of  what  this  work  was.  The  feudal  castle,  torn  to  pieces  by  the 
infuriated  mob  of  revolted  peasants,  as  the  shelter  of  tyrannous  privi- 
leges, was  originally  built  by  the  willing  and  an.xious  labor  of  their 
ancestors  as  their  only  refuge  from  worse  evils  than  the  lord's 
oppression.  .  .  . 

Feudalism  is  a  form  of  political  organization  which  allows  the  state  to 
separate  into  as  minute  fragments  as  it  will,  virtually  independent  of  one 
another  and  of  the  state,  without  the  total  destruction  of  its  own  life 
with  which  such  an  experience  would  seem  to  threaten  every  general 
government.  .  .  . 

It  was  this  that  feudalism  did.  It  was  an  arrangement  suited  to  crude 
and  barbarous  times,  by  which  an  advanced  political  organization  be- 
longing to  a  more  orderly  civilization  might  be  carried  through  such 
times  without  destruction,  though  unsuited  to  them,  and  likely  to  perish 
if  left  to  its  own  resources.  There  is  no  intention  of  asserting  in  this 
proposition  that  such  a  system  is  ideally  the  best  way  to  accomplish  this 
result,  or  that  it  could  not  have  been  done,  perhaps  with  less  time  and 
expense,  by  some  other  expedient,  but  only  that  this  is  what  it  did  do 
historically,  and  possibly  further  that  the  general  history  of  the  world 
shows  it  to  be  a  natural  method  in  similar  cases. 

57.  Essential  principles  of  the  medieval  empire.  The  theory 
underlying  the  medieval  concept  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  is 
brilliantly  worked  out  by  Bryce  :  ^ 

There  was,  nevertheless,  such  a  thing  as  medieval  imperialism,  a 
theory  of  the  nature  of  the  state  and  the  best  form  of  government, 
which  has  been  described  once  already,  and  need  not  be  described  again. 
It  is  enough  to  say,  that  from  three  leading  principles  all  its  properties 
may  be  derived.  The  first  and  the  least  essential  was  the  existence  of 
the  state  as  a  monarchy.    The  second  was  the  exact  coincidence  of  the 

1  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  STATE  95 

state's  limits  and  the  perfect  harmony  of  its  workings  with  the  limits 
and  the  v/orkings  of  the  church.  The  third  was  its  universality.  These 
three  were  vital.  Forms  of  political  organization,  the  presence  or 
absence  of  constitutional  checks,  the  degree  of  liberty  enjoyed  by  the 
subject,  the  rights  conceded  to  local  authorities,  all  these  were  matters 
of  secondary  importance.  But  although  there  brooded  over  all  the 
shadow  of  a  despotism,  it  was  a  despotism  not  of  the  sword  but  of  law  ; 
a  despotism  not  chilling  and  blighting,  but  one  which,  in  Germany  at 
least,  looked  with  favor  on  municipal  freedom,  and  everywhere  did  its 
best  for  learning,  for  religion,  for  intelligence ;  a  despotism  not  heredi- 
tary, but  one  which  constantly  maintained  in  theory  the  principle  that  he 
should  rule  who  was  found  the  fittest.  To  praise  or  to  decry  the  Empire 
as  a  despotic  power  is  to  misunderstand  it  altogether.  We  need  not, 
because  an  unbounded  prerogative  was  useful  in  ages  of  turbulence, 
advocate  it  now ;  nor  need  we,  with  Sismondi,  blame  the  Frankish  con- 
queror because  he  granted  no  "  constitutional  charter  "  to  all  the  nations 
that  obeyed  him.  Like  the  Papacy,  the  Empire  expressed  the  political 
ideas  of  a  time,  and  not  of  all  time :  like  the  Papacy,  it  decayed  when 
those  ideas  changed ;  when  men  became  more  capable  of  rational  liberty ; 
when  thought  grew  stronger,  and  the  spiritual  nature  shook  itself  more 
free  from  the  bonds  of  sense. 

58.  Individualism  in  the  feudal  state.  The  contributions  of 
the  medieval  period  to  the  principles  that  underlie  modern 
democracy  are  pointed  out  by  Woodrow  Wilson  : 

Through  all  the  developments  of  government  down  to  the  time  of 
the  rise  of  the  Roman  Empire  the  State  continued,  in  the  conception  of 
the  western  nations  at  least,  to  eclipse  the  individual.  Private  rights  had 
no  standing  as  against  the  State.  Subsequently  many  influences  com- 
bined to  break  in  upon  this  immemorial  conception.  Chief  among  these 
influences  were  Christianity  and  the  institutions  of  the  German  con- 
querors of  the  fifth  century.  Christianity  gave  each  man  a  magistracy 
over  himself  by  insisting  upon  his  personal,  individual  responsibility  to 
God.  For  right  living,  at  any  rate,  each  man  was  to  have  only  his  own 
conscience  as  a- guide.  In  these  deepest  matters  there  must  be  for  the 
Christian  an  individuality  which  no  claim  of  his  State  upon  him  could 
rightfully  be  suffered  to  infringe.  The  German  nations  brought  into  the 
Romanized  and  partially  Christianized  world  of  the  fifth  century  an 
individuality  of  another  sort,  —  the  idea  of  allegiance  to  individuals. 
Perhaps  their  idea  that  each  man  had  a  money  value  which  must  be  paid 
by  any  one  who   might  slay  him  also   contributed  to  the  process  of 


96 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


making  men  units  instead  of  State  fractions ;  but  their  idea  of  personal 
allegiance  played  the  more  prominent  part  in  the  transformation  of 
society  which  resulted  from  their  western  conquests.  The  Roman  knew 
no  allegiance  save  allegiance  to  his  State.  He  swore  fealty  to  his 
imperator  as  to  an  embodiment  of  that  State,  not  as  to  an  individual. 
The  Teuton,  on  the  other  hand,  bound  himself  to  his  leader  by  a  bond 
of  personal  service  which  the  Roman  either  could  not  understand  or 
understood  only  to  despise.  There  were,  therefore,  individuals  in  the 
German  State :  great  chiefs  or  warriors  with  a  following  {comitatiis)  of 
devoted  volunteers  ready  to  die  for  them  in  frays  not  directed  by  the 
State,  but  of  their  own  provoking.  There  was  with  all  German  tribes 
freedom  of  individual  movement  and  combination  within  the  ranks,  —  a 
wide  play  of  individual  initiative.  When  the  German  setded  down  as 
master  amongst  the  Romanized  populations  of  western  and  southern 
Europe,  his  thought  was  led  captive  by  the  conceptions  of  the  Roman 
law,  as  all  subsequent  thought  that  has  known  it  has  been,  and  his  habits 
were  much  modified  by  those  of  his  new  subjects ;  but  this  strong  ele- 
ment of  individualism  was  not  destroyed  by  the  contact.  It  lived  to 
constitute  one  of  the  chief  features  of  the  Feudal  System.  .  .  . 

This  system  was  fatal  to  peace  and  good  government,  but  it  cleared 
the  way  for  the  rise  of  the  modern  State  by  utterly  destroying  the  old 
conceptions.  The  State  of  the  ancients  had  been  an  entity  in  itself,  — 
an  entity  to  which  the  entity  of  the  individual  was  altogether  subordi- 
nate. The  Feudal  State  was  merely  an  aggregation  of  individuals,  —  a 
loose  bundle  of  separated  series  of  men  knowing  few  common  aims  or 
actions.  It  not  only  had  no  actual  unity :  it  had  no  thought  of  unity. 
National  unity  came  at  last,  —  in  France,  for  instance,  by  the  subjuga- 
tion of  the  barons  by  the  king ;  in  England  by  the  joint  effort  of  people 
and  barons  against  the  throne,  —  but  when  it  came  it  was  the  ancient 
unity  with  a  difference.  Men  w^ere  no  longer  State  fractions ;  they  had 
become  State  integers.  The  State  seemed  less  like  a  natural  organism 
and  more  like  a  deliberately  organized  association.  Personal  allegiance 
to  kings  had  everywhere  taken  the  place  of  native  membership  of  a 
body  politic.    Men  were  now  subjects,  not  citizens. 

Presently  came  the  thirteenth  century  with  its  wonders  of  personal 
adventure  and  individual  enterprise  in  discovery,  piracy,  and  trade. 
Following  hard  upon  these,  the  Renaissance  woke  men  to  a  philosophical 
study  of  their  surroundings,  —  and  above  all  of  their  long-time  unques- 
tioned systems  of  thought.  Then  arose  Luther  to  reiterate  the  almost 
forgotten  truths  of  the  individuality  of  men's  consciences,  the  right  of 
individual  judgment.  Erelong  the  new  thoughts  had  penetrated  to  the 
masses  of  the  people.    Reformers  had  begun  to  cast  aside  their  scholastic 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  STATE 


97 


weapons  and  come  down  to  the  common  folk  about  them,  talking  their 
own  vulgar  tongue  and  craving  their  acquiescence  in  the  new  doctrines 
of  deliverance  from  mental  and  spiritual  bondage  to  Pope  or  Schoolman. 
National  literatures  were  born.  Thought  had  broken  away  from  its 
exclusion  in  cloisters  and  universities  and  had  gone  out  to  challenge  the 
people  to  a  use  of  their  own  minds.  By  using  their  minds,  the  people 
gradually  put  away  the  childish  things  of  their  days  of  ignorance,  and 
began  to  claim  a  part  in  affairs.  Finally,  systematized  popular  education 
has  completed  the  story.  Nations  are  growing  up  into  manhood. 
Peoples  are  becoming  old  enough  to  govern  themselves. 

III.  The  Modern  State 

59.  Rise  of  monarchic  states.  The  rise  of  national  states,  in 
the  form  of  absolute  monarchies,  that  characterized  the  close  of 
medieval  and  the  beginning  of  modern  political  history  is  briefly 
outlined  in  the  following  : 

Before  1300,  Europe  had  tried  various  principles  of  organization. 
Feudal  aristocracy  and  town  detnocracy  had  both  been  found  wanting  in 
order  and  permanence.  The  ideal  of  a  universal  numarchy  had  been 
shattered  by  the  quarrel  between  popes  and  emperors.  The  papacy 
(theocratic  rule)  had  seemed  to  come  out  of  that  struggle  triumphant, 
but  almost  at  once  it  was  to  fall  before  a  new  form  of  organization,  — 
the  separate  mojmrchic  states,  into  which  Europe  had  been  growing. 
Says  Lavisse,  "  from  the  wreck  of  the  two  universal  powers  (papacy  and 
empire),  the  various  nationalities  emerged.  Just  as  Christendom  had 
succeeded  the  Roman  Empire,  so  Europe  succeeded  Christendom." 

This  rise  of  "  new  monarchies,"  each  with  a  definite  territory,  is  the 
political  change  that  characterized  the  close  of  the  Middle  Ages.  Each 
such  territory  had  contained  several  distinct,  mutually  jealous  classes,  — 
nobles,  burgesses,  artisans,  clergy,  peasantry,  —  and  for  centuries,  French 
nobility  and  German  nobility  had  had  more  in  common  with  each  other 
than  either  had  with  the  townsmen  of  their  own  country.  So  of  the  other 
classes.  Social  unity  and  sympathies  had  not  been  national,  German  or 
English:  they  had  followed  the  lines  of  class-cleavage  across  Europe. 
The  monarchies  were  to  change  all  this.  They  were  to  weld  these  classes, 
within  each  of  their  respective  territories,  into  one  nation  with  a  common 
patriotism.  Probably  no  king  put  this  end  before  him  clearly  as  his 
task  ;  but  the  result  followed  naturally  from  the  thing  the  king  did  strive 
for,  —  namely,  to  consolidate  the  numerous  petty  feudal  states  within  his 
realm  into  one  state  with  a  uniform  administration  centering  in  his  will. 


gS  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

While  this  was  being  accomplished,  some  old  liberties  were  lost  and 
the  monarchs  became  despots :  but  the  Uberties  were  of  a  kind  that  had 
proved  to  be  intertwined  with  anarchy,  and  the  seeming  loss  was  only 
for  a  time.  A  few  centuries  later  there  was  to  grow  up  a  freer,  broader, 
more  secure  freedom  than  had  ever  before  been  possible. 

In  Germany  and  Italy  the  destructive  conflict  between  papacy  and 
Empire  ruined  all  chance  for  progress  toward  national  monarchies  for 
hundreds  of  years.  Until  1250,  these  countries  had  been  the  centers  of 
interest ;  then  leadership  passed  to  England,  France,  and  Spain,  —  the 
lands  in' which  the  new  monarchic  movement  was  best  developed. 

60.  Science  and  the  spirit  of  reform.  One  of  the  leading  in- 
fluences that  struck  a  powerful  blow  at  the  remnants  of  feudal 
institutions  in  modem  Europe  is  thus  stated  in  a  recent  book  : 

A  thoughtful  obser\'er  in  the  eighteenth  century  would,  as  we  have 
seen,  have  discovered  many  medieval  institutions  which  had  persisted 
in  spite  of  the  considerable  changes  which  had  taken  place  in  conditions 
and  ideas  during  the  previous  five  hundred  years.  Serfdom,  the  guilds, 
the  feudal  dues,  the  nobility  and  clergy  with  their  peculiar  privileges, 
the  declining  monastic  orders,  the  confused  and  cruel  laws,  —  these  were 
a  part  of  the  heritage  which  Europe  had  received  from  what  was  coming 
to  be  regarded  as  a  dark  and  barbarous  period.  People  began  to  be 
keenly  alive  to  the  deficiencies  of  the  past,  and  to  look  to  the  future  for 
better  things,  even  to  dream  of  progress  beyond  the  happiest  times  of 
which  they  had  any  record.  They  came  to  feel  that  the  chief  obstacles 
to  progress  were  the  outworn  institutions,  the  ignorance  and  prejudices 
of  their  forefathers,  and  that  if  they  could  only  be  freed  from  this 
incubus,  they  would  find  it  easy  to  create  new  and  enlightened  laws  and 
institutions  to  suit  their  needs. 

This  attitude  of  mind  seems  natural  enough  in  our  progressive  age, 
but  two  centuries  ago  it  was  distinctly  new.  Mankind  has  in  general 
shown  an  unreasoning  respect  and  veneration  for  the  past.  Until  the 
opening  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  former  times  were  commonly  held 
to  have  been  better  than  the  present,  for  the  evils  of  the  past  were  little 
known  while  those  of  the  present  were,  as  always,  only  too  apparent. 
Men  looked  backward  rather  than  forward.  They  aspired  to  fight  as 
well,  or  be  as  saintly,  or  write  as  good  books,  or  paint  as  beautiful 
pictures,  as  the  great  men  of  old.  That  they  might  excel  the  achieve- 
ments of  their  predecessors  did  not  occur  to  them.  Knowledge  was 
sought  not  by  studying  the  world  about  them  but  in  some  ancient 
authority.    In  Aristotle's  vast  range  of  works  on  various  branches  of 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  STATE  gg 

science,  the  Middle  Ages  felt  that  they  had  a  mass  of  authentic  infor- 
mation which  it  should  be  the  main  business  of  the  universities  to 
explain  and  impart  rather  than  to  increase  or  correct  it  by  new  investi- 
gations. Men's  ideals  centered  in  the  past,  and  improvement  seemed  to 
them  to  consist  in  reviving,  so  far  as  possible,  the  "  good  old  days." 

It  was  mainly  to  the  patient  men  of  science  that  the  western  world 
owed  its  first  hopes  of  future  improvement.  It  is  they  who  have  shown 
that  the  ancient  writers  were  mistaken  about  many  serious  matters  and 
that  they  had  at  best  a  very  crude  and  imperfect  notion  of  the  world. 
They  have  gradually  robbed  men  of  their  old  blind  respect  for  the  past 
and,  by  their  discoveries,  have  pointed  the  way  to  indefinite  advance,  so 
that  now  we  expect  constant  change  and  improvement  and  are  scarcely 
astonished  at  the  most  marvelous  inventions.  .  .  . 

Those  who  accepted  the  traditional  views  of  the  world  and  of  religion, 
and  opposed  change,  were  quite  justified  in  suspecting  that  scientific  in- 
vestigation would  sooner  or  later  make  them  trouble.  It  taught  men  to 
distrust,  and  even  to  scorn,  the  past  which  furnished  so  many  instances 
of  ignorance  and  gross  superstition. 

61.  The  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries.  The  following  is 
a  brief  summary  of  the  political  de\elopment  of  the  past  two  cen- 
turies.   It  also  suggests  the  chief  political  problems  of  the  present : 

We  have  seen  how,  in  the  eighteenth  centun,',  the  European  monarchs 
light-heartedly  made  war  upon  one  another  in  the  hope  of  adding  a  bit 
of  territory  to  their  realms,  or  of  seating  a  relative  or  friend  on  a  vacant 
throne.  Such  enterprises  were  encouraged  by  the  division  of  Germany 
and  Italy  into  small  states  which  could  be  used  as  counters  in  this  royal 
game  of  war  and  diplomacy.  But  nevertheless  in  the  eighteenth  century 
European  history  was  already  broadening  out.  The  whole  eastern  half 
of  the  continent  was  brought  into  relation  with  the  West  by  Peter  the 
Great  and  Catharine,  and  merchants  and  traders  were  forcing  the 
problem  of  colonial  expansion  upon  their  several  governments.  England 
succeeded  in  driving  France  from  India  and  America  and  in  laying  the 
foundation  of  that  empire,  unprecedented  in  extent,  over  which  she 
rules  to-day.  Portugal  and  the  Netherlands,  once  so  conspicuous  upon 
the  seas,  had  lost  their  importance,  and  the  grasp  of  Spain  upon  the 
New  World  was  relaxing. 

We  next  considered  the  condition  of  the  people  over  whom  the 
monarchs  of  the  eighteenth  century  reigned,  —  the  serfs,  the  towns- 
people with  their  guilds,  the  nobility,  the  clergy,  and  the  religious  orders. 
We  noted  the  unlimited  authority  of  the  kings  and  the  extraordinary 


lOO  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

prerogatives  and  privileges  enjoyed  by  the  Roman  Catholic  clergy. 
The  origin  of  the  Anglican  Church  and  of  the  many  Protestant  sects  in 
England  was  explained.  We  next  showed  how  the  growing  interest  in 
natural  science  served  to  wean  men  from  their  reverence  for  the  past  and 
to  open  up  vistas  of  progress ;  how  the  French  philosophers,  Voltaire, 
Diderot,  Rousseau,  and  many  others,  attacked  existing  institutions,  and 
how  the  so-called  enlightened  despots  who  listened  to  them  undertook  a 
few  timid  reforms,  mainly  with  a  view  of  increasing  their  own  power. 
But  when  at  last,  in  1789,  the  king  of  France  was  forced  to  call  together 
representatives  of  his  people  to  help  him  fill  an  empty  treasury,  they 
seized  the  opportunity  to  limit  his  powers,  abolish  the  old  abuses,  and 
proclaim  a  program  of  reform  which  was  destined  to  be  accepted  in  turn 
by  all  the  European  nations. 

The  wars  which  began  in  1792  led  to  the  establishment  of  a  temporary 
republic  in  France,  but  a  military  genius,  the  like  of  which  the  world  had 
never  before  seen,  soon  brought  not  only  France  but  a  great  part  of 
western  Europe  under  his  control.  He  found  it  to  his  interest  to  intro- 
duce many  of  the  reforms  of  the  French  Revolution  in  the  countries 
which  he  conquered  and,  by  his  partial  consolidation  of  Germany  and  the 
consequent  extinction  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  he  prepared  the  way 
for  the  creation  later  of  one  of  the  most  powerful  European  states  of 
to-day. 

Since  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  which  readjusted  the  map  of  Europe 
after  Napoleon's  downfall,  a  number  of  very  important  changes  have 
occurred.  Both  Germany  and  Italy  have  been  consolidated  and  have 
taken  their  places  among  the  great  powers.  The  Turk  has  been  steadily 
pushed  back,  and  a  group  of  states  unknown  in  the  eighteenth  century 
has  come  into  existence  in  the  Balkan  peninsula.  Everywhere  the  mon- 
archs  have  lost  their  former  absolute  powers  and  have  more  or  less 
gracefully  submitted  to  the  limitations  imposed  by  a  constitution.  Even 
the  Tsar,  while  still  calling  himself  "'  Autocrat  of  all  the  Russias,"  has 
promised  to  submit  new  laws  and  the  provisions  of  his  yearly  budget  to 
a  parliament,  upon  which  he  and  his  police,  however,  keep  a  very 
sharp  eye. 

Alongside  these  important  changes  an  Industrial  Revolution  has  been 
in  progress,  the  influence  of  which  upon  the  lives  of  the  people  at  large 
has  been  incalculably  greater  than  all  that  armies  and  legislative  assem- 
blies have  accomplished.  It  has  not  only  given  rise  to  the  most  serious 
problems  which  face  Europe  to-day  but  has  heralded  in  imperialism. 
During  the  latter  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  European  powers, 
especially  England,  France,  Germany,  and  Russia,  have  been  busy  open- 
ing up  the  vast  Chinese  Empire  and  other  Asiatic  countries  to  European 


I 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  STATE  lOi 

influences,  and  in  this  way  the  whole  continent  of  Asia  has,  in  a  certain 
sense,  been  drawn  into  the  current  of  European  history.  Africa,  the 
borders  alone  of  which  were  known  in  1850,  has,  during  the  past  thirty 
years,  been  explored  and  apportioned  out  among  the  European  powers. 
It  will  inevitably  continue  for  many  years  to  be  completely  dominated  by 
them.  These  are  perhaps  the  most  striking  features  of  our  study  of  the 
past  two  hundred  years.  .  .  .  Among  the  most  important  questions 
which  have  been  discussed  in  newspapers,  books,  and  public  assemblies 
since  the  opening  of  the  French  Revolution  are  those  connected  with 
government.  They  may,  perhaps,  be  reduced  to  three:  (i)  Who  shall 
control  the  government  ?  (2)  How  far  shall  the  government  be  forbidden 
to  interfere  with  the  independence  of  individual  citizens  in  the  conduct  of 
their  own  affairs  ?  (3)  What,  on  the  other  hand,  shall  be  the  responsibili- 
ties of  the  government  in  protecting  the  members  of  society,  preventing 
them  from  injuring  one  another,  and  in  promoting  the  general  welfare  ? 

62.  The  modern  national  state.  Burgess,  the  leading  exponent 
of  the  importance  of  geographic  and  ethnic  unity,  gives  the  follow- 
ing panegyric  of  the  modern  national  state  : 

The  national  state  is  the  most  modern  product  of  political  history, 
political  science  and  practical  politics.  It  comes  nearer  to  solving  all  the 
problems  of  political  organization  than  any  other  system  as  yet  developed. 
In  the  first  place,  it  rescues  the  world  from  the  monotony  of  the  univer- 
sal empire.  This  is  an  indispensable  condition  of  political  progress.  We 
advance  politically,  as  well  as  individually,  by  contact,  competition  and 
antagonism.  The  universal  empire  suppresses  all  this  in  its  universal 
reign  of  peace,  which  means,  in  the  long  run,  stagnation  and  despotism. 
At  the  same  time,  the  national  state  solves  the  problem  of  the  relation 
between  states  by  the  evolution  of  the  system  of  international  law. 
Through  this  it  preserves  most  of  the  advantages  of  the  universal  empire 
while  discarding  its  one-sided  and  intolerant  character.  In  the  second 
place,  the  national  state  solves  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  sovereignty 
to  liberty  ;  so  that  while  it  is  the  most  powerful  political  organization  that 
the  world  has  ever  produced,  it  is  still  the  freest.  This  is  easy  to  com- 
prehend. The  national  state  permits  the  participation  of  the  governed 
in  the  government.  In  a  national  state  the  population  have  a  common 
language  and  a  common  understanding  of  the  principles  of  rights  and  the 
character  of  wrongs.  This  common  understanding  is  the  strongest  moral 
basis  which  a  government  can  possibly  have ;  and,  at  the  same  time,  it 
secures  the  enactment  and  administration  of  laws  whose  righteousness 
must  be  acknowledged,  and  whose  effect  will  be  the  realization  of  the 


I02  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

truest  liberty.  In  the  third  place,  the  national  state  solves  the  question 
of  the  relation  of  central  to  local  government,  in  that  it  rests  upon  the 
principle  of  self-government  in  both  domains.  In  the  perfect  national 
state  there  can  thus  be  no  jealousy  between  the  respective  spheres ;  and 
the  principle  will  be  universally  recognized  that,  where  uniformity  is 
necessary,  it  must  exist;  but  that  where  uniformity  is  not  necessary, 
variety  is  to  reign  in  order  that  through  it  a  deeper  and  truer  harmony 
may  be  discovered.  The  national  state  is  thus  the  most  modern  and  the 
most  complete  solution  of  the  whole  problem  of  political  organization 
which  the  world  has  as  yet  produced ;  and  the  fact  that  it  is  the  creation 
of  Teutonic  political  genius  stamps  the  Teutonic  nations  as  the  political 
nations  par  excellence,  and  authorizes  them,  in  the  economy  of  the  world, 
to  assume  the  leadership  in  the  establishment  and  administration  of  states. 

63.  The  future  of  the  national  state.  Willoughby  suggests  that 
nationality  may  be  a  transient  phase  of  political  development,  and 
points  out  the  influences  tending  toward  "  internationality."  ^ 

The  tendency  of  course  is,  as  indicated  in  Mill's  definition,  for 
Nations  to  constitute  themselves  as  individual  States,  and  it  may  be 
said  that  this  demand  for  political  unity  constitutes  the  surest  index 
to  the  existence  of  a  national  feeling.  Hence,  most  publicists  see  in 
the  national  State  the  most  perfect  type  of  political  development  thus 
far  attained. 

The  advancing  enlightenment  of  the  masses  has  been  instrumental 
in  creating  the  true  feeling  of  nationality,  that  is  to  say,  a  demand  for 
unity  based  upon  some  other  ground  than  mere  coercive  political  control ; 
and  the  present  century  has  seen  the  enormous  influence  that  this  princi- 
ple has  had  in  reforming  the  political  map  of  Europe.  At  the  same  time 
the  point  may  be  made  that  it  is  not  too  much  to  expect  that  this  same 
spirit  of  enlightenment  that  has  thus  given  rise  to  this  demand  for  a  re- 
demarcation  of  political  boundaries  will,  in  turn,  as  civilization  continues 
to  advance,  make  this  demand  less  imperative.  And  for  this  reason : 
While  at  first  the  enlightenment  of  the  masses  creates  in  them  a  con- 
sciousness of  their  own  individuality  and  solidarity,  and  thus  a  national 
feeling ;  at  the  same  time,  as  the  culture  of  the  people  increases,  their 
sympathies  become  more  cosmopolitan,  and  their  appreciation  of  the  true 
unity  of  all  humanity  more  real.  Ethnic,  lingual,  and  even  political  unity 
will  thus  exercise  comparatively  less  and  less  influence  as  Nations  find 
themselves  drawn  into  a  higher  and  more  intellectual  union.  At  the  same 
time,  also,  economic  interests  will  tend  more  and  more  to  cross  national 

1  Copyright,  1896,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  STATE  1 03 

and  political  boundaries,  and  thus  unite  with  increasing  closeness  the 
material  interests  of  different  Peoples. 

It  may  thus  be  entirely  possible  that  the  spirit  of  nationality  at  present 
so  active  in  politics  will  prove  to  be  a  phase  of  civilization  rather  than 
a  permanent  product ;  and  that  while  the  realization  of  a  true  World- 
State  may  never  be  possible,  we  may  yet  look  forward  to  a  growth  of 
internationality  that  will  largely  deprive  the  feeling  of  nationality  of  its 
present  force. 

64.  The  newer  democracy.  In  his  recent  book  Dealey  empha- 
sizes the  political  experiments  that  are  now  being  tried  in  certain 
places,  and  considers  them  the  vanguard  of  a  newer  democracy. 

No  one  is  yet  prepared  to  prophesy  the  outcome  of  this  movement 
toward  a  radical  humanitarian  form  of  democracy.  In  quiet  nooks  of 
civilization,  such  as  Finland,  Sweden  and  Switzerland,  in  the  "  Wild 
West "  of  the  United  States,  and  on  the  fringes  of  civilization  in  Australa- 
sia, may  be  found  the  vanguard  and  fighting  line  of  a  newer  democracy. 
Casting  precedent  to  the  winds,  the  governments  in  these  localities  are 
pressing  to  a  logical  conclusion  the  teaching  that  all  political  power 
should  be  exercised  directly  by  the  people  themselves.  In  these  experi- 
mental laboratories  they  seem  to  be  trying  every  conceivable  political 
policy.  The  electorates,  rnade  up  of  every  adult  man,  and  for  the  most 
part  of  every  adult  woman,  are  dictating  the  principles  of  the  fundamen- 
tal law  and  are  working  out  startling  policies  of  reform.  By  building  up 
through  careful  investigation  a  scientific  system  of  legal  regulation,  they 
hope  to  restrain  the  monopolistic  tendencies  of  capital  and  to  elevate 
standards  of  living  for  the  "  submerged  tenth "  and  the  "  depressed 
classes."  For  these  purposes  the  state  does  not  hesitate,  in  one  place  or 
another,  to  authorize,  as  necessity  demands,  governmental  ownership  of 
lands,  mines,  waters  and  the  usual  agencies  for  transportation  ;  nor  to 
embark  in  all  sorts  of  business  enterprises,  even  to  the  extent  of  lending 
money  at  low  rates  of  interest  to  its  citizens  and  serving  as  "  middle- 
man "  for  them  in  the  disposal  of  their  products.  These  regions  seem 
more  anxious  to  abolish  pauperism  and  crime  than  to  multiply  million- 
aires ;  apparently  they  listen  more  readily  to  the  demands  of  labor  than 
to  the  allurements  of  capital,  and,  strangely  enough,  seem  more  inter- 
ested in  the  health  and  education  of  children  than  in  their  exploitation  in 
the  industries. 

Yet,  after  all,  these  commonwealths  combined  form  but  a  petty  frac- 
tion of  human  society,  and  on  the  face  of  it  there  seems  no  possibility 
that  such  iridescent  visions  of  democracy  can  ever  dominate  the  idealism 


I04  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

of  western  civilization  as  a  whole.  Progress  as  a  rule  goes  on  halting 
feet  and  with  leaden  step.  And  yet,  if  ever  "  young  men  see  visions," 
there  may  come  in  their  hearts  an  enthusiasm  for  a  newer  civilization 
founded  on  justice  and  intelligence.  Then  these  seemingly  rash  and  well- 
nigh  chimerical  experiments  in  democracy  may  pass  into  history  as  the 
silver  lining  of  the  clouds  that  hid  a  brighter  day  for  mankind. 

65.  Political  evolution  of  the  future.  The  following  striking 
sentence  suggests  the  most  important  political  tendency  of  the 
present  day  : 

As  we  can  follow  through  the  feudal  epoch  the  development  of  the 
monarchical  idea  which  was  to  destroy  feudalism,  and  as  we  can  follow 
across  the  monarchical  epoch  the  development  of  the  national  idea  which 
was  to  throw  dynastic  interests  back  into  the  second  place,  so  we  can 
follow  across  the  history  of  the  last  two  centuries  the  development  of 
economic  and  industrial  interests,  the  social  idea,  which  is  destined  to 
overthrow  the  national. 


IV.  Summary  of  Political  Evolution 

66.  Aspects  of  the  state.  The  following  is  a  brief  outline  of 
the  main  phases  of  political  evolution  : 

The  various  aspects  assumed  by  the  state  in  the  course  of  its  histori- 
cal development  may  now  be  noted  in  review.  In  primitive  times  are  to 
be  traced  the  beginnings  of  the  fundamental  ideas  involved  in  the  theory 
of  the  modern  state ;  the  loosely  organized  horde  represents  the  nation, 
and  the  power  wielded  by  its  natural  leaders  typifies  the  power  of  sover- 
eignty in  later  times.  The  pastoral  stage  of  the  patriarchal  period  substi- 
tuted the  tribe  for  the  horde,  and  gave  greater  definiteness  to  the 
organization  of  the  community.  The  agricultural  stage  gave  the  clan  or 
the  village  community,  which  slowly  developed  by  conquest  and  alliance 
into  loosely  confederated  empires.  At  the  same  time  the  influence  of 
rapidly  growing  commerce  gave  birth  to  the  city  state,  best  known  in  the 
familiar  Greek  form,  but  found  also  in  the  medieval  cities  of  Germany 
and  Italy.  In  the  East,  in  Greece  under  Alexander,  and  in  Rome,  as 
well  as  in  later  Europe,  developed  the  idea  of  a  world  empire,  the  dream 
and  the  ambition  of  every  great  military  leader  of  all  times.  This  ideal 
was  translated  by  Christianity  into  dreams  of  a  spiritual  empire  in  which 
all  the  nations  of  the  world  would  pay  allegiance  to  the  Founder  of  the 
Faith,  and,  with  the  development  of  the  Papacy,  to  his  successor  seated 
in  St.  Peter's  chair  at  Rome. 


EVOLUTION  OF  THE  STATE  105 

The  rise  of  commerce  and  the  consequent  differentiation  of  interests 
among  the  peoples  of  western  Europe  resulted  in  the  formation  of 
national  states  held  firmly  together  by  ties  of  common  interests  and 
nationality.  Intercourse  among  these  gave  great  impetus  to  the  develop- 
ment of  diplomacy,  permanent  embassies  and  international  law,  all  designed 
to  aid  in  the  development  of  economic  interests  and  the  maintenance  of 
peace.  The  discovery  of  America  not  only  poured  mineral  wealth  into 
the  impoverished  kingdoms  of  Europe,  but  ushered  in  the  great  era  of 
colonization  in  which  Spain,  Portugal,  Holland,  France  and  Great  Britain 
vied  with  one  another  in  seeking  out  by  exploration  all  of  the  unknown 
world  that  could  be  utilized  for  purposes  of  commerce  and  exploitation. 
A  happy  combination  of  circumstances  developed  in  the  United  States 
of  America  the  federation,  an  improved  form  of  confederation,  combin- 
ing in  one  organization  the  advantages  of  autonomous  commonwealths 
with  the  high  centralization  of  an  empire  in  matters  of  general  policy. 
This  form,  so  well  adapted  to  the  needs  of  great  empires,  is  rapidly  prov- 
ing its  utility  as  a  form  of  government ;  indeed,  the  time  may  yet  come 
when  the  smaller  states  will  best  secure  their  autonomy  and  nationality  by 
uniting  in  federation  with  one  another  and  with  the  larger  leading  states. 

67.  Contributions  of  nations  to  political  civilization.  The  fol- 
lowing broad  summary  indicates  the  lines  along  which  the  great 
historic  states  have  contributed  to  the  political  ideas  of  the  present  : 

After  a  survey  of  political  evolution  and  differentiation,  he  would  have 
a  difficult  task  who  should  try  to  estimate  with  any  completeness  the 
relative  contribution  of  the  world's  great  historic  states  to  political  civili- 
zation. Yet  it  would  be  easy  enough  to  see  that  in  India,  in  Egypt,  on 
the  plains  of  China  and  of  Mesopotamia  and  in  the  cities  and  harbors  of 
Asia  Minor,  there  developed  great  patriarchal  and  commercial  empires 
which  fixed  the  fundamental  type  of  state  for  civilized  man ;  and  that, 
notwithstanding  the  rise  and  fall  of  dynasties  and  races,  the  petty  states 
of  early  Europe  inherited  from  the  East  and  the  South  all  that  was  really 
valuable  of  a  decadent  civilization. 

In  Phoenicia,  the  most  modern  of  ancient  Asiatic  governments,  and  in 
Carthage  its  great  colony,  in  Greece  and  in  Rome,  centered  the  contribu- 
tions of  preceding  ages,  as  each,  one  after  the  other,  assumed  promi- 
nence and  made  its  own  offering  to  the  common  stock.  From  the  first 
three  came  that  emphasis  on  commerce  and  colonization,  which  makes  a 
modern  Englishman  feel  perfectly  at  home  as  he  reads  of  the  expansion 
policy  of  these  nations ;  Athens,  in  addition,  taught  philosophers  how  to 
reason  about  the  principles  of  government  and  to  work  toward  higher 


I06  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

and  better  standards  of  political  life.  The  genius  of  Rome  lay  by  con- 
trast in  its  emphasis  on  law  and  administration.  By  the  aid  of  Greek 
philosophy  it  enlarged  its  customary  law  into  a  code  that  will  stand  for 
many  future  centuries,  as  the  high-water  mark  of  attainment  in  respect  to 
civil  rights.  By  its  administrative  and  centralizing  capacity  it  developed  a 
system  of  political  organization  that  finds  its  best  expression  to-day  in  the 
imperialistic  hierarchy  of  the  Roman  Catholic  church,  and  in  the  highly 
centralized  governmental  organization  of  France.  From  England  in  later 
centuries  came  an  efficient  judicial  system,  a  successful  colonial  policy 
and  a  parliament  working  out  through  a  joint  cabinet  an  harmonious 
cooperation  of  governmental  and  civic  interests.  France,  a  true  daughter 
of  the  Roman  empire,  as  shown  by  its  capacity  in  war,  in  law  and  in 
administration,  came  to  the  front  in  the  eighteenth  centui/y,  set  fire  to 
the  dry  tinder  of  European  politics  and  intoxicated  the  political  world 
with  the  inspiration  derived  from  the  "  Marseillaise,"  the  pursuit  of  glory, 
and  the  ideals  of  democracy  contained  in  the  motto.  Liberty,  Equality  and 
Fraternity.  This  influence  spread  through  western  and  southern  Europe, 
passed  to  the  Latin  colonies  in  South  America,  rivaling  there  the  com- 
peting influences  of  Spain  and  the  United  States,  and  even  affected  in 
the  latter  country  the  policies  of  such  democratic  leaders  as  Jefferson  and 
Monroe.  Germany  and  Japan  are  adding  their  contributions  to  the  world 
state  in  the  form  of  applications  of  scientific  principles  to  governmental 
functions  and  organization,  thereby  overcoming  natural  handicaps.  The 
United  States  also  is  no  mean  factor  in  the  modem  political  world. 
From  it  has  come  the  federation,  the  written  constitution,  a  humanitarian- 
ism  cosmopolitan  in  its  scope  and  a  wide  application  of  the  principles  of 
democracy.  This  development  has  been  greatly  aided  by  its  freedom 
from  military  necessities,  its  system  of  general  education  and  the  inven- 
tive capacity  of  its  people,  devoted  to  the  development  of  a  large,  well- 
watered,  fertile  land  rich  in  fuels  and  minerals.  Through  these  the  nation, 
with  its  composite  racial  population,  is  deeply  impressing  its  governmen- 
tal type  on  the  political  systems  of  the  world,  and  has  by  no  means  yet 
reached  the  height  of  its  powers.  Add  to  all  these  the  many  experiments 
being  made  in  odd  corners  of  the  earth,  such  as  in  Australasia,  Finland, 
Scandinavia  and  Switzerland,  and  the  conviction  might  readily  grow  that 
the  state,  in  its  governmental  functioning  and  organization,  is  still  plastic, 
is  still  adapting  itself  to  newer  conditions  and  by  steady  improvement  is 
becoming  unquestionably  the  great  agency  through  which  humanity  will 
continue  to  accomplish  its  ends  of  social  development. 


CHAPTER  Vn 

THEORIES  OF  THE  STATE 

I.    Political  Theory 

68.  The  value  of  political  theory.  In  the  preface  to  his  discus- 
sion of  the  "  Political  Theories  of  the  Ancient  World,"  Willoughby 
indicates  the  importance  of  political  theory  as  follows  : 

In  the  general  field  of  philosophy  political  speculation  has  occupied  an 
important  place,  attracting  to  its  pursuit  the  greatest  thinkers  of  all  times. 
A  study  of  the  history  of  political  theories  thus  not  only  brings  one  at 
once  into  touch  with  one  of  the  most  important  subjects  with  which  men's 
minds  have  been  concerned  since  first  was  attempted  the  determination 
of  the  nature  and  end  of  human  life,  but,  because  of  the  special  phenom- 
ena dealt  with,  renders  possible,  to  a  degree  not  to  be  attained  through 
any  other  means,  an  insight  into  the  logic  and  significance  of  political 
history.  Political  theories  have  ever  been  dependent  upon,  and  have 
been  evoked  by,  particular  objective  conditions.  They  therefore  reflect 
the  thoughts,  and  serve  to  interpret  the  actuating  motives,  at  the  root  of 
important  political  movements.  .  .  .  Who,  for  instance,  could  hope  to 
understand  the  Puritan  movement,  either  in  England  or  in  our  own  coun- 
try, without  a  knowledge  of  its  political  theories  ;  or  expect  to  appreciate 
the  history  of  the  middle  and  early  modern  ages  without  a  comprehen- 
sion of  the  various  views  regarding  the  relation  between  church  and  state 
promulgated  by  medieval  writers  ?  .  .  .  Not  only  have  political  specula- 
tions been  largely  influenced  by  practical  contemporaneous  problems,  but 
they  have  been,  to  an  almost  equal  extent,  though  less  directly,  controlled 
by  what  has  been  called  the  "  intellectual  climate  "  of  their  times.  .  .  . 
Beliefs  which  at  one  time  have  had  almost  universal  currency  are  at  an- 
other declared  absurd,  the  reason  for  the  change  being,  not  so  much  that 
specific  evidence  or  exact  logic  has  overthrown  the  old  ideas,  as  that  the 
intellectual  trend  of  the  later  time  has  been  toward  a  skepticism  as  regards 
the  particular  class  of  facts  involved.  Witchcraft,  for  example,  is  now 
relegated  by  all  enlightened  minds  to  the  limbo  of  superstition  and  fraud  ; 
yet,  as  Lecky  says  .  .  .,  for  more  than  fifteen  hundred  years  it  was  uni- 
versally believed  that  the  Bible  established,  in  the  clearest  manner,  the 

107 


Io8  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

reality  of  the  crime,  and  that  an  amount  of  evidence,  so  varied  and  so 
ample  as  to  preclude  the  very  possibility  of  doubt,  attested  its  continuance 
and  its  prevalence.  .  .  . 

Exactly  the  same  phenomenon  is  to  be  observed  in  tracing  the  devel- 
opment of  political  theories.  Dominant  political  systems  lose  support  and 
are  supplanted  by  others  as  the  chief  thought  of  the  times  changes  from 
matters  military  to  matters  industrial,  or  from  belief  in  the  beneficence  of 
authority  to  confidence  in  the  inherent  goodness  of  freedom.  .  ,  .  Doc- 
trines of  papal  supremacy,  of  religious  persecution,  and  of  natural  rights 
have  each  had  their  summer  of  prosperity,  only  to  be  blasted  as  the  gen- 
eral intellectual  climate  has  assumed  toward  them  a  wintry  aspect. 

Finally,  the  history  of  political  theories  has  the  same  value  that  the 
history  of  any  subject  possesses ;  namely,  as  a  means  of  more  fully 
understanding  the  conceptions  and  problems  dealt  with  than  is  other- 
wise possible.  .  .  . 

However  abstract  in  form,  political  speculations  are  almost  necessarily 
the  outcome  of  existing  objective  political  conditions,  and  have  for  their 
aim  the  solution  of  those  problems  that  at  the  time  seem  most  needful  of 
determination.  .  .  .  Conversely,  though  not  in  equal  degree,  political  the- 
ories have  often  been  influential  in  bringing  about  in  actual  life  political 
developments  in  conformity  with  the  principles  which  they  have  stated. 

n.  Ancient  Political  Theory 

69.  Political  ideas  of  the  Hebrews.  The  following  extracts  from 
the  Old  Testament,  dealing  with  the  nature  of  the  monarchy,  the 
judiciary,  and  the  law,  show  the  theocratic  nature  of  the  Hebrew 
commonwealth  : 

4.  Then  all  the  elders  of  Israel  gathered  themselves  together,  and  came 
to  Samuel  unto  Ramah, 

5.  And  said  unto  him,  Behold,  thou  art  old,  and  thy  sons  walk  not  in 
thy  ways :  now  make  us  a  king  to  judge  us  like  all  the  nations. 

6.  But  the  thing  displeased  Samuel,  when  they  said,  Give  us  a  king 
to  judge  us.    And  Samuel  prayed  unto  the  Lord.   .  .  . 

24.  And  Samuel  said  to  all  the  people,  See  ye  him  whom  the  Lord 
hath  chosen,  that  there  is  none  like  him  among  all  the  people  ?  And  all 
the  people  shouted,  and  said,  God  save  the  king.  .  .  . 

8.  If  there  arise  a  matter  too  hard  for  thee  in  judgment,  between 
blood  and  blood,  between  plea  and  plea,  and  between  stroke  and  stroke, 
being  matters  of  controversy  within  thy  gates  :  then  shalt  thou  arise,  and 
get  thee  up  into  the  place  which  the  Lord  thy  God  shall  choose ; 


THEORIES  OF  THE  STATE 


109 


9.  And  thou  shalt  come  unto  the  priests  the  Levites,  and  unto  the 
judge  that  shall  be  in  those  days,  and  inquire ;  and  they  shall  shew  thee 
the  sentence  of  judgment. 

10.  And  thou  shalt  do  according  to  the  sentence,  which  they  of  that 
place  which  the  Lord  shall  choose  shall  shew  thee ;  and  thou  shalt  ob- 
serve to  do  according  to  all  that  they  inform  thee.  .  .  . 

15.  And  Moses  turned,  and  went  down  from  the  mount,  and  the  two 
tables  of  the  testimony  were  in  his  hand :  .  .   . 

16.  And  the  tables  were  the  work  of  God,  and  the  writing  was  the 
writing  of  God,  graven  upon  the  tables.  .  .  . 

2.  And  the  king  went  up  into  the  house  of  the  Lord,  and  all  the  men 
of  Judah,  and  all  the  inhabitants  of  Jerusalem  with  him,  and  all  the  priests, 
and  the  prophets,  and  all  the  people,  both  small  and  great :  and  he  read 
in  their  ears  all  the  words  of  the  book  of  the  covenant  which  was  found 
in  the  house  of  the  Lord. 

3.  And  the  king  stood  by  a  pillar,  and  made  a  covenant  before  the 
Lord,  to  walk  after  the  Lord,  and  to  keep  his  commandments  and  his 
testimonies  and  his  statutes,  with  all  their  heart  and  all  their  soul,  to  per- 
form the  words  of  this  covenant  that  were  written  in  this  book :  and  all 
the  people  stood  to  the  covenant. 

70.  The  "  Republic  "  of  Plato.  The  fallowing  extracts  illustrate 
the  philosophical  ideal  of  the  Greeks  rather  than  a  definite  attempt 
to  frame  a  political  theory  : 

The  formation  of  a  city  is  due,  as  I  imagine,  to  this  fact,  that  we  are 
not  individually  independent,  but  have  many  wants.  .  .  . 

Thus  it  is,  then,  that  owing  to  our  many  wants,  and  because  each  seeks 
the  aid  of  others  to  supply  his  various  requirements,  we  gather  many  as- 
sociates and  helpers  into  one  dwelling  place,  and  give  to  this  joint  dwell- 
ing the  name  of  city.  .  .   . 

You  are  doubtless  all  brethren,  as  many  as  inhabit  the  city,  but  the 
God  who  created  you  mixed  gold  in  the  composition  of  such  of  you  as 
are  qualified  to  rule,  which  gives  them  the  highest  value ;  while  in  the 
auxiliaries  he  made  silver  an  ingredient,  assigning  iron  and  copper  to  the 
cultivators  of  the  soil  and  the  other  workmen.  Therefore,  inasmuch  as 
you  are  all  related  to  one  another,  although  your  children  will  generally 
resemble  their  parents,  yet  sometimes  a  golden  parent  will  produce  a 
silver  child,  and  a  silver  parent  a  golden  child,  and  so  on.  .  .  .  And  if 
a  child  be  born  in  their  class  with  an  alloy  of  copper  or  iron,  they  are 
to  have  no  manner  of  pity  upon  it,  but  giving  it  the  value  that  belongs 
to  its  nature,  they  are  to  thrust  it  away  into  the  class  of  artisans  or 


no  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

agriculturists  ;  and  if  again  among  these  a  child  be  born  with  any  admix- 
ture of  gold  or  silver,  when  they  have  assayed  it,  they  are  to  raise  it  either 
to  the  class  of  guardians,  or  to  that  of  auxiliaries :  .  .  . 

This  then,  I  continued,  will  also  serve  as  the  best  standard  for  our 
governors  to  adopt,  in  regulating  the  size  of  the  state,  and  the  amount 
of  land  which  they  should  mark  off  for  a  state  of  the  due  size,  leaving 
the  rest  alone.  What  is  the  standard  ?  he  asked.  The  following,  I  con- 
ceive ;  so  long  as  the  city  can  grow  without  abandoning  its  unity,  up  to 
that  point  it  may  be  allowed  to  grow,  but  not  beyond  it.  .  .  . 

Then  it  is  the  knowledge  residing  in  its  smallest  class  or  section,  that 
is  to  say,  in  the  predominant  and  ruling  body,  which  entitles  a  state,  or- 
ganized agreeably  to  nature,  to  be  called  wise  as  a  whole ;  and  that  class 
whose  right  and  duty  it  is  to  partake  of  the  knowledge  which  alone  of  all 
kinds  of  knowledge  is  properly  called  wisdom,  is  naturally,  as  it  appears, 
the  least  numerous  body  in  the  state.  .  .  . 

I  think  that  the  remainder  left  in  the  state,  after  eliminating  the  qual- 
ities which  we  have  considered,  I  mean  temperance,  and  courage,  and 
wisdom,  must  be  that  which  made  their  entrance  into  it  possible,  and 
which  preserves  them  there  so  long  as  they  exist  in  it.  Now  we  affirmed 
that  the  remaining  quality,  when  three  out  of  the  four  were  found,  would 
be  justice.  .  .  . 

The  constitutions  to  which  I  allude  .  .  .  are  the  following.  First,  we 
have  the  constitution  of  Crete  and  Sparta,  which  has  the  general  voice 
in  its  favor.  Second  in  order,  as  in  estimation,  stands  oligarchy,  as  it  is 
called,  a  commonwealth  fraught  with  many  evils.  Then  comes  democracy, 
which  is  the  adversary  and  successor  of  oligarchy ;  and,  finally,  that  glo- 
rious thing,  despotism,  which  differs  from  all  the  preceding,  and  consti- 
tutes the  fourth  and  worst  disease  of  a  state.  .  .  . 

Then  must  we  proceed  to  describe  those  inferior  men,  to  wit,  the  con- 
tentious and  ambitious  man,  answering  to  the  Spartan  constitution  ;  and 
likewise  the  oligarchical,  and  the  democratical,  and  the  despotic  man  ;  in 
order  that  we  may  get  a  view  of  the  most  unjust  man,  and  contrast  him 
with  the  most  just. 

71.  The  "Politics"  of  Aristotle.  Aristotle,  basing  his  study 
on  actual  conditions  and  careful  analysis,  lays  the  foundation  for 
political  science  proper : 

Hence  it  is  evident  that  the  state  is  a  creation  of  nature,  and  that  man  is 
by  nature  a  political  animal.  .  .  .  And  it  is  a  characteristic  of  man  that  he 
alone  has  any  sense  of  good  and  evil,  of  just  and  unjust,  and  the  association 
of  living  beings  who  have  this  sense  makes  a  family  and  a  state.  .  .  . 


THEORIES  OF  THE  STATE  I  1 1 

If,  however,  there  be  some  one  person  .  .  .  whose  virtue  is  so  pre- 
eminent that  the  virtues  or  the  political  capacity  of  all  the  rest  admit  of 
no  comparison  with  his,  he  can  be  no  longer  regarded  as  part  of  a  state  • 
for  justice  will  not  be  done  to  the  superior,  if  he  is  reckoned  only  as  the 
equal  of  those  who  are  so  far  inferior  to  him  in  virtue  and  in  political 
capacity.  .  .  .  Hence  we  see  that  legislation  is  necessarily  concerned 
only  with  those  who  are  equal  in  birth  and  in  power ;  and  that  for  men 
of  preeminent  virtue  there  is  no  law  —  they  are  themselves  a  law.  .  .  . 

Now  in  all  states  there  are  three  elements ;  one  class  is  very  rich,  an- 
other very  poor,  and  a  third  in  a  mean.  It  is  admitted  that  moderation 
and  the  mean  are  best.  .  .  .  Thus  it  is  manifest  that  the  best  political 
community  is  formed  by  citizens  of  the  middle  class,  and  that  those  states 
are  likely  to  be  well  administered,  in  which  the  middle  class  is  large.  .  .  . 

We  have  next  to  consider  what  means  there  are  of  preserving  states 
in  general,  and  also  in  particular  cases.  .   .  . 

In  all  well-attempered  governments  there  is  nothing  which  should  be 
more  jealously  maintained  than  the  spirit  of  obedience  to  law.   .   .  . 

States  are  preserved  when  their  destroyers  are  at  a  distance,  and  some- 
times also  because  they  are  near,  for  the  fear  of  them  makes  the  govern- 
ment keep  in  hand  the  state.  .  .  . 

It  is  a  principle  common  to  democracy,  oligarchy,  and  every  other  form 
of  government  not  to  allow  the  disproportionate  increase  of  any  citizen, 
but  to  give  moderate  honor  for  a  long  time  rather  than  great  honor  for 
a  short  time.  .  .  . 

But  above  all  every  state  should  be  so  administered  and  so  regulated 
by  law  that  its  magistrates  cannot  possibly  make  money.  .  .   . 

There  are  three  qualifications  required  in  those  who  have  to  fill  the 
highest  offices  —  (i)  first  of  all,  loyalty  to  the  established  constitution; 
(2)  the  greatest  administrative  capacity;  (3)  virtue  and  justice  of  the 
kind  proper  to  each  form  of  government.   .  .  . 

But  of  all  the  things  which  I  have  mentioned,  that  which  most  con- 
tributes to  the  permanence  of  constitutions  is  the  adaptation  of  education 
to  the  form  of  government.   .   .  . 

Now  it  is  evident  that  the  form  of  government  is  best  in  which  every 
man,  whoever  he  is,  can  act  for  the  best  and  live  happily.  .  .  . 

Clearly,  then,  the  best  limit  of  the  population  of  a  state  is  the  largest 
number  which  suffices  for  the  purposes  of  life,  and  can  be  taken  in  at  a 
single  view.  ...  In  size  and  extent  it  should  be  such  as  may  enable  the  in- 
habitants to  live  temperately  and  liberally  in  the  enjoyment  of  leisure.  .  .  . 

Husbandmen,  craftsmen,  and  laborers  of  all  kinds  are  necessary  to 
the  existence  of  states,  but  the  parts  of  the  state  are  the  warriors  and 
councilors. 


112  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

72.  The  "Commonwealth"  of  Cicero.  Cicero  handed  down  the 
current  philosophy  of  the  Greeks  but  added  few  new  ideas.  He 
praised  the  Roman  constitution  as  combining  the  merits  of  all 
forms  of  government. 

A  commonwealth  is  a  constitution  of  the  entire  people.  But  the  peo- 
ple is  not  every  association  of  men,  however  congregated,  but  the  asso- 
ciation of  the  entire  number,  bound  together  by  the  compact  of  justice, 
and  the  communication  of  utility.  The  first  cause  of  this  association  is 
not  so  much  the  weakness  of  man,  as  a  certain  spirit  of  congregation 
which  naturally  belongs  to  him.  .  .   . 

When  the  direction  of  all  depends  on  one  person,  we  call  this  individ- 
ual a  king ;  and  this  form  of  political  constitution,  a  kingdom.  When  it 
is  in  the  power  of  privileged  delegates,  the  state  is  said  to  be  ruled  by  an 
aristocracy ;  and  when  the  people  are  all  in  all,  they  call  it  a  democracy, 
or  popular  constitution.  .  .  .  There  is  a  fourth  kind  of  government, 
therefore,  which,  in  my  opinion,  is  preferable  to  all  these :  it  is  that 
mixed  and  moderate  government,  which  is  composed  of  the  three  par- 
ticular forms  which  I  have  already  noticed.  .  ,  .  But  if  I  must  confine 
myself  to  one  of  these  particular  forms  simply  and  exclusively,  I  must 
confess  I  prefer  the  royal  one,  and  praise  that  as  the  first  and  best.  .  .  . 

But  it  is  itself  inferior  to  that  which  is  composed  of  an  equal  mixture 
of  the  three  best  forms  of  government,  united  and  modified  by  one  another. 
I  wish  to  establish  in  a  commonwealth  a  royal  and  preeminent  chief.  An- 
other portion  of  power  should  be  deposited  in  the  hands  of  the  aristocracy, 
and  certain  things  should  be  reserved  to  the  judgment  and  wish  of  the 
multitude.  .  .  . 

The  laws  are,  therefore,  based  not  on  our  sense  of  justice,  but  on  our 
fear  of  punishment.  There  is,  therefore,  no  natural  justice ;  and  hence 
it  follows  that  men  cannot  be  just  by  nature.   .  .   . 

True  law  is  right  reason  conformable  to  nature,  universal,  unchange- 
able, eternal,  whose  commands  urge  us  to  duty,  and  whose  prohibitions 
restrain  us  from  evil.  .  .  . 

So  this  statesman  of  ours  should  have  studied  the  science  of  jurispru- 
dence and  legislation  ;  he  should  have  investigated  their  original  sources  ; 
but  he  should  not  embarrass  himself  in  debating  and  arguing,  reading  and 
scribbling.  He  should  rather  employ  himself  in  the  actual  administration 
of  government,  and  become  a  sort  of  steward  of  it,  being  perfectly  con- 
versant with  the  principles  of  universal  law  and  equity,  without  which  no 
man  can  be  just :  not  unfamiliar  with  the  civil  laws  of  states  ;  but  he  will 
use  them  for  practical  purposes,  even  as  a  pilot  uses  astronomy,  and  a 
physician  natural  philosophy. 


THEORIES  OF  THE  STATE  1 1  3 

III.  Medieval  Political  Theory 

73.  Political  theory  of  the  early  Church.  The  following  ex- 
tracts from  the  New  Testament  show  the  unpolitical  nature  of  the 
early  Church  : 

21.  .  .  .  Then  saith  he  unto  them,  Render  therefore  unto  Caesar  the 
things  which  are  Caesar's,  and  unto  God  the  things  that  are  God's. 

36.  Jesus  answered,  My  kingdom  is  not  of  this  world  :  if  my  kingdom 
were  of  this  world,  then  would  my  servants  fight,  that  I  should  not  be 
delivered  to  the  Jews :  but  now  is  my  kingdom  not  from  hence. 

1.  Let  every  soul  be  subject  unto  the  higher  powers.  For  there  is  no 
power  but  of  God :  the  powers  that  be  are  ordained  of  God. 

2.  Whosoever  therefore  resisteth  the  power,  resisteth  the  ordinance 
of  God :  and  they  that  resist  shall  receive  to  themselves  damnation. 

3.  For  rulers  are  not  a  terror  to  good  works,  but  to  the  evil.  .  .  . 

6.  For,  for  this  cause  pay  ye  tribute  also :  for  they  are  God's  minis- 
ters, attending  continually  upon  this  very  thing. 

7.  Render  therefore  to  all  their  dues  :  tribute  to  whom  tribute  is  due  ; 
custom  to  whom  custom  ;  fear  to  whom  fear ;  honor  to  whom  honor. 

74.  Political  theory  of  the  Popes.  The  Dictatus  Papae,  for- 
mulated about  1090,  states  the  papal  claims  as  to  rights  and 
prerogatives. 

1 .  That  the  Roman  church  was  established  by  God  alone. 

2.  That  the  Roman  pontiff  alone  is  rightly  called  universal.  .  .  . 

8.  That  he  alone  may  use  the  imperial  insignia. 

9.  That  all  princes  shall  kiss  the  foot  of  the  pope  alone.  .  .  . 
12.  That  he  has  the  power  to  depose  emperors.  .  .  . 

24.  That  by  his  command  or  permission  subjects  may  accuse  their 
rulers. 

27.  That  he  has  the  power  to  absolve  subjects  from  their  oath  of 
fidelity  to  wicked  rulers. 

In  the  deposition  and  excommunication  of  Henry  IV,  issued  by 
Gregory  VII  in  1076,  the  claim  that  the  Pope  has  temporal  power 
derived  from  God  is  stated  : 

St.  Peter,  prince  of  the  apostles  ...  it  is  not  by  my  efforts,  but  by  thy 
grace,  that  I  am  set  to  rule  over  the  Christian  world  which  was  specially 
intrusted  to  thee  by  Christ.    It  is  by  thy  grace  and  as  thy  representative 


114  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

that  God  has  given  to  me  the  power  to  bind  and  to  loose  in  heaven  and 
in  earth.  Confident  of  my  integrity  and  authority,  I  now  declare  in 
the  name  of  omnipotent  God,  the  Father,  Son,  and  Holy  Spirit,  that 
Henry,  son  of  the  emperor  Henry,  is  deprived  of  his  kingdom  of 
Germany  and  Italy. 

The  Pope's  claim  that  the  spiritual  power  is  superior  to  the 
temporal  is  expressed,  as  early  as  494  a.d.,  in  the  following  letter 
of  Gelasius  I  to  the  Emperor  Anastasius : 

There  are  two  powers,  august  Emperor,  by  which  this  world  is  chiefly 
ruled,  namely,  the  sacred  authority  of  the  priests  and  the  royal  power. 
Of  these,  that  of  the  priests  is  the  more  weighty,  since  they  have  to  ren- 
der an  account  for  even  the  kings  of  men  in  the  divine  judgment.  You 
are  also  aware,  dear  son,  that  while  you  are  permitted  honorably  to  rule 
over  human  kind,  yet  in  things  divine  you  bow  your  head  humbly  before 
the  leaders  of  the  clergy  and  await  from  their  hands  the  means  of  your 
salvation.  In  the  reception  and  proper  disposition  of  the  heavenly  mys- 
teries you  recognize  that  you  should  be  subordinate  rather  than  superior 
to  the  religious  order,  and  that  in  these  matters  you  depend  on  their 
judgment  rather  than  wish  to  force  them  to  follow  your  will. 

The  bull  Unani  Smictmn,  issued  by  Boniface  VIII  in  1302,  is 
the  most  noted  assertion  of  papal  supremacy. 

In  this  Church  and  in  its  power  are  two  swords,  to  wit,  a  spiritual  and 
a  temporal,  and  this  we  are  taught  by  the  words  of  the  Gospel ;  for  when 
the  apostles  said,  "  Behold,  here  are  two  swords  "  (in  the  Church,  namely, 
since  the  apostles  were  speaking),  the  Lord  did  not  reply  that  it  was  too 
many,  but  enough.  And  surely  he  who  claims  that  the  temporal  sword 
is  not  in  the  power  of  Peter  has  but  ill  understood  the  word  of  our  Lord 
when  he  said,  "  Put  up  again  thy  sword  into  his  place."  Both  the  spirit- 
ual and  the  material  swords,  therefore,  are  in  the  power  of  the  Church, 
the  latter  indeed  to  be  used  for  the  Church,  the  former  by  the  Church, 
the  one  by  the  priest,  the  other  by  the  hand  of  kings  and  soldiers,  but 
by  the  will  and  sufferance  of  the  priest. 

75.  Dante's  conception  of  the  imperial  power.  In  the  following 
selection  Dante  maintains  the  independence  of  the  empire,  and 
urges  universal  monarchy  as  the  ideal  form  of  government : 

The  question  pending  investigation,  then,  concerns  two  great  lumina- 
ries, the  Roman  Pontiff  and  the  Roman  Prince ;  and  the  point  at  issue 


THEORIES  OF  THE  STATE 


115 


is  whether  the  authority  of  the  Roman  monarch,  who,  as  proved  in  the 
second  book,  is  rightful  monarch  of  the  world,  is  derived  from  God 
directly,  or  from  some  vicar  or  minister  of  God,  by  whom  I  mean  the 
successor  of  Peter,  indisputable  keeper  of  the  keys  of  the  kingdom  of 
heaven.  .  .  . 

Those  men  .  .  .  assert  that  the  authority  of  the  Empire  depends  on 
the  authority  of  the  Church.  .  .  .  They  are  drawn  to  this  by  divers 
opposing  arguments,  some  of  which  they  take  from  Holy  Scripture,  and 
some  from  certain  acts  performed  by  the  chief  pontiff,  and  by  the 
Emperor  himself.   .  .   . 

For,  first,  they  maintain  that,  according  to  Genesis,  God  made  two 
mighty  luminaries,  a  greater  and  a  lesser,  the  former  to  hold  supremacy 
by  day  and  the  latter  by  night.  These  they  interpret  allegorically  to  be 
the  two  rulers  —  spiritual  and  temporal.  Whence  they  argue  that  as  the 
lesser  luminary,  the  moon,  has  no  light  but  that  gained  from  the  sun, 
so  the  temporal  ruler  has  no  authority  but  that  gained  from  the  spiritual 
ruler.  .  .   . 

I  proceed  to  refute  the  above  assumption  that  the  two  luminaries  of 
the  world  typify  its  two  ruling  powers.  The  whole  force  of  their  argu- 
ment lies  in  the  interpretation  ;  but  this  we  can  prove  indefensible  in  two 
ways.  First,  since  these  ruling  powers  are,  as  it  were,  accidents  neces- 
sitated by  man  himself,  God  would  seem  to  have  used  a  distorted  order 
in  creating  first  accidents,  and  then  the  subject  necessitating  them.  It 
is  absurd  to  speak  thus  of  God,  but  it  is  evident  from  the  Word  that  the 
two  lights  were  created  on  the  fourth  day,  and  man  on  the  sixth. 

Secondly,  the  two  ruling  powers  exist  as  the  directors  of  men  toward 
certain  ends,  as  will  be  shown  further  on.  But  had  man  remained  in 
the  state  of  innocence  in  which  God  made  him,  he  would  have  required 
no  such  direction.  These  ruling  powers  are  therefore  remedies  against 
the  infirmity  of  sin.  Since  on  the  fourth  day  man  was  not  only  not  a 
sinner,  but  was  not  even  existent,  the  creation  of  a  remedy  would  have 
been  purposeless,  which  is  contrary  to  divine  goodness.  .   .  . 

That  ecclesiastical  authority  is  not  the  source  of  imperial  authority  is 
thus  verified.  A  thing  nonexistent,  or  devoid  of  active  force,  cannot  be 
the  cause  of  active  force  in  a  thing  possessing  that  quality  in  full 
measure.  But  before  the  Church  existed,  or  while  it  lacked  power  to 
act,  the  Empire  had  active  force  in  full  measure.  Hence  the  Church  is 
the  source,  neither  of  acting  power  nor  of  authority  in  the  Empire, 
where  power  to  act  and  authority  are  identical.  .  .  . 

Omniscient  Providence  has  thus  designed  two  ends  to  be  contem- 
plated by  man :  first,  the  happiness  of  this  life  .  .  .  and  then  the 
blessedness  of  life  everlasting.  .  .  . 


Il6  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

Wherefore  a  twofold  directive  agent  was  necessary  to  man,  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  twofold  end ;  the  Supreme  Pontiff  to  lead  the  human 
race  to  life  eternal  by  means  of  revelation,  and  the  Emperor  to  guide  it 
to  temporal  well-being  by  means  of  philosophic  instruction.  .   .  . 

It  is  established,  then,  that  the  authority  of  temporal  monarchy 
descends  without  mediation  from  the  fountain  of  universal  authority.  .  .   . 

But  the  truth  of  this  final  question  must  not  be  restricted  to  mean  that 
the  Roman  Prince  shall  not  be  subject  in  some  degree  to  the  Roman 
Pontiff,  for  well-being  that  is  mortal  is  ordered  in  a  measure  after  well- 
being  that  is  immortal.  Wherefore  let  Caesar  honor  Peter  as  a  first-born 
son  should  honor  his  father,  so  that,  brilliant  with  the  light  of  paternal 
grace,  he  may  illumine  with  greater  radiance  the  earthly  sphere  over 
which  he  has  been  set  by  Him  who  alone  is  Ruler  of  all  things  spiritual 
and  temporal. 

76.  The  "Prince"  of  Machiavelli.  Some  of  the  attributes 
which,  under  the  prevailing  conditions  in  the  Italian  cities,  a  good 
ruler  should  possess,  are  thus  stated  by  Machiavelli : 

It  remains  now  to  see  what  ought  to  be  the  rules  of  conduct  for  a 
prince  towards  subject  and  friends.  .  .  .  Hence  it  is  necessary  for  a 
prince  wishing  to  hold  his  own  to  know  how  to  do  wrong,  and  to  make 
use  of  it  or  not  according  to  necessity.  .  .  .  And  I  know  that  every  one 
will  confess  that  it  would  be  most  praiseworthy  in  a  prince  to  exhibit  all 
the  above  qualities  that  are  considered  good ;  but  because  they  can 
neither  be  entirely  possessed  nor  observed,  for  human  conditions  do  not 
permit  it,  it  is  necessary  for  him  to  be  sufficiently  prudent  that  he  may 
know  how  to  avoid  the  reproach  of  those  vices  which  would  lose  him 
his  state ;  and  also  to  keep  himself,  if  it  be  possible,  from  those  which 
would  not  lose  him  it ;  but  this  not  being  possible,  he  may  with  less 
hesitation  abandon  himself  to  them.  And  again,  he  need  not  make  him- 
self uneasy  at  incurring  a  reproach  for  those  vices  without  which  the 
state  can  only  be  saved  with  difficulty,  for  if  everything  is  considered 
carefully,  it  will  be  found  that  something  which  looks  like  virtue,  if  fol- 
lowed, would  be  his  ruin ;  whilst  something  else,  which  looks  like  vice, 
yet  followed  brings  him  security  and  prosperity.  .  .  . 

Coming  now  to  the  other  qualities  mentioned  above,  I  say  that  every 
prince  ought  to  desire  to  be  considered  clement  and  not  cruel.  Never- 
theless he  ought  to  take  care  not  to  misuse  this  clemency.  .  .  .  There- 
fore a  prince,  so  long  as  he  keeps  his  subjects  united  and  loyal,  ought 
not  to  mind  the  reproach  of  cruelty ;  because  with  a  few  examples  he 
will  be  more  merciful  than  those  who,  through  too  much  mercy,  allow 


THEORIES  OF  THE  STATE  1 1  7 

disorders  to  arise,  from  which  follow  murder  or  robbery ;  for  these  are 
wont  to  injure  the  whole  people,  whilst  those  executions  which  originate 
with  a  prince  offend  the  individual  only.   .   ,   . 

Upon  this  a  question  arises :  whether  it  he  better  to  be  loved  than 
feared  or  feared  than  loved  ?  It  may  be  answered  that  one  should  wish 
to  be  both,  but,  because  it  is  difficult  to  unite  them  in  one  person,  it  is 
much  safer  to  be  feared  than  loved,  when,  of  the  two,  either  must  be 
dispensed  with.  ... 

Every  one  admits  how  praiseworthy  it  is  in  a  prince  to  keep  faith, 
and  to  live  with  integrity  and  not  with  craft.  Nevertheless  our  experi- 
ence has  been  that  those  princes  who  have  done  great  things  have  held 
good  faith  of  little  account,  and  have  known  how  to  circumvent  the 
intellect  of  men  by  craft,  and  in  the  end  have  overcome  those  who  have 
relied  on  their  word.  .  .  . 

But  it  is  necessary  to  know  well  how  to  disguise  this  characteristic, 
and  to  be  a  great  pretender  and  dissembler ;  and  men  are  so  simple,  and 
so  subject  to  present  necessities,  that  he  who  seeks  to  deceive  will 
always  find  some  one  who  will  allow  himself  to  be  deceived. 

77.  Puritan  principles  of  government.  The  doctrines  of  Calvin, 
as  modified  by  his  later  followers,  gave  an  impetus  to  revolution 
and  democracy.  The  following  extract  indicates  Calvin's  attitude 
toward  civil  government : 

Having  already  stated  that  man  is  the  subject  of  two  kinds  of  govern- 
ment, and  having  sufficiently  discussed  that  which  is  situated  in  the  soul, 
or  the  inner  man,  and  relates  to  eternal  life ;  we  are,  in  this  chapter,  to 
say  something  of  the  other  kind,  which  relates  to  civil  justice,  and  the 
regulation  of  the  external  conduct.   .   .  . 

But  the  perspicuity  of  order  will  assist  the  readers  to  attain  a  clearer 
understanding  of  what  sentiments  ought  to  be  entertained  respecting  the 
whole  system  of  civil  administration,  if  we  enter  on  a  discussion  of  each 
branch  of  it.  .  .  .  These  are  three :  The  Magistrate,  who  is  the  guard- 
ian and  conservator  of  the  laws :  The  Laws,  according  to  which  he 
governs :  The  People,  who  are  governed  by  the  laws,  and  obey  the 
magistrate.  Let  us,  therefore,  examine,  first,  the  function  of  a  magis- 
trate, whether  it  be  a  legitimate  calling  and  approved  by  God,  the 
nature  of  the  duty,  and  the  extent  of  the  power :  secondly,  by  what  laws 
Christian  government  ought  to  be  regulated :  and  lastly,  what  advantage 
the  people  derive  from  the  laws,  and  what  obedience  they  owe  to  the 
magistrate. 


Il8  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

The  Lord  hath  not  only  testified  that  the  function  of  magistrates  has 
his  approbation  and  acceptance,  but  hath  eminently  commended  it  to  us, 
by  dignifying  it  with  the  most  honorable  titles.  .  .   . 

Indeed,  if  these  three  forms  of  government,  which  are  stated  by 
philosophers,  be  considered  in  themselves,  I  shall  by  no  means  deny, 
that  either  aristocracy  or  a  mixture  of  aristocracy  and  democracy  far 
excels  all  others.  .  .  . 

From  the  magistracy  we  next  proceed  to  the  laws,  which  are  the 
strong  nerves  of  civil  polity.  ...  No  observation  therefore  can  be  more 
correct  than  this,  that  the  law  is  a  silent  magistrate,  and  the  magistrate 
a  speaking  law.   .   .   . 

The  first  duty  of  subjects  towards  their  magistrates  is  to  entertain  the 
most  honorable  sentiments  of  their  function,  which  they  know  to  be  a 
jurisdiction  delegated  to  them  from  God,  and  on  that  account  to  esteem 
and  reverence  them  as  God's  ministers  and  vicegerents.  .  .  . 

But  it  will  be  said  that  rulers  owe  mutual  duties  to  their  subjects. 
That  I  have  already  confessed.   .  .   . 

But  in  the  obedience  which  we  have  shown  to  be  due  to  the  authority 
of  governors,  it  is  always  necessary  to  make  one  exception,  and  that  is 
entitled  to  our  first  attention,  that  it  do  not  seduce  us  from  obedience  to 
him,  to  whose  will  the  desires  of  all  kings  ought  to  be  subject,  to  whose 
decrees  all  their  commands  ought  to  yield,  to  whose  majesty  all  their 
scepters  ought  to  submit.  . 

IV,  The  Divine-Right  Theory 

78.  Speech  of  James  I  of  England.  In  a  speech  made  before 
the  Court  of  Star  Chamber  on  June  20,  1601,  the  doctrine  of 
divine  right  was  thus  stated  by  James  I  : 

I  am  next  to  come  to  the  limits  wherein  you  are  to  bound  yourselves, 
which  likewise  are  three.  First,  encroach  not  upon  the  prerogative  of 
the  crown :  if  there  falls  out  a  question  that  concerns  my  prerogative  or 
mystery  of  state,  deal  not  with  it,  till  you  consult  with  the  king  or  his 
council,  or  both ;  for  they  are  transcendent  matters  and  must  not  be 
deliberately  carried  out  with  overrash  willfulness.  .  .  .  That  which  con- 
cerns the  mystery  of  the  king's  power  is  not  lawful  to  be  disputed ;  for 
that  is  to  wade  into  the  weakness  of  princes,  and  to  take  away  the 
mystical  reverence  that  belongs  unto  them  that  sit  on  the  throne  of 
God.  ... 

It  is  atheism  and  blasphemy  to  dispute  what  God  can  do :  good 
Christians  content  themselves  with  his  will  revealed  in  his  word,  so  it  is 


THEORIES  OF  THE  STATE 


119 


presumption  and  high  contempt  in  a  subject  to  dispute  what  a  king  can 
do,  or  say  that  a  king  cannot  do  this  or  that ;  but  rest  in  that  which  is 
the  king's  revealed  will  in  his  law. 

79.  The  theory  of  Louis  XIV.  The  following  extract  is  taken 
from  a  treatise  prepared  by  Bossuet,  the  preceptor  of  the  son  of 
Louis  XIV,  for  the  purpose  of  giving  him  a  proper  idea  of  the 
position  and  responsibilities  of  kingship  : 

We  have  already  seen  that  all  power  is  of  God.  The  ruler,  adds  St. 
Paul,  "  is  the  minister  of  God  to  thee  for  good.  But  if  thou  do  that 
which  is  evil,  be  afraid ;  for  he  beareth  not  the  sword  in  vain :  for  he  is 
the  minister  of  God,  a  revenger  to  execute  wrath  upon  him  that  doeth 
evil."  ^  Rulers  then  act  as  the  ministers  of  God  and  as  his  lieutenants  on 
earth.  It  is  through  them  that  God  exercises  his  empire.  Think  ye  "  to 
withstand  the  kingdom  of  the  Lord  in  the  hand  of  the  sons  of  David  ?  "  ■ 
Consequently,  as  we  have  seen,  the  royal  throne  is  not  the  throne  of  a 
man,  but  the  throne  of  God  himself.  .  .  . 

Moreover,  that  no  one  may  assume  that  the  Israelites  were  peculiar 
in  having  kings  over  them  who  were  established  by  God,  note  what  is 
said  in  Ecclesiasticus :  "  God  has  given  to  every  people  its  ruler,  and 
Israel  is  manifestly  reserved  to  him."  *  He  therefore  governs  all 
peoples  and  gives  them  their  kings,  although  he  governed  Israel  in  a 
more  intimate  and  obvious  manner. 

It  appears  from  all  this  that  the  person  of  the  king  is  sacred,  and  that 
to  attack  him  in  any  way  is  sacrilege.  .  .  .  Kings  should  be  guarded 
as  holy  things,  and  whosoever  neglects  to  protect  them  is  worthy  of 
death.  .  .   . 

The  prince  need  render  account  of  his  acts  to  no  one.  "  I  counsel 
thee  to  keep  the  king's  commandment,  and  that  in  regard  of  the  oath  of 
God.  Be  not  hasty  to  go  out  of  his  sight :  stand  not  on  an  evil  thing,  for 
he  doeth  whatsoever  pleaseth  him.  Where  the  word  of  a  king  is,  there 
is  power  :  and  who  may  say  unto  him,  What  docst  thou  }  Whoso  keepeth 
the  commandment  shall  feel  no  evil  thing."  *  Without  this  absolute 
authority  the  king  could  neither  do  good  nor  repress  evil.  .  .  . 

Finally,  let  us  put  together  the  things  so  great  and  so  august  which 
we  have  said  about  royal  authority.  Behold  an  immense  people  united  in 
a  single  person;  behold  this  holy  power,  paternal  and  absolute;  behold 
the  secret  cause  which  governs  the  whole  body  of  the  State,  contained 
in  a  single  head:  you  see  the  image  of  God  in  the  king. 

1  Romans  xiii,  1-7.  » Ecclesiasticus  xvii,  M-'S- 

2  Chronicles  xiii,  8.  *  Ecclesiasticus  viii,  2-5. 


I20  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

V.  The  Social-Contract  Theory 

80.  The  "  Leviathan  "  of  Hobbes.  The  following  extracts  show 
Hobbes's  idea  as  to  the  nature  of  the  contract  in  which  the  state 
originated  : 

For  the  laws  of  nature,  2&  justice,  eqtdty,  modesty,  mercy,  and,  in  some, 
doing  to  others,  as  we  would  be  done  to,  of  themselves,  without  the  terror 
of  some  power,  to  cause  them  to  be  observed,  are  contrary  to  our 
natural  passions,  that  carry  us  to  partiality,  pride,  revenge,  and  the  like, 
and  covenants,  without  the  sword,  are  but  words,  and  of  no  strength  to 
secure  a  man  at  all.  .  .  . 

A  commo7iwealth  is  said  to  be  instituted,  when  a  multitude  of  men  do 
agree,  and  cove^iant,  every  one,  tenth  every  ofie,  that  to  whatsoever  fnan, 
or  assembly  of  men,  shall  be  given  by  the  major  part,  the  right  to  present 
the  person  of  them  all,  that  is  to  say,  to  be  their  representative ;  every 
one,  as  well  he  that  voted  for  it,  as  he  that  voted  against  it,  shall  authorize 
all  the  actions  and  judgments,  of  that  man,  or  assembly  of  men,  in  the 
same  manner,  as  if  they  were  his  own,  to  the  end,  to  live  peaceably 
amongst  themselves,  and  be  protected  against  other  men.  .  .  . 

Because  the  right  of  bearing  the  person  of  them  all,  is  given  to  him 
they  make  sovereign,  by  covenant  only  of  one  to  another,  and  not  of 
him  to  any  of  them  ;  there  can  happen  no  breach  of  covenant  on  the  part 
of  the  sovereign ;  and  consequently  none  of  his  subjects,  by  any  pre- 
tense of  forfeiture,  can  be  freed  from  his  subjection. 

81.  The  "Two  Treatises  of  Government"  of  Locke.  Locke, 
writing  to  confute  Filmer's  "  Patriarcha,"  and  to  uphold  the  acces- 
sion of  William  III,  makes  his  theory  the  support  of  constitutional 
monarchy : 

To  understand  political  power  aright,  and  derive  it  from  its  original,  we 
must  consider  what  state  all  men  are  naturally  in,  and  that  is,  a  state  of 
perfect  freedom  to  order  their  actions  and  dispose  of  their  possessions 
and  persons,  as  they  think  fit,  within  the  bounds  of  the  law  of  nature ; 
without  asking  leave,  or  depending  upon  the  will  of  any  other  man.  .  .  . 

Whenever  therefore  any  number  of  men  are  so  united  into  one 
society,  as  to  quit  every  one  his  executive  power  of  the  law  of  nature, 
and  to  resign  it  to  the  public,  there  and  there  only  is  a  political,  or  civil 
society.  .  .  . 

Hence  it  is  evident  that  absolute  monarchy,  which  by  some  men  is 
counted  the  only  government  in  the  world,  is  indeed  inconsistent  with 
civil  society,  and  so  can  be  no  form  of  civil  government  at  all.  .  .  . 


THEORIES  OF  THE  STATE  121 

The  majority  having,  as  has  been  shown,  upon  men's  first  uniting  into 
society,  the  whole  power  of  the  community  naturally  in  them,  may 
employ  all  that  power  in  making  laws  for  the  community  from  time  to 
time,  and  executing  those  laws  by  officers  of  their  own  appointing. 

82.  The  "Social  Contract"  of  Rousseau.  The  following  ex- 
tracts indicate  Rousseau's  idea  of  the  social  contract,  of  the  nature 
of  government,  and  of  popular  sovereignty  : 

Since  no  man  has  any  natural  authority  over  his  fellow  men,  and 
since  force  is  not  the  source  of  right,  conventions  remain  as  the  basis  of 
all  lawful  authority  among  men.   .   .   . 

Now,  as  men  cannot  create  any  new  forces,  but  only  combine  and 
direct  those  that  exist,  they  have  no  other  means  of  self-preservation 
than  to  form  by  aggregation  a  sum  of  forces  which  may  overcome  the 
resistance,  to  put  them  in  action  by  a  single  motive  power,  and  to  make 
them  work  in  concert. 

This  sum  of  forces  can  be  produced  only  by  the  combination  of 
many.  .  .  . 

"  To  find  a  form  of  association  which  may  defend  and  protect  with 
the  whole  force  of  the  community  the  person  and  property  of  every  as- 
sociate, and  by  means  of  which  each,  coalescing  with  all,  may  never- 
thel^s  obey  only  himself,  and  remain  as  free  as  before."  Such  is 
the  fundamental  problem  of  which  the  social  contract  furnishes  the 
solution.   .  .  . 

If  then  we  set  aside  what  is  not  of  the  essence  of  the  social  contract, 
we  shall  find  that  it  is  reducible  to  the  following  terms :  "  Each  of  us 
puts  in  common  his  person  and  his  whole  power  under  the  supreme 
direction  of  the  general  will,  and  in  return  we  receive  every  member  as 
an  indivisible  part  of  the  whole."  ,   .  . 

But  the  body  politic  or  sovereign,  deriving  its  existence  only  from  the 
contract,  can  never  bind  itself,  even  to  others,  in  anything  that  derogates 
from  the  original  act,  such  as  alienation  of  some  portion  of  itself,  or 
submission  to  another  sovereign.  To  violate  the  act  by  which  it  exists 
would  be  to  annihilate  itself,  and  what  is  nothing  produces  nothing.  .   .  . 

It  follows  from  what  precedes,  that  the  general  will  is  always  right  and 
always  tends  to  the  public  advantage.   .  .   . 

The  public  force,  then,  requires  a  suitable  agent  to  concentrate  it  and 
put  it  in  action  according  to  the  directions  of  the  general  will,  to  serve  as 
a  means  of  communication  between  the  state  and  the  sovereign,  to  effect 
in  some  manner  in  the  public  person  what  the  union  of  soul  and  body 
effects  in  a  man.    This  is,  in  the  State,  the  function  of  government, 


122  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

improperly  confounded  with  the  sovereign  of  which  it  is  only  the 
minister.  .  .  . 

It  is  not  sufficient  that  the  assembled  people  should  have  once  fixed 
the  constitution  of  the  state  by  giving  their  sanction  to  a  body  of 
laws.  .  .  .  Besides  the  extraordinary  assemblies  which  unforeseen  events 
may  require,  it  is  necessary  that  there  should  be  fixed  and  periodical  ones 
which  nothing  can  abolish  or  prorogue ;  so  that,  on  the  appointed  day, 
the  people  are  rightfully  convoked  by  the  law,  without  needing  for  that 
purpose  any  formal  summons.  .  .  . 

So  soon  as  the  people  are  lawfully  assembled  as  a  sovereign  body,  the 
whole  jurisdiction  of  the  government  ceases,  the  executive  power  is  sus- 
pended, and  the  person  of  the  meanest  citizen  is  as  sacred  and  inviolable 
as  that  of  the  first  magistrate,  because  where  the  represented  are,  there 
is  no  longer  any  representative. 


VL  The  Organic  Theory 

83.  Society  as  an  organism.  Spencer  states  the  analogy  between 
the  organization  and  functions  of  society  and  of  the  Hving  organ- 
ism as  follows  : 

The  reasons  for  asserting  that  the  permanent  relations  among  the 
parts  of  a  society  are  analogous  to  the  permanent  relations  among  the 
parts  of  a  living  body,  we  have  now  to  consider.  .  .  . 

Compared  with  things  we  call  inanimate,  living  bodies  and  societies  so 
conspicuously  exhibit  augmentation  of  mass,  that  we  may  fairly  regard 
this  as  characterizing  them  both.  .  .  . 

It  is  also  a  character  of  social  bodies,  as  of  living  bodies,  that  while 
they  increase  in  size  they  increase  in  structure.   .  .  . 

This  community  will  be  more  fully  appreciated  on  observing  that  pro- 
gressive differentiation  of  structures  is  accompanied  by  progressive 
differentiation  of  functions.  .  .  . 

Evolution  establishes  in  them  both,  not  differences  simply,  but  defi- 
nitely-connected differences  —  differences  such  that  each  makes  the 
others  possible.  .  .  . 

How  the  combined  actions  of  mutually-dependent  parts  constitute  life 
of  the  whole,  and  how  there  hence  results  a  parallelism  between  social 
life  and  animal  life,  we  see  still  more  clearly  on  learning  that  the  life  of 
every  visible  organism  is  constituted  by  the  lives  of  units  too  minute  to 
be  seen  by  the  unaided  eye.  .  .  . 

The  relation  between  the  lives  of  the  units  and  the  life  of  the  aggre- 
gate, has  a  further  character  common  to  the  two  cases.   By  a  catastrophe 


THEORIES  OF  THE  STATE  123 

the  life  of  the  aggregate  may  be  destroyed  without  immediately  destroy- 
ing the  lives  of  all  its  units  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  if  no  catastrophe 
abridges  it,  the  life  of  the  aggregate  is  far  longer  than  the  lives  of  its 
units.  .  .  . 

In  both  cases,  too,  the  mutually-dependent  functions  of  the  various 
divisions,  being  severally  made  up  of  the  actions  of  many  units,  it  re- 
sults that  these  units  dying  one  by  one,  are  replaced  without  the  func- 
tion in  which  they  share  being  sensibly  affected.  .  .  .  Hence  arises  in 
the  social  organism,  as  in  the  individual  organism,  a  life  of  the  whole 
quite  unlike  the  lives  of  the  units ;  though  it  is  a  life  produced  by 
them.  .  .  . 

Societies,  like  living  bodies,  begin  as  germs  —  originate  from  masses 
which  are  extremely  minute  in  comparison  with  the  masses  some  of  them 
eventually  reach.  .  .  . 

The  growths  of  individual  and  social  organisms  are  allied  in  another 
respect.  In  each  case  size  augments  by  two  processes,  which  go  on 
sometimes  separately,  sometimes  together.  There  is  increase  by  simple 
multiplication  of  units,  causing  enlargement  of  the  group ;  there  is 
increase  by  union  of  groups,  and  again  by  union  of  groups  of 
groups.  .  .  . 

Thus  the  increasing  mutual  dependence  of  parts,  which  both  kinds  of 
organisms  display  as  they  evolve,  necessitates  a  further  series  of  remarka- 
ble parallelisms.  Cooperation  being  in  either  case  impossible  without  ap- 
pliances by  which  the  cooperating  parts  shall  have  their  actions  adjusted, 
it  inevitably  happens  that  in  the  body  politic,  as  in  the  living  body,  there 
arises  a  regulating  system ;  and  within  itself  this  differentiates  as  the 
sets  of  organs  evolve. 

The  cooperation  most  urgent  from  the  outset  is  that  required  for 
dealing  with  environing  enemies  and  prey.  Hence  the  first  regulating 
center,  individual  and  social,  is  initiated  as  a  means  to  this  cooperation ; 
and  its  development  progresses  with  the  activity  of  this  cooperation.  .  .  . 

To  this  chief  regulating  system,  controlling  the  organs  which  carry  on 
outer  actions,  there  is,  in  either  case,  added  during  the  progress  of  evo- 
lution, a  regulating  system  for  the  inner  organs  carrying  on  sustentation  ; 
and  this  gradually  establishes  itself  as  independent.   .  .  . 

And  then  the  third  or  distributing  system,  which,  though  necessarily 
arising  after  the  others,  is  indispensable  to  the  considerable  development 
of  them,  eventually  gets  a  regulating  apparatus  peculiar  to  itself. 

84.  The  organic  nature  of  the  state.  Bluntschli  considers  the 
state  as  an  organism  of  a  higher  nature  than  that  of  other  living 
beins:s. 


124  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

The  State  is  in  no  way  a  lifeless  instrument,  a  dead  machine  :  it  is  a 
living  and  therefore  organized  being.  .   .  . 

The  State  indeed  is  not  a  product  of  nature,  and  therefore  it  is  not  a 
natural  organism  ;  it  is  indirectly  the  work  of  man.   .  .  . 

In  calling  the  State  an  organism  we  are  not  thinking  of  the  activities 
by  which  plants  and  animals  seek,  consume  and  assimilate  nourishment, 
and  reproduce  their  species.  We  are  thinking  rather  of  the  following 
characteristics  of  natural  organisms  :  — 

(a)  Every  organism  is  a  union  of  soul  and  body,  i.e.  of  material  ele- 
ments and  vital  forces. 

(b)  Although  an  organism  is  and  remains  a  whole,  yet  in  its  parts  it 
has  members,  which  are  animated  by  special  motives  and  capacities,  in 
order  to  satisfy  in  various  ways  the  varying  needs  of  the  whole  itself. 

(c)  The  organism  develops  itself  from  within  outwards,  and  has  an 
external  growth. 

In  all  three  respects  the  organic  nature  of  the  State  is  evident.  .  .  . 

Whilst  history  explains  the  organic  nature  of  the  State,  we  learn  from 
it  at  the  same  time  that  the  State  does  not  stand  on  the  same  grade  with 
the  lower  organisms  of  plants  and  animals,  but  is  of  a  higher  kind  ;  we 
learned  that  it  is  a  moral  and  spiritual  organism,  a  great  body  which  is 
capable  of  taking  up  into  itself  the  feelings  and  thoughts  of  the  nation, 
of  uttering  them  in  laws,  and  realizing  them  in  acts  ;  we  are  informed  of 
moral  qualities  and  of  the  character  of  each  State.  History  ascribes  to 
the  State  a  personality  which,  having  spirit  and  body,  possesses  and 
manifests  a  will  of  its  own. 

Vn.  Present  Political  Theory 

85,  English  and  continental  political  theory.  Some  of  the 
leading  differences  in  the  attitude  of  mind  of  English  and  conti- 
nental publicists  are  thus  stated  by  Pollock  :  ^ 

The  Continental  schools,  or  the  two  branches  of  the  Continental 
school,  may  be  described  as  ethical  and  historical.  By  the  ethical  school 
I  mean  .  .  .  those  authors  who  throw  their  main  strength  on  investigating 
the  universal  moral  and  social  conditions  of  government  and  laws,  or  at 
any  rate  civilized  government  and  laws,  and  expounding  what  such  gov- 
ernment and  laws  are  or  ought  to  be,  so  far  as  determined  by  conformity 
to  those  conditions.  ...  « 

Still  there  is  no  doubt  that  there  is  a  certain  mutual  repulsion  between 
the  English  and  the  Continental  mode  of  treating  these  inquiries.  .  .  . 

1  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


THEORIES  OF  THE  STATE  125 

What  is  the  explanation  of  this  ?  The  German  or  Germanizing  philoso- 
pher is  ready  with  an  easy  one.  "  It  just  means,"  he  would  say,  "  that 
you  English  have  not  taken  the  pains  to  understand  modem  philoso- 
phy. ..."  There  are  Englishmen  on  the  other  hand  who  would  be  no 
less  ready  with  their  answer.  "  We  confess,"  they  would  say,  "  that  we 
know  very  little  of  your  transcendental  philosophies,  and  care  less.  .  .  ." 

The  English  student,  in  turn,  is  naturally  repelled  by  this  misunder- 
standing, and  is  prone  to  assume  that  no  solid  good  is  to  be  expected  of 
philosophers  who  have  not  yet  clearly  separated  in  their  minds  the  notion 
of  things  as  they  are  from  that  of  things  as  they  ought  to  be.  The  Ger- 
man school  seems  to  him  to  mix  up  the  analytical  with  the  practical 
aspect  of  politics,  and  politics  in  general  with  ethics,  in  a  bewildering 
manner.  .  .  . 

The  historical  method  in  politics,  as  understood  on  the  Continent,  is 
not  opposed  to  what  I  have  called  the  deductive,  but  apart  from  it. 
Publicists  of  the  historical  school  seek  an  explanation  of  what  institutions 
are,  and  are  tending  to  be,  more  in  the  knowledge  of  what  they  have  been 
and  how  they  came  to  be  what  they  are,  than  in  the  analysis  of  them  as 
they  stand.  ,  .  .  The  general  idea  of  the  historical  method  may  be 
summed  up  in  the  aphorism,  now  familiar  enough,  that  institutions  are 
not  made,  but  grow. 

86.  Changes  in  political  theory  in  the  United  States.  Merriam 
outlines  some  of  the  significant  changes  that  have  taken  place  in 
the  political  thought  of  the  United  States  as  follows  :  ^ 

Looking  back  over  the  development  of  the  United  States,  a  great 
growth  in  national  spirit  and  sentiment  is  at  once  observed.  In  1787,  the 
general  attitude  toward  the  central  government  was  that  of  suspicion  and 
distrust,  if  not  of  open  hostility.  Liberty  was  regarded  as  local  in  charac- 
ter, and  the  states  as  the  great  champions  of  the  individual.  The  greater 
the  power  of  the  central  government,  the  greater  the  danger  to  the 
freedom  of  the  citizen.  "  Consolidated  "  government  was  considered  as 
equivalent  to  tyranny  and  oppression.  A  century  of  national  development 
has  reversed  this  attitude.  The  states  are  now  looked  upon  with  more 
suspicion  than  is  the  national  government,  and  it  is  frequently  considered 
a  matter  of  congratulation  when  a  given  subject  falls  under  federal  ad- 
ministration. It  is  no  longer  generally  feared  that  human  liberty  is 
menaced  by  the  federal  government,  and  protected  only  by  the  states. 
Denunciation  of  the  United  States  as  a  "  consolidated  fabric  "  of  "  aristo- 
cratical  tyranny"  is  seldom  heard,  but  certain  states  are  sometimes 
1  Copyright,  1903,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


126  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

denominated  as  ''  rotten  boroughs."  The  state  has- in  fact  in  many  cases 
become  a  less  important  unit,  economically,  politically,  and  socially,  than 
the  city,  and,  on  the  whole,  the  tendency  of  this  time  is  overwhelmingly 
national,  both  in  fact  and  in  theory.  .  .  . 

In  conclusion,  it  appears  that  recent  political  theory  in  the  United 
States  shows  a  decided  tendency  away  from  many  doctrines  that  were 
held  by  the  men  of  1776.  The  same  forces  that  have  led  to  the  general 
abandonment  of  the  individualistic  philosophy  of  the  eighteenth  century  by 
political  scientists  elsewhere  have  been  at  work  here  and  with  the  same 
result.  The  Revolutionary  doctrines  of  an  original  state  of  nature,  natu- 
ral rights,  the  social  contract,  the  idea  that  the  function  of  the  govern- 
ment is  limited  to  the  protection  of  person  and  property,  —  none  of 
these  finds  wide  acceptance  among  the  leaders  in  the  development  of 
political  science.  The  great  service  rendered  by  these  doctrines,  under 
other  and  earlier  conditions,  is  fully  recognized,  and  the  presence  of  a  cer- 
tain element  of  truth  in  them  is  freely  admitted,  but  they  are  no  longer 
generally  received  as  the  best  explanation  for  political  phenomena. 
Nevertheless,  it  must  be  said  that  thus  far  the  rejection  of  these  doc- 
trines is  a  scientific  tendency  rather  than  a  popular  movement.  Probably 
these  ideas  continue  to  be  articles  of  the  popular  creed,  although  just 
how  far  they  are  seriously  adhered  to  it  is  difficult  to  ascertain.  As  far 
as  the  theory  of  the  function  of  government  is  concerned,  it  would  seem 
that  the  public  has  gone  beyond  the  political  scientists,  and  is  ready  for 
assumption  of  extensive  powers  by  the  political  authorities.  The  public, 
or  at  least  a  large  portion  of  it,  is  ready  for  the  extension  of  the  functions 
of  government  in  almost  any  direction  where  the  general  welfare  may  be 
advanced,  regardless  of  whether  individuals  as  such  are  benefited  thereby 
or  not.  But  in  regard  to  the  conception  of  natural  right  and  the  social- 
contract  theory,  the  precise  condition  of  public  opinion  is,  at  the  present 
time,  not  easy  to  estimate. 


CHAPTER    VIII 

SOVEREIGNTY 

I.  Nature  of  Sovereignty 

87.  Meaning  of  the  term  sovereignty.  The  different  meanings 
that  have  been  given  to  the  term  sovereignty  are  thus  stated  by 
Merriam  : 

We  may  summarize  as  follows  the  different  senses  in  which  the  term 
sovereignty  has  been  and  is  employed  : 

I.  Sovereignty  may  designate  the  position  of  privilege  held  by  the 
monarch  in  a  State.  In  the  modern  constitutional  State,  the  sovereignty 
of  the  king  either  is  merely  titular,  or  at  the  most  denotes  a  preeminent 
position  in  the  hierarchy  of  the  constitutional  organs  of  the  State. 
"  Monarchical  Sovereignty  "  is  in  its  best  estate  a  position  of  constitu- 
tional superiority,  not  of  complete  supremacy. 

II.  Sovereignty  may  have  reference  to  the  relation  of  the  State  to 
the  individuals  or  associations  on  its  territory.  The  State,  as  the  organ- 
ization for  the  purpose  of  social  control,  determines  what  ends  it  will 
follow  out  and  what  means  it  will  devote  to  these  purposes,  and  forcibly 
compels  the  execution  of  its  plans.  This  power  is  the  vital  principle  of 
a  political  society ;  it  is  universal,  absolute,  indivisible,  continuous.  This 
is  sovereignty  conceived  as  the  supremacy  of  the  State  over  the  indi- 
viduals or  associations  of  individuals  on  the  given  territory. 

Under  this  head  are  to  be  distinguished  again  several  significations  of 
the  term :  (a)  Sovereignty  may  refer  to  that  power  which  in  a  gi\'en 
government  or  constitutional  order  has  no  governmental  or  constitutional 
superior.  Thus  the  English  Parliament  possesses  a  governmental  sover- 
eignty, (b)  Sovereignty  may  refer  to  the  power  of  the  State  in  an  ulti- 
mate organization,  back  of  the  ordinary  government  even.  This  is  not 
the  supreme  power  under  any  given  co)istitutio?ial  organization,  but  the 
power  that  determines  what  this  constitutional  order  shall  be.  Such  a 
body  is  a  Constitutional  Convention  in  the  United  States,  (c)  Sovereignty 
may  signify  that  power  in  the  given  State  or  society  the  will  of  which  is 
ultimately  obeyed,  —  that  body  which  if  not  adequately  organized  in  the 
ordinary  government  or  in   the  extraordinary  government  will,  when 

127 


128  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

occasion  demands,  create  for  itself  means  through  which  its  supreme  will 
may  find  expression.  If  the  pressure  of  public  opinion  cannot  accom- 
plish this,  then  a  way  will  be  made  by  fire  and  sword. 

III.  Sovereignty  has  been  regarded  as  the  relation  of  a  State  to 
other  States.  In  this  sense,  the  term  signifies  the  independence  or  self- 
suflficiency  of  a  political  society  as  against  all  other  political  societies. 
From  this  point  of  view,  sovereignty  might  be  termed  international 
autonomy  or  independence. 

88.  Sovereignty  as  unlimited  power.  Burgess  emphasizes  the 
absolute  nature  of  sovereign  power  and  considers  the  national  con- 
sciousness of  modern  states  the  highest  expression  of  truth. 

Power  cannot  be  sovereign  if  it  be  limited ;  that  which  imposes  the 
limitation  is  sovereign ;  and  not  until  we  reach  the  power  which  is  un- 
limited, or  only  self-limited,  have  we  attained  the  sovereignty.  Those 
who  hold  to  the  idea  of  a  limited  sovereignty  (which,  I  contend,  is  a 
confradiaio  in  adjectd)  do  not,  indeed,  assert  a  real  legal  limitation,  but  a 
limitation  by  the  laws  of  God,  the  laws  of  Nature,  the  laws  of  reason, 
the  laws  between  nations.  But  who  is  to  interpret,  in  last  instance, 
these  principles,  .  .  .  when  they  are  invoked  by  anybody  in  justifica- 
tion of  disobedience  to  a  command  of  the  state,  or  of  the  powers 
which  the  state  authorizes  ?  Is  it  not  evident  that  this  must  be  the  state 
itself  ?  It  is  conceivable,  no  doubt,  that  an  individual  may,  upon  some 
point  or  other,  or  at  some  time  or  other,  interpret  these  principles  more 
truly  than  does  the  state,  but  it  is  not  at  all  probable,  and  not  at  all  ad- 
missible in  principle.  It  is  conceivable,  also,  that  a  state  may  outgrow 
its  form  of  organization,  so  that  the  old  organization  no  longer  contains 
the  real  sovereignty ;  and  that  an  individual,  or  a  number  of  individuals, 
may  rouse  the  real  sovereign  to  resist  triumphantly  the  commands  of 
the  apparent  sovereign  as  misinterpretations  of  the  truths  of  God, 
nature,  and  reason.  That  would  only  prove  that  we  have  mistaken  the 
point  of  sovereignty,  and  would  teach  the  lesson  that  the  state  must 
always  hold  its  form  to  accord  with  its  substance.  ,  .  .  The  common 
consciousness  is  the  purest  light  given  to  men  by  which  to  interpret 
truth  in  any  direction ;  it  is  the  safest  adviser  as  to  when  principle  shall 
take  on  the  form  of  command ;  and  the  common  consciousness  is  the 
state  consciousness.  In  the  modern  national  state  we  call  it  the  national 
consciousness.  The  so-called  laws  of  God,  of  nature,  of  reason,  and 
between  states  are  legally,  and  for  the  subject,  what  the  state  declares 
them  to  be ;  and  these  declarations  and  commands  of  the  state  are 
to  be  presumed  to  contain  the  most  truthful  interpretations  of  these 


SOVEREIGNTY  1 29 

principles,  which  a  fallible  and  developing  human  view  can,  at  the  given 
moment,  discover.  It  is  begging  the  question  to  appeal  to  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  world  or  of  humanity  against  the  consciousness  of  the  state ; 
for  the  world  has  no  form  of  organization  for  making  such  interpretation, 
or  for  intervening  between  the  state  and  its  citizens  to  nullify  the  state's 
interpretation.  ...  At  the  present  stage  of  the  world's  civilization,  a 
nearer  approximation  to  truth  seems  to  be  attainable  from  the  stand- 
point of  a  national  state  consciousness  than  from  the  standpoint  of 
what  is  termed  the  consciousness  of  mankind.  An  appeal  to  the  con- 
sciousness of  mankind,  if  it  bring  any  reply  at  all,  will  receive  an  answer 
confused,  contradictory,  and  unintelligible.  .  .  .  Contact  between  states 
may,  and  undoubtedly  does,  clarify  and  harmonize  the  consciousness  of 
each ;  but  it  is  still  the  state  consciousness  which  is  the  sovereign  inter- 
preter, and  the  state  power  which  is  the  sovereign  transformer  of  these 
interpretations  into  laws.  .  .  .  The  state  must  have  the  power  to  compel 
the  subject  against  his  will ;  otherwise  it  is  no  state ;  it  is  only  an 
anarchic  society.  Now  the  power  to  compel  obedience  and  to  punish 
for  disobedience,  is,  or  originates  in,  sovereignty. 

89.  Characteristics  of  sovereignty.  Bluntschli,  while  denying 
the  possibility  of  absolute  internal  supremacy  and  of  complete 
external  independence  in  actual  practice,  summarizes  the  charac- 
teristics of  sovereign  power  as  follows  : 

The  State  is  the  embodiment  and  personification  of  the  national 
power.  This  power,  considered  in  its  highest  dignity  and  greatest  force, 
is  called  Sovereignty.  .  .  .   Sovereignty  implies  :  — 

1.  Independence  of  the  authority  of  any  other  State.  Yet  this  inde- 
pendence must  be  understood  as  only  relative.  International  law,  which 
binds  all  States  together,  no  more  contradicts  the  Sovereignty  of  States 
than  constitutional  law,  which  limits  the  exercise  of  public  authority 
within.  .  .  . 

2.  Supreme  public  dignity  —  what  the  Romans  called  majestas. 

3.  Plenitude  of  public  power,  as  opposed  to  mere  particular  powers. 
Sovereignty  is  not  a  sum  of  particular  isolated  rights,  but  is  a  general  or 
common  right:  it  is  a  "central  conception,"  and  is  as  important  in 
Public  as  that  of  property  is  in  Private  Law. 

4.  Further,  it  is  the  highest  in  the  State.  Thus  there  can  be  no  polit- 
ical power  above  it.  .   .   . 

5.  Unity,  a  necessary  condition  in  every  organism.  The  division  of 
sovereignty  paralyzes  and  dissolves  a  State,  and  is  therefore  incompat- 
ible with  its  healthy  existence. 


I30  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

90.  Sovereignty  as  supreme  will.  Willoughby  considers  sov- 
ereignty as  the  supreme  will  of  a  politically  organized  community. 
He  also  distinguishes  between  its  internal  and  external  aspects.^ 

Sovereignty  is  something  more  than  a  collection  of  powers.  It  is 
something  more  than  a  mechanical  aggregate  of  separate  and  particular 
capacities.  It  does,  indeed,  include  and  necessitate  the  possession  of  cer- 
tain powers,  such  as,  for  example,  those  of  taxation,  of  contracting 
treaties,  maintaining  an  armed  force,  etc. ;  but  its  content  is  not  ex- 
hausted by  an  enumeration  of  these.  It  is  an  entity  of  itself,  and  repre- 
sents the  highest  political  power  as  embodied  in  the  State.  Sovereignty 
belongs  to  the  State  as  a  person,  and  represents  the  supremacy  of  its  will. 

Sovereignty,  as  thus  expressing  a  supreme  will,  is  necessarily  a  unity 
and  indivisible,  —  unity  being  a  necessary  predicate  of  a  supreme  will. 
As  Rousseau  truly  says :  "  Though  Power  may  be  divided.  Will  can- 
not." The  logical  impossibility  of  conceiving  of  a  divided  Sovereignty  is 
apparent  from  the  impossibility  of  predicating  in  the  same  body  two 
powers  each  supreme.  The  will  of  the  State  may  find  its  form  of  expres- 
sion through  different  mouthpieces,  and  its  activities  may  be  exercised 
through  a  variety  of  organs,  but  the  will  itself,  as  thus  variously  ex- 
pressed and  performed,  is  a  unity.  In  every  political  organization  there 
must  be  one  and  only  one  source,  whence  all  authority  ultimately  springs. 

This  leads  us  to  the  second  view  in  which  the  Sovereignty  of  the 
State  is  to  be  considered :  namely,  that  of  the  relation  of  a  State  to 
other  States.  Thus  far,  we  have  considered  Sovereignty  as  expressing 
the  supremacy  of  the  State's  will  over  that  of  all  persons  and  public 
bodies  within  its  own  organization  :  as  binding  them  all,  and  being  bound 
by  none.  Viewing  it  outwardly,  now,  in  its  international  aspects.  Sover- 
eignty denotes  independence,  or  complete  freedom  from  all  external  con- 
trol of  a  legal  character.  The  State  can  be  legally  bound  only  by  its 
own  will.  If  upon  any  one  point,  however  insignificant,  its  own  will  be 
not  conclusive,  but  is  legally  dependent  upon  the  consent  of  another 
power,  its  Sovereignty  is  destroyed. 

91.  Sovereignty  from  a  sociological  standpoint.  Giddings,  in 
surveying  social  evolution,  finds  four  modes  of  sovereignty.^ 

According  to  the  accepted  conception  of  sovereignty,  any  individual, 
group  or  class  of  cooperating  individuals,  or  entire  codperating  people, 
having  the  disposition  and  the  power  to  exact,  and,  in  fact,  exacting 

1  Copyright,  1896,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 

2  Copyright,  1906,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


SOVEREIGNTY 


131 


obedience  from  all  individuals  in  the  social  population,  is  a  sovereign ; 
and  all  individuals  who  obey  a  sovereign  —  be  that  sovereign  a  person, 
a  class,  or  a  people  —  are  subjects ;  while  sovereign  and  subjects  to- 
gether in  their  normal  relation  of  authority  and  obedience  are  a  state. 

This  conception  of  sovereignty  is  demonstrably  inadequate  and  even 
inaccurate.  There  has  never  yet  existed  in  any  human  society  any 
power  that  could,  or  continuously  and  under  all  circumstances  did,  com- 
pel the  obedience  of  all  individual  members  of  that  society,  or  even  suc- 
cessfully punish  all  for  disobedience.  The  accepted  conception  is  an 
approximately  true  picture  of  sovereignty  under  one  particular  grouping 
of  social  conditions.  Social  psychology  and  the  facts  of  history  yield 
other  conceptions,  each  approximately  true  for  some  given  stage  of 
social  evolution. 

What,  for  instance,  is  the  true  nature  of  sovereignty  in  a  community 
where  nearly  all  individuals  most  of  the  time  actually  yield  loyal  obedi- 
ence to  a  supreme  political  person,  a  monarch,  or  a  dictator .'  This 
supreme  political  person  has  no  power  to  compel  the  obedience  of  his 
subjects  if  they  choose  to  defy  his  commands.  Yet  he  has  a  power  that 
is  real,  and  it  is  a  development  of  one  of  the  fundamental  and  universal 
phenomena  of  social  psychology.  He  has  the  power  to  command  obedi- 
ence. This  is  from  every  point  of  view,  psychological  and  practical,  a 
wholly  different  thing  from  the  power  to  compel.  It  is  the  power  of 
impression  rather  than  of  physical  force,  but  it  achieves  the  same  end  : 
it  secures  the  obedience.  In  most  of  the  nations  of  the  world,  through- 
out the  greater  part  of  their  history,  sovereignty  has  been  in  fact  a 
personal  power  to  command  obedience. 

There  is  a  form  of  political  society  in  which  the  real  sovereign  is  a 
superior  class,  an  aristocracy.  This  class  is  descended  from  a  group  of 
conquerors  that  for  a  time  retained  and  exercised  an  actual  power  to 
compel  the  obedience  of  the  conquered.  But  it  tends  to  become  a 
relatively  small  minority  until,  presently,  it  could  readily  be  overthrown 
if  the  people  rose  against  it.  Instead  of  rebelling,  however,  they  con- 
tinue to  yield  obedience.  They  yield  to  a  power  which  dominates  them 
through  their  deference  to  wealth,  through  their  homage  to  superior 
mind,  and  through  the  assent  of  their  minds  to  beliefs  and  dogmas, 
above  all,  to  tradition.  Fortified  by  religion  and  all  the  authority  of  tra- 
dition, the  superior  class  exacts  the  obedience  which  it  would  be  power- 
less, were  resort  made  to  physical  force,  to  compel. 

There  have  been  occasions,  recurring  throughout  history,  when  the 
masses  of  the  people,  aroused  to  opposition  and  compacted  by  revolu- 
tionary madness  into  infuriated  mobs,  have  become,  for  the  time  being,  a 
resistless  physical  power.    These  have  been  occasions  and  circumstances 


132  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

under  which,  as  after  conquest,  sovereignty  has  been  in  fact  a  power  to 
compel  obedience.  No  individual,  class,  or  group  has  been  able  to  resist 
or  withstand  it. 

Finally,  there  have  been  in  the  past,  and  are  now,  political  communities 
in  which  practically  all  men  have  contributed  or  contribute,  through  dis- 
cussion and  voluntary  conduct,  to  the  creation  of  a  general  purpose  or 
policy ;  and  in  which  practically  all  men  yield  or  have  yielded  assent  to 
a  general  will.  This  general  will  might  command,  exact,  or  compel  a 
vast  deal  of  individual  obedience,  but,  actually,  it  does  something  differ- 
ent and  higher.  It  evokes  obedience.  Appealing  to  reason  and  to  con- 
science, it  calls  forth  an  obedience  that  is  rendered  freely  and  with  full 
understanding  that  it  is  a  reasonable  and  unforced  service. 

Instead,  then,  of  one  universal  mode  of  sovereignty  in  political  society, 
sociology,  surveying  past  and  existing  societies  comparatively,  and 
guided  by  the  facts  of  social  psychology,  discovers  four  distinct  modes 
of  sovereignty,  presented  by  different  stages  of  social  evolution  ;  namely, 
first.  Personal  Sovereignty,  or  the  power  of  the  strong  personality  to 
cot7imand  obedience;  second.  Class  Sovereigrfty,  or  the  power  of  the 
mentally  and  morally  superior,  with  the  aid  of  religion  and  tradition,  to 
inspire  obedience  or  through  control  of  wealth  to  exact  obedience  ;  third. 
Mass  Sovereignty,  or  the  power  of  an  emotionally  and  fanatically  solidi- 
fied majority  to  compel  obedience ;  and,  fourth,  General  Sovereignty,  or 
the  power  of  an  enlightened,  deliberative  community  to  ez'oke  obedience 
through  a  rational  appeal  to  intelligence  and  conscience. 

92.  The  limits  of  sovereignty.  Lowell,  considering  sovereignty 
as  a  question  of  fact,  argues  that  its  extent  depends  upon  the 
amount  of  obedience  actually  rendered. ^ 

If  the  extent  of  sovereign  power  is  measured  by  the  disposition  to 
obedience  on  the  part  of  the  bulk  of  the  society,  it  may  be  said  that  the 
power  of  no  sovereign  can  be  strictly  unlimited,  because  comrnands  can 
be  imagined  which  no  society  would  be  disposed  to  obey.  This  may 
very  well  be  true,  and  perhaps  it  would  be  proper  to  classify  sovereigns, 
not  according  as  their  authority  is  absolute  or  not,  but  according  as  it  is 
indefinite,  or  restrained  within  bounds  more  or  less  definitely  fixed ;  for 
unless  the  limits  of  power  are  tolerably  well  determined,  they  tend  to 
stretch  farther  and  farther.  Definite  limits  may  be  set  to  sovereign 
power  in  either  one  of  two  ways :  they  may  result  from  the  rivalry  of 
two  independent  rulers,  who  settle  by  negotiation  questions  concerning 
the  boundaries  of  their  respective  jurisdictions,  and  quarrel  when  they 

^  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 


SOVEREIGNTY  133 

cannot  agree ;  or  they  may  be  established  by  some  formal  declaration, 
which  by  sufficient  precision  enables  the  bulk  of  the  society  to  have  a 
general  opinion  about  the  extent  of  legislative  authority,  and  to  distin- 
guish between  those  commands  which  fall  within  the  boundaries  pre- 
scribed and  those  which  do  not. 


II.  Location  of  Sovereignty 

93.  Sovereignty  of  the  people.  A  recent  statement  of  the  doc- 
trine that  sovereignty  lies  back  of  the  government  in  the  hands  of 
the  people  is  given  by  Hart. 

The  common  phrases,  ''  the  people  "  and  "  consent  of  the  governed," 
suggest  the  distinguishing  mark  of  popular  government  which  makes  the 
legal  constitutional  depository  of  sovereignty  nearly  correspond  to  the 
physical  possessor  of  ultimate  power.  Where  nearly  all  adult  men  can 
vote,  the  majority  which  decides  questions  has  presumably  the  prepon- 
derant strength  necessary  to  carry  out  its  will ;  hence  sovereignty  of  the 
people  avoids  many  of  the  shocks  and  revolutions  which  under  other 
forms  are  necessary  to  enforce  the  truth  that  in  the  long  run  a  minority 
cannot  impose  its  will  on  a  majority.  Yet  the  government  of  the  many  must 
be  carried  out  by  the  few ;  and  for  a  time  the  majority  may  yield  to  a 
small  number  of  determined  men,  better  armed  or  better  organized  or 
simply  in  possession. 

The  long  and  bitter  experience  of  mankind  shows  the  necessity  of 
protecting  the  minority,  or  the  apathetic  and  disorganized  majority,  by 
such  a  formal  statement  of  principles  as  may  cause  the  powerful  to  hes- 
itate before  applying  the  ultimate  test  of  sovereignty,  namely,  the  pos- 
session of  superior  force.  Tradition,  law,  and  especially  definite  and 
written  constitutions,  compel  usurpers  to  confront  vested  rights  and  prej- 
udices which  are  immense  social  forces ;  hence  the  modern,  and  espe- 
cially the  American,  practice  of  multiplying  checks  on  the  methods  and 
extent  to  which  the  sovereign  power  shall  be  exercised. 

One  such  check  is  the  doctrine  of  the  compact,  —  very  familiar  at  the 
time  of  the  Revolution, — which  was  in  effect  that  government  was  founded 
on  an  agreement  between  those  who  exercised  power  and  those  on  whom 
it  was  exercised,  and  that  to  violate  the  tenor  of  the  agreement  would 
justify  resistance.  Another  form  of  stating  the  same  thing  is  the  doctrine 
of  indefeasible  personal  rights,  which  cannot  be  destroyed  by  any  act  of 
sovereignty :  the  doctrine  does  not  in  itself  save  men  from  arbitrary  im- 
prisonment, but  it  causes  their  oppressors  to  be  objects  of  suspicion  and 
dislike.    The  doctrine  of  constitutional  limitations  on  government  is  a  way 


I  -4  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

of  preventing  occasions  for  dispute ;  and  the  doctrine  of  checks  and  bal- 
ances attempts  to  provide  an  automatic  machinery  which  shall  sound 
an  alarm  at  encroachments  by  members  of  the  governing  class  on  others 
of  the  same  class.  Underlying  all  these  ideas  is  the  fundamental  doctrine 
of  revolution,  —  that  is,  of  the  moral  right  of  the  governed  to  take  arms 
and  try  to  prove  their  povi^er  as  a  sovereign  majority,  if  the  impalpable 
restrictions  on  government  are  not  obser\-ed. 

This  conception  denies  the  sovereignty  of  those  who  exercise  government, 
and  puts  it  back  on  those  who  have  the  right,  within  legal  forms,  to  cre- 
ate restrictions  on  sovereignty.  If,  therefore,  we  can  discover  who  has 
the  ultimate  legal  power  to  make  and  alter  constitutions,  we  have  found 
the  ultimate  depository  of  sovereignty.  In  England,  such  a  power  rests 
in  the  peers  of  the  realm  and  the  constituencies  of  the  House  of  Commons. 
In  France,  it  rests  in  the  electors  of  the  Chamber  and  the  Senate,  acting 
in  a  joint  convention.  In  the  United  States,  the  ultimate  sovereign  is  the 
body  of  persons  who,  acting  through  two  thirds  of  the  members  voting 
in  the  two  houses  of  Congress,  and  through  majorities  of  members  voting 
in  the  two  houses  of  the  legislatures  of  three  fourths  of  the  states,  may 
amend  the  federal  constitution. 

94.  Political  sovereignty.  Sidgwick  locates  sovereign  power, 
either  conscious  or  unconscious,  in  the  mass  of  the  people.^ 

I  think  we  must  admit  that  there  is,  therefore,  a  certain  sense  in  which 
the  mass  of  the  people  in  any  country  may  be  said  to  be  the  ultimate  de- 
pository of  supreme  political  power.  Still,  to  say  without  qualification  that 
the  people  is  ever^^where  sovereign  would  be  altogether  misleading ;  since 
the  statement  would  ignore  the  fundamental  distinction  between  power 
that  is  unconsciously  possessed  —  and  therefore  cannot  be  exercised  at 
will  —  and  power  consciously  possessed.  An  aggregate  of  men  do  not 
become  conscious  of  their  power  as  a  body,  until  they  become  confident 
of  mutual  cooperation  for  the  realization  of  common  wishes ;  and  this 
confidence  is,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  only  acquired  gradually  by 
the  habit  of  acting  in  concert.  Accordingly,  when  the  governed  are  with- 
out the  habit  of  acting  in  concert,  they  are,  as  a  body,  unconscious  that 
they  possess  the  power  of  refusing  obedience  to  their  government.  Even 
the  knowledge  that,  if  an  overwhelming  majority  agreed  to  refuse  obedi- 
ence, it  could  not  be  enforced,  and  that  an  overwhelming  majority  would 
be  glad  to  disobey  if  each  could  rely  on  the  cooperation  of  the  others, 
would  not  necessarily  give  a  consciousness  of  power  to  disobey  with  im- 
punity :  since  mutual  communication  sufficient  to  produce  the  requisite 

1  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


SOVEREIGNTY 


15 


mutual  reliance  may  be  wanting  ;  and  in  its  absence,  each  and  all  may  be 
effectually  restrained  from  disobedience  by  fear  of  the  penalties  it  would 
entail.  So  far  as  the  Government  is,  for  this  reason,  able  to  count  on  the 
obedience  of  the  mass  of  the  people,  in  spite  of  their  dislike  to  what  is 
commanded,  though  we  may  still  attribute  power  to  the  latter,  we  must 
add  the  fundamentally  important  qualification  that  it  is  an  unconscious 
and  unexercised  power.  .  .  . 

I  hold  that,  in  a  modern  constitutional  State,  political  power  that  is  not 
merely  exercised  at  the  discretion  of  a  political  superior, —  and  that  must 
therefore  be  regarded  as  supreme  or  ultimate, —  is  usually  distributed  in 
a  rather  complex  way  among  different  bodies  and  individuals  ;  though,  as 
I  have  said,  it  is  also  important  to  bear  in  mind  that  from  the  mere  form 
of  government  in  any  state  we  can  only  conjecture  very  incompletely  the 
actual  distribution  of  the  power  of  producing  political  effects. 

95.  Ultimate  political  sovereignty.  Ritchie  makes  an  extreme 
statement  of  political  sovereignty,  including  past  influences  and 
future  tendencies  as  component  parts  of  sovereign  public  opinion. 

The  ultimate  political  sovereignty  is  not  the  detenninate  number  of  per- 
sons now  existing  in  the  nation,  but  the  opinions  and  feelings  of  these 
persons  ;  and  of  these  opinions  and  feelings  the  traditions  of  the  past,  the 
needs  of  the  present,  and  the  hopes  of  the  future  all  form  a  part. 

96.  The  legal  sovereign.  The  theory  that  sovereignty  lies  in 
each  state  in  the  hands  of  those  who  may  legally  amend  its  consti- 
tution is  clearly  stated  in  the  following  : 

As  a  state  in  the  exercise  of  its  sovereignty  may  have  occasion  from 
time  to  time  to  amend  or  even  to  revise  entirely  its  constitution,  so  as 
to  adapt  its  life  to  newer  conditions,  there  must  be  in  every  state  a 
person  or  body  of  persons  recognized  as  having  the  legal  right  to  per- 
form such  a  function.  This  agency  of  the  state  voicing  its  will  in  the 
enunciation  of  its  fundamental  law,  is  the  legal  sovereign.  The  legal 
sovereign,  then,  in  the  exercise  of  its  power  decides  the  form  of  the 
organization  of  the  state,  assigns  powers  to  the  other  departments  of 
government,  prohibits  the  exercise  of  some  powers  and  designates  the 
manner  in  which  the  several  powers  assigned  must  be  exercised.  It 
may  even  specify  the  manner  in  which  it  will  exercise  its  own  powers, 
but  such  specifications  must  be  considered  as  constitutional  guaranties, 
not  as  limitations  on  its  activity.  In  other  words,  the  legal  sovereign 
voicing  as  it  does  the  absolute  sovereignty  of  the  state  cannot  legally 
bind  itself  not  to  exercise  any  part  of  sovereignty.    It  may  give  a  fonnal 


1^6  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


J 


pledge  in  the  nature  of  a  limitation  of  its  powers,  but  the  binding  force 
is  moral,  not  legal,  for  a  legal  sovereign  unable  to  perform  its  sovereign 
function  would  be  limited  in  its  powers,  and  hence  not  the  repository  of 
the  most  fundamental  of  sovereign  powers. 

In  exercising  this  great  power  the  legal  sovereign  should  represent 
the  will  of  the  nation,  and,  as  a  rule,  will  more  or  less  fully  voice  the 
desires  of  the  people  as  a  whole.  As,  however,  states  are  constantly 
changing  the  conditions  that  determine  their  development,  a  legal  sover- 
eign designed  in  one  age  to  express  the  will  of  the  body  politic,  may  in 
a  later  age  fail  to  represent  correctly  that  will.  In  such  a  case  if  the 
legal  sovereign  of  its  own  accord  fails  to  modify  its  composition  so  as  to 
suit  newer  conditions,  a  revolution  will  probably  take  place  after  a 
period  of  dissatisfaction  and  agitation.  This  is  the  so-called  Right  of 
Revolution,  the  right  of  a  community  which  finds  itself  hindered  in 
development  by  existing  forms,  to  overthrow  these  and  substitute  others 
more  in  accordance  with  the  will  of  the  community.  Such  a  right  must 
of  course  be  justified  on  moral  grounds  ;  legally  speaking  all  revolutions 
are  rebellions  and  in  violation  of  law. 

In  old-fashioned  monarchies  the  legal  sovereignty  will  naturally  be 
found  vested  absolutely  in  the  king,  or  in  the  king  and  his  council, 
under  the  theory  that  these  truly  represent  the  larger  interests  of  the 
state.  In  such  cases  the  king,  or  the  king  and  his  council,  may  alter  at 
will  the  fundamental  law  of  the  land.  The  inertia  of  custom  and  the 
fear  of  revolution  or  assassination  may  deter  the  king  from  making 
unpopular  alterations,  but  if  any  changes  at  all  are  legally  to  be  made, 
he  is  the  proper  agency  to  decide  on  and  to  enunciate  them.  If  in  such 
a  state  a  representative  council  or  a  legislature  should  develop,  this  body 
may  gain  the  right  to  share  in  the  exercise  of  this  power,  and  the  three 
bodies,  king,  council,  and  legislature  would  then  form  the  legal  sovereign, 
as  in  England.  In  a  similar  manner  the  powers  of  the  legal  sover- 
eign may  pass  entirely  from  the  head  of  the  state  to  the  lawmaking 
body,  as  in  Fra^ice,  or  to  the  lawmaking  body  and  the  electorate,  as  in 
Switzerland.  If  the  state  be  completely  democratic,  the  electorate  alone 
would  exercise  that  power.  This  stage  has  almost  been  reached  in 
Switzerland,  through  the  use  of  the  initiative  and  the  referendum,  and 
in  some  of  the  commonwealths  of  the  United  States  of  America  through 
the  use  of  the  constitutional  convention.  In  a  federative  form  of 
government,  the  federal  lawmaking  body,  combined  with  the  lawmaking 
bodies  of  the  federated  commonwealths,  may  constitute  the  legal  sover- 
eign, as  in  the  national  system  of  the  United  States. 

In  respect  to  legal  sovereignties  located  in  lawmaking  bodies,  as 
in  Great  Britain,  France,  and  the  United  States,  it  might  properly  be 


SOVEREIGNTY 


137 


maintained  tTiat  the  electorate  also  should  be  considered  as  legally  a  part  of 
the  legal  sovereign,  so  far  as  it  has  the  right  to  determine  by  election  the 
membership  of  the  parliament  or  legislative  body.  This  would  certainly 
be  true  if  the  electorate  had  also  the  right  of  instruction  and  of  recall. 
If,  however,  the  lawmaking  body,  when  elected,  has  full  discretion  in 
respect  to  its  policy,  irrespective  of  instructions  from  constituencies,  it 
may  be  better,  on  the  whole,  to  consider  that  body  for  all  practical 
purposes  as  the  legal  sovereign. 

In  an  absolute  form  of  government  the  personal  sovereign  will  also 
be  the  legal  sovereign,  but  the  double  aspect  of  the  sovereign  under  such 
conditions  is  clear.  Similarly  if  a  legislature  happens  to  be  also  the  legal 
sovereign,  it  is  always  possible  to  distinguish  between  the  legislature  as 
a  constituent  and  as  a  legislative  body.  Likevv^ise,  in  a  democracy,  the 
electorate  is  the  legal  sovereign  only  when  it  directly  exercises  the 
powers  of  the  legal  sovereign.  In  the  national  system  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  e.g.,  the  electorate  is  not  legally  sovereign,  for  the 
constitution  vests  the  power  of  amendment  in  the  national  congress  and 
the  legislatures  of  the  commonwealths.  The  electorate  may  request 
these  to  pass  amendments,  but  has  no  power  to  command  them  so  to 
do.  Theoretically,  these  lawmaking  bodies  might  at  their  discretion 
change  the  republic  into  an  empire  or  into  a  socialistic  form  of  govern- 
ment, without  consulting  at  all  the  wishes  of  the  electorate.  The  same 
illustration  might  apply  in  the  case  of  Great  Britain.  The  legal  sover- 
eign is  the  king  in  parliament,  and  action  taken  by  this  body  is  legally 
final,  irrespective  of  the  wishes  of  the  electorate. 

97.  Sovereignty  as  total  lawmaking  power.  Considering  the 
expression  of  the  state's  will  as  the  manifestation  of  sovereign 
power,  Willoughby  locates  sovereignty  in  the  sum  total  of  the 
organs  that  may  legally  express  such  will.  ^ 

Understanding  now  by  Sovereignty  a  power  which  is  capable  of 
exercise  only  through  existing  governmental  agencies,  it  necessarily 
follows  that  this  supreme  power  is  exhibited  whenever  the  will  of  the 
State  is  expressed.  In  fact,  it  is  almost  correct  to  say  that  the  sovereign 
will  is  the  State,  that  the  State  exists  only  as  a  supreme  controlling  will, 
and  that  its  life  is  only  displayed  in  the  declaration  of  binding  com- 
mands, the  enforcement  of  which  is  left  to  mere  executive  agents. 
These  executive  agents,  while  acting  as  such,  have  no  will  of  their  own, 
and  are  but  implements  for  the  performance  of  that  will  which  gives 
to  them  a  political  and  legal  authority. 

1  Copyright,  1896,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


138  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

This,  then,  locates  the  exercise  of  Sovereignty  in  the-  lawmaking 
bodies.  By  whomsoever,  or  whatsoever  body,  therefore,  the  will  of  the 
State  is  expressed,  and  law  created,  there  we  have  Sovereignty  exer- 
cised. If  we  distinguish  between  executive,  judicial,  and  legislative  de- 
partments of  the  State,  it  is  in  this  last-named  department  that  the 
exercise  of  Sovereignty  rests.   .  .  . 

The  only  point  that  we  must  remember  is  that  the  term  "  legislative  " 
must  not  be  so  narrowly  construed  as  to  limit  its  application  to  those 
bodies  by  which  formal  statutory  enactments  are  made.  In  so  far  as  the 
chief  executive  of  the  State  has  the  ordinance  power,  he  may  express 
the  sovereign  will  and  therefore  exercise  Sovereignty.  .  .  .  Again,  con- 
stitutional conventions,  in  so  far  as  they  have  the  direct  power  of 
creating  constitutional  law,  exercise  this  sovereign  power.  Finally,  in  so 
far  as  courts  are  the  organs  of  the  State  for  the  creation  of  law,  they 
express  the  will  of  the  State  and  hence  exercise  Sovereignty.  In  so  far, 
however,  as  their  work  is  merely  interpretative  of  existing  law,  they  of 
course  do  not  exercise  this  power.  .  .  . 

As  we  have  already  said,  the  electorate  is  to  be  distinguished  from 
the  People.  There  are  instances  in  which  this  former  body  may  act  as 
an  organ  of  the  State  for  the  exercise  of  its  sovereignty.  This  happens 
whenever  there  exists  a  provision  according  to  which  law  may  be  created 
by  a  referendum  or  other  method  of  plebiscite.  When  so  called  upon 
for  its  vote,  the  electorate  is  to  be  considered  as  ad  hoc  a  legislative 
body.  .  .  . 

To  repeat,  then,  in  conclusion  ;  all  organs  through  which  are  expressed 
the  volitions  of  the  State,  be  they  parliaments,  courts,  constitutional 
assemblies,  or  electorates,  are  to  be  considered  as  exercising  sovereign 
power,  and  as  constituting  in  the  aggregate  the  depository  in  which  the 
State's  Sovereignty  is  located. 

98.  Divisibility  of  sovereignty.  In  the  early  history  of  the 
United  States  the  theory  prevailed  that  sovereignty  was  divided 
between  the  "'  States  "  and  the  Union.  Expressions  of  this  point 
of  view  follow  :  ^ 

U.  S.  Supreme  Court :  —  The  United  States  are  sovereign  as  to  all 
powers  of  government  actually  surrendered.  Each  state  in  the  Union  is 
sovereign  as  to  all  the  powers  reserved. 

U.S.  Supreme  Court:  —  The  several  states  retained  all  internal 
sovereignty  and  .  .  .  Congress  properly  possessed  the  great  rights  of 
external  sovereignty. 

^Quoted  in  Merriam,  "American  Political  Theories,"  pp.  257-261. 


SOVEREIGNTY  1 39 

James  Madison  :  —  It  is  difficult  to  argue  intelligibly  concerning  the 
compound  system  of  government  in  the  United  States  without  admit- 
ting the  divisibility  of  sovereignty. 

Nathaniel  Chipman :  —  The  opinion  formerly  entertained  that  the 
sovereignty  of  a  state  was  a  sort  of  indivisible  essence,  a  power  abso- 
lute, uncontrolled  and  uncontrollable,  has  been  corrected  in  modern 
times.    Experience  has  shown  it  capable  of  division. 

99.  Delegation  of  sovereignty.  The  exercise  of  extensive  powers 
may  be  delegated  to  various  governmental  organs  without  affecting 
the  location  of  sovereignty. 

Having  then  established  that  the  sovereign  body,  as  such,  is  inde- 
pendent of  law,  and  that  the  sovereign  body  lays  down,  as  positive  law, 
the  rules  which  are  to  regulate  the  conduct  of  the  political  society  which 
it  governs,  the  inquiry  into  the  relation  of  rulers  and  their  subjects 
would,  for  legal  purposes,  seem  to  be  complete.  It  would  be  a  simple 
relation  of  governors  and  governed. 

But,  in  fact,  this  simple  state  of  things  is  uowhere  known  to  exist. 
Not  only  does  the  sovereign  body  find  it  necessary  to  employ  others  to 
execute  its  commands,  by  enforcing  obedience  whenever  particular 
individuals  evince  a  disinclination  to  obey  the  law ;  but  in  almost  every 
country  authority  is  delegated  by  the  sovereign  body  to  some  person  or 
body  of  persons  subordinate  to  itself,  who  are  thereby  empowered,  not 
merely  to  carry  out  the  sovereign  commands  in  particular  cases,  but  to 
exercise  the  sovereign  power  itself,  in  a  far  more  general  manner ;  some- 
times extending  even  to  the  making  of  rules,  which  are  law  in  the 
strictest  sense  of  the  term. 

When  the  sovereign  body  thus  substitutes  for  its  own  will  the  will  of 
another  person,  or  body  of  persons,  it  is  said  to  delegate  its  sovereignty. 

There  is  scarcely  any  authority,  even  to  execute  a  specific  command, 
which  is  conferred  by  the  sovereign  body  in  terms  so  precise  as  not  to 
leave  something  to  the  discretion  of  the  person  on  whom  it  is  conferred. 
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  scarcely  any  delegation  of  sovereignty  which 
is  so  general  and  extensive  as  to  leave  the  exercise  of  it,  at  any  time, 
completely  uncontrolled.  And  it  would  be  easy  to  construct  out  of  the 
powers  usually  delegated  to  others  by  the  sovereign  body,  a  continuous 
series,  advancing  by  insensible  degrees,  from  the  most  precise  order, 
where  the  discretion  is  scarcely  perceptible,  up  to  a  viceregal  authority, 
which  is  very  nearly  absolute.  Any  attempt,  therefore,  to  divide  these 
powers  accurately  into  groups  by  a  division  founded  on  the  extent  of  the 
authority  conferred  must  necessarily  fail. 


I40  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

III.  Modern  Concepts  of  Sovereignty 

100.  Present  theory  of  sovereignty.  Recent  tendencies  con- 
cerning the  theory  of  the  indivisibility  and  absoluteness  of  sov- 
ereignty are  thus  given  by  Merriam  : 

In  regard  to  the  nature  of  sovereignty,  there  are  two  points  which 
have  been  particularly  emphasized  during  the  recent  period.  In  the  first 
place  the  indivisibility  of  sovereignty  has  been,  with  the  exception  of  a 
short  time  in  America  and  Germany,  generally  recognized.  The  writers 
during  the  reaction  against  the  Revolutionary  theory  were  inclined  to 
emphasize  the  unity  of  the  sovereignty  as  much  as  Rousseau  had  done. 
The  conflict  between  king  and  people  ended,  not  by  a  division  of  powers 
between  them,  but  by  a  recognition  of  the  essential  unity  of  the  ulti- 
mate power  in  the  hands  of  people,  nation  or  State.  Modern  constitu- 
tionalism has  rated  highly  the  utility  of  a  division  of  governmental 
powers,  but  it  has  not  tended  to  show  that  the  sovereignty  itself  is 
capable  of  such  a  division.  The  legislative,  administrative  and  judicial 
functions  are  not  regarded  as  militating  against  the  essential  and  ulti- 
mate unity  of  the  principle  from  which  they  emanate.  Not  even  in  the 
haziness  that  has  obscured  the  Federal  State  has  the  principle  of  a 
divided  sovereignty  been  able  to  maintain  the  ground  it  won,  but  it  has 
been  driven  out  and  replaced  by  the  conception  of  the  one  and  indivisi- 
ble sovereignty  resident  in  the  State.  In  the  United  States  the  logic  of 
Calhoun,  in  Germany  that  of  Seydel — both  particularists  —  so  damaged 
the  idea  of  divided  sovereignty  that  it  has  not  since  recovered  its  lost 
prestige. 

Again,  as  to  the  absoluteness  of  sovereignty.  In  this  direction  there 
has  been  a  general  tendency  to  admit  the  impossibility  of  placing  limi- 
tations on  the  sovereign  power,  formally  at  least.  There  have  been 
found  various  restrictions  in  the  nature  of  the  State,  in  the  general  prin- 
ciples of  righteousness,  in  considerations  of  a  utilitarian  nature ;  but 
none  of  these  can  be  regarded  as  political  limitations.  It  is  generally 
agreed  that  there  is  no  other  political  power  capable  of  limiting  the 
sovereign,  else  by  hypothesis  that  limiting  power  must  itself  be  sover- 
eign. And  here  again  neither  Constitutionalism  nor  Federalism  has 
operated  against  the  strength  of  the  idea.  The  king  is  no  longer  abso- 
lute, the  ordinary  Government  is  no  longer  unrestrained,  but,  never- 
theless, the  power  that  organizes  the  constitution,  that  can  add  to  or 
subtract  from  it,  is  as  unlimited  and  irresistible  as  ever.  And  this  fact 
has  been  generally  recognized  in  political  theory.  Also  in  relation  to 
the  Federal  State,  the  drift  of  opinion  has  been  toward  the  denial  of  the 


SOVEREIGNTY  i  ^ , 

possibility  of  a  relative  or  limited  sovereignty.  Despite  the  temptation  to 
the  recognition  of  a  mere  diminution  of  sovereign  power  on  the  entrance 
of  a  State  into  a  Federal  Union,  the  opposite  principle  has  clearly  tri- 
umphed.   The  State  is  "  legally  despotic." 

101.  Criticism  of  the  theory  of  sovereignty.  Leacock,  in  his 
recent  book,  states  briefly  the  main  objections  urged  against  the 
theory  of  sovereignty  of  the  analytic  jurists.  ^ 

The  objections  raised  against  it  are  directed  to  show  that  it  is  only  of 
a  formal  and  abstract  nature,  that  it  is  inadequate  in  that  it  does  not 
really  indicate  the  ultimate  source  of  political  authority,  and  that  it 
presents  an  erroneous  conception  of  the  nature  of  law. 

The  first  of  these  objections  to  the  Austinian  theory  is  especially 
urged  in  the  criticism  offered  by  the  English  jurist  Sir  Henry  Maine  in 
his  Oxford  lectures  on  the  "  Early  History  of  Institutions."  From  his 
seven  years'  experience  as  legal  member  of  the  council  for  India,  Maine 
was  brought  in  contact  with  a  civilization  of  an  essentially  different 
character  from  the  environment  of  English  legal  institutions  which  had 
been  the  basis  of  Austin's  work.  In  Eastern  countries  immemorial 
custom  reigns  supreme.  The  idea  of  deliberate  statutory  enactment  is 
alien  to  the  oriental  mind,  and  the  most  ruthless  of  Eastern  despots 
finds  his  power  controlled  by  the  barriers  of  ancient  usage  and  religious 
awe.  Maine  was,  therefore,  led  to  question  whether  there  is  "  in  every 
independent  political  community  some  single  person  or  combination  of 
persons  which  has  the  power  of  compelling  the  other  members  of  the 
community  to  do  exactly  as  it  pleases."  .  .  .  The  inevitable  conclusion 
seems  to  be  that  the  conceptions  of  sovereignty,  state,  and  law  adopted 
in  the  Austinian  jurisprudence  are  inapplicable  to  communities  of  this 
description.  But  it  is  not  only  in  regard  to  oriental  society  that  Mninc 
finds  Austin's  analysis  inadequate.  Even  in  the  world  of  Western  ci\i- 
lization  it  is  only  true  as  the  result  of  a  process  of  abstraction  which 
"  throws  aside  all  the  characteristics  and  attributes  of  government  and 
society  except  one,"  namely,  the  possession  of  force  ;  this  explanation  of 
political  power  by  reference  solely  to  a  single  attribute  disregards  at 
the  same  time  "  the  entire  history  of  the  community,  .  .  .  the  mass 
of  its  historic  antecedents,  which  in  each  community  determines  how 
the  sovereign  shall  exercise,  or  forbear  from  exercising,  his  irresistible 
coercive  power." 

The  nature  of  this  objection  had,  indeed,  been  in  some  measure 
anticipated  by  Austin  himself.     In  order  to  cover  all  those  cases  of 

1  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 


142  READINGS  IN   POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

usage  in  which  not  the  direct  command  of  the  sovereign  but  dictates 
of  c^ustomary  procedure  obtained  sway,  he  laid  down  the  maxim,  "  What 
the  sovereign  permits  he  commands."  The  application  of  this  doctrine 
may  be  best  seen  in  the  case  of  the  English  common  (or  customary) 
law.  This  is  a  body  of  regulations  never  expressed  in  the  form  of 
statutes  issued  by  the  sovereign  Parliament,  but  existing  from  ancient 
times,  and  constantly  modified  and  expanded  by  the  interpretation  of  the 
courts.  It  would  be  quite  wrong,  Austin  argues,  to  hold  that  the  exist- 
ence and  continuance  of  this  body  of  law  is  any  indication  of  a  limitation 
of  the  sovereign  power  of  Parliament.  For  since  the  latter  is  admittedly 
competent  to  alter  or  abrogate  the  common  law  as  it  sees  fit,  the  con- 
tinued existence  thereof  is  to  be  viewed  as  virtually  by  command  of 
Parliament.  .  .  . 

It  may  perhaps  reasonably  be  held  that  Austin's  analysis  is  appli- 
cable to  modern  civilized  states,  but  inapplicable  to  half-organized  or 
primitive  communities.  Even  in  the  case  of  civilized  states,  it  is  true  that 
the  theory  is  in  a  certain  sense  an  abstraction.  "  It  is  true,"  says  Sir 
James  Stephen,  in  speaking  of  the  theory  of  sovereignty,  "like  the 
propositions  of  mathematics  or  political  economy,  in  the  abstract  only. 
That  is  to  say,  the  propositions  which  it  states  are  propositions  which 
are  suggested  to  the  imagination  by  facts,  though  no  facts  completely 
embody  and  exemplify  them.  As  there  is  in  nature  no  such  thing  as  a 
perfect  circle,  ...  so  there  is  in  nature  no  such  thing  as  an  absolute 
sovereign." 

102.  International  law  and  sovereignty.  The  necessity  of  modi- 
fying the  conception  of  absolute  sovereignty  when  considering 
international  relations  is  brought  out  in  the  following: 

By  some  writers  it  has  been  held  that  there  are  in  reality  two  distinct 
sides  to  the  problem  of  sovereignty,  namely,  the  international  or  external 
and  the  purely  internal.  External  sovereignty  relates  to  the  position  of 
the  State  among  other  States  :  internal  to  the  relation  between  the  State 
and  all  other  persons  or  associations  within  its  territory.  The  essence  of 
the  external  or  international  sovereignty  is  consequently  independence  in 
relation  to  sovereigns,  while  that  of  internal  sovereignty  is  supremacy  in 
relation  to  subjects.  .  .  .  From  the  standpoint  of  international  law,  the 
distinguishing  characteristic  of  sovereignty  is  found  in  the  independence 
of  the  will  of  other  States,  while  the  internal  aspects  of  the  case  are 
almost  wholly  ignored.  The  two  sides  of  the  State's  existence  are  distin- 
guished,, and  its  external  and  internal  relations  regarded  as  separable. 
Hence  it  may  follow  that  a  community  may  be  sovereign  internally,  that 


SOVEREIGNTY  143 

is,  supreme  over  all  persons  and  associations  on  its  tcrritor)',  but  non- 
sovereign  or  semi-sovereign  in  relation  to  other  political  societies.  Or  on 
the  other  hand,  a  State  may  be  sovereign  externally  and  yet  lack  the 
internal  sovereignty,  as  in  the  case  of  a  confederacy.  .  .  .  Thus  the 
State  from  one  point  of  view  is  sovereign,  and  from  another  subordinate. 
Where  independence  in  relation  to  other  States  is  lost,  there  may  remain 
control  over  internal  affairs ;  or  where  complete  control  over  internal 
affairs  is  wanting,  there  may  be  independence  internationally.  A  complete 
sovereignty  would,  of  course,  include  both  the  external  and  the  internal  sov- 
ereignty ;  but  the  absence  of  one  does  not  necessarily  work  the  destruction 
of  the  other,  and  the  State  may  still  live  on,  relatively  or  half-sovereign. 

In  international  law,  then,  sovereignty  is  primarily  the  independence  of 
a  State  among  States.  This  independence  is  indicated  by  the  possession 
of  certain  rights  which  afford  a  criterion  of  the  existence  or  nonexistence 
of  sovereign  power.  Sovereignty  being  equivalent  to  a  sum  of  powers, 
tlie  loss  of  a  part  of  these  does  not  destroy  its  existence,  and  there  is 
consequently  room  for  the  recognition  of  a  semi-sovereign  State.  The 
great  authorities  on  international  law  have  not  failed  to  find  in  this 
division  of  sovereignty  a  logical  contradiction,  even  an  apparent  absurd- 
ity, but  in  view  of  the  perplexing  conditions  to  be  interpreted  and  con- 
strued, no  other  way  of  escape  seems  open.  The  half-sovereign  State 
may  be  "  almost  a  contradiction  in  terms,"  an  anomaly,  a  passing  phe- 
nomenon, even  "  a  bastard  political  society  "  ;  but  it  persists  in  its  trouble- 
some existence.  International  relations,  it  is  reasoned,  must  when 
presented  be  accounted  for  and  explained ;  and  in  these  nicely  graded 
forms  of  transition  from  sovereignty  to  subjection,  the  doctrine  of  the 
half-sovereign  State  is  of  invaluable  practical  service. 

103.  Sovereignty  in  constitutional  and  international  law.    An 

attempt  to  reconcile  the  difficulty  of  applying  the  strict  legal  con- 
ception of  absolute  internal  sovereignty  to  the  apparently  limited 
sovereignty  found  in  international  relations,  is  made  in  a  recent 
monograph.  Crane  considers  internal  sovereignty  as  supreme  will 
and  external  sovereignty  as  a  collection  of  powers. 

In  regard  to  the  term  "  sovereignty,"  in  particular,  there  is  a  dispute 
so  hardily  sustained  that  no  definition  is  even  tolerably  acceptable  to  over 
one  half  the  students  of  politics.  In  fact,  the  absence  of  accord  upon 
this  fundamental  question  produces  a  schism  in  political  philosophy  so 
deep  as  to  cleave  it  almost  asunder,  since  it  is  as  one  of  the  immediate 
results  of  this  dissension  that  the  question  of  the  divisibility  or  indivisi- 
bility of  sovereignty  has  apparently  separated  political  thinkers  into  two 


144 


READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


groups  so  widely  dissimilar  in  their  views  that  it  may  almost  be  said  that 
there  are  two  political  sciences.  .   .  . 

As  has  been  said,  the  conflict  between  the  two  groups  of  thinkers 
revolves  most  heartily  about  the  question  of  the  divisibility  of  sovereignty. 
It  is,  of  course,  absurd  to  charge  the  semi-sovereigntists  with  lack  of 
logic  by  alleging  that  they  deem  it  possible  to  divide  a  supreme  will ;  for 
they  do  not  define  sovereignty  as  supreme  will,  but  as  supreme  power, 
and  for  that  reason  are  able  to  assert  the  validity  of  their  conception  of 
a  "  semi-sovereignty."  There  really  is  no  question,  then,  of  the  logical 
possibility  of  semi-sovereignty,  as  that  question  is  usually  understood. 
The  real  question  grows  out  of  the  two  different  conceptions  of  sover- 
eignty as  will  and  as  power.  These  two  different  ideas  of  sovereignty  go 
hand  in  hand  with  two  different  conceptions  of  the  state,  for  the  ideas 
of  state  and  sovereignty  are  too  closely  knit  together  to  separate  the  one 
from  the  other.  It  is,  therefore,  these  two  pairs  of  concepts  that  are 
considered  in  this  inquiry :  that  is  to  say,  on  the  one  hand  that  theory 
of  state  and  sovereignty  from  which  is  deduced  the  indivisibility  of  the 
latter,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  that  theory  which  leads  to  the  assertion 
of  a  divisible  sovereignty. 

A  brief  survey  of  political  writings  shows  that  the  former  of  these 
theories  has  been  developed  and  is  held  mainly  by  those  authors  who  are 
most  interested  in  the  state  from  the  internal  point  of  view ;  and  the 
latter  theory,  that  of  divisibility,  by  those  who  are  chiefly  concerned  in 
the  external  relations  of  the  state.  Although  this  classification  may  be 
subject  to  many  exceptions,  it  is  nevertheless  fair  to  attach  the  theory  of 
indivisibility  to  analytical  jurisprudence,  which  deals  with  municipal,  or 
constitutional,  law,  and  to  attach  the  theory  of  divisibility  to  international 
law.  .  .  . 

The  expounders  of  each  of  these  theories  are  thus  seen  to  have  a  dif- 
ferent original  province  of  interest  to  which  they  have  primarily  directed 
their  inquiries.  Each  school  seeks,  however,  to  apply  its  own  theory 
throughout  the  entire  range  of  political  speculation ;  each  regards  its 
central  concepts  as  of  exclusive  validity.  To  no  question,  from  the 
status  of  the  meanest  subject  to  the  most  delicate  relations  of  the  great 
powers  with  one  another,  does  either  school  deem  its  respective  theory 
inapplicable.  .  .  . 

In  consequence,  the  hypothesis  is  here  advanced  that  each  of  these 
two  theories  has  an  exclusive  sphere  of  utility  and  fundamental  validity 
within  the  field  of  political  phenomena.  In  order  to  restrict  each  theory 
to  a  limited  sphere  of  operation  it  is  necessary  to  discover  elements  in- 
herent in  the  theory  that  properly  negative  its  application  within  the 
sphere  of  the  other.    The  endeavor  is  not  to  uphold  either  theory,  even 


SOVEREIGNTY  145 

within  a  given  sphere,  for  each  has  ample  authority  behind  it ;  but  to 
exclude  each  from  a  given  sphere  which  shall  thus  be  left  undisputed 
to  the  other.  .  .   . 

The  result  of  this  critical  consideration  of  the  two  theories  is  to  show 
that  that  theory  which  has  in  anticipation  been  denominated  the  "  consti- 
tutional theory  "  must  be  logically  confined  to  the  constitutional,  or  munic- 
ipal, law  of  the  state,  and  the  international  theory  in  like  manner  is 
limited  to  the  domain  of  international  law.  .  .  . 

I'he  preceding  discussion  of  the  two  great  political  theories,  in  which 
is  found  asserted,  in  the  one  the  indivisibility  of  sovereignty,  in  the  other 
its  divisibility,  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the  two  theories  are  entirely 
congruous,  in  spite  of  their  use  of  the  same  terms  with  different 
signification. 

The  applicability  of  the  principles  of  each  theory  is  confined  to  a  dis- 
tinct sphere.  The  analytical  theory  determines  the  nature  of  the  internal 
organization  of  the  state,  of  its  municipal,  including  its  constitutional,  law  ; 
the  international  theory  explains  the  nature  of  the  mutual  relations  of 
states,  the  nature  of  international  law.  The  analytical  theory  with  its 
"  sovereignty "  and  kindred  concepts  affords  no  explanation  of  inter- 
national law,  nor  the  international  theory  with  its  "  independence  "  any 
explanation  of  constitutional  law. 

It  is,  of  course,  a  fact  that  principles  of  international  law  have  by 
statute  been  adopted  into  municipal  law,  and  are  thus  in  very  large  part 
to  be  found  in  the  municipal  law  of  most  of  the  various  nations ;  that  is, 
applied  in  their  municipal  courts.  The  fact  that  the  same  principle  is 
recognized  by  the  nation  both  by  way  of  international  law  and  of  consti- 
tutional law  does  not  merge  the  two  distinct  natures  of  that  principle  in 
its  separate  capacities.  The  nation  may  enact  into  law  a  rule  of  conduct 
taken  from  any  source  it  may  choose,  but  it  cannot  thereby  alter  its 
own  essential  nature.  To  illustrate,  international  law  recognizes  a  spe- 
cific territory  as  belonging  to  a  nation ;  that  nation  may  or  may  not,  as 
it  sees  fit,  erect  that  international  possession  into  constitutional  posses- 
sion, for  the  possession  of  land  is  inconsequential  in  the  analytical  theory. 
On  the  other  hand,  international  law  recognizes  certain  individuals  as 
subjects  of  the  nation,  but,  even  if  the  definition  by  international  law  of 
"  subject "  be  adopted  into  the  municipal  law,  that  adoption  is  incapable 
of  operating  to  change  the  nature  of  the  "  subject "  of  municipal  law, 
for  that  is  immutably  fixed. 

Thus  it  is  plainly  necessary  to  keep  distinct  the  concepts  of  each 
theory,  and  there  are  a  number  of  minor  concepts  the  significance  of 
which  for  the  one  theory  or  the  other,  for  international  or  constitutional 
law,  or  for  both,  it  is  essential  to  determine. 


146  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

IV.   Revolution 

104.  Moral  right  of  revolution.  The  following  paragraph  argues 
a  moral  right  of  revolution,  even  in  the  most  democratic  states, 
and  suggests  certain  conditions  in  which  revolution  is  justifiable 
and  desirable  :  ^ 

A  legal  or  constitutional  right  of  insurrection  is  an  absurdity,  if  not  a 
contradiction  in  terms ;  but,  in  the  present  period  of  political  thought, 
few  would  contest  the  moral  right  to  resist  and  overthrow  established 
rulers  in  extreme  cases  of  misrule,  under  most  forms  of  government.  .  .  . 
Few,  on  the  other  hand,  would  deny  that  such  attempts  at  resistance  and 
revolution  ought  only  to  take  place  in  extreme  cases,  when  there  appear 
to  be  no  milder  means  available  for  remedying  either  grave  practical 
misgovernment,  or  persistent  deliberate  violation  of  established  and  im- 
portant guarantees  for  good  government.   .  .  . 

I  conceive,  then,  that  a  moral  righc  of  insurrection  must  be  held  to 
exist  in  the  most  popularly  governed  community.  In  saying  this  I  do 
not  mean  to  imply  that  this  violent  remedy  ought  to  be  frequently  used, 
or  that  it  is  likely  to  be  brought  into  operation  frequently  in  a  modern 
civilized  society.  In  such  a  society,  the  interest  of  the  citizens  generally 
in  the  maintenance  of  order  is  so  great,  that  the  victims  of  democratic 
oppression  will  usually  find  resistance  hopeless  ;  they  will  have  to  submit 
or  depart  with  the  best  terms  that  they  can  obtain  from  the  triumphant 
majority.  Still  I  think  it  important  to  dispel  the  illusion  that  any  form 
of  government  can  ever  give  a  complete  security  against  civil  war.  Such 
a  security,  if  attained,  must  rest  on  a  moral  rather  than  a  political  basis ; 
it  must  be  maintained  by  the  moderation  and  justice,  the  comprehensive 
sympathies  and  enlightened  public  spirit,  of  the  better  citizens,  keeping 
within  bounds  the  fanaticism  of  sects,  the  cupidities  of  classes,  and  the 
violence  of  victorious  partisanship ;  it  cannot  be  found  in  any  supposed 
moral  right  of  a  numerical  majority  of  persons  inhabiting  any  part  of  the 
earth's  surface,  to  be  obeyed  by  the  minority  who  live  within  the  same 
district.  .  .  . 

I  have  already  suggested  that  a  democratic  state  will  naturally  be  dis- 
posed to  concede  local  autonomy  to  its  parts,  to  the  utmost  extent  com- 
patible with  the  interests  of  the  whole ;  and  I  conceive  that  there  are 
cases  in  which  the  true  interests  of  the  whole  may  be  promoted  by 
disruption.  For  instance,  where  two  portions  of  a  state's  territory  are 
separated  by  a  long  interval  of  sea,  or  other  physical  obstacles,  from  any 

1  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


SOVEREIGNTY  1 47 

very  active  intercommunication,  and  when,  from  differences  of  race  or 
religion,  past  history  or  present  social  conditions,  their  respective  inhabi- 
tants have  divergent  needs  and  demands  in  respect  of  legislation  and 
other  governmental  interference,  it  may  easily  be  inexpedient  that  they 
should  have  a  common  government  for  internal  affairs ;  while  if,  at  the 
same  time,  their  external  relations,  apart  from  their  union,  would  be  very 
different,  it  is  quite  possible  that  each  part  may  lose  more  through  the 
risk  of  implication  in  the  other's  quarrels,  than  it  is  likely  to  gain  from 
the  aid  of  its  military  force.  Under  such  conditions  as  these,  it  is  not  to 
be  desired  that  any  sentiment  of  historical  patriotism,  or  any  pride  in  the 
national  ownership  of  an  extensive  territory,  should  permanently  prevent 
a  peaceful  dissolution  of  the  incoherent  whole  into  its  natural  parts. 

105.  Types  of  revolutions.  Amos,  considering  a  relocation  of 
sovereignty  from  the  internal  standpoint  only,  distinguishes  the 
following  kinds  of  revolutions  : 

By  way  of  preface,  it  is  necessary  to  notice  that  revolution  is  of  three 
kinds,  each  of  which  is  usually  strongly  marked,  so  as  to  render  it  clearly 
distinguishable  from  either  of  the  others. 

A  revolution  may  be,  first,  essentially  anarchical,  that  is,  it  may  pro- 
ceed from  a  general  undisciplined  temper  in  the  revolting  population,  and 
be  directed  to  the  upsetting  of  the  existing  government,  or  government 
and  constitution  combined,  without  those  who  conduct  it  having  any 
views  as  to  substitutes  for  one  or  the  other,  and  being  in  fact  other  than 
indifferent  as  to  tlie  political  prospect  of  the  future.  This  form  of 
revolution  is  likely  to  be  chiefly  manifested  in  a  primitive  stage  of 
civilization,  when  the  advantages  of  orderly  and  settled  government  have 
not  been  long  experienced,  and  when  these  advantages,  indeed,  only 
exist  in  a  moderate  degree,  from  the  political  weakness  of  the  govern- 
ment and  from  the  imperfectly  organized  state  of  society. 

A  second  form  of  revolution  is  when  no  thought  is  entertained  of 
reverting  to  anarchy,  but  the  object  of  those  who  take  part  in  it  is,  pri- 
marily, either  to  change  the  personality  of  the  government  or  to  resist 
some  legislative  or  executive  measure.  'I'his  measure  may  presumedly 
be  in  accordance  with  the  constitution,  in  which  case  the  movement  is 
directed  to  bring  about  a  new  interpretation  of  constitutional  rules,  or  a 
modification  of  the  constitution,  or  a  better  use  of  discretionar)-  powers  on 
the  part  of  the  authorities  complained  of :  or  the  measure  complained  of 
may  be  contrary  to  the  rules  or  spirit  of  the  constitution,  in  which  case 
the  object  of  the  movement  is  to  reenforce  the  constitution  and  establish 
it  on  surer  foundations. 


148  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

A  third  form  of  revolution  is  where  the  object,  conscious  or  uncon 
scious,  is  to  change  the  constitution  itself  from  its  foundations  and  to 
introduce  a  new  form  of  government. 

106.  The  right  of  revolution.  The  current  belief  in  the  right  of 
revolution  inherent  in  the  "  natural  rights  "  theory  is  thus  stated  in 
the  Declaration  of  Independence  issued  by  the  American  colonies  : 

We  hold  these  truths  to  be  self-evident,  that  all  men  are  created  equal, 
that  they  are  endowed  by  their  Creator  with  certain  unalienable  Rights, 
that  among  these  are  Life,  Liberty  and  the  pursuit  of  Happiness.  That 
to  secure  these  rights,  Governments  are  instituted  among  Men,  deriving 
their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  governed.  That  whenever  any 
Form  of  Government  becomes  destructive  of  these  ends,  it  is  the  Right 
of  the  People  to  alter  or  to  abolish  it,  and  to  institute  new  Government, 
laying  its  foundation  on  such  principles  and  organizing  its  powers  in 
such  form,  as  to  them  shall  seem  most  likely  to  effect  their  Safety  and 
Happiness.  Prudence,  indeed,  will  dictate  that  Governments  long  estab- 
lished should  not  be  changed  for  light  and  transient  causes ;  and  accord- 
ingly all  experience  hath  shown,  that  mankind  are  more  disposed  to 
suffer,  while  evils  are  sufferable,  than  to  right  themselves  by  abolishing 
the  forms  to  which  they  are  accustomed.  But  when  a  long  train  of 
abuses  and  usurpations,  pursuing  invariably  the  same  Object  evinces  a 
design  to  reduce  them  under  absolute  Despotism,  it  is  their  right,  it  is 
their  duty,  to  throw  off  such  Government,  and  to  provide  new  Guards  for 
their  future  security. 

107.  An  ordinance  of  secession.  On  the  basis  of  the  theory  that 
sovereignty  lay  in  the  component  commonwealths  of  the  United 
States,  a  convention,  assembled  at  Columbia,  South  Carolina,  on 
the  20th  of  December,  1 860,  adopted  the  following  ordinance  and 
declared  South  Carolina  "an  independent  commonwealth"  : 

We,  the  people  of  the  State  of  South  Carolina  in  convention  assem- 
bled, do  declare  and  ordain,  and  it  is  hereby  declared  and  ordained,  that  the 
ordinance  adopted  by  us  in  convention  on  the  twenty-third  day  of  May, 
in  the  year  of  our  Lord  one  thousand  seven  hundred  and  eighty-eight, 
whereby  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  of  America  was  ratified, 
and  also  all  acts  and  parts  of  acts  of  the  general  assembly  of  this  State 
ratifying  amendments  of  the  said  Constitution,  are  hereby  repealed ; 
and  that  the  union  now  subsisting  between  South  Carolina  and  other 
States,  under  the  name  of  the  "  United  States  of  America,"  is  hereby 
dissolved. 


SOVEREIGNTY  1 49 

108.  Decree  for  suspending  Louis  XVI.  On  August  10,  1792, 
after  the  storming  of  the  Tuileries,  the  following  decree  was  passed 
by  the  French  Legislative  Assembly  : 

The  National  Assembly,  considering  that  the  dangers  of  the  father- 
land have  reached  their  height ; 

That  it  is  for  the  Legislative  Body  the  most  sacred  of  duties  to  em- 
ploy all  means  to  save  it ; 

That  it  is  impossible  to  find  efficacious  ones,  unless  they  shall  occupy 
themselves  with  removing  the  source  of  its  evils ; 

Considering  that  these  evils  spring  principally  from  the  misgivings 
which  the  conduct  of  the  head  of  the  executive  power  has  inspired, 
in  a  war  undertaken  in  his  name  against  the  constitution  and  the 
national  independence ; 

That  these  misgivings  have  provoked  from  different  parts  of  the 
Empire  a  desire  tending  to  the  revocation  of  the  authority  delegated  to 
Louis  XVI ;  .  .  .  decrees  as  follows : 

1.  The  French  people  are  invited  to  form  a  National  Convention; 
the  extraordinary  commission  shall  present  to-morrow  a  proposal  to  indi- 
cate the  method  and  the  time  of  this  convention. 

2.  The  head  of  the  executive  power  is  provisionally  suspended  from 
his  functions  until  the  National  Convention  has  pronounced  upon  the 
measures  which  it  believes  ought  to  be  adopted  in  order  to  assure  the 
sovereignty  of  the  people  and  the  reign  of  liberty  and  equality. 


CHAPTER  IX 

INDIVIDUAL  LIBERTY 

I.  Nature  of  Individual  Liberty 

109.  Different  meanings  of  liberty.  Seeley  points  out  the  differ- 
ent meanings  of  the  term  "  hberty  "  in  ordinary  usage.^ 

To  sum  up :  it  may  be  convenient  to  contrast  briefly  the  three  chief 
political  meanings  of  the  word  liberty  in  popular  usage :  — 

First,  it  stands  for  national  independence.  This  is  the  case  especially 
in  ancient  history  and  poetry,  as  when  we  connect  it  with  Marathon,  Ther- 
mopylae, Morgarten,  Bannockburn,  and  so  on. 

Secondly,  for  responsibility  of  government.  This  occurs  not  only 
in  ancient  history,  in  the  classical  stories  of  tyrannicide,  but  also  in 
our  own  [England's]  constitutional  history,  for  the  main  object  of  our 
struggle  in  the  seventeenth  century  was  to  establish  the  responsibility 
of  government. 

Thirdly,  it  stands  for  a  limitation  of  the  province  of  government.  This 
meaning  also  is  quite  usual,  but  it  has  seldom  been  distinguished  from 
the  other. 

I  gave  reasons  for  thinking  that  the  word  liberty  is  best  applied  when 
it  bears  this  meaning,  so  that  a  people  ought  to  be  called  free  in  propor- 
tion as  its  government  has  a  restricted  province. 

Thus  understood,  liberty  will  appear  to  be  a  good  or  a  bad  thing  accord- 
ing to  circumstances.  When  it  is  complete  it  will  be  equivalent  to  utter 
anarchy,  and  that  is  not  a  condition  which  we  have  any  reason  to  think 
desirable.  Whatever  in  human  history  is  great  or  admirable  has  been  found 
in  governed  communities  ;  in  other  words,  has  been  the  result  of  a  certain 
restriction  of  liberty.  On  the  other  hand,  when  government  is  once 
established  it  easily  becomes  excessively  strong.  During  a  great  part  of 
their  recorded  history  men  have  suffered  from  an  excess  of  government. 
Accordingly  they  have  learnt  to  sigh  for  liberty  as  one  of  the  greatest 
of  blessings,  but  in  accustoming  themselves  to  regard  it  so  they  have 
insensibly  modified  the  meaning  of  the  word.  What  poets  and  orators 
yearn  for  is  not  the  destruction  of  government  —  though  they  are  not 

^  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 
150 


INDIVIDUAL  LIBERTY  151 

careful  to  explain  this,  being  accustomed  to  presuppose  a  government 
which  is  certain  to  be  strong  enough  —  but  only  a  reasonable  restriction 
of  government. 

110.  Relation  of  sovereignty  to  liberty,  l^urgess  shows  that 
sovereignty  and  liberty  are  not  contradictory,  but  that  liberty  becomes 
more  extensive  and  secure  as  sovereignty  becomes  more  definite 
and  real. 

The  unlimited  sovereignty  of  the  state  is  not  hostile  to  individual 
liberty,  but  is  its  source  and  support.  Deprive  the  state,  either  wholly 
or  in  part,  of  the  power  to  determine  the  elements  and  the  scope  of 
individual  liberty,  and  the  result  must  be  that  each  individual  will  make 
such  determination,  wholly  or  in  part,  for  himself  ;  that  the  determinations 
of  different  individuals  will  come  into  conflict  with  each  other ;  and  that 
those  individuals  only  who  have  power  to  help  themselves  will  remain  free, 
reducing  the  rest  to  personal  subjection.  It  is  true  that  the  sovereign 
state  may  confer  liberty  upon  some  and  not  upon  others,  or  more  liberty 
upon  some  than  upon  others.  But  it  is  also  true  that  no  state  has  shown 
so  little  disposition  to  do  this,  and  that  no  state  has  made  liberty  so  full 
and  general,  as  the  modern  national  popular  state.  Now  the  modern 
national  popular  state  is  the  most  perfectly  and  undisputedly  sovereign 
organization  of  the  state  which  the  world  has  yet  attained.  It  exempts 
no  class  or  person  from  its  law,  and  no  matter  from  its  jurisdiction.  It 
sets  exact  limits  to  the  sphere  in  which  it  permits  the  individual  to  act 
freely.  It  is  ever  present  to  prevent  the  violation  of  those  limits  by  any 
individual  to  the  injury  of  the  rights  and  liberties  of  another  individual, 
or  of  the  welfare  of  the  community.  It  stands  ever  ready,  if  perchance 
the  measures  of  prevention  prove  unsuccessful,  to  punish  such  violations. 
This  fact  surely  indicates  that  the  more  completely  and  really  sovereign 
the  state  is,  the  truer  and  securer  is  the  liberty  of  the  individual.  If  we 
go  back  an  era  in  the  history  of  political  civilization,  we  shall  find  this 
view  confirmed  beyond  dispute.  The  absolute  monarchies  of  the  fif- 
teenth, sixteenth,  and  seventeenth  centuries  were,  no  one  will  gainsay, 
far  more  sovereign  organizations  of  the  state  than  the  feudal  system  which 
they  displaced  ;  and  yet  they  gave  liberty  to  the  common  man  at  the  same 
time  that  they  subjected  the  nobles  to  the  law  of  the  state.  In  fact  they 
gave  liberty  to  the  common  man  by  subjecting  the  nobles  to  the  law  of 
the  state.  Should  we  continue  to  go  backward  from  the  absolute  mon- 
archic system  to  those  systems  in  which  the  sovereignty  of  the  state  was 
less  and  less  perfectly  developed,  we  should  find  the  liberty  of  the  indi- 
vidual more  and  more  uncertain  and  insecure,  until  at  last  the  barbarism 
of  individualism  would  begin  to  appear. 


1  S2 


READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


111.  The  idea  and  source  of  individual  liberty.  Burgess  states 
clearly  the  nature  of  individual  liberty  and  its  source  in  the  sover- 
eignty of  the  state,  as  follows  : 

The  idea.  Individual  liberty  has  a  front  and  a  reverse,  a  positive  and 
a  negative  side.  Regarded  upon  the  negative  side,  it  contains  immu- 
nities, upon  the  positive,  rights  ;  i.e.  viewed  from  the  side  of  public  law,  it 
contains  immunities,  from  the  side  of  private  law,  rights.  The  whole  idea 
is  that  of  a  domain  in  which  the  individual  is  referred  to  his  own  will  and 
upon  which  government  shall  neither  encroach  itself,  nor  permit  encroach- 
ments from  any  other  quarter.  Let  the  latter  part  of  the  definition  be 
carefully  remarked,  I  said  it  is  a  domain  into  which  govenimefit  shall  not 
penetrate.    It  is  not,  however,  shielded  from  the  power  of  the  state.  .  .  . 

There  is  no  point  in  regard  to  which  the  modern  state  presents  so 
marked  a  contrast  to  the  antique  and  the  medieval  as  in  the  recognition 
of  a  province  within  whose  limits  government  shall  neither  intrude  itself 
not  permit  intrusion  from  any  other  quarter.  This  is  entirely  compre- 
hensible from  the  standpoint  of  the  reflection  that  the  theocracy  crushes 
the  individual  will  at  every  point  by  the  divine  will ;  that  the  despotism 
confounds  the  state  with  the  government,  and  vests  the  whole  power  of 
the  state  in  the  government;  and  that  the  feudal  state  confounds  property 
in  the  soil  with  dominion  over  the  inhabitants  thereof,  substituting  thus 
the  petty  despotism  for  the  grand.  Not  until  the  rise  of  the  modern  mon- 
archic governments  upon  the  ruins  of  feudalism  do  we  become  aware  of 
the  fact  that  a  new  constitutional  principle  had  found  lodgment  in  the 
consciousness  of  the  age.  To  this  period  individual  liberty  had  existed 
only  in  so  far  as  the  government  allowed.  It  had  no  defense  against  the 
government  itself.  ...  In  the  so-called  constitutional  state,  i.e.  in  the 
state  which  is  organized  back  of  the  government,  which  limits  the  powers 
of  the  government,  and  which  creates  the  means  for  restraining  the  gov- 
ernment from  violating  these  limitations,  individual  liberty  finds  its  first 
real  definer  and  its  defender. 

The  source.  Therefore  we  affirm  that  the  state  is  the  source  of  indi- 
vidual liberty.  The  revolutionists  of  the  eighteenth  century  said  that  indi- 
vidual liberty  was  natural  right ;  that  it  belonged  to  the  individual  as  a 
human  being,  without  regard  to  the  state  or  society  in  which,  or  the  gov- 
ernment under  which,  he  lived.  But  it  is  easy  to  see  that  this  view  is 
utterly  impracticable  and  barren ;  for,  if  neither  the  state,  nor  the  society 
nor  the  government  defines  the  sphere  of  individual  autonomy  and  con- 
structs its  boundaries,  then  the  individual  himself  will  be  left  to  do  these 
things,  and  that  is  anarchy  pure  and  simple.  The  experiences  of  the  French 
revolution,  where  this  theory  of  natural  rights  was  carried  into  practice, 


INDIVIDUAL  LIBERTY 


153 


showed  the  necessity  of  this  result.  These  experiences  drove  the  more 
pious  minds  of  this  period  to  formulate  the  proposition  that  God  is  the 
source  of  individual  liberty.  .  .  .  But  who  shall  interpret  the  will  of  God 
in  regard  to  individual  liberty  ?  If  the  individual  interprets  it  for  himself, 
then  the  same  anarchic  result  as  before  will  follow.  If  the  state,  or  the 
church,  or  the  government  interprets  it,  then  the  individual  practically 
gives  up  the  divine  source  of  his  liberty ;  for  the  question  of  the  inter- 
pretation and  legal  formulation  of  individual  rights  and  immunities  is 
the  only  part  of  the  question  which  has  any  practical  value.   .  .  . 

The  present  moment  is  much  more  favorable  to  an  exact  and  scien- 
tific statement  of  these  relations.  We  may  express  the  most  modern  prin- 
ciple as  follows :  The  individual,  both  for  his  own  highest  development 
and  the  highest  welfare  of  the  society  and  state  in  which  he  lives,  should 
act  freely  within  a  certain  sphere  ;  the  impulse  to  such  action  is  a  uni- 
versal quality  of  human  nature ;  but  the  state,  the  ultimate  sovereign,  is 
alone  able  to  define  the  elements  of  individual  liberty,  limit  its  scope  and 
protect  its  enjoyment.  The  individual  is  thus  defended  in  this  sphere 
against  the  government,  by  the  power  that  makes  and  maintains  and 
can  destroy  the  government ;  and  by  the  same  power,  through  the  gov- 
ernment, against  encroachments  from  every  other  quarter.  Against  that 
power  itself,  however,  he  has  no  defense.  .  .  .  The  ultimate  sovereignty, 
the  state,  cannot  be  limited  either  by  individual  liberty  or  governmental 
powers ;  and  this  it  would  be  if  individual  liberty  had  its  source  outside 
of  the  state. 

112.  The  rise  of  individual  liberty.  Willoughby  traces  the 
development  of  the  idea  of  individual  liberty  and  distinguishes 
its  two  aspects,  —  political  and  civil  freedom.^ 

The  primary  purpose  of  the  State  is  undoubtedly  that  of  keeping  the 
peace  between  individuals,  and,  in  the  first  stages  of  barbarism,  this,  to- 
gether with  that  of  offense  and  defense  against  other  tribes,  is  almost  its 
sole  aim.  As  Bagehot  has  pointed  out,  in  his  Physics  and  Politics,  in 
these  early  times  the  quantity  of  government  is  much  more  important 
than  its  quality.  That  which  is  wanted  is  a  comprehensive  rule  that  shall 
bind  men  together  and  make  them  act  in  accordance  with  some  definite 
rule  of  conduct.  "What  this  rule  is  does  not  matter  so  much.  A  good 
rule  is  better  than  a  bad  one,  but  any  rule  is  better  than  none."  Thus 
this  urgent  necessity  for  a  public  control  of  some  sort  or  other  leaves  but 
litde  room  for  the  freedom  of  the  individual,  —  a  freedom  which,  indeed, 
the  individual  has  not  yet  learned  to  desire,  or  properly  to  exercise  should 

1  Copyright,  1S96,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


154 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


he  possess  it.  The  variety  of  the  powers  that  are  exercised  in  this  stage 
by  the  ruling  authority  is  not,  in  actual  practice,  so  great;  but  the  rules 
that  define  the  scope  and  manner  of  exercise  of  this  authority  are  so  gen- 
eral and  indefinite  in  character  that  in  almost  no  direction  does  the  indi- 
vidual possess  any  guarantee  against  State  molestation. 

As  civilization  advances,  however,  not  only  does  the  orderly  habit  of 
the  people  increase,  but  their  moral  qualities  become  more  developed. 
The  distinction  between  right  and  wrong  becomes  more  clearly  recog- 
nized, and  principles  of  justice  are  more  frequently  followed  without 
reference  to  the  sanction  of  the  State.  The  feeling  of  self-dependence 
arises,  the  desire  for  a  certain  latitude  of  action  uncontrolled  by  the 
powers  of  the  State  comes  into  being,  and  thus,  by  degrees,  the  arbi- 
trary and  extensive  control  of  the  State  becomes  irksome.  Thus  arises  a 
struggle  between  authority  and  liberty  —  a  struggle  that  has  continued 
and  will  probably  continue  throughout  all  history. 

This  struggle,  it  is  to  be  remarked,  is  of  a  twofold  nature :  First,  to 
secure  to  the  individual  a  certain  field  in  which  he  shall  be  free  to  act  as 
he  will,  without  interference  either  by  the  political  power  or  by  private 
individuals.  Secondly,  to  establish  general  rules  according  to  which  the 
functions  that  are  given  to  government  shall  be  exercised ;  that  is,  to 
substitute  for  the  arbitrary  and  uncertain  action  of  government  a  more 
or  less  certain  and  uniform  regulation  of  public  affairs.  Neither  one  of 
these  aims  is  necessarily  bound  up  in  the  other.  Each  is  separately  ob- 
tainable. We  thus  distinguish  between  political  freedom  and  individual 
freedom.  The  former  refers  to  the  extent  to  which  the  people  participate 
generally  in  the  management  of  the  State,  or  at  least  dictate  the  manner 
in  which  its  powers  shall  be  exercised.  The  latter  has  to  do  with  the 
extent  to  which  private  rights  of  life,  liberty  and  property  are  secured. 

113.  The  evolution  of  liberty.  A  brief  summary  of  the  contri- 
butions of  various  periods  to  the  idea  of  modern  liberty  follows  : 

In  the  despotisms  of  the  Orient  personal  liberty  was  entirely  unknown, 
the  life,  actions,  and  property  of  the  individual  being  completely  at  the 
mercy  of  the  ruler. 

The  Greeks  were  familiar  with  the  idea  of  liberty,  but  they  confounded 
liberty  with  popular  sovereignty.  They  possessed  political  liberty  but 
lacked  personal  freedom  in  the  modern  sense.  In  the  Greek  city  repub- 
lics the  citizens  (excluding  of  course  the  slaves,  who  had  no  legal  rights 
of  any  sort )  made  the  laws,  decided  upon  peace  or  war,  elected  magis- 
trates, served  as  judges,  and  performed  the  duties  resting  upon  them  as 
partakers  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  State.  But  there  was  no  sphere  of 
life  to  which  the  interference  of  the  government  might  not  be  extended. 


INDIVIDUAL  LIBERTY  I  55 

The  despotism  of  the  State  prevented  the  growth  of  private  rights. 
The  Greek  was  primarily  a  citizen.  He  existed  for  the  State,  not  the 
State  for  him.  The  family  life,  the  religion,  the  property,  the  time,  yes, 
all  actions  of  the  individual,  were  under  the  control  of  the  State.  The 
Greek  State  ostracized  Aristides  and  put  Socrates  to  death. 

To  the  Roman  jurists  we  owe  the  distinction  between  public  and  pri- 
vate rights.  "  Public  Right,"  they  said,  "serves  the  Roman  State,  Private 
Right,  the  interests  of  individuals." 

But  among  the  Romans  as  among  the  Greeks  we  notice  the  same  des- 
potism of  the  State,  the  same  confusion  of  sovereignty  with  liberty,  which 
left  the  individual  at  the  mercy  of  the  State.  The  Roman  citizen  could 
not  choose  his  own  religion,  as  the  persecution  of  the  Christians  shows. 
His  speech,  dress,  manners,  and  actions  were  regulated  by  the  censors. 

The  feudal  system  of  the  Middle  Ages  obliterated  the  distinction  be- 
tween public  and  private  rights  by  associating  the  possession  of  prop- 
erty with  the  exercise  of  sovereignty.  Government  was  regarded,  not  as 
a  public  trust,  but  as  private  property.  The  possession  of  land  carried 
with  it  jurisdiction  over  those  dwelling  upon  the  land.  Each  baron  was 
lord  over  his  domain.  The  State  no  longer  existed.  There  were  now  only 
rights  and  duties  between  lord  and  vassal,  which  were  based  upon  con- 
tract and  were  founded  upon  personal,  not  political,  relations. 

In  modern  times  the  distinction  between  private  and  public  rights  has 
again  been  emphasized.  The  results  of  this  separation  have  been  bene- 
ficial to  both.  While  public  rights  and  duties  have  become  more  majestic 
and  authoritative  on  the  one  hand,  private  rights  and  duties  on  the  other 
have  become  more  sharply  defined,  and  have  been  more  widely  extended 
and  more  effectively  secured.  .  .   . 

The  desire  of  personal  freedom  which  is  so  characteristic  of  modern 
times  is  the  product  of  two  factors  mainly  ;  namely,  of  Christianity  and 
of  the  nature  of  the  modern,  as  distinguished  from  the  ancient,  State. 
While  the  religions  of  the  ancient  world  were  State  religions,  Christianity 
is  the  world  religion.  It  appeals  to  the  individual  as  a  man,  not  as  the 
member  of  a  particular  State  or  people.  .  .  . 

Then,  also,  the  relation  of  the  individual  to  the  government  is  neces- 
sarily entirely  different  in  the  modern  Slate  —  which  comprises  a  large 
territory,  often  with  many  millions  of  inhabitants  — from  what  it  was  in  the 
ancient  city  state.  In  the  latter  a  greater  unity  was  possible  and  conse- 
quently the  control  of  the  community  over  the  individual  was  greater.  The 
immediate  control  of  the  State  over  its  citizens  is  likely  to  diminish  as  the 
extent  of  territory  increases.  Since  it  is  impossible  in  a  large  State  that 
the  people  exercise  their  sovereign  power  directly  in  a  popular  assembly, 
as  they  did  in  the  city  state  of  antiquity,  the  powers  of  government  must 


156  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

be  delegated  to  one  or  a  few  persons  who  represent  the  State.  This 
makes  the  distinction  between  the  government  and  the  people  more 
evident. 

II.  National  Liberty 

114.  National  independence.  Lieber  considers  national  autonomy 
essential  to  liberty  in  its  fullest  sense. 

It  is  impossible  to  imagine  liberty  in  its  fullness,  if  the  people  as  a  total- 
ity, the  country,  the  nation  —  whatever  name  may  be  preferred  —  or  its 
government,  is  not  independent  of  foreign  interference.  The  country  must 
have  what  the  Greeks  called  autonomy.  This  implies  that  the  country 
must  have  the  right,  and,  of  course,  the  power,  of  establishing  that  govern- 
ment which  it  considers  best,  without  interference  from  without  or  pres- 
sure from  above.  No  foreigner  must  dictate ;  no  extra-governmental 
principle,  no  divine  right  or  "  principle  of  legitimacy,"  must  act  in  the 
choice  and  foundation  of  the  government ;  no  claim  superior  to  that  of 
the  people's,  that  is,  national  sovereignty,  must  be  allowed.  This  inde- 
pendence or  national  self-government  farther  implies  that,  the  civil  govern- 
ment of  free  choice  or  free  acquiescence  being  established,  no  influence 
from  without,  besides  that  of  freely  acknowledged  justice,  fairness,  and 
morality,  must  be  admitted.  ...  On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  this  unstinted  autonomy  is  greatly  endangered  at  home  by 
interfering  with  the  domestic  affairs  of  foreigners. 

115.  The  American  Declaration  of  Independence.  The  national 
liberty  of  the  United  States  of  America  was  proclaimed  in  the 
following  document : 

When  in  the  Course  of  human  events,  it  becomes  necessary  for  one 
people  to  dissolve  the  political  bands  which  have  connected  them  with  an- 
other, and  to  assume  among  the  Powers  of  the  earth,  the  separate  and 
equal  station  to  which  the  Laws  of  Nature  and  of  Nature's  God  entitle 
them,  a  decent  respect  to  the  opinions  of  mankind  requires  that  they 
should  declare  the  causes  which  impel  them  to  the  separation.  .  .  . 

We,  therefore,  the  Representatives  of  the  united  States  of  America, 
in  General  Congress,  Assembled,  appealing  to  the  Supreme  Judge  of  the 
world  for  the  rectitude  of  our  intentions,  do,  in  the  Name,  and  by  Author- 
ity of  the  good  People  of  these  Colonies,  solemnly  .publish  and  declare, 
That  these  United  Colonies  are,  and  of  Right  ought  to  be  Free  and  Inde- 
pendent States  ;  that  they  are  Absolved  from  all  Allegiance  to  the  British 
Crown,  and  that  all  political  connection  between  them  and  the  State  of 


INDIVIDUAL  LIBERTY  157 

Great  Britain,  is  and  ought  to  be  totally  dissolved ;  and  that  as  Free  and 
Independent  States,  they  have  full  Power  to  levy  War,  conclude  Peace, 
contract  Alliances,  establish  Commerce,  and  to  do  all  other  Acts  and 
Things  which  Independent  States  may  of  right  do.  And  for  the  support 
of  this  Declaration,  with  a  firm  reliance  on  the  Protection  of  Divine  Prov- 
idence, we  mutually  pledge  to  each  other  our  Lives,  our  Fortunes  and 
our  Sacred  Honor. 

116.  The  acknowledgment  of  American  independence.  In  the 
opening  speech  before  Parliament  in  December,  1782,  the  king 
of  England,  George  III,  acknowledged  American  independence  in 
the  following  words  : 

My  Lords  and  Gentlemen : 

Since  the  close  of  the  last  session  I  have  employed  my  whole  time  in 
that  care  and  attention  which  the  important  and  critical  conjuncture  of 
affairs  required  of  me. 

I  lost  no  time  in  giving  the  necessary  orders  to  prohibit  the  further 
prosecution  of  offensive  war  upon  the  continent  of  North  America.  Adopt- 
ing, as  my  inclination  will  always  lead  me  to  do,  with  decision  and  effect, 
whatever  I  collect  to  be  the  sense  of  my  parliament  and  my  people,  I  have 
pointed  all  my  views  and  measures,  as  well  in  Europe  as  in  North  America, 
to  an  entire  and  cordial  reconciliation  with  those  colonies. 

Finding  it  indispensable  to  the  attainment  of  this  object,  I  did  not  hesi- 
tate to  go  the  full  length  of  the  powers  vested  in  me,  and  offered  to  de- 
clare them  free  and  independent  states,  by  an  article  to  be  inserted  in  the 
treaty  of  peace.  Provisional  articles  are  agreed  upon,  to  take  effect  when- 
ever terms  of  peace  shall  be  finally  settled  with  the  court  of  France. 

In  thus  admitting  their  separation  from  the  crown  of  these  kingdoms, 
I  have  sacrificed  every  consideration  of  my  own  to  the  wishes  and  opinion 
of  my  people.  I  make  it  my  humble  and  earnest  prayer  to  Almighty  God 
that  Great  Britain  may  not  feel  the  evils  which  might  result  from  so  great 
a  dismemberment  of  the  empire ;  and  that  America  may  be  free  from 
those  calamities  which  have  formerly  proved  in  the  mother  country'  how 
essential  monarchy  is  to  the  enjoyment  of  constitutional  liberty.  Religion, 
language,  interest,  affections  may,  and  I  hope  will,  yet  prove  a  bond  of 
permanent  union  between  the  two  countries :  to  this  end,  neither  atten- 
tion nor  disposition  on  my  part  shall  be  wanting. 

117.  Recognition  by  the  powers  of  Greek  independence.  Because 
of  the  general  disorder  in  southeastern  Europe  caused  by  the 
revolt  of  Greece  against  Turkey,  intencntion  b)-  England,  France, 


i 


158  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

and  Russia  compelled  the  Sultan  to  acknowledge  Greek  independ- 
ence. In  1832  the  powers  announced  to  Greece  their  selection  of 
Prince  Otto  of  Bavaria  as  king  for  the  newly  formed  Greek  state. 
The  proclamation  follows : 

Greeks : 

Your  new  destinies  are  about  to  be  fulfilled !  The  courts  of  France, 
Great  Britain,  and  Russia  have  decided  upon  the  choice  of  a  sovereign, 
whose  election  the  Greek  nation  had  committed  to  their  charge.  Their 
cooperation,  equally  active  and  disinterested,  had  contributed  to  the  inde- 
pendence of  Greece.  By  the  choice  which  they  have  now  made,  that  inde- 
pendence will  be  consolidated  under  the  scepter  of  Prince  Otto  of  Bavaria. 
Greece  is  raised  to  the  dignity  of  a  kingdom,  and  obtains  the  alliance  of 
one  of  the  most  ancient  and  illustrious  of  the  royal  houses  of  Europe,  — 
one  which  has  supported  Greece  in  her  struggles,  assisted  her  in  her 
misfortunes,  and  encouraged  her  in  her  regeneration. 

The  king  of  Greece  will  hasten,  in  person,  to  bind  himself  to  the  nation 
by  the  most  sacred  ties.  He  brings  with  him  the  best  founded  hopes  for 
territorial  boundaries  of  increased  extent  and  security,  of  great  financial 
resources,  every  means  of  attaining  gradually  a  high  degree  of  civilization, 
all  the  elements  of  an  enlightened  administration,  of  a  good  military  organ- 
ization, and,  consequendy,  every  pledge  for  the  peace  and  happiness  of 
his  new  country.  The  three  courts  are  persuaded  that  they  would  mis- 
take the  character  of  the  Greek  nation,  if  they  could  doubt  the  sentiments 
which  the  nation  will,  with  one  voice,  proclaim  on  this  event. 

Greeks,  indulge  these  feelings  with  confidence!  Encircle  your  new 
sovereign  with  gratitude  and  affection.  Faithful  subjects!  rally  round  his 
throne ;  aid  him  with  true  devotion  in  the  work  of  giving  to  the  State  a 
definitive  constitution,  and  of  securing  to  it  the  double  blessing  of  peace 
abroad,  of  tranquillity,  the  observance  of  the  laws,  and  of  order,  at  home. 
This  is  the  only  recompense  which  the  three  courts  require  of  you  for 
the  services  which  they  have  had  the  means  of  rendering  to  you. 

(Signed)  Talleyrand 

Palmerston 

LlEVEN,  MaTUSZEWIC 

118.  Bulgarian  proclamation  of  independence.  Bulgaria  an- 
nounced her  independence  of  Turkey  in  the  following  manifesto 
issued  by  Prince  Ferdinand  on  October  5,  1908  : 

By  the  will  of  our  never-to-be-forgotten  liberator  and  the  great  kindred 
Russian  nation,  aided  by  our  good  friends  and  neighbors,  the  subjects 


INDIVIDUAL  LIBERTY 


159 


of  the  king  of  Roumania,  and  by  the  Bulgarian  heroes,  on  February  18, 
1878,  the  chains  were  broken  which  had  for  so  many  centuries  enslaved 
Bulgaria,  once  a  great  and  glorious  power. 

From  that  time  until  to-day,  full  thirty  years,  the  Bulgarian  nation,  still 
cherishing  the  memory  of  those  who  had  labored  for  its  freedom,  and  in- 
spired by  its  traditions,  has  worked  incessantly  for  the  development  of  its 
beautiful  country,  and,  under  my  guidance  and  that  of  the  late  Prince 
Alexander,  it  has  become  a  nation  fit  to  take  a  place  as  an  equal  among 
the  civilized  States  of  the  world,  and  has  shown  itself  capable  of  progress 
in  science,  art,  and  industry.  While  advancing  along  this  path  nothing 
should  arrest  the  progress  of  Bulgaria,  nothing  should  hinder  her  success. 
Such  is  the  desire  of  the  nation,  such  is  its  will.  Let  that  desire  be  ful- 
filled. The  Bulgarian  nation  and  its  chief  can  have  but  one  sentiment, 
one  desire.  Practically  independent,  the  nation  was  impeded  in  its  normal 
and  peaceful  development  by  certain  illusory  and  formal  limitations  which 
resulted  in  a  coldness  in  the  relations  of  Turkey  and  Bulgaria.  I  and 
the  nation  desire  to  rejoice  in  the  political  development  of  Turkey.  Turkey 
and  Bulgaria  free  and  entirely  independent  of  each  other  may  exist  under 
conditions  which  will  allow  them  to  strengthen  their  amicable  relations 
and  devote  themselves  to  peaceful  internal  development. 

Inspired  by  the  sacred  purpose  of  satisfying  national  requirements  and 
fulfilling  national  desires,  I  proclaim,  with  the  blessing  of  the  Almighty, 
Bulgaria,  united  since  September  6,  1885,  an  independent  kingdom. 

In  conjunction  with  the  nation  I  believe  that  this  act  will  meet  the 
approbation  of  the  great  powers. 

119.  Recognition  by  the  United  States  of  the  independence  of 
Cuba.  On  April  20,  1898,  after  considerable  debate,  the  following 
joint  resolution  was  passed  and  approved.  The  vote  in  the  House 
was  311  to  6  ;  in  the  Senate,  42  to  35  : 

Joint  Resolution  for  the  recognition  of  the  independence  of  the  people  of 
Cuba,  demanding  that  the  government  of  Spain  relinquish  its  author- 
ity and  government  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  and  to  withdraw  its  land 
and  naval  forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban  waters,  and  directing  the 
President  of  the  United  States  to  use  the  land  and  naval  forces  of 
the  United  States  to  carry  these  resolutions  into  effect. 
Whereas  the  abhorrent  conditions  which  have  existed  for  more  than 
three  years  in  the  island  of  Cuba,  so  near  our  own  borders,  have  shocked 
the  moral  sense  of  the  people  of  the  United  States,  have  been  a  disgrace  to 
Christian  civilization,  culminating,  as  they  have,  in  the  destruction  of  a 
United  States  battleship,  with  two  hundred  and  sixty-six  of  its  officers 


l6o  READINGS  IN   POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

and  crew,  while  on  a  friendly  visit  in  the  harbor  of  Havana,  and  cannot 
longer  be  endured,  as  has  been  set  forth  by  the  President  of  the  United 
States  in  his  message  to  Congress  of  April  eleventh,  eighteen  hundred  and 
ninety-eight,  upon  which  the  action  of  Congress  was  invited :  Therefore, 

Resolved  .  .  . ,  First.  That  the  people  of  the  Island  of  Cuba  are,  and 
of  right  ought  to  be,  free  and  independent. 

Second.  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  demand,  and  the 
government  of  the  United  States  does  hereby  demand,  that  the  govern- 
ment of  Spain  at  once  relinquish  its  authority  and  government  in  the 
Island  of  Cuba  and  withdraw  its  land  and  naval  forces  from  Cuba 
and  Cuban  waters. 

Third.  That  the  President  of  the  United  States  be,  and  he  hereby  is, 
directed  and  empowered  to  use  the  entire  land  and  naval  forces  of  the 
United  States,  and  to  call  into  the  actual  service  of  the  United  States  the 
militia  of  the  several  States,  to  such  extent  as  may  be  necessary  to  carry 
these  resolutions  into  effect. 

Fourth.  That  the  United  States  hereby  disclaims  any  disposition  or 
intention  to  exercise  sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  or  control  over  said  Island 
except  for  the  pacification  thereof,  and  asserts  its  determination,  when 
that  is  accomplished,  to  leave  the  government  and  control  of  the  Island 
to  its  people. 

Approved,  April  20,  1898 

III.  Civil  Liberty 

120.  The  meaning  of  civil  liberty.  Lieber  explains  civil  liberty 
as  protection  against  undue  interference  on  the  part  of  both  indi- 
vidual and  government. 

Liberty,  in  its  absolute  sense,  means  the  faculty  of  willing,  and  the 
power  of  doing  what  has  been  willed,  without  influence  from  any  other 
source,  or  from  without.  It  means  self-determination,  unrestrainedness 
of  action. 

In  this  absolute  meaning,  there  is  but  one  free  Being,  because  there  is 
but  one  Being  whose  will  is  absolutely  independent  upon  any  influence, 
but  that  which  he  wills  himself,  and  whose  power  is  adequate  to  his  ab- 
solute will  —  who  is  Almighty.  .  .   . 

If  we  apply  the  idea  of  self-determination  to  the  sphere  of  politics,  or 
to  the  state,  and  the  relations  which  subsist  between  it  and  the  individual, 
and  between  different  states,  we  must  remember  that  the  following  points 
are  necessarily  involved  in  the  comprehensive  idea  of  the  state :    .  .  . 
The  term  state  means  a  society  of  men,  that  is,  of  beings  with  individual 


INDIVIDUAL  LIBERTY  l6l 

destinies  and  responsibilities,  from  which  arise  individual  rights,  that  show 
themselves  the  clearer  and  become  more  important  as  man  advances 
in  political  civilization.  S^nce,  then,  he  is  obliged  and  destined  to  live  in 
society,  it  is  necessary  to  prevent  these  rights  from  being  encroached  upon 
by  his  associates.  .  .   . 

Lastly,  the  idea  of  the  state  involving  the  idea  of  government,  that  is, 
of  a  certain  contrivance  with  coercing  power  superior  to  the  power  of  the 
individual,  the  idea  of  self-determination  necessarily  implies  protection  of 
the  individual  against  encroaching  power  of  the  government,  or  checks 
against  government  interference.  .  .   . 

We  come  thus  to  the  conclusion,  that  liberty  applied  to  political  man 
practically  means,  in  the  main,  protection  or  checks  against  undue  inter- 
ference, whether  this  be  from  individuals,  from  masses,  or  from  gov- 
ernment. The  highest  amount  of  liberty  comes  to  signify  the  safest 
guarantees  of  undisturbed  legitimate  action,  and  the  most  efficient  checks 
against  undue  interference. 

121.  Liberty  and  authority.  Mill  outlines  the  phases  of  the 
evolution  of  libert}^  and  argues  for  a  wide  sphere  of  freedom 
against  governmental  encroachment. 

The  struggle  between  Liberty  and  Authority  is  the  most  conspicuous 
feature  in  the  portions  of  history  with  which  we  are  earliest  familiar,  par- 
ticularly in  that  of  Greece,  Rome,  and  England.  But  in  old  times  this 
contest  w^as  between  subjects,  or  some  classes  of  subjects,  and  the  govern- 
ment. By  liberty  was  meant  protection  against  the  tyranny  of  the  polit- 
ical rulers.  .  .  .  The  aim,  therefore,  of  patriots  was  to  set  limits  to  the 
power  which  the  ruler  should  be  suffered  to  exercise  over  the  community  ; 
and  this  limitation  was  what  they  meant  by  liberty.  It  was  attempted  in 
two  ways.  First,  by  obtaining  a  recognition  of  certain  immunities,  called 
political  liberties  or  rights,  which  it  was  to  be  regarded  as  a  breach  of 
duty  in  the  ruler  to  infringe,  and  which,  if  he  did  infringe,  specific  resist- 
ance, or  general  rebellion,  was  held  to  be  justifiable.  A  second,  and  gen- 
erally a  later  expedient,  was  the  establishment  of  constitutional  checks ; 
by  which  the  consent  of  the  community,  or  of  a  body  of  some  sort  sup- 
posed to  represent  its  interests,  was  made  a  necessary  condition  to  some 
of  the  more  important  acts  of  the  governing  power.  .  .  . 

A  time,  however,  came,  in  the  progress  of  human  affairs,  when  men 
ceased  to  think  it  a  necessity  of  nature  that  their  governors  should  be  an 
independent  power,  opposed  in  interest  to  themselves.  It  appeared  to 
them  much  better  that  the  various  magistrates  of  the  State  should  be  their 
tenants  or  delegates,  revocable  at  their  pleasure.    In  that  wa\'  alone  it 


l62  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

seemed,  could  they  have  complete  security  that  the  powers  of  government 
would  never  be  abused  to  their  disadvantage.  By  degrees,  this  new  de- 
mand for  elective  and  temporary  rulers  becanie  the  prominent  object  of 
the  exertions  of  the  popular  party,  wherever  any  such  party  existed  ;  and 
superseded,  to  a  considerable  extent,  the  previous  efforts  to  limit  the 
power  of  rulers.  .  .  . 

It  was  now  perceived  that  such  phrases  as  "  self-government,"  and 
"the  power  of  the  people  over  themselves,"  do  not  express  the  true  state 
of  the  case.  The  "  people  "  who  exercise  the  power  are  not  always  the 
same  people  with  those  over  whom  it  is  exercised  ;  and  the  "self-govern- 
ment" spoken  of  is  not  the  government  of  each  by  himself,  but  of  each 
by  all  the  rest.  The  will  of  the  people,  moreover,  practically  means  the 
will  of  the  most  numerous  or  the  most  active  pan  of  the  people  ;  the  ma- 
jority, or  those  who  succeed  in  making  themselves  accepted  as  the  majority: 
the  people,  consequently,  77iay  desire  to  oppress  a  part  of  their  number ; 
and  precautions  are  as  much  needed  against  this,  as  against  any  other 
abuse  of  power.  The  limitation,  therefore,  of  the  power  of  government 
over  individuals  loses  none  of  its  importance  when  the  holders  of  power 
are  regularly  accountable  to  the  community,  that  is,  to  the  strongest  party 
therein.  .  .  .  There  is  a  limit  to  the  legitimate  interference  of  collective 
opinion  with  individual  independence  ;  and  to  find  that  limit,  and  maintain 
it  against  encroachment,  is  as  indispensable  to  a  good  condition  of  human 
affairs,  as  protection  against  political  despotism.  .  .  . 

The  only  part  of  the  conduct  of  any  one,  for  which  he  is  amenable  to 
society,  is  that  which  concerns  others.  In  the  part  which  merely  concerns 
himself,  his  independence  is,  of  right,  absolute.  Over  himself,  over  his 
own  body  and  mind,  the  individual  is  sovereign.  .  .  . 

This,  then,  is  the  appropriate  region  of  human  liberty.  It  comprises, 
first,  the  inward  domain  of  consciousness ;  demanding  liberty  of  con- 
science, in  the  most  comprehensive  sense  ;  liberty  of  thought  and  feeling; 
absolute  freedom  of  opinion  and  sentiment  on  all  subjects,  practical  or 
speculative,  scientific,  moral,  or  theological.  The  liberty  of  expressing  and 
publishing  opinions  may  seem  to  fall  under  a  different  principle,  since  it 
belongs  to  that  part  of  the  conduct  of  an  individual  which  concerns  other 
people  ;  but,  being  almost  of  as  much  importance  as  the  liberty  of  thought 
itself,  and  resting  in  great  part  on  the  same  reasons,  is  practically  insepa- 
rable from  it.  Secondly,  the  principle  requires  liberty  of  tastes  and  pur- 
suits ;  of  framing  the  plan  of  our  life  to  suit  our  own  character ;  of  doing 
as  we  like,  subject  to  such  consequences  as  may  follow ;  without  imped- 
iment from  our  fellow  creatures,  so  long  as  what  we  do  does  not  harm 
them,  even  though  they  should  think  our  conduct  foolish,  perverse,  or 
wrong.    Thirdly,  from  this  liberty  of  each  individual  follows  the  liberty, 


INDIVIDUAL  LIBERTY  1 63 

within  the  same  limits,  of  combination  among  individuals;  freedom  to 
unite,  for  any  purpose  not  involving  harm  to  others ;  the  persons  com- 
bining being  supposed  to  be  of  full  age,  and  not  forced  or  deceived. 

No  society  in  which  these  liberties  arc  not,  on  the  whole,  respected  is 
free,  whatever  may  be  its  form  of  government ;  and  none  is  completely 
free  in  which  they  do  not  exist  absolute  and  unqualified. 

122.  Civil  liberty  in  the  United  States.  The  following  is  a 
brief  classification  of  the  individual  rights  specially  guaranteed  and 
protected  in  the  United  States  : 

The  guaranties  found  in  the  state  and  federal  constitutions  which  are 
intended  for  the  protection  of  the  individual  in  his  person,  his  liberty,  and 
his  property  have  not  been  the  result  of  any  theorizing  as  to  what  ought 
to  be  secured  to  the  individual  by  way  of  enjoyment ;  they  have  been  the 
result  of  experience,  and  they  relate  to  the  supposed  respects  in  which  it 
has  been  found  necessary  to  limit  the  powers  of  government  in  order 
that  the  largest  practicable  measure  of  individual  freedom  and  opportu- 
nity may  be  secured.  Nearly  all  of  them  may  be  traced  more  or  less 
directly  to  struggles  on  the  part  of  the  people  against  the  unjust  exer- 
cise of  powers  of  government  in  England  and  in  this  country. 

The  guaranty  of  the  right  to  "life"  seems  to  be  intended  as  a  safe- 
guard against  inflicting  death  on  persons  who  are  regarded  as  obnoxious 
to  the  government,  otherwise  than  as  the  result  of  a  regular  and  orderly 
procedure  for  the  punishment  of  crime ;  hence  the  provisions  with  refer- 
ence to  the  method  uf  accusation,  trial,  and  punishment  ma)*  be  regarded 
as  guaranties  intended  for  the  protection  of  the  right  to  life. 

But  liberty  is  equally  imperiled  by  criminal  proceedings  which  arc  not 
in  accordance  with  regular  and  orderly  methods,  and  by  imprisonment 
inflicted  as  a  punishment  for  crime  for  which  there  has  not  been  a  proper 
conviction.  Therefore,  the  provisions  with  reference  to  the  methods  of 
criminal  procedure  are  guaranties  both  as  to  life  and  liberty.  .   .  . 

The  enjoyment  of  the  largest  measure  of  liberty  which  can  consist- 
ently be  guaranteed  by  organized  government  to  the  individual  involves, 
however,  much  more  than  protection  against  unlawful  physical  restraint. 
Liberty  is  a  most  comprehensive  term.  It  suggests,  not  only  freedom  of 
action,  but  the  unrestricted  enjoyment  of  the  result  of  beneficial  activity 
so  far  as  such  freedom  is  not  inconsistent  with  like  freedom  on  the  part 
of  others.  Civil  liberty  is  therefore  impaired  when  individuals  are  de- 
prived of  protection  in  the  acquisition  and  enjoyment  of  property,  for  the 
accumulation  of  property  is  one  of  the  most  substantial  results  of  the 
freedom  of  action,  the  desire  for  acquisition  being  one  of  the  strongest 


l64  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

desires  of  human  beings.  Hence,  proper  guaranties  of  civil  liberty  involve 
guaranties  of  property  rights  and  of  rights  to  pursue  profitable  occupa- 
tions, and  to  make  and  enforce  contracts. 

The  social  instincts  involve  a  desire  to  communicate  with  others, 
either  for  the  mere  pleasure  of  social  intercourse  or  for  the  purpose  of 
persuading  or  inducing  others  to  act  in  accordance  with  one's  wishes  or 
for  his  benefit.  Therefore,  civil  liberty  is  unduly  restricted  if  the  privilege 
of  writing  and  speaking  one's  views  and  sentiments,  so  far  as  the  privi- 
lege may  be  exercised  without  involving  injury  to  others,  is  impaired  or 
taken  away.  Hence,  the  so-called  freedom  of  speech  and  the  press  is 
among  the  rights  protected  by  constitutional  guaranties. 

Among  the  privileges  most  highly  prized  are  those  involving  the  en- 
joyment of  religious  forms  and  observances  according  to  the  dictates  of 
individual  conscience.  Therefore,  among  the  provisions  for  securing  civil 
liberty  are  those  prohibiting  the  undue  interference  with  religious  beliefs 
and  the  expression  thereof  in  suitable  forms. 

123.  Civil  liberty  guaranteed  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States.  The  first  eight  amendments  to  the  Constitution  form  the 
American  Bill  of  Rights. 

ARTICLE  I 

Congress  shall  make  no  law  respecting  an  establishment  of  religion, 
or  prohibiting  the  free  exercise  thereof ;  or  abridging  the  freedom  of 
speech,  or  of  the  press  ;  or  the  right  of  the  people  peaceably  to  assemble, 
and  petition  the  government  for  a  redress  of  grievances. 

ARTICLE  II 

A  well-regulated  militia  being  necessary  to  the  security  of  a  free  state, 
the  right  of  the  people  to  keep  and  bear  arms  shall  not  be  infringed. 

ARTICLE  III 

No  soldier  shall,  in  time  of  peace,  be  quartered  in  any  house,  without 
the  consent  of  the  owner,  nor  in  time  of  war,  but  in  a  manner  to  be  pre- 
scribed by  law. 

ARTICLE  IV 

The  right  of  the  people  to  be  secure  in  their  persons,  houses,  papers, 
and  effects,  against  unreasonable  searches  and  seizures  shall  not  be  vio- 
lated, and  no  warrants  shall  issue  but  upon  probable  cause,  supported  by 
oath  or  affirmation,  and  particularly  describing  the  place  to  be  searched, 
and  the  persons  or  things  to  be  seized. 


INDIVIDUAL  LIBERTY  165 


ARTICLE  V 


No  person  shall  be  held  to  answer  for  a  capital,  or  otherwise  infamous 
crime,  unless  on  a  presentment  or  indictment  of  a  grand  jury,  except  in 
cases  arising  in  the  land  or  naval  forces,  or  in  the  militia  when  in  active 
service  in  time  of  war  or  public  danger ;  nor  shall  any  person  be  subject 
for  the  same  offense  to  be  twice  put  in  jeopardy  of  life  or  limb  ;  nor  shall 
be  compelled,  in  any  criminal  case,  to  be  a  witness  against  himself ;  nor 
be  deprived  of  life,  liberty,  or  property,  without  due  process  of  law ;  nor 
shall  private  property  be  taken  for  public  use  without  just  compensation. 

ARTICLE  VI 

In  all  criminal  prosecutions  the  accused  shall  enjoy  the  right  to  a 
speedy  and  public  trial,  by  an  impartial  jury  of  the  State  and  district 
wherein  the  crime  shall  have  been  committed,  which  district  shall  have 
been  previously  ascertained  by  law,  and  to  be  informed  of  the  nature  and 
cause  of  the  accusation  ;  to  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses  against  him  ; 
to  have  compulsory  process  for  obtaining  witnesses  in  his  favor ;  and  to 
have  the  assistance  of  counsel  for  his  defense. 

ARTICLE  VII 
In  suits  at  common  law,  where  the  value  in  controversy  shall  exceed 
twenty  dollars,  the  right  of  trial  by  jury  shall  be  preserved ;  and  no  fact 
tried  by  a  jury  shall  be  otherwise  reexamined  in  any  court  of  the  United 
States  than  according  to  the  rules  of  the  common  law. 

ARTICLE  VIII 
Excessive  bail  shall  not  be  required,  nor  excessive  fines  imposed,  nor 
cruel  and  unusual  punishment  inflicted. 

124.  Civil  liberty  in  England.  The  following  is  an  outline  of 
the  leading  "  liberties  of  the  subject  "  in  England  : 

It  is  always  held  to  be  a  valuable  characteristic  of  the  English  Con- 
stitution that,  under  it,  the  maintenance  of  what  is  called  the  "  Libert>' 
of  the  Subject "  is  treated  as  a  matter  of  peculiar  consideration  and  conse- 
quence. The  expression  "  Liberty  of  the  Subject "  does  not,  of  course, 
mean  that  there  is  any  member  of  the  State  who  can  do  everything  he 
likes,  or  is  exempt  from  the  control  of  the  Laws.  It  means  that  the  Laws 
are  ( if  the  true  principles  of  the  Constitution  be  observed  ),  or  are  in- 
tended to  be,  made  and  executed  in  such  a  way  that  no  individual  person's 
freedom  is  impaired  to  a  greater  extent  than  is  absolutely  needed  in  order 
to  secure  the  largest  possible  amount  of  freedom  and  benefit  for  all.  .  .  . 


l66  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

The  chief  safeguards  of  the  Liberty  of  the  Subject  concern  (I)  the 
mode  of  making  laws ;  (II)  the  judicial  administration  of  laws,  that  is, 
the  trial  of  accused  persons ;  (III)  the  general  prevention  of  illegal  im- 
prisonment ;  and  (IV)  the  definition  and  circumscription  of  the  duties  of 
the  police,  especially  in  respect  of  subjecting  suspected  persons  to  a  pre- 
liminary judicial  examination. 

I.  The  first  class  of  safeguards  is  found  in  the  existence  and  mode  of 
composition  of  the  House  of  Commons,  the  popular  and  representative 
branch  of  the  Legislature.  .  .  . 

II.  The  second  class  of  safeguards  includes  the  provision  for  Trial 
by  Jury  in  the  more  important  criminal  cases.  .  .  .  To  the  same  class 
of  safeguards  belongs  the  protection  accorded  to  jurymen  by  which  they 
cannot  be  made  civilly  or  criminally  responsible  for  their  verdicts.  .  .  . 
To  this  same  class  also  belongs  the  protection  of  the  functions  of  jury- 
men against  possible  encroachment  by  Judges.  .  .  .  To  this  class  of 
safeguards  also  belongs  the  independence  of  the  Judges  of  the  Superior 
Courts.  .  .  . 

III.  The  third  class  of  safeguards  are  those  which  provide  against  il- 
legal imprisonment  or  confinement.  These  safeguards  either  take  the 
form  of  securing  that  any  one  whose  liberty  is  restrained  shall  have  an 
opportunity  (such  as  that  presented  by  the  proceedings  for  obtaining  the 
writ  of  Habeas  Corpus)  of  having  the  ground  of  his  restraint  judicially 
investigated ;  of  being  speedily  brought  to  trial  if  accused ;  and  of  the 
executive  being  restricted  as  to  the  place  of  his  imprisonment :  or  they 
take  the  form  of  securing  compensation  in  a  civil  action  for  illegal  deten- 
tion. The  general  principle  that  "excessive  bail  must  not  be  required" 
is  an  acknowledged,  if  not  very  available,  safeguard  for  the  same  end.  .  .  . 

IV.  The  fourth  class  of  safeguards  concerns  the  definition  and  cir- 
cumscription of  the  duties  of  the  police,  especially  in  respect  of  subject- 
ing suspected  persons  to  a  preliminary  judicial  examination.  .  .  .  The 
purpose  of  a  warrant  is  to  secure  the  responsible  cooperation  and  assent 
of  a  judicial  officer  at  the  earliest  stage  of  the  proceedings.  ...  It  is  a 
common  maxim  that  an  "Englishman's  house  is  his  castle":  this  means, 
however,  no  more  than  that  an  Englishman's  house  or  private  room  can- 
not be  forcibly  entered  by  the  police  except  for  a  few  clearly  defined  pur- 
poses and  for  important  public  ends. 

125.  Magna  Charta.  This  document  forms  the  basis  of  all 
later  English  and  American  written  statements  of  free  institutions. 
Some  of  its  most  important  provisions  follow : 

12.  No  scutage  or  aid  shall  be  imposed  in  our  kingdom,  unless  by 
the  general  council  of  our  kingdom.  .  .  . 


INDIVIDUAL  LIBERTY  167 

14.  And  for  holding  the  general  council  of  the  kingdom  concerning 
the  assessment  of  aids,  except  in  the  three  cases  aforesaid,  and  for  the 
assessing  of  scutages,  we  shall  cause  to  be  summoned  the  archbishops, 
bishops,  abbots,  earls,  and  greater  barons  of  the  realm,  singly  by  our 
letters.  And  furthermore,  we  shall  cause  to  be  summoned  generally,  by 
our  sheriffs  and  bailiffs,  all  others  who  hold  of  us  in  chief,  for  a  certain 
day,  that  is  to  say,  forty  days  before  their  meeting  at  least,  and  to  a  cer- 
tain place ;  and  in  all  letters  of  such  summons  we  will  declare  the  cause 
of  such  summons.  And,  summons  being  thus  made,  the  business  shall 
proceed  on  the  day  appointed  according  to  the  advice  of  such  as  shall  be 
present,  although  all  that  were  summoned  come  not.  .  .  . 

36.  Nothing  from  henceforth  shall  be  given  or  taken  for  a  writ  of  in- 
quisition of  life  or  limb,  but  it  shall  be  granted  freely,  and  not  denied.  .  .  . 

39.  No  freeman  shall  be  taken  or  imprisoned,  or  disseized,  or  out- 
lawed, or  banished,  or  anyways  destroyed,  nor  will  we  pass  upon  him, 
nor  will  we  send  upon  him,  unless  by  the  lawful  judgment  of  his  peers, 
or  by  the  law  of  the  land. 

40.  We  will  sell  to  no  man,  we  will  not  deny  or  delay  to  any  man, 
either  justice  or  right. 

126.  Declaration  of  the  Rights  of  Man  and  Citizen.  This  is  the 
most  famous  document  of  the  early  stages  of  the  French  Revolu- 
tion. While  it  was  probably  suggested  by  the  Bills  of  Rights 
attached  to  American  state  constitutions,  it  indicates  the  existing 
abuses  in  France  at  that  time. 

1.  Men  are  born  and  remain  free  and  equal  in  rights.  Social  distinc- 
tions can  be  based  only  upon  public  utility. 

2.  The  aim  of  every  political  association  is  the  preservation  of  the 
natural  and  imprescriptible  rights  of  man.  These  rights  are  liberty,  prop- 
erty, security,  and  resistance  to  oppression,  .  .  . 

4.  Liberty  consists  in  the  power  to  do  anything  that  does  not  injure 
others ;  accordingly,  the  exercise  of  the  natural  rights  of  each  man  has 
for  its  only  limits  those  that  secure  to  the  other  members  of  society  the 
enjoyment  of  these  same  rights.  These  limits  can  be  determined  only  by 
law.  .  .  . 

6.  Law  is  the  expression  of  the  general  will.  All  citizens  have  the 
right  to  take  part  personally  or  by  their  representatives  in  its  formation. 
It  must  be  the  same  for  all,  whether  it  protects  or  punishes.  All  citizens 
being  equal  in  its  eyes,  are  equally  eligible  to  all  public  dignities,  places, 
and  employments,  according  to  their  capacities,  and  without  other  dis- 
tinction than  that  of  their  virtues  and  their  talents. 


1 68  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

7.  No  man  can  be  accused,  arrested,  or  detained  except  in  the  cases 
determined  by  the  law  and  according  to  the  forms  that  it  has  prescribed. 
Those  who  procure,  expedite,  execute,  or  cause  to  be  executed  arbitrary 
orders  ought  to  be  punished :  but  every  citizen  summoned  or  seized  in 
virtue  of  the  law  ought  to  render  instant  obedience ;  he  makes  himself 
guilty  by  resistance. 

8.  The  law  ought  to  establish  only  penalties  that  are  strictly  and 
obviously  necessary  and  no  one  can  be  punished  except  in  virtue  of  a 
law  established  and  promulgated  prior  to  the  offense  and  legally  applied. 

9.  Every  man  being  presumed  innocent  until  he  has  been  pronounced 
guilty,  if  it  is  thought  indispensable  to  arrest  him,  all  severity  that  may 
not  be  necessary  to  secure  his  person  ought  to  be  strictly  suppressed  by 

law, 

10.  No  one  ought  to  be  disturbed  on  account  of  his  opinions,  even 
religious,  provided  their  manifestation  does  not  derange  the  public  order 
established  by  law. 

1 1 .  The  free  communication  of  ideas  and  opinions  is  one  of  the  most 
precious  of  the  rights  of  man  ;  every  citizen  then  can  freely  speak,  write, 
and  print,  subject  to  responsibility  for  the  abuse  of  this  freedom  in  the 
cases  determined  by  law.  .   .  . 

14.  All  the  citizens  have  the  right  to  ascertain,  by  themselves  or  by 
their  representatives,  the  necessity  of  the  public  tax,  to  consent  to  it 
freely,  to  follow  the  employment  of  it,  and  to  determine  the  quota,  the 
assessment,  the  collection,  and  the  duration  of  it.  .   .  . 

17.  Property  being  a  sacred  and  inviolable  right,  no  one  can  be 
deprived  of  it  unless  a  legally  established  public  necessity  evidently 
demands  it,  under  the  condition  of  a  just  and  prior  indemnity. 

127.  Civil  liberty  in  Russia.  Even  the  recently  issued  "  Fun- 
damental Laws  of  the  Russian  Empire  "  contains  provisions  for 
individual  liberty. 

30.  No  one  shall  be  prosecuted  for  criminal  offenses  in  any  other 
manner  than  that  established  by  law. 

31.  No  one  shall  be  arrested  except  in  the  cases  determined  by  law. 

32.  No  one  shall  be  tried  and  punished  except  for  criminal  offenses 
provided  by  laws  in  force  at  the  time  they  were  committed,  unless  new 
laws  exclude  the  actions  committed  by  the  culprit  from  the  category  of 
criminal  offenses. 

^2.  The  domicile  of  every  one  is  inviolable.  Searches  or  sequestrations 
in  a  domicile  without  the  consent  of  the  owner  shall  take  place  only  in 
the  cases  and  in  the  manner  provided  by  law. 


INDIVIDUAL  LIBERTY  j  r^cj 

34.  Every  Russian  subject  shall  have  the  right  to  select  his  place  of 
abode  and  his  occupation,  to  buy  and  sell  property,  and  to  depart  from 
the  territory  of  the  Empire  without  molestation  ;  limitations  upon  these 
rights  are  established  by  law. 

35.  Property  is  inviolable.  The  forced  taking  of  real  property,  when 
such  is  necessary  for  governmental  or  public  interests,  shall  take  place 
only  for  an  equitable  and  adequate  compensation. 

36.  Russian  subjects  shall  have  the  right  to  assemble  peacefully  and 
without  arms,  for  purposes  allowed  by  the  law.  The  law  determines  the 
conditions  under  which  meetings  may  be  held,  the  manner  of  closing 
them,  and  likewise  the  limitation  as  to  the  localities  where  they  may  take 
place. 

37.  Every  one  shall  have  the  right,  within  the  limits  prescribed  by  law, 
to  express  his  thoughts  orally  or  in  writing,  and  also  to  disseminate  them 
through  the  press  or  by  other  means. 

38.  Russian  subjects  shall  have  the  right  to  form  societies  and  associa- 
tions for  purposes  which  are  not  forbidden  by  law.   .   .   . 

39.  The  Russian  subjects  shall  enjoy  liberty  of  conscience.  The  con- 
ditions under  which  this  liberty  is  enjoyed  shall  be  determined  by  law. 

40.  All  foreigners  residing  in  Russia  shall  enjoy  the  same  rights  as 
Russian  subjects,  within  certain  limitations  established  by  law. 

41.  Exceptions  from  the  provisions  of  this  chapter,  with  regard  to 
localities  in  a  state  of  war  or  in  other  exceptional  state,  shall  be  deter- 
mined by  the  law, 

IV,   Political  Liberty 

128.  Political  rights.  The  following  arc  the  most  important 
aspects  of  the  rights  of  citizens  to  share  in  government : 

Rights,  as  already  said,  are  based  on  the  law  of  the  land  and  secured 
through  governmental  agencies.  But  if  the  citizen  body  as  a  whole  has 
no  voice  in  the  making  of  laws,  and  if  the  government  is  controlled  by  a 
comparatively  small  per  cent  of  the  citizens,  there  would  be  no  real  as- 
surance that  general  rights  of  life  and  property  would  be  safeguarded. 
Experience  shows  that  a  small  class  in  control  of  the  law  and  its  adminis- 
tration too  easily  inclines  to  neglect  general  interests,  especially  when 
these  are  in  conflict  with  its  own  private  interests.  For  such  reasons 
there  have  been  from  time  immemorial  demands  such  as  these : 

(i)  That  office  be  considered  not  a  private  right  but  a  public  trust,  to 
be  administered  by  responsible  persons,  who  may  be  called  to  account 
for  violations  of  law.     (2)  That  the  law  be  definite,  and  open  to  the 


170 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


knowledge  of  all.  (3)  That  the  citizen  body  have  a  determining  voice  in 
the  making  of  law,  either  directly  or  through  representatives.  (4)  That 
the  electorate  or  body  of  voters  include  the  largest  possible  per  cent  of  the 
entire  citizen  body.  (5)  That  the  judicial  system  be  so  administered 
as  to  secure  to  all  citizens  their  rights. 

These  demands  are  now  acknowledged  in  democracies  and  in  conse- 
quence a  large  proportion  of  the  citizen  body  have  the  political  right  of 
suffrage.  This  power  has  been  wielded  so  effectively  that  other  impor- 
tant political  rights  have  been  secured  one  by  one. 

In  addition  to  the  right  of  manhood  suffrage,  there  is :  (i)  The  right 
of  every  voter  to  aspire  to  any  office  in  the  state.  (2)  The  right  to  fill 
offices  through  election  or  through  elected  representatives,  and  the  right 
to  hold  all  officials  responsible  for  inefficiency  and  misconduct  in  office. 

(3)  The  right  to  determine  directly  or  through  representatives  the  funda- 
mental law  of  the  land,  whether  expressed  in  a  written  or  unwritten  con- 
stitution ;  and,  in  addition,  the  right  to  formulate  all  other  legislation. 

(4)  The  right  to  discuss  freely  and  to  criticize  openly  governmental 
measures,  policies  and  officials.  (5)  In  English-speaking  countries,  the 
right  to  assist  in  the  settlement  of  judicial  cases  by  jury  service. 

In  these  rights  the  essential  point  is  that  the  citizens  themselves 
directly  participate  in  the  exercise  of  governmental  functions,  or  name 
from  their  ranks  those  who  shall  perform  these  activities  in  the  name 
and  for  the  welfare  of  the  people.  President  Lincoln  ably  voiced  the 
democratic  ideal  in  his  famous  Gettysburg  speech,  in  expressing  his 
determination  that  "  government  of  the  people,  by  the  people,  and  for 
the  people  shall  not  perish  from  the  earth."  Naturally,  the  complete 
attainment  of  this  ideal  is  possible  only  in  high  civilization,  but  all  modern 
nations  tend  to  enlarge  more  and  more  the  political  rights  of  their 
citizens. 

These  rights  have  sometimes  been  attained  in  advance  of  a  general 
capacity  to  use  them  wisely,  with  the  result  that  inefficiency  and  corrup- 
tion become  common.  Experience,  however,  which  is  always  the  best 
teacher,  brings  home  the  lesson  of  misgovernment  in  heavy  taxation, 
excessive  death  rates- and  economic  disorders.  Democracies,  therefore, 
tend  to  emphasize  at  the  present  time  character  and  intelligence  as  pre- 
requisities  for  suffrage ;  with  the  proviso,  however,  that  the  state  furnish 
free  general  education  and  further  morality  so  as  to  develop  its  citizens 
into  persons  capable  of  an  intelligent  exercise  of  the  suffrage.  Compul- 
sory education  and  an  efficient  system  of  schools  are  the  safest  guar- 
anties of  a  democratic  suffrage.  Should  these  not  be  in  evidence,  a 
more  aristocratic  form  is  preferable  until  political  intelligence  becomes 
common. 


INDIVIDUAL  LIBERTY 


171 


129.  Political  liberty  in  Oklahoma.  New  communities  are 
often  most  radical  in  political  experiments.  The  following  sec- 
tions from  the  recently  adopted  constitution  of  Oklahoma  indicate 
the  popular  control  over  government  there  established : 

Section  i.  The  legislative  authority  of  the  State  shall  be  vested 
in  a  legislature,  consisting  of  a  senate  and  a  house  of  representatives ; 
but  the  people  reserve  to  themselves  the  power  to  propose  laws 
and  amendments  to  the  Constitution  and  to  enact  or  reject  the  same 
at  the  polls  independent  of  the  legislature,  and  also  reserve  power 
at  their  own  option  to  approve  or  reject  at  the  polls  any  act  of  the 
legislature. 

Sec.  2.  The  first  power  reserved  by  the  people  is  the  initiative,  and 
eight  per  centum  of  the  legal  voters  shall  have  the  right  to  propose  any 
legislative  measure,  and  fifteen  per  centum  of  the  legal  voters  shall  have 
the  right  to  propose  amendments  to  the  Constitution  by  petition,  and 
every  such  petition  shall  include  the  full  text  of  the  measure  so  proposed. 
The  second  power  is  the  referendum,  and  it  may  be  ordered  (except  as 
to  laws  necessary  for  the  immediate  preservation  of  the  public  peace, 
health,  or  safety),  either  by  petition  signed  by  five  per  centum  of  the  legal 
voters  or  by  the  legislature  as  other  bills  are  enacted.  The  ratio  and 
per  centum  of  legal  voters  hereinbefore  stated  shall  be  based  upon  the 
total  number  of  votes  cast  at  the  last  general  election  for  the  State  office 
receiving  the  highest  number  of  votes  at  such  election. 

Sec  3.  .  .  .  The  veto  power  of  the  Governor  shall  not  extend  to 
measures  voted  on  by  the  people.  .  .  .  Any  measure  referred  to  the 
people  by  the  initiative  shall  take  effect  and  be  in  force  when  it  shall, 
have  been  approved  by  a  majority  of  the  votes  cast  in  such  election. 
Any  measure  referred  to  the  people  by  the  referendum  shall  take  effect 
and  be  in  force  when  it  shall  have  been  approved  by  a  majority  of  the 
votes  cast  thereon  and  not  otherwise. 

The  style  of  all  bills  shall  be :  "  Be  it  Enacted  by  the  People  of  the 
State  of  Oklahoma.  ..." 

Sec.  4.  The  referendum  may  be  demanded  by  the  people  against  one 
or  more  items,  sections,  or  parts  of  any  act  of  the  legislature  in  the 
same  manner  in  which  such  power  may  be  exercised  against  a  complete 
act.  ,  .  . 

Sec  5.  The  powers  of  the  initiative  and  referendum  reserved  to  the 
people  by  this  Constitution  for  the  State  at  large,  are  hereby  further 
reserved  to  the  legal  voters  of  every  county  and  district  therein,  as  to 
all  local  legislation,  or  action,  in  the  administration  of  county  and  district 
government  in  and  for  their  respective  counties  and  districts.   .  .  . 


172  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

130.  Manifesto  summoning  the  First  Russian  Duma.  Terrible 
disturbances  in  Russia,  together  with  her  defeat  at  the  hands  of 
Japan,  compelled  the  extension  of  certain  political  rights  to  the 
people.    The  following  manifesto  was  issued   in  August,    1905  : 

The  empire  of  Russia  is  formed  and  strengthened  by  the  indestructi- 
ble union  of  the  Tsar  with  the  people  and  the  people  with  the  Tsar. 
This  concord  and  union  of  the  Tsar  and  the  people  is  the  great  moral 
force  which  has  created  Russia  in  the  course  of  centuries  by  protecting 
her  from  all  misfortunes  and  all  attacks,  and  has  constituted  up  to  the 
present  time  a  pledge  of  unity,  independence,  integrity,  material  well- 
being,  and  intellectual  development  in  the  present  and  in  the  future. 

In  our  manifesto  of  February  26,  1903,  we  summoned  all  faithful 
sons  of  the  fatherland  in  order  to  perfect,  through  mutual  understanding, 
the  organization  of  the  State,  founding  it  securely  on  public  order  and 
private  welfare.  We  devoted  ourselves  to  the  task  of  coordinating  local 
elective  bodies  {zemstvos)  with  the  central  authorities,  and  removing  the 
disagreements  existing  between  them,  which  so  disturbed  the  normal 
course  of  the  national  life.  Autocratic  Tsars,  our  ancestors,  have  had  this 
aim  constantly  in  view,  and  the  time  has  now  come  to  follow  out  their 
good  intentions  and  to  summon  elected  representatives  from  the  whole 
of  Russia  to  take  a  constant  and  active  part  in  the  elaboration  of  laws, 
adding  for  this  purpose  to  the  higher  State  institutions  a  special  consulta- 
tive body  intrusted  with  the  preliminary  elaboration  and  discussion  of 
measures  and  with  the  examination  of  the  State  Budget.  It  is  for  this 
reason  that,  while  preserving  the  fundamental  law  regarding  autocratic 
power,  we  have  deemed  it  well  to  form  a  Gosoudarstvefinaia  Duma 
(i.e.  State  Council)  and  to  approve  regulations  for  elections  to  this 
Duma,  extending  these  laws  to  the  whole  territory  of  the  empire,  with 
such  exceptions  only  as  may  be  considered  necessary  in  the  case  of  some 
regions  in  which  special  conditions  obtain.   .   .   . 

We  have  ordered  the  Minister  of  the  Interior  to  submit  immediately 
for  our  approbation  regulations  for  election  to  the  Duma,  so  that  deputies 
from  fifty  governments,  and  the  military  province  of  the  Don,  may  be 
able  to  assemble  not  later  than  the  middle  of  January,  1906.  We  reserve 
to  ourselves  exclusively  the  care  of  perfecting  the  organization  of  the 
Gosoudarstvenriaia  Duma,  and  when  the  course  of  events  has  demon- 
strated the  necessity  of  changes  corresponding  to  the  needs  of  the  times 
and  the  welfare  of  the  empire,  we  shall  not  fail  to  give  the  matter  our 
attention  at  the  proper  moment. 

We  are  convinced  that  those  who  are  elected  by  the  confidence  of  the 
whole  people,  and  who  are  called  upon  to  take  part  in  the  legislative 


INDIVIDUAL  LIBERTY 


173 


work  of  the  government,  will  show  themselves  in  the  eyes  of  all  Russia 
worthy  of  the  imperial  trust  in  virtue  of  which  they  have  been  invited  to 
cooperate  in  this  great  work  ;  and  that  in  perfect  harmony  with  the 
other  institutions  and  authorities  of  the  State,  established  by  us,  they 
will  contribute  profitably  and  zealously  to  our  labors  for  the  well-being  of 
our  common  mother,  Russia,  and  for  the  strengthening  of  the  unity, 
security,  and  greatness  of  the  empire,  as  well  as  for  the  tranquillity  and 
prosperity  of  the  people.   .  .   . 

Given  at  Peterhof  on  the  nineteenth  day  of  August,  in  the  year  of 
grace  1905,  and  the  eleventh  year  of  our  reign. 

Nicholas 

131.  Weakness  of  democracies.  Bryce  summarizes  the  accusa- 
tions against  states  in  which  political  liberty  is  extensive. ^ 

The  chief  faults  which  philosophers  .  .  .  and  popular  writers  repeat- 
ing and  caricaturing  the  dicta  of  philosophers,  have  attributed  to  demo- 
cratic governments,  are  the  following  : 

Weakness  in  emergencies,  incapacity  to  act  with  promptitude  and 
decision. 

Fickleness  and  instability,  frequent  changes  of  opinion,  consequent 
changes  in  the  conduct  of  affairs  and  in  executive  officials. 

Insubordination,  internal  dissensions,  disregard  of  authority,  a  frequent 
resort  to  violence,  bringing  on  an  anarchy  which  ends  in  military  tyranny. 

A  desire  to  level  down,  and  intolerance  of  greatness. 

Tyranny  of  a  majority  over  the  minority. 

A  love  of  novelty  :  a  passion  for  changing  customs  and  destroying  old 
institutions. 

Ignorance  and  folly,  producing  a  liability  to  be  deceived  and  misled ; 
consequent  growth  of  demagogues  playing  on  the  passions  and  selfish- 
ness of  the  masses. 

^  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


CHAPTER  X 

LAW 

I.  Nature  of  Law 

132.  The  meaning  of  law.  The  following  paragraph  brings  out 
the  social  origin  of  law  and  the  transition  from  customary  rule  to 
politically  enforced  state  will : 

In  any  community  there  will  develop  set  and  customary  ways  of 
carrying  on  social  activities.  Persons  soon  realize  that  time  is  saved 
and  fricdon  avoided  by  conforming  their  actions  to  social  standards  and 
routine.  Such  customs  develop  in  all  ages  and  in  all  kinds  of  social  life, 
whether  economic,  domesdc,  or  religious.  They  form  a  sort  of  unwritten 
code,  enforced  by  parental  and  ecclesiasdcal  authority  or  by  the  pressure 
of  public  opinion.  Some  of  these  customs,  however,  may  become  so 
important  for  general  welfare  that  stronger  pressure  than  social  authority 
or  opinion  must  be  brought  to  bear  on  those  members  of  the  community 
who  incline  to  acts  in  violation  of  social  standards.  Whenever  a  com- 
munity in  its  collective  capacity,  presumably  acting  through  its  body  of 
elders,  its  government,  undertakes  to  apply  such  pressure,  by  fixing 
penalty  for  violation,  then  such  customs  cease  to  be  purely  social  and 
become  political.  In  other  words  they  become  the  law  of  the  land. 
They  are  virtually  commands,  ordering  or  prohibiting  certain  actions, 
and  disobedience  is  followed  by  the  infliction  of  a  penalty  fixed  by  the 
governing  body  of  the  community.  As  the  sphere  of  governmental 
activity  widens,  other  social  customs  become  of  general  importance, 
enforceable  under  penalty  by  the  state.  Throughout  the  endre  history 
of  the  state,  laws  have  developed  in  this  manner  from  customs.  These, 
arising  from  social  intercourse,  are  at  first  largely  personal  and  local ; 
some  in  process  of  time  develop  general  importance,  and  when  really 
essential,  are  enforced  through  government  for  the  sake  of  the  general 
welfare.  Law,  therefore,  may  be  defined  as  the  formulated  will  of  the 
state,  enforced  by  the  sovereign  power  of  the  state.  This  will  may  be 
formulated  in  customs  having  a  legal  sanction,  or  in  commands  written 
or  unwritten. 

174 


^^'^ 


17' 


133.  The  concept  of  law.  Lee  also  emphasizes  the  essentially 
spontaneous  origin  and  natural  basis  of  law  as  follows  :  ^ 

What,  then,  is  law  ?  It  may  be  considered  either  as  it  has  become  by 
the  evolution  of  thought,  or  as  it  was  when  it  first  became  differentiated 
from  closely  related  elements  of  the  primitive  human  consciousness. 
The  definition  of  the  analytic  jurists  according  to  the  former  method  is 
as  follows :  According  to  Austin  and  Bentham,  a  law  may  be  resolved 
into  a  general  command,  one  emanating  from  a  sovereign  or  lawgiver 
and  imposing  an  obligation  upon  citizens,  which  obligation  is  enforced 
by  a  sanction  or  penalty,  threatened  in  the  case  of  disobedience.  I'his 
definition,  never  quite  true,  never  quite  applicable,  is  for  all  that  not  to 
be  wholly  rejected  in  its  political  sense.  Yet  it  is  too  unsatisfactory,  too 
impracticable,  to  be  recognized  as  a  complete  definition  of  even  the  most 
modern  concrete  law,  though  therein  lies  its  chief  claim  to  authority. 
And  certainly  such  a  definition  does  not  apply  to  the  early  law,  or  that 
from  which  modern  law  has  been  evolved.  In  the  early  forms  of  society 
there  was,  in  place  of  the  skillfully  defined  modern  law,  a  body  of  custom, 
not  attributable  to  any  sovereign  authority  or  lawgiver.  This  custom 
was  regarded  as  binding  upon  the  whole  body  of  persons  forming  the 
primitive  social  group  in  which  such  custom  obtained.  Furthermore, 
that  custom  was  enforced  in  a  rude  manner,  either  by  permitting  the 
person  injured  by  its  violation  to  avenge  himself  as  best  he  could,  or  by 
depriving  the  offender  of  certain  rights,  such  as  the  aid  and  society  of 
members  of  the  group.  In  such  a  state,  law  would  be  best  defined  as 
that  body  of  customs  regarded  as  binding  upon  the  members  of  a  group 
or  class,  and  enforced  by  their  authority.  This  is  law  as  first  discerned 
in  all  nations ;  it  is  the  form  in  which  it  constantly  appears  in  the  course 
of  history.  Only  with  the  rise  of  the  abundant  modern  legislation  has  it 
been  seen  that  law  might  be  conceived  as  the  command  of  a  sovereign 
body.  .  .  . 

Possibly  no  great  department  of  man's  higher  thought  and  activity  is 
so  closely  connected  with  his  actual  life  as  is  the  law.  Because  law  is  that 
body  of  customs  which  are  enforced  by  the  community,  it  is  that  which 
regulates  man's  conduct  toward  his  fellow  men,  which  controls  his  gross 
passions  and  restrains  his  rude  impulses.  It  renders  possible  common  life. 
To  a  great  degree,  it  takes  its  rise  in  the  demands  of  trade,  and  it  makes 
that  trade  practicable.  Much  of  it  arises  spontaneously  in  connection 
with  the  possession  of  property,  and  it  renders  possession  possible.  In 
other  words,  it  arises  spontaneously  in  connection  with  man's  social 
life,  and  its  distinctiveness  from  custom  lies  only  in  the  fact  that  law  is 

^  Copyright,  1900,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


1 76  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

so  necessary  to  the  existence  of  society  and  the  common  activity  that  it 
is  enforced  by  an  authority. 

134.  The  nature  of  law.  Wilson  makes  law  include  custom  as 
well  as  definite  enactment,  and  considers  recognition  and  enforce- 
ment by  the  state  its  essential  attributes. 

Law  is  the  will  of  the  State  concerning  the  civic  conduct  of  those 
under  its  authority.  This  will  may  be  more  or  less  formally  expressed : 
it  may  speak  either  in  custom  or  in  specific  enactment.  Law  may,  more- 
over, be  the  will  either  of  a  primitive  family  community  such  as  we  see 
in  the  earliest  periods  of  history,  or  of  a  highly  organized,  fully  self- 
conscious  State  such  as  those  of  our  own  day.  But  for  the  existence  of 
Law  there  is  needed  in  all  cases  alike  (i)  an  organic  community  capable 
of  having  a  will  of  its  own,  and  (2)  some  clearly  recognized  body  of 
rules  to  which  that  community  has,  whether  by  custom  or  enactment, 
given  life,  character,  and  effectiveness.  Law  is  that  portion  of  the  estab- 
lished thought  and  habit  which  has  gained  distinct  and  formal  recogni- 
tion in  the  shape  of  uniform  rules  backed  by  the  authority  and  power 
of  Government.  The  nature  of  each  State,  therefore,  will  be  reflected 
in  its  law ;  in  its  law,  too,  will  appear  the  functions  with  which  it 
charges  itself ;  and  in  its  law  will  it  be  possible  to  read  its  history. 

135.  Law  as  custom.  The  following  illustration,  used  by  Maine, 
shows  a  type  of  society  in  which  the  idea  of  makmg-  law  is  as  yet 
absent : 

At  first  sight  there  could  be  no  more  perfect  embodiment  than  Run- 
jett  Singh  of  sovereignty  as  conceived  by  Austin.  He  was  absolutely 
despotic.  Except  occasionally  on  his  wild  frontier  he  kept  the  most  per- 
fect order.  He  could  have  commanded  anything  :  the  smallest  disobedi- 
ence to  his  command  would  have  been  followed  by  death  or  mutilation, 
and  this  was  perfectly  well  known  to  the  enormous  majority  of  his  sub- 
jects. Yet  I  doubt  whether  once  in  all  his  life  he  issued  a  command 
which  Austin  would  call  a  law.  .  .  .  He  had  all  material  of  power  and  he 
exercised  it  in  various  ways.  But  he  never  made  law.  The  rules  which 
regulated  the  lives  of  his  subjects  were  derived  from  their  immemorial 
usages,  and  these  rules  were  administered  by  domestic  tribunals.  .  .  . 

136.  Positive  law.  In  final  analysis  the  essence  of  law,  in  its 
political  sense,  is  found  to  be  its  enforcement  by  the  state.  This 
is  clearly  brought  out  in  the  following : 


LAW 


177 


The  most  essential  idea  connoted  by  the  term  hnv  is  that  of  order  or 
uniformity.  A  law,  in  other  words,  using  it  in  its  most  general  meaning, 
states  a  rule  or  principle  in  accordance  with  which  certain  classes  of 
natural  phenomena  are  conceived  to  occur,  or  in  conformity  to  which  it 
is  desired  or  expected  that  men  shall  shape  their  conduct.  Analyzing  the 
idea  further  than  this,  it  is  found  that  laws  may  be  sharply  distinguished 
from  each  other  according  to:  (i)  the  source  whence  their  binding 
authority  is  conceived  to  come,  (2)  the  means  by  which  their  contents 
are  made  known  to  or  are  discoverable  by  men,  (3)  the  character  of  the 
facts  or  acts  to  which  they  apply.  As  regards  the  source  whence  their 
authority  is  conceived  to  be  derived,  this  may  be  ascribed  to  a  god  or 
gods,  to  great  Nature  as  creative  or  legislative,  to  the  reason  of  each 
individual  man,  or  to  the  fiat  of  some  human  authority.  As  regards  the 
means  by  which  the  contents,  i.e.  the  specific  prescriptions,  of  laws,  are 
made  known  to  men,  this  may  be  either  by  way  of  direct  divine  revela- 
tion, by  the  individual  reason,  by  custom  and  tradition,  or  by  the  pub- 
lished will  of  human  legislators.  As  regards  the  character  of  the  facts 
or  acts  to  which  they  are  to  apply,  laws  may  be  either  statements  of 
sequences  of  causes  and  effects  as  observed  in  the  phenomenal  world, 
or  they  may  express  canons  for  the  guidance  of  men's  conduct.  In  the 
latter  case,  they  may  have  reference  solely  to  the  internal  acts  of  the 
will,  and  for  this  reason  are  termed  moral,  or  they  may  be  regulative  of 
outward  acts,  in  which  case  they  may  be  social  or  political  according  as 
they  refer  to  conduct  socially  or  politically  significant.  In  the  one  case 
the  sanction  or  coercive  power  is  supplied  by  social  disapprobation  in 
the  event  of  their  violation,  in  the  other  by  penalties  determined  and 
applied  by  the  politically  governing  power.  In  this  last  case,  laws  are 
described  as  political  or  positive.  By  political  or  positive  law,  then,  we 
understand  a  command  issued  by  a  political  superior  to  a  political  in- 
ferior,—  from  a  sovereign  to  a  subject,  —  ordering  that  something  be 
done  or  not  done,  as  the  case  may  be,  and  threatening  a  penalty  in  case 
of  disobedience.  To  use  the  language  of  John  Austin,  "  Law  is  the 
aggregate  of  rules  set  by  men  as  politically  superior,  or  sovereign,  to 
men  as  politically  subject." 

137.  Definition  of  law.  Holland,  after  a  process  of  exclusion, 
arrives  at  the  following  definition  of  law  : 

Leaving  therefore  on  one  side  those  rules  which  are  set  by  God,  we 
come  to  those  which  are  set  by  a  definite  human  authority,  and  here  we 
draw  the  final  distinction  between  the  case  when  such  authority  is,  and 
the  case  when  it  is  not,  a  sovereign  political  authority.  Rules  set  by 
such  an  authority  are  alone  properly  called  "  laws." 


178  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

By  a  successive  narrowing  of  the  rules  for  human  action,  we  have  at 
length  arrived  at  such  of  those  rules  as  are  laws.  A  law,  in  the  proper 
sense  of  the  term,  is  therefore  a  general  rule  of  human  action,  taking 
cognizance  only  of  external  acts,  enforced  by  a  determinate  authority, 
which  authority  is  human,  and,  among  human  authorities,  is  that  which 
is  paramount  in  a  political  society. 

More  briefly,  a  general  rule  of  external  human  action  enforced  by  a 
sovereign  political  authority. 

All  other  rules  for  the  guidance  of  human  action  are  called  laws  merely 
by  analogy ;  and  any  propositions  which  are  not  rules  for  human  action 
are  called  laws  by  metaphor  only. 

138.  Definition  of  law.    Markby  defines  law  as  follows  : 

We  thus  arrive  at  a  conception  of  the  term  law  which  may  be  summed 
up  as  follows.  That  it  is  the  general  body  of  rules  which  are  addressed 
by  the  rulers  of  a  political  society  to  the  members  of  that  society  and 
which  are  generally  obeyed. 

II.  Sources  and  Development  of  Law 

139.  The  sources  of  law.  Holland,  in  his  chapter  on  "The 
Sources  of  Law,"  states  them  as  follows  : 

1.  Custom  or  usage.  4.  Scientific  discussion. 

2.  Religion.  5.  Equity. 

3.  Adjudication  or  judicial  decision.  6.  Legislation. 

140.  Present  sources  of  law.  The  relative  parts  played  by  the 
various  sources  of  law  are  stated  by  Willoughby  as  follows  :  ^ 

In  a  general  way,  the  sources  of  Law  have  now  been  indicated.  De- 
fining the  law  of  the  land,  as  we  have  thus  far  used  the  term,  as  that 
body  of  principles  applied  by  the  courts  in  the  exercise  of  their  jurisdic- 
tions, we  have  seen  its  sources  to  be  custom,  judicial  construction  and 
precedent,  scientific  commentary,  and  legislative  enactment.  As  we  have 
seen,  the  recent  tendency  has  been,  and  will  undoubtedly  continue  to  be, 
for  the  last  source  to  become  relatively  more  and  more  important.  At 
the  same  time,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  other  agencies  will  be 
ever  present.  Custom  with  its  slow  tread  will  render  obsolete  laws  that 
have  become  anachronistic,  and  will  create  new  principles  that  will  force 
their  recognition  upon  the  legislatures  and  courts.   Scientific  commentaries 

1  Copyright,  1S96,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


LAW 


179 


and  textbooks  will  continue  their  influence,  and  courts,  too,  of  necessity, 
will  never  be  freed  from  the  task  of  producing  judge-made  law.  All 
statutory  law,  from  its  formal  and  definite  statement,  is  rigid  in  character, 
and,  in  its  application  to  changing  conditions,  must  be  softened  by  the 
judge,  if  the  sense  of  justice  be  not  outraged. 

In  the  development  of  law,  custom  is  the  conservative  element,  legis- 
lative enactment  the  radical.  The  task  of  the  true  statesman  is  to  give 
to  both  of  these  elements  their  due  importance.  It  was  the  great  merit 
of  the  work  of  Savigny  that  he  showed  that  the  task  of  the  legislator 
should  be  largely  limited  to  the  statutory  confirmation  of  principles  that 
common  usage  has  already  established,  rather  than  the  invention  of  laws 
according  to  individual  caprice  (jr  judgment.  As  Count  Portalis  has  ex- 
pressed it,  "  the  legislature  should  not  invent  law,  but  only  write  it." 

At  the  same  time,  however,  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that  there  should 
be,  especially  in  these  modern  times,  a  more  active  principle  than  this 
in  legislation.  The  opportunities  enjoyed  by  legislatures  should  be  used 
for  the  creation  of  rules  that  custom  cannot  supply.  The  necessity  often 
arises,  also,  for  the  release  of  society  from  rules  which  custom  has  itself 
created,  but  which  no  longer  comport  with  the  best  interests  of  all.  .  .   . 

In  our  day,  however,  the  danger  seems  to  be  that  our  legislatures  will 
go  to  the  other  extreme,  and  give  expression  to  that  spirit  of  innovation 
which,  acting  without  reference  to  the  past,  or  sufficient  consideration  for 
the  future,  seems  to  characterize  popular  bodies.  The  dictates  of  pru- 
dence and  the  feelings  of  personal  responsibility  that  restrain  the  monarch 
from  too  hasty  action  are  both  wanting  in  a  large  representative  assembly. 
The  responsibility  in  case  of  ill  success,  when  distributed  among  a  large 
number,  is  reduced  to  a  minimum,  and,  at  the  same  time,  the  feeling  on 
the  part  of  such  a  body  that  it  represents  in  itself  the  entire  nation,  gives 
to  it  a  feeling  of  power  that  is  necessarily  intoxicating. 

141.  The  beginnings  of  law.  The  origin  of  those  customs  which 
serve  as  law  in  primitive  society  is  discussed  by  Jenks  as  follows  : 

So  far  back  as  records  go.  Law  has  always  been  the  expression  of 
social  force.  Whatever  views  men  may  have  held  as  to  the  origin  of 
those  rules  of  conduct  which  they  have  felt  themselves  bound  to  follow, 
the  force  which  has  compelled  their  obedience  has  been  the  approval 
or  disapproval  of  the  community  in  which  they  have  found  themselves. 
That  approval  or  disapproval  may  have  assumed  different  forms ;  that 
community  may  have  been  based  on  one  or  other  of  many  different  prin- 
ciples, it  may  have  been  organized  on  one  or  other  of  many  different 
plans.  But,  so  far  back  as  recorded  history  goes,  the  force  at  the  back 
of  law  has  always  been  a  social  force. 


l8o  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

There  is,  however,  not  a  little  in  the  early  history  of  legal  ideas  to 
raise  a  plausible  conjecture  that  Law,  at  least  in  its  rudimentary  state,  is 
older  than  society.  The  nongregarious  animals  are  governed  by  a  force 
to  which  we  apply  the  name  of  Instinct,  but  which,  in  its  results,  is 
hardly  to  be  distinguished  from  Law.  We  can  predict  with  almost  per- 
fect certainty  that  such  an  animal  will  do  certain  acts,  and  will  not  do 
certain  other  acts,  far  more  confidently  indeed  than  we  can  make  a  similar 
assertion  of  human  beings  in  the  best  ordered  society.  And  yet,  it  is 
certainly  not  a  social  force  of  any  kind  which  insures  this  regularity  of 
conduct.  It  is,  if  we  are  to  credit  those  who  are  best  entitled  to  be  heard 
on  such  a  subject,  the  force  of  inherited  experience.  .  .   . 

It  may  be  freely  admitted  that  we  have  no  direct  evidence  of  any  pre- 
social  condition  of  the  human  race,  of  any  period  in  which  isolated  in- 
dividuals, or  even  isolated  pairs,  represent  the  normal  condition  of 
mankind.  But  there  is  nothing  inherently  impossible  in  such  a  state  of 
things,  nothing  at  all  inconsistent  with  the  recorded  stages  of  human 
history.  Under  such  conditions  Man  may  very  well  have  acquired,  in 
precisely  the  same  way  as  the  bear  and  the  tiger,  instinctive  habits,  which 
afterwards  developed  into  deliberate  conduct.  .  .  . 

But,  whatever  may  have  been  the  cause,  it  is  quite  clear  that  the  effect 
of  the  association  of  men  in  groups  was,  ultimately,  to  transmute  the 
habits  of  individuals  into  the  customs  of  communities,  and  to  sanctify 
these  customs  by  a  force  wholly  unknown  to  isolated  individuals.  The 
weakness  of  the  individual  habit  is,  that  it  gives  way  before  caprice, 
before  temptation,  before  mere  curiosity.  No  one  can  really  be  a  law 
unto  himself ;  however  firmly  he  may  resolve  to  follow  a  certain  rule,  he 
will  break  it  if  he  thinks  fit.  But  if  he  is  a  member  of  a  community, 
whose  members  all  regard  the  rule  as  binding,  the  case  will  be  different. 
If  he  then  breaks  the  rule,  he  must  be  prepared  to  face  the  disapproval 
of  his  fellows.  There  may  be  no  regular  organization  for  expressing  this 
disapproval ;  the  form  which  it  will  take  may  be  uncertain.  But  we  have 
no  reason  to  suppose  that  it  will  be  ineffectual.  At  the  very  least,  the 
offender  will  be  "  taboo."  ...  A  well-arranged  "  taboo  "  would  probably 
mean  speedy  starvation  for  the  victim. 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  from  the  association  of  men  into  groups  we 
must  date  a  new  stage  in  the  evolution  of  Law.  As  Man's  logical  facul- 
ties begin  to  develop,  as  Reason  in  its  feebler  forms  takes  the  place  of 
Instinct,  we  observe  a  new  idea  which  is  to  give  tremendous  force  to  the 
influence  of  Law.  Arguing  from  the  seen  to  the  unseen,  unhappily 
familiar  with  disasters  arising  from  human  agency  —  with  murder,  theft, 
incendiarism  —  Man  believes  that  the  disasters  for  which  no  human 
agency  will  account  must  be  the  work  of  unseen  beings,  whose  anger 


LAW  l8i 

has,  by  some  means  or  another,  been  aroused.  It  may  be  only  that  they 
are  hungry ;  hunger  always  looms  largely  before  the  consciousness  of 
primitive  Man.  And  so,  propitiatory  sacrifices  are  offered,  that  the  wrath 
of  the  Unseen  Powers  may  be  appeased,  as  their  hunger  abates.  But  it 
is  equally  likely  to  be  that  some  breach  of  habit  or  custom  has  aroused 
their  indignation.  Man  is  aware  that  such  breaches  are  a  frequent  source 
of  calamities  arising  from  human  anger ;  he  draws  an  obvious  inference 
when  he  attributes  to  a  similar  cause  the  anger  of  the  Unseen  Powers. 
It  is  in  this  connection  that  social  force  begins  to  work  so  powerfully 
on  rudimentary  notions  of  Law,  that  from  henceforth  the  history  of  Law 
becomes  inseparable  from  the  history  of  Society.  Breach  of  habit  by  the 
member  of  a  social  group  is  believed  to  be  a  source  of  danger,  not  only 
to  the  individual  who  commits  it,  but  to  the  group  of  which  he  is  a  mem- 
ber ;  for  the  Unseen  Powers  cannot  be  expected  to  discriminate  very 
accurately.  The  group  which  harbors  an  accursed  man  is  itself  accursed. 
The  offender  must  be  got  rid  of.  He  will  be  lucky  if  he  is  not  sacrificed 
to  propitiate  the  angry  gods  ;  lucky  if  he  gets  off  with  "  taboo." 

142.  The  development  of  law  in  modern  Europe.  Markby  traces 
the  development  of  law  in  modern  luirope,  showinf^  the  difference 
between  the  Roman-law  origin  of  the  jurisprudence  of  the  conti- 
nent and  the  customar)^-la\v  origin  of  the  legal  system  of  England. 

None  of  the  great  nations  founded  on  the  continent  of  Western  Europe 
after  the  fall  of  the  Roman  Empire  have  constructed  an  independent  legal 
system  of  their  own.  France,  Italy,  Austria,  Germany,  Holland,  and 
Spain  have  eveiy  one  of  them  adopted  the  Roman  law  as  their  general 
or  common  law,  and  have  only  departed  from  it  so  far  as  jiarticular  occa- 
sions might  require.  Every  gap  not  filled  up  by  special  legislation,  or 
specially  recognized  custom,  has  been  supplied  from  the  Roman  law,  and 
even  their  modern  codes  to  a  very  large  extent  only  contain  the  ideas  of 
the  Corpus  Juris  in  a  nineteenth-century  dress. 

The  history  of  the  process  by  which  the  Roman  law  became  the  com- 
mon law  of  the  Western  portion  of  the  European  continent  can  only  be 
referred  to  here  with  extreme  brevity  and  in  its  broadest  features.  It 
commences,  of  course,  when  the  Goths,  the  Burgundians,  the  Franks, 
and  the  Lombards  began  to  found  new  kingdoms  upon  the  ruins  of  the 
Roman  Empire.  In  none  of  these  were  the  Roman  citizens  deprived  of 
the  enjoyment  of  their  own  laws.  The  conquering  invaders  and  the  con- 
quered inhabitants  lived  side  by  side  each  under  their  own  system,  just  as 
the  natives  of  India  and  Europeans  do  at  the  present  day ;  and  when  the 
German  races  began  to  concjucr  each  other,  especially  when  several  ot 


l82  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

them  were  united  by  Charlemagne  under  one  Empire,  the  same  forbear- 
ance was  exercised.  Each  person  retained  the  law  indicated  by  his  birth, 
so  that  you  could  find  side  by  side  not  only  two  systems,  a  Roman  and 
a  barbarian,  but  several  systems,  a  Roman,  a  Gothic,  a  Burgundian,  a 
Lombardic,  and  so  forth.  .  .  . 

At  this  period  law  was  personal ;  that  is,  a  man  took  the  law  of  his 
parents  simply  by  reason  of  his  descent,  and  not  because  he  or  they  were 
domiciled  on  any  particular  spot  or  owed  allegiance  to  any  particular 
ruler.  Subsequently  law  became  territorial ;  that  is  to  say,  a  given  body 
of  law  was  made  applicable  to  a  district  marked  out  by  geographical 
limits,  and  applicable  generally  within  those  limits,  because  of  their  in- 
habitancy and  their  consequent  allegiance  to  a  single  government.  The 
influence  under  which  a  territorial  law  and  territorial  sovereignty  were 
arrived  at  was,  I  conceive,  feudalism.  Wherever  feudalism  prevailed  the 
tenant  began  to  take  his  law  from  the  land  and  not  from  his  descent. 

But  we  have  still  to  see  how  the  several  barbarian  laws  became  welded 
together  with  the  Roman  law  and  with  that  which  we  call  the  feudal 
system  into  one  compact  body  of  law  for  each  country.  How  did  the 
descendant  of  the  Roman  citizen  and  the  descendant  of  his  barbarian  con- 
queror come  each  to  lose  his  distinctive  rights  ?  Of  this  we  know  but 
little.  But  the  amalgamation  probably  commenced  at  a  very  early  period 
after  the  barbarian  conquest :  and  this  amalgamation  would  be  greatly 
facilitated  by  the  circumstance  that  even  the  barbarian  laws  consisted  of 
something  more  than  the  rude  customs  which  these  tribes  had  brought 
with  them  from  their  native  forests.  The  leges  barbarorum  all  bear  ob- 
vious traces  of  having  been  themselves  influenced  by  the  Roman  law. 

Language,  literature,  education,  and  above  all,  commerce,  were  on 
the  side  of  the  Roman  lawyers.  Still  it  is  not  without  astonishment  that 
we  find  the  law  of  the  conquered  silently  displacing  the  law  of  the  con- 
querors, and  the  Roman  law  adopted  everywhere  as  the  law  of  the  land. 
This  adoption  of  the  Roman  law  took  place  rapidly  after  the  twelfth  cen- 
tury. A  flourishing  school  of  Roman  law  arose  at  Bologna,  and  another 
at  Paris  immediately  after;  and  the  Corpus  Juris  became  the  general 
source  of  law  throughout  the  continent  of  Western  Europe. 

In  England  alone  we  find  the  overwhelming  influence  of  the  Roman  law 
successfully  resisted.  True  it  is  that  not  a  few  maxims  of  the  Roman  law 
have  been  transferred  to  English  law  and,  avowedly  or  unavowedly  (for 
the  most  part  unavowedly),  the  doctrines  of  the  Roman  law  have  largely 
influenced  the  opinions  of  English  lawyers  ;  but  no  one  has  ever  been  able 
to  quote  a  text  of  the  Roman  law  as  authority  either  in  the  courts  of 
common  law  or  in  the  courts  of  chancery.  It  was  only  within  the  very 
narrow  jurisdiction  which  the  ecclesiastical  courts  managed  to  secure,  and 


LAW  183 

in  the  comparatively  insignificant  affairs  of  the  admiralty  courts  (which 
dealing  with  foreigners  felt  the  want  of  a  universal  law),  that  the  Roman 
law  was  accepted.  .  .  . 

The  resource  of  the  English  lawyers  when  called  on  to  fill  the  gap 
which  was  elsewhere  supplied  by  the  Roman  law  was  custom,  usually 
called  by  us  the  common  law.  Of  this  custom  the  judges  were  them- 
selves, in  the  last  resort,  the  repository.  .  .  . 

It  is,  however,  always  as  indicating  the  custom  of  England,  and  not  as 
authority,  that  the  decisions  of  earlier  judges  were  cited  during  all  this 
period  and  even  afterwards.  .  .  .  'I'hese  decisions  were  at  first  evidence 
only  of  what  the  practice  had  been,  guiding,  but  not  compelling,  those 
who  consulted  them  to  a  conclusion.  But  when  Blackstone  wrote,  each 
single  decision  standing  by  itself  had  already  become  an  authority  which 
no  succeeding  judge  was  at  liberty  to  disregard.  This  important  change 
was  very  gradual,  and  the  practice  was  very  likely  not  altogether  uniform. 
As  the  judges  became  conscious  of  it  they  became  much  more  careful  of 
their  expression,  and  gave  much  more  elaborate  explanations  of  their  rea- 
sone.  They  also  betrayed  greater  diffidence  in  dealing  with  new  cases  to 
which  no  rule  was  applicable,  cases  of  first  impression  as  they  were  called  ; 
and  they  introduced  the  curious  practice  of  occasionally  appending  to  a 
decision  an  expression  of  desire  that  it  was  not  to  be  drawn  into  a  precedent. 

Thus  it  comes  to  pass  that  English  case  law  does  for  us  what  the 
Roman  law  does  for  the  rest  of  Western  Europe.  And  this  difference  be- 
tween our  common  law  and  the  common  law  of  continental  P.urope  has 
produced  a  marked  difference  between  our  own  and  foreign  legal  systems. 
Where  the  principles  of  the  Roman  law  are  adopted  the  advance  must 
always  be  made  on  certain  lines.  An  English  or  American  judge  can  go 
wherever  his  good  sense  leads  him.  The  result  has  been,  that  whilst  the 
law  of  continental  Europe  is  formally  correct  it  is  not  always  easily  adapted 
to  the  changing  wants  of  those  amongst  whom  it  is  administered.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  English  law,  whilst  it  is  cumbrous,  ill-arranged,  and  barren 
of  principles,  whilst  it  is  obscure  and  not  unfrequently  in  conflict  with  it- 
self, is  yet  a  system  under  which  justice  can  be  done. 

143.  The  spread  of  Roman  and  English  law.  l^ryce  traces  the 
remarkable  extension  of  Roman  and  linglish  jDrinciples  into  all 
parts  of  the  world,  and  considers  them  of  comparatively  equal 
strength  and  importance. 

European  law  means,  as  we  have  seen,  either  Roman  law  or  English 
law,  so  the  last  question  is :  Will  either,  and  if  so  which,  of  these  great 
rival  systems  prevail  over  the  other  ? 


1 84  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

They  are  not  unequally  matched.  The  Roman  jurists,  if  we  include 
Russian  as  a  sort  of  modified  Roman  law,  influence  at  present  a  larger 
part  of  the  world's  population,  but  Bracton  and  Coke  and  Mansfield  might 
rejoice  to  perceive  that  the  doctrines  which  they  expounded  are  being  dif- 
fused even  more  swiftly,  with  the  swift  diffusion  of  the  English  tongue, 
over  the  globe.  It  is  an  interesting  question,  this  competitive  advance  of 
legal  systems,  and  one  which  would  have  engaged  the  attention  of  histo- 
rians and  geographers,  were  not  law  a  subject  which  lies  so  much  outside 
the  thoughts  of  the  lay  world  that  few  care  to  study  its  historical  bear- 
ings. It  furnishes  a  remarkable  instance  of  the  tendency  of  strong  types 
to  supplant  and  extinguish  weak  ones  in  the  domain  of  social  develop- 
ment. The  world  is,  or  will  shortly  be,  practically  divided  between  two 
sets  of  legal  conception  of  rules,  and  two  only.  The  elder  had  its  birth 
in  a  small  Italian  city,  and  though  it  has  undergone  endless  changes  and 
now  appears  in  a  variety  of  forms,  it  retains  its  distinctive  character,  and 
all  these  forms  still  show  an  underlying  unity.  The  younger  has  sprung 
from  the  union  of  the  rude  customs  of  a  group  of  Low  German  tribes 
with  rules  worked  out  by  the  subtle,  acute,  and  eminently  disputatious 
intellect  of  the  Gallicized  Norsemen  who  came  to  England  in  the  eleventh 
century.  It  has  been  much  affected  by  the  elder  system,  yet  it  has  re- 
tained its  distinctive  features  and  spirit,  a  spirit  specially  contrasted 
with  that  of  the  imperial  law  in  everything  that  pertains  to  the  rights  of 
the  individual  and  the  means  of  asserting  them.  And  it  has  communi- 
cated something  of  this  spirit  to  the  more  advanced  forms  of  the  Roman 
law  in  constitutional  countries. 

At  this  moment  the  law  whose  foundations  were  laid  in  the  Roman 
Forum  commands  a  wider  area  of  the  earth's  surface,  and  determines  the 
relations  of  a  larger  mass  of  mankind.  But  that  which  looks  back  to 
Westminster  Hall  sees  its  subjects  increase  more  rapidly,  through  the 
growth  of  the  United  States  and  the  British  Colonies,  and  has  a  prospect 
of  ultimately  overspreading  India  also.  Neither  is  likely  to  overpower  or 
absorb  the  other.  But  it  is  possible  that  they  may  draw  nearer,  and  that 
out  of  them  there  may  be  developed,  in  the  course  of  ages,  a  system  of 
rules  of  private  law  which  shall  be  practically  identical  as  regards  con- 
tracts and  property  and  civil  wrongs,  possibly  as  regards  offenses  also. 
Already  the  commercial  law  of  all  civilized  countries  is  in  substance  the 
same  everywhere,  that  is  to  say,  it  guarantees  rights  and  provides  reme- 
dies which  afford  equivalent  securities  to  men  in  their  dealings  with  one 
another  and  bring  them  to  the  same  goal  by  slightly  different  paths. 

The  more  any  department  of  law  lies  within  the  domain  of  economic 
interest,  the  more  do  the  rules  that  belong  to  it  tend  to  become  the  same 
in  all  countries,  for  in  the  domain  of  economic  interest  Reason  and  Science 


LAW  185 

have  full  play.  But  the  more  the  element  of  human  emotion  enters  any 
department  of  law,  as  for  instance  that  which  deals  with  the  relations  of 
husband  and  wife,  or  of  parent  and  child,  or  that  which  defines  the  free- 
dom of  the  individual  as  against  the  State,  the  greater  becomes  the  prob- 
ability that  existing  divergences  between  the  laws  of  different  countries 
may  in  that  department  continue,  or  even  that  new  divergences  may 
appear. 

Still,  on  the  whole,  the  progress  of  the  world  is  towards  uniformity  in 
law,  and  towards  a  more  evident  uniformity  than  is  discoverable  either  in 
the  sphere  of  religious  beliefs  or  in  that  of  political  institutions. 

144.  The  diffusion  of  law.  The  leading  infiuenccs  that  cause 
the  spread  of  legal  principles  may  be  summarized  as  follows  :  ^ 

It  is  the  duty  of  Historical  Jurisprudence  not  merely  to  point  out 
the  contribution  which  each  nation  and  race  has  made  to  the  common 
product,  but  also  to  show  how  and  why  the  law  of  one  nation  has  been 
adopted  by  another.  Again  and  again  the  laws  of  the  conquered  nation 
are  seen  to  prevail  over  the  conquerors,  because  the  law  of  the  conquered 
alone  rendered  possible  the  life  and  activity  which  made  the  conquest 
valuable,  and  appreciation  and  enjoyment  of  the  conquest  was  possible 
only  through  maintenance  of  the  laws.  On  the  other  hand,  the  laws  of 
the  conquerors  are  seen  to  be  imposed  upon  the  conquered,  and  adopted 
because  the  new  life  brought  about  by  the  conquest  was  in  this  way  best 
stimulated  to  spring  up  and  flourish  wherever  favorable  conditions  were 
present. 

Yet  more  important  than  conquest  for  the  diffusion  of  law  was  com- 
merce, the  peaceful  intercourse  of  one  nation  with  others.  It  was  this 
that  transformed  the  law  of  Rome  from  the  law  of  a  small  Italian  city  to 
the  law  suited  to  the  whole  world  —  a  law  which  has  actually  passed  into 
the  jurisprudence  of  every  modern  civilized  state.  With  the  decline  of 
commerce,  and  the  increasing  crudeness  and  retrogression  of  life,  law  is 
seen  to  decline  and  the  transactions  of  men  to  become  limited  to  a  few 
simple  forms  which  could  suggest  but  few  legal  principles. 

145.  Universality  of  legal  conception.  Wilson  points  out  the 
fact  that  certain  legal  ideas  are  uni\'ersal. 

The  correspondence  of  law  with  national  character,  its  basis  in  national 
habit,  does  not  deprive  it  of  all  universal  characteristics.  Many  common 
features  it  does  wear  among  all  civilized  peoples.  As  the  Romans  found 
it  possible  to  put  together,  from  the  diversified  systems  of  law  existing 

^  Copyright,  1900,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


1 86  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

among  the  subject  peoples  of  the  Mediterranean  basin,  a  certain  number 
of  general  maxims  of  justice  out  of  which  to  construct  the  foundations 
of  their  jus  gent  mm,  so  may  jurists  to-day  discover  in  all  systems  of 
law  alike  certain  common  moral  judgments,  a  certain  evidence  of  unity 
of  thought  regarding  the  greater  principles  of  equity.  There  is  a  com- 
mon legal  conscience  in  mankind. 

Thus,  for  example,  the  sacredness  of  human  life ;  among  all  Aryan 
nations  at  least,  the  sanctity  of  the  nearer  family  relationships ;  in  all 
systerns  at  all  developed,  the  plainer  principles  of  "  mine  "  and  "  thine  "  ; 
the  obligation  of  promises ;  many  obvious  duties  of  man  to  man  sug- 
gested by  the  universal  moral  consciousness  of  the  race,  receive  recog- 
nition under  all  systems  alike.  Sometimes  resemblances  between  systems 
the  most  widely  separated  in  time  and  space  run  even  into  ceremonial 
details,  such  as  the  emblematic  transfer  of  property,  and  into  many 
items  of  personal  right  and  obligation. 

146.  Scientific  legislation.  Dealey  notes  the  growing  tendency 
to  legislate  on  a  rational  basis,  and  indicates  certain  lines  for  future 
improvement  as  follows  : 

These  several  tendencies  in  legislation  point  to  a  time  when  legis- 
lation will  be  far  more  scientific  than  it  is  at  present.  American  law- 
making bodies  formulate  entirely  too  many  rules  for  petty  and  routine 
matters,  which  might  more  wisely  be  left  to  administrative  bodies. 
Much  hasty  legislation  could  be  vastly  improved  if  legislators  were  more 
familiar  with  the  experiments  and  experiences  of  other  lawmaking 
bodies.  Bureaus  for  the  study  of  comparative  legislation,  like  that  of 
New  York,  the  legislative  reference  bureau  developed  by  Wisconsin, 
and  commissions  appointed  for  the  special  study  of  important  topics 
are  steps  in  this  direction. 

But  really  scientific  legislation  is  as  yet  an  ideal  to  be  attained.  The 
fault  found  with  legislatures  is  chiefly  due  to  their  failure  to  satisfy  the 
ideals  aroused  by  the  optimistic  democracy  of  the  eighteenth  century. 
We  all  have  to  admit  the  truth  of  Spencer's  denunciation  of  the  "  Sins 
of  Legislators"  and  of  the  perennial  criticisms  of  American  legislation. 
There  is  a  vigorous  demand  that  legislation  be  wiser,  and  that  it 
emphasize  permanent  general  interests  through  a  knowledge  of  the  laws 
of  human  nature  and  social  development.  Jeremy  Bentham  ( 1 7  48- 1832) 
voiced  this  demand  for  the  nineteenth  century  in  his  "Theory  of 
Legislation."  Sociological  studies  will  make  possible  for  the  twentieth 
century  a  still  wiser  theory.^ 

1  See  Ward's  Applied  Sociology,  pp.  337-339- 


LAW  1S7 


Legislation  is  too  largely  prohibitive  in  kind,  aiming  to  suppress  by 
threats  certain  supposed  evil  tendencies  in  human  nature.  The  doctrine 
of  human  depravity  is  not  so  popular  as  formerly,  and  the  question 
arises  whether  threats  of  punishment  are  really  eflficacious  in  preventing 
crime.  Men  are  more  easily  influenced  to  do  right  than  intimidated 
from  wrong.  The  principles  used  in  horticulture  and  stirpiculture 
indicate  the  method  to  be  followed  in  scientific  legislation ;  we  should 
assume  that  there  is  much  potential  perfectibility  in  human  nature. 
Social  conditions  should  be  so  adjusted  as  to  assist  in  the  development 
of  this ;  evil  tendencies  will  thereby  atrophy  from  disuse.  Preventive, 
probative,  and  reformative  methods  are  cheaper  and  wiser  in  the  long 
run  than  punitive.  The  principle  of  self-interest  can  be  appealed  to  in 
such  a  way  as  to  foster  respect  for  law,  not  disregard  of  it.  The  begin- 
nings of  such  legislation  may  already  be  seen  in  laws  already  formulated, 
and  illustrations  are  not  hard  to  find.  The  necessity  of  raising  taxes 
without  too  much  friction  has  sharpened  legislative  ingenuity  so  that 
there  are  many  scientific  elaborations  of  laws  in  regard  to  taxation.  The 
taxation  of  luxuries  as  against  necessities,  for  example,  or  a  slight  dis- 
count for  prompt  payment  illustrate  this.  The  probation  system  for 
petty  offenses  and  the  reduction  of  terms  of  imprisonment  for  good 
behavior  prove  efficacious  in  reducing  crime.  If  illegitimacy  is  common 
through  the  heavy  expense  of  a  formal  religious  marriage,  the  legal- 
ization of  a  civil  marriage  at  nominal  cost  largely  reduces  the  per  cent.^ 
A  wise  divorce  law  proves  a  great  aid  to  social  morality,  and  the 
Gothenburg  license  system,  through  the  elimination  of  private  profits, 
considerably  reduces  intemperance.  The  American  device  of  reducing 
the  cost  and  difficulty  of  securing  a  patent  powerfully  stimulates  inven- 
tion. The  reduction  of  the  cost  of  postage  is  a  well-known  instance  of 
an  aid  to  commercial  and  industrial  expansion.  Many  governments 
stimulate  local  administrative  efficiency  by  offering  to  pay  part  of  the 
expense  if  a  set  standard  is  maintained.  Other  illustrations  will  readily 
suggest  themselves. 

The  success  already  achieved  along  such  lines  gives  hope  that  legis- 
latures may  in  time  become  intelligent  enough  to  formulate  such 
legislation  regularly.  Plato  said  that  perfect  government  would  come 
when  wise  men  legislate  or  legislators  become  wise.  An  unintelligent 
democracy  is  like  a  rudderless  ship,  for  scientific  government  above  all 
things  requires  an  intelligent  public  opinion ;  but  this  condition  depends 
on  the  growth  of  general  scientific  knowledge,  political  intelligence,  and 
civic  patriotism. 

1  This  finds  many  illustrations  in  the  experience  of  Latin-American  gov- 
ernments. 


1 88  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

III.  Divisions  of  Law 

147.  Classification  of  law.  On  the  basis  of  their  manner  of 
statement,  laws  may  be  classified  as  follows  :^ 

First  of  all,  there  are  those  principles  which  are  to  be  found  embodied 
in  the  formal  legislative  acts  of  the  State,  and  termed  Statutes.  Secondly, 
there  is  that  large  body  of  legal  principles  that  are  enforced  by  the 
judicial  tribunals  of  a  country,  but  whose  origin  it  is  impossible  to  dis- 
cover in  any  formal  declarations  of  the  will  of  the  State,  and  whose 
validity  is  commonly  considered  to  rest  upon  custom.  Thirdly,  there  is 
in  every  State  that  body  of  fundamental  principles,  written  or  unwritten, 
that  controls  the  organization  of  the  State  itself  and  the  scope  and 
manner  of  exercise  of  its  governmental  powers.  These  principles  are 
termed  constitutional  laws,  and  though  not,  as  a  rule,  when  written, 
enunciated  through  the  ordinary  legislative  mouthpiece  of  the  State,  are 
considered  as  expressing  the  highest  will  of  the  State.  They  differ  from 
statutory  and  customary  law,  not  only  as  to  their  formal  source,  but  also 
as  to  their  prevailing  power  when  in  apparent  contradiction  to  them. 
Fourthly,  and  finally,  there  is  that  aggregate  of  rules  that  control  the 
relations  of  a  State  to  other  States,  commonly  known  as  International 
Law.  These  last  differ  from  the  three  preceding  classes  of  principles 
not  only  as  to  their  source,  but  as  to  their  manner  of  •enforcement.  It 
will  be  necessary,  indeed,  to  consider  whether  they  may  be  properly 
termed  laws  at  all. 

148.  Divisions  of  law.  On  the  basis  of  the  nature  of  the  per- 
sons concerned,  Holland  classifies  law  as  follows  : 

A  very  radical  division  of  Rights  is  based  upon  a  broad  distinction 
between  the  public  or  private  character  of  the  persons  with  whom  the 
Right  is  connected.  By  a  "  Public  person  "  we  mean  either  the  State, 
or  the  sovereign  part  of  it,  or  a  body  or  individual  holding  delegated 
authority  under  it. 

By  a  "  Private  person  "  we  mean  an  individual,  or  collection  of  in- 
dividuals however  large,  who,  or  each  one  of  whom,  is  of  course  a  unit 
of  the  State,  but  in  no  sense  represents  it,  even  for  a  special  purpose. 

When  both  of  the  persons  with  whom  a  right  is  connected  are  private 
persons,  the  right  also  is  private.  When  one  of  the  persons  is  the  State, 
while  the  other  is  a  private  person,  the  right  is  public. 

From  this  division  of  rights  there  results  a  division  of  Law,  as  the 
definer  and  protector  of  Rights,  which,  when  they  subsist  — 

1  Copyright,  1896,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


LAW 


1 89 


(i)  Between  subject  and  subject,  are  regulated  by  I'rivate  law. 

(2)  When  between  State  and  subject,  by  Public  law.   .   .   . 

Private  law,  as  thus  treated,  is  either  "  substantive  "  or  "  adjective," 
that  is  to  say,  it  either  defines  the  rights  of  individuals,  or  indicates  the 
procedure  by  which  they  are  to  be  enforced. 

The  rights  dealt  with  by  substantive  law  may  be  either  "  normal  "  or 
"  abnormal,"  as  the  persons  with  whom  they  are  connected  are  of  the 
ordinary  type,  or  deviate  from  it. 

Both  classes  of  rights  are  cither  "  antecedent "  or  "  remedial."  A 
right  of  the  former  kind,  it  will  be  remembered,  is  one  which  exists 
irrespectively  of  any  wrong  having  been  committed.  ...  A  right  of  the 
latter  kind  is  one  which  is  given  by  way  of  compensation  when  an 
"  antecedent "  right  has  been  violated.  Antecedent  rights  are  either 
"  in  rem  "  or  "  in  personam  "  ;  that  is  to  say,  they  are  available  either 
against  the  whole  world  or  only  against  a  definite  individual.  Thus  the 
proprietary  right  of  the  owner  of  a  house  is  good  against  all  the  world, 
while  the  right  of  a  landlord  to  his  rent  is  good  only  against  his  tenant.  .  .  . 

The  correlation  of  the  parts  of  public  law  one  to  another  is  indeed  far 
from  being  settled.  It  never  attracted  the  attention  of  the  Roman  law- 
yers, and  has  been  very  variously,  and  somewhat  loosely,  treated  by  the 
jurists  of  modern  Europe.  The  subject  is,  indeed,  one  which  lends  itself 
but  reluctantly  to  systematic  exposition,  and  it  is  with  some  hesitation 
that  we  propose  to  consider  it  under  the  heads  of  —  I.  Constitutional 
law;  II.  Administrative  law;  III.  Criminal  law;  IV.  Criminal  pro- 
cedure ;  V.  the  law  of  the  State  considered  in  its  quasi-private  person- 
ality ;  VI.  the  procedure  relating  to  the  State  as  so  considered. 

The  first  four  of  these  heads  contain  the  topics  which  are  most 
properly  comprised  in  Public  law.  It  would  be  possible,  though  not 
convenient,  to  arrange  these  topics  in  accordance  with  the  classification 
adopted  in  Private  law.  If  the  attempt  were  made,  antecedent  rights 
would  have  to  be  sought  for  in  Constitutional,  in  Administrative  and 
also  in  Criminal  law ;  remedial  rights  in  Criminal  and  also  in  Adminis- 
trative law ;  adjective  law  mainly  in  Criminal  procedure ;  and  abnormal 
law  mainly  in  Constitutional  and  Criminal  law. 

149,  Nature  of  administrative  law.  The  nature  of  administra- 
tive law  and  the  distinctions  between  it  and  the  other  forms  of  law 
are  given  by  Goodnow  as  follows  : 

Adopting  the  system  of  legal  classification  now  generally  admitted  to 
be  the  most  desirable,  viz.,  according  to  relations  governed,  we  find  that 
administrative  law  is  that  part  of  the  law  which  governs  the  relations  of 


I90  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

the  executive  and  administrative  authorities  of  the  government.  It  is 
therefore  a  part  of  the  public  law,  but  it  is  only  a  part.  All  such  rules 
of  law  as  concern  the  function  of  administration,  and  only  such  rules  of 
law,  belong  to  administrative  law.  Further,  since  the  function  of  admin- 
istration depends  for  its  discharge  upon  the  existence  of  administrative 
authorities,  whose  totality  is  called  the  administration,  administrative  law 
is  concerned  not  alone  with  the  relations  of  the  administrative  author- 
ities but  also  with  their  organization.  Administrative  law  at  the  same 
time  fixes  the  offices  which  shall  form  part  of  the  administration  and 
determines  the  relations  into  which  the  holders  of  these  offices  shall 
enter. 

In  so  far  as  it  fixes  the  organization  of  the  administrative  authorities, 
administrative  law  is  the  necessary  supplement  to  constitutional  law. 
While  constitutional  law  gives  the  general  plan  of  governmental  organ- 
ization, administrative  law  carries  out  this  plan  in  its  minutest  details. 
But  administrative  law  not  only  supplements  constitutional  law,  in  so  far 
as  it  regulates  the  administrative  organization  of  the  government ;  it  also 
complements  constitutional  law,  in  so  far  as  it  determines  the  rules  of 
law  relative  to  the  activity  of  the  administrative  authorities.  For  while 
constitutional  law  treats  the  relations  of  the  government  with  the  indi- 
vidual from  the  standpoint  of  the  rights  of  the  individual,  administrative 
law  treats  them  from  the  standpoint  of  the  powers  of  the  government. 
Constitutional  law,  it  has  been  said,  lays  stress  upon  rights ;  adminis- 
trative law  emphasizes  duties.  But  while  administrative  law  emphasizes 
the  powers  of  the  government  and  the  duties  of  the  citizen,  it  is  never- 
theless to  the  administrative  law  that  the  individual  must  have  recourse 
when  his  rights  are  violated.  For  just  so  far  as  administrative  law 
delimits  the  sphere  of  action  of  the  administration,  it  indicates  what  are 
the  rights  of  the  individual  which  the  administration  must  respect ;  and,  in 
order  to  prevent  the  administration  from  violating  them,  offers  to  the 
individual  remedies  for  the  violation  of  these  rights. 

Administrative  law  is  therefore  that  part  of  the  public  law  which  fixes 
the  Organization  and  determines  the  competence  of  the  administrative 
authorities,  and  indicates  to  the  individual  remedies  for  the  violation  of 
his  rights.   .  .   . 

While  administrative  law  has  a  sufficiently  distinctive  character  to  jus- 
tify its  assignment  to  a  separate  position  in  a  scheme  of  legal  classifi- 
cation, there  are  many  cases  in  which  it  is  extremely  difficult  to  distinguish 
it  from  other  branches  of  the  law,  many  cases  also  where  practical  con- 
siderations have  such  weight  as  to  overbalance  any  desire  for  logical 
exactness.  This  is  especially  true  of  some  of  the  points  where  the  domain 
of  administrative  law  seems  to  touch  upon  that  of  private  law. 


LAW 


191 


We  find  many  rules  of  law  which,  if  we  abide  by  the  definition  that 
has  been  given  of  administrative  law,  viz.,  as  that  portion  of  the  law  which 
governs  the  relations  of  the  administration,  must  be  regarded  as  falling 
within  its  borders,  but  which  at  the  same  time  have  been  enacted  mainly 
with  the  idea  of  founding  or  strengthening  purely  private  rights.  .  .  . 
On  account  of  their  character  the  usual  practice  is,  notwithstanding  the 
fact  that  they  at  the  same  time  govern  the  relations  of  the  administration, 
to  regard  them  as  a  part  of  the  private  law.  That  is,  all  rules  of  law 
whose  immediate  purpose  is  the  promotion  of  the  rights  of  individuals 
are  parts  of  the  private  law  whether  they  govern  at  the  same  time  the 
relations  of  the  administration  or  not.  ,  .  . 

The  endeavor  must  also  be  made  to  distinguish  administrative  law  from 
the  other  branches  of  public  law.  The  distinction  between  administra- 
tive and  constitutional  law  has  already  been  indicated.  While  constitutional 
law  defines  the  general  plan  of  state  organization  and  action,  administra- 
tive law  carries  out  this  plan  in  its  minutest  details,  supplements,  and 
complements  it.  .  .  .  The  distinction  between  the  two  is  thus  one  more 
of  degree  than  of  kind.  .  .  .  The  distinction  between  administrative  and 
international  law  also  is  quite  clear.  While  administrative  law  lays  down 
the  rules  which  shall  guide  the  officers  of  the  administration  in  their  action 
as  agents  of  the  government,  international  law  consists  of  that  body  of 
usage  which  it  is  supposed  that  a  state  will  follow  in  its  relations  with 
other  states.  .  .  . 

The  usual  method  of  legal  classification  assigns  to  the  criminal  law  a 
place  in  the  public  law.  If  this  method  is  correct  it  becomes  necessary 
to  distinguish  the  administrative  law  from  the  criminal  law.  Any  attempt 
to  make  such  a  distinction,  as  indeed  to  distinguish  the  criminal  law  from 
any  of  the  clearly  defined  branches  of  the  law,  will  be  found,  however, 
to  present  almost  insurmountable  difficulties.  The  conclusion  is  irresist- 
ible that  from  the  scientific  point  of  view  the  criminal  law  does  not  oc- 
cupy any  well-defined  position  in  the  legal  system  separated  in  kind  from 
the  distinct  branches  of  the  law.  It  consists  really  of  a  body  of  penal 
sanctions  which  are  applied  to  all  the  branches  of  the  law. 

150.  The  application  of  law.  Several  important  questions  arise 
concerning  the  application  of  law  to  specific  facts. 

So  long  as  law  is  regarded  as  a  body  of  abstract  principles,  its  interest 
is  merely  speculative.  Its  practical  importance  begins  when  these  prin- 
ciples are  brought  to  bear  upon  actual  combinations  of  circumstances. 

Many  questions  may  be  raised  as  to  the  extent  and  mode  in  which  this 
takes  place,  and,  for  their  solution,  rules  have  been  laid  down  which,  like 


192  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

other  legal  rules,  are  susceptible  of  analysis  and  classification.  They  make 
up  that  department  of  Jurisprudence  which  we  propose  to  call  "  the 
Application  of  law."  When  a  set  of  facts  has  to  be  regulated  in  accord- 
ance with  law,  two  questions  of  capital  importance  present  themselves. 
First,  what  State  has  jurisdiction  to  apply  the  law  to  the  facts?  And  sec- 
ondly, what  law  will  it  apply  ?  The  former  of  these  questions  is  said  to 
relate  to  the  appropriate  "  Forum,"  the  latter  to  the  appropriate  "Lex." 
A  third  question,  which,  for  the  purpose  of  our  present  inquiry,  is  of 
less  importance  than  these  two,  and  may  be  dismissed  in  a  few  words, 
relates  to  "  Interpretation." 

IV.  Law  and  Ethics 

151.  Distinctions  between  law  and  morality.  Wilson  points  out 
the  line  of  demarcation  between  the  spheres  of  law  and  ethics  as 
follows : 

Ethics  concerns  the  whole  walk  and  conversation  of  the  individual ;  it 
touches  the  rectitude  of  each  man's  life,  the  truth  of  his  dealings  with  his 
own  conscience,  the  whole  substance  of  character  and  conduct,  righteous- 
ness both  of  act  and  of  mental  habit.  Law,  on  the  other  hand,  concerns 
only  man's  life  in  society.  It  not  only  confines  itself  to  controlling  the 
outward  acts  of  men ;  it  limits  itself  to  those  particular  acts  of  man  to 
man  which  can  be  regulated  by  the  public  authority,  which  it  has  proved 
practicable  to  regulate  in  accordance  with  uniform  rules  applicable  to  all 
alike  and  in  an  equal  degree.  ...  It  does  not  assume  to  be  the  guard- 
ian of  men's  characters,  it  only  stands  with  a  whip  for  those  who  give 
overt  proof  of  bad  character  in  their  dealings  with  their  fellow  men.  Its 
limitations  are  thus  limitations  both  of  kind  and  of  degree.  It  addresses 
itself  to  the  regulation  of  outward  conduct  only:  that  is  its  limitation  of 
kind ;  and  it  regulates  outward  conduct  only  so  far  as  workable  and  uni- 
form rules  can  be  found  for  its  regulation  :  that  is  its  limitation  of  degree. 

Law  thus  plays  the  role  neither  of  conscience  nor  of  Providence.  More 
than  this,  it  follows  standards  of  policy  only,  not  absolute  standards  of 
right  and  wrong.  Many  things  that  are  wrong,  even  within  the  sphere  of 
social  conduct,  it  does  not  prohibit ;  many  things  not  wrong  in  themselves 
it  does  prohibit.  It  thus  creates,  as  it  were,  a  new  class  of  wrongs,  relative 
to  itself  alone  :  77iala  prohibita,  things  wrong  because  forbidden.  In  keep- 
ing the  commands  of  the  state  regarding  things  fairly  to  be  called  morally 
indifferent  in  themselves  men  are  guided  by  their  legal  conscience.  Society 
rests  upon  obedience  to  the  laws :  laws  determine  the  rules  of  social  con- 
venience as  well  as  of  social  right  and  wrong ;  and  it  is  as  necessary  for 


LAW  193 

the  perfecting  of  social  relationships  that  the  rules  of  convenience  be 
obeyed  as  it  is  that  obedience  be  rendered  to  those  which  touch  more  vital 
matters  of  conduct.  .   .  . 

In  all  civilized  states  law  has  long  since  abandoned  attempts  to  regulate 
conscience  or  opinion ;  it  would  find  it,  too,  both  fruitless  and  unwise  to 
essay  any  regulation  of  conduct,  however  reprehensible  in  itself,  which 
did  not  issue  in  definite  and  tangible  acts  of  injury  to  others.  But  it  does 
seek  to  command  the  outward  conduct  of  men  in  their  palpable  dealings 
with  each  other  in  society.  Law  is  the  mirror  of  active,  organic  political 
life.  It  may  be  and  is  instructed  by  the  ethical  judgments  of  the  com- 
munity, but  its  own  province  is  not  distinctively  ethical ;  it  may  regard 
religious  principle,  but  it  is  not  a  code  of  religion.  Ethics  has  been  called 
the  science  of  the  well-being  of  man,  law  the  science  of  his  right  civil 
conduct.  Ethics  concerns  the  development  of  character;  religion,  the 
development  of  man's  relation  with  (}od  ;  law,  the  development  of  men's 
relations  to  each  other  in  society.  Ethics,  says  Mr.  Sidgwick,  "  is  con- 
nected with  politics  so  far  as  the  well-being  of  any  individual  man  is  bound 
up  with  the  well-being  of  his  society." 

152,  Moral  and  legal  norms.  W'undt  shows  the  close  connection 
between  law  and  morality,^ 

In  all  these  respects  the  case  of  law  is  similar  to  that  of  morality  itself; 
the  two  are  here,  as  elsewhere,  directly  connected.  The  only  universal 
moral  norms  that  ethics  can  reach  are  such  as  indicate,  from  the  point 
of  view  of  existing  moral  conceptions,  the  road  towards  the  realization  of 
those  ends  which  lie  in  the  direction  of  the  moral  ideal,  itself  never  to  be 
attained.  And  so  no  legal  principles  can  do  more  than  furnish,  whether 
directly  or  by  implication,  a  broad  outline  of  those  more  external  ends 
which  are  necessary  for  the  protection  of  society,  and  which  express  the 
conception  of  morality.  .   .   . 

From  this  intimate  connection  of  law  with  ethics,  which,  though  some- 
times frankly  explicit,  is  often  unconscious,  we  may  infer  that  theories 
about  the  significance  and  basis  of  law  are  usually  direct  reflections  of  the 
corresponding  ethical  theories.  The  older  conception  of  law,  which  still 
numbers  many  adherents  among  juristic  savants,  by  reason  of  the  con- 
servative character  which  legal  science  owes  to  certain  well-known  histor- 
ical conditions,  was  thoroughly  individualistic  in  its  point  of  view.  In  this 
respect  it  is  a  faithful  mirror  of  the  individualistic  ethics.  .  .  . 

The  broader  conception  of  social  life  and  historical  relations  that  began 
to  be  current  in  later  times  necessarily  influenced  the  conception  of  law 

1  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


194  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

as  well.  .  .  .  But  as  this  department  of  law,  with  its  positive  social  prob- 
lems, has  come  into  prominence  through  the  increasing  activity  of  public 
life  in  modern  times  and  the  increasing  claims  of  the  State  on  individual 
functions,  a  twofold  need  has  arisen.  On  the  one  hand,  the  concept  of 
law  must  be  made  broad  enough  to  include  all  these  forms ;  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  must  be  defined  with  sufficient  precision  and  assigned  its 
proper  place  in  the  general  sphere  of  social  and  ethical  concepts.   .  .  . 

Bearing  in  mind  the  ultimate  moral  purpose  of  all  law,  we  may  de- 
scribe objective  right,  or  law,  as  the  sum  total  of  all  those  various  sub- 
jective rights  and  duties  which  the  moral  will  of  society,  the  creator  of 
law,  insures  as  rights  to  itself  and  its  subordinate  individual  wills,  in  order 
to  the  fulfillment  of  certain  purposes ;  and  imposes  as  duties,  in  order  to 
the  protection  of  the  rights  in  question. 

This  formula  does  not  restrict  the  nature  of  law  to  the  protection  of 
certain  goods,  or,  what  amounts  to  the  same  thing,  the  maintenance  of 
the  conditions  necessary  to  the  life  of  society.  Besides  protective  rights 
and  duties,  the  system  of  law  embraces  many  institutions  which  may  be 
teiTned  promotive  rights  and  duties.  The  superintendence  of  instruction, 
together  with  certain  positive  regulations  for  the  advancement  of  material 
welfare  and  of  the  most  important  interests  of  culture,  are  duties  of  equal 
weight  with  the  protection  of  persons  and  property,  insured  by  political 
legislation ;  and  they  are  directed  only  in  part  towards  the  protection  of 
the  existing  conditions  of  life.  Their  aim  is  in  equal  measure  the  improve- 
ment of  those  conditions.  For  social  life,  like  all  life,  is  change  and 
development.  Law  would  be  neglecting  one  of  its  most  important  func- 
tions if  it  refused  to  meet  the  demands  of  this  ceaseless  evolution.  Hence 
constitutional  law  makes  comprehensive  provisions  for  the  alteration  of 
existing  law  to  suit  new  needs.  But  in  addition  to  these  arrangements 
for  the  origin  and  abolition  of  laws,  the  progressive  factor  can  never  be 
wholly  absent  from  law  as  it  actually  exists.  Only  it  will  assume  various 
forms  according  to  the  current  way  of  regarding  the  function  of  the  legal 
order.  In  an  age  that  ascribes  the  prime  importance  to  individual  rights, 
the  chief  task  of  the  system  of  law  will  be  to  remove  the  hindrances  that 
obstruct  the  free  development  of  personal  activities.  On  the  other  hand, 
when  the  social  functions  of  the  State  are  given  a  higher  rank,  the  system 
of  public  law  will  contain  a  number  of  positive  and  promotive  regulations. 


CHAPTER  XI 

RELATION  OF  STATE  TO  STATE 

I.    International  Relations 

153.  The  world  powers.  A  summary  of  the  development  of 
great  powers  and  of  their  influence  in  foreign  affairs  follows  : ' 

Twenty  years  ago  the  expression  "  world  power  "  was  unknown  in 
most  languages ;  to-day  it  is  a  political  commonplace,  bandied  about  in 
wide  discussion.  .  .  .  The  idea  that  one  people  should  control  the  known 
world  is  ancient  enough,  its  most  salient  expression  being  found  in  im- 
perial Rome  and  equally  imperial  China ;  and  it  is  not  extinct  even 
now,  ...  As  there  have  been  in  the  past,  so  there  will  always  be,  cer- 
tain leading  states  which,  when  they  are  agreed,  will  find  some  way  of 
imposing  their  decisions  upon  the  rest,  and  by  their  mutual  jealousies 
will  tend  to  establish  a  balance  of  power  among  themselves. 

Without  stopping  to  trace  the  working  of  these  principles  in  earlier 
days,  we  note  that,  by  the  close  of  the  fifteenth  century,  certain  states 
had  assumed  a  position  which  entitles  them  to  the  modern  designation 
of  "  great  European  powers."  The  Holy  Roman  Empire,  still  first  in 
dignity ;  France,  after  she  had  recovered  from  the  Hundred  Years'  War 
and  had  broken  the  might  of  l^r  great  feudal  nobles ;  England,  in  the 
firm  hand  of  Henry  VII ;  the  newly  formed  kingdom  of  Spain,  which 
had  finally  ended  Moorish  rule  in  the  peninsula,  —  all  these  held  a  posi- 
tion unlike  that  of  their  neighbors.  The  difference  between  them  and 
such  powers  as  Denmark,  the  Swiss  Confederation,  and  Venice  was  one 
of  rank  as  well  as  of  strength.  Politically  they  were  on  another  plane : 
they  were  not  merely  the  leaders,  they  were  the  spokesmen,  the  directors, 
of  the  whole  community. 

As  time  went  on,  changes  took  place  in  their  membership.  In  the 
course  of  the  sbcteenth  century,  when  the  Empire  became  so  dislocated 
that  it  was  hardly  a  power  at  all,  its  place  was  taken  by  Austria,  a 
strangely  conglomerate  formation,  which  protected  the  eastern  frontier 
of  Christendom  against  the  Turks.  Spain  was  for  a  while  a  real  world 
1  Copyright,  190S,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 
195 


196  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

power,  overshadowing  all  the  others,  dominant  in  Europe,  supreme  in 
America,  and  dreaded  even  in  remote  Japan.  The  seventeenth  century 
witnessed  the  decline  of  Spain,  the  primacy  of  France,  and  the  temporary 
rise  of  Sweden  and  the  Netherlands;  but  the  greatness  of  these  last 
rested  on  too  small  a  material  foundation  to  support  it  after  the  coun- 
tries themselves  had  outlived  their  heroic  period.  The  eighteenth  century 
saw  them  subside  into  relative  insignificance,  and  in  their  stead  two  new- 
comers step  to  the  forefront  of  European  affairs.  The  huge  semi-Asiatic 
empire  of  Russia  was  now,  by  the  genius  of  Peter  the  Great,  transformed 
into  the  outward  semblance  of  a  European  state ;  and  the  little  military 
kingdom  of  Prussia,  the  representative  of  northern  Germany,  won  for 
itself  a  position  which  its  resources  hardly  warranted,  but  which,  thanks 
to  the  extraordinary  ability  of  its  rulers  and  the  sense  of  discipline  of  its 
people,  it  succeeded  in  maintaining.  - 

After  the  violent  episode  of  the  French  Revolution  and  the  Napoleonic 
wars,  the  European  continent  settled  down  to  what  seemed  to  be  a  stable 
organization  with  five  great  powers,  — Russia,  England,  Austria,  Prussia, 
and  France,  for  the  skill  of  Talleyrand  at  Vienna  prevented  France  from 
being  even  temporarily  excluded  after  her  disasters.  The  Ottoman  Em- 
pire was  still,  in  spite  of  Metternich,  held  to  be  not  quite  European ;  and 
the  weaker  countries  were  consulted  but  little  on  general  questions.  It 
was  not  the  formal  meetings  of  all  the  representatives  of  the  nations 
assembled  that  decided  the  affairs  of  Europe  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna 
in  1814;  it  was  a  small  committee  of  the  leading  states.  -What  they, 
after  much  wrangling,  agreed  upon  among  themselves,  the  others  had 
to  accept. 

This  arrangement  lasted  for  two  generations,  although  the  relative 
positions  of  the  several  states  changed  not  a  little.  In  the  seventies, 
the  German  Empire,  with  a  mighty  development,  inherited  the  interna- 
tional place  formerly  held  by  the  Prussian  kingdom,  and  a  new  member 
was  added  to  the  oligarchy  by  the  formation  of  United  Italy.  Since  then 
there  have  been  six  great  European  powers  instead  of  five.  This  does 
not  mean  that  they  are  equal  in  size  and  strength :  there  is,  for  instance, 
less  difference  between  Italy,  which  is  recognized  as  a  great  power,  and 
Spain  or  the  Ottoman  Empire,  which  technically  is  not,  than  between 
Italy  and  Germany  or  Russia ;  but  the  line,  however  artificial,  has  been 
clearly  drawn  by  political  usage. 

In  the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century  a  new  situation,  with  a 
far  wider  horizon,  gradually  attracted  the  attention  of  writers  and  states- 
men. Great  Britain,  France,  Spain,  Portugal,  and  Holland  had  long 
owned  extensive  territories  in  many  climes ;  but  the  last  three  countries 
had  ceased  to  be  of  the  first  rank.  .   .  . 


RELATION  OF  STATE  TO  STATE 


197 


Suddenly,  almost  without  warning,  the  nations  entered  upon  a  wild 
scramble  for  land  wherever  it  was  not  strongly  held  or  protected  by 
competing  interests.  .  .  .  The  circumstances,  the  pretexts,  the  excuses, 
have  differed  in  the  case  of  each  state  which  has  taken  part  in  the 
movement  of  expansion ;  but  the  fundamental  reasons  have  been 
the  same.   .  .  . 

It  was  in  course  of  the  discussions  provoked  by  this  succession  of 
startling  events  that  political  writers,  in  formulating  the  principles  of  the 
new  state  of  affairs,  began  to  employ  an  expression  which  has  now 
passed  into  common  use,  — "  world  powers  " ;  that  is  to  say,  powers 
which  are  directly  interested  in  all  parts  of  the  world  and  whose  voices 
must  be  listened  to  everywhere. 

154.  Advantages  of  international  relations.  The  desirability 
of  international  rivalries,  even  at  the  expense  of  occasional  dis- 
putes, in  contrast  to  the  stagnation  of  world  unity  is  urged  in  the 
following :  ^ 

It  is,  however,  very  doubtful  whether  political  world  unity  is  in  any 
case  desirable.  Our  imagination  instinctively  shrinks  from  the  thought 
of  a  re'gime  of  dead  uniformity  throughout  all  the  countries  of  the  globe  : 
whether  it  be  imposed  by  the  harsh  will  of  a  despotic,  conquering  race, 
or  reached  by  the  gradual  assimilation  of  all  nationalities,  such  a  pros- 
pect is  equally  uninviting.  We  should  ponder  this  well  before  we  express 
a  wish  even  for  the  gradually  increased  paramountcy  of  our  own  civiliza- 
tion ;  for  even  that  would  mean  in  the  end  a  deadening  uniformity. 

Far  preferable  is  the  present  state  of  international  equilibrium,  with 
the  intense  rivalry  among  peoples  that  brings  out  their  strongest  char- 
acteristics. Even  with  its  occasional  discords,  the  present  general  har- 
mony of  the  concert  of  nations  is  to  be  preferred  to  the  dead  monotone 
of  a  world  state.  Each  nationality  is  in  this  competition  given  an  oppor- 
tunity to  develop  its  characteristics  freely,  and  to  enrich  the  general  life 
of  the  civilized  world  with  its  distinctive  literature,  art,  music,  and  moral 
ideals.  The  rapid  social  progress  since  the  Renaissance  is  certainly  due 
in  great  measure  to  this  rivalry  of  independent  nations,  constantly  invited 
to  self-criticism  by  the  successes  and  failures  of  their  neighbors.  At  pres- 
ent, civilization  has  the  benefit  of  the  constant  mutual  criticisms  among  na- 
tions, by  which  an  intelligent  and  real  public  opinion  of  the  world  is  created  ; 
in  this  manner  the  individual  bent  of  a  particular  nation  is  restrained  from 
becoming  exaggerated  into  a  vice  or  engendering  a  danger  to  the  general 
welfare. 

1  Copyright,  1900.  by  The  Macmillan  Comixmy. 


198  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

The  rivalry  among  nations  is  sharp,  and  calls  for  the  constant  exercise 
of  all  their  intellectual,  moral,  and  physical  powers,  in  order  to  avoid  the 
decadence  that  would  lose  them  their  position  in  the  family  of  nations. 
So  fierce  does  this  struggle  at  times  become  that  to  men  of  pessimistic 
mood  a  great  world  warfare  seems  inevitable  within  the  near  future. 
We  should,  however,  avoid  the  temper  of  mind  that  constantly  engenders 
suspicions  and  exaggerated  fears.  Thus  far,  happily,  no  nation  has 
acquired  enough  preponderance  to  threaten  really  and  effectively  the 
political  existence  of  its  neighbors.  Most  of  the  mutual  fear  and  mistrust 
that  mar  the  harmony  of  nations  is  founded  on  misunderstanding.  There 
is,  it  is  true,  a  gi'eat  danger  to  civilization  in  this  constant  misinterpreta- 
tion of  motives ;  and  it  were  well  if  people  would  set  about  it  to  study 
seriously  the  political  ideals,  motives,  and  aims  of  other  nations,  rather 
than  seize  upon  every  pretext  to  scent  a  trace  of  bitter  enmity.  .  .  . 
It  is  in  the  interest  of  civilization  that  nations  should  watch  each  other 
carefully,  and  that  they  should  not  permit  any  one  power  to  obtain  undue 
advantages  over  others ;  it  is  equally  important  that  this  be  done  in  a 
spirit  of  mutual  understanding  and  amity,  without  sowing  the  seed  of 
hatred  and  unending  dissensions. 

155.  Scope  of  international  interests.  The  effect  of  colonial 
expansion  and  world-wide  commerce  in  revising  former  ideas  of 
international  relations  is  well  stated  by  Coolidge  as  follows  -A 

One  effect  of  the  present  international  evolution  has  been  to  modify 
certain  long-accepted  formulas.  Among  these  is  the  idea  of  a  continent 
as  a  group  of  states,  each  of  which  has,  besides  historical  traditions  of 
its  own,  particular  ties  and  interests  common  to  them  all,  but  not  shared 
by  the  rest  of  mankind.  This  has  in  the  past  been  more  or  less  true  of 
Europe,  and  as  a  sentimental  bond  it  deserves  respect.  In  actual  politics, 
however,  it  is  becoming  a  mere  figure  of  speech.  Are  we  to  regard 
Imperial  Britain  as  a  European  power,  when  the  greater  part  of  her 
external  interests  and  difficulties  are  connected  with  her  situation  on 
other  continents  ?  Are  not  the  vast  majority  of  Englishmen  more  in 
touch  in  every  way  with  Australians,  Canadians,  Americans,  than  they 
are  with  Portuguese,  Italians,  or  Austrians  of  one  sort  or  another  }  What 
strictly  European  interests  does  England  represent,  she  who  is  now 
joined  in  close  alliance  with  the  Asiatic  empire  of  Japan  ?  Or  is  Russia 
European  ?  Although  the  majority  of  her  inhabitants  live  on  the  west- 
ern side  of  the  open  range  of  hills  we  call  the  Urals,  much  the  larger 
portion  of  her  territory  is  on  the  other,  and  in  Europe  itself  she  has 

1  Copyright,  1908,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


RELATION  OF  STATE  TO  STATE 


199 


many  Asiatic  elements.  In  character  and  population,  there  is  indeed 
hardly  more  real  separation  between  European  Russia  and  Siberia  than 
there  is  between  the  eastern  and  western  parts  of  the  United  States.  Of 
late  Russia's  foreign  policy  has  been  chiefly  concerned  with  Asiatic 
questions,  and  it  is  likely  so  to  continue.  As  for  France,  although  her 
national  life  is,  and  will  remain,  centered  in  the  European  continent,  her 
many  colonies  are  scattered  over  the  globe.  Already  some  of  them  are 
represented  in  her  chambers,  and  as  time  goes  on  they  will  become, 
more  and  more,  parts  of  one  organic  dominion.  A  Frenchman  born  in 
Algeria  regards  himself  as  a  European,  and  with  good  right ;  but  he  is 
no  more  so  than  is  the  white  Australian  or  the  Canadian,  or,  except  in 
the  matter  of  allegiance,  than  the  American.  Under  these  circumstances, 
when  people  abroad  talk  about  a  union  of  the  European  powers  against 
"the  Asiatic  peril"  or  "the  American  commercial  invasion,"  they  are 
appealing  to  a  community  of  interests  which  does  not  exist. 

156.  Scope  of   international   law.    The  general  field  of  inter- 
national law  may  be  outlined  as  follows  : 
International  law  is  usually  divided  into : 

(a)  Public  international  law,  which  treats  of  the  rules  and  principles 
which  are  generally  observed  in  interstate  action,  and 

(b)  Private  international  law,  which  treats  of  the  rules  and  principles . 
which  are  observed  in  cases  of  conflict  of  jurisdiction  in  regard  to  private 
rights.  These  cases  are  not  properly  international,  and  a  better  term  for 
this  branch  of  knowledge  is  that  given  by  Judge  Story,  "  The  Conflict  of 
Laws."   International  law,  in  the  true  sense,  deals  only  with  state  affairs. 

International  law  is  generally  observed  by  civilized  states;  some 
states,  even  before  they  were  fully  opened  to  western  civilization,  pro- 
fessed to  observe  its  rules.  The  expansion  of  commerce  and  trade,  the 
introduction  of  new  and  rapid  means  of  communication,  the  diffusion  of 
knowledge  through  books  and  travel,  the  establishment  of  permanent  em- 
bassies, the  making  of  many  treaties  containing  the  same  general  provi- 
sions, and  the  whole  movement  of  modern  civilization  toward  unifying  the 
interests  of  states,  has  rapidly  enlarged  the  range  of  international  action 
and  the  scope  of  international  law.  Civilized  states,  so  far  as  possible, 
observe  the  rules  of  international  law  in  their  dealings  with  uncivilized 
communities  which  have  not  yet  attained  to  statehood.  International  law- 
covers  all  the  relations  into  which  civilized  states  may  come,  both  peace- 
ful and  hostile.  In  general,  its  scope  should  not  be  extended  so  as  to 
interfere  with  domestic  affairs  or  to  limit  domestic  jurisdiction,  though  it 
does  often  limit  the  economic  and  commercial  action  of  a  given  state,  and 
determine  to  some  extent  its  policy. 


200  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

II.  History  of  International  Law 

157,  Development  of  the  theory  of  international  law.  Woolsey 
traces  the  main  phases  through  which  the  theories  of  international 
law  have  developed. 

In  tracing  the  progress  of  international  law,  that  is  of  views  or  theories 
concerning  it,  we  may  notice  several  stages,  more  or  less  clearly  defined, 
through  which  it  has  passed,  i.  Among  the  ancients  we  have  a  recog- 
nidon  of  right  and  wrong  in  the  intercourse  of  states  together  with  some 
rules  regulating  intercourse  and  some  rules  of  humanity  in  war,  —  placed 
chiefly  under  the  sanction  of  religion,  —  but  no  separation  of  this  branch 
of  law  from  the  rest,  as  a  distinct  department.  This  period  continued 
until  after  the  revival  of  learning.  In  the  Middle  Ages  the  science  was 
still  undeveloped,  but  religious  institutions  and  antipathies  modified  the 
practice  of  Christian  states.  During  the  revival  of  learning,  a  spirit  arose 
in  Italy,  which  made  light  of  all  obligations  between  states,  and  almost 
deified  successful  wickedness.  Soon  after  this,  we  perceive  that  the  fore- 
runners of  Grotius,  as  Suarez,  Ayala,  and  above  all,  Albericus  Gentilis, 
are  aware  that  a  system  of  international  law  ought  to  be  evolved,  and 
are  working  out  particular  titles  of  it. 

2.  With  Grotius  a  new  era  begins.  His  great  aim  was  practical,  not 
scientific,  —  it  was  to  bring  the  practice  of  nations,  especially  in  war,  into 
conformity  with  justice.  He  held  firmly  to  a  system  of  natural  justice 
between  states,  without,  however,  very  accurately  defining  it.  To  posi- 
tive law,  also,  originated  by  states,  he  conceded  an  obligatory  force,  unless 
it  contravened  this  justice  of  nature.  In  setting  forth  his  views,  he  adduces 
in  rich  abundance  the  opinions  of  the  ancients,  and  illustrations  from 
Greek  and  Roman  history.  The  nobleness  of  his  aim,  and  his  claim  to 
respect  as  the  father  of  the  science,  have  given  to  the  treatise  "  De  Jure 
Belli  et  Pacis  "  an  enduring  influence. 

3.  After  Grotius  there  appear  two  tendencies.  One  is  to  disregard 
all  that  is  positive  and  actual  in  the  arrangements  between  nations,  and 
to  construct  a  system  on  the  principles  of  natural  law ;  in  which  way  a 
law  for  states,  differing  from  ethics  and  natural  justice,  is  in  fact  denied. 
This  tendency  is  represented  by  Puffendorf.  The  other  tendency  was  a 
reaction  against  this  writer,  and  satisfied  itself  with  representing  the  actual 
state  of  international  law,  as  it  exists  by  usage  and  treaty,  without  setting 
up  or  recognizing  a  standard  of  natural  justice  by  its  side.  Bynkershoek 
and  Moser,  with  Martens  and  others  in  more  recent  times,  are  examples 
here.  Many  writers,  however,  treading  in  the  steps  of  Grotius,  regard 
natural  justice  as  a  source  of  right,  with  which  the  practice  of  states  must 


RELATION  OF  STATE  TO  STATE        20 1 

be  compared  and  brought  into  conformity,  and  which  may  not  be  neglected 
in  a  scientific  system. 

There  has  been  a  general  progress  in  the  views  of  text  writers  since 
the  age  of  Grotius,  and  a  substantial  agreement  between  those  of  all 
nationalities  at  the  same  era.  And  yet  minor  differences  are  very  observ- 
able. Some  of  the  most  striking  of  these  are  the  differences  between  the 
English  and  the  Continental  doctrine,  arising  from  the  insular  position  of 
Great  Britain,  frt)m  her  commercial  interests,  and  her  power  on  the  sea. 
Thus  we  find  her  behind  the  Continent  in  respecting  the  sanctity  of  am- 
bassadors until  into  the  eighteenth  century.  Thus  also  while  her  practice 
in  land  wars  has  been  humane,  her  sea  rules  and  the  decisions  of  her 
courts  have  in  several  ways  borne  hardly  upon  neutrals.  It  is  worthy  of 
notice  that  our  [American]  courts  have  followed  English  precedents, 
while  our  Government,  as  that  of  a  nation  generally  neutral,  has  for  the 
most  part  leaned  in  its  doctrines  and  treaties  towards  Continental  views. 

158.  The  formation  of  international  law.  The  influences  wliich, 
during  the  ancient  and  medieval  periods,  paved  the  way  for  modern 
international  law,  may  be  summarized  as  follows  : 

The  history  of  the  development  of  those  rules  and  principles  now  con- 
sidered in  international  law  naturally  falls  into  three  periods,  earl}-,  middle 
and  modern. 

The  early  period  dates  from  the  development  of  early  European  civili- 
zation, and  extends  to  the  beginning  of  the  Christian  Era.  During  this 
period  the  germs  of  the  present  system  appear. 

(a)  The  dispersion  of  the  Greeks  in  many  colonies  which  became 
practically  independent  communities  gave  rise  to  systems  of  intercourse 
involving  the  recognition  of  general  obligations.  The  maritime  law  of 
Rhodes  is  an  instance  of  the  general  acceptance  of  common  principles.  .  .  . 
The  recognition  by  Greece  of  the  existence  of  other  independent  states, 
and  the  relations  into  which  the  states  entered,  developed  crude  forms 
of  international  comity,  as  in  the  sending  and  receiving  of  ambassadors 
and  the  formation  of  alliances. 

(b)  Rome  made  many  contributions  to  the  principles  of  international 
law  in  the  way  of  the  extension  of  her  own  laws  to  wider  spheres,  and 
in  the  attempt  to  adapt  Roman  laws  to  conditions  in  remote  territories.  .  .  . 
Wherever  Rome  extended  her  political  rule,  she  adapted  her  laws  to  the 
peoples  brought  under  her  sway.  .   .  . 

The  varied  struggles  of  the  middle  period  —  from  the  beginning  of 
the  Christian  Era  to  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  centur)-  —  had  a 
decided  influence  upon  the  body  and  form  of  international  law. 


202  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

(a)  The  growth  of  the  Roman  Empire,  as  the  single  world  power  and 
sole  source  of  political  authority,  left  small  need  of  international  stand- 
ards. The  appeal  in  case  of  disagreement  was  not  to  such  standards, 
but  to  Caesar.  The  idea  of  one  common  supremacy  was  deep-rooted. 
Political  assimilation  followed  the  expansion  of  political  privileges. 

(b)  A  similar  unifying  influence  was  found  in  the  growth  of  the  Chris- 
tian Church  which  knew  no  distinction  —  bond  or  free,  Jew  or  Gentile. 
Christianity,  called  to  be  the  state  religion  early  in  the  fourth  century, 
modeled  its  organization  on  that  of  the  Roman  Empire ;  and  from  the 
sixth  century,  with  the  decay  of  the  Empire,  the  Church  became  the 
great  power.  .  .  . 

(c)  By  the  eleventh  century  feudalism  had  enmeshed  both  the  temporal 
and  spiritual  authorities.  This  system,  closely  related  to  the  possession 
of  land  and  gradation  of  classes,  discouraged  the  development  of  the 
ideas  of  equality  of  state  powers  necessary  for  the  development  of  inter- 
national law,  though  it  did  emphasize  the  doctrine  of  sovereignty  as  based 
on  land  in  distinction  from  the  personal  sovereignty  of  earlier  days. 

(d)  The  Crusades,  uniting  Christendom  against  the  Saracen  for  foreign 
intervention,  awakening  Europe  to  a  new  civilization,  expanding  the  study 
and  practice  of  the  Roman  law  which  feudal  courts  had  checked,  weak- 
ening many  feudal  overlords,  enfranchising  towns,  freeing  the  third  estate, 
spreading  the  use  of  the  Latin  language,  enlarging  and  diversifying  com- 
merce, and  teaching  the  possible  unity  of  national  interests,  led  to  the 
apprehension  of  a  broader  basis  in  comity  which  hastened  the  growth  of 
interstate  relations. 

(e)  The  code  of  chivalry  and  the  respect  for  honor  which  it  enjoined 
introduced  a  basis  of  equitable  dealing  which  on  account  of  the  inter- 
national character  of  the  orders  of  chivalry  reacted  upon  state  practice 
throughout  Christian  Europe. 

(f)  The  expansion  of  commerce,  especially  maritime,  emphasized  the 
duties  and  rights  of  nations.  The  old  Rhodian  laws  of  commerce,  which 
had  in  part  been  incorporated  in  and  expanded  by  the  Roman  code  dur- 
ing the  days  before  the  overthrow  of  the  Empire,  formed  a  basis  for 
maritime  intercourse. 

(g)  Closely  connected  with  the  development  of  maritime  law  during 
the  latter  part  of  the  middle  period  was  the  establishment  of  the  ofhce  of 
consul.  The  consuls,  .  .  .  resident  in  foreign  countries,  assisted  by  advice 
and  information  the  merchants  of  their  own  countries,  and  endeavored 
to  secure  to  their  countrymen  such  rights  and  privileges  as  possible. 
Consuls  seem  to  have  been  sent  by  Pisa  early  in  the  eleventh  centur)', 
and  were  for  some  time  mainly  sent  by  the  Mediterranean  countries  to 
the  East. 


RELATION  OF  STATE  TO  STATE       20^ 

(h)  The  discovery  of  America  marked  a  new  epoch  in  territorial  and 
mercantile  expansion,  and  introduced  new  problems  among  those  handed 
down  from  an  age  of  political  chaos. 

(i)  The  middle  period,  with  all  its  inconsistencies  in  theor>'  and  prac- 
tice, had  nevertheless  taught  men  some  lessons.  'I'he  world  empire  of 
Rome  showed  a  common  political  sovereignty  by  which  the  acts  of 
remote  territories  might  be  regulated ;  the  world  religion  of  the  Church 
of  the  middle  period  added  the  idea  of  a  common  bond  of  humanity. 
Both  of  these  conceptions  imbued  men's  minds  with  the  possibility  of  a 
unity,  but  a  unity  in  which  all  other  powers  should  be  subordinate  to  a 
single  power,  and  not  a  unity  of  several  sovereign  powers  acting  on 
established  principles.  The  feudal  system  emphasized  the  territorial  basis 
of  sovereignty.  The  Crusades  gave  to  the  Christian  peoples  of  Europe  a 
knowledge  and  tolerance  of  one  another  which  the  honor  of  the  code  of 
chivalry  made  more  beneficent,  while  the  growth  of  the  free  cities  opposed 
the  dominance  of  classes,  feudal  or  religious.  The  fluctuations  and  un- 
certainties in  theory  and  practice  of  international  intercourse,  both  in 
peace  and  war,  made  men  ready  to  hear  the  voice  of  Grotius  (1583- 
1645),  whose  work  marks  the  beginning  of  the  modern  period. 

159.  Importance  of  the  conception  of  territorial  sovereignty. 
The  idea  of  territorial  sovereignty,  introduced  by  feudalism,  funda- 
mentally affected  the  conception  of  the  external  obligations  of  states. 

Foremost  among  the  secondary  influences  which  determined  the  ideas 
of  the  Middle  Ages  upon  international  relations  was  the  conception  of 
territorial  sovereignty  due  to  feudalism.  When  the  political  rights  and 
duties  of  individuals  within  the  state  came  to  be  associated  with  the  pos- 
session of  land,  it  was  an  easy  inference  that  the  sovereign  of  the  com- 
munity, whose  political  functions  were  far  larger  than  those  of  any  other 
member  of  it,  must  have  a  corresponding  extension  given  to  his  rights 
over  the  soil  on  which  his  people  were  settled.  Formerly,  if  he  could  not 
be  universal  ruler,  he  was  lord  of  his  people.  Now,  in  the  absence  of  the 
former  alternative,  he  claimed  to  be  lord  of  his  people's  lands.  Thus 
sovereignty  became  territorial,  a  character  it  still  retains. 

160.  Influence  of  Grotius  on  international  law.  The  conditions 
that  made  possible  the  enormous  influence  of  the  work  of  Grotius 
are  explained  in  the  following  :  ^ 

At  a  most  opportune  moment  in  the  history  of  the  science,  there  ap- 
peared the  first  authoritative  treatise  upon  the  law  of  nations,  as  that  temi  is 

1  Copyright,  1900  and  1908,  by  George  H.  Davis. 


204  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

now  understood.  It  was  prepared  by  Hugo  Grotius,  a  native  of  Delft,  in 
Holland.  He  was  a  man  of  great  learning,  of  considerable  experience 
in  public  affairs,  and  a  profound  student  of  the  Roman  law ;  and  his 
treatise,  which  was  published  early  in  the  seventeenth  century,  is,  in 
substance,  an  application  of  its  principles  to  the  external  relations  of 
states.  It  was  at  once  perceived  to  be  a  work  of  standard  and  perma- 
nent value,  of  the  first  authority  upon  the  subject  of  which  it  treats.  .  .  . 

Great  as  were  the  inherent  merits  of  Grotius's  work,  i^owcv^er,  it  could 
never  have  exercised  so  decisive  an  influence  upon  state  affairs  as  it  did, 
had  it  not  appeared  at  a  time  when  the  existing  political  conditions 
were  especially  favorable  for  its  reception.  The  Thirty  Years'  War,  then 
in  progress,  had  been  marked  during  its  course  by  a  refinement  of 
barbarous  cruelty,  and  by  acts  of  atrocity  perpetrated  upon  the  unarmed 
and  unoffending  inhabitants  of  the  valley  of  the  Rhine,  which  stand 
without  a  parallel  in  the  history  of  ancient  or  modern  war.  Many  of  the 
military  operations  had  been  undertaken  rather  with  a  view  to  the 
chance  of  pillage  than  from  a  desire  to  injure  or  defeat  the  enemy. 
Population  had  diminished,  great  tracts  of  territory  had  been  laid  waste, 
and  commerce  and  manufactures  had  well-nigh  disappeared.  With  an 
experience  of  the  horrors  of  war  so  bitter  and  long  continued  as  that 
which  Europe  was  then  undergoing,  it  is  not  remarkable  that  men 
should  have  been  willing  to  listen  to  any  scheme  which  promised  to 
mitigate  the  severity  of  war,  or  to  lighten  in  any  degree  its  terrible 
burdens. 

But,  great  as  the  losses  had  been  in  men  and  material  wealth,  it  may 
be  doubted  whether  a  desire  to  ameliorate  the  existing  usages  of  war 
would  have  been,  of  itself,  an  agency  sufficiently  potent  to  bring  about 
a  reform  of  international  law,  had  not  another  and  a  more  powerful 
factor  contributed  directly  to  the  same  end.  During  the  continuance  of 
the  Thirty  Years'  War,  the  purposes  for  which  the  war  was  carried  on 
had  undergone  a  complete  change.  The  contest  had  originated  in  an 
attempt  on  the  part  of  the  Protestant  princes  of  Germany  to  achieve 
their  political  and  religious  independence.  In  its  later  stages  it  had  been 
transformed  into  a  struggle  for  preponderance  between  France  and 
Austria,  and  it  had  terminated,  in  1648,  to  the  complete  advantage  of 
the  former  power.  In  the  course  of  the  war  the  old  idea  of  papal  and 
imperial  supremacy  had  finally  disappeared.  The  ancient  standard  of 
international  obligation  had  ceased  to  exist,  and  a  newer  and  more  en- 
during standard  had  to  be  erected  in  its  place.  As  the  idea  of  a  common 
earthly  superior  was  no  longer  recognized,  it  became  necessary  to  invent  a 
theory  which,  while  conforming  to  existing  political  conditions,  should  fur- 
nish a  safe  and  practicable  rule  for  the  conduct  of  interstate  relations. 


RELATION  OF  STATE  TO  STATE        205 

Such  a  scheme  was  that  proposed  by  Grotius.  The  materials  for  his 
work  were  drawn  from  two  principal  sources,  the  law  of  nature  —  the 
jus  gentium  of  the  Romans  —  and  the  tacit  or  express  consent  of 
nations.  The  last  of  these  sources  of  authority  was  believed  by  him  to 
be  nearly  supplemental  to  the  first,  and  could  ordain  nothing  contrary 
to  it.  States,  like  men,  were,  from  his  point  of  view,  controlled  in  their 
actions  and  relations  by  the  operation  of  a  law  of  nature  as  ancient  as 
the  universe  itself.  This  law  could  be  added  to,  but  not  modified.  He 
believed  it  to  constitute  a  standard  by  which  the  conduct  of  states  and 
the  actions  of  individuals  could  be  finally  judged ;  and  he  imagined  that 
the  Roman  Empire  afforded  an  historical  example  of  its  successful 
application  in  international  affairs. 

We  now  know  that  Grotius's  theory  of  international  obligation  was  in 
the  main  correct,  however  erroneous  may  have  been  his  conception  of 
its  origin  and  sanction ;  and  it  is  a  remarkable  tribute  to  the  intrinsic 
excellence  of  his  work  that  it  has  endured  so  successfully,  for  more  than 
two  centuries  and  a  half,  the  assaults  of  destructive  criticism  and  the 
crucial  test  of  practical  experience.  None  of  the  many  ingenious  theories 
which  have  been  advanced  in  opposition  to  his  have  received  even 
transient  recognition,  and  upon  the  foundations  so  deeply  and  solemnly 
laid  by  its  immortal  founder  the  fabric  of  the  science  securely  rests. 

161.  International  law  since  1648.  That  the  development  of 
international  law  since  the  time  of  Grotius  has  been  a  jjrocess 
of  expansion  rather  than  of  fundamental  change  is  stated  by 
Lawrence. 

Since  1648  modern  International  Law  has  had  no  rival  system  to 
contend  with.  It  has  been  enriched  by  many  new  rules,  and  some  of  its 
original  precepts  have  given  place  to  others  generalized  from  the 
changed  practice  of  modern  times.  But  the  continuity  of  its  life  has 
never  been  broken,  and  there  seems  no  prospect  of  any  revolutionary 
change  passing  over  it.  Perhaps  the  most  important  chapter  that  has 
been  added  to  it  is  one  which  deals  with  the  rights  and  duties  of 
neutrals.  Grotius  left  that  portion  of  his  subject  very  incompletely 
worked  out,  and  for  a  long  time  the  practice  of  nations  showed  con- 
clusively that  they  felt  themselves  bound  in  the  matter  by  no  clearly 
defined  rules.  Even  now,  though  the  rise  of  a  neutral  state  can  be  for- 
mulated with  tolerable  precision,  its  duties  are  very  difficult  to  define. 
.  .  .  The  great  fundamental  principles  of  national  independence  and 
state  sovereignty  still  meet  with  universal  acceptance  ;  and,  though  the 
theory  of  a  Law  of  Nature  has  been  discredited  owing  to  the  attacks  of 


2o6  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

historical  and  analytical  jurists,  the  system  of  Grotius  rests  secure  upon 
the  alternative  foundation  of  general  consent.  Slowly,  and  almost  im- 
perceptibly, additions  are  made  to  it,  as  the  public  opinion  of  the 
civilized  world  decides  new  cases,  or  grows  to  greater  heights  of  humanity 
and  justice. 

162.  Influence  of  the  United  States  on  the  development  of  inter- 
national law.  Some  of  the  contributions  of  the  United  States  to 
the  principles  of  international  law  are  as  follows  : 

The  United  States  of  America  for  many  years  after  1776  occupied  a 
position  to  a  considerable  extent  apart  from  European  influences.  It 
developed,  therefore,  ideas  in  regard  to  international  relations  which 
showed  the  influence  of  general  principles  rather  than  the  influence  of 
national  policy. 

(a)  The  regulations  in  regard  to  neutrality  issued  in  1793  set  forth 
the  principles  which  have  subsequently  become  generally  recognized.   .  .  . 

(b)  The  United  States  has  also  consistently  advocated  the  freedom 
of  commerce  and  navigation.  Many  claims  for  exclusive  rights  over 
rivers,  gulfs,  and  other  bodies  of  water  were  resisted  by  the  United 
States  from  the  time  of  the  acquisition  of  statehood.  .  .  . 

(c)  The  United  States  has  also  uniformly  striven  for  the  largest 
possible  freedom  of  trade  routes  as  in  the  maintenance  of  the  policy  of 
the  "  open  door  "  in  the  Far  East. 

(d)  It  has  protected  its  citizens  in  their  legitimate  rights  and  has 
opposed  oppression  and  arbitrary  measures.  .  .  . 

(e)  The  United  States  has  also  contributed  toward  the  establishing  of 
the  laws  of  war  both  upon  the  land  and  upon  the  sea.  The  Instructions 
for  the  Government  of  Armies  of  the  United  States  in  the  Field,  pre- 
pared by  Dr.  Lieber  in  1863,  have  served  as  the  basis  for  the  modern 
rules  for  warfare  on  land.  The  United  States  has  advocated  some  of 
the  most  advanced  positions  upon  the  customs  of  war  upon  the  sea.  At 
the  Hague  Convention  of  1907  an  earnest  attempt  was  made  to 
secure  the  exemption  from  capture  of  private  property  at  sea,  in  accord 
with  the  traditional  attitude  of  the  United  States.  .  .  . 

(f)  In  the  United  States  there  have  always  been  many  advocates 
of  the  peaceful  methods  of  settlement  of  international  disputes.  Such 
method  was  provided  for  the  settlement  of  differences  among  the  states 
of  the  United  States  by  the  Articles  of  Confederation  in  1778.  Com- 
missions were  frequently  appointed  by  the  United  States  for  settlement 
of  difficulties  with  foreign  states.  ...  At  the  various  strictly  Ameri- 
can conferences,  and  at  The  Hague  in  1899  and  in  1907,  the  United 


RELATION  OF  STATE  TO   STATE  207 

States  representatives  gave  cordial  support  to  the  extension  of  arbitra- 
tion to  the  fullest  practicable  extent. 

(g)  The  isolation  of  the  United  States  during  the  early  period  of  its 
existence  made  it  possible  to  pay  more  regard  to  principle  because  less 
influenced  by  policy.  These  principles  showed  the  general  attitude  of 
the  United  States  and  have  had  increasing  weight  in  the  councils  of  the 
nations  as  the  United  States  has  gained  in  power.  I'he  advocacy  of 
the  principle  of  freedom  of  navigation  and  commerce,  the  observance  of 
neutrality,  the  establishment  of  just  rules  for  war,  and  the  support 
of  arbitration  as  a  means  of  settling  international  differences  show  the 
direction  in  which  the  United  States  has  influenced  the  development  of 
international  law  in  the  remarkable  progress  of  recent  years. 

163.  Present  tendencies  in  international  relations.  Willoughby 
traces  some  of  the  leading  influences  affecting  present  international 
relations.^ 

Beginning  first  with  the  relation  of  States  to  each  other,  the  most 
obvious  fact  is  the  increasing  internationality  of  interests  that  attends 
advancing  civilization.  Improved  means  of  transportation  and  com- 
munication hasten  this  movement  upon  the  economic  side ;  higher  ideals 
of  humanity  promote  it  upon  the  ethical  and  intellectual  side.  Already 
these  interstate  relations  have  become  both  numerous  and  definite.  The 
principles  of  international  conduct  that  are  generally  accepted  by  all 
civilized  peoples  already  constitute  a  very  considerable  body  of  pro- 
cedure. In  numberless  ways  States  are  united  by  treaties,  not  only  for 
purposes  of  mutual  military  offense  and  defense,  but  for  the  regulation 
of  common  political  and  economic  interests.  In  many  cases  common 
administrative  organs  have  been  established,  as,  for  example,  for  the 
regulation  of  navigation  of  rivers,  for  postal,  telegraph,  and  railway 
services,  etc.  The  State  protects  its  citizens  beyond  its  own  limits,  and 
with  the  acquiescence  and  assistance  of  friendly  powers  apprehends  and 
brings  back  from  foreign  lands  the  fleeing  criminal,  and  through  its 
consular  and  diplomatic  agents  exercises,  especially  among  the  less 
advanced  peoples,  many  judicial  and  administrative  functions.  ...  In 
the  field  of  international  politics  proper,  the  present  century  has  seen  the 
peaceful  settlement  by  arbitration  of  many  international  difficulties  that 
in  former  times  would  have  been  submitted  to  the  arbitrament  of  the 
sword.  And  there  is  evident  an  increasing  disposition  on  the  part  of 
civilized  States  to  resort  to  this  peaceful  means  of  settlement.  .   .   . 

But  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  there  exist,  in  Europe  at  least,  factors 

^  Copyright,  1896,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


2o8  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

that  operate  in  the  other  direction.  The  chief  of  these  are  the  two 
principles  of  "  balance  of  power  "  and  "  rights  of  nationality  "  ;  the  one 
giving  rise  to  the  maintenance  of  enormous  standing  armies,  .  .  .  and 
the  other  to  the  demand  for  autonomy  of  nations  now  joined  by  political 
ties  to  alien  races.  .  .  . 

What  will  be  the  outcome  of  these  conflicting  conditions,  it  would  be 
a  rash  prophet  who  would  predict.  Whether  as  the  result  of  some  great 
war  a  condition  will  be  reached  in  which  disarmament  will  be  practically 
possible  ;  whether  ...  the  present  demand  for  a  coincidence  of  nation- 
ality and  political  individuality  will  be  a  passing  phase  rather  than  a 
permanent  product  of  civilization,  we  cannot  foresee.  .  .  . 

As  time  goes  on  the  association  of  States  will  undoubtedly  grow 
closer,  and  the  rules  of  international  morality  will  increase  both  in  force 
and  number,  but  that  a  genuine  World  State,  or  a  State  embracing  the 
civilized  nations  of  the  world,  will  ever  be  established,  does  not  seem 
possible. 

III.  Sources  of  International  Law 

164.  Meaningof  the  phrase,  "sources  of  international  law."  The 

sources  of  international  law  refer  to  the  origin  of  its  rules,  regard- 
less of  the  reasons  for  their  adoption  or  of  the  nature  of  the  sanc- 
tion that  supports  them. 

By  the  sources  of  International  Law  we  mean  the  places  where  its 
rules  are  first  found.  An  inquiry  into  them  is  therefore  historical  in  its 
nature.  It  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  reason  why  the  rules  were  origi- 
nally invented  or  accepted.  Whether  those  who  first  set  them  forth  or 
obeyed  them  did  so  because  of  their  conformity  with  a  supposed  Law 
of  Nature  or  because  of  their  obvious  utility,  whether  they  were  actuated 
by  motives  of  benevolence  or  by  motives  of  self-interest,  are  questions 
foreign  to  the  present  inquiry.  Doubtless  considerations  of  very  various 
degrees  of  respectability  have  presided  over  the  making  of  the  complex 
mass  of  rules  we  call  International  Law.  But  our  object  here  is  to  trace 
the  process  of  formation,  not  to  enter  into  the  mental  and  moral  predi- 
lections of  those  who  took  part  in  it.  We  must  also  remember  that  no 
rule  can  have  authority  as  law  unless  it  has  been  generally  accepted  by 
civilized  states.  Its  source  does  not  give  its  validity.  Custom  is,  as  it 
were,  the  filter  bed  through  which  all  that  comes  from  the  fountains 
must  pass  before  it  reaches  the  main  stream.  We  have  to  take  the 
rules  we  find  in  operation  to-day  and  trace  them  back  to  the  places 
where  they  have  their  origin. 


RELATION  OF  STATE  TO  STATE 


209 


165.  Sources  of  international  law.  A  clear  outline  of  the  vari- 
ous sources  from  which  international  law  has  drawn  its  content 
follows  : 

Practice  and  Usage:  If  for  a  time  international  intercourse  follows 
certain  methods,  these  methods  are  regarded  as  binding  in  later  inter- 
course, and  departure  from  this  procedure  is  held  a  violadon  of  inter- 
national right. 

Precedent  afid  Decisions :  The  domestic  courts  of  those  states  within 
the  family  of  nations,  may  by  their  decisions  furnish  precedents  which 
become  the  basis  of  international  practice. 

(a)  Prize  and  admiralty  courts  decisions  form  in  themselves  a  large 
body  of  law.  .  .  . 

(b)  The  decisions  of  domestic  courts  upon  such  matters  as  extra- 
dition, diplomatic  privileges,  piracy,  etc.,  tend  to  become  a  source  of 
international  law. 

(c)  The  decisions  of  courts  of  arbitration  and  other  mixed  courts  are 
usually  upon  broad  principles.  Some  of  the  principles  involved  may 
become  established  precedents.  .  .  . 

Treaties  and  State  Papers:  Treaties  and  state  papers  of  whatever 
form  indicate  the  state  of  opinion,  at  a  given  time,  in  regard  to  the 
matters  of  which  they  speak.  Since  they  are  binding  upon  the  pardes 
to  them,  treaties  may  be  regarded  as  evidence  of  what  the  states,  bound 
by  their  terms,  accept  as  law.  When  the  same  terms  are  generally 
accepted  among  nations,  treaties  become  a  valuable  evidence  of  concrete 
facts  of  practice  and  proper  sources  of  international  law.  .  .  . 

(a)  Treaties  and  state  papers  may  lay  down  new  rules  or  outline  the 
operation  of  old  rules.  .  ,  . 

(b)  Treaties  and  state  papers  may  enunciate  established  rules  as 
understood  by  the  parties  to  the  treaty.   .  .  . 

(c)  Treaties  and  state  papers  may  agree  as  to  rules  which  shall  be 
held  as  binding  upon  the  parties  to  the  treaty  or  paper.  .  .   . 

(d)  Most  treaties  and  state  papers,  however,  deal  with  matters  of 
interstate  politics,  and  are  not  in  any  sense  sources  of  international 
law.  •.  .  . 

Text  Writers :  During  the  seventeenth  and  the  first  half  of  the  eight- 
eenth century,  the  writings  of  the  great  publicists  were  regarded  as  the 
highest  source  of  authority  upon  matters  now  in  the  domain  of  inter- 
national law.  These  writings  not  only  laid  down  the  principles  which 
should  govern  cases  similar  to  those  which  had  arisen,  but  from  the  broad 
basis  given  the  law  of  nations  deduced  the  principles  for  such  cases  as 
might  arise.  .  .  . 


2IO  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

Diplomatic  Papers :  Tlie  diplomatic  papers,  as  distinct  from  the  state 
papers  to  which  more  than  one  state  becomes  a  party,  are  simply  papers 
issued  by  a  state  for  the  guidance  of  its  own  representatives  in  inter- 
national intercourse.  .  .  .  These  papers,  showing  the  opinions  of  various 
states  from  time  to  time  upon  certain  subjects  which  may  not  come  up 
for  formal  state  action,  afford  a  valuable  source  of  information  upon  the 
attitude  of  states  towards  questions  still  formally  unsettled. 

166.  Legal  bases  of  international  law.  The  nature  and  sanction 
of  international  law  are  affected  by  the  following  legal  influences  : 

(a)  The  Roman  law  was  the  most  potent  influence  in  determining 
the  early  development,  particularly  in  respect  to  dominion  and  acqui- 
sition of  territory.   .   .   . 

(b)  The  canon  law,  as  the  law  of  the  ecclesiastics  who  were  supposed 
to  recognize  the  broadest  principles  of  human  unity,  gave  an  ethical 
element  to  early  international  law.  .  .  .  The  canon  law  gave  a  quasi- 
religious  sanction  to  its  observance,  and  in  so  far  as  international  law 
embodied  its  principles,  gave  the  same  sanction  to  the  observance  of 
international  equity.  .  .  . 

(c)  The  common  law,  itself  international  as  according  to  tradition, 
derived  by  Edward  the  Confessor  from  three  systems,  and  subsequently 
modified  by  custom,  furnished  a  practical  element  in  determining  the 
nature  of  international  law. 

(d)  Equity  promoted  the  development  of  the  recognition  of  prin- 
ciples in  international  law.   .   .   . 

(e)  Admiralty  law  may  be  defined  as  in  one  sense  the  law  of  the  sea. 
Anterior  to  and  during  the  Middle  Ages,  the  maritime  relations  of  states 
gave  rise  to  sea  laws,  many  of  which  are  to-day  well-recognized  prin- 
ciples of  international  law. 

167.  Influence  of  Roman  law  on  international  law.  Morey 
points  out  several  ways  in  which  the  ideas  of  Roman  law  have 
influenced  the  general  principles  of  international  law. 

Not  only  has  the  Roman  law  been  preserved  in  the  municipal  and 
ecclesiastical  jurisprudence  of  modern  Europe ;  it  has  also  exercised  a 
marked  influence  on  the  growth  of  that  body  of  rules  by  which  the 
states  of  Europe  are  bound  together  in  one  moral  commonwealth.  .  .  . 
A  few  examples  only  of  this  influence  can  be  noticed  here. 

(i)  The  most  fundamental  point  of  contact  between  Roman  and 
modern  international  law  is  to  be  found  in  the  idea  of  natural  law  em- 
bodied in  theyV/i-  gentium.  The  jus  getitium  was  not,  it  is  true,  con- 
ceived by  the  Romans  as  applying  to  the  relations  between  independent 


RELATION  OF  STATE  TO   STATE  211 

states.  It  was,  nevertheless,  so  interpreted  by  the  early  publicists  of 
modern  times ;  and  the  ambiguity  thus  attaching  to  the  term,  jus  gen- 
tium, led,  in  fact,  to  the  most  important  and  beneficent  results.  It  came 
to  be  regarded,  not  simply  as  a  law  common  to  all  states,  nor  even  as  a 
natural  law  universally  binding  upon  individuals,  —  the  earlier  and  later 
ideas  of  the  Romans,  —  but  as  a  universal  law  morally  binding  upon  all 
nations  inter  se.  .  .  .  States  were  looked  upon  as  moral  persons  — 
subjects  of  the  natural  law,  and  as  equal  to  each  other  in  their  moral 
rights  and  obligations. 

(2)  The  contact  between  Roman  and  international  jurisprudence  may 
be  seen  more  specifically  in  the  law  relating  to  national  dominion.  Mr. 
Maine  has  clearly  shown  how  the  application  of  the  Roman  law  of  owner- 
ship was  favored  by  the  association  of  political  sovereignty  with  territory. 
The  old  medieval  idea  that  a  king  was  merely  the  chief  of  his  tribe, 
or  people,  was  gradually  superseded  by  the  idea  that  he  was  the  owner 
of  the  soil  occupied  by  his  people.  Hence  it  became  possible  to  look 
upon  the  sovereigns  of  Europe  as  "  a  group  of  Roman  proprietors.-" 
Their  respective  rights  over  their  own  lands,  and  their  territorial  rela- 
tions to  each  other,  could  be  justly  determined  upon  principles  derived 
from  the  Roman  law  of  dominium,  or  ownership.   .   .   . 

(3)  Furthermore,  the  law  relating  to  ffeaties  is,  to  a  great  extent, 
founded  upon  principles  derived  from  the  Roman  law  of  contracts.  As 
states  are  moral  persons,  the  obligations  which  they  establish  by  mutual 
agreement  are  binding  in  so  far  as  a  recession  from  the  agreement  would 
be  injurious  to  either  party.  The  Roman  law  of  contract  was  largely- 
derived  from  the  jus  gentium,  and  was  liberally  interpreted  according  to 
the  principles  of  natural  equity.  It  thus  furnished  a  broad  basis  for  the 
law  relating  to  those  obligations  which  grow  out  of  national  agreements. 

IV.  Nature  of  International  Law 

168.  Meaning  of  the  term  "international  law."  Holland  dis- 
cusses the  nature  of  international  law  as  follows  : 

It  is  plain  that  if  Law  be  defined  as  we  have  defined  it,  a  political 
arbiter  by  which  it  can  be  enforced  is  of  its  essence,  and  law  without 
an  arbiter  is  a  contradiction  in  terms.  Convenient  therefore  as  is  on 
many  accounts  the  phrase  "  International  Law,"'  to  express  those  niles 
of  conduct  in  accordance  with  which,  either  in  consequence  of  their 
express  consent,  or  in  pursuance  of  the  usage  of  the  civilized  world, 
nations  are  expected  to  act,  it  is  impossible  to  regard  these  rules  as  being 
in  reality  anything  more  than  the  moral  code  of  nations.   .  .   . 


2  12  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

International  Law  differs  from  ordinary  law  in  being  unsupported  by 
the  authority  of  a  State.  It  differs  from  ordinary  morality  in  being  a  rule 
for  States  and  not  for  individuals. 

It  is  the  vanishing  point  of  Jurisprudence  ;  since  it  lacks  any  arbiter  of 
disputed  questions,  save  public  opinion,  beyond  and  above  the  disputant 
parties  themselves,  and  since,  in  proportion  as  it  tends  to  become  assimi- 
lated to  true  law  by  the  aggregate  of  States  into  a  larger  society,  it  ceases  to 
be  itself,  and  is  transmuted  into  the  public  law  of  a  federal  government. 

169.  The  nature  and  origin  of  international  law.  Hall  points 
out  two  leading  views  of  the  nature  and  origin  of  international  law. 

International  law  consists  in  certain  rules  of  conduct  which  modern 
civilized  states  regard  as  being  binding  on  them  in  their  relations  with 
one  another  with  a  force  comparable  in  nature  and  degree  to  that  bind- 
ing the  conscientious  person  to  obey  the  laws  of  his  country,  and  which 
they  also  regard  as  being  enforceable  by  appropriate  means  in  case  of 
infringement. 

Two  principal  views  may  be  held  as  to  the  nature  and  origin  of  these 
rules.  They  may  be  considered  to  be  an  imperfect  attempt  to  give  effect 
to  an  absolute  right  which  is  assumed  to  exist  and  to  be  capable  of  being 
discovered ;  or  they  may  be  looked  upon  simply  as  a  reflection  of  the 
moral  development  and  the  external  life  of  the  particular  nations  which 
are  governed  by  them. 

170.  Nature  of  international  rights.  Willoughby  shows  that,  in 
the  strict  legal  sense,  "  international  rights  "  are  impossible.  ^ 

The  term  "  law,"  when  applied  to  the  rules  and  principles  that  prevail 
between  independent  nations,  is  misleading  because  such  rules  depend  for 
their  entire  validity  upon  the  forbearance  and  consent  of  the  parties  to 
whom  they  apply,  and  are  not  and  cannot  be  legally  enforced  by  any  com- 
mon superior.  In  a  command  there  is  the  necessary  idea  of  superior  and 
inferior,  while  in  international  relations  the  fundamental  postulate  is  that 
of  the  theoretical  equality  of  the  parties,  however  much  they  may  differ 
in  actual  strength.  Finally,  there  exist  no  tribunals  wherein  these  princi- 
ples may  be  interpreted  and  applied  to  particular  cases.  The  uniformity 
with  which  these  principles  are  followed,  and  the  practical  necessity  under 
which,  at  least,  the  smaller  States  are  to  obey  them,  does  not  alter  the 
case.  The  sanction  to  most  of  these  rules  may  be,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
very  strong  and  effective,  but  it  is  not  a  legal  sanction.  Regulations  which 
depend  upon  the  consent  of  the  parties  to  whom  they  apply,  not  only  for 

^  Copyright,  1896,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


RELATION  OF  STATE  TO  STATE        213 

their  interpretation  and  application,  but  for  their  enforcement,  certainly 
partake  insufficiently  of  those  qualities  which  would  cause  them  to  be 
designated,  in  sensu  strictiore,  laws.  International  regulations  thus  re- 
semble in  this  respect  many  of  the  agreements  that  are  daily  entered 
into  between  individuals,  by  which  moral  obligations  are  incurred,  but  for 
the  enforcement  of  which,  in  case  of  violation,  there  are  no  legal  means 
provided.  .  .  . 

In  the  absence,  then,  of  a  common  superior,  the  only  rational  view  in 
which  States  are  to  be  regarded  in  their  relations  to  each  other  is  that  of 
freedom  from  all  possible  legal  control ;  and  with  their  mutual  interests 
subject  only  to  such  regulations  as  the  considerations  of  justice  and  expe- 
diency shall  dictate.   International  "  rights,"  strictly  speaking,  do  not  exist. 

171.  International  law  not  strictly  law.  Wilson,  after  quoting 
Bluntschli  and  Bulmerincq,  distinguishes  as  follows  the  law  of 
nations  from  law  proper : 

The  province  of  International  Law  may  be  described  as  a  province  half- 
way between  the  province  of  morals  and  the  province  of  positive  law.  .  .  . 
"  The  law  of  nations,"  says  Bluntschli,  "  is  that  recognized  universal  Law 
of  Nature  which  binds  different  states  together  in  a  humane  jural  society, 
and  which  also  secures  to  the  members  of  different  states  a  common  pro- 
tection of  law  for  their  general  human  and  international  rights.".  .  . 
International  Law,  says  Dr.  Bulmerincq,  "  is  the  totality  of  legal  rules 
and  institutions  which  have  developed  themselves  touching  the  relations 
of  states  to  one  another." 

International  Law  is,  therefore,  not  law  at  all  in  the  strictest  sense  of 
the  term.  It  is  not,  as  a  whole,  the  will  of  any  state :  there  is  no  author- 
ity set  above  the  nations  whose  command  it  is.  In  one  aspect,  the  aspect 
of  Bluntschli's  definition,  it  is  simply  the  body  of  rules,  developed  out  of 
the  common  moral  judgments  of  the  race,  which  ought  to  govern  nations 
in  their  dealings  with  each  other.  Looked  at  from  another,  from  Dr. 
Bulmerincq's,  point  of  view,  it  is  nothing  more  than  a  generalized  state- 
ment of  the  rules  which  nations  have  actually  recognized  in  their  treaties 
with  one  another,  made  from  time  to  time,  and  which  by  reason  of  such 
precedents  are  coming  more  and  more  into  matter-of-course  acceptance. 

172.  Municipal  law  and  international  law.  Municipal  law  and 
international  law  may  be  distinguished  as  follows  :  ^ 

Municipal  law  may  therefore  be  defined  as  comprising  those  rules  of 
human  conduct  which  arc  established  or  sanctioned  by  a  state,  in  virtue 
1  By  permission  of  Harper  &  Brothers. 


214 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


of  its  sovereign  authority,  for  the  guidance  and  direction  of  its  citizens  or 
subjects.  The  municipal  law  of  a  state  applies,  as  will  subsequently  ap- 
pear, not  only  to  citizens,  properly  so  called,  but  to  all  persons,  whatever 
their  nationality,  who  come  within  its  territorial  limits  as  travelers  or 
sojourners.  As  such  persons  are  protected  by  the  local  municipal  law,  it 
is  their  duty  to  conform  to  its  requirements  during  the  period  of  their 
residence  within  its  borders. 

International  law,  or,  as  it  is  sometimes  called,  the  "  law  of  nations," 
may  therefore  be  defined  as  that  body  of  rules  and  limitations  which  the 
Sovereign  states  of  the  civilized  world  agree  to  observe  in  their  intercourse 
and  relations  with  each  other.  The  agreement  or  consent,  which  is  essen- 
tial to  the  validity  of  a  rule  of  international  law,  is  said  to  be  express,  or 
positive,  when  it  is  embodied  in  treaties,  or  formal  declarations  of  public 
policy,  or  in  statutes  which  are  enacted  in  support,  or  recognition  of  the 
accepted  usages  of  nations ;  it  is  said  to  be  tacit  when  it  takes  the  form 
of  conformity  to  the  approved  practice  of  states  in  their  international 
relations. 

The  essential  difference  between  the  two  systems  of  law  will  be  found 
to  consist  in  the  extent  and  character  of  the  binding  force  of  each.  The 
sovereign  authority  of  a  state  sanctions  its  municipal  laws  and,  within  its 
territorial  limits,  enforces  obedience  to  their  provisions.  As  sovereign 
states  acknowledge  no  common  superior,  it  is  obvious  that  there  is  no 
authority  above  a  state,  or  outside  of  it,  which  can  effectively  coerce  it 
into  obedience  to  the  provisions  of  international  law.  An  individual  who 
suffers  an  injury,  or  whose  personal  or  property  rights  are  invaded,  seeks 
and  obtains  redress  in  the  courts  of  his  country,  which  are  authorized  to 
hear  and  decide  his  case,  and  are  given  power  to  enforce  their  judgments 
and  decrees.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  a  nation  be  injured  or  invaded  by 
another,  or  have  a  cause  of  difference  with  a  foreign  state,  it  cannot 
appeal  to  an  international  tribunal  of  any  kind  to  remedy  its  wrong 
or  to  adjust  its  difference,  but  must  seek  redress  by  remonstrance  or 
negotiation,  or,  as  a  last  resort,  by  war,  when  all  peaceable  methods  of 
adjustment  have  failed. 

173.  International  law  and  morality.  Sidgvvick  gives  reasons 
for  considering  international  law  as  occupying  an  intermediate 
position  between  law  proper  and  morality.^ 

There  are,  however,  considerations  on  the  other  side,  leading  us  to 
assign  to  international  law,  in  respect  of  the  normal  process  of  changing 
it,  an  intermediate  position  between  ordinary  law  and  ordinary  morality, 

^  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


RELATION  OF  STATE  TO  STATE 


215 


\ 


as  they  exist  in  a  modern  State.  Changes  in  ordinary  law  are,  as  we  have 
seen,  mainly  introduced  in  modern  States  by  the  formal  agreement  of  the 
persons  and  bodies  that  compose  the  supreme  legislature,  acting  collec- 
tively after  debate.  Changes  in  Positive  Morality,  on  the  other  hand,  can 
only  be  brought  about  gradually  by  the  unconcerted  agreement  of  a  num- 
ber of  individuals,  judging  of  others  and  acting  towards  them  as  indi- 
viduals, in  the  exercise  of  their  legal  freedom  of  choice  in  social  relations. 
Now  in  the  case  of  international  law,  though  there  is  no  regular  organ 
of  legislative  innovation,  the  concerted  action  of  States,  in  the  way  of 
treaties  and  conventions,  plays  an  important  part  in  the  introduction  of 
changes,  to  which  there  is  no  counterpart  in  the  development  of  positive 
morality.   .   .   . 

Further,  the  concerted  action  of  which  I  have  been  speaking  is  not 
the  only  method  by  which  the  rules  of  international  law  have  been  modi- 
fied ;  it  is  undeniable  that  international  law,  like  civil  law,  has  been  gradu- 
ally made  more  definite  and  coherent  by  a  series  of  arguments  of  the 
ordinary  legal  kind,  terminated  in  some  cases  by  judicial  or  quasi-judicial 
decisions ;  and  it  is  conceivable  that  this  process  might  be  continued 
until  international  law  should  reach  something  like  the  systematic  pre- 
cision which  parts  of  our  own  common  law  have  attained  through  judicial 
interpretation  alone.  .  .  . 

In  these  various  ways  a  body  of  definite  rules  of  international  conduct 
has  gradually  been  formed,  which  certainly  bears,  regarded  as  an  intelli- 
gible system,  a  closer  resemblance  to  the  positive  law  than  it  does  to  the 
positive  morality  of  a  modern  state. 

174.  International  law  as  law.  Leacock  summarizes  as  follows 
the  arguments  that  may  be  brought  forward  in  support  of  the  posi- 
tion that  international  law  is  properly  "  law"  :^ 

As  against  the  point  of  view  adopted  in  such  criticisms  of  the  propriety 
of  the  term  "  international  law,"  various  arguments  may  be  adduced. 
In  the  first  place,  the  objection  urged  by  many  writers  adopting  a  re- 
stricted connotation  of  the  term  "  law  "  may  also  be  applied  here.  We 
have  seen  that  law  in  its  strict  sense  is  not  applicable  to  a  state  of  society 
in  which  life  is  regulated  to  a  large  extent  by  custom,  and  to  which  the 
idea  of  deliberate  enactment  is  altogether  alien.  Nor  is  the  term  in  its 
strict  sense  applicable  to  a  community  in  which  imperfect  political  organi- 
zation or  chronic  anarchy  renders  the  general  obedience  to  regulative 
control  spasmodic  and  uncertain.  Many  writers  have  therefore  preferred 
to  expand  the  sense  of  the  term  "  law  "  in  order  to  make  its  use  extend 

1  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 


2i6  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

to  societies  of  this  character,  and  recognize  the  existence  of  "  law  in  the 
making,"  as  well  as  of  law.  Viewed  in  this  light,  international  law  may  be 
considered  as  truly  law,  although  as  yet  only  in  an  inchoative  stage  ;  it  be- 
comes analogous,  as  Sir  Frederick  Pollock  expresses  it,  "  to  those  customs 
and  observances  in  an  imperfectly  organized  society,  which  have  not  yet 
fully  acquired  the  character  of  law  but  are  on  the  way  to  become  law." 

Even  at  the  present  stage  of  its  development  international  law  is  not 
so  much  devoid  of  a  binding  sanction  as  might  at  first  appear.  Where 
its  precepts  are  definite  and  their  meaning  obvious,  the  general  presump- 
tion of  civilized  opinion  —  a  potent  factor  in  the  world  politics  of  our 
day  —  is  against  any  power  acting  in  violation  of  them.  A  flagrant  dis- 
regard of  international  law  would  involve  a  decided  loss  of  national 
prestige,  and  offer  a  perhaps  tempting  chance  for  intervention  on  the 
part  of  an  outside  power. 

175.  The  sanction  of  international  law.  In  his  presidential 
address  delivered  before  the  second  annual  meeting  of  the  Amer- 
ican Society  of  International  Law,  in  1908,  Elihu  Root  discussed 
the  sanction  of  international  law  as  follows  : 

In  former  times,  each  isolated  nation,  satisfied  with  its  own  opinion  of 
itself  and  indifferent  to  the  opinion  of  others,  separated  from  all  others 
by  mutual  ignorance  and  misjudgment,  regarded  only  the  physical  power 
of  other  nations.  .  .  .  Now,  however,  there  may  be  seen  plainly  the 
effects  of  a  long-continued  process  which  is  breaking  down  the  isolation 
of  nations,  permeating  every  country  with  better  knowledge  and  under- 
standing of  every  other  country,  spreading  throughout  the  world  a  knowl- 
edge of  each  government's  conduct  to  serve  as  a  basis  for  criticism  and 
judgment,  and  gradually  creating  a  community  of  nations,  in  which 
standards  of  conduct  are  being  established,  and  a  world-wide  public 
opinion  is  holding  nations  to  conformity  or  condemning  them  for  dis- 
regard of  the  established  standards.  The  improved  facilities  for  travel 
and  transportation,  the  enormous  increase  of  production  and  commerce, 
the  revival  of  colonization  and  the  growth  of  colonies  on  a  gigantic  scale, 
the  severance  of  the  laborer  from  the  soil,  accomplished  by  cheap  steam- 
ship and  railway  transportation  and  the  emigration  agent,  the  flow  and 
the  return  of  millions  of  emigrants  across  national  lines,  the  amazing 
development  of  telegraphy  and  of  the  press,  conveying  and  spreading 
instant  information  of  every  interesting  event  that  happens  in  regions 
however  remote  —  all  have  played  their  part  in  this  change. 

Pari  passu  with  the  breaking  down  of  isolation,  that  makes  a  com- 
mon public  opinion  possible,  the  building  up  of  standards  of  conduct  is 


RELATION  OF  STATE  TO   STATE  2  17 

being  accomplished  by  the  formulation  and  establishment  of  rules  that 
are  being  gradually  taken  out  of  the  domain  of  discussion  into  that  of 
general  acceptance  —  a  process  in  which  the  recent  conferences  at  The 
Hague  have  played  a  great  and  honorable  part.  There  is  no  civilized 
country  now  which  is  not  sensitive  to  this  general  opinion,  none  that  is 
willing  to  subject  itself  to  the  discredit  of  standing  brutally  on  its  power 
to  deny  to  other  countries  the  benefit  of  recognized  rules  of  right  con- 
duct. The  deference  shown  to  this  international  public  opinion  is  in  due 
proportion  to  a  nation's  greatness  and  advance  in  civilization.  The  nearest 
approach  to  defiance  will  be  found  among  the  most  isolated  and  least 
civilized  of  countries,  whose  ignorance  of  the  world  prevents  the  effect  of 
the  world's  opinion ;  and  in  every  such  country  internal  disorder,  oppres- 
sion, poverty,  and  wretchedness  mark  the  penalties  which  warn  mankind 
that  the  laws  established  by  civilization  for  the  guidance  of  national 
conduct  cannot  be  ignored  with  impunity. 

National  regard  for  international  opinion  is  not  caused  by  amour 
propre  alone  —  not  merely  by  desire  for  the  approval  and  good  opinion 
of  mankind.  Underlying  the  desire  for  approval  and  the  aversion  to 
general  condemnation  with  nations  as  with  the  individual,  there  is  a  deep 
sense  of  interest,  based  partly  upon  the  knowledge  that  mankind  backs 
its  opinions  by  its  conduct  and  that  nonconformity  to  the  standard  of 
nations  means  condemnation  and  isolation,  and  partly  upon  the  knowledge 
that  in  the  give  and  take  of  international  affairs  it  is  better  for  every 
nation  to  secure  the  protection  of  the  law  by  complying  with  it  than  to 
forfeit  the  law's  benefits  by  ignoring  it. 

Beyond  all  this  there  is  a  consciousness  that  in  the  most  important 
affairs  of  nations,  in  their  political  status,  the  success  of  their  under- 
takings and  their  processes^  of  development,  there  is  an  indefinite  and 
almost  mysterious  influence  exercised  by  the  general  opinion  of  the 
world  regarding  the  nation's  character  and  conduct.  The  greatest  and 
strongest  governments  recognize  this  influence  and  act  with  reference 
to  it.  They  dread  the  moral  isolation  created  by  general  adverse  opinion 
and  the  unfriendly  feeling  that  accompanies  it,  and  they  desire  general 
approval  and  the  kindly  feeling  that  goes  with  it.  .  .  . 

These  are  the  considerations  which  determine  the  course  of  national 
conduct  regarding  the  vast  majority  of  questions  to  which  are  to  be 
applied  the  rules  of  international  law.  The  real  sanction  which  enforces 
those  rules  is  the  injury  which  inevitably  follows  nonconformity  to  public 
opinion ;  while,  for  the  occasional  and  violent  or  persistent  lawbreaker, 
there  always  stands  behind  discussion  the  ultimate  possibility  of  war,  as 
the  sheriff  and  the  policeman  await  the  occasional  and  comparatively 
rare  violators  of  municipal  law. 


CHAPTER  XII 

CONTENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW 

I,  Independence  and  Equality 

176.  Nature  of  intervention.  In  opposition  to  the  general  prin- 
ciple that  states  are  independent  and  equal,  and  hence  free  from 
external  interference,  the  nature  of  "  intervention"  may  be  noted. 

Intervention  takes  place  when  a  state  interferes  in  the  relations  of 
two  other  states  without  the  consent  of  both  or  either  of  them,  or  when 
it  interferes  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  another  state  irrespectively  of  the 
will  of  the  latter  for  the  purpose  of  either  maintaining  or  altering  the 
actual  condition  of  things  within  it.  Prima  fade  intervention  is  a  hostile 
act,  because  it  constitutes  an  attack  upon  the  independence  of  the  state 
subjected  to  it.  Nevertheless  its  position  in  law  is  somewhat  equivocal. 
Regarded  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  state  intruded  upon,  it  must 
always  remain  an  act  which,  if  not  consented  to,  is  an  act  of  war.  But 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  intervening  power  it  is  not  a  means 
of  obtaining  redress  for  a  wrong  done,  but  a  measure  of  prevention  or 
of  police,  undertaken  sometimes  for  the  express  purpose  of  avoiding 
war.  .  .  . 

The  grounds  upon  which  intervention  has  taken  place,  or  upon  which 
it  is  said  with  more  or  less  of  authority  that  it  is  permitted,  may  be  referred 
to  the  right  of  self-preservation,  to  a  right  of  opposing  wrongdoing,  to 
the  duty  of  fulfilling  engagements,  and  to  friendship  for  one  of  two 
parties  in  a  state. 

177.  Intervention  of  the  powers  in  behalf  of  Greek  independence. 

In  1 82 1  Greece  revolted  against  the  oppressive  government  of  the 
Turks.  After  terrible  massacres  the  Greeks  aroused  the  sympathy 
of  western  Europe,  and  the  intervention  of  England,  Russia,  and 
France  forced  the  Sultan  to  recognize  their  independence  in  1829. 

Of  the  intervention  of  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia,  Mr.  Abdy 
in  his  edition  of  Kent,  thus  speaks :  "  The  intervention  .  .  .  was  based 
on  three  grounds.    First,  in  order  to  comply  with  the  request  of  one  of 

218 


CONTENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL.  LAW  219 

the  parties ;  secondly,  on  the  ground  of  humanity,  in  order  to  stay  the 
effusion  of  blood ;  and,  thirdly,  in  order  to  put  a  stop  to  piracy  and 
anarchy." 

The  treaty  between  France,  Great  Britain,  and  Russia,  signed  at 
London  July  6,  1827,  for  the  pacification  of  Greece,  sets  forth  the 
specific  grounds  on  which  the  three  powers  intervened.  In  the  pre- 
amble the  contracting  parties  declare  that,  "  penetrated  with  the  necessity 
of  putting  an  end  to  the  sanguinary  struggle  which,  while  it  abandons 
the  Greek  provinces  and  the  islands  of  the  archipelago  to  all  the  dis- 
orders of  anarchy,  daily  causes  fresh  impediments  to  the  commerce  of 
the  states  of  Europe,  and  gives  opportunity  for  acts  of  piracy  which  not 
only  expose  the  subjects  of  the  high  contracting  parties  to  grievous 
losses,  but  also  render  necessary  measures  which  are  burdensome  for 
their  observation  and  suppression  " ;  and  that  two  of  the  high  contract- 
ing parties  (France  and  Great  Britain)  having  besides  "  received  from 
the  Greeks  an  earnest  invitation  to  interpose  their  Mediation  with  the 
Ottoman  Porte,"  and  being,  together  with  the  Emperor  of  Russia, 
"  animated  with  the  desire  of  putting  a  stop  to  the  effusion  of  blood, 
and  of  preventing  the  evils  of  every  kind  which  the  continuance  of  such 
a  state  of  affairs  may  produce,"  they  had  all  resolved  to  combine  and 
regulate  their  efforts  by  a  formal  treaty  with  a  view  to  reestablish  peace 
between  the  contending  parties  by  means  of  an  arrangement  demanded 
"  no  less  by  sentiments  of  humanity,  than  by  interests  for  the  tranquil- 
lity of  Europe." 

178.  Reply  of  Japan  to  the  intervention  of  Russia,  Germany, 
and  France.  In  1895,  after  the  treaty  of  peace  between  China 
and  Japan  had  ceded  territory  to  the  latter,  Russia,  (k-rmany,  and 
France  sent  a  joint  note  to  Japan  politely  commanding  her  to 
return  the  territory  gained.  The  following  extract  is  taken  from 
Japan's  diplomatic  reply  : 

We  recently  complied  with  the  request  of  China,  and  in  consequence 
appointed  plenipotentiaries  and  caused  them  to  confer  with  the  pleni- 
potentiaries appointed  by  China  and  to  conclude  a  Treaty  of  Peace 
between  the  two  Empires. 

Since  then  the  governments  of  their  Majesties  the  Emperors  of 
Russia  and  Germany  and  of  the  Republic  of  France  have  united  in  a 
recommendation  to  our  government  not  to  permanently  possess  the 
peninsula  of  Feng-t'ien,  our  newly  acquired  territory,  on  the  ground  that 
such  permanent  possession  would  be  detrimental  to  the  lasting  peace  of 
the  Orient. 


2  20  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

Devoted  as  we  unalterably  are  and  ever  have  been  to  the  principles 
of  peace,  we  were  constrained  to  take  up  arms  against  China  for  no  other 
reason  than  our  desire  to  secure  for  the  Orient  an  enduring  peace. 

Now  the  friendly  recommendation  of  the  three  powers  was  equally 
prompted  by  the  same  desire.  Consulting,  therefore,  the  best  interests 
of  peace  and  animated  by  a  desire  not  to  bring  upon  our  people  added 
hardship  or  to  impede  the  progress  of  national  destiny  by  creating  new 
complications  and  thereby  making  the  situation  difficult  and  retarding 
the  restoration  of  peace,  we  do  not  hesitate  to  accept  such  recom- 
mendation. 

179.  American  statements  of  policy  regarding  nonintervention. 

The  following  extracts  from  the  writings  of  leading  American 
statesmen  indicate  the  traditional  foreign  policy  of  the  United 
States.    Significant  changes  are  shown  in  the  attitude  of  Roosevelt. 

IVashifigton  (1796) — Europe  has  a  set  of  primary  interests  which 
to  us  have  none  or  a  very  remote  relation.  Hence,  she  must  be  en- 
gaged in  frequent  controversies,  the  causes  of  which  are  essentially 
foreign  to  our  concerns.  Hence,  therefore,  it  must  be  unwise  in  us 
to  implicate  ourselves  by  artificial  ties  in  the  ordinary  vicissitudes  of 
her  politics,  or  the  ordinary  combinations  and  collisions  of  her  friendships 
or  enmities. 

Jefferson  (1823)  —  I  have  ever  deemed  it  fundamental  for  the  United 
States  never  to  take  an  active  part  in  the  quarrels  of  Europe.  Their 
political  interests  are  entirely  distinct  from  ours.  Their  mutual  jealousies, 
their  balance  of  power,  their  complicated  alliances,  their  forms  and 
principles  of  government,  are  all  foreign  to  us. 

Monroe  {\^2^^- — -Separated  as  we  are  from  Europe  by  the  Great 
Atlantic  Ocean,  we  can  have  no  concern  in  the  wars  of  the  European 
governments  nor  in  the  causes  which  produce  them.  The  balance  of 
power  between  them,  into  whichever  scale  it  may  turn  in  its  various 
vibrations,  cannot  affect  us.  It  is  the  interest  of  the  United  States  to 
preserve  the  most  friendly  relations  with  every  power  and  on  conditions 
fair,  equal,  and  applicable  to  all. 

Webster  {\^\2) — The  great  communities  of  the  world  are  regarded 
as  wholly  independent,  each  entitled  to  maintain  its  own  system  of  law 
and  government,  while  all  in  their  mutual  intercourse  are  understood 
to  submit  to  the  established  rules  and  principles  governing  such  inter- 
course. And  the  perfecting  of  this  system  of  communication  among 
nations,  requires  the  strictest  application  of  the  doctrine  of  noninter- 
vention of  any  with  the  domestic  concerns  of  others. 


CONTENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW      22 1 

Sewarif  (iS 6 4) — Whatever  may  be  thought  by  other  nations  of  this 
policy,  it  seems  to  the  undersigned  to  be  in  strict  conformity  with  those 
prudential  principles  of  international  law  —  that  nations  arc  equal  in 
their  independence  and  sovereignty,  and  that  each  individual  state  is 
bound  to  do  unto  all  other  states  just  what  it  reasonably  expects  those 
states  to  do  unto  itself. 

Di7}'  (1898) — The  rule  of  this  government  is  to  observe  the  most 
absolute  impartiality  in  respect  to  questions  arising  between  its  neigh- 
bors ;  to  refrain  from  forming  a  judgment  upon  the  merits  of  the  mutual 
recriminations  which  may  attend  such  disputes ;  to  abstain  from  advis- 
ing either  party  to  the  difference ;  and  to  exert  mediatorial  offices  only 
when  acceptable  to  both  parties. 

Roosevelt  (1904)  —  In  asserting  the  Monroe  doctrine,  in  taking  such 
steps  as  we  have  taken  in  regard  to  Cuba,  Venezuela,  and  Panama,  and 
in  endeavoring  to  circumscribe  the  theater  of  war  in  the  Far  East,  and 
to  secure  the  open  door  in  China,  we  have  acted  in  our  own  interest  as 
well  as  in  the  interest  of  humanity  at  large.  There  are,  however,  cases 
in  which,  while  our  own  interests  are  not  greatly  involved,  strong  appeal 
is  made  to  our  sympathies.  Ordinarily  it  is  very  much  wiser  and  more  useful 
for  us  to  concern  ourselves  with  striving  for  our  own  moral  and  material 
betterment  here  at  home  than  to  concern  ourselves  with  tr)'ing  to  better 
the  condition  of  things  in  other  nations.  .  .  .  Nevertheless  there  are 
occasional  crimes  committed  on  so  vast  a  scale  and  of  such  peculiar 
horror  as  to  make  us  doubt  whether  it  is  not  our  manifest  duty  to 
endeavor  at  least  to  show  our  disapproval  of  the  deed  and  our  sympathy 
with  those  who  have  suffered  by  it.  The  cases  must  be  extreme  in 
which  such  a  course  is  justifiable.  .  .  .  But  in  extreme  cases  action  may 
be  justifiable  and  proper. 

180.  Intervention  of  the  United  States  in  Cuba.  The  following 
extract  from  President  McKinlcy's  special  message  to  Congress, 
April  II,  1898,  gives  the  grounds  on  which  the  United  States 
undertook  forcible  intervention  in  Cuban  affairs. 

First.  In  the  cause  of  humanity  and  to  put  an  end  to  the  barbarities, 
bloodshed,  starvation,  and  horrible  miseries  now  existing  there,  and  which 
the  parties  to  the  conflict  are  either  unable  or  unwilling  to  stop  or  miti- 
gate. It  is  no  answer  to  say  this  is  all  in  another  country,  belonging  to 
another  nation,  and  is  therefore  none  of  our  business.  It  is  specially  our 
duty,  for  it  is  right  at  our  door. 

Second.  We  owe  it  to  our  citizens  in  Cuba  to  afford  them  that  pro- 
tection and  indemnity  for  life  and  property  which  no  government  there 


22  2  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

can  or  will  afford,  and  to  that  end  to  terminate  the  conditions  that  deprive 
them  of  legal  protection. 

Third.  The  right  to  intervene  may  be  justified  by  the  very  serious 
injury  to  the  commerce,  trade,  and  the  business  of  our  people,  and  by 
the  wanton  destruction  of  property  and  devastation  of  the  island. 

Fourth,  and  which  is  of  the  utmost  importance.  The  present  condition 
of  affairs  in  Cuba  is  a  constant  menace  to  our  peace,  and  entails  upon 
this  government  an  enormous  expense.  With  such  a  conflict  waged  for 
years  in  an  island  so  near  us  and  with  which  our  people  have  such  trade 
and  business  relations ;  when  the  lives  atnd  liberty  of  our  citizens  are  in 
constant  danger  and  their  property  destroyed  and  themselves  ruined ; 
where  our  trading  vessels  are  liable  to,  seizure  and  are  seized  at  our  very 
door  by  warships  of  a  foreign  nation,  the  expeditions  of  filibustering  that 
we  are  powerless  to  prevent  altogether,  and  the  irritating  questions  and 
entanglements  thus  arising — all  these  and  others  that  I  need  not  mention, 
with  the  resulting  strained  relations,  are  a  constant  menace  to  our  peace, 
and  compel  us  to  keep  on  a  semi-war  footing  with  a  nation  with  which 
we  are  at  peace. 

181.  The  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  essential  clauses  of  President 
Monroe's  message,  stating  the  policies  of  "  noncolonization  "  and 
"'  nonintervention,"  follow : 

...  the  occasion  has  been  judged  proper  for  asserting,  as  a  principle 
in  which  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  United  States  are  involved,  that 
the  American  continents,  by  the  free  and  independent  condition  which 
they  have  assumed  and  maintain,  are  henceforth  not  to  be  considered  as 
subjects  for  future  colonization  by  any  European  powers.   .   .   . 

In  the  wars  of  the  European  powers,  in  matters  relating  to  themselves, 
we  have  never  taken  any  part,  nor  does  it  comport  with  our  policy  so  to 
do.  .  .  .  The  political  system  of  the  allied  powers  is  essentially  different, 
in  this  respect,  from  that  of  America.  .  .  .  We  owe  it,  therefore,  to 
candor,  and  to  the  amicable  relations  existing  between  the  United  States 
and  those  powers,  to  declare,  that  we  should  consider  any  attempt  on 
their  part  to  extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere,  as 
dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety.  With  the  existing  colonies  or  depend- 
encies of  any  European  power,  we  have  not  interfered,  and  shall  not 
interfere. 

182.  The  Olney  Doctrine.  In  1895,  at  the  time  of  the  boundary 
dispute  between  Venezuela  and  British  Guiana,  Secretary  of  State 
Olney,  in  a  letter  to  the  United  States  ambassador  to  Great  Britain, 


CONTENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW      223 

interpreted  the  Monroe  Doctrine  so  broadly  that  his  point  of  view 
has  often  been  called  the  Olney  Doctrine. 

Is  it  true,  then,  that  the  safety  and  welfare  of  the  United  States  are  so 
concerned  with  the  maintenance  of  the  independence  of  every  American 
state  as  against  any  European  power  as  to  justify  and  require  the  inter- 
position of  the  United  .States  whenever  that  independence  is  endangered? 
The  question  can  be  candidly  answered  in  but  one  way.  The  states  of 
America,  South  as  well  as  North,  by  geographical  proximity,  by  natural 
sympathy,  by  similarity  of  governmental  constitutions,  are  friends  and 
allies,  commercially  and  politically,  of  the  United  States.  To  allow  the 
subjugation  of  any  of  them  by  an  European  power  is,  of  course,  to  com- 
pletely reverse  that  situation  and  signifies  the  loss  of  all  the  advantages 
incident  to  their  natural  relations  to  us.   .  .  . 

To-day  the  United  States  is  practically  sovereign  on  this  continent,  and 
its  fiat  is  law  upon  the  subjects  to  which  it  confines  its  interposition. 
Why  ?  .  .  .  It  is  because,  in  addition  to  all  other  grounds,  its  infinite 
resources  combined  with  its  isolated  position  render  it  master  of  the  situ- 
ation and  practically  invulnerable  as  against  any  or  all  other  powers. 

183.  The  Drago  Doctrine.  December  29,  1902,  the  Argentine 
minister  at  Washington  was  instructed  to  present  to  the  United 
States  certain  views  with  reference  to  the  forcible  collection  of 
public  debts.  From  the  name  of  their  author,  these  principles 
are  usually  called  the  Drago  Doctrine. 

Among  the  fundamental  principles  of  public  international  law  which 
humanity  has  consecrated,  one  of  the  most  precious  is  that  which  decrees 
that  all  states,  whatever  be  the  force  at  their  disposal,  are  entities  in  law, 
perfectly  equal  one  to  another,  and  mutually  entitled  by  virtue  thereof  to 
the  same  consideration  and  respect.  .  .  . 

"  Contracts  between  a  nation  and  private  individuals  are  obligatory 
according  to  the  conscience  of  the  sovereign,  and  may  not  be  the  object 
of  compelling  force,"  said  the  illustrious  Hamilton.  "  They  confer  no 
right  of  action  contrary  to  the  sovereign  will."  .  .   . 

This  is  in  no  wise  a  defense  for  bad  faith,  disorder,  and  deliberate  and 
voluntary  insolvency.  It  is  intended  merely  to  preserve  the  dignity  of  the 
public  international  entity  which  may  not  thus  be  dragged  into  war  with 
detriment  to  those  high  ends  which  determine  the  existence  and  liberty 
of  nations.   .  .  . 

The  collection  of  loans  by  military  means  implies  territorial  occupation  to 
make  them  effective,  and  territorial  occupation  signifies  the  suppression  or 
subordination  of  the  governments  of  the  countries  on  which  it  is  imposed. 


224 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


184.  The  theory  of  the  balance  of  power.  Lawrence  explains 
the  nature  of  the  "'  balance  of  power  "  theory,  and  shows  its  present 
status  in  world  politics. 

From  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century  till  recent  times,  it  was  an 
undoubted  maxim  of  European  diplomacy  that  what  was  called  the  Bal- 
ance of  Power  must  be  preserved  at  all  risks.  The  courts  and  cabinets 
of  the  Old  World  were  dominated  by  the  idea  that  the  chief  states  of 
Europe  ought  to  possess  such  a  nicely  proportioned  share  of  power  that 
no  one  of  them  should  be  able  to  greatly  outweigh  the  others  in  influence 
and  authority.  It  was  held  that  a  sort  of  international  equilibrium  of 
forces  had  been  established,  and  that  any  state  which  attempted  to 
destroy  its  nice  adjustments  might  be  attacked  by  others  whose  relative 
importance  would  be  diminished  if  it  were  permitted  to  carry  out  its 
projects.  For  a  long  time  this  doctrine  was  accounted  axiomatic.  .  .  . 
But  of  late  years  it  has  fallen  into  disrepute,  and  those  who  still  maintain 
it  set  it  forth  in  a  greatly  modified  form.  They  are  content  to  argue  that 
civilized  states  have  duties  to  perform  to  the  great  society  of  which  they 
are  all  members,  and  that  they  should  act  in  concert  against  any  ag- 
gressive member  of  it  whose  unsocial  conduct  endangers  the  welfare 
of  the  whole, 

II.  Property  and  Jurisdiction 

185.  Territorial  waters  of  a  state.  The  extent  to  which  waters 
form  part  of  the  territory  of  a  state  is  thus  given  by  Wheaton : 

The  territory  of  the  state  includes  the  lakes,  seas,  and  rivers,  entirely 
inclosed  within  its  limits.  The  rivers  which  flow  through  the  territory 
also  form  a  part  of  the  domain  from  their  sources  to  their  mouths,  or  as 
far  as  they  flow  within  the  territory,  including  the  bays  or  estuaries  formed 
by  their  junction  with  the  sea.  .  .  . 

Things  of  which  the  use  is  inexhaustible,  such  as  the  sea  and  running 
water,  cannot  be  so  appropriated  as  to  exclude  others  from  using  these 
elements  in  any  manner  which  does  not  occasion  a  loss  or  inconvenience 
to  the  proprietor.  This  is  what  is  called  an  hmocetit  use.  Thus  we  have 
seen  that  the  jurisdiction  possessed  by  one  nation  over  sounds,  straits, 
and  other  arms  of  the  sea,  leading  through  its  own  territory  to  that  of  an- 
other, or  to  other  seas  common  to  all  nations,  does  not  exclude  others 
from  the  right  of  innocent  passage  through  these  communications.  The 
same  principle  is  applicable  to  rivers  flowing  from  one  state  through  the 
territory  of  another  into  the  sea,  or  into  the  territory  of  a  third  state. 
The  right  of  navigating,  for  commercial  purposes,  a  river  which  flows 


CONTENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW      225 

through  the  territory  of  different  states,  is  common  to  all  the  nations  in- 
habiting the  different  parts  of  its  banks  ;  but  this  right  of  innocent  passage 
being  what  the  text  writers  call  an  imperfect  right,  its  exercise  is  neces- 
sarily modified  by  the  safety  and  convenience  of  the  state  affected  by  it, 
and  can  only  be  effectually  secured  by  mutual  convention  regulating  the 
mode  of  its  exercise. 

186.  The  three-mile  limit.  In  consequence  of  the  case  of  the 
Franco7iia}  the  English  Parliament,  in  1878,  passed  the  following 
act : 

The  territorial  waters  of  Her  Majesty's  dominions,  in  reference  to  the 
sea,  means  such  part  of  the  sea  adjacent  to  the  coast  of  the  United  King- 
dom, or  the  coast  of  some  other  part  of  Her  Majesty's  dominions,  as  is 
deemed  by  international  law  to  be  within  the  territorial  sovereignty  of 
Her  Majesty  ;  and  for  the  purpose  of  any  offense  declared  by  this  Act  to  be 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Admiral,  any  part  of  the  open  sea  within  one 
marine  league  of  the  coast  measured  from  low-water  mark  shall  be  deemed 
to  be  open  sea  within  the  territorial  waters  of  Her  Majesty's  dominions. 

187.  River  boundaries.  In  1856  Attorney-General  Caleb  Gush- 
ing gave  the  following  opinion  of  the  nature  of  a  river  boundar)- 
between  states : 

When  a  river  is  the  dividing  limit  of  arcifinious  territories,  the  natural 
changes  to  which  itself  is  liable,  or  which  its  action  may  produce  on  the 
face  of  the  country,  give  rise  to  various  questions,  according  to  the  phys- 
ical events  which  occur,  and  the  previous  relation  of  the  river  to  the  re- 
spective territories.  The  most  simple  of  all  the  original  conditions  of  the 
inquiry  is  where  the  river  appertains  by  convention  equally  to  both  coun- 
tries, their  rights  being  on  either  side  to  ihcflmn  aquae,  or  middle  of 
the  channel  of  the  stream.   .  .  . 

With  such  conditions,  whatever  changes  happen  to  either  bank  of  the 
river  by  accretion  on  the  one  or  degradation  of  the  other;  that  is,  by  the 
gradual  and,  as  it  were,  insensible  accession  or  abstraction  of  mere  par- 
ticles, the  river  as  it  runs  continues  to  be  the  boundary.  One  country- 
may,  in  process  of  time,  lose  a  little  of  its  territory,  and  the  other  gain  a 
little,  but  the  territorial  relations  cannot  be  reversed  by  such  imperceptible 
mutations  in  the  course  of  the  river.  .  .  .  And  the  convenience  of  al- 
lowing the  river  to  retain  its  previous  function,  notwithstanding  such  in- 
sensible changes  in  its  course,  or  in  cither  of  its  banks,  outweighs  the 
inconveniences  even  to  the  injured  party.  .  .  . 

1  J.  B.  Scott,  "Cases  on  International  Law,"  p.  154. 


2  26  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

But,  on  the  other  hand,  if,  deserting  its  original  bed,  the  river  forces 
for  itself  a  new  channel  in  another  direction,  then  the  nation,  through 
whose  territory  the  river  thus  breaks  its  way,  suffers  injury  by  the 
loss  of  territory  greater  than  the  benefit  of  retaining  the  natural  river 
boundary,  and  that  boundary  remains  in  the  middle  of  the  deserted 
river  bed. 

188.  Acquisition  of  teriritory  by  discovery.  The  principle  that 
discovery  gives  a  valid  title  to  land  occupied  by  uncivilized  peoples 
is  stated  in  the  following  opinion  of  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court : 

On  the  discovery  of  this  immense  continent  the  nations  of  Europe 
were  eager  to  appropriate  to  themselves  so  much  of  it  as  they  could  re- 
spectively acquire.  Its  vast  extent  offered  an  ample  field  to  the  ambition 
and  enterprise  of  all ;  and  the  character  and  religion  of  its  inhabitants 
afforded  an  apology  for  considering  them  as  a  people  over  whom  the 
superior  genius  of  Europe  might  claim  an  ascendancy.  The  potentates 
of  the  old  world  found  no  difficulty  in  convincing  themselves  that  they 
made  ample  compensation  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  new,  by  bestowing  on 
them  civilization  and  Christianity,  in  exchange  for  unlimited  independence. 
But,  as  they  were  all  in  pursuit  of  nearly  the  same  object,  it  was  neces- 
sary, in  order  to  avoid  conflicting  settlements,  and  consequent  war  with 
each  other,  to  establish  a  principle  which  all  should  acknowledge  as  the 
law  by  which  the  rights  of  acquisition,  which  they  all  asserted,  should  be 
regulated  as  between  themselves.  This  principle  was,  that  discovery  gave 
title  to  the  government  by  whose  subjects,  or  by  whose  authority,  it  was 
made,  against  all  other  European  governments,  which  title  might  be  con- 
summated by  possession.  .  .  . 

On  the  establishment  of  these  relations,  the  rights  of  the  original  in- 
habitants were,  in  no  instance,  entirely  disregarded,  but  were  necessarily, 
to  a  considerable  extent,  impaired.  They  were  admitted  to  be  the  right- 
ful occupants  of  the  soil,  with  a  legal  as  well  as  just  claim  to  retain  pos- 
session of  it,  and  to  use  it  according  to  their  own  discretion  ;  but  their 
rights  to  complete  sovereignty,  as  independent  nations,  were  necessarily 
diminished  and  their  power  to  dispose  of  the  soil  at  their  own  will,  to 
whomsoever  they  pleased,  was  denied  by  the  original  fundamental  prin- 
ciple, that  discovery  gave  exclusive  title  to  those  who  made  it. 

189.  Annexation  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands.  The  following  joint 
resolution,  approved  July  7,  1898,  illustrates  one  method  of  ac- 
quiring territory  : 


CONTENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW      227 

Whereas  the  Government  of  the  Republic  of  Hawaii  having,  in  due 
form,  signified  its  consent,  in  the  manner  provided  by  its  constiluliun,  to 
cede  absolutely  and  without  reserve  to  the  United  States  of  America  all 
rights  of  sovereignty  of  whatsoever  kind  in  and  over  the  Hawaiian  Islands 
and  their  dependencies,  and  also  to  cede  and  transfer  to  the  United  States 
the  absolute  fee  and  ownership  of  all  public,  Government,  or  Crown  lands, 
public  buildings  or  edifices,  ports,  harbors,  military  equipment,  and  all 
other  public  property  of  every  kind  and  description  belonging  to  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  together  with  every  right  and  appurte- 
nance thereunto  appertaining :    Therefore, 

Resolved,  .  .  . ,  That  said  cession  is  accepted,  ratified,  and  confirmed, 
and  that  the  said  Hawaiian  Islands  and  their  dependencies  be,  and  they 
are  hereby,  annexed  as  a  part  of  the  territory  of  the  United  States  and 
are  subject  to  the  sovereign  dominion  thereof,  and  that  all  and  singular 
the  property  and  rights  hereinbefore  mentioned  are  vested  in  the  United 
States  of  America. 

190.  The  determination  of  nationality.  The  following  opinion 
of  Sir  A.  Cockburn  indicates  the  methods  by  which  nationality 
may  be  acquired,  and  the  differences  between  the  laws  of  the  Con- 
tinent as  compared  with  those  of  England  and  the  United  States. 

Nationality  by  birth  or  origin  depends,  according  to  the  law  of  some 
nations,  on  the  place  of  birth ;  according  to  that  of  others  on  the  na- 
tionality of  the  parents.  In  many  countries  both  elements  exist,  one  or 
other,  however,  predominating.   .   .  . 

By  the  common  law  of  England,  every  person  born  within  the  domin- 
ions of  the  Crown,  no  matter  whether  of  English  or  of  foreign  parents, 
and,  in  the  latter  case,  whether  the  parents  were  settled,  or  merely 
temporarily  sojourning  in  the  country,  was  an  English  subject;  save 
only  the  children  of  foreign  ambassadors  .  .  .  ,  or  a  child  born  to  a 
foreigner  during  the  hostile  occupation  of  any  part  of  the  territories  of 
England.  No  effect  appears  to  have  been  given  to  descent  as  a  source 
of  nationality.  .  .  . 

The  law  of  the  United  States  of  America  agrees  with  our  own.  The 
law  of  England  as  to  the  effect  of  the  place  of  birth  in  the  matter  of 
nationality  became  the  law  of  America  as  part  of  the  law  of  the  mother 
country,  which  the  original  settlers  carried  with  them.  .  .  . 

By  the  law  of  France,  anterior  to  the  revolution,  a  child  born  on 
French  soil,  though  of  foreign  parents,  was  a  Frenchman,  as  it  was 
\.txm(^^  Jure  soli ;  a  child  born  of  French  parents  out  of  French  territory, 
was  a  Frenchman  jure  sanguinis.    The  framers  of  the  Code  Naiwleon, 


2  28  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

adopting  a  sounder  principle,  excluded  the  place  of  birth  as  the  source 
of  nationality  in  itself ;  but  compromising,  as  it  were,  with  the  old  rule, 
they  allowed  the  place  of  birth  to  have  effect  so  far  as  to  give  to  the  off- 
spring of  an  alien  the  right  of  claiming  French  nationality  on  attaining 
full  age.  The  example  set  by  the  framers  of  the  French  Code  has  been 
followed  by  the  nations  by  which  that  Code  has  been  adopted,  as  also  by 
others  in  remodeling  their  Constitutions  or  Codes.  The  result  has  been 
that,  throughout  the  European  States  generally,  descent,  and  not  the 
place  of  birth,  has  been  adopted  as  the  primary  criterion  of  nationality, 
though  with  a  reservation  in  some,  of  a  right  to  persons  born  within  the 
territory  to  claim  nationality  within  a  fixed  period. 

191.  Extradition  for  political  offenses.  In  general,  states  refuse 
to  extradite  persons  accused  of  "  political  offenses."  Considerable 
difficulty  arises  in  properly  defining  such  cases. 

Most  codes  extend  their  definitions  of  treason  to  acts  not  really  against 
one's  country.  They  do  not  distinguish  between  acts  against  the  gov- 
ernment and  acts  against  the  oppressions  of  the  government.  The  latter 
are  virtues,  yet  have  furnished  more  victims  to  the  executioner  than 
the  former.  .  .  .  The  unsuccessful  strugglers  against  tyranny  have 
been  the  chief  martyrs  of  treason  laws  in  all  countries.  .  .  .  Treasons, 
then,  taking  the  simulated  with  the  real,  are  sufficiently  punished  by 
exile.  .  .  . 

By  the  treaties  between  the  United  States  on  the  one  hand,  and 
Belgium  and  Luxemburg  on  the  other,  which  were  respectively  con- 
cluded in  18S2  and  1883,  when  the  memory  of  the  assassination  of 
President  Garfield  was  still  fresh,  it  was  provided  that  an  attempt  against 
the  life  of  the  head  of  the  government  or  against  that  of  any  member  of 
his  family,  when  such  attempt  "  comprises  the  act  either  of  murder  or 
assassination,  or  of  poisoning,  shall  not  be  considered  a  political  offense 
or  an  act  connected  with  such  an  offense.  .  .   . 

Although  anarchists  profess  political  motives  for  their  acts,  yet  in  June, 
1894,  the  British  government,  after  full  consideration  of  the  question  by 
the  court  of  Queen's  Bench,  delivered  up  to  Prance  a  fugitive  from  jus- 
tice, who  was  charged  with  causing  the  explosion  at  the  Cafe  Ve'ry  in 
Paris,  as  well  as  another  explosion  at  certain  government  barracks.  The 
court  held  "  that,  in  order  to  constitute  an  offense  of  a  political  charac- 
ter, there  must  be  two  or  more  parties  in  the  state,  each  seeking  to  im- 
pose the  government  of  their  own  choice  on  the  other  " ;  and  that  the 
offense  must  be  "  committed  by  one  side  or  the  other  in  pursuance  of 
that  object."  .   .  . 


CONTENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  229 

192.  Immunities  of  diplomatic  agents.  The  exemption  of 
foreign  ministers  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  states  to  which  they 
are  sent  is  brought  out  in  the  following  case  : 

A  case  of  homicide  having  occurred  at  Washington,  in  1856,  in  the 
presence  of  the  Dutch  minister,  whose  testimony  was  deemed  al- 
together material  for  the  trial,  "  and  inasmuch  as  he  was  exempt  from 
the  ordinary  process  to  compel  the  attendance  of  witnesses,"  an  applica- 
tion was  made  by  the  district  attorney,  through  the  Secretary  of  State,  to 
Mr.  Dubois  to  appear  and  testify.  The  minister  having  refused,  by  the 
unanimous  advice  of  his  colleagues,  in  a  note  of  the  nth  of  May,  1856, 
to  the  Secretary  of  State,  to  appear  as  a  witness,  Mr.  Marcy,  Secretary 
of  State,  instructed,  May  15,  1856,  Mr.  Belmont,  minister  of  the  United 
States  at  The  Hague,  to  bring  the  matter  to  the  attention  of  the  Nether- 
lands Government. 

Mr.  Marcy  says,  that  "  it  is  not  doubted  that  both  by  the  usage  of 
nations  and'the  laws  of  the  United  States,  Mr.  Dubois  has  the  legal  right 
to  decline  to  give  his  tL'stimony ;  but  he  is  at  perfect  liberty  to  exercise 
the  privilege  to  the  extent  requested,  and  by  doing  so  he  does  not  sub- 
ject himself  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  country.  The  circumstances  of  this 
case  are  such  as  to  appeal  strongly  to  the  universal  sense  of  justice." 

III.  Diplomacy 

193.  Importance  of  the  diplomatic  service.  A  special  committee 
of  the  English  Parliament  some  years  ago  considered  the  question 
of  the  value  of  the  diplomatic  service.  Many  of  the  most  experi- 
enced statesmen  of  the  day  were  examined. 

Mr.  Cobden  asked  the  following  question :  "  If  you  go  back  two  or 
three  hundred  years,  when  there  were  no  newspapers,  when  there  was 
scarcely  such  a  thing  as  international  postal  communication,  when  affairs 
of  state  turned  upon  a  court  intrigue,  or  the  caprice  of  a  mistress,  or  a 
Pope's  bull,  or  a  marriage,  was  it  not  of  a  great  deal  more  consequence 
at  that  time  to  have  ministers  at  foreign  courts  .  .  .  than  it  is  in  these 
constitutional  times,  when  affairs  of  state  are  discussed  in  the  public  news- 
papers and  in  the  legislative  assemblies  .  ,  .  under  these  circumstances 
are  not  the  functions  of  an  ambassador  less  important  now  than  they 
were  two  or  three  hundred  years  ago  ?  " 

In  reply,  Lord  Palmerston  said :  "  I  should  humbly  conceive  that  they 
are  more  important  on  account  of  the  very  circumstances  whicli  have 
just  been  stated.   ...   I  should  think  that  the  change  which  has  taken 


2  30  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

place  with  regard  to  the  transaction  of  public  affairs  in  Europe  tends 
to  make  diplomatic  agents  of  more  importance  rather  than  of  less 
importance." 

194.  Rank  of  diplomatic  agents.  The  rank  of  diplomatic  agents, 
settled  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna  in  1815,  was  formerly  a  subject 
of  fierce  controversy. 

Four  centuries  ago  the  Pope  of  Rome,  by  virtue  of  his  conceded 
preeminence  and  ecclesiastical  authority,  sought  to  settle  the  vexed  ques- 
tion by  issuing  an  order  fixing  the  relative  rank  of  the  then  existing  na- 
tions of  Christendom.  It  illustrates  the  intensity  of  feeling  which  the 
question  had  aroused  to  state  that,  notwithstanding  the  high  papal 
authority  of  that  day,  this  arbitrary  settlement  was  not  accepted  gener- 
ally, and  was  observed  in  Rome  only,  and  even  there  merely  for  a  brief 
period.  It  also  illustrates  the  evanescent  character  of  the  honor  and  the 
changes  of  the  governments  of  the  world  to  note  that,  of  the  score  and 
a  half  of  nations  enumerated  in  the  papal  order,  only  three  (England, 
Spain,  and  Portugal)  exist  to-day  with  the  royal  titles  then  accorded 
them.  It  is  also  curious  to  note  that  in  this  table  of  precedence  England 
stood  eighth  in  order,  and  Russia  does  not  appear  in  the  list. 

195.  Reception  of  envoys.  The  ceremonial  attending  diplomatic 
relations  varies  in  different  countries. 

The  American  diplomatic  representative  goes  to  his  post  with  no  dis- 
play, and  much  as  a  private  gentleman  makes  a  visit  abroad.  In  this 
respect  a  great  change  has  taken  place  in  modem  times.  When  Sully, 
the  minister  of  King  Henry  of  Navarre,  went  on  his  mission  to  Queen 
Elizabeth,  he  took  to  England  a  retinue  of  two  hundred  gentlemen. 
Ambassador  Bassompierre  speaks  of  an  "  equipage  of  five  hundred  " 
returning  with  him  to  France,  \^'hen  Sully  reached  London,  he  was 
saluted  with  three  thousand  guns  from  the  Tower.  D'Estrades,  am- 
bassador of  Louis  XIV,  reports  that  he  was  met  at  Ryswick  by  the 
deputies  of  Holland  with  a  train  of  threescore  coaches-and-six. 

While  this  extravagant  display  has  given  place  in  the  western  nations 
to  more  official  simplicity,  the  old  diplomatic  order  of  things  still  lingers 
in  the  Far  East.  When  the  Viceroy  Li  Hung  Chang  went  to  Japan  in 
1895  to  sue  for  peace,  two  merchant  steamers  were  chartered  to  carry 
his  suite  of  one  hundred  and  thirty-five  persons  and  their  paraphernalia. 
The  Japanese  embassy  which  visited  Peking  in  1905,  to  negotiate  for 
an  adjustment  of  the  questions  growing  out  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war, 
was  attended  with  great  state.    The  ambassador  and  his  suite,  whenever 


CONTENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  231 

they  moved  about,  were  accompanied  by  a  large  and  imposing  escort, 
and  the  ceremonial  observed  was  studiously  |)lanned  to  impress  the 
Chinese.  On  their  departure  they  bestowed  liberal  gifts  of  money  upon 
various  local  institutions,  and  traveled  by  special  railway  train  with  a 
military  guard. 

196.  Refusal  to  receive  diplomatic  agents.  The  following  case 
is  an  example  of  reasons  for  which  a  diplomatic  agent  may  be 
persona  non  grata : 

In  1885  the  Italian  Government  objected  to  receiving  as  minister 
from  the  United  States  Mr.  A.  M.  Keiley.  Its  objection  was  ba.sed  upon 
a  speech  made  by  Mr.  Keiley  at  a  public  meeting  of  Roman  Catholics, 
held  in  Richmond,  Va.,  January  12,  187 1,  in  support  of  certain  resolu- 
tions prepared  by  the  bishops  of  the  diocese,  one  of  which  protested 
"  against  the  invasion  and  spoliation  of  the  states  of  the  church  by  King 
Victor  Emmanuel  as  a  crime  against  solemn  treaties  and  against  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  head  of  the  church  on  earth,  which  must  always  be  im- 
periled while  he  is  the  subject  of  any  temporal  prince  or  government." 
When  the  objection  of  the  Italian  Government  was  brought  to  Mr. 
Keiley's  attention  he  resigned  his  commission.  The  Government  of  the 
United  States,  in  the  correspondence  with  the  Italian  Government, 
recognized  "  the  full  and  independent  right "  of  the  King  of  Italy  to 
decide  the  question  of  the  "  personal  acceptability  to  him  "  of  an  envoy 
from  another  government. 

197.  Privileges  and  immunities  of  consuls  in  eastern  coiintries. 

The  consular  regulations  of  the  LTnited  States  outline  the  follow- 
ing rights  of  consuls  in  non-Christian  countries  : 

In  non-Christian  countries  the  rights  of  exterritoriality  have*  been 
largely  preserved,  and  have  generally  been  confirmed  by  treaties  to  con- 
sular officers.  To  a  great  degree  they  enjoy  the  immunities  of  diplo- 
matic representatives,  together  with  certain  prerogatives  of  jurisdiction, 
the  right  of  worship,  and,  to  some  extent,  the  right  of  as)-lum.  These 
immunities  extend  to  exemption  from  both  the  civil  and  criminal  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  country  to  which  they  are  sent,  and  protect  their  households 
and  the  effects  covered  by  the  consular  residence.  Their  personal  proj> 
erty  is  exempt  from  taxation,  though  it  may  be  otherwise  with  real  estate 
or  movables  not  connected  with  the  consulate.  Generally,  they  are  ex- 
empt from  all  personal  impositions  that  arise  from  the  character  or  quality 
of  a  subject  or  citizen  of  the  country. 


2  32  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

198.  Exchange  of  gifts  on  the  ratification  of  treaties.  The 
practice  of  exchanging  gifts  when  treaties  are  ratified,  formerly 
common,  has  now  fallen  into  disuse.^ 

After  the  treaty  with  Persia  of  1866  was  concluded,  ...  the  Ameri- 
can minister  to  Turkey,  who  signed  it,  wrote  the  Secretary  of  State  as 
follows :  "  You  are  aware  of  the  fact  that  the  Ottoman  and  Persian 
Governments  always  expect  to  receive  presents  from  the  Christian  pow- 
ers with  whom  they  negotiate  treaties,  when  the  ratifications  of  such 
treaties  are  exchanged.  The  treaty  made  with  Turkey  cost  the  United 
States  some  fifty  thousand  dollars.  A  much  less  sum  would,  in  my 
opinion,  suffice  to  satisfy  the  Persian  officials.  I  learn  that  Spain,  upon 
the  exchange  of  ratifications  of  a  treaty  made  by  her  with  Persia,  gave 
presents  to  the  amount  of  twelve  thousand  dollars.  I  do  not  think  that 
our  Government  should  give  less. 

■  "  I  would  suggest  the  following  present :  a  diamond  snuffbox  of  the 
value  of  four  thousand  dollars,  for  the  Shah,  and  a  few  good  specimens 
of  improved  American  firearms,  he  being  very  fond  of  hunting ;  to  Mirza 
Agbra  Khan,  the  Grand  Vizier,  a  diamond  snuffbox  to  the  value  of  three 
thousand  dollars ;  to  Farrukh  Khan,  with  whom  the  treaty  was  negoti- 
ated, another  of  the  same  value.  ...  To  Melkhom  Khan,  who  was  also 
engaged  in  the  negotiation  of  the  treaty  and  was  instrumental  in  forming 
it,  a  present  of  the  value  of  one  thousand  dollars,  besides  baksheeshes  to 
the  different  attache's  of  the  Persian  legation,  who  all  expect  them.  A 
less  amount  than  fifteen  thousand  dollars  will  not  suffice." 

199.  The  open  door.  In  a  letter  from  Secretary  of  State  John 
Hay  to  the  United  States  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  the  prin- 
ciples which  the  United  States  desired  to  see  applied  in  China  are 
thus  stated  : 

The  principles  which  this  Government  is  particularly  desirous  of  see- 
ing formally  declared  by  His  Imperial  Majesty  and  by  all  the  great 
Powers  interested  in  China,  and  which  will  be  eminently  beneficial  to 
the  commercial  interests  of  the  whole  world,  are : 

First.  The  recognition  that  no  Power  will  in  any  way  interfere  with 
any  treaty  port  or  any  vested  interest  within  any  leased  territory  or 
within  any  so-called  "  sphere  of  interest "  it  may  have  in  China. 

Second.  That  the  Chinese  treaty  tariff  of  the  time  being  shall  apply 
to  all  merchandise  landed  or  shipped  to  all  such  ports  as  are  within  said 
"  sphere  of  interest "  (unless  they  be  "  free  ports  "),  no  matter  to  what 

^  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 


CONTENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW      233 

nationality  it  may  belong,  and  that  duties  so  leviable  shall  be  collected  by 
the  Chinese  Government. 

Third.  That  it  will  levy  no  higher  harbor  dues  on  vessels  of  another 
nationality  frequenting  any  port  in  such  "  sphere  "  than  shall  be  levied 
on  vessels  of  its  own  nationality,  and  no  higher  railroad  charges  over 
lines  built,  controlled,  or  operated  within  its  "  sphere  "  on  merchandise 
belonging  to  citizens  or  subjects  of  other  nationalities  transported  through 
such  "  sphere  "  than  shall  be  levied  on  similar  merchandise  belonging 
to  its  own  nationals  transported  over  equal  distances. 

200.  The  call  of  the  first  peace  conference.  In  August,  1898, 
the  following  letter  was  issued  by  the  Russian  foreign  minister  : 

The  maintenance  of  general  peace,  and  a  possible  reduction  of  the 
excessive  armaments  which  weigh  upon  all  nations,  present  themselves 
in  the  existing  condition  of  the  whole  world,  as  the  ideal  towards  which 
the  endeavors  of  all  governments  should  be  directed. 

The  humanitarian  and  magnanimous  ideas  of  His  Majesty  the  Em- 
peror, my  august  master,  have  been  won  over  to  this  view.  In  the 
conviction  that  this  lofty  aim  is  in  conformity  with  the  most  essential 
interests  and  the  legitimate  views  of  all  powers,  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment thinks  that  the  present  moment  would  be  very  favorable  for  seek- 
ing, by  means  of  international  discussion,  the  most  effectual  means  of 
insuring  to  all  peoples  the  benefits  of  a  real  and  durable  peace,  and, 
above  all,  of  putting  an  end  to  the  progressive  development  of  the 
present  armaments.  .  .  . 

Filled  with  this  idea.  His  Majesty  has  been  pleased  to  order  me  to 
propose  to  all  the  governments  whose  representatives  are  accredited  to 
the  Imperial  Court,  the  meeting  of  a  conference  which  should  occupy 
itself  with  this  grave  problem. 

201.  The  work  of  the  Second  Hague  Conference.  Ur.  J.  W. 
Scott,  a  technical  delegate  representing  the  United  States  at  the 
Second  Hague  Conference  (1907),  sums  up  its  work  as  follows  : 

The  work  of  the  Second  Conference,  for  which  the  year  1907  will 
be  memorable,  was  twofold.  First,  it  revised  and  enlarged  the  conven- 
tions of  1899  in  the  light  of  experience,  in  the  light  of  practice  as  well 
as  of  theory,  and  put  them  forth  to  the  world  in  a  new  and  modified 
form.  In  the  next  place,  the  Conference  did  not  limit  itself  to  these 
subjects.  To  the  three  conventions  of  1899,  revised  in  1907,  were  added 
ten  new  conventions.  .  .  .  Tried  by  the  standards  of  results,  the  Con- 
ference clearly  justified  its  existence,  but  it  would  have  been  a  success 


2  34  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

had  it  demonstrated  nothing  more  than  the  possibility  of  the  represent- 
atives of  forty-four  nations    to   live  in  peace  and  quiet  during  four 

months.   .   .   . 

Leaving  out  minor  matters,  this  Conference  did  four  things  of  funda- 
mental importance  : 

1.  It  provided  for  a  meeting  of  the  Third  Conference  within  an  analo- 
gous period,  namely  eight  years,  to  be  under  the  control  of  the  powers 
generally,  instead  of  the  control  of  any  one  of  them. 

2.  It  adopted  a  convention  for  the  nonforcible  collection  of  contract 
debts,  substituting  arbitration  and  an  appeal  to  reason  for  force  and  an 
appeal  to  arms. 

3.  It  established  a  prize  court  to  safeguard  neutrals. 

4.  It  laid  the  foundations  of,  if  it  did  not  put  the  finishing  stone  to,  a 
CTcat  court  of  arbitration. 

o 

IV.  War 

202.  Reprisals.  The  following  cases  are  examples  of  reprisals, 
or  measures  involving  force  that  falls  short  of  war  : 

A  convention  was  signed  at  London  on  October  31,  1861,  between 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  Spain  for  the  purpose  of  taking  forcible 
measures  with  a  view  to  obtain  redress  from  Mexico  for  injuries  done 
to  their  subjects  in  that  country.  The  United  States  was  advised  to 
accede  to  the  arrangement,  but  declined  to  do  so.  After  the  three 
Governments  had  adopted  certain  measures  of  force,  the  British  and 
Spanish  Governments  withdrew,  while  France  entered  upon  that  course 
of  intervention  which  resulted  in  the  attempt  to  establish  an  empire  in 
Mexico.  .  .  . 

In  November,  1901,  France  seized  the  customhouse  at  Mytilene  in 
order  to  enforce  compliance  by  the  Turkish  Government  with  demands 
for  the  settlement  of  the  Lorando  claim,  the  rebuilding  of  French  schools 
and  institutions  destroyed  in  1895-96,  the  official  recognition  of  exist- 
ing schools  and  institutions,  and  the  recognition  of  the  Chaldean 
patriarch. 

203.  Kinds  of  war.  Distinctions  may  be  drawn  between  "gen- 
eral "  and  "  limited  "  wars  ;  and  various  degrees  of  internal  dis- 
turbance admit  of  classification. 

Wheaton  and  other  writers  speak  of  "  perfect  "  and  "  imperfect  "  wars, 
the  former  being  one  in  which  it  is  said  the  whole  nation  is  at  war  with 
another  nation  and  all  the  members  of  each  are  authorized  to  commit 


CONTENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  235 

hostilities  against  all  ihc  members  of  the  other  in  ever)-  case  permitted 
by  the  laws  of  war ;  the  latter,  a  war  limited  as  to  places,  persons,  and 
things.  It  may  be  suggested  that  it  would  be  more  nearly  correct  to 
speak  of  wars  in  this  sense  as  general  and  limited.  .   .  . 

Insurrection  is  the  rising  of  people  in  arms  against  their  government, 
or  a  portion  of  it,  or  against  one  or  more  of  its  laws,  or  against  an  offi- 
cer or  officers  of  the  government.  It  may  be  confined  to  mere  armed 
resistance,  or  it  may  have  greater  ends  in  view. 

Civil  war  is  war  between  two  or  more  portions  of  a  country  or  state, 
each  contending  for  the  mastery  of  the  whole,  and  each  claiming  to  be  the 
legitimate  government.  The  term  is  also  sometimes  api)Iied  U)  war  of 
rebellion,  when  the  rebellious  provinces  or  portions  of  the  state  are 
contiguous  to  those  containing  the  seat  of  government. 

The  term  rebellion  is  applied  to  an  insurrection  of  large  extent,  and 
is  usually  a  war  between  the  legitimate  government  of  a  countrv  and 
portions  of  provinces  of  the  same  who  seek  to  throw  off  their  allegiance 
to  it  and  set  up  a  government  of  their  own. 

204.  Residence  in  case  of  war.  The  duties  of  American  citizens 
resident  in  foreign  states  at  a  time  when  their  country  is  engaged 
in  war  are  thus  stated  by  the  Supreme  Court : 

The  duty  of  a  citizen  when  war  breaks  out,  if  it  be  a  foreign  war,  and 
he  is  abroad,  is  to  return  without  delay ;  and  if  it  be  a  civil  war,  and  he 
is  a  resident  in  the  rebellious  section,  he  should  leave  it  as  soon  as  prac- 
ticable and  adhere  to  the  regular  established  government.   .   .  . 

Personal  property,  except  such  as  is  the  product  of  the  hostile  soil, 
follows  as  a  general  rule  the  rights  of  the  proprietor ;  but  if  suffered  to 
remain  in  the  hostile  country  after  war  breaks  out,  it  becomes  impressed 
with  the  national  character  of  the  belligerent  where  it  is  situated. 
Promptitude  is  therefore  justly  required  of  citizens  resident  in  the  enemy 
country,  or  having  personal  property  there,  in  changing  their  domicile, 
severing  those  business  relations,  or  disposing  of  their  effects,  as  matter 
of  duty  to  their  own  government,  and  as  tending  to  weaken  the  enemy. 
Presumption  of  the  law  of  nations  is  against  one  who  lingers  in  the 
enemy's  country,  and  if  he  continues  there  for  much  length  of  time, 
without  satisfactory'  explanations,  he  is  liable  to  be  considered  as  remcv 
rant,  or  guilty  of  culpable  delay,  and  an  enemy. 

205.  Conquest  and  private  ownership  of  land.  The  general 
principle  that  conquest  works  no  change  in  jM-i\ate  titles  to  land  is 
laid  down  in  the  following  opinion  of  Chief  justice  Swaync  (1863): 


2  ^^6  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


■3 


California  belonged  to  Spain  by  the  rights  of  discovery  and  conquest. 
The  government  of  that  country  established  regulations  for  transfers  of 
the  public  domain  to  individuals.  When  the  sovereignty  of  Spain  was 
displaced  by  the  revolutionary  action  of  Mexico,  the  new  government 
established  regulations  upon  the  same  subject.  These  two  sovereignties  are 
the  springheads  of  all  the  land  titles  in  California,  existing  at  the  time 
of  the  cession  of  that  country  to  the  United  States  by  the  treaty  of 
Guadalupe  Hidalgo.  That  cession  did  not  impair  the  rights  of  private 
property.  They  were  consecrated  by  the  law  of  nations,  and  protected 
by  the  tre^y. 

206.  Treatment  of  prisoners  of  war.  The  following  extracts 
from  letters  written  by  Secretary  of  State  Webster  (1842)  indicate 
the  modern  attitude  toward  prisoners  of  war : 

Prisoners  of  war  are  to  be  considered  as  unfortunate  and  not  as  crim- 
inal, and  are  to  be  treated  accordingly,  although  the  question  of  deten- 
tion or  liberation  is  one  affecting  the  interest  of  the  captor  alone,  and 
therefore  one  with  which  no  other  government  ought  to  interfere  in  any 
way ;  yet  the  right  to  detain  by  no  means  implies  the  right  to  dispose  of 
the  prisoners  at  the  pleasure  of  the  captor.  That  right  involves  certain 
duties,  among  them  that  of  providing  the  prisoners  with  the  necessaries 
of  life  and  abstaining  from  the  infliction  of  any  punishment  upon  them 
which  they  may  not  have  merited  by  an  offense  against  the  laws  of  the 
country  since  they  were  taken.  .  .  . 

The  law  of  war  forbids  the  wounding,  killing,  impressment  into  the 
troops  of  the  countr}',  or  the  enslaving  or  otherwise  maltreating  of 
prisoners  of  war,  unless  they  have  been  guilty  of  some  grave  crime ;  and 
from  the  obligation  of  this  law  no  civilized  state  can  discharge  itself. 

207.  The  Geneva  Convention.  The  character  and  purpose  of  the 
Red  Cross  Convention,  signed  at  Geneva,  August  2,  1864,  by 
representatives  of  twelve  powers  and  later  agreed  to  by  twenty 
others,  follow  :  ^ 

The  treatment  of  the  sick  and  wounded  in  war  is  now  largely  regu- 
lated by  the  requirements  of  the  Geneva  Convention  of  August  2,  1864, 
the  operation  of  which  has  been  extended  to  hostilities  at  sea  by  the 
Additional  Articles  of  October  10,  1868,  and  by  the  Convention  in 
respect  to  the  rules  of  maritime  warfare  which  were  adopted  by  the 
Peace  Conference  at  The  Hague  in  1899.     Nearly  all  civilized  states 

^  By  permission  of  Harper  &  Brothers. 


CONTENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


■^n 


are  now  parties  to  the  operation  of  these  agreements,  the  efficiency  of 
which,  as  agencies  for  the  amelioration  of  the  condition  of  the  sick  and 
wounded,  has  been  fully  established  in  the  great  international  conflicts 
which  have  taken  place  during  the  generation  that  has  elapsed  since 
their  original  adoption.  .  .  . 

The  rules  of  the  Geneva  Convention,  and  other  undertakings  of  like 
character,  become  operative  only  when  individual  combatants  have  been 
disabled  by  wounds  and  disease.  Their  effect  is  to  confer  certain  privi- 
leges and  immunities  upon  the  sickvand  wounded,  as  a  class,  and  to 
secure  to  the  places  in  which  they  are  collected  and  cared  for,  and  to 
the  persons  who  attend  them,  as  complete  an  immunity  from  the  effects 
of  hostile  operations  as  it  is  possible  to  accord  them  under  the  circum- 
stances of  each  particular  case. 

208.  Flags  of  truce.  The  following  conventions  regarding  the 
laws  and  customs  of  \yar  on  land  were  adopted  at  the  First  Hague 
Conference,  July  29,  1899  : 

Article  XXXI I.  An  individual  is  considered  as  bearing  a  flag  of 
truce  who  is  authorized  by  one  of  the  belligerents  to  enter  into  commu- 
nication with  the  other,  and  who  carries  a  white  flag.  He  has  a  right 
to  inviolability,  as  well  as  the  trumpeter,  bugler,  or  drummer,  the  flag 
bearer,  and  the  interpreter  who  may  accompany  him. 

Article  XXXIII.  The  Chief  to  whom  a  flag  of  truce  is  sent  is  not 
obliged  to  receive  it  in  all  circumstances. 

He  can.  take  all  steps  necessary  to  prevent  the  envoy  taking  advan- 
tage of  his  mission  to  obtain  information. 

In  case  of  abuse,  he  has  the  right  to  detain  the  envoy  temporarily. 

Article  XXXIV.  The  envoy  loses  his  rights  of  inviolability  if  it  is 
proved  beyond  a  doubt  that  he  has  taken  advantage  of  his  privileged 
position  to  provoke  or  commit  an  act  of  treachery. 

209.  Methods  of  carrying  on  war.  The  international  usage  and 
practice  of  nations  in  war  are  still  indicated  fairly  well  by  the  rules 
laid  clown  for  the  guidance  of  the  army  of  the  United  States  at  the 
time  of  the  Civil  War.    The  history  of  this  code  is  as  follows  :  ^ 

The  need  of  a  positive  code  of  instructions  was  severely  felt  during 
the  eariy  part  of  the  Civil  War  in  the  United  States.  During  the  first 
two  years  of  that  war  the  Federal  Government  had  succeeded  in  plac- 
ing in  the  field  armies  of  unexampled  size,  composed,  in  great  part,  of 

1  By  permission  of  Harper  &  Brothers. 


2^8  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


■J 


men  taken  from  civil  pursuits,  most  of  whom  were  unfamiliar  with  mili- 
tary affairs,  and  so  utterly  unacquainted  with  the  usages  of  war.  These 
armies  were  carrying  on  hostile  operations  of  every  kind  over  a  wide 
area,  and  questions  of  considerable  intricacy  and  difficulty  were  con- 
stantly arising,  which  required  for  their  decision  a  knowledge  of  inter- 
national law  which  was  not  always  possessed  by  those  to  whom  these 
questions  were  submitted  for  decision.  .  .   . 

To  remedy  this  difficulty.  Professor  Francis  Lieber,  an  eminent  jurist, 
who  had  been  for  many  years  an  esteemed  and  honored  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  was  requested  by  the  Secretary  of  War  to  prepare  a  code 
of  instructions  for  the  government  of  the  armies  in  the  field.  .  .  .  The 
rules  prepared  by  Dr.  Lieber  were  submitted  to  a  board  of  officers,  by 
whom  they  were  approved  and  recommended  for  adoption.  They  were 
published  in  1863,  and  were  made  obligatory  upon  the  armies  of  the 
United  States  by  their  publication  in  the  form  of  a  General  Order  of  the 
War  Department. 

Although  more  than  a  generation  has  elapsed  since  they  were  pre- 
pared, they  are  still  in  substantial  accordance  with  the  existing  rules  of 
international  law  upon  the  subject  of  which  they  treat,  and  form  the 
basis  of  Bluntschli's  and  other  elaborate  works  upon  the  usages  of  war. 
They  are  accepted  by  text  writers  of  authority  as  having  standard  and 
permanent  value,  and  as  expressing,  with  great  accuracy,  the  usage  and 
practice  of  nations  in  war. 

210.  Legal  principles  observed  by  prize  courts.  The  nature  of 
the  law  applied  by  prize  courts  may  be  stated  as  follows  : 

The  court  of  prize  is  emphatically  a  court  of  the  law  of  nations ;  and 
it  takes  neither  its  character  nor  its  rules  from  the  mere  municipal  regu- 
lations of  any  country.  By  this  law  the  definition  of  prize  goods  is  that 
they  are  goods  taken  on  the  high  seas,  jure  belli,  out  of  the  hands  of 
the  enemy.  .  .  . 

Prize  courts  are  subject  to  the  instructions  of  their  own  sovereign. 
In  the  absence  of  such  instructions  their  jurisdiction  and  rules  of  decision 
are  to  be  ascertained  by  reference  to  the  known  powers  of  such  tribunals 
and  the  principles  by  which  they  are  governed  under  the  public  law  and 
the  practice  of  nations. 

Prize  courts  are  tribunals  of  the  law  of  nations,  and  the  jurisprudence 
they  administer  is  a  part  of  that  law.  They  deal  with  cases  of  capture 
as  distinguished  from  seizures ;  their  decrees  are  decrees  of  condemna- 
tion, not  of  forfeiture ;  they  judge  the  character  and  relations  of  the 
vessel  and  cargo,  and  not  the  acts  of  persons. 


CONTENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  239 

V.  Neutrality  and  Neutral  Commerce 

211.  Neutralized  states.  States  have  been  permanently  neutral- 
ized by  convention.  Such  states  must  not  take  part  in  war ;  in 
return  they  are  guaranteed  against  attack. 

As  early  as  1803  France  promised  constandy  to  employ  her  good 
offices  to  procure  the  neutrality  of  Switzerland  .  .  . ;  and  by  a  decla- 
ration confirmed  by  the  Treaty  of  Vienna,  Art.  84,  it  was  recited  that  the 
European  powers  acknowledge  "  that  the  general  interest  demands  that 
the  Helvetic  State  should  enjoy  the  advantage  of  a  perpetual  neu- 
trality"; and  such  a  neutrality  was  guaranteed  to  it  accordingly.  .  .  . 
By  the  treaties  of  1831  and  1839  Belgium  was  recognized  as  ''an  in- 
dependent and  perpetually  neutral  state,  bound  to  observe  the  same 
neutrality  with  reference  to  other  states."  At  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
of  1870,  England  made  treaties  with  France  and  Prussia,  respectively, 
with  a  view  to  further  securing  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.   .   .   . 

By  the  Treaty  of  London  of  May  11,  1867,  Art.  I,  Luxemburg  is 
declared  to  be  a  perpetually  neutral  state  under  the  guarantee  of  the 
courts  of  Austria,  Great  Britain,  Prussia,  and  Russia. 

212.  International  position  of  the  Suez  and  Panama  canals.  The 

following  arrangements  concerning  the  I'anama  Canal,  contained 
in  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  of  1901,  are  substantially  the  same 
as  those  concerning  the  .Suez  Canal,  contained  in  the  convention 
signed  at  Constantinople  in  1888. 

1.  The  canal  shall  be  free  and  open  to  the  vessels  of  commerce  and 
of  war  of  all  nations  observing  these  Rules,  on  terms  of  entire  equality.  .  .  . 

2.  The  canal  shall  never  be  blockaded,  nor  shall  any  right  of  war 
be  exercised  nor  any  act  of  hostility  be  committed  within  it.   .  .  . 

3.  Vessels  of  war  of  a  belligerent  shall  not  revictual  nor  take  any 
stores  in  the  canal  except  so  far  as  may  be  strictly  necessary ;  and  the 
transit  of  such  vessels  through  the  canal  shall  be  effected  with  the  least 
possible  delay.   .   .  . 

4.  No  belligerent  shall  embark  or  disembark  troops,  munitions  of  war, 
or  warlike  materials  in  the  canal.  .  .  . 

5.  The  provisions  of  this  Article  shall  apply  to  waters  adjacent  to  the 
canal,  within  three  marine  miles  of  either  end.  Vessels  of  war  of  a 
belligerent  shall  not  remain  in  such  waters  longer  than  twenty-four 
hours  at  any  one  time,  except  in  case  of  distress,  and  in  such  case,  shall 
depart  as  soon  as  possible ;  but  a  vessel  of  war  of  one  belligerent  shall 


240  READINGS  IN   POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

not  depart  within  twenty-four  hours  from  the  departure  of  a  vessel  of 
war  of  the  other  belligerents. 

213.  Rules  of  neutrality  applied  in  the  Geneva  award.    The 

arbiters,  in  determining  British  liability  for  the  depredations  of 
the  Alabama  and  other  cruisers,  observed  the  following  rules  laid 
down  for  them  in  the  Treaty  of  Washington,  1871. 

A  neutral  Government  is  bound  — 

First.  To  use  due  diligence  to  prevent  the  fitting  out,  arming,  or 
equipping,  within  its  jurisdiction,  of  any  vessel  which  it  has  reasonable 
ground  to  believe  is  intended  to  cruise  or  to  carry  on  war  against  a 
power  with  which  it  is  at  peace;  and  also  to  use  like  diligence  to  pre- 
vent the  departure  from  its  jurisdiction  of  any  vessel  intended  to  cruise 
or  carry  on  war  as  above,  such  vessel  having  been  specially  adapted,  in 
whole  or  in  part,  within  such  jurisdiction,  to  warlike  use. 

Secondly.  Not  to  permit  or  suffer  either  belligerent  to  make  use  of 
its  ports  or  waters  as  the  base  of  naval  operations  against  the  other,  or 
for  the  purpose  of  the  renewal  or  augmentation  of  military  supplies  or 
arms,  or  the  recruitment  of  men. 

Thirdly.  To  exercise  due  diligence  in  its  own  ports  and  waters,  and 
as  to  all  persons  within  its  jurisdiction,  to  prevent  any  violation  of  the 
foregoing  obligations  and  duties. 

214.  The  Rule  of  1756.  This  principle,  made  famous  during 
the  Napoleonic  period,  may  be  briefly  explained  as  follows  : 

Under  the  rule  of  colonial  monopoly  that  universally  prevailed  in  the 
eighteenth  century,  the  trade  with  colonial  possessions  was  exclusively 
confined  to  vessels  of  the  home  country.  In  1756  the  French,  being,  by 
reason  of  England's  maritime  supremacy,  unable  longer  to  carry  on 
trade  with  their  colonies  in  their  own  bottoms,  and  being  thus  deprived 
of  colonial  succor,  issued  licenses  to  Dutch  vessels  to  take  up  and  carry 
on  the  prostrate  trade.  Thereupon  the  British  minister  at  The  Hague, 
by  instruction  of  his  Government,  announced  to  the  Government  of  the 
Netherlands  that  Great  Britain  would  in  future  enforce  the  rule  that 
neutrals  would  not  be  permitted  to  engage  in  time  of  war  in  a  trade 
from  which  they  were  excluded  in  time  of  peace.  The  restriction  thus 
announced  was  enforced  by  the  British  Government  through  its  prize 
courts.    It  has  since  been  known  as  "  the  rule  of  the  war  of  1756." 

215.  The  Declaration  of  Paris.  On  March  30,  1856,  the  Cri- 
mean War  was  terminated  by  the  Treaty  of  Paris.  At  the  suggestion 
of  the  French  plenipotentiary,  the  representatives  of  the  powers 


CONTENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW      24 1 

that  had  been  parties  to  the  treaty  met  to  consider  the  rules  of 
maritime  capture.    On  April  16,  1856,  they  adopted  the  following  : 

.  .  .  Considering: 

That  maritime  law,  in  time  of  war,  has  long  been  the  subject  of 
deplorable  disputes ; 

That  the  uncertainty  of  the  law,  and  of  the  duties  in  such  a  matter, 
gives  rise  to  differences  of  opinion  between  neutrals  and  belligerents 
which  may  occasion  serious  difficulties,  and  even  conflicts ; 

That  it  is  consequently  advantageous  to  establish  a  uniform  doctrine 
on  so  important  a  point ;  .   .   . 

The  above-mentioned  Plenipotentiaries  .  .  .  have  adopted  the  fol- 
lowing solemn  declaration : 

1.  Privateering  is,  and  remains  abolished. 

2.  The  neutral  flag  covers  enemy's  goods,  with  the  exception  of 
contraband  of  war. 

3.  Neutral  goods,  with  the  exception  of  contraband  of  war,  are  not 
liable  to  capture  under  the  enemy's  flag. 

4.  Blockades,  in  order  to  be  binding,  must  be  effective,  that  is  to  say, 
maintained  by  a  force  sufficient  really  to  prevent  access  to  the  coast  of 
the  enemy. 

216.  Policy  of  the  United  States  regarding  neutral  trade.    The 

leading  reasons  for  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  in  desiring  to 

extend  the  rights  of  neutrals  follow : 

The  policy  of  the  United  States  is  to  maintain  neutral  immunities  for 
the  following  reasons:  —  (i)  The  probabilities  of  war  are  far  less  with 
us  than  with  the  great  European  states.  From  the  nature  of  things, 
points  of  friction  between  the  United  States  and  foreign  nations  are 
comparatively  few.  ...  (2)  Although  the  richest  country  in  the  world, 
our  traditions  and  temper  are  averse  to  large  naval  and  military  estab- 
lishments. (3)  The  idea  of  pacific  settlement  of  disputed  international 
questions  is  one  of  growing  power  among  us ;  the  horror  of  war  has  not 
been  diminished  by  the  experience  of  the  civil  war ;  there  is  no  country 
in  the  world  where  love  of  order  is  so  great,  and  in  which  public  peace 
is  kept  by  an  army  and  navy  so  small.  ...  (4)  It  is  impossible  to  over- 
come the  feeling  that  the  sea,  like  the  air,  should  be  free,  and  that  no 
power,  no  matter  how  great  its  resources,  should  be  permitted  to  domi- 
nate it,  so  as  to  enable  it,  in  case  of  war,  to  ransack  all  ships  which  may 
be  met  for  the  discovery  of  an  enemy's  goods.  .  .  .  (5)  It  is  not  right 
to  offer  such  a  premium  to  preponderance  of  naval  strength  as  is  offered 
by  the  theory  of  belligerent  rights  as  maintained  in  Great  Britain. 


242  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

217.  Method  of  exercising  the  right  of  search.  The  following 
instructions  issued  to  American  war  vessels  during  the  Spanish 
War  indicate  modern  methods  of  search  : 

This  right  should  be  exercised  with  tact  and  consideration,  and  in 
strict  conformity  with  treaty  provisions,  wherever  they  exist.  The 
following  directions  are  given,  subject  to  any  special  treaty  stipulations : 
After  firing  a  blank  charge,  and  causing  the  vessel  to  lie  to,  the  cruiser 
should  send  a  small  boat,  no  larger  than  a  whaleboat,  with  an  officer  to 
conduct  the  search.  There  may  be  arms  in  the  boat,  but  the  men 
should  not  wear  them  on  their  persons.  The  officer  wearing  only  his 
side  arms,  and  accompanied  on  board  by  not  more  than  two  men  of  his 
boat's  crew,  unarmed,  should  first  examine  the  vessel's  papers  to 
ascertain  her  nationality  and  her  ports  of  departure  and  destination.  If 
she  is  neutral,  and  trading  between  neutral  ports,  the  examination  goes 
no  further.  If  she  is  neutral,  and  bound  to  an  enemy's  port  not 
blockaded,  the  papers  which  indicate  the  character  of  her  cargo  should 
be  examined.  If  these  show  contraband  of  war,  the  vessel  should  be 
seized;  if  not,  she  should  be  set  free,  unless,  by  reason  of  strong 
grounds  of  suspicion,  a  further  search  should  seem  to  be  requisite. 

218.  Kinds  of  blockade.    The  distinctions  between  the  two 

main  types  of  blockade  follow : 

Blockades  are  divided,  by  English  and  American  publicists,  into  two 
kinds:  (i)  A  simple  or  de  facto  blockade,  and  (2)  a  public  or  govern- 
mental blockade.  ...  A  simple  or  de  facto  blockade  is  constituted 
merely  by  the  fact  of  an  investment,  and  without  any  necessity  of  a 
public  notification.  As  it  arises  solely  from  facts,  it  ceases  when  they 
terminate;  its  existence  must,  therefore,  in  all  cases,  be  established  by 
clear  and  decisive  evidence.  The  burden  of  truth  is  thrown  upon  the 
captors,  and  they  are  bound  to  show  that  there  was  an  actual  blockade 
at  the  time  of  the  capture.  ...  A  public,  or  governmental  blockade,  is 
one  where  the  investment  is  not  only  actually  established,  but  where 
also  a  public  notification  of  the  fact  is  made  to  neutral  powers  by  the 
government,  or  officers  of  state,  declaring  the  blockade.  .  .  .  Hence  the 
burden  'of  proof  is  changed,  and  the  captured  party  is  now  bound  to 
repel  the  legal  presumptions  against  him  by  unequivocal  evidence. 

219.  Contraband  in  the  Declaration  of  London.  The  most  defi- 
nite statement  of  the  vexed  question  of  contraband  was  made  at 
a  conference  of  naval  powers  held  in  London  during  the  winter 
of  1 908- 1 909. 


CONTENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  ->.-. 

Article  22.  The  following  articles  and  materials  are,  without  notice, 
regarded  as  contraband,  under  the  name  of  absolute  contraband  :  .  .  . 

Article  24.  The  following  articles  and  materials,  susceptible  of  use 
in  war  as  well  as  for  purposes  of  peace,  are  without  notice  regarded  as 
contraband  of  war,  under  the  name  of  conditional  contraband  :   .   .   . 

Article  27.  Articles  and  materials,  which  are  not  susceptible  of  use 
in  war,  are  not  to  be  declared  contraband  of  war.  .   .  . 

Article  30.  Absolute  contraband  is  liable  to  capture  if  it  is  sh(jwn 
to  be  destined  to  territory  belonging  to  or  occupied  by  the  enemy,  or  to 
the  armed  forces  of  the  enemy.  It  is  immaterial  whether  the  carriage  of 
the  goods  is  direct  or  entails  either  transshipment  or  transport  over 
land.   .  .   . 

Article  ;^^.  Conditional  contraband  is  liable  to  capture  if  it  is  shown 
that  it  is  destined  for  the  use  of  the  armed  forces  or  of  a  government 
department  of  the  enemy  state,  unless  in  this  latter  case  the  circum- 
stances show  that  the  articles  cannot  in  fact  be  used  for  the  purposes  of 
the  war  in  progress.   ... 

Article  35.  Conditional  contraband  is  not  liable  to  capture,  e.xcept 
when  on  board  a  vessel  bound  for  territor)^  belonging  to  or  occupied  by 
the  enemy,  or  for  the  armed  forces  of  the  enemy,  and  when  it  is  ncH  to 
be  discharged  at  an  intervening  neutral  port. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

FORM  OF  THE  STATE  AND  OF  GOVERNMENT 

I.  Forms  of  the  State 

220.  Aristotle's  classification  of  states.  This  analysis  of  the 
forms  of  the  state,  current  among  the  Greeks,  may  still  be  applied 
in  present  political  science. 

The  government,  which  is  the  supreme  authority  in  states,  must  be  in 
the  hands  of  one,  or  of  a  few,  or  of  many.  The  true  forms  of  govern- 
ment, therefore,  are  those  in  which  the  one,  or  the  few,  or  the  many, 
govern  with  a  view  to  the  common  interest ;  but  governments  which  rule 
with  a  view  to  the  private  interest,  whether  of  the  one,  or  of  the  few,  or 
of  the  many,  are  perversions.  For  citizens,  if  they  are  truly  citizens, 
ought  to  participate  in  the  advantages  of  a  state.  Of  forms  of  govern- 
ment in  which  one  rules,  we  call  that  which  regards  the  common  inter- 
ests, kingship  or  royalty ;  that  in  which  more  than  one,  but  not  many, 
rule,  aristocracy  (the  rule  of  the  best)  ;  and  it  is  so  called,  either  because 
the  rulers  are  the  best  men,  or  because  they  have  at  heart  the  best  in- 
terests of  the  state  and  of  the  citizens.  But  when  the  citizens  at  large 
administer  the  state  for  the  common  interest,  the  government  is  called 
by  the  generic  name  —  a  constitution.   .   .   . 

Of  the  above-mentioned  forms,  the  perversions  are  as  follows :  —  of 
royalty,  tyranny  ;  of  aristocracy,  oligarchy  ;  of  constitutional  government, 
democracy.  For  tyranny  is  a  kind  of  monarchy  which  has  in  view  the 
interest  of  the  monarch  only  ;  oligarchy  has  in  view  the  interest  of  the 
wealthy  ;  democracy,  of  the  needy  :  none  of  them  the  common  good  of  all. 

221.  Four  fundamental  forms  of  the  state.  Bluntschli  adds  to 
Aristotle's  system  a  fourth  type  of  state. 

1.  The  first  form  is  Ideocracy,  of  which  the  highest  type  is  Theocracy. 
Here  the  people  regard  their  ruler  as  a  superhuman  being,  who  is  raised 
above  them  by  nature  :  God  Himself  is  regarded  as  the  true  governor  of 
the  State. 

2.  In  direct  opposition  to  Theocracy  is  Democracy.  In  the  former  the 
people  are  subjected  to  an  external  power  outside  and  above  themselves  ; 

244 


FORM  OF  THE  STATE  AND  OF  GOVERNMENT      245 

in  the  latter  the  people  govern  themselves,  i.e.  collectively  they  form 
the  government,  but  as  individuals  they  are  subjects. 

3.  In  Aristocracy  the  distinction  between  government  and  subject  is 
human,  and  within  the  limits  of  the  nation  :  an  upper  class  or  tribe 
becomes  the  government,  while  the  other  classes  and  tribes  are  subjects. 
But  while  the  latter  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  government,  the 
individual  members  of  the  ruling  class  are  also  subjects. 

4.  In  Monarchy  the  distinction  between  government  and  subjects  is 
complete,  but  it  is  again  human.  The  government  is  concentrated  in  an 
individual,  who  is  merely  a  ruler,  and  not  at  the  same  time  a  subject,  but 
who  belongs  altogether  to  the  State,  and  personifies  the  unity  of  the  nation. 

In  each  of  these  four  fundamental  forms  an  original  type  is  reflected  :  — 

Theocracy  represents  the  rule  of  God  over  the  world,  but  a  rule  which 
is  exerted  directly,  and  in  a  way  harshly  and  despotically. 

Monarchy  glorifies  the  unity  of  humanity  in  "  Man"  as  an  individual : 
the  ruler  represents  the  collective  State,  the  national  unity  is  personified 
in  its  prince. 

Democracy  expresses  the  idea  of  the  community  of  the  nation,  or  of 
all  individuals,  and  presents  to  us  the  State  as  a  parish  or  commune. 

Aristocracy  embodies  the  distinction  between  the  noble  and  the  lower 
elements  of  the  nation,  and  gives  the  rule  to  the  former.  Its  type  is  the 
nobility  of  higher  race  and  quality,  just  as  the  commune  is  the  type  of 
Democracy. 

222.  Criticism  of  Bluntschli's  classification,  l^urgess  rejects  the 
addition  of  "  theocracy  "  as  a  distinct  type  of  state. 

He  [Bluntschli]  holds  to  the  general  principle  that  states  are  to  be 
distinguished  into  monarchies,  aristocracies  and  democracies,  but  under- 
takes to  add  a  fourth  form,  which  he  calls  "  Idiokratie."  He  defines  the 
ideocracy  to  be  a  state  in  which  the  supreme  ruler  is  considered  to  be 
God  or  some  superhuman  spirit  or  an  idea.  This  appears  to  me  ver)- 
fanciful.  The  person  or  body  of  persons  who  in  last  resort  interpret  the 
will  of  God  or  of  the  superhuman  spirit  or  the  idea  for  a  given  people, 
and  who  give  their  interpretations  the  force  of  law,  constitute  the  state. 
It  signifies  nothing  that  that  person  or  body  of  j^ersons  may  have  pro- 
fessed to  derive  his  or  its  powers,  so  long  as  the  will  of  God  or  of  the 
'  superhuman  spirit  or  the  principles  of  the  idea  can  only  be  known  and 
legally  formulated  through  him  or  it.  Political  science  cannot  examine  into 
the  truth  or  fiction  of  such  a  claim.  Its  dictum  is  simply  that  the  highest 
human  power  over  a  given  population  is  the  state,  no  matter  what  may 
be  the  suiKThuman  support  upon  which  it  ma)-  claim  lo  rest.   We  must. 


246  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

therefore,  reject  this  new  creation  from  our  political  science.    It  must  be 
relegated  to  the  domain  of  political  mysticism. 

223.  Classification  of  states  according  to  international  law.   The 

following  valuable  classification  of  states  from  the  standpoint  of 
their  personality  in  external  dealings  is  given  by  Moore  : 

From  the  point  of  view  of  their  external  relations,  states  may  be 
classed  as  either  simple  or  composite.  The  characteristic  of  the  simple 
state  is  that  it  has  one  supreme  government,  and  exerts  a  single  will, 
whether  it  be  the  individual  will  of  a  sovereign  ruler,  or  the  collective 
will  of  a  popular  body  or  of  a  representative  assembly.  .  .  . 

The  simple  state  may  be  either  single,  i.e.,  wholly  separate  and  dis- 
tinct from  any  other  state,  or  it  may  be  connected  with  another  state  by 
what  is  called  a  personal  union.  .   .  . 

"  Personal  union  "  is  the  phrase  reserved  to  denote  the  condition  that 
exists  where  states,  which  are  wholly  separate  and  distinct,  have  the 
same  ruling  prince.   .   .   . 

A  composite  state  is  one  composed  of  two  or  mor-e  states.  The  char- 
acter of  the  international  person  thus  constituted  depends  upon  the 
nature  of  the  act  by  which  the  union  was  created  and  the  extent  to 
which  the  sovereignty  of  the  component  parts  is  impaired  or  taken  away. 

For  the  purposes  of  international  law,  composite  states  are  usually 
classed  as  real  unions,  confederacies,  and  federal  unions. 

Where  states  are  not  only  ruled  by  the  same  prince,  but  are  also  united 
for  international  purposes  by  an  express  agreement,  there  is  said  to  exist 
a  real  union.   .   .   . 

Where  states  associate  themselves,  in  a  permanent  manner,  for  the 
exercise  in  common  of  their  rights  of  sovereignty  for  the  general  advan- 
tage, they  constitute  a  confederation.  .  .  .  Those  states,  however,  retain 
their  internal  and,  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  their  external  sovereignty. 
Their  personality  in  international  law  is  not  destroyed.   .   .   . 

Where  states  are  united  under  a  central  government,  which  is  supreme 
within  its  sphere  and  which  possesses  and  exercises  in  external  affairs 
the  powers  of  national  sovereignty,  they  are  said  to  form,  a  federal 
union.  "  The  composite  state,  which  results  from  this  league,  is  alone  a 
sovereign  power."   .  .   . 

A  state  which  is  not  a  member  of  a  composite  state,  but  which,  while 
it  retains  a  certain  personality  in  international  law,  is  subject  to  the 
authority  of  another  state  in  its  foreign  relations,  is  commonly  called  a 
semi-sovereign  state.  The  paramount  state  is  called  the  suzerain,  and  its 
relation  to  the  subject  state  is  described  as  snzerahity. 


CONTENT  OF   L\  TKRNA'IIONAL  LAW  2  "^  I 

they  moved  about,  were  accompanied  by  a  large  and  imposing  escort, 
and  the  ceremonial  observed  was  studiously  planned  to  impress  the 
Chinese.  On  their  departure  they  bestowed  liberal  gifts  of  money  upon 
various  local  institutions,  and  traveled  by  special  railway  train  with  a 
military  guard. 

196.  Refusal  to  receive  diplomatic  agents.  The  following  case 
is  an  example  of  reasons  lor  which  a  diplomatic  agent  may  be 
persona  noi  grata  : 

In  1885  the  Italian  Government  objected  to  receiving  as  minister 
from  the  United  States  Mr.  A.  M.  Keiley.  Its  objection  was  based  upon 
a  speech  made  by  Mr.  Keiley  at  a  public  meeting  of  Roman  Catholics, 
held  in  Richmond,  Va.,  January  12,  187 1,  in  support  of  certain  resolu- 
tions prepared  by  the  bishops  of  the  diocese,  one  of  which  protested 
"  against  the  invasion  and  spoliation  of  the  states  of  the  church  by  King 
Victor  Emmanuel  as  a  crime  against  solemn  treaties  and  against  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  head  of  the  church  on  earth,  which  must  always  be  im- 
periled while  he  is  the  subject  of  any  temporal  prince  or  government." 
When  the  objection  of  the  Italian  Government  was  brought  to  Mr. 
Keiley's  attention  he  resigned  his  commission.  The  Government  of  the 
United  States,  in  the  correspondence  with  the  Italian  (Government, 
recognized  "the  full  and  independent  right"  of  the  King  of  Italy  to 
decide  the  question  of  the  "  personal  acceptability  to  him  "  of  an  envoy 
from  another  government. 

197.  Privileges  and  immunities  of  consuls  in  eastern  countries. 

The  consular  regulations  of  the  United  States  outline  tiie  follow- 
ing rights  of  consuls  in  non-Christian  countries  : 

In  non-C"hristian  countries  the  rights  of  exterritoriality  have  been 
largely  preserved,  and  have  generally  been  confirmed  b}'  treaties  to  con- 
sular officers.  To  a  great  degree  they  enjoy  the  immunities  of  diplo- 
matic representatives,  together  with  certain  prerogatives  of  jurisdiction, 
the  right  of  worship,  and,  to  some  extent,  the  right  of  asylum.  These 
immunities  extend  to  exemption  from  both  the  ci\il  and  criminal  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  country  to  which  they  are  sent,  and  protect  their  households 
and  the  effects  covered  by  the  consular  residence.  Their  personal  proj> 
erty  is  exempt  from  taxation,  though  it  may  be  otherwise  with  real  estate 
or  movables  not  connected  with  the  consulate,  (icnerally.  they  are  ex- 
empt from  all  personal  impositions  that  arise  from  the  character  or  quality 
of  a  subject  or  citizen  of  the  countr)-. 


232  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

198.  Exchange  of  gifts  on  the  ratification  of  treaties.  The 
practice  of  exchanging  gifts  when  treaties  are  ratified,  formerly 
common,  has  now  fallen  into  disuse.^ 

After  the  treaty  with  Persia  of  1866  was  concluded,  ...  the  Ameri- 
can minister  to  Turkey,  who  signed  it,  wrote  the  Secretary  of  State  as 
follows :  "  You  are  aware  of  the  fact  that  the  Ottoman  and  Persian 
Governments  always  expect  to  receive  presents  from  the  Christian  pow- 
ers with  whom  they  negotiate  treaties,  when  the  ratifications  of  such 
treaties  are  exchanged.  The  treaty  made  with  Turkey  cost  the  United 
States  some  fifty  thousand  dollars.  A  much  less  sum  would,  in  my 
opinion,  suffice  to  satisfy  the  Persian  officials.  I  learn  that  Spain,  upon 
the  exchange  of  ratifications  of  a  treaty  made  by  her  with  Persia,  gave 
presents  to  the  amount  of  twelve  thousand  dollars.  I  do  not  think  that 
our  Government  should  give  less. 

"  I  would  suggest  the  following  present :  a  diamond  snuffbox  of  the 
value  of  four  thousand  dollars,  for  the  Shah,  and  a  few  good  specimens 
of  improved  American  firearms,  he  being  very  fond  of  hunting ;  to  Mirza 
Agbra  Khan,  the  Grand  Vizier,  a  diamond  snuffbox  to  the  value  of  three 
thousand  dollars ;  to  Farrukh  Khan,  with  whom  the  treaty  was  negoti- 
ated, another  of  the  same  value.  .  .  .  To  Melkhom  Khan,  who  was  also 
engaged  in  the  negotiation  of  the  treaty  and  was  instrumental  in  forming 
it,  a  present  of  the  value  of  one  thousand  dollars,  besides  baksheeshes  to 
the  different  attache's  of  the  Persian  legation,  who  all  expect  them.  A 
less  amount  than  fifteen  thousand  dollars  will  not  suffice." 

199.  The  open  door.  In  a  letter  from  Secretary  of  State  John 
Hay  to  the  United  States  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  the  prin- 
ciples which  the  United  States  desired  to  see  applied  in  China  are 
thus  stated  : 

The  principles  which  this  Government  is  particularly  desirous  of  see- 
ing formally  declared  by  His  Imperial  Majesty  and  by  all  the  great 
Powers  interested  in  China,  and  which  will  be  eminently  beneficial  to 
the  commercial  interests  of  the  whole  world,  are : 

First.  The  recognition  that  no  Power  will  in  any  way  interfere  with 
any  treaty  port  or  any  vested  interest  within  any  leased  territory  or 
within  any  so-called  "  sphere  of  interest "  it  may  have  in  China. 

Second.  That  the  Chinese  treaty  tariff  of  the  time  being  shall  apply 
to  all  merchandise  landed  or  shipped  to  all  such  ports  as  are  within  said 
"  sphere  of  interest "  (unless  they  be  "  free  ports  "),  no  matter  to  what 

1  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 


CONTENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW      233 

nationality  it  may  belong,  and  that  duties  so  leviable  shall  be  collected  by 
the  Chinese  Government. 

Third.  That  it  will  levy  no  higher  harbor  dues  on  vessels  of  another 
nationality  frequenting  any  port  in  such  "  sphere  "  than  shall  be  levied 
on  vessels  of  its  own  nationality,  and  no  higher  railroad  charges  over 
lines  built,  controlled,  or  operated  within  its  "  sphere  "  on  merchandise 
belonging  to  citizens  or  subjects  of  other  nationalities  transported  through 
such  "  sphere  "  than  shall  be  levied  on  similar  merchandise  belonging 
to  its  own  nationals  transported  over  equal  distances. 

200.  The  call  of  the  first  peace  conference.  In  August,  1898, 
the  following  letter  was  issued  by  the  Russian  foreign  minister : 

The  maintenance  of  general  peace,  and  a  possible  reduction  of  the 
excessive  armaments  which  weigh  upon  all  nations,  present  themselves 
in  the  existing  condition  of  the  whole  world,  as  the  ideal  towards  which 
the  endeavors  of  all  governments  should  be  directed. 

The  humanitarian  and  magnanimous  ideas  of  His  Majesty  the  Em- 
peror, my  august  master,  have  been  won  over  to  this  view.  In  the 
conviction  that  this  lofty  aim  is  in  conformity  with  the  most  essential 
interests  and  the  legitimate  views  of  all  powers,  the  Imperial  Govern- 
ment thinks  that  the  present  moment  would  be  very  favorable  for  seek- 
ing, by  means  of  international  discussion,  the  most  effectual  means  of 
insuring  to  all  peoples  the  benefits  of  a  real  and  durable  peace,  and, 
above  all,  of  putting  an  end  to  the  progressive  development  of  the 
present  armaments.  .  .  . 

Filled  with  this  idea,  His  Majesty  has  been  pleased  to  order  me  to 
propose  to  all  the  governments  whose  representatives  are  accredited  to 
the  Imperial  Court,  the  meeting  of  a  conference  which  should  occupy 
itself  with  this  grave  problem. 

201.  The  work  of  the  Second  Hague  Conference.  Dr.  J.  B. 
Scott,  a  technical  delegate  representing  the  United  States  at  the 
Second  Hague  Conference  ( 1 907),  sums  up  its  work  as  follows  : 

The  work  of  the  Second  Conference,  for  which  the  year  1907  will 
be  memorable,  was  twofold.  First,  it  revised  and  enlarged  the  conven- 
tions of  1899  in  the  light  of  experience,  in  the  light  of  practice  as  well 
as  of  theor}',  and  put  them  forth  to  the  world  in  a  new  and  modified 
form.  In  the  next  place,  the  Conference  did  not  limit  itself  to  these 
subjects.  To  the  three  conventions  of  1899,  revised  in  1907,  were  added 
ten  new  conventions.  .  .  .  Tried  by  the  standards  of  results,  the  Con- 
ference clearly  justified  its  existence,  but  it  would  have  been  a  success 


234 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


had  it  demonstrated  nothing  more  than  the  possibility  of  the  represent- 
atives of  forty-four  nations  to  live  in  peace  and  quiet  during  four 
months.  .  .  . 

Leaving  out  minor  matters,  this  Conference  did  four  things  of  funda- 
mental importance  : 

1.  It  provided  for  a  meeting  of  the  Third  Conference  within  an  analo- 
gous period,  namely  eight  years,  to  be  under  the  control  of  the  powers 
generally,  instead  of  the  control  of  any  one  of  them. 

2.  It  adopted  a  convention  for  the  nonforcible  collection  of  contract 
debts,  substituting  arbitration  and  an  appeal  to  reason  for  force  and  an 
appeal  to  arms. 

3.  It  established  a  prize  court  to  safeguard  neutrals. 

4.  It  laid  the  foundations  of,  if  it  did  not  put  the  finishing  stone  to,  a 
great  court  of  arbitration. 

IV.  War 

202.  Reprisals.  The  following  cases  are  examples  of  reprisals, 
or  measures  involving  force  that  falls  short  of  war : 

A  convention  was  signed  at  London  on  October  31,  1861,  between 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  Spain  for  the  purpose  of  taking  forcible 
measures  with  a  view  to  obtain  redress  from  Mexico  for  injuries  done 
to  their  subjects  in  that  country.  The  United  States  was  advised  to 
accede  to  the  arrangement,  but  declined  to  do  so.  After  the  three 
Governments  had  adopted  certain  measures  of  force,  the  British  and 
Spanish  Governments  withdrew,  while  France  entered  upon  that  course 
of  intervention  which  resulted  in  the  attempt  to  establish  an  empire  in 
Mexico.  .  .  . 

In  November,  1901,  France  seized  the  customhouse  at  Mytilene  in 
order  to  enforce  compliance  by  the  Turkish  Government  with  demands 
for  the  settlement  of  the  Lorando  claim,  the  rebuilding  of  French  schools 
and  institutions  destroyed  in  1895-96,  the  official  recognition  of  exist- 
ing schools  and  institutions,  and  the  recognition  of  the  Chaldean 
patriarch. 

203.  Kinds  of  war.  Distinctions  may  be  drawn  between  "gen- 
eral "  and  "  limited  "  wars  ;  and  various  degrees  of  internal  dis- 
turbance admit  of  classification, 

Wheaton  and  other  writers  speak  of  "  perfect  "  and  "  imperfect  "  wars, 
the  former  being  one  in  which  it  is  said  .the  whole  nation  is  at  war  with 
another  nation  and  all  the  members  of  each  are  authorized  to  commit 


CONTENT  Ol'    l.\rj:R\All().\AL   LAW  2 ''^ 

hostilities  against  all  the  members  of  the  other  in  every  case  permitted 
by  the  laws  of  war ;  the  latter,  a  war  limited  as  to  places,  persons,  and 
things.  It  may  be  suggested  that  it  would  be  more  nearly  correct  to 
speak  of  wars  in  this  sense  as  general  and  /itnifed.   .   .  . 

Insurrection  is  the  rising  of  people  in  arms  against  their  government, 
or  a  portion  of  it,  or  against  one  or  more  of  its  laws,  or  against  an  offi- 
cer or  officers  of  the  government.  It  may  be  confined  to  mere  armed 
resistance,  or  it  may  have  greater  ends  in  view. 

Civil  war  is  war  between  two  or  more  portions  of  a  country  or  stale, 
each  contending  for  the  mastery  of  the  whole,  and  each  claiming  to  be  the 
legitimate  government.  The  term  is  also  sometimes  applied  to  war  of 
rebellion,  when  the  rebellious  provinces  or  portions  of  the  state  are 
contiguous  to  those  containing  the  seat  of  government. 

The  term  rebellion  is  applied  to  an  insurrection  of  large  extent,  and 
is  usually  a  war  between  the  legitimate  government  of  a  country  and 
portions  of  provinces  of  the  same  who  seek  to  throw  off  their  allegiance 
to  it  and  set  up  a  government  of  their  own. 

204.  Residence  in  case  of  war.  The  duties  of  American  citizens 
resident  in  foreign  states  at  a  time  when  their  country  is  engaged 
in  war  arc  thus  stated  by  the  Sui^remc  Court : 

The  duty  of  a  citizen  when  war  breaks  out,  if  it  be  a  foreign  war.  and 
he  is  abroad,  is  to  return  v.dthout  delay ;  and  if  it  be  a  civil  war,  and  he 
is  a  resident  in  the  rebellious  section,  he  should  leave  it  as  soon  as  prac- 
ticable and  adhere  to  the  regular  established  government.  .   .  . 

Personal  property,  except  such  as  is  the  product  of  the  hostile  soil, 
follows  as  a  general  rule  the  rights  of  the  proprietor ;  but  if  suffered  to 
remain  in  the  hostile  country  after  war  breaks  out,  it  becomes  impressed 
with  the  national  character  of  the  belligerent  where  it  is  situated. 
Promptitude  is  therefore  justly  required  of  citizens  resident  in  the  enemy 
country,  or  having  personal  property  there,  in  changing  their  domicile, 
severing  those  business  relations,  or  disposing  of  their  effects,  as  matter 
of  duty  to  their  own  government,  and  as  tending  to  weaken  the  enemy. 
Presumption  of  the  law  of  nations  is  against  one  who  lingers  in  the 
enemy's  country,  and  if  he  continues  there  for  much  length  of  time, 
without  satisfactor}'  explanations,  he  is  liable  to  be  considered  as  remo- 
rant,  or  guilty  of  culpable  delay,  and  an  enemy. 

205.  Conquest  and  private  ownership  of  land.  The  general 
principle  that  conquest  works  no  change  in  private  titles  to  land  is 
laid  down  in  the  following  opinion  of  Chief  Justice  Swayne  (1863): 


236  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

California  belonged  to  Spain  by  the  rights  of  discovery  and  conquest. 
The  government  of  that  country  established  regulations  for  transfers  of 
the  public  domain  to  individuals.  When  the  sovereignty  of  Spain  was 
displaced  by  the  revolutionary  action  of  Mexico,  the  new  government 
established  regulations  upon  the  same  subject.  These  two  sovereignties  are 
the  springheads  of  all  the  land  titles  in  California,  existing  at  the  time 
of  the  cession  of  that  country  to  the  United  States  by  the  treaty  of 
Guadalupe  Hidalgo.  That  cession  did  not  impair  the  rights  of  private 
property.  They  were  consecrated  by  the  law  of  nations,  and  protected 
by  the  treaty. 

206.  Treatment  of  prisoners  of  war.  The  following  extracts 
from  letters  written  by  Secretary  of  State  Webster  (1842)  indicate 
the  modern  attitude  toward  prisoners  of  war : 

Prisoners  of  war  are  to  be  considered  as  unfortunate  and  not  as  crim- 
inal, and  are  to  be  treated  accordingly,  although  the  question  of  deten- 
tion or  liberation  is  one  affecting  the  interest  of  the  captor  alone,  and 
therefore  one  with  which  no  other  government  ought  to  interfere  in  any 
way ;  yet  the  right  to  detain  by  no  means  implies  the  right  to  dispose  of 
the  prisoners  at  the  pleasure  of  the  captor.  That  right  involves  certain 
duties,  among  them  that  of  providing  the  prisoners  with  the  necessaries 
of  life  and  abstaining  from  the  infliction  of  any  punishment  upon  them 
which  they  may  not  have  merited  by  an  offense  against  the  laws  of  the 
country  since  they  were  taken.  .  .  . 

The  law  of  war  forbids  the  wounding,  killing,  impressment  into  the 
troops  of  the  country',  or  the  enslaving  or  otherwise  maltreating  of 
prisoners  of  war,  unless  they  have  been  guilty  of  some  grave  crime ;  and 
from  the  obligation  of  this  law  no  civilized  state  can  discharge  itself. 

207.  The  Geneva  Convention.  The  character  and  purpose  of  the 
Red  Cross  Convention,  signed  at  Geneva,  August  2,  1864,  by 
representatives  of  twelve  powers  and  later  agreed  to  by  twenty 
others,  follow  :  ^ 

The  treatment  of  the  sick  and  wounded  in  war  is  now  largely  regu- 
lated by  the  requirements  of  the  Geneva  Convention  of  August  2,  1864, 
the  operation  of  which  has  been  extended  to  hostilities  at  sea  by  the 
Additional  Articles  of  October  10,  1868,  and  by  the  Convention  in 
respect  to  the  rules  of  maritime  warfare  which  were  adopted  by  the 
Peace  Conference  at  The  Hague  in  1899.    Nearly  all  civilized  states 

1  By  permission  of  Harper  &  Brothers, 


CONTENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  237 

are  now  parties  to  the  operation  of  these  agreements,  the  efficiency  of 
which,  as  agencies  for  the  amelioration  of  the  condition  of  the  sick  and 
wounded,  has  been  fully  established  in  the  great  international  conflicts 
which  have  taken  place  during  the  generation  that  has  elapsed  since 
their  original  adoption.  .  .  . 

The  rules  of  the  Geneva  Convention,  and  other  undertakings  of  like 
character,  become  operative  only  when  individual  combatants  have  been 
disabled  by  wounds  and  disease.  Their  effect  is  to  confer  certain  privi- 
leges and  immunities  upon  the  sick  and  wounded,  as  a  class,  and  to 
secure  to  the  places  in  which  they  are  collected  and  cared  for,  and  to 
the  persons  who  attend  them,  as  complete  an  immunity  from  the  effects 
of  hostile  operations  as  it  is  possible  to  accord  them  under  the  circum- 
stances of  each  particular  case. 

208.  Flags  of  truce.  The  following  conventions  regarding  the 
laws  and  customs  of  war  on  land  were  adopted  at  the  First  Hague 
Conference,  July  29,  1899  : 

Article  XXXII.  An  individual  is  considered  as  bearing  a  flag  of 
truce  who  is  authorized  by  one  of  the  belligerents  to  enter  into  commu- 
nication with  the  other,  and  who  carries  a  white  flag.  He  has  a  right 
to  inviolability,  as  well  as  the  trumpeter,  bugler,  or  drummer,  the  flag 
bearer,  and  the  interpreter  who  may  accompany  him. 

Article  XXXIII.  The  Chief  to  whom  a  flag  of  truce  is  sent  is  not 
obliged  to  receive  it  in  all  circumstances. 

He  can  take  all  steps  necessary  to  prevent  the  envoy  taking  advan- 
tage of  his  mission  to  obtain  information. 

In  case  of  abuse,  he  has  the  right  to  detain  the  envoy  temporarily. 

Article  XXXIV.  The  envoy  loses  his  rights  of  inviolability  if  it  is 
proved  beyond  a  doubt  that  he  has  taken  advantage  of  his  privileged 
position  to  provoke  or  commit  an  act  of  treachery. 

209.  Methods  of  carrying  on  war.  The  international  usage  and 
practice  of  nations  in  war  are  still  indicated  fairly  well  by  the  rules 
laid  down  for  the  guidance  of  the  army  of  the  United  States  at  the 
time  of  the  Civil  War.    Tiic  histor)'  of  this  code  is  as  follows  :  ^ 

The  need  of  a  positive  code  of  instructions  was  severely  felt  during 
the  early  part  of  the  Civil  War  in  the  United  States.  During  the  first 
two  years  of  that  war  the  Federal  Government  had  succeeded  in  plac- 
ing in  the  field  armies  of  unexampled  size,  composed,  in  great  part,  of 

^  By  permission  of  Harper  &  Brothers. 


238  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

men  taken  from  civil  pursuits,  most  of  whom  were  unfamiliar  with  mili- 
tary affairs,  and  so  utterly  unacquainted  with  the  usages  of  war.  These 
armies  were  carrying  on  hostile  operations  of  every  kind  over  a  wide 
area,  and  questions  of  considerable  intricacy  and  difficulty  were  con- 
stantly arising,  which  required  for  their  decision  a  knowledge  of  inter- 
national law  which  was  not  always  possessed  by  those  to  whom  these 
questions  were  submitted  for  decision.   .   .   . 

To  remedy  this  difficulty.  Professor  Francis  Lieber,  an  eminent  jurist, 
who  had  been  for  many  years  an  esteemed  and  honored  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  was  requested  by  the  Secretary  of  XVar  to  prepare  a  code 
of  instructions  for  the  government  of  the  armies  in  the  field.  .  .  .  The 
rules  prepared  by  Dr.  Lieber  were  submitted  to  a  board  of  officers,  by 
whom  they  were  approved  and  recommended  for  adoption.  They  were 
published  in  1863,  and  were  made  obligatory  upon  the  armies  of  the 
LTnited  States  by  their  publication  in  the  form  of  a  General  Order  of  the 
War  Department. 

Although  more  than  a  generation  has  elapsed  since  they  were  pre- 
pared, they  are  still  in  substantial  accordance  with  the  existing  rules  of 
international  law  upon  the  subject  of  which  they  treat,  and  form  the 
basis  of  Bluntschli's  and  other  elaborate  works  upon  the  usages  of  war. 
They  are  accepted  by  text  writers  of  authority  as  having  standard  and 
permanent  value,  and  as  expressing,  with  great  accuracy,  the  usage  and 
practice  of  nations  in  war. 

210.  Legal  principles  observed  by  prize  courts.  The  nature  of 
the  law  applied  by  prize  courts  may  be  stated  as  follows  : 

The  court  of  prize  is  emphatically  a  court  of  the  law  of  nations ;  and 
it  takes  neither  its  character  nor  its  rules  from  the  mere  municipal  regu- 
lations of  any  country.  By  this  law  the  definition  of  prize  goods  is  that 
they  are  goods  taken  on  the  high  seas,  jure  belli,  out  of  the  hands  of 
the  enemy.  .   .  . 

Prize  courts  are  subject  to  the  instructions  of  their  own  sovereign. 
In  the  absence  of  such  instructions  their  jurisdiction  and  rules  of  decision 
are  to  be  ascertained  by  reference  to  the  known  powers  of  such  tribunals 
and  the  principles  by  which  they  are  governed  under  the  public  law  and 
the  practice  of  nations. 

Prize  courts  are  tribunals  of  the  law  of  nations,  and  the  jurisprudence 
they  administer  is  a  part  of  that  law.  They  deal  with  cases  of  capture 
as  distinguished  from  seizures ;  their  decrees  are  decrees  of  condemna- 
tion, not  of  forfeiture ;  they  judge  the  character  and  relations  of  the 
vessel  and  cargo,  and  not  the  acts  of  persons. 


CONTENT  Ol'  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  239 

V.  Nkutkaf.itv  and  Neutral  Commerce 

211.  Neutralized  states.  States  have  been  permanently  neutral- 
ized by  convention.  Such  states  must  not  take  part  in  war  ;  in 
return  they  are  guaranteed  against  attack. 

As  early  as  1803  France  promised  constantly  to  employ  her  good 
offices  to  procure  the  neutrality  of  Switzerland  .  .  . ;  and  by  a  decla- 
ration confirmed  by  the  Treaty  of  Vienna,  Art.  84,  it  was  recited  that  the 
European  powers  acknowledge  "  that  the  general  interest  demands  that 
the  Helvetic  State  should  enjoy  the  advantage  of  a  perpetual  neu- 
trality"; and  such  a  neutrality  was  guaranteed  to  it  accordingly.  .  .  . 
By  the  treaties  of  1831  and  1839  Belgium  was  recognized  as  "an  in- 
dependent and  perpetually  neutral  state,  bound  to  observe  the  same 
neutrality  with  reference  to  other  states."  At  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
of  1870,  England  made  treaties  with  France  and  Prussia,  respectively, 
with  a  view  to  further  securing  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  .   .  . 

By  the  Treaty  of  London  of  May  11,  1867,  Art.  I,  Luxemburg  is 
declared  to  be  a  perpetually  neutral  state  under  the  guarantee  of  the 
courts  of  Austria,  Oreat  Britain,  Prussia,  and  Russia. 

212.  International  position  of  the  Suez  and  Panama  canals.  The 
following  arrangements  concerning  the  Panama  Canal,  contained 
in  the  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  of  1901,  are  substantially  the  same 
as  those  concerning  the  Suez  Canal,  contained  in  the  convention 
signed  at  Constantinople  in  1888. 

1.  The  canal  shall  be  free  and  open  to  the  vessels  of  commerce  and 
of  war  ol  all  nations  observing  these  Rules,  on  terms  of  entire  equality.  .  .  . 

2.  The  canal  shall  never  be  blockaded,  nor  shall  any  right  of  war 
be  exercised  nor  any  act  of  hostility  be  committed  within  it.   .  .  . 

3.  Vessels  of  war  of  a  belligerent  shall  not  revictual  nor  take  any 
stores  in  the  canal  except  so  far  as  may  be  strictly  necessar)' ;  and  the 
transit  of  such  vessels  through  the  canal  shall  be  effected  with  the  least 
possible  delay.   .   .   . 

4.  No  belligerent  shall  embark  or  disembark  troops,  munitions  of  war, 
or  warlike  materials  in  the  canal.   .   .   . 

5.  The  provisions  of  this  Article  shall  apply  to  waters  adjacent  to  the 
canal,  within  three  marine  miles  of  either  end.  Vessels  of  war  of  a 
belligerent  shall  not  remain  in  such  waters  longer  than  twenty-four 
hours  at  any  one  time,  except  in  case  of  distress,  and  in  such  case,  shall 
depart  as  soon  as  possible ;  but  a  vessel  of  war  of  one  belligerent  shall 


240 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


not  depart  within  twenty-four  hours  from  the  departure  of  a  vessel  of 
war  of  the  other  belligerents. 

213.  Rules  of  neutrality  applied  in  the  Geneva  award.    The 

arbiters,  in  determining  British  liability  for  the  depredations  of 
the  Alabama  and  other  cruisers,  observed  the  following  rules  laid 
down  for  them  in  the  Treaty  of  Washington,  1871. 

A  neutral  Government  is  bound  — 

First.  To  use  due  diligence  to  prevent  the  fitting  out,  arming,  or 
equipping,  within  its  jurisdiction,  of  any  vessel  which  it  has  reasonable 
ground  to  believe  is  intended  to  cruise  or  to  carry  on  war  against  a 
power  with  which  it  is  at  peace;  and  also  to  use  like  diligence  to  pre- 
vent the  departure  from  its  jurisdiction  of  any  vessel  intended  to  cruise 
or  carry  on  war  as  above,  such  vessel  having  been  specially  adapted,  in 
whole  or  in  part,  within  such  jurisdiction,  to  warlike  use. 

Secondly.  Not  to  permit  or  suffer  either  belligerent  to  make  use  of 
its  ports  or  waters  as  the  base  of  naval  operations  against  the  other,  or 
for  the  purpose  of  the  renewal  or  augmentation  of  military  supplies  or 
arms,  or  the  recruitment  of  men. 

Thirdly.  To  exercise  due  diligence  in  its  own  ports  and  waters,  and 
as  to  all  persons  within  its  jurisdiction,  to  prevent  any  violation  of  the 
foregoing  obligations  and  duties. 

214.  The  Rule  of  1756.  This  principle,  made  famous  during 
the  Napoleonic  period,  may  be  briefly  explained  as  follows  : 

Under  the  rule  of  colonial  monopoly  that  universally  prevailed  in  the 
eighteenth  century,  the  trade  with  colonial  possessions  was  exclusively 
confined  to  vessels  of  the  home  country.  In  1756  the  French,  being,  by 
reason  of  England's  maritime  supremacy,  unable  longer  to  carry  on 
trade  with  their  colonies  in  their  own  bottoms,  and  being  thus  deprived 
of  colonial  succor,  issued  licenses  to  Dutch  vessels  to  take  up  and  carry 
on  the  prostrate  trade.  Thereupon  the  British  minister  at  The  Hague, 
by  instruction  of  his  Government,  announced  to  the  Government  of  the 
Netherlands  that  Great  Britain  would  in  future  enforce  the  rule  that 
neutrals  would  not  be  permitted  to  engage  in  time  of  war  in  a  trade 
from  which  they  were  excluded  in  time  of  peace.  The  restriction  thus 
announced  was  enforced  by  the  British  Government  through  its  prize 
courts.    It  has  since  been  known  as  "  the  rule  of  the  war  of  1756." 

215.  The  Declaration  of  Paris.  On  March  30,  1856,  the  Cri- 
mean War  was  terminated  by  the  Treaty  of  Paris.  At  the  suggestion 
of  the  French  plenipotentiary,  the .  representatives  of  the  powers 


CONTENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW 


241 


that  had  been  parties  to  the  treaty  met  to  consider  the  rules  of 
maritime  capture.    On  April  16,  1856,  they  adopted  the  following: 

.   .   .   Considering : 

That  maritime  law,  in  time  of  war.  has  long  been  the  subject  of 
deplorable  disputes ; 

That  the  uncertainty  of  the  law,  and  of  the  duties  in  such  a  matter, 
gives  rise  to  differences  of  opinion  between  neutrals  and  belligerents 
which  may  occasion  serious  difficulties,  and  even  conflicts ; 

That  it  is  consequently  advantageous  to  establish  a  uniform  doctrine 
on  so  important  a  point ;  .  .  . 

The  above-mentioned  Plenipotentiaries  .  .  .  have  adopted  the  fol- 
lowing solemn  declaration  : 

1.  I^rivateering  is,  and  remains  abolished. 

2.  The  neutral  flag  covers  enemy's  goods,  with  the  exception  of 
contraband  of  war. 

3.  Neutral  goods,  with  the  exception  of  contraband  of  war,  are  not 
liable  to  capture  under  the  enemy's  flag. 

4.  Blockades,  in  order  to  be  binding,  must  be  effective,  that  is  to  say, 
maintained  by  a  force  sufficient  really  to  prevent  access  to  the  coast  of 
the  enemy. 

216.  Policy  of  the  United  States  regarding  neutral  trade.  The 
leading  reasons  for  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  in  desiring  to 
extend  the  rights  of  neutrals  follow : 

The  policy  of  the  United  States  is  to  maintain  neutral  immunities  for 
the  following  reasons:  —  (i)  The  probabilities  of  war  are  far  less  with 
us  than  with  the  great  European  states.  From  the  nature  of  things, 
points  of  friction  between  the  United  States  and  foreign  nations  are 
comparatively  few.  ...  (2)  Although  the  richest  country  in  the  world, 
our  traditions  and  temper  are  averse  to  large  naval  and  militar)-  estab- 
lishments. (3)  The  idea  of  pacific  settlement  of  disputed  international 
questions  is  one  of  growing  power  among  us  ;  the  horror  of  war  has  not 
been  diminished  by  the  experience  of  the  civil  war ;  there  is  no  country- 
in  the  world  where  love  of  order  is  so  great,  and  in  which  ])ublic  peace 
is  kept  by  an  army  and  navy  so  small.  ...  (4)  It  is  impossible  to  over- 
come the  feeling  that  the  sea,  like  the  air,  should  be  free,  and  that  no 
power,  no  matter  how  great  its  resources,  should  be  permitted  to  domi- 
nate it,  so  as  to  enable  it,  in  case  of  war,  to  ransack  all  ships  which  may 
be  met  for  the  discovery  of  an  enemy's  goods.  .  .  .  (5)  It  is  not  right 
to  offer  such  a  premium  to  preponderance  of  naval  strength  as  is  offered 
by  the  theory  of  belligerent  rights  as  maintained  in  (Jrcat  Hritain. 


242 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


217.  Method  of  exercising  the  right  of  search.  The  following 
instructions  issued  to  American  war  vessels  during  the  Spanish 
War  indicate  modern  methods  of  search  : 

This  right  should  be  exercised  with  tact  and  consideration,  and  in 
strict  conformity  with  treaty  provisions,  wherever  they  exist.  The 
following  directions  are  given,  subject  to  any  special  treaty  stipulations : 
After  firing  a  blank  charge,  and  causing  the  vessel  to  lie  to,  the  cruiser 
should  send  a  small  boat,  no  larger  than  a  whaleboat,  with  an  officer  to 
conduct  the  search.  There  may  be  arms  in  the  boat,  but  the  men 
should  not  wear  them  on  their  persons.  The  officer  wearing  only  his 
side  arms,  and  accompanied  on  board  by  not  more  than  two  men  of  his 
boat's  crew,  vmarmed,  should  first  examine  the  vessel's  papers  to 
ascertain  her  nationality  and  her  ports  of  departure  and  destination.  If 
she  is  neutral,  and  trading  between  neutral  ports,  the  examination  goes 
no  further.  If  she  is  neutral,  and  bound  to  an  enemy's  port  not 
blockaded,  the  papers  which  indicate  the  character  of  her  cargo  should 
be  examined.  If  these  show  contraband  of  war,  the  vessel  should  be 
seized ;  if  not,  she  should  be  set  free,  unless,  by  reason  of  strong 
grounds  of  suspicion,  a  further  search  should  seem  to  be  requisite. . 

218.  Kinds  of  blockade.  The  distinctions  between  the  two 
main  types  of  blockade  follow  : 

Blockades  are  divided,  by  English  and  American  publicists,  into  two 
kinds:  (i)  A  simple  or  de  facto  blockade,  and  (2)  a  public  or  govern- 
mental blockade.  ...  A  simple  or  de  facto  blockade  is  constituted 
merely  by  the  fact  of  an  investment,  and  without  any  necessity  of  a 
public  notification.  As  it  arises  solely  from  facts,  it  ceases  when  they 
terminate ;  its  existence  must,  therefore,  in  all  cases,  be  established  by 
clear  and  decisive  evidence.  The  burden  of  truth  is  thrown  upon  the 
captors,  and  they  are  bound  to  show  that  there  was  an  actual  blockade 
at  the  time  of  the  capture.  ...  A  public,  or  governmental  blockade,  is 
one  where  the  investment  is  not  only  actually  established,  but  where 
also  a  public  notification  of  the  fact  is  made  to  neutral  powers  by  the 
government,  or  officers  of  state,  declaring  the  blockade.  .  .  .  Hence  the 
burden  of  proof  is  changed,  and  the  captured  party  is  now  bound  to 
repel  the  legal  presumptions  against  him  by  uneqnivocal  evidence. 

219.  Contraband  in  the  Declaration  of  London.  The  most  defi- 
nite statement  of  the  vexed  question  of  contraband  was  made  at 
a  conference  of  naval  powers  held  in  London  during  the  winter 
of  1 908- 1 909. 


CONTENT  OF  INTERNATIONAL  LAW  24- 

Article  22.  The  followinj^  articles  and  materials  are,  without  notice, 
regarded  as  contraband,  under  the  name  of  absolute  contraband :   .   .   . 

Article  24.  The  following  articles  and  materials,  susceptible  of  use 
in  war  as  well  as  for  purposes  of  peace,  are  without  notice  regarded  as 
contraband  of  war,  under  the  name  of  conditional  contraband :   .   .   . 

Article  27.  Articles  and  materials,  which  are  not  susceptible  of  use 
in  war,  are  not  to  be  declared  contraband  of  war.   .   .  . 

Article  30.  Absolute  contraband  is  liable  to  capture  if  it  is  shown 
to  be  destined  to  territory  belonging  to  or  occupied  by  the  enemy,  or  to 
the  armed  forces  of  the  enemy.  It  is  immaterial  whether  the  carriage  of 
the  goods  is  direct  or  entails  either  transshipment  or  transport  over 
land.   .   .   . 

Article  ;^^.  Conditional  contral)and  is  liable  to  capture  if  it  is  .shown 
that  it  is  destined  for  the  use  of  the  armed  forces  or  of  a  government 
department  of  the  enemy  state,  unless  in  this  latter  case  the  circum- 
stances show  that  the  articles  cannot  in  fact  be  used  for  the  purposes  of 
the  war  in  progress.  .  .   . 

Article  35.  Conditional  contraband  is  not  liable  to  capture,  except 
when  on  board  a  vessel  bound  for  territory  bclf)nging  to  or  occupied  by 
the  enemy,  or  for  the  armed  forces  of  the  enemy,  and  when  it  is  not  to 
be  discharged  at  an  intervening  neutral  port. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

FORM  OF  THE  STATE  AND  OF  GOVERNMENT 

I,  Forms  of  the  State 

220.  Aristotle's  classification  of  states.  This  analysis  of  the 
forms  of  the  state,  current  among  the  Greeks,  may  still  be  applied 
in  present  political  science. 

The  government,  which  is  the  supreme  authority  in  states,  must  be  in 
the  hands  of  one,  or  of  a  few,  or  of  many.  The  true  forms  of  govern- 
ment, therefore,  are  those  in  which  the  one,  or  the  few,  or  the  many, 
govern  with  a  view  to  the  common  interest ;  but  governments  which  rule 
with  a  view  to  the  private  interest,  whether  of  the  one,  or  of  the  few,  or 
of  the  many,  are  perversions.  For  citizens,  if  they  are  truly  citizens, 
ought  to  participate  in  the  advantages  of  a  state.  Of  forms  of  govern- 
ment in  which  one  rules,  we  call  that  which  regards  the  common  inter- 
ests, kingship  or  royalty ;  that  in  which  more  than  one,  but  not  many, 
rule,  aristocracy  (the  rule  of  the  best)  ;  and  it  is  so  called,  either  because 
the  rulers  are  the  best  men,  or  because  they  have  at  heart  the  best  in- 
terests of  the  state  and  of  the  citizens.  But  when  the  citizens  at  large 
administer  the  state  for  the  common  interest,  the  government  is  called 
by  the  generic  name  —  a  constitution.  .  .  . 

Of  the  above-mentioned  forms,  the  perversions  are  as  follows :  —  of 
royalty,  tyranny  ;  of  aristocracy,  oligarchy  ;  of  constitutional  government, 
democracy.  For  tyranny  is  a  kind  of  monarchy  which  has  in  view  the 
interest  of  the  monarch  only ;  oligarchy  has  in  view  the  interest  of  the 
wealthy  ;  democracy,  of  the  needy  :  none  of  them  the  common  good  of  all. 

221.  Four  fundamental  forms  of  the  state.  Bluntschli  adds  to 
Aristotle's  system  a  fourth  type  of  state. 

1.  The  first  form  is  Ideocracy,  of  which  the  highest  type  is  Theocracy. 
Here  the  people  regard  their  ruler  as  a  superhuman  being,  who  is  raised 
above  them  by  nature  :  God  Himself  is  regarded  as  the  true  governor  of 
the  State. 

2.  In  direct  opposition  to  Theocracy  is  Democracy.  In  the  former  the 
people  are  subjected  to  an  external  power  outside  and  above  themselves ; 

244 


FORM  OF  THE  STATE  AND  OF  GOVERNMENT 


245 


in  the  latter  the  people  govern  themselves,  i.e.  collectively  they  form 
the  government,  but  as  individuals  they  are  subjects. 

3.  In  Aristocracy  the  distinction  between  government  and  subject  is 
human,  and  within  the  limits  of  the  nation  :  an  upper  class  or  tribe 
becomes  the  government,  while  the  other  classes  and  tribes  are  subjects. 
But  while  the  latter  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  government,  the 
individual  members  of  the  ruling  class  are  also  subjects. 

4.  In  Monarchy  the  distinction  between  government  and  subjects  is 
complete,  but  it  is  again  human.  The  government  is  concentrated  in  an 
individual,  who  is  merely  a  ruler,  and  not  at  the  same  time  a  subject,  but 
who  belongs  altogether  to  the  State,  and  personifies  the  unity  of  the  nation. 

In  each  of  these  four  fundamental  forms  an  original  type  is  reflected  :  — 

Theocracy  represents  the  rule  of  God  over  the  world,  but  a  rule  which 
is  exerted  directly,  and  in  a  way  harshly  and  despotically. 

Monarchy  glorifies  the  unity  of  humanity  in  "  Man"  as  an  individual : 
the  ruler  represents  the  collective  State,  the  national  unity  is  personified 
in  its  prince. 

Democracy  expresses  the  idea  of  the  community  of  the  nation,  or  of 
all  individuals,  and  presents  to  us  the  State  as  a  parish  or  commune. 

Aristocracy  embodies  the  distinction  between  the  noble  and  the  lower 
elements  of  the  nation,  and  gives  the  rule  to  the  former.  Its  type  is  the 
nobility  of  higher  race  and  quality,  just  as  the  commune  is  the  type  of 
Democracy. 

222.  Criticism  of  Bluntschli's  classification.  Burgess  rejects  the 
addition  of  '"  theocracy  "  as  a  distinct  type  of  state. 

He  [Bluntschli]  holds  to  the  general  principle  that  states  are  to  be 
distinguished  into  monarchies,  aristocracies  and  democracies,  but  under- 
takes to  add  a  fourth  form,  which  he  calls  "  Idiokratie."  He  defines  the 
ideocracy  to  be  a  state  in  which  the  supreme  ruler  is  considered  to  be 
God  or  some  superhuman  spirit  or  an  idea.  This  appears  to  me  ver)- 
fanciful.  The  person  or  body  of  persons  who  in  last  resort  interpret  the 
will  of  God  or  of  the  superhuman  spirit  or  the  idea  for  a  given  people, 
and  who  give  their  interpretations  the  force  of  law,  constitute  the  state. 
It  signifies  nothing  that  that  person  or  body  of  persons  may  have  pro- 
fessed to  derive  his  or  its  powers,  so  long  as  the  will  of  God  or  of  the 
superhuman  spirit  or  the  principles  of  the  idea  can  only  be  known  and 
legally  formulated  through  him  or  it.  Political  science  cannot  examine  into 
the  truth  or  fiction  of  such  a  claim.  Its  dictum  is  simply  that  the  highest 
human  power  over  a  given  population  is  the  state,  no  matter  what  may 
be  the  superhuman  support  upon  which  it  may  claim  to  rest.  We  must. 


246  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

therefore,  reject  this  new  creation  from  our  political  science.    It  must  be 
relegated  to  the  domain  of  political  mysticism. 

223.  Classification  of  states  according  to  international  law.  The 
following  valuable  classification  of  states  from  the  standpoint  of 
their  personality  in  external  dealings  is  given  by  Moore  : 

From  the  point  of  view  of  their  external  relations,  states  may  be 
classed  as  either  simple  or  composite.  The  characteristic  of  the  simple 
state  is  that  it  has  one  supreme  government,  and  exerts  a  single  will, 
whether  it  be  the  individual  will  of  a  sovereign  ruler,  or  the  collective 
will  of  a  popular  body  or  of  a  representative  assembly.  .  .  . 

The  simple  state  may  be  either  single,  i.e.,  wholly  separate  and  dis- 
tinct from  any  other  state,  or  it  may  be  connected  with  another  state  by 
what  is  called  a  personal  union.   .   .   . 

"  Personal  union  "  is  the  phrase  reserved  to  denote  the  condition  that 
exists  where  states,  which  are  wholly  separate  and  distinct,  have  the 
same  ruling  prince.   .   .   . 

A  composite  state  is  one  composed  of  two  or  more  states.  The  char- 
acter of  the  international  person  thus  constituted  depends  upon  the 
nature  of  the  act  by  which  the  union  was  created  and  the  extent  to 
which  the  sovereignty  of  the  component  parts  is  impaired  or  taken  away. 

For  the  purposes  of  international  law,  composite  states  are  usually 
classed  as  real  unions,  confederacies,  and  federal  unions. 

Where  states  are  not  only  ruled  by  the  same  prince,  but  are  also  united 
for  international  purposes  by  an  express  agreement,  there  is  said  to  exist 
a  real  union.   .   .   . 

Where  states  associate  themselves,  in  a  permanent  manner,  for  the 
exercise  in  common  of  their  rights  of  sovereignty  for  the  general  advan- 
tage, they  consdtute  a  confederation.  .  .  .  Those  states,  however,  retain 
their  internal  and,  to  a  greater  or  less  extent,  their  external  sovereignty. 
Their  personality  in  international  law  is  not  destroyed.   .   .   . 

Where  states  are  united  under  a  central  government,  which  is  supreme 
within  its  sphere  and  which  possesses  and  exercises  in  external  affairs 
the  powers  of  national  sovereignty,  they  are  said  to  form  a  federal 
union.  "  The  composite  state,  which  results  from  this  league,  is  alone  a 
sovereign  power."   .  .   . 

A  state  which  is  not  a  member  of  a  composite  state,  but  which,  while 
it  retains  a  certain  personality  in  international  law,  is  subject  to  the 
authority  of  another  state  in  its  foreign  relations,  is  commonly  called  a 
semi-sovereign  state.  The  paramount  state  is  called  the  suzerain,  and  its 
relation  to  the  subject  state  is  described  as  suzerainty. 


FORM  OF  THE  STATE  AND  OF  GOVERNMEM       247 

224.  Impossibility  of  classifying  states.  Willoughby,  consider- 
ing sovereignty  as  the  essence  of  the  state,  possessed  ahke  by  all, 
deems  that  such  a  thing  as  a  classification  of  states  is  impossible.^ 

There  can  be  no  such  thing  as  a  classification  of  States,  as  States. 
In  essence  they  are  all  alike,  —  each  and  all  being  distinguished  by  the 
same  sovereign  attributes.  Hence  it  follows  that  the  only  manner  in  which 
States  may  be  differentiated  is  according  to  the  structural  peculiarities  of 
their  governmental  organizations.  .  .  . 

In  two  particulars,  all  governments  are  necessarily  alike :  first,  their 
duties  are  of  a  threefold  character,  — legislative,  executive,  and  judicial; 
and  secondly,  the  quantum  of  their  power  is  the  same.  It  may  be  that 
the  exercise  of  these  three  orders  of  functions  is  not  intrusted  to  inde- 
pendent or  distinct  organs,  and,  indeed,  their  absolute  separation  is  im- 
possible ;  yet,  however  united  or  separated,  they  are  distinguishable  duties 
that  must  be  performed  by  every  State. 

That  the  quantum  of  power  exercised  by  all  governments  must  be  the 
same  follows  from  the  fact  that,  as  has  been  stated,  all  States  are  neces- 
sarily completely  organized  within  their  governments.  The  apparent 
differences  in  the  scope  of  powers  possessed,  arise  from  the  manner  in 
which  the  totality  of  political  power  is  distributed  among  the  various 
organs,  and  the  character  of  these  organs  themselves. 

II.  Forms  of  Government 

225.  Classification  of  governments.  The  following  paragraphs 
indicate  some  of  the  leading  standpoints  from  which  classification 
of  governments  has  been  attempted  : 

From  the  standpoint  of  the  variety  of  powers  commonly  exercised, 
governments  have  also  been  termed  legal,  paternal,  socialistic,  or 
communistic.  .  .  . 

Historically  viewed,  governments  have  been  classified  as  ancient, 
classic,  medieval,  modem,  and  the  like,  such  names  obviously  indicating 
no  special  peculiarities  of  form,  except  in  so  far  as  we  are  accustomed  to 
connect  certain  types  of  rule  with  certain  chronological  periods.   .   .   . 

Turning  now  more  directly  to  the  classification  of  governments,  irre- 
spective of  their  good  or  bad  qualities,  we  find  it  a  comparatively  easy 
task  to  separate  them  into  distinct  groups  according  to  the  possession  or 
nonpossession  by  them  of  some  one  selected  feature.  Thus,  fi»r  examj^le, 
it  is  entirely  feasible  to  classify  them  according  to  whether  founded  on 

1  Copyright,  1S96,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


248  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

written  or  unwritten  constitutions ;  whether  possessed  of  unicameral  or 
bicameral  legislatures  ;  whether  the  chief  executive  power  be  in  the  hands 
of  a  single  individual  or  of  a  number ;  whether  this  executive,  single  or  col- 
legiate, be  hereditary  or  elective,  and,  if  the  latter,  whether  the  tenure  of 
office  be  for  a  number  of  years  or  for  life,  etc.  At  the  same  time  it  does 
not  need  to  be  said  that  groupings  such  as  these  are  of  an  eminently 
unsatisfactory  character.  They  demand  a  segregation  of  governments 
which,  though  agreeing  in  the  possession  of  the  feature  selected  as  a 
basis  of  distinction,  are  otherwise  widely  dissimilar.  Nevertheless,  differ- 
ences of  structure  seem  to  offer  the  only  true  means  of  distinguishing 
governments  in  kind. 

226.  Forms  of  democratic  government.  Bryce  outlines  the  three 
main  methods  according  to  which  popular  rule  has  been  organized. ^ 

For  the  sake  of  making  clear  what  follows,  I  will  venture  to  recapitu- 
late what  was  said  in  an  earlier  chapter  as  to  the  three  forms  which 
government  has  taken  in  free  countries.  First  came  primary  assemblies, 
such  as  those  of  the  Greek  republics  of  antiquity,  or  those  of  the  early 
Teutonic  tribes,  which  have  survived  in  a  few  Swiss  cantons.  The  whole 
people  met,  debated  current  questions,  decided  them  by  its  votes,  chose 
those  who  were  to  carry  out  its  will.  Such  a  system  of  direct  popular 
government  is  possible  only  in  small  communities,  and  in  this  day  of 
large  States  has  become  a  matter  rather  of  antiquarian  curiosity  than  of 
practical  moment. 

In  the  second  form,  power  belongs  to  representative  bodies,  Parlia- 
ments and  Chambers.  The  people  in  their  various  local  areas  elect  men, 
supposed  to  be  their  wisest  or  most  influential,  to  deliberate  for  them, 
resolve  for  them,  choose  their  executive  servants  for  them.  They  give 
these  representatives  a  tolerably  free  hand,  leaving  them  in  power  for  a 
considerable  space  of  time,  and  allowing  them  to  act  unchecked,  except 
in  so  far  as  custom,  or  possibly  some  fundamental  law,  limits  their  dis- 
cretion. This  is  done  in  the  faith  that  the  Chamber  will  feel  its  responsi- 
bility and  act  for  the  best  interests  of  the  country,  carrying  out  what  it 
believes  ta  be  the  wishes  of  the  majority,  unless  it  should  be  convinced 
that  in  some  particular  point  it  knows  better  than  the  majority  what  the 
interests  of  the  country  require.  Such  a  system  has  long  prevailed  in  Eng- 
land, and  the  English  model  has  been  widely  imitated  on  the  continent  of 
Europe  and  in  the  British  colonies. 

The  third  is  something  between  the  other  two.  It  may  be  regarded 
either  as  an  attempt  to  apply  the  principle  of  primary  assemblies  to 
large  countries,  or  as  a  modification  of  the  representative  system  in  the 
*  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


FORM  OF  THE  STATE  AND  OF  GOVERNMENT     249 

direction  of  direct  popular  sovereignty.  There  is  still  a  legislature,  but  it 
is  elected  for  so  short  a  time  and  checked  in  so  many  ways  that  much  of 
its  power  and  dignity  has  departed.  Supremacy  is  not  with  it,  but  with 
the  people,  who  have  fixed  limits  beyond  which  it  cannot  go,  and  who 
use  it  merely  as  a  piece  of  machinery  for  carrying  out  their  wishes  and 
settling  points  of  detail  for  them.  The  supremacy  of  their  will  is  ex- 
pressed in  the  existence  of  a  Constitution  placed  above  the  legislature, 
although  capable  of  alteration  by  a  direct  popular  vote.  The  position  of 
the  representatives  has  been  altered.  They  are  conceived  of,  not  as  wise 
and  strong  men  chosen  to  govern,  but  as  delegates  under  specific  orders 
to  be  renewed  at  short  intervals. 

227.  Classification  based  on  the  spirit  of  government.  Govern- 
ments differ  in  the  spirit  that  animates  their  actual  working  as 
well  as  in  the  nature  of  their  organization. 

In  addition  to  a  system  of  classification  by  form,  however,  there  should 
be  a  supplementary  classification  emphasizing  the  spirit  of  government. 
The  government  may,  for  example,  be  characterized  as  despotic,  auto- 
cratic or  constitutional ;  as  aristocratic  or  democratic ;  as  conservative, 
liberal,  or  radical. 

If  emphasis  be  placed  on  the  spirit  of  government,  a  practical  system 
of  classification  can  be  obtained  by  noting  the  degree  of  democratic 
development  in  the  nation.  This  may  be  indicated  in  several  ways : 
(i)  By  noting  the  ratio  of  the  electorate  to  the  whole  population.  A 
system  of  unrestricted  manhood  suffrage  would  approximately  gi\-e  one 
voter  to  every  four  and  one-half  persons  in  the  population.  As  the  ratio 
rises,  the  government  is  presumably  less  democratic.  (2)  If  the  govern- 
ment is  representative,  the  basis  of  representation  in  the  membership  of 
the  lawmaking  body  may  be  noted.  This  basis  may  be  hereditary  right 
or  a  right  based  on  ofificeholding  or  a  right  based  on  wealth ;  or  localities 
irrespective  of  wealth  or  population  may  be  represented  equally  ;  or  equal 
masses  of  population  may  form  the  basis  of  representation.  (3)  Possibly 
the  clearest  idea  of  the  spirit  of  government  may  be  had  by  noting  the 
body  that  has  the  legal  right  to  alter  at  will  the  fundamental  law  of  the 
land.  Such  a  body  may  be  called  the  "  legal  sovereign,"  and  may  be 
composed  of  the  electorate,  as  in  Switzerland,  or  of  a  lawmaking  bod)-, 
as  in  Great  Britain ;  or  may  be  in  the  hands  of  an  hereditary  ruler,  as  in 
Russia.  Under  such  a  classification  the  ancient  Greek  terms  might  again 
be  found  useful,  and  governments  be  classified  as  in  spirit  monarchical, 
aristocratic  or  democratic,  according  as  the  power  of  legal  sovereignty  is 
in  the  hands  of  one,  few,  or  many. 


250  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

228.  Types  of  government.  Giddings  classifies  governments 
from  the  sociological  standpoint.^ 

The  sovereign  may  govern  directly,  or  may  delegate  the  function  of 
governing  to  authorized  ministers  or  agents. 

Direct  government  by  a  personal  sovereign,  or  by  a  sovereign  class,  is 
rule  by  a  minority  of  the  population.  Direct  government  by  a  sovereign 
mass  is  rule  by  a  majority,  or  by  a  large  and  powerful  plurality  of  the 
population.  Direct  self-government  by  a  deliberating  sovereign  people  is 
rule  by  a  plurality  or  by  a  majority  of  the  population. 

Delegated  authority  to  govern  may  be  vested  in  either  a  minority  or 
a  majority. 

Direct  government  by  the  sovereign  is  necessarily  an  absolute  rule, 
since  the  will  of  the  sovereign  is  the  supreme  will.  A  personal,  or  class, 
sovereign,  governing  directly,  rules  absolutely,  and  such  government  by 
such  a  sovereign  may  be  described  as  absolute  minority  rule.  A  mass 
sovereign,  governing  directly,  governs  absolutely,  and  such  government 
by  such  a  sovereign  may  be  described  as  absolute  majority  rule. 

Indirect  or  delegated  government  may  be  an  absolute  or  a  limited  rule, 
according  to  the  extent  of  the  authority  delegated  by  the  sovereign.' 

A  personal,  class,  mass,  or  general  sovereign  may  delegate  to  a  min- 
ister, or  to  a  ministerial  body,  authority  to  govern  unconditionally.  That 
is  to  say,  either  may  institute  absolute  minority  rule.  A  sovereign  mass, 
or  a  sovereign  people,  may  delegate  to  a  majority  authority  to  govern 
unconditionally.  That  is  to  say,  either  mass  or  people  may  institute 
absolute  majority  rule. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  personal,  class,  mass,  or  general  sovereign  may 
delegate  to  a  minister,  or  to  a  ministerial  body,  authority  to  govern  con- 
ditionally and  within  prescribed  limits.  That  is  to  say,  it  may  institute  a 
limited  minority  rule.  A  sovereign  mass,  or  a  sovereign  people,  may 
delegate  to  a  majority  authority  to  govern  conditionally  and  within  limits. 
That  is  to  say,  either  mass  or  people  may  institute  a  limited  majority  rule. 

There  are,  then,  four  fundamental  types  of  government  disclosed  in 
the  foregoing  possibilities,  and  actually  seen   among  men.    They  are, 
'namely.    Absolute    Minority    Rule,    Limited    Minority    Rule,    Absolute 
Majority  Rule,  and  Limited  Majority  Rule. 

229.  Governments  classified  according  to  the  character  of  the 
chief  executive.  The  following  classification  is  that  of  Gareis. 
Willoughby  says  that  "though  not  completely  satisfactory,"  it  is 
"  one  of  the  best." 

1  Copyright,  1906,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


FORM  OF  THE  STATE  AND  OF  GOVERNMENT 


2sl 


(i)  Those  in  which  the  chief  executive  organ  is  a  nonrespotisible  single 
person  or  monarch  ;  and  he  may  be  — 

ia)  without  constitutional  limitations  upon  his  power ;  i.e.  absolute  or 
autocratic,  as  is  the  case  in  Russia,  Turkey,  Persia,  etc.    Or  — 

(b)  constitutionally  limited ;  as,  for  examples,  the  other  monarchies 
of  Europe. 

(2)  Those  in  which  the  chief  executive  organ  is  a  responsible  single 
person ;  as,  for  example,  the  President  of  the  United  States  or  of  France. 
Responsibility  is  here  used,  of  course,  not  in  the  sense  of  parliamentary 
responsibility,  but  of  amenability  to  law  for  all  acts  done  in  a  private 
capacity,  or  in  excess  of  delegated  authority. 

(3)  Those  in  which  there  is  a  nonrespo?isible  plural  executive ;  as,  for 
example,  the  Roman  collegiate,  or  the  joint  regency  in  Japan  before 
1867.    This  is  a  comparaitively  rare  type. 

(4)  Those  in  which  there  is  a  responsible  plural  executive ;  as,  for 
examples,  the  French  Directory,  the  Roman  consuls,  and  the  Swiss 
Federal  Council. 

230.  Forms  of  government.  The  following  classification  by  Bur- 
gess is  one  of  the  most  elaborate  and  logical  systems  of  division  : 

I.  My  first  canon  of  distinction  will  be  the  identity  or  nonidentity  of 
the  state  with  its  government.  From  this  standpoint  government  is 
either  immediate  or  7-epresetitative. 

1.  Immediate  government  is  that  form  in  which  the  state  exercises 
directly  the  functions  of  government.  This  form  of  government  must 
always  be  unlimited,  no  matter  whether  the  state  be  monarchic,  aristo- 
cratic or  democratic ;  for  the  state  alone  can  limit  the  government,  and, 
therefore,  where  the  state  is  the  government,  its  limitations  can  only  be 
self-limitations,  i.e.  no  limitations  in  public  law*.  .  .  . 

Immediate  government  may  be  monarchic,  aristocratic  or  democratic, 
according  as  the  form  of  state  with  which  it  is  identified  is  monarchic, 
aristocratic  or  democratic.   .  .  . 

2.  Representative  government  is,  in  general  definition,  that  form  in 
which  the  state  vests  the  power  of  government  in  an  organization  or  in 
organizations  more  or  less  distinct  from  its  own  organization. 

Representative  government  may  be  limited  or  unlimited.  If  the  state 
vests  its  whole  power  in  the  government,  and  reserves  no  sphere  of  au- 
tonomy for  the  individual,  the  government  is  unlimited.  ...  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  state  confers  upon  the  government  less  than  its  whole 
power  .  .  .  either  by  enumerating  the  powers  of  government,  or  by 
defining  and  safeguarding  individual  liberty  against  them,  the  go\eni- 
ment  is  limited.  .  .  . 


252 


READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


Representative  government  may  be  monarchic,  aristocratic  or  demo- 
cratic, according  as  one  or  a  few  or  the  mass  of  the  population  of  the 
state  are  made  eligible  by  the  state  to  hold  office  or  mandate.  .  .  , 

II.  My  second  canon  of  distinction  is  the  concentration  or  distribution 
of  governmental  power. 

The  first  alternative  which  arises  in  the  application  of  this  canon  is 
between  the  centralized  and  dual  systems  of  government. 

1.  Centralized  government  is  that  form  in  which  the  state  vests  all 
governmental  authority  in  a  single  organization.  In  this  form  there  is  no 
constitutional  autonomy  in  the  localities,  no  independent  local  govern- 
ment. The  local  government  is  only  an  agency  of  the  central  govern- 
ment, established,  modified  or  displaced  by  the  central  government  at  its 
own  will.  .  .  . 

2.  Dual  government  is  the  form  in  which 'the  state  distributes  the 
powers  of  government  between  two  classes  of  organizations,  which  are 
so  far  independent  of  each  other,  that  the  one  cannot  destroy  the  other 
or  limit  the  powers  of  the  other  or  encroach  upon  the  sphere  of  the 
other  as  determined  by  the  state  in  the  constitution.  Both  are  com- 
pletely subject  to  the  state.  Either  may  be  changed  or  abolished  at  will 
by  the  state.  Neither  is  in  essence  an  agency  of  the  other,  although  it 
is  conceivable,  and  often  true,  that  the  one  may  and  does  employ  the 
other  as  agent. 

The  dual  form  is  subject  to  a  subdivision.  It  may  be  confederate  gov- 
ernment or  federal  government.  Confederate  government  is  the  form  in 
which,  as  to  territory  and  population,  the  state  is  coextensive  in  its  own 
organization  with  the  organization  of  the  local  government.  Federal 
government  is  the  form  in  which,  as  to  territory  and  population,  the 
state  is  coextensive  in  its  own  organization  with  the  organization  of  the 
general  government.  In  the  confederate  system  there  are  several  states, 
an  equal  number  of  local  governments,  and  one  central  government.  In 
the  federal  system  we  have  one  state,  one  central  government  and 
several  local  governments.  ... 

The  second  alternative  arising  from  the  application  of  my  second 
canon  of  distinction  is  between  what  I  will  term  consolidated  government 
and  coordifiated  government. 

3.  Consolidated  government  is  the  form  in  which  the  state  confides 
all  governmental  power  to  a  single  body.  If  this  body  be  a  single 
natural  person,  then  the  government  is  monarchic.  If  it  consist  of  a 
number  of  natural  persons,  then  the  government  is  aristocratic  or 
democratic,  according  as  the  number  of  persons  is  narrower  or  wider, 
whom  the  state  makes  eligible  to  hold  voice  and  vote  in  the  govern- 
ing body. 


FORM  OF  THE  STATE  AND  OF  GOVERNMENT      253 

4.  Coordinated  government  is  that  form  in  which  the  state  distributes 
the  powers  of  government,  according  to  their  nature,  between  separate 
departments  or  bodies,  each  created  by  the  state  in  the  constitution,  and, 
therefore,  each  equally  independent  of,  but  coordinated  with,  the  other 
or  others.  .  .  . 

III.  My  third  canon  of  distinction  is  the  tenure  of  the  persons  holding 
office  or  mandate.  Viewed  from  this  standpoint  government  is  either 
hereditary  or  elective. 

1.  Hei*editary  government  is  the  form  in  which  the  state  confers  the 
powers  of  government  upon  a  person  or  upon  an  organization  or  organiza- 
tions composed  of  persons,  standing  in  a  certain  family  relation  to  his  or 
their  immediate  predecessors.  The  state  determines,  in  the  constitution, 
what  the  relation  shall  be.  Four  general  solutions  of  this  problem  meet 
us  in  political  practice,  viz. ;  anciennete',  ancicnnete'  in  the  male  line, 
primogeniture,  primogeniture  in  the  male  line.  .  .  . 

2.  Elective  government  is  that  form  in  which  the  state  confers  the 
powers  of  government  upon  a  person,  or  upon  an  organization  or  organi- 
zations composed  of  persons,  chosen  by  the  suffrage  of  other  persons 
enfranchised  by  the  state,  and  holding  the  powers  thus  conferred  for  a 
distinct  term  and  under  certain  conditions. 

Election  may  be  direct  or  indirect ;  i.e.  the  suffrage  holders  may  vote 
immediately  for  the  person  to  hold  power,  or  for  another  person  or 
other  persons  who  shall  vote  for  the  person  to  hold  power. 

Election  may  also  be  by  general  ticket  or  by  district  ticket ;  i.e.  each 
suffrage  holder  may  vote  for  a  number  of  persons  representing  a  larger 
division  of  territory  and  population,  or  for  a  single  person  representing 
a  smaller  division.  .  .  . 

IV.  My  fourth  ancf  last  canon  of  distinction  is  the  relation  of  the 
legislature  to  the  executive. 

Viewed  from  this  standpoint  government  is  either  presidential  or 
parliamentary. 

1.  Presidential  government  is  that  form  in  which  the  state,  the  sov- 
ereign, makes  the  executive  independent  of  the  legislature,  both  in  ten- 
ure and  prerogative,  and  furnishes  him  with  sufficient  power  to  prevent 
the  legislature  from  trenching  upon  the  sphere  marked  out  by  the  state 
as  executive  independence  and  prerogative.  .  .  . 

2.  Parliamentary  government  is  that  form  in  which  the  state  confers 
upon  the  legislature  the  complete  control  of  the  administration  of  law. 
Under  this  form  the  legislature  originates  the  tenure  of  the  real  (though 
perhaps  not  the  nominal)  executive,  and  terminates  it  at  pleasure  :  and 
under  this  form  the  exercise  of  no  executive  prerogative  in  any  sense  and 
manner  unapproved  by  the  legislature,  can  be  successfully  undertaken. 


254  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

III.  Parliamentary  and  Nonparliamentary  Governments 

231.  Parliamentary  system  and  congressional  system.  Hart 
gives  a  clear  statement  of  the  chief  differences  between  these  two 
great  types  of  organization. 

The  English  parliamentary  system  and  the  so-called  "  congressional," 
or  committee,  system  are  fairly  rivals  in  representative  government.  The 
British  system  has  been  followed  in  France,  Italy,  Belgium,  Denmark, 
Sweden,  and  to  some  degree  in  Austro-Hungary ;  parts  of  the  congres- 
sional system  are  followed  in  Germany  and  Switzerland.  The  main 
differences  between  the  two  involve  the  relation  of  the  legislative  with 
the  executive,  and  the  preparation  of  legislative  measures.  Many  critics 
of  American  government  hold  our  system  inferior  on  both  counts  to  the 
English  responsible  ministry,  which  is  in  effect  a  joint  committee  of  the 
two  houses,  numbering  about  nineteen  and  possessing  the  confidence  of 
the  House  of  Commons.  The  ministry  takes  charge  of  both  the  execu- 
tive and  the  legislative  business  of  the  English  nation :  the  different 
ministers  are  heads  of  executive  departments,  the  details  of  which  are 
carried  on  by  permanent  chiefs ;  and  at  the  same  time  the  ministry  as  a 
whole  is  a  board  for  deciding  on  the  executive  policy  of  England.  The 
ministry  as  a  whole  also  decides  what  legislation  shall  be  submitted  to 
Parliament,  drafts  bills,  fixes  the  order  in  which  measures  shall  come  up, 
and  agrees  on  the  attitude  which  the  government  will  take  on  amend- 
ments offered  in  Parliament.  If  the  ministry  —  or  any  member  of  it  — 
is  outvoted  on  any  serious  question,  it  forthwith  resigns  ;  hence  its  sup- 
porters must  squarely  back  it  up. 

Under  the  congressional  system,  the  executive  business  is  nearly  all 
out  of  the  hands  of  Congress,  because  conducted  by  a  president  elected 
for  four  years,  not  affected  by  majorities  against  him  in  Congress,  and 
appointing  directly  or  indirectly  all  subordinate  officials.  The  chieftains 
of  the  majority  in  Congress  have  no  control  over  executive  matters  ;  in 
like  manner,  the  president  and  his  cabinet  are  not  responsible  for  legisla- 
tion, and  cannot  introduce  official  measures.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
president  knows  that  he  has  four  years  to  carry  out  his  policy ;  he  is 
therefore  less  subject  than  the  English  prime  minister  to  temporary 
currents  of  public  prejudice,  and  he  is  not  obliged  to  make  concessions 
in  order  to  remain  in  office.  The  relation  between  the  executive  and  the 
legislature  is  much  closer  than  appears  on  the  surface ;  for,  besides  the 
president's  official  and  unofficial  influence  over  legislation,  the  members 
of  the  cabinet  appear  before  committees  of  the  House  and  Senate  to 
urge  the  introduction  and  passage  of  measures  which  they  think  desirable. 


FORM  OF  THE  STATE  AND  OF  GOVERNMENT      255 

The  subdivision  of  public  business  among  standing  committees  has  many 
serious  drawbacks,  but  it  is  not  a  necessar}'  part  of  the  congressional 
system. 

In  the  long  run,  the  congressional  system  works  about  as  well  as  the 
parliamentary,  and  in  some  respects  it  works  better ;  for,  where  there 
are  three  parties  under  the  parliamentary  system,  it  is  difficult  to  keep 
up  a  stable  administration.  France  during  the  last  thirty  years  has  had 
about  forty  ministries.  In  the  United  States  the  executive  goes  on 
steadily  and  undiminished,  even  if  no  party  has  a  clear  majority  in  the 
Hbuse  or  the  Senate. 

232.  Defects  of  the  presidential  system.  Bryce,  in  discussing 
the  American  system  of  government,  sums  up  the  main  accusations 
against  the  nonparliamentary  form  of  government  as  follows  :  ^ 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  sum  up  the  practical  results  of  the 
system  which  purports  to  separate  Congress  from  the  executive,  in- 
stead of  uniting  them  as  they  are  united  under  a  cabinet  government. 
I  say  "  purports  to  separate,"  because  it  is  plain  that  the  separation, 
significant  as  it  is,  is  less  complete  than  current  language  imports,  or  than 
the  Fathers  of  the  Constitution  would  seem  to  have  intended.  The 
necessary  coherence  of  the  two  powers  baffled  them.  These  results 
are  five :  — 

The  President  and  his  ministers  have  no  initiative  in  Congress,  little 
influence  over  Congress,  except  what  they  can  exert  over  individual 
members,  through  the  bestowal  of  patronage. 

Congress  has,  together  with  unlimited  powers  of  inquir)',  imperfect 
powers  of  control  over  the  administrative  departments. 

The  nation  does  not  always  know  how  or  where  to  fix  responsibility 
for  misfeasance  or  neglect.  The  person  and  bodies  concerned  in  making 
and  executing  the  laws  are  so  related  to  one  another  that  each  can 
generally  shift  the  burden  of  blame  on  some  one  else,  and  no  one  acts 
under  the  full  sense  of  direct  accountability. 

There  is  a  loss  of  force  by  friction  —  i.e.  part  of  the  energ\',  force, 
and  time  of  the  men  and  bodies  that  make  up  the  government  is  dissi- 
pated in  struggles  with  one  another.  This  belongs  to  all  free  governments, 
because  all  free  governments  rely  upon  checks.  But  the  more  checks, 
the  more  friction. 

There  is  a  risk  that  executive  vig(^r  and  promptitude  may  be  found 
wanting  at  critical  moments. 

1  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


256  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

We  may  include  these  defects  in  one  general  expression.  There  is  in 
the  American  government,  considered  as  a  whole,  a  want  of  unity.  Its 
branches  are  unconnected ;  their  efforts  are  not  directed  to  one  aim,  do 
not  produce  one  harmonious  result. 

233.  Presidential  and  cabinet  systems  in  times  of  crises.    The 

advantages  of  the  more  flexible  cabinet  form  of  government  in 
times  of  uncertainty  and  danger  are  thus  stated  by  Bagehot : 

But  in  addition  to  this,  a  Parliamentary  or  Cabinet  constitution  pos- 
sesses an  additional  and  special  advantage  in  very  dangerous  times.  It 
has  what  we  may  call  a  reserve  of  power  fit  for  and  needed  by  extreme 
exigencies. 

The  principle  of  popular  government  is  that  supreme  power,  the 
determining  efficacy  in  matters  political,  resides  in  the  people — ■ 
not  necessarily  or  commonly  in  the  whole  people,  in  the  numerical 
majority,  but  in  a  chosen  people,  a  picked  and  selected  people.  .  .  . 
Under  a  Cabinet  constitution  at  a  sudden  emergency  this  people  can 
choose  a  ruler  for  the  occasion.  It  is  quite  possible  and  even  likely 
that  he  would  not  be  the  ruler  before  the  occasion.  The  great  quali- 
ties, the  imperious  will,  the  rapid  energy,  the  eager  nature  fit  for  a  great 
crisis  are  not  required  —  are  impediments  —  in  common  times.  A 
Lord  Liverpool  is  better  in  everyday  politics  than  a  Chatham ;  a 
Louis  Philippe  far  better  than  a  Napoleon.  By  the  structure  of  the 
world  we  often  want,  at  the  sudden  occurrence  of  a  grave  tempest,  to 
change  the  helmsman,  to  replace  the  pilot  of  the  calm  by  the  pilot  of 
the  storm. 

In  England  we  have  had  so  few  catastrophes  since  our  Constitution 
attained  maturity  that  we  can  hardly  appreciate  this  latent  excellence. 
We  have  not  needed  a  Cavour  to  rule  a  revolution  —  a  representative 
man  above  all  men  fit  for  a  great  occasion,  and  by  a  natural,  legal  mode 
brought  in  to  rule.  But  even  in  England,  at  what  was  the  nearest  to  a 
great  sudden  crisis  which  we  have  had  of  late  years,  at  the  Crimean 
difficulty,  we  used  this  inherent  power.  We  abolished  the  Aberdeen 
Cabinet,  the  ablest  we  have  had,  perhaps,  since  the  Reform  Act  —  a 
Cabinet  not  only  adapted,  but  eminently  adapted,  for  every  sort  of  diffi- 
culty save  the  one  it  had  to  meet,  which  abounded  in  pacific  discretion, 
and  was  wanting  only  in  the  "  demonic  element " ;  we  chose  a  states- 
man who  had  the  sort  of  merit  then  wanted,  who,  when  he  feels  the 
steady  power  of  England  behind  him,  will  advance  without  reluctance, 
and  will  strike  without  restraint.  As  was  said  at  the  time,  "  We  turned 
out  the  Quaker,  and  put  in  the  pugilist." 


FORM  OF  THE  STATE  AND  OF  GOVERNMENT      257 

But  under  a  presidential  government  you  can  do  nothing  of  the  kind. 
The  American  government  calls  itself  a  government  of  the  supreme 
people ;  but  at  a  quick  crisis,  the  time  when  a  sovereign  power  is  most 
needed,  you  cannot  find  the  supreme  people.  You  have  got  a  Congress 
elected  for  one  fixed  period,  going  out  perhaps  by  fixed  installments, 
which  cannot  be  accelerated  or  retarded  ;  you  have  a  president  chosen 
for  a  fixed  period,  and  immovable  during  that  period  :  all  the  arrange- 
ments are  for  stated  times.  There  is  no  elastic  element ;  everything  is 
rigid,  specified,  dated.  Come  what  may,  you  can  quicken  nothing  and 
can  retard  nothing.  You  have  bespoken  your  government  in  advance, 
and  whether  it  suits  you  or  not,  whether  it  works  well  or  works  ill, 
whether  it  is  what  you  want  or  not,  by  law  you  must  keep  it.  In  a 
country  of  complex  foreign  relations  it  would  mostly  hajipen  that  the 
first  and  most  critical  year  of  every  war  would  be  managed  by  a  peace 
premier,  and  the  first  and  most  critical  years  of  peace  by  a  war  premier. 
In  each  case  the  period  of  transition  would  be  irrevocably  governed  by 
a  man  selected  not  for  what  he  was  to  introduce,  but  what  he  was  to 
change ;  for  the  policy  he  was  to  abandon,  not  for  the  policy  he  was 
to  administer. 

IV.  Modern  States 

234.  Varieties  of  organization.  Jenks  points  out  some  of  the 
more  important  distinctions  that  characterize  the  organization  of 
modern  states.^ 

Within  these  limits,  sovereignty  may  be  orgajiized  in  different  ways.  It 
may  be  vested  (in  theory  at  least)  in  the  hands  of  a  single  individual,  as, 
for  example,  in  Russia.  Or  it  may  be  vested,  and  this  is  by  far  the 
commoner  case,  in  a  number  of  individuals  or  bodies,  as  in  the  Crown, 
Lords  and  Commons,  in  the  British  Empire.  As  this  latter  arrangement 
always  gives  rise  to  a  good  many  elaborate  rules  concerning  the  relation- 
ship between  the  different  individuals  or  bodies  composing  the  sovereign 
poziier,  it  has  received  the  name  of  eonstitiitioiuil  government,  while  the 
sovereignty  vested  in  a  single  individual  receives  the  name  of  aiitoeratic 
government.  .  .  .  Needless  to  say,  the  proportions  in  which  sovereign 
power  is  divided  among  the  different  members  of  a  sovereign  body 
varies  almost  infinitely  with  each  case.  And  so  also  do  the  methods  by 
which  the  various  members  are  selected.  Sometimes  the  executive  and 
legislative  powers  are  quite  distinct,  as  in  the  German  Empire,  and, 
virtually,   in  Austria;  sometimes   they   are    combined,  as  in    England, 

1  Copyright,  1900,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


258  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

Sometimes  the  law  courts  are  beyond  the  control  of  the  legislature,  as  in 
the  United  States  of  America ;  sometimes  they  are,  legally  at  least,  sub- 
ject to  its  control,  as,  again,  in  the  British  Empire.  Again,  the  head  of 
the  State  may  be  hereditary  or  elective,  and  this  independently  of  the 
extent  of  his  powers.  The  German  Emperor,  with  very'  great  power,  is 
hereditary  ;  the  President  of  the  United  States,  also  with  great  power, 
is  elective.  The  King  of  the  Netherlands,  who  has  very  little  power,  is 
hereditary  ;  the  President  of  the  French  Republic,  also  with  small  power, 
is  elective. 

Another,  and  almost  equally  important,  variation  of  sovereignties  is, 
that  some  are  what  we  may  call  orditiar)\  others  extraordinary.  That  is 
to  say,  in  some  States  the  sovereign  authority  is  in  constant  action,  or  at 
least  always  ready  to  act ;  in  others  it  requires  an  elaborate  machinery 
to  set  it  in  motion.  .  .  .  This  fact,  which  is  extremely  important,  gives 
rise  to  the  distinction  between  fiDidametital  and  ordinary  laws ;  the  for- 
mer being  those  which  cannot  be  passed  or  altered  by  the  ordinary 
legislature,  the  latter,  those  which  can.  This  distinction  has  been  aptly 
expressed  by  Mr.  James  Bryce,  as  the  distinction  between  rigid  and 
flexible  constitutions.  It  is  closely,  though  not  inevitably,  connected  with 
the  division  of  constitutions  into  written  and  unwritten.  The  written 
constitution  is  nearly  always  rigid ;  because  its  framers  do  not  really 
believe  that  it  ever  will  require  alteration.  The  unwritten  constitution  is 
nearly  aiways  flexib/e,  i.e.  it  can  be  altered  by  the  ordinary  legislature.  .  .  . 

The  last  distinction  in  point  of  /onn  which  we  need  point  out  is  the 
important  distinction  between  centralized  and  localized  States.  .  .  .  Be- 
ginning with  the  highly  centralized  States,  we  may  notice  that  they 
correspond  closely  with  those  States  which  have  been  formed  by  the 
gradual  conquest  by  one  ruler  over  a  group  of  surrounding  rulers,  whose 
independence  he  has  desired  to  crush.  Thus,  modern  France  was  formed 
by  the  victory  of  the  kings  at  Paris  in  a  struggle,  long  and  profound, 
with  the  rulers  of  the  neighboring  fiefs  .  .  .  and  France  is  the  best 
example  of  a  highly  centralized  country.  That  is  to  say,  the  central  gov- 
ernment at  Paris  really  controls  even  petty  local  affairs  throughout 
France,  leaving  practically  no  independence  to  the  so-called  local  authori- 
ties. ...  On  the  other  hand,  a  State  which  was  formed  suddenly  by  the 
conquest  of  a  foreign  ruler,  or  in  which  a  long-established  government 
has  produced  a  real  fusion  of  the  population,  there  is  generally  a  con- 
siderable allowance  of  genuine  local  ifidependence.  That  is  to  say,  the 
local  authorities  are  genuinely  chosen  by  the  people  whom  they  have 
to  govern ;  they  are  not  bound  at  every  step  to  seek  instructions  from 
the  central  government ;  and  so  long  as  they  act  within  their  legal 
powers,  they  cannot  be  interfered  with   by  the   central  authorities. 


FORM  OF  THE  STATE  AND  OF  GOVERNMENT      259 

235.  Classification  of  modern  states.    Lcacock  classifies  existing 
states  in  the  following  diagram  i^ 


MODERN  STATES 

I 


DEMOCRATIC 


Abyssinia  1 

Afghanistan  limited  monarchy 

Korea  -  I 

Monaco  |       ~                                  I 

Morocco  UNITARY  FEDERAL 

Oman 
Persia 
Russia 
Turkey 
China  ^ 


Parlia- 
mentary 

I 

Belgium 

Denmark 

Greece 


1 

Nonparlia- 
mentary 

I 
Luxemburg 
Montenegro 
Prussia  and 


Parlia- 
mentary 

I 
Australia' 
Canada" 


Nonparlia- 
mentary 

I 

German 

Empire 


Parlia-       Nonparlia-        Parlia-  Nonparlia- 
mentary       mentary         mentary       mentary 
I                     I                     I  I 

Bolivia    Switzerland*  Argentine 


Italy  German  monarchies 


Austria- Hungary ' 


Japan 

Netherlands 

Norway" 

Portugal 

Roumania 

Spain 

Sweden  6 

United  Kingdom 


Siam 
Servia 


Chile 

Republic 

Colombia 

Brazil 

Costa  Rica 

Mexico 

Cuba 

United  States 

Ecuador 

Venezuela 

Guatemala 

Havti 

Honduras 

Liberia 

Nicaragua 

Panama 

Paraguay 

Peru 

Salvador    . 

Santo  Domingo 

Uruguay 

236.  Modern  democratic  states.  Burgess  states  the  essential 
nature  of  modern  democracies  as  follows  : 

What  we  call  the  modem  states  are  those  based  upon  the  principle  of 
popular  sovereignty ;  i.e.  they  are  democracies.  Not  all  of  them  appear 
to  be  such,  but  a  close  scrudny  of  the  facts  will  reveal  the  truth  of  the 
proposition  that  they  are.    The  reason  of  the  deceptive  appearance  in 

1  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 

2  Since  the  treaty  of  November,  1905,  Korea  may  be  said  to  be  under  the 
suzerainty  of  Japan. 

3  The  case  of  China  is  peculiar.    The  emperor  appoints  his  own  successor.  .  .  . 

4  The  recognition  of  the  cabinet  principle  has  been  in  Japan  a  disputed  consti- 
tutional   point.     See   Encyclopaedia    Britannica,    supplementary  volume,    article, 

"  Japan."  ,  .^      j 

6  For  the  relation  of  executive  and  legislature  in   Norway  and  Sweden,  see 

Wilson,  "  The  State,"  §§  813,  824. 

6  Considered  apart  from  the  rest  of  the  British  Empire. 

'  Hungary  itself  has  cabinet  government.  ^^ 

8  The  Swiss  executive  offers  a  special  case.    See  "  Statesman's  \  ear-Uook. 


26o  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

such  cases  will  be  found  to  be  the  fact  that  the  state  has  but  recently 
taken  on  its  new  form,  and  has  not  perfected  its  organization ;  while 
the  old  state  form,  remaining  as  government,  is  still  clad  in  the  habili- 
ments of  sovereignty,  shabby  and  threadbare  perhaps,  but  still  recogniz- 
able. It  will  be  highly  instructive  to  consider,  for  a  moment,  the  social 
conditions  which  precede,  and  make  possible,  the  existence  of  the  demo- 
cratic state.  They  may  be  expressed  in  a  single  phrase,  viz. :  national 
harmony.  There  can  be  no  democratic  state  unless  the  mass  of  the 
population  of  a  given  state  shall  have  attained  a  consensus  of  opinion  in 
reference  to  rights  and  wrongs,  in  reference  to  government  and  liberty. 
This  implies,  in  the  first  place,  that  they  shall  understand  each  other ;  i.e. 
that  they  shall  have  a  common  language  and  a  common  psychologic 
standpoint  and  habit.  It  implies,  in  the  second  place,  that  they  shall 
have  a  common  interest,  in  greater  or  less  degree,  over  against  the  popu- 
lations of  other  states.  It  implies,  finally,  that  they  shall  have  risen,  in 
their  mental  development,  to  the  consciousness  of  the  state,  in  its  essence, 
means,  and  purposes ;  that  is,  the  democratic  state  must  be  a  national 
state,  and  the  state  whose  population  has  become  truly  national  will  in- 
evitably become  democratic.  There  is  a  natural  and  an  indissoluble  con- 
nection between  this  condition  of  society  and  this  form  of  state. 

237.  Modern  national  empires.  Reinsch  describes  national 
imperialism,  the*  ideal  aimed   at  by  states  of  the   present  day.^ 

We  should  here  distinguish  between  the  spirit  of  modem  national 
imperialism  and  that  which  animated  the  Roman  Empire.  The  cardinal 
difference  between  the  two  is  that  the  ideal  of  the  latter  was  the  com- 
prehension of  all  civilized  nations  under  the  sway  of  a  world  empire, 
while  the  former  recognizes  the  separate  existence  of  national  states. 
Orbis  terrarum  and  imperiimi  were  convertible  terms  to  the  Romans ; 
there  was  only  one  empire,  which  embraced  the  world,  or  at  least  its 
desirable  parts.  Separate  nationalism  was  not  respected ;  in  the  words 
of  Ihering,  "  The  spiritual  substance  of  Rome  is  an  acid  which,  when 
brought  in  contact  with  the  living  organism  of  a  nationality,  acts  as  an 
irritant  and  dissolvent."  National  imperialism,  on  the  other  hand,  takes 
as  its  basis  a  national  state  and  is  not  inconsistent  with  respect  for  the 
political  existence  of  other  nationalities ;  it  endeavors  to  increase  the 
resources  of  the  national  state  through  the  absorption  or  exploitation  of 
undeveloped  regions  and  inferior  races,  but  does  not  attempt  to  impose 
political  control  upon  highly  civilized  nations.  Napoleon,  indeed,  strove  to 
revive  the  Roman  form  of  imperialism,  but  the  rising  spirit  of  nationalism 

1  Copyright,  1900,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


FORM  OF  THE  STATE  AND  OF  GOVERNMENT      261 

was  too  strong  for  him ;   against  tlie  forces  of  historical  development  his 
genius  was  of  no  avail. 

The  nineteenth  century  has  been  an  age  of  nationalism.  The  twentieth 
is  to  be  the  age  of  national  imperialism. 

238.  The  government  of  the  future.  Burgess  risks  the  following 
prophecy  concerning  the  probable  form  of  the  state  in  the  future. 

Toward  what  form  the  political  world  is  tending  is  not  so  easy  to 
discern.  The  drift  away  from  monarchic,  aristocratic,  unlimited,  heredi- 
tary forms  would,  I  think,  indicate  a  tendency,  at  least,  toward  republi- 
canism. I  do  not  believe  it  is  Utopian  to  predict  that  the  republican 
form  will  live  after  all  other  forms  have  perished.  The  mysticism  and 
credulity  are  being  surely  dispelled  which  make  these  forms  necessary, 
useful  or  possible  ;  and  the  popular  intelligence  and  virtue  are  being 
developed  which  will  make  republicanism  possible  and,  at  last,  necessary 
everywhere. 

Whether  it  will  be  centralized  or  federalized  republicanism  is  a  ques- 
tion more  difficult  to  answer ;  and  most  difficult  of  all  is  the  query  as  to 
whether  presidential  or  parliamentary  government  will  be  the  general 
form  of  the  future. 

As  I  have  said,  the  world  manifests  some  dissatisfaction  with  both 
centralized  and  federalized  government,  and  with  both  presidential  and 
parliamentary  government.  In  the  existing  centralized  systems  the  tend- 
ency is  manifest  toward  federalization  in  administration,  while  in  the 
federalized  systems,  the  tendency  is  manifest  toward  centralization  in 
legislation.  Again,  in  the  presidential  systems,  the  tendency  seems 
toward  some  closer  connection  of  the  executive  and  the  legislature  in 
procedure,  while  in  the  parliamentary  systems  the  tendency  is,  on  the 
other  hand,  toward  a  greater  independence  of  the  executive.  The  form 
of  the  future  will  doubtless  be  the  resultant  of  all  of  these  tendencies 
and  will  satisfy  them  all. 

It  is  a  hazardous  venture  to  prophesy  what  the  form  of  the  future 
will  be.  It  seems  to  me,  however,  that  that  form  will  be  a  republic, 
with  centralized  legislation  and  federalized  administration.  Its  executive 
will  be  independent  in  tenure,  and  will  exercise  a  veto  power,  a  military 
power,  and  an  ordinance  power  active  enough  and  strong  enough  to 
defend  his  constitutional  prerogatives  and  initiate  and  direct  the  meas- 
ures of  administration.  But  he  will  be  bound  to  keep  his  cabinet  of 
advisers  in  political  accord  with  the  lower  house  of  the  legislature.  He 
will  be  bound  to  change  them  as  that  majority  changes ;  cither  immedi- 
ately, or  after  a  dissolution  of  that  body  by  his  order,  approved  by  the 


262  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

upper  house  of  the  legislature,  and  after  the  return  of  the  same  party 
majority  by  the  electors.  He  will  also  be  bound  to  approve  the  acts  of 
the  legislature  which  do  not,  in  his  judgment,  trench  upon  his  preroga- 
tive or  contain  unsound  or  disadvantageous  measures  of  administration. 
Which  of  the  great  states  of  the  world  will  arrive  at  this  form  first 
and  win  for  itself  the  prestige  of  becoming  the  example  for  all  the  rest, 
in  the  development  of  the  world's  political  civilization,  is  a  question 
which  the  future  must  decide ;  but  I  do  not  think  it  chauvinistic  to  say 
that  the  governmental  system  of  the  United  States  seems  to  me  to  be 
many  stages  in  advance  of  all  the  rest  in  this  line  of  progress.  In  spite 
of  all  the  difficulties  and  the  discouragements  which  surround  us  in  our, 
in  many  respects,  crude  and  undeveloped  society,  it  seems  to  me  evident 
that  the  destiny  of  history  is  clearly  pointing  to  the  United  States  as  the 
great  world  organ  for  the  modem  solution  of  the  problem  of  govern- 
ment as  well  as  of  liberty. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT 

I.    Forms  of  Union 

239.  Classification  of  unions.  Willouf^hby,  following  Jellinek  ^ 
in  the  main,  outlines  the  various  forms  of  unions  into  which  polit- 
ical organizations  may  enter.^ 

Jellinek,  in  his  classification  of  unions,  makes  the  first  division  into 
Unorganized  and  Organized  Unions.  These  names  serve  to  indicate  the 
distinction  that  is  made  between  the  two  classes.  In  the  first  class  are 
included  instances  in  which  more  or  less  permanent  relations  between 
States  have  been  entered  into  for  the  regulation  of  certain  mutual  inter- 
ests, but  in  which  no  central  organization  has  been  created.  Such  com- 
mon action  as  is  necessary  in  these  unions  is  had  through  one  or  all  of 
the  governmental  organs  of  the  individual  States.  .  .  .  Within  this  cate- 
gory fall  such  types  as  "  Alliances  "  for  offense  or  defense,  and  for  the 
guarantee  of  particular  rights ;  as,  for  example,  perpetual  neutrality  of 
particular  territories,  etc.  .  .  . 

Coming  now  to  "  Organized  Unions  "  we  find  established  in  them,  as 
their  name  imports,  permanent  central  organs.  They  admit  of  segrega- 
tion into  four  classes,  as  follows  :  (i)  International  Administrative  Unions, 
(2)  The  Realunion,  (3)  The  Staatenbund  (Confederacy),  (4)  The  Bun- 
desstaat  (Federal  State). 

Examples  of  the  first  subclass  are  combinations  of  States  for  the 
common  regulation  of  particular  interests  wherein  permanent  adminis- 
trative authorities  are  created.  .  .  . 

By  the  term  "  Realunion  "  is  indicated  by  German  publicists  that 
composite  type  of  State  life  in  which  there  is  an  intimate  and  lasting 
union  entered  into  between  two  or  more  States,  according  to  which 
there  is  a  common  ruler,  but  a  preservation  of  the  territorial  divisions, 
and  a  recognition  and  protection  of  the  constitutional  rights  of  each  of 
the  uniting  States.   ... 

A  type  very  much  resembling  the  Realunion,  and  often  confused 
with  it,  is  what  is  termed  the  Personal utiion.    There  is,  however,  a  clear 

1  "  Die  Lehre  von  den  Staatenverbindungen." 

2  Copyright,  1896,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 

263 


264  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

distinction  between  them.  In  the  first  there  exists  a  permanent  provision 
that  the  two  States  shall  be  commonly  represented  by  a  single  sovereign. 
In  the  latter,  community  of  ruler  is  accidental,  and  is  occasioned  by  one 
sovereign  becoming  invested  by  descent  or  other  casual  circumstance 
with  two  or  more  rulerships.  .  .  . 

The  two  main  types  of  the  composite  State  are  the  Confederacy 
(Staatenbund)  and  the  Federal  State  (Bundesstaat).  ... 

240.  Degrees  of  relationship  among  states.  A  classification  of 
the  relation  that  may  exist  among  states  that  is  of  especial  value 
in  international  affairs  follows  : 

The  best  line  of  demarcation  of  classes  among"  nations  is  that  of  the 
responsibility  of  a  common  agent  in  the  exercise  of  rights  over  the 
entire  territory  of  the  nation.  Where  a  nation  exercises  rights,  if  at  all, 
through  its  own  exclusive  agents,  or  through  an  agent  who,  though  com- 
mon to  another  nation,  is  yet  responsible  to  itself  for  the  exercise  of  its 
rights,  or  where  the  rights  exercised  by  its  common  agents  extend  to 
only  a  portion  of  its  territory,  the  nation  is  commonly  called  independent ; 
where,  on  the  contrary,  a  common  agent  exercises  one  or  more  of  the 
rights  of  a  nation  as  to  its  whole  territory,  without  responsibility  to  it, 
the  nation  is  said  to  be  dependent.  Among  independent  nations,  it  is 
seen,  there  may  be  distinguished  three  groups :  (i)  those  that  exercise 
all  the  rights  of  independence  that  they  possess  through  their  own 
agents;  (2)  those  that  have  rights  exercised  by  agents  responsible  to 
themselves  in  common  with  other  nations;  and  (3)  those  that  have 
rights  exercised  as  to  a  portion  of  their  territory  by  agents  who,  within 
the  limits  of  their  office,  are  not  directly  responsible  to  themselves. 

The  bare  relinquishment  or  deprivation  of  certain  of  the  rights  of  in- 
dependence is  not  regarded  as  a  material  impairment  of  that  attribute. 
Two  categories  of  independent  nations  in  this  situation  are  recognized. 
One  of  these  consists  of  neutralized  states,  which  do  not  possess  the 
right  of  offensive  warfare;  and  the  other  comprises  tributary  states, 
which  are  under  an  obligation  to  pay  a  tax  to  another  nation.  With  this 
group  may  also  be  placed  nations  which  enjoy  rights  not  generally  pos- 
sessed by  independent  nations  and  hence  not  necessary  to  the  concep- 
tion of  independence.    These  are  guaranteed  states. 

The  employment  of  a  common  agent,  responsible  to  each  of  the 
several  nations,  constitutes  an  alliance  or  union.  Such  is  the  personal 
union  in  which  two  or  more  nations  have  a  common  ruler  through  acci- 
dent or  coincidence.  The  real  union  or  confederation  is  a  form  in 
which  the  employment  of  a  common  agent  is  the  result  of  treaty.  In 
both  the  personal  union  and  the  real  union  or  confederation  the  rights 


FEDERAL  (GOVERNMENT  26' 

exerciscd  by  the  common  agent  include  always  a  part  at  least  of  the 
rights  of  treating  with  other  nations.  Many  unions  of  states  through 
which  are  established  commissions  of  one  kind  or  another  are  not  classi- 
fied in  international  law,  owing  to  their  temporary  character  or  to  the 
relative  unimportance  of  the  rights  exercised  by  the  agent. 

The  third  class  of  independent  nations  consists  of  those,  one  or  more 
of  whose  rights  are  exercised  as  to  a  portion  of  their  territory  by  an 
agent  not  responsible  to  themselves.  Such  are  the  nations  subject  to 
the  exercise  within  definite  areas  of  their  territories  -of  foreign  consular 
jurisdiction  over  aliens  of  the  consuls'  nationality.  Such  also  are  the 
nations,  portions  of  whose  territories  are  administered  by  a  common 
agent  not  responsible  to  themselves.  Territory  thus  held  is  known 
partly  as  leased  territory  and  partly  as  vassal  territory.  The  nation  that 
possesses  the  right  of  territory  is  the  suzerain  state ;  the  nation  to 
which  the  common  agent  is  responsible  is  the  lessee  or  administering  state. 

A  dependent  nation  is  one  that  has  an  agent  not  directly  responsible 
to  itself  in  common  with  some  other  nation  for  the  exercise  of  one  or 
more  of  its  rights  of  independence  as  to  its  entire  territory.  Of  this 
class  is  the  protected  state,  which  differs  from  the  guaranteed  state  in 
that  in  return  for  protection  it  relinquishes  some  portion  of  its  inde- 
pendence to  the  exercise  of  a  common  agent.  An  administered  state  is 
unlike  the  protected  state  in  that  the  rights  exercised  by  the  common  agent 
in  the  former  include  those  concerned  purely  with  internal  administration. 

241.  Forms  of  union.  Burgess  considers  the  main  forms  of 
union  for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  no  such  thing  as  a  com- 
pound state  can  exist ;  but  that,  at  most,  only  a  dual  S}'stem  of 
government  may  be  created. 

Two  states  in  personal  union  form  no  compound  state.  Thev  do  not 
even  form  a  compound  government.  A  personal  union  of  two  or  more 
states  results  when  the  executive  head  of  the  government  of  one  be- 
comes the  executive  head  of  the  government  or  governments  of  the 
other  or  others.  This  person  then  acts  in  two  or  more  entirely  distinct 
capacities.  .  .  .  The  fact  that  two  or  more  states  make  use  of  the  same 
person,  or  even  of  the  same  institution,  in  their  governmental  organiza- 
tion, does  not  make  these  states  a  compound  state.  Its  influence  toward 
the  consolidation  of  the  states  is  favorable ;  but  that  is  another  thing. 

Again,  the  confederacy  is  no  compound  state.  The  states  forming 
the  same  remain  separate,  simple  states.  The  confederate  organization 
has  no  power  to  bind  any  one  of  the  states  entering  into  the  same  with- 
out its  own  separate  and  expressed  consent ;  i.e.  it  has  no  sovereignty ; 


266  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

it  is  no  state  at  all ;  it  is  only  government.  The  confederate  constitution 
is  a  treaty,  an  interstate  agreement.  It  differs  from  the  usual  treaty  in 
two  points,  viz.;  it  creates  a  sort  of  governmental  organization,  or 
rather  a  council  of  advisers,  and  contains  the  general  agreement  on  the 
part  of  the  different  states  to  execute  the  recommendations  of  this  body ; 
and  it  has,  generally,  no  limitation  as  to  duration.  These  are  circum- 
stances favorable  to  the  consolidation  of  the  separate  states  into  one 
state.  The  very  fact  of  the  confederacy  is  the  best  of  proof  that  there 
are  natural  forces,  at  work  conspiring  to  secure  such  consolidation. 
After  this  consolidation  shall  have  been  accomplished,  however,  there  is 
no  compound  state  as  the  result ;  i.e.  no  state  in  which  the  sovereignty 
is  partly  in  the  new  state  and  partly  in  the  old  states,  but  there  is  a 
simple  state  of  wider  organization. 

This  last  reflection  leads  to  the  consideration  of  the  final  species  of 
compound  state  .  .  .  viz. ;  the  federal  I  take  the  ground  here,  again, 
that  this  is  no  compound  state ;  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  federal 
state ;  and  that  what  is  really  meant  by  the  phrase  is  a  dual  system  of 
government  under  a  common  sovereign.  If  we  put  this  case  to  a  rigid 
scientific  test,  we  shall  find  that  the  so-called  federal  state  is  a  state 
which  extends  over  a  territory  and  comprehends  a  population  previously 
divided  into  several  independent  states  ;  that  physical,  ethnical,  economic, 
and  social  harmony,  conspiring  to  produce  political  unity,  existed  through- 
out the  several  states ;  that  consolidation  was  resisted  by  the  govern- 
ments of  some  of  the  states,  possibly  by  some  of  the  states  themselves ; 
that,  consequently,  the  consolidation  was  produced  by  violence,  and  the 
first  organization  of  the  new  state  was  therefore  revolutionary,  i.e.  was 
not  created  according  to  the  prescripts  of  existing  law ;  that  the  new 
state  under  its  revolutionary  organization  has  framed  a  constitution  in 
which  it  has  constructed  a  government  for  the  general  affairs  of  the 
whole  state,  and  has  left  to  the  old  bodies,  whose  former  sovereignty  it 
has  destroyed,  the  residuary  powers  of  government,  to  be  exercised  by 
them,  under  certain  general  limitations,  as  they  will,  so  long  as  the  new 
state  may  not  see  fit  to  make  other  disposition  in  reference  to  them.  .  .  . 
It  is  no  longer  proper  to  call  them  states  at  all. 

242.  Nature  of  the  union  between  Austria  and  Hungary. 
Lowell  discusses  the  character  of  this  peculiar  union,  showing  its 
nature  and  the  reasons  for  its  existence.^ 

If  France  has  been  a  laboratory  for  political  experiments,  Austria- 
Hungary  is  a  museum  of  political  curiosities,  but  it  contains  nothing 
so  extraordinary  as  the  relation  between  Austria  and  Hungary  themselves. 
^  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 


FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT  267 

The  explanation  of  the  strange  connection  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that 
the  two  countries  are  not  held  together  from  within  by  any  affection  or 
loyalty  to  a  common  Fatherland,  but  are  forced  together  by  a  pressure 
from  outside  which  makes  the  union  an  international  and  military 
necessity.  Austria,  on  the  one  hand,  would  not  be  large  enough  alone 
to  be  a  really  valuable  ally  to  Germany  and  Italy ;  and  if  not  an  ally,  she 
would  be  likely  to  become  a  prey,  for  she  contains  districts  which  they 
would  be  glad  to  absorb.  Moreover,  there  would  be  imminent  danger  of 
some  of  her  different  races  breaking  into  open  revolt  if  the  Emperor  had 
not  the  Hungarian  troops  at  his  command.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Magyars  without  Austria  would  not  be  sufficiently  strong  to  block  the 
ambitions  of  Russia,  or  resist  the  tide  of  panslavism.  They  would  not 
only  have  little  influence  outside  their  own  dominions,  but  they  would 
run  a  grave  risk  of  foreign  interference  in  favor  of  the  Slavs  in  Ilungarj'. 
The  union  is,  therefore,  unavoidable,  and  it  is  very  little  closer  than  is 
absolutely  necessary  to  carry  out  the  purposes  for  which  it  exists.  There 
is  a  common  army,  a  common  direction  of  foreign  affairs,  and  a  ter- 
minable customs  union,  which  is,  after  all,  the  most  convenient  method 
of  defraying  part  of  the  cost  of  the  military  establishment. 

In  regard  to  the  system  adopted  for  accomplishing  this  object,  two 
points  are  especially  noticeable.  One  is  the  privileged  position  of 
Hungary,  which  pays  thirty-two  per  cent,  of  the  expenses,  and  furnishes 
forty-one  per  cent,  of  the  troops,  but  is  given  one  half  of  the  power  by 
law,  and  practically  enjoys  even  a  larger  share.  The  other  point  is  the 
clumsiness  of  the  machinery,  which  requires  for  its  working  an  infinite 
amount  of  tact  and  skill.  There  is  no  single  authority  that  has  power  to 
settle  anything,  but  every  measure  involves  a  negotiation  between  the 
two  delegations  or  the  two  parliaments,  and  government  becomes  in 
consequence  an  endless  series  of  compromises  between  legislative  bodies 
belonging  to  different  races  which  are  jealous  of  each  other.  Moreover, 
the  true  source  of  power  lies  in  the  two  parliaments,  and  to  these  the 
joint  ministers  have  no  access.  It  is  in  fact  specially  provided  that  they 
shall  not  be  members  of  either  cabinet.  .  .  .  The  ministers  of  Austria 
are  at  least  nominally  responsible  to  the  lower  house  of  the  Reichsrath, 
and  those  of  Hungary  are  actually  responsible  to  the  Table  of  Deputies, 
but  the  joint  ministers  are  not  in  fact  directly  responsible  to  any  legis- 
lative body.  One  would  naturally  suppose  that  a  mechanism  so  intricate 
and  so  unwieldy  would  be  continually  getting  out  of  order,  and  in 
constant  danger  of  breaking  down.  But  political  necessity  is  stronger 
than  perfection  of  organization,  and  apart  from  some  radical  change  in  the 
western  half  of  the  monarchy,  the  forces  that  have  made  the  dual  system 
work  smoothly  in  the  past  are  likely  to  produce  the  same  result  in  the  future. 


268  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

IL  Nature  of  Federal  Government 

243.  Distinctions  between  federation  and  confederation.  Dealey 
points  out  some  of  the  essential  differences  between  two  often-con- 
fused forms  of  organization  : 

In  a  confederation  the  several  states  composing  the  unity  are  in- 
dividually sovereign,  and  are  merely  bound  together  by  a  sort  of  treaty 
relationship,  under  the  terms  of  which  a  joint  organization  is  effected  for 
the  performance  of  specified  functions  delegated  to  it.  As  each  state  in 
the  union  remains  sovereign  it  may  legally  secede  at  pleasure,  influenced 
only  by  the  fear  of  consequences  in  case  it  violates  obligations  existing 
between  itself  and  the  other  states  of  the  confederation.  In  a  federa- 
tion, however,  this  right  of  withdrawal  is  not  claimed  by  the  common- 
wealths in  the  union,  which  can  only  be  dissolved  by  mutual  consent. 
In  such  a  union  the  sovereignty  of  the  several  states  merges  into  the 
sovereignty  of  the  totality  and  the  commonwealths  cease  to  be  inter- 
national states.  They  differ,  however,  in  status  from  provinces  or  de- 
partments in  that  their  autonomy  is  fully  safeguarded  by  constitution. 
Furthermore,  they  are  given  by  constitution  a  determining  voice  in  the 
federal  government  and  in  the  amendment  and  revision  of  the  national 
constitution.  In  a  federation,  therefore,  the  unity  is  permanent  and 
definite,  not  dissolvable  at  the  whim  of  one  or  several  of  its  parts,  but 
only  by  the  united  will  of  all.  Its  federal  government  exercises  powers 
that  cannot  be  hindered  by  individual  commonwealths,  and  that  must  be 
altered  if  at  all  by  united  action  under  the  constitution.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  commonwealths  of  the  federation  exercise  sovereign  powers  in 
purely  local  matters  without  interference  from  the  federal  government, 
and  each  has  a  voice  in  the  settlement  of  all  matters  that  concern  the 
welfare  of  the  union  as  a  whole. 

244.  Distinguishing  marks  of  a  federal  state.  Wilson  considers 
the  following  to  be  the  essential  features  of  federal  union  : 

The  federal  state  has,  as  contrasted  with  a  confederation,  these  dis- 
tinguishing features :  (a)  A  permanent  surrender  on  the  part  of  the 
constituent  communities  of  their  right  to  act  independently  of  each 
other  in  matters  which  touch  the  common  interest,  and  the  consequent 
fusion  of  these  communities,  in  respect  of  these  matters,  into  what  is 
practically  a  single  state.  As  regards  other  states  they  have  merged 
their  individuality  into  one  national  whole  :  the  lines  which  separate  them 
are  none  of  them  on  the  outside  but  all  on  the  inside,  (b)  The  federal 
state    possesses  a  special  body  of   federal  law  and  a  special  federal 


FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT  269 

jurisprudence  in  which  is  expressed  the  national  authority  of  the  compound 
state.  This  is  not  a  law  agreed  to  by  the  constituent  communities :  as 
regards  the  federal  law  there  are  no  constituent  communities.  It  is  the 
spoken  will  of  the  new  community,  the  Union,  (c)  There  results  a  new 
conception  of  sovereignty.  The  functions  of  political  authority  are  par- 
celed out.  In  certain  spheres  of  action  the  authorities  of  the  Union  are 
entitled  to  utter  laws  which  are  the  supreme  law  of  the  land ;  in  other 
spheres  of  action  the  constituent  communities  still  act  with  the  full 
autonomy  of  independent  states.  The  one  set  of  authorities  is  sover- 
eign ;  for  it  presides,  and  the  range  of  its  powers  is,  in  the  last  resort, 
determined  by  itself ;  but  the  other  set  of  authorities  exercises  full 
dominion,  though  in  a  narrower  sphere.  Its  powers  are  independent  and 
■  self-sufficient,  neither  given  nor  subject  to  be  taken  away  by  the  govern- 
ment of  the  Union,  originative  of  rights,  and  exercised  at  will. 

All  modern  federal  states  have  written  constitutions ;  but  a  written 
constitution  is  not  an  essential  characteristic  of  federalism,  it  is  only  a 
feature  of  high  convenience ;  such  delicate  coordinate  rights  and  func- 
tions as  are  characteristic  of  federalism  must  be  carefully  defined ;  each 
set  of  authorities  must  have  its  definite  commission. 

245.  The  nature  of  a  federal  state.  The  jural  basis  on  which  a 
federation  rests  and  the  nature  of  the  state  thus  formed  are  well 
summarized  in  the  following  : 

A  State  owes  its  existence  to  the  fact  that,  in  the  individuals  over 
whom  its  authority  extends,  there  is  a  sentiment  of  unity  sufficiently 
strong  to  lead  them  to  surrender  themselves  to  the  control  of  a  single 
political  power  for  the  sake  of  realizing  the  desires  to  which  such  a 
sentiment  gives  rise.  In  other  words,  this  subjective  condition  first 
comes  into  being,  and,  when  sufficiently  powerful,  finds  objective  mani- 
festation in  the  creation  of  a  political  organization. 

This  being  the  manner  in  which  a  State  comes  into  being,  it  follows 
that  it  is  improper,  in  any  instance,  to  ascribe  to  it  a  juristic  or  conven- 
tional origin.  A  State  is  not  created  by  the  formal  adoption  of  a  written 
Constitution.  .  .  .  Written  Constitutions  are,  indeed,  of  comparative!)- 
recent  origin,  and  their  raison  (riire  goes  no  deeper  than  political 
expediency. 

Another  conclusion  following  from  the  fact  that  a  formal  or  juristic 
origin  cannot  be  ascribed  to  States,  is  that  no  State  can  obtain  its 
sovereignty  by  a  simple  transfer  of  authority  from  other  States.  A  new 
State  can  take  its  origin  only  after  the  entire  withdrawal  of  a  people 
from  the  civic  bonds  in  which  they  have  before  been  living.    Not  until 


270  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

the  old  State  (or  States)  has  (or  have)  been  destroyed,  peaceably  or  by 
force,  can  the  new  State  take  its  rise,  for  a  People  cannot  live  under  two 
sovereign  powers  at  the  same  time.   .  .  . 

Applying  the  foregoing  conclusions  to  the  apparent  creation  of  a 
new  Federal  State  by  the  union  of  a  number  of  States,  w^e  are  neces- 
sarily led  to  hold  that  though  the  birth  of  the  new  sovereignty  is  practi- 
callv  synchronous  with  the  adoption  of  the  written  articles  of  union,  it 
cannot  be  said  that  such  Federal  State  owes  its  creation  to  that  act.  If 
it  be  admitted  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  a  single  sovereign  State  has 
come  into  being,  its  conditioning  basis  must  be  considered  to  have  been 
the  feeling  of  national  unity  that  first  created  it  a  single  political  body 
out  of  a  number  of  sovereign  Peoples,  and  then  gave  to  it  an  objective 
organization.  The  new  State  cannot,  in  other  words,  be  held  to  have 
derived  its  sovereignty  by  grant  from  the  formerly  existing  sovereign- 
ties, nor  can  such  sovereignties  be  held  to  continue  to  exist  after  the 
new  national  sovereignty  becomes  a  fact. 

We  are  thus  irresistibly  led  to  the  conclusions  that  not  only  cannot  a 
so-called  Federal  State  be  based  upon  an  agreement  or  compact  between 
preexistent  States,  but  that  it  cannot  be  itself,  in  any  strict  sense,  com- 
posed of  constituent  States.  In  all  exactness,  the  term  "  Federal 
State  "  is  thus  an  improper  one.  A  federal  form  of  Government  we  may 
have,  but  not  a  Federal  State ;  for  a  State  is  by  its  very  nature  a  unity 
in  that  its  essential  attribute,  its  sovereignty,  is  necessarily  a  unity. 
There  cannot  be,  therefore,  any  such  thing  as  a  State  composed  of 
States.  Strictly  speaking,  therefore,  the  only  correct  manner  in  which 
the  term  "  Federal  State  "  may  be  employed  is  to  designate  a  State  in 
which  a  very  considerable  degree  of  administrative  autonomy  is  given  to 
the  several  districts  into  which  the  State's  territory  is  divided.  Con- 
versely, we  must  hold  that  in  all  composite  political  organizations  in 
which  the  individual  members  still  retain  their  sovereignty,  and  therefore 
continue  to  exist  as  States,  no  National  State  is  created.  A  Central 
Government  with  very  considerable  powers  may  indeed  exist,  but  only 
as  the  common  agent  of  the  several  associated  States,  not  as  the  organ 
of  a  distinct  central  sovereignty.  Furthermore,  the  written  articles  of 
union,  if  such  there  be,  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  law  or  Constitution,  but 
only  as  an  international  compact  or  treaty. 

The  foregoing  analysis  of  the  nature  of  sovereignty  and  the  State 
enables  us  to  say  that  the  distinction  between  a  National  State  with  a 
federal  form  of  government  and  a  Confederacy  of  sovereign  States  is 
not  based  upon  the  qiiantuTn  of  powers,  the  exercise  of  which  is  vested 
in  the  Central  Government ;  nor,  necessarily,  upon  whether  the  com- 
mands emanating  from   the   central  legislature  operate  directly  upon 


FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT 


271 


individuals  or  upon  the  individual  commonwealths ;  nor,  finally,  upon 
the  difference  between  a  Central  Government  with  enumerated  and  one 
with  unenumerated  powers.  The  one  absolute  and  finally  determining 
criterion  is :  What  authority  has,  in  the  last  instance,  the  legal  power  of 
fixing  its  own  legal  competence,  and,  as  a  result,  that  of  the  others  ? 

In  the  sovereign  State  of  the  federal  governmental  form,  the  legal 
right  of  secession  on  the  part  of  the  individual  commonwealths  is  of 
course  excluded.  From  the  strictly  juristic  standpoint,  the  Common- 
wealths derive  their  existence  from  the  will  of  the  national  State.  They 
have,  therefore,  no  control  over  their  own  political  status. 

III.  Distribution  of  Powers 

246.  Development  of  the  theory  of  the  American  Union.  The 
leading  theories  held  in  the  United  States  as  to  the  nature  of  the 
Union  and  the  proper  division  of  powers  may  be  summarized  as 
follows  :  ^ 

At  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  and  for  a  considerable 
period  thereafter,  it  was  believed  that  the  Union  was  of  a  peculiar  and 
anomalous  character,  and  that  the  sovereignty,  so  far  as  vested  in  gov- 
ernment, was  divided  between  the  states  and  the  United  States.  The 
real  sovereign  was  thought  to  be  the  "  people,"  but  whether  this  meant 
the  people  of  the  United  States  as  a  whole  or  the  people  of  the  sexx-rai 
states  was  left  undetermined.  As  the  contest  between  nationalism  and 
state  rights  became  more  acute,  this  middle  position  was  abandoned  by 
both  parties.  Calhoun  contended  that  the  sovereign  people  were  the 
people  of  the  several  states,  and  that  the  sovereignty  was,  moreover, 
essendally  indivisible.  The  states  w-ere  hence  sovereign  communities, 
and  the  general  government  had  only  the  powers  delegated  to  it  by  them. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  nationalist  posidon  was  defended  by  Webster, 
who  declared  that  the  Constitution  was  adopted  by  the  people  of  the 
United  States  as  a  whole,  by  means  of  an  agreement  as  binding  as  the 
social  contract.  After  the  war  had  settled  the  vexed  question  of  seces- 
sion, the  new  school  of  nationalists  developed  and  strengthened  the 
earlier  doctrine.  The  argument  from  the  letter  of  the  law  was  less  em- 
phasized and  the  consideration  of  social  and  political  facts  made  more 
conspicuous.  The  nation  was  declared  supreme,  but  this  differed  from 
the  earlier  "  people  "  in  that  the  contract  idea  was  largely  eliminated. 
and  the  organic  and  evolutionary  character  of  the  nation  given  greater 
attention.  Calhoun's  doctrine  of  the  indivisibility  of  sovereignty  was 
1  Copyright,  1903,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


2  72  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

accepted,  but  sovereignty  was  claimed  for  the  Union  to  the  exclusion  of 
the  states,  which  were  relegated  to  the  position  of  organs  of  the  nation. 
Differences  of  opinion  appeared  as  to  the  exact  location  of  the  sover- 
eignty, whether  with  the  nation  as  an  aggregation  of  individuals  or  as  an 
aggregation  of  states ;  but  the  sovereignty  of  the  Union  was  undisputed. 

247.  Distribution  of  powers  in  the  United  States.  The  following 
statement  indicates  the  general  nature  of  the  constitutional  division 
of  powers  between  the  national  and  the  commonwealth  governments 
in  the  United  States  : 

The  first  state  constitutions  were  adopted  at  a  time  when  there  was 
no  established  federal  government,  so  that  all  the  powers  of  government, 
so  far  as  their  exercise  was  in  any  way  provided  for,  were  distributed 
among  the  three  departments  of  the  state  governments,  and  this  form  of 
constitution  has  been  substantially  followed  to  the  present  time  in  the 
amendment  of  former  constitutions  or  the  making  of  new  ones.  But 
when  the  people,  through  their  proper  representative,  adopted  the  federal 
constitution,  they  thereby  restricted  the  authority  of  the  state  govern- 
ment, so  far  as  powers  which  had  theretofore  existed  in  the  state  gov- 
ernments were  conferred  upon  that  department  by  the  state  constitution, 
subject  to  the  limitations  found  in  the  state  constitution  itself ;  and  sub- 
ject also  to  the  implied  limitation  arising  out  of  the  creation  and  existence 
of  a  federal  government  with  the  powers  delegated  to  it.  .  .  .  There 
is  a  division  of  powers  of  government,  therefore,  between  the  state  and 
federal  governments,  which  division  was  effectuated  by  the  adoption  of 
the  federal  constitution,  creating  a  national  government  which  should 
exercise  the  authority  conferred  upon  it  by  that  instrument.  .  .  .  Prac- 
tically, it  is  to  be  noticed  that  the  powers  given  to  the  federal  govern- 
ment are  in  general  only  those  essential  to  the  existence  of  such  a 
government  and  the  discharge  of  functions  involving  a  union  of  the 
states  and  the  common  interests  of  the  people  of  the  different  states ; 
while  to  the  state  governments  is  left  such  authority  as  is  necessary  to 
the  protection  of  the  people  of  the  different  states  in  their  personal 
liberty,  their  property,  and  their  general  welfare.  .  .  . 

General  powers  of  government,  involving  the  protection  of  personal 
and  property  rights,  remain  in  the  state,  except  in  so  far  as  by  the  pro- 
visions of  the  federal  constitution  they  are  conferred  upon  the  federal 
government.  Thus  the  so-called  police  power,  that  is,  the  power  to  regu- 
late the  conduct  of  persons  and  the  control  and  management  of  prop- 
erty, with  the  general  object  of  securing  to  each  protection  against 
unlawful  interference  by  another,  and  to  protect  the  public  as  a  whole 


FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT  273 

against  injury  from  unlawful  action  of  its  members,  is  in  the  state.  It 
is  for  the  state  government  to  regulate  the  conduct  of  persons  and  the 
control  of  property  so  as  to  prevent  injury  to  the  public  or  to  others. 
As  a  branch  of  this  general  police  power,  the  punishment  of  crime  is 
left  to  the  states.  .  .  . 

On  the  other  hand,  the  federal  government  is  given  authority  to  legis- 
late with  reference  to  taxation  for  national  purposes,  the  relations  of  the 
United  States  to  foreign  governments,  the  making  of  war  and  peace, 
the  maintenance  of  an  army  and  navy,  the  regulation  of  foreign  and 
interstate  commerce,  and  the  government  of  territory  not  included  within 
any  state.  .  .  . 

It  is  apparent  from  what  has  been  said  that  the  general  powers  of 
government  are  vested  in  the  departments  of  the  state  government, 
while  the  departments  of  the  federal  government  have  only  such  powers 
as  are  given  to  them  under  the  federal  constitution.  It  may  therefore 
properly  be  said  that  the  state  government  has  all  the  governmental 
power  not  denied  to  it  by  the  state  constitution,  so  far  as  not  inconsist- 
ent with  the  powers  given  to  the  general  government  by  the  federal 
constitution  ;  while  the  federal  government,  on  the  other  hand,  is  one  of 
enumerated  powers.  .   .  . 

Although  the  federal  government  is  given  limited  rather  than  general 
powers,  it  cannot  be  said  that  it  has  no  powers  save  those  expressed  in 
the  federal  constitution.  In  determining  the  meaning  of  any  written 
document,  whether  it  be  a  contract,  a  statute,  or  a  constitution,  it  will 
frequently  be  necessary  to  determine  the  meaning  by  considering  what 
is  implied,  as  well  as  what  is  expressed,  in  the  language  used.  .  .  .  The 
federal  government,  therefore,  has  not  only  the  powers  expressly  granted 
to  it  by  the  constitution,  but  also  those  which  by  reasonable  implication 
are  included  in  or  flow  from  those  expressly  granted. 

248.  Continental  theories  of  federalism.  The  following  is  a 
brief  summary  of  the  development  in  l^Lurope  of  the  political  prin- 
ciples applied  in  the  recent  rise  of  federal  government : 

Likewise  the  continental  forms  of  federalism  induced  the  growth  of 
theories  as  to  the  nature  of  sovereignty.  Transmitted  by  De  Tocquc- 
ville,  the  idea  of  a  double  sovereignty  was  at  first  accepted  as  a  satis- 
factory solution  of  the  problems  presented  by  the  "  Bundesstaat."  But 
under  the  influence  of  altered  constitutional  conditions,  in  which  Ger- 
man national  sovereignty  appeared  in  a  clearer  light  than  before,  this 
theory  was  abandoned,  and  another  developed.  This  took  the  form  of  the 
"  Kompetenz-Kompetenz,"  the  idea  that  sovereignty  consists  essentially 


2  74 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


in  the  power  of  the  State  to  determine  at  will  the  limits  of  its  own 
competence  or  jurisdiction.  The  distinguishing  characteristic  of  the 
supreme  power  was  held  to  be  the  capacity  to  mark  out  independently 
the  metes  and  bounds  of  its  own  activity.  Even  this  doctrine  was  deemed 
too  positive,  however,  and  there  appeared  a  modification  of  the  idea  to 
the  effect  that  sovereignty  consists  merely  in  the  power  of  a  commu- 
nity to  be  legally  bound  solely  through  its  own  will.  A  State  may  not 
be  able  to  extend  the  bounds  of  its  jurisdiction  at  pleasure,  yet  if  its 
acts  are  all  determined  by  its  own  will  and  it  cannot  be  legally  bound 
by  the  will  of  another,  the  possession  of  sovereignty  must,  none  the  less. 
be  conceded.  These  new  doctrines  were  attended,  however,  by  impor- 
tant changes  of  view  as  to  the  nature  of  the  State.  The  historic  theory 
that  the  State  and  sovereignty  are  inseparably  united  was  found  to  be 
no  longer  applicable  to  modern  political  conditions,  and  the  idea  of  a 
nonsovereign  State  was  widely  adopted  as  the  easiest  way  of  escape 
from  the  difficulties  of  constitutional  and  juristic  construction  presented 
by  federalism. 

249.  Powers  of  the  imperial  government  of  Germany.  The  con- 
stitution of  the  German  Empire  indicates  the  sphere  of  federal 
jurisdiction  as  follows  : 

Art.  4.  The  following  matters  shall  be  under  the  supervision  of  the 
Empire  and  subject  to  imperial  legislation  : 

(i)  Regulations  with  respect  to  the  freedom  of  migration  ;  matters  of 
domicile  and  settlement ;  citizenship ;  passports ;  surveillance  of  for- 
eigners ;  trade  and  industry',  including  insurance  ;  so  far  as  these  matters 
are  not  already  provided  for  by  Art.  3  of  this  constitution,  in  Bavaria,  how- 
ever, exclusive  of  matters  relating  to  domicile  and  settlement ;  and  likewise 
matters  relating  to  colonization  and  emigration  to  foreign  countries. 

(2)  Legislation  concerning  customs  duties,  commerce,  and  such  taxes 
as  are  to  be  applied  to  the  uses  of  the  Empire. 

(3)  Regulation  of  weights  and  measures ;  of  the  coinage ;  and  the 
establishment  of  the  principles  for  the  issue  of  funded  and  unfunded 
paper  money. 

(4)  General  banking  regulations. 

(5)  Patents  for  inventions. 

(6)  The  protection  of  intellectual  property. 

(7)  The  organization  of  a  general  system  of  protection  for  German 
trade  in  foreign  countries,  of  German  navigation,  and  of  the  German 
flag  on  the  high  seas ;  and  the  establishment  of  a  common  consular 
representation,  which  shall  be  maintained  by  the  Empire. 


FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT  275 

(8)  Railway  matters,  subject  in  Bavaria  to  the  provisions  of  Art. 
46  ;  and  the  construction  of  land  and  water  ways  for  the  purposes  of 
public  defense,  and  of  general  commerce. 

(9)  Rafting  and  navigation  upon  waterways  which  are  commcjn  to 
several  states,  the  condition  of  such  waterways,  river  and  other  water 
dues  [and  also  the  signals  of  maritime  navigation  (beacons,  buoys,  lights, 
and  other  signals)]. 

(10)  Postal  and  telegraph  affairs;  in  Bavaria  and  Wiirttemberg,  how- 
ever, only  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Art.  52. 

(11)  Regulations  concerning  the  reciprocal  execution  of  judicial  sen- 
tences in  civil  matters,  and  the  fulfillment  of  requisitions  in  general. 

(12)  The  authentication  of  public  documents. 

(13)  General  legislation  as  to  the  whole  domain  of  civil  and  criminal 
law,  and  judicial  procedure. 

(14)  The  imperial  military  and  naval  affairs. 

(15)  Police  regulation  of  medical  and  veterinary  matters. 

(16)  Laws  relating  to  the  press,  and  to  the  right  of  association. 

250.  Powers  of  the  federal  government  of  Switzerland.  In 
contrast  to  the  brief  and  general  statement  of  the  powers  of  the 
federal  government  in  the  United  States,  the  Swiss  constitution 
enumerates  the  powers  of  the  federal  government  in  elaborate 
detail. 

Article  8.  The  Confederation  shall  have  the  sole  right  of  declaring 
war,  of  making  peace,  and  of  concluding  alliances  and  treaties  with 
foreign  powers,  particularly  treaties  relating  to  tariffs  and  commerce.  .   .  . 

Article  14.  In  case  of  differences  arising  between  cantons,  the  states 
shall  abstain  from  violence  and  from  arming  themselves ;  they  shall 
submit  to  the  decision  to  be  taken  upon  such  differences  by  the 
Confederation.   .  .  . 

Article  23.  The  Confederation  may  construct  at  its  own  expense, 
or  may  aid  by  subsidies,  public  works  which  concern  Switzerland  or  a 
considerable  part  of  the  country.  .  .  . 

Article  24.  The  Confederation  shall  have  the  right  of  superintend- 
ence over  the  police  of  streams  and  forests.  .   .  . 

Article  25.  The  Confederation  shall  have  power  to  make  legisla- 
tive enactments  for  the  regulation  of  fishing  and  hunting,  particularly 
with  a  view  to  the  preservation  of  the  big  game  in  the  mountains,  as 
well  as  for  the  protection  of  birds  useful  to  agriculture  and  forestry.  .  .  . 

Article  26.  Legislation  upon  the  construction  and  operation  of 
railroads  is  within  the  province  of  the  Confederation. 


276  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

Article  27.  The  Confederation  may  establish,  besides  the  existing 
Polytechnic  School,  a  federal  university  and  other  institutions  of  higher 
instruction,  or  may  subsidize  institutions  of  such  a  character.  .  .  . 

Article  28.  The  customs  system  shall  be  within  the  control  of  the  Con- 
federation.   The  Confederation  may  levy  export  and  import  duties.  .  .  . 

Article  32  (ii).  The  Confederation  is  authorized  to  make  regula- 
tions, by  law,  for  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  distilled  liquors.  .  .  . 

Article  34.  The  Confederation  shall  have  power  to  enact  uniform 
laws  as  to  the  labor  of  children  in  factories,  and  as  to  the  length  of 
the  working  day  fixed  for  adults  therein,  and  as  to  the  protection  of 
laborers  engaged  in  unsanitary  and  dangerous  manufactures.   .  .   . 

Article  34  (ii).  The  Confederation  shall  by  law  establish  accident 
and  invalid  insurance.  .  .  . 

Article  36.  The  posts  and  telegraphs  in  all  Switzerland  shall  be 
controlled  by  the  Confederation.   .  .  . 

Article  38.  The  Confederation  shall  exercise  all  the  exclusive 
rights  pertaining  to  coinage.  .  .  . 

Article  40.  The  Confederation  shall  fix  the  standard  of  weights 
and  measures.  .  .  . 

Article  41.  The  manufacture  and  sale  of  gunpowder  throughout 
Switzerland  shall  belong  exclusively  to  the  Confederation.  .  ,  , 

Article  69.  Legislation  concerning  measures  of  sanitary  police 
against  epidemic  and  cattle  diseases,  causing  a  common  danger,  is  in- 
cluded in  the  powers  of  the  Confederation. 

Article  69  (ii).  The  Confederation  shall  have  the  power  to  enact 
laws : 

(a)  Concerning  traffic  in  food  products. 

(/^)  Concerning  traffic  in  other  articles  of  use  and  consumption,  in  so 
far  as  they  may  be  dangerous  to  life  or  health. 

IV.  Advantages  and  Disadvantages  of  Federal 
Government 

251.  Advantages  of  federal  organization.  Hamilton,  writing  in 
the  "  Federalist,"  quotes  the  following  arguments  from  Montesquieu 
in  favor  of  a  "  confederate  republic." 

It  is  very  probable  .  .  .  that  mankind  would  have  been  obliged,  at 
length,  to  live  constantly  under  the  government  of  a  SINGLE  PERSON, 
had  they  not  contrived  a  kind  of  constitution,  that  has  all  the  internal 
advantages  of  a  republican,  together  with  the  external  force  of  a  mo- 
narchical government.    I  mean  a  CONFEDERATE  REPUBLIC. 


FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT 


277 


This  form  of  government  is  a  convention  by  which  several  smaller 
states  agree  to  become  members  of  a  larger  one,  which  they  intend  to 
form.  It  is  a  kind  of  assemblage  of  societies,  that  constitute  a  new  one, 
capable  of  increasing  by  means  of  new  associations,  till  they  arrive  to 
such  a  degree  of  power  as  to  be  able  to  provide  for  the  security  of  the 
united  body. 

A  republic  of  this  kind,  able  to  withstand  an  external  force,  may 
support  itself  without  any  internal  corruption.  The  form  of  this  society 
prevents  all  manner  of  inconveniences. 

If  a  single  member  should  attempt  to  usurp  the  supreme  authority, 
he  could  not  be  supposed  to  have  an  equal  authority  and  credit  in  all  the 
confederate  states.  Were  he  to  have  too  great  influence  over  one,  this 
would  alarm  the  rest.  Were  he  to  subdue  a  part,  that  which  would  still 
remain  free  might  oppose  him  with  forces  independent  of  those  which 
he  had  usurped,  and  overpower  him  before  he  could  be  settled  in  his 
usurpation. 

Should  a  popular  insurrection  happen  in  one  of  the  confederate 
states,  the  others  are  able  to  quell  it.  Should  abuses  creep  into  one  part, 
they  are  reformed  by  those  that  remain  sound.  The  state  may  be 
destroyed  on  one  side,  and  not  on  the  other ;  the  confederacy  may  be 
dissolved,  and  the  confederates  preserve  their  sovereignty. 

As  this  government  is  composed  of  small  republics,  it  enjoys  the 
internal  happiness  of  each,  and  with  respect  to  its  external  situation,  it  is 
possessed,  by  means  of  the  association,  of  all  the  advantages  of  large 
monarchies. 

252.  Weaknesses  in  federal  government.  Bryce  outlines  the  weak 
points  of  the  federal  system  and  applies  them  to  the  United  States.^ 

The  faults  generally  charged  on  federations  as  compared  with  unified 
governments  are  the  following :  — 

I.  Weakness  in  the  conduct  of  foreign  affairs. 

II.  Weakness  in  home  government,  that  is  to  say,  deficient  authority 
over  the  component  States  and  the  individual  citizens. 

III.  Liability  to  dissolution  by  the  secession  or  rebellion  of  States. 

IV.  Liability  to  division  into  groups  and  factions  by  the  formation  of 
separate  combinations  of  the  component  States. 

V.  Want  of  uniformity  among  the  States  in  legislation  and  adminis- 
tration. 

VI.  Trouble,  expense,  and  delay  due  to  the  complexity  of  a  double 
system  of  legislation  and  administration. 

1  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


278  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

The  first  four  of  these  are  all  due  to  the  same  cause,  viz.  the  exist- 
ence within  one  government,  which  ought  to  be  able  to  speak  and  act 
in  the  name  and  with  the  united  strength  of  the  nation,  of  distinct 
centers  of  force,  organized  political  bodies  into  which  part  of  the 
nation's  strength  has  flowed,  and  whose  resistance  to  the  will  of  the 
majority  of  the  whole  nation  is  likely  to  be  more  effective  than  could  be 
the  resistance  of  individuals,  because  such  bodies  have  each  of  them  a 
government,  a  revenue,  a  militia,  a  local  patriotism  to  unite  them, 
whereas  individual  recalcitrants,  however  numerous,  would  be  unor- 
ganized, and  less  likely  to  find  a  legal  standing  ground  for  opposition. 
The  gravity  of  the  first  two  of  the  four  alleged  faults  has  been  exag- 
gerated by  most  writers,  who  have  assumed  on  rather  scanty  grounds 
that  Federal  governments  are  necessarily  weak  governments.  History 
does  not  warrant  so  broad  a  proposition.  .  .   . 

All  that  can  fairly  be  concluded  from  the  history  of  the  American 
Union  is  that  Federalism  is  obliged  by  the  law  of  its  nature  to  leave  in 
the  hands  of  States  powers  whose  exercise  may  give  to  political  con- 
troversy a  peculiarly  dangerous  form,  may  impede  the  assertion  of 
national  authority,  may  even,  when  long-continued  exasperation  has 
suspended  or  destroyed  the  feeling  of  a  common  patriotism,  threaten 
national  unity  itself.  Against  this  danger  is  to  be  set  the  fact  that  the 
looser  structure  of  a  Federal  government  and  the  scope  it  gives  for 
diversities  of  legislation  in  different  parts  of  a  country  may  avert 
sources  of  discord,  or  prevent  local  discord  from  growing  into  a  contest 
of  national  magnitude. 

253.  Advantages  and  disadvantages  of  federal  union.  Sidgwick 
estimates  the  relative  value  of  the  arguments  for  and  against  the 
formation  of  federal  union,  as  follows  :  ^ 

Firstly,  it  enables  small  independent  communities  not  strongly  divided 
by  interests  or  sentiments,  to  escape  the  chief  military  and  economic 
disadvantages  attaching  to  small  states,  at  the  least  possible  sacrifice  of 
independence.  A  small  state  with  large  and  powerful  neighbors  incurs 
some  danger  of  high-handed  aggression  —  though  the  mutual  jealousy 
of  the  neighbors  may  often  render  this  remote  and  vague  —  and  it 
incurs  the  milder  but  more  certain  disadvantage  of  being  obliged  to 
yield  in  disputes  where  the  question  of  right  is  ambiguous.  Further,  so 
long  as  modem  states  endeavor,  by  elaborately  arranged  tariffs,  to 
exclude  or  hamper  the  competition  of  foreign  producers  in  their 
markets,  it  will  generally  be  some  disadvantage  to  the  members  of  a 

1  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT  279 

small  state  that  they  can  only  rely  on  a  comparatively  small  area  of 
unrestricted  trade.  ... 

Further,  North  America  may  also  illustrate  the  advantages  of  feder- 
alism from  a  different  point  of  view ;  i.e.  as  a  mode  of  political  organ- 
ization by  which  a  nation  may  realize  the  maximum  of  liberty  compatible 
with  order:  since,  as  we  have  already  seen,  the  amount  of  governmental 
coercion  is  likely,  ceteris  paribus,  to  be  less,  in  proportion  as  the  powers 
of  local  governments  are  extended  at  the  expense  of  the  central  govern- 
ment. .  .  .  For  the  federal  form  of  polity  also  diminishes  —  in  propor- 
tion as  the  functions  of  the  central  legislature  are  restricted  —  the 
practical  difficulties  which  extent  of  territory  tends  to  throw  in  the  way 
of  good  government ;  especially  the  difficulty  of  enforcing  obedience  if 
the  inhabitants  of  distant  districts  are  recalcitrant,  and  the  difficulty  of 
securing  that  the  central  government  is  sufficiently  informed  as  to  the 
needs  of  such  districts.  .  .   . 

The  chief  disadvantages  of  Federalism  have  been  incidentally  noticed 
in  the  preceding  chapter,  when  we  were  discussing  the  proper  limits  of 
the  powers  of  local  government  in  a  unitary  state.  I  have  there  suffi- 
ciently dwelt  on  the  drawbacks  of  localized  legislation  in  a  countrj^  whose 
parts  are  in  active  mutual  communication.  I  also  pointed  out  that  the 
strength  and  stability  which  a  state  derives  from  internal  cohesion  tend 
to  be  somewhat  reduced  by  the  independent  activity  of  local  govern- 
ments, if  the  latter  can  be  effectively  used  as  centers  of  local  resistance 
to  the  national  will.  .  .  .  On  the  other  hand,  if  disorder  and  disruption 
are  prevented,  the  federal  form  of  polity,  requiring  as  it  does  a  rigid  and 
stable  constitution  to  secure  the  partial  independence  of  the  part  states, 
is  exposed  to  the  general  objections  which  may  be  urged  against  such  a 
constitution  as  compared  with  a  more  flexible  one. 

In  conclusion,  it  may  be  observed,  that  federalism  is  likely  to  be  in 
many  cases  a  transitional  stage  through  which  a  society  —  or  an  aggre- 
gate of  societies  —  passes  on  its  way  to  a  completer  union ;  since,  as 
time  goes  on,  and  mutual  intercourse  grows,  the  narrower  patriotic 
sentiments  that  were  originally  a  bar  to  full  political  union  tend  to 
diminish,  while  the  inconvenience  of  a  diversity  of  laws  is  more  keenly 
felt,  especially  in  a  continuous  territory. 

254.  The  weakness  of  the  American  confederation.  Madison,  in 
his  notes  on  the  debates  in  the  Federal  Convention,  gives  the 
following  extracts  from  his  speech  against  the  "  New  Jersey  Plan." 
The  leading  defects  of  the  existing  Confederation  and  the  remedies 
expected  from  a  stronger  union  are  indicated. 


28o  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

Proceeding  to  the  consideration  of  Mr.  Patterson's  plan,  he  stated  the 
'object  of  a  proper  plan  to  be  twofold  —  first,  to  preserve  the  Union  ;  sec- 
ondly, to  provide  a  government  that  will  remedy  the  evils  felt  by  the  states, 
both  in  their  united  and  individual  capacities.  Examine  Mr.  Patterson's 
plan,  and  say  whether  it  promises  satisfaction  in  these  respects. 

1.  Will  it  prevent  the  violations  of  the  law  of  nations  and  of  treaties, 
which,  if  not  prevented,  must  involve  us  in  the  calamities  of  foreign 
wars  ?  The  tendency  of  the  states  to  these  violations  has  been  mani- 
fested in  sundry  instances.  .  .  . 

2.  Will  it  prevent  encroachments  on  the  federal  authority?  A  tend- 
ency to  such  encroachments  has  been  sufficiently  exemplified  among 
ourselves,  as  well  as  in  every  other  confederated  republic,  ancient  and 
modern.  .  .  . 

3.  Will  it  prevent  trespasses  of  the  states  on  each  other  ?  .  .  .  We 
have  seen  retaliating  acts  on  the  subject,  which  threatened  danger,  not 
to  the  harmony  only,  but  the  tranquillity  of  the  Union.  .  .  . 

4.  Will  it  secure  the  internal  tranquillity  of  the  states  themselves  ? 
The  insurrections  in  Massachusetts  admonished  all  the  states  of  the 
danger  to  which  they  were  exposed.  .  .  . 

5.  Will  it  secure  a  good  internal  legislation  and  administration  to  the 
particular  states .''  In  developing  the  evils  which  vitiate  the  political 
system  of  the  United  States,  it  is  proper  to  take  into  view  those  which 
prevail  within  the  states  individually,  as  well  as  those  which  affect  them 
collectively  ;  since  the  former  indirectly  affect  the  whole.  .  .  .  Under  this 
head  he  enumerated  and  animadverted  on  —  first,  the  multiplicity  of  the 
laws  passed  by  the  several  states ;  secondly,  the  mutability  of  their  laws ; 
thirdly,  the  injustice  of  them  ;  and,  fourthly,  the  impotence  of  them.  .  .  . 

6.  Will  it  secure  the  Union  against  the  influence  of  foreign  powers 
over  its  members  ?  .  .  . 

7.  He  begged  the  smaller  states,  which  were  most  attached  to  Mr. 
Patterson's  plan,  to  consider  the  situation  in  which  it  would  leave  them. 
In  the  first  place,  they  would  continue  to  bear  the  whole  expense  of 
maintaining  their  delegates  in  Congress.  ...  In  the  second  place,  the 
coercion  on  which  the  efficacy  of  the  plan  depends  can  never  be  exerted 
but  on  themselves.  The  larger  states  will  be  impregnable,  the  smaller 
only  can  feel  the  vengeance  of  it. 

255.  Probable  future  of  federalism.  Numerous  recent  publicists 
believe  that  present  tendencies  indicate  a  further  development  of 
the  principle  of  federal  union  among  states. ^ 

^  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


FEDERAL  GOVERNMENT  28 1 

The  future  of  constitutional  monarchy  I  was  unwilling  to  prophesy : 
but  I  feel  more  disposed  to  predict  a  development  of  federality,  partly 
from  the  operation  of  the  democratic  tendency  just  noticed,  partly  from 
the  tendency  shown  throughout  the  history  of  civilization  to  form  con- 
tinually larger  political  societies  —  as  Spencer  would  say,  to  "  integra- 
tion "  —  which  seems  to  accompany  the  growth  of  civilization.  This 
tendency  we  traced  in  the  early  history  of  the  Graeco-Italian  city  states ; 
Rome  and  Athens  were  obviously  formed  by  the  aggregation  of  elements 
between  which  a  state  of  hostility  had  previously  existed.  We  noticed 
also  that  the  history  of  the  German  tribes  showed  them  gradually  com- 
bining in  larger  and  larger  aggregates.  And  especially  w-e  noticed  how, 
in  the  third  century  B.C.,  after  the  Greek  cities  had  been  for  forty  years 
tossed  helpless  in  the  strife  among  the  successors  of  Alexander  —  against 
whose  armies  they  were,  from  mere  size,  unable  effectively  to  contend  — 
the  revival  and  extension  of  the  Achaean  league,  uniting  several  important 
city  states  into  one  body  with  the  old,  comparatively  insignificant  Achasan 
towns,  gave  them  a  brief  interval  of  real  independence.  We  have  seen 
the  same  tendency  in  recent  times  in  the  formation  of  Germany  and 
Italy  :  and  we  have  in  North  America  an  impressive  example  of  a  political 
society  maintaining  internal  peace  over  a  region  larger  than  Western 
Europe.  I  therefore  think  it  not  beyond  the  limits  of  a  sober  forecast  to 
conjecture  that  some  further  integration  may  take  place  in  the  West 
European  states :  and  if  it  should  take  place,  it  seems  probable  that  the 
example  of  America  will  be  followed,  and  that  the  new  political  aggregate 
will  be  formed  on  the  basis  of  a  federal  polity. 

When  we  turn  our  gaze  from  the  past  to  the  future,  an  extension  of 
federalism  seems  to  me  the  most  probable  of  the  political  prophecies 
relative  to  the  form  of  srovemment. 


CHAPTER  XV 

CONSTITUTIONS 

I,  Nature  of  Constitutions 

256.  Meanings  of  the  term  "constitution."  In  the  Introduc- 
tion to  his  recent  work  on  "  The  Government  of  England,"  Lowell 
points  out  the  different  meanings  of  the  word  "  constitution."  ^ 

De  Tocqueville  declared  that  the  English  Constitution  did  not  really 
exist,  and  he  said  so  because  in  his  mind  the  word  "  constitution  "  meant 
a  perfectly  definite  thing  to  which  nothing  in  England  conformed.  An 
examination  of  modem  governments  shows,  however,  that  the  thing  is 
by  no  means  so  definite  as  he  had  supposed. 

The  term  "  constitution  "  is  usually  applied  to  an  attempt  to  embody 
in  a  single  authoritative  document,  or  a  small  group  of  documents,  the 
fundamental  polidcal  institudons  of  a  state.  But  such  an  attempt  is 
rarely,  if  ever,  completely  successful ;  and  even  if  the  constitution  when 
framed  covers  all  the  main  principles  on  which  the  government  is  based, 
it  often  happens  that  they  become  modified  in  practice,  or  that  other 
principles  arise,  so  that  the  constitudon  no  longer  corresponds  fully  with 
the  actual  government  of  the  country.  .  .  . 

De  Tocqueville  had  more  particularly  in  mind  another  meaning  which 
is  commonly  attached  to  the  term  "  constitution."  It  is  that  of  an  in- 
strument of  special  sanctity,  distinct  in  character  from  all  other  laws  ;  and 
alterable  only  by  a  peculiar  process,  differing  to  a  greater  or  less  extent 
from  the  ordinary  forms  of  legislation.  ...  A  separation  between  the 
constituent  and  lawmaking  powers  does  not,  in  fact,  always  exist  in  writ- 
ten constitutions.  .  .  .  From  countries  which  can  change  their  funda- 
mental constitution  by  the  ordinary  process  of  legislation  we  pass  by 
almost  imperceptible  degrees  to  those  where  the  constitutional  and  law- 
making powers  are  in  substantially  different  hands.   .   .  . 

The  separation  of  constituent  and  lawmaking  powers  has  been  ren- 
dered of  much  less  practical  importance  in  some  countries  not  only  by 
making  the  process  of  amending  the  constitution  more  simple,  but  also 

1  Copyright,  1908,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 
282 


CONSTITUTIONS  283 

by  making  the  enactment  of  laws  more  complex.  ...  It  would  seem, 
therefore,  that  the  distinction  between  constitutions  which  are  flexible 
and  those  which  are  rigid,  while  valuable,  has  ceased  to  mark  a  contrast 
between  widely  separated  groups  ;  and  that  it  might  be  well  to  regard  the 
distinction  as  one  of  degree  rather  than  of  kind.  .  .  . 

If  the  term  "  constitution  "  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  the  so-called 
constituent  and  lawmaking  powers  are  in  different  hands,  still  less  docs 
it  imply  the  existence  of  a  law  of  superior  obligation  which  controls  legally 
the  acts  of  the  legislature.  .  .  .  'J'he  conception  of  a  constitution  as  a 
law  of  superior  obligation,  which  imposes  legal  restraints  upon  the  action 
of  the  legislature,  is  really  confined  to  a  very  few  countries,  chiefly  to 
America  and  the  English  self-governing  colonies.  In  Europe  it  has  no 
proper  place,  for  whether  a  constitution  in  continental  states  be  or  be  not 
regarded  as  a  supreme  law,  no  body  of  men  has,  as  a  rule,  been  intrusted 
with  legal  authority  to  enforce  its  provisions  as  against  the  legislature. 

257.  Definitions  of  the  term  "constitution."  The  following  defi- 
nitions indicate  the  general  nature  of  the  constitution  of  a  state  : 

T.  D.  Woolsey :  There  must  in  every  state  be  some  leading  principles 
according  to  which  the  relations  of  the  organs  and  functions  of  the  state 
are  adjusted ;  work  is  distributed,  powers  are  assigned  in  such  sort  that 
there  shall  be  as  little  interference  as  possible,  and  all  the  active  powers 
of  the  state  shall  know  their  places.  There  must  also  be  some  under- 
standing as  to  what  are  the  relations  of  the  governing  parts  to  the  gov- 
erned, and  what  may  be  done  in  the  exercise  of  lawful  authority.  There 
will  of  necessity,  therefore,  be  some  limitations  on  the  action  of  the 
several  organs,  and  some  rights  guaranteed  to  the  people.  .  .  .  'i'he  col- 
lection of  principles  according  to  which  the  powers  of  the  government, 
the  rights  of  the  governed,  and  the  relations  between  the  two  are  adjusted 
is  called  a  constitution. 

J.  Q.  Dealey :  Every  state  from  the  moment  when  it  begins  its  exist- 
ence has  a  constitution,  which  may  be  defined  as  that  fundamental  law 
or  body  of  laws,  written  or  unwritten,  in  which  may  be  found  (a)  the 
form  of  the  organization  of  the  state,  (b)  the  extent  of  power  intrusted 
to  the  various  agencies  of  the  state,  and  (c)  the  manner  in  which  these 
powers  are  to  be  exercised. 

S.  Amos :  All  the  Laws  and  all  the  customary  practices  which,  taken 
together,  determine  the  person  or  persons  who  shall  constitute  the 
Supreme  Political  Authority  of  a  State,  and  which  ascertain  the  modes 
of  Legislation,  and  the  method  of  appointing  and  restricting  the  Executive 
Authority,  are  compendiously  styled  the  Constitution  of  that  Stale. 


284  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

258.  Classification  of  constitutions.  According  to  their  relation 
to  the  ordinary  laws  of  the  state  and  to  their  ease  of  amendment, 
Bryce  divides  constitutions  into  two  main  types,  —  flexible  and  rigid. 

If  we  survey  constitutions  generally,  in  the  past  as  well  as  in  the 
present,  we  find  them  conforming  to  one  or  other  of  two  leading  types. 
Some  are  natural  growths,  unsymmetrical  both  in  their  form  and  in  their 
contents.  They  consist  of  a  variety  of  specific  enactments  or  agreements 
of  different  dates,  possibly  proceeding  from  different  sources,  intermixed 
with  customary  rules  which  rest  only  on  tradition  or  precedent,  but  are 
deemed  of  pracdcally  equal  authority.  Other  constitutions  are  works  of 
conscious  art,  that  is  to  say,  they  are  the  result  of  a  deliberate  effort  on 
the  part  of  the  State  to  lay  down  once  for  all  a  body  of  coherent  pro- 
visions under  which  its  government  shall  be  established  and  conducted. 
Such  constitutions  are  usually  comprised  in  one  instrument  —  possibly, 
however,  in  more  than  one  —  an  instrument  solemnly  enacted  whose  form 
and  title  distinguish  it  from  ordinary  laws.  ...  It  is,  therefore,  desirable 
to  have  some  more  definite  and  characteristic  test  or  criterion  whereby  to 
mark  off  the  two  types  which  have  been  just  described  in  general  terms. 

Such  a  criterion  may  be  found  in  the  relation  which  each  constitution 
bears  to  the  ordinary  laws  of  the  State,  and  to  the  ordinary  authority 
which  enacts  those  laws.  Some  constitutions,  including  all  that  belong  to 
the  older  or  Common  Law  type,  are  on  the  level  of  the  other  laws  of  the 
country,  whether  those  laws  exist  in  the  form  of  statutes  only,  or  also  in 
the  form  of  recorded  decisions  defining  and  confirming  a  custom.  Such 
constitutions  proceed  from  the  same  authorities  which  make  the  ordinary 
laws  ;  and  they  are  promulgated  or  repealed  in  the  same  way  as  ordinary 
laws.  In  such  cases  the  term  "  Constitution  "  denotes  nothing  more  than 
such  and  so  many  of  the  statutes  and  customs  of  the  country  as  deter- 
mine the  form  and  arrangements  of  its  political  system.  And  it  is  often 
difficult  to  say  of  any  particular  law  whether  it  is  or  is  not  a  part  of  the 
political  constitution. 

Other  constitutions,  most  of  them  belonging  to  the  newer  or  Statutory 
class,  stand  above  the  other  laws  of  the  country  which  they  regulate. 
The  instrument  (or  instruments)  in  which  such  a  constitution  is  embodied 
proceeds  from  a  source  different  from  that  whence  spring  the  other  laws, 
is  repealable  in  a  different  way,  exerts  a  superior  force.  It  is  enacted, 
not  by  the  ordinary  legislative  authority,  but  by  some  higher  or  specially 
empowered  person  or  body.  If  it  is  susceptible  of  change,  it  can  be 
changed  only  by  that  authority  or  by  that  special  person  or  body.  When 
any  of  its  provisions  conflict  with  a  provision  of  the  ordinary  law,  it  pre- 
vails, and  the  ordinary  must  give  way.  .  .  . 


CONSTITUTIONS  285 

Constitutions  of  the  older  type  may  be  called  Flexible,  because  they 
have  elasticity,  because  they  can  be  bent  and  altered  in  form  while  retain- 
ing their  main  features.  Constitutions  of  the  newer  kind  cannot,  because 
their  lines  are  hard  and  fixed.  They  may  therefore  receive  the  name  of 
Rigid  Constitutions. 

259.  Written  and  unwritten  constitutions.  Some  of  the  im- 
portant differences  between  written  and  unwritten  constitutions 
may  be  stated  as  follows : 

The  constitution  of  a  government  is  the  body  or  collection  of  rules  and 
principles  in  accordance  with  which  the  powers  of  that  government  are 
exercised ;  and  a  constitutional  government  is  one  the  powers  of  which 
are  exercised  in  accordance  with  rules  and  principles  which  are  generally 
accepted  as  binding  upon  it  and  usually  followed.  In  this  proper  and 
usual  sense  all  the  governments  of  civilized  peoples  are  constitutional, 
whether  they  be  monarchical  or  republican.  If  the  body  of  rules  and 
principles  is  not  reduced  to  definite  and  authoritatively  written  form,  the 
constitution  is  said  to  be  unwritten,  as  in  the  familiar  case  of  Great  Britain. 
The  body  of  rules  and  principles  defining  the  nature  of  the  British  govern- 
ment and  prescribing  the  persons  who  exercise  authority  under  it  and 
the  scope  of  such  authority  is  to  some  extent  declared  in  statutes  which 
are  a  part  of  the  written  law ;  to  a  further  extent  is  composed  of  rules  of 
law  recognized  by  the  courts,  without  any  written  basis,  and  therefore  a 
part  of  the  unwritten  law ;  and  to  a  still  further  extent  consists  of  con- 
ventions or  customs  which  though  generally  recognized  and  followed,  do 
not  have  the  force  of  law.  .  .  . 

The  constitution  of  Great  Britain  as  a  whole  is,  therefore,  unwritten 
in  the  sense  that  it  is  not  reduced  to  any  definite  and  authoritative  state- 
ment, although  as  a  whole  or  in  parts  it  has  been  expounded  and  explained 
by  authors  who  have  written  on  the  subject,  and  who  have  stated,  with 
more  or  less  fullness  and  accuracy,  its  rules  and  principles.  .  .  . 

In  the  United  States  the  constitutions  of  the  various  states  and  of  the 
federal  government  are  formally  written  and  rest  upon  the  will  of  the 
people  expressed  directly,  through  their  chosen  representatives,  and  are 
regarded,  therefore,  as  having  a  higher  authority  than  that  of  statutes 
enacted  by  the  legislatures,  created  and  existing  in  accordance  with  the 
provisions  of  the  constitutions,  or  of  executive  acts  authorized  by  the  con- 
stitutions. .  .  .  Strictly  speaking,  constitutional  law,  as  the  term  is  used  in 
this  country,  takes  no  account  of  mere  practices  and  usages,  no  matter  how 
generally  observed,  but  is  based  on  the  language  of  written  constitutions, 
and  takes  into  account  statutes,  treaties,  executive  acts  and  regulations, 
and  the  decisions  of  the  courts  applying  their  provisions  to  sjjecific  cases. 


286  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

Although  the  authority  of  a  state  or  federal  government  is  to  be  deter- 
mined by  the  provisions  of  the  written  state  and  federal  constitutions,  and 
not  from  any  mere  general  principles  or  constitutional  rules  recognized  in 
this  country  or  in  England,  nevertheless  a  written  constitution  is,  like  a 
statute,  subject  to  interpretation,  and  must  be  applied  to  new  circum- 
stances and  conditions  by  determining  the  true  intent  and  purpose  of  its 
provisions.  Nowhere  is  there  any  authority,  however,  to  add  to  those 
provisions  or  to  eliminate  any  portion  of  them,  or  to  give  them  a  meaning 
not  reasonably  within  the  intent  with  which  they  were  framed,  save  by  a 
formal  amendment,  as  authorized  in  the  constitutions  themselves.  .  .  . 

In  Great  Britain  no  act  of  Parliament  regularly  adopted  can  be  said 
to  be  unconstitutional  in  the  sense  of  being  invalid  and  without  legal  effect. 
It  may  be  urged  as  against  a  proposed  act  of  Parliament  that  it  will  be 
unconstitutional  because  in  violation  of  the  general  principles  and  usages 
recognized  by  the  unwritten  constitution.  But  when  adopted  the  statute 
in  practical  effect  modifies  the  constitution,  and  is  fully  operative  and 
potent.  In  this  country,  however,  a  statute  which  is  in  violation  of  the 
constitution  is  wholly  invalid  and  impotent,  and  the  constitution  remains 
unaffected. 

260,  The  nature  of  the  English  constitution.  The  various  ele- 
ments that  make  up  the  constitution  of  England  are  thus  summa- 
rized by  a  leading  English  publicist. 

The  Constitution  of  England  is  the  resulting  product  of  all  the  institu- 
tions, the  customary  practices,  and  the  laws  which  together  determine 
what  persons  take  part  in  the  government  of  the  country ;  how  these 
persons  are  related  to  one  another ;  how  laws  are  made,  and  how  and  by 
whom  they  are  executed ;  and  what  securities  the  people  of  the  country 
have  against  misgovemment.  .  .  . 

There  are  parts  of  the  Constitution  which  seem  to  be  far  more  solid 
and  indestructible  than  other  parts ;  so  much  so  that  they  could  not  be 
suddenly  removed  or  even  changed  without  the  permanence  of  the  State 
itself  seeming  to  be  endangered.  Such  parts  are  the  institution  of  Mon- 
archy in  its  limited  or  constitutional  form  ;  the  distribution  of  the  Legis- 
lature into  three  branches;  the  Representative  system  of  Government 
with  its  attendant  control  of  Taxation ;  the  independence  of  Judges,  and 
the  securities  afforded  against  unfair  trials  and  tyrannical  imprisonment ; 
and  the  subjection  of  all  State  officials  to  the  Common  Law  of  the 
Land.   .   .   . 

There  are,  again,  parts  of  the  Constitution  which  are  made  up  of 
enduring  and  of  fragile  elements  conjointly.    The  former  either  undergo 


CONSTITUTIONS  287 

no  change,  or  change  so  insensibly  that  the  effects  can  only  be  observed 
at  long  intervals  of  time ;  the  latter  are  readily  and  constantly  modified 
as  occasion  dictates.  The  changeable  and  the  unchangeable  elements  are, 
however,  so  closely  blended  together  that  they  cannot  easily  be  severed, 
and  much  of  the  difficulty  that  attends  proposed  changes  is  due  to  this 
fact.  Examples  of  such  composite  parts  are  the  rules  which  determine 
the  qualifications  of  members  of  the  two  Houses,  and  of  electors  of 
members  of  the  House  of  Commons ;  which  fix  the  exact  line  of  succes- 
sion to  the  Crown  ;  and  which  determine  the  judicial  or  other  special 
privileges  of  the  two  Houses  and  of  the  members  of  each  House.  .  .  . 
Besides  a  careful  study  of  existing  and  immemorial  institutions,  the 
Constitution  of  England  can  be  known  only  by  reference  to  the  following 
classes  of  authorities : 

I.  Written  documents  of  the  nature  of  solemn  engagements  made  at 
great  national  crises  between  persons  representing  opposed  political  forces. 
Such  are  the  Great  Charter  and  its  several  Confirmations  and  Amended 
Editions,  the  Petition  of  Right,  and  the  Declaration  of  Rights. 

II.  Statutes,  such  as  the  Habeas  Corpus  Act  and  its  Amendments, 
the  Bill  of  Rights,  the  Act  of  Settlement,  Mr.  Fox's  Libel  Act,  the  Pris- 
oners' Counsel  Act,  the  Reform  Acts,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Judicature 
Act,  the  Naturalization  Act,  the  Municipal  Corporation  Act,  and  the 
Local  Government  Acts. 

III.  Authoritative  Judicial  Decisions,  as  those  on  the  Rights  of  Jury- 
men, on  the  Prerogative  of  the  Crown,  on  the  Privileges  of  the  Houses 
of  Parliament  and  of  their  Members,  and  on  the  rights  and  duties  of  the 
Police. 

IV.  Parliamentary  Precedents  as  recorded  in  Reports  of  Committees 
of  both  Houses,  in  the  writings  of  authoritative  Commentators  on  Parlia- 
mentary usage,  and  in  the  reported  Debates  and  Proceedings  of  both 
Houses. 

II.  Requisites  of  Constitutions 

261.  The  fundamental  parts  of  a  constitution.  Burgess  states 
as  follows  the  contents  of  a  proper  constitution  : 

A  complete  constitution  may  be  said  to  consist  of  three  fundamental 
parts.  The  first  is  the  organization  of  the  state  for  the  accomplishment 
of  future  changes  in  the  constitution.  This  is  usually  called  the  amending 
clause,  and  the  power  which  it  describes  and  regulates  is  called  the 
amending  power.  This  is  the  most  important  part  of  a  constitution. 
Upon  its  existence  and  truthfulness,  i.e.  its  correspondence  with  real  and 
natural  conditions,  depends  the  question  as  to  whether  the  state  shall 


288  RK-VniNCS  IN   POLirU   \1    sriKNCE 

develop  with  peaceable  cxMitinuity  or  shall  suffer  alternations  of  stagnation, 
ivtn^gression.  and  anolution.  A  constitution,  which  may  be  imperfect 
and  erroneous  in  its  other  parts,  can  be  easily  supplemented  and  air- 
rected.  if  only  the  state  be  truthfully  org-ani/ed  in  the  constitution  ;  but  if 
this  be  not  accomplished,  ern.>r  will  accumulate  until  nothing-  short  of 
revolution  c;m  save  the  life  of  the  state,  .  .  .  The  secxmd  fundamental 
part  of  a  cv^nplete  constitution,  I  denominate  the  constitution  of  liberty ; 
and  the  third,  the  amstitution  of  govonmient.  .  .  . 

A  true  and  perfect  political  science  will  ixxjuire.  as  I  have  alrcad\ 
pointed  out,  first,  the  org-anization  of  the  state,  ix.  the  sovereigiUy  back 
of  the  constitution  ;  secx>nd,  the  cxmtinued  org-anization  of  the  sovereignty 
within  the  constitution  :  third,  the  tracing  out  of  the  domain  of  civil  liberty 
within  the  constitution,  by  the  sovereigiity,  the  state  ;  fourth,  the  g-\iaranty 
of  civil  liberty  ordinarily  agiiinst  ever)'  power,  except  the  sovereignty  or- 
gimized  within  the  a>nstitution ;  fifth,  provisions  for  the  temporaiy  sus- 
pension of  civil  liberty  by  the  government  in  time  of  war  and  public 
danger ;  sixth,  the  org-ani;^ation  of  govenunent  within  the  amstitution,  by 
the  sovereigntv,  the  state ;  and  seventh,  the  security  of  the  govemment 
against  all  changes,  except  by  the  sovereignty  orgimizt^  within  the 
constitution. 

262.  Contents  of  constitutional  law.  A  more  detailed  statement 
of  the  topics  that  propcrl\  belong  to  constitutional  law  is  given  by 
Holland. 

The  definition  of  the  sovereign  power  in  a  state  necessarily  leads  to 
the  consideration  of  its  component  parts.  .  .  .  \\'ith  reference  to  all 
these  questions  constitutional  law  enters  into  minute  detail.  It  prescribes 
the  order  of  succession  to  the  throne ;  or,  in  a  Republic,  the  mode  of  elect- 
ing a  President.  It  provides  for  the  continuity  of  the  executive  power.  It 
enumerates  the  "  prerogatives  "  of  the  king,  or  other  chief  magistrate. 
It  regulates  the  cx)mposition  of  the  Council  of  State,  and  of  the  Upper 
and  Lower  Houses  of  the  Assembly,  when  the  Assembly  is  thus  divided  ; 
the  mode  in  which  a  seat  is  acquired  in  the  Upper  House,  whether  by 
succession,  nomination,  election,  or  tenure  of  otfice  ;  the  mode  of  electing 
the  members  of  the  house  of  representatives ;  the  powers  and  privileges 
of  the  assembly  as  a  whole,  and  of  the  individuals  who  compose  it ;  and 
the  machiner\-  of  lawmaking.  It  deals  also  with  the  ministers,  their  re- 
sponsibilitv  and  their  respective  spheres  of  action  ;  the  government  offices 
and  their  orgimization ;  the  armed  forces  of  the  State,  their  control  and 
the  mode  in  which  they  are  recruited  ;  the  relation,  if  any.  between  Churcli 
and  State;  the  judges  and  their  immunities;  their  power,  if  any.  of 


CONSTITUTIONS  289 

disallowing  as  unconstitutional  the  acts  of  nonsovereign  legislative  Ixxlies ; 
local  self-government ;  the  relations  between  the  mother  country  and  its 
colonies  and  dependencies.  It  describes  the  portions  of  the  earth's  sur- 
face over  which  the  sovereignty  of  the  State  extends,  and  defines  the  per- 
sons who  are  subject  to  its  authority.  It  comprises  therefore  rules  for 
the  ascertainment  of  nationality,  and  for  regulating  the  acquisition  of  a 
new  nationality  by  ''naturalization."  It  declares  the  rights  of  the  State 
over  its  subjects  in  respect  of  their  liability  to  military  conscription,  to 
service  as  jurymen,  and  otherwise.  It  declares,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
rights  of  the  subjects  to  be  assisted  and  protected  by  the  State,  and  of 
that  narrower  class  of  subjects  which  enjoys  full  civic  rights  to  hold  public 
offices  and  to  elect  their  representatives  to  the  Assembly,  or  Parliament, 
of  the  Nation. 

263.  The  American  conception  of  a  constitution.  A  brief  state- 
ment of  the  essentials  of  a  constitution  according  to  the  American 
point  of  view  follows  : 

By  "  constitution  "  we  mean  a  specific  written  instrument  defining  the 
government;  and  an  executive  or  legislative  act  is  unconstitutional  if 
contrary  to  the  terms  of  that  instrument.  The  five  elements  of  the 
fundamental  conception  of  our  constitution  are,  that  it  is  definite,  com- 
prehensive, supreme  over  all  other  forms  of  written  law,  fundamental, 
and  alterable  only  by  a  special  process. 

264.  Preambles  to  constitutions.  Many  constitutions  contain 
interesting  preliminary  statements  that  throw  light  on  the  political 
history  and  the  national  psychology  of  peoples» 

Constitution  of  the  Argentine  Nation :  W'e,  the  representatives  of  the 
people  of  the  Argentine  Nation,  assembled  in  general  constitutional  con- 
vention by  the  will  and  election  of  the  provinces  of  which  it  is  composed, 
in  pursuance  of  previous  agreements,  for  the  purpose  of  constituting  the 
National  Union,  of  establishing  justice,  of  insuring  domestic  peace,  of 
providing  for  the  common  defense,  of  promoting  the  general  welfare,  and 
of  securing  the  benefits  of  liberty  to  ourselves,  our  posterity,  and  to  all 
persons  who  may  desire  to  inhabit  the  Argentine  soil,  invoking  the  pro- 
tection of  God,  the  source  of  all  reason  and  justice,  do  hereby  ordain, 
decree,  and  establish  this  constitution  for  the  Argentine  Nation.  .  .  . 

Commonwealth  0/  Australia  Constitution  Act :  Whereas  the  people  of 
New  South  Wales,  Victoria,  South  Australia,  Queensland,  and  Tasmania, 
humbly  relying  on  the  blessing  of  Almighty  God,  have  agreed  to  unite 


290 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


in  one  indissoluble  Federal  Commonwealth  under  the  Crown  of  the  United 
Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  and  under  the  Constitution  hereby 
established  :  and  Whereas  it  is  expedient  to  provide  for  the  admission  into 
the  Commonwealth  of  other  Australasian  Colonies  and  possessions  of 
the  Queen  : 

Be  it  therefore  enacted  by  the  Queen's  Most  Excellent  Majesty,  by 
and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Lords  Spiritual  and  Temporal, 
and  Commons,  in  this  present  Parliament  assembled,  and  by  the  authority 
of  the  same  as  follows  :  .  .  . 

The  British  North  America  Ad:  An  Act  for  the  Union  of  Canada, 
Nova  Scotia  and  New  Brunswick,  and  the  Government  thereof ;  and  for 
purposes  connected  therewith. 

Whereas  the  provinces  of  Canada,  Nova  Scotia  and  New  Brunswick 
have  expressed  their  desire  to  be  federally  united  into  one  Dominion  under 
the  Crown  of  the  united  kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  with  a 
constitution  similar  in  principle  to  that  of  the  united  kingdom  : 

And  whereas  such  a  union  would  conduce  to  the  welfare  of  the  prov- 
inces and  promote  the  interests  of  the  British  empire : 

And  whereas  on  the  establishment  of  the  union  by  authority  of  parlia- 
ment it  is  expedient,  not  only  that  the  constitution  of  the  legislative  au- 
thority in  the  Dominion  be  provided  for,  but  also  that  the  nature  of  the 
executive  government  therein  be  declared : 

And  whereas  it  is  expedient  that  provision  be  made  for  the  eventual  ad- 
mission into  the  union  of  other  parts  of  British  North  America : 

Be  it  therefore  enacted  and  declared  by  the  queen's  most  excellent 
majesty,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  lords  spiritual  and  tem- 
poral, and  commons,  in  this  present  parliament  assembled,  and  by  the 
authority  of  the  same  as  follows  :  .  .  . 

Constitution  of  the  Germafi  Empire :  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia, 
in  the  name  of  the  North  German  Confederation,  His  Majesty  the  King 
of  Bavaria,  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Wiirttemberg,  His  Royal  Highness 
the  Grand  Duke  of  Baden,  and  His  Royal  Highness  the  Grand  Duke  of 
Hesse  and  Rhenish  Hesse  for  those  parts  of  the  Grand  Duchy  of  Hesse 
lying  south  of  the  Main,  conclude  an  eternal  alliance  for  the  protection 
of  the  territory  of  the  Confederation,  and  of  the  rights  of  the  same  as 
well  as  for  the  promotion  of  the  welfare  of  the  German  people.  This 
Confederation  shall  bear  the  name  of  the  German  Empire,  and  shall  have 
the  following  Constitution :   .   .   . 

Constitution  of  the  Swiss  Confederation  :  In  the  Name  of  Almighty  God. 

The  Swiss  Confederation,  desiring  to  confirm  the  alliance  of  the 
Confederates,  to  maintain  and  to  promote  the  unity,  strength,  and  honor 
of  the  Swiss  nation,  has  adopted  the  following  federal  constitution  :  .  .  . 


CONSTITUTIONS  29 1 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States :  W'c  the  people  of  the  United 
States,  in  order  to  form  a  more  perfect  union,  establish  justice,  insure 
domestic  tranquillity,  provide  for  the  common  defense,  promote  the  gen- 
eral welfare,  and  secure  the  blessings  of  liberty  to  ourselves  and  our  pos- 
terity, do  ordain  and  establish  this  Constitution  for  the  United  States  of 
America. 

III.  Ckkation  of  Constitutions 

265.  The  constitution  and  state  origin.  The  fact  that  the  state 
exists  subjectively  before  it  is  definitely  organized,  and  that  the 
adoption  of  a  constitution  is  merely  a  formal  expression  of  preexist- 
ing national  consciousness  is  brought  out  in  the  following :  ^ 

1 

It  follows  from  what  has  been  said,  that  this  transformation  of  a 
community  or  of  a  society  into  a  People,  potentially  or  actually  con- 
sidered, cannot  be  due  to  any  formal  act  on  their  part.  Sentiments  and 
desires  are  not  thus  formed.  The  necessity  for  the  existence  of  the 
subjective  condition  prior  to  the  objective  creation  of  a  political  organ- 
ization, makes  impossible  the  assumption  of  a  formal  origin  of  the 
State.  The  logical  result,  therefore,  is,  that  it  is  impossible  to  ascribe, 
even  in  modern  times,  a  formal  or  juristic  origin  to  the  State.  The 
adoption  of  a  formal  constitution  cannot  be  considered  as  a  creative  act. 
The  State  is  not,  thereby,  brought  into  existence,  though  from  the 
historical  standpoint  it  is  for  convenience  properly  so  considered.  The 
solemn  adoption  by  a  people  of  such  a  fundamental  instrument  is  but 
the  act  through  which  that  which  has  formerly  existed  in  a  more  or  less 
undefined  and  vague  state,  is  brought  into  definite  and  positive  statement. 

It  may  be  the  fact,  indeed,  that  the  origin  of  the  State  (as,  for  ex- 
ample, the  creation  of  a  federal  State,  by  the  union  of  formerly  inde- 
pendent States)  is  apparently  synchronous  with  the  adoption  of  the 
written  constitution  by  which  such  union  is  effected.  But  it  cannot  be 
said  that  such  federal  State  was  created  by  such  instrument.  The 
creating  cause  was  the  feeling  of  national  unity  which  found  its  formal 
and  juristic  expression  in  the  articles  of  union.  The  constitution  is  the 
instrument  that  definitely  creates  and  defines  the  organs  through  which 
the  State,  already  subjectively  in  existence,  is  henceforth  to  exercise  its 
activities.  The  essence  of  the  State  is  the  national  feeling  that  unites  its 
People,  and  its  written  constitution  is  but  the  formal  expression  of  the 
fundamental  principles  according  to  which  this  People  propose  to  con- 
duct their  political  life.  The  truth  of  this  is  seen  in  the  fact  that  a 
1  Copyright,  1896,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


292  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

written  constitution  is  by  no  means  essential  to  State  life,  and  is,  indeed, 
of  very  recent  invention.  Its  raison  d'etre  is  no  deeper  than  a  political 
expediency  that  is  based  upon  the  definiteness  thus  obtained,  and  the 
added  stability  acquired  by  the  restrictions  that  these  v^rritten  instruments 
ordinarily  impose  upon  hasty  and  constant  amendment. 

From  the  standpoint  of  Public  Law,  it  may  not  be  necessary  to  go 
back  of  a  written  constitution ;  but  from  the  philosophical  standpoint 
the  more  teleological  view  is  demanded.  Viewed  in  this  latter  aspect, 
the  true  constitution  of  the  State  may  be  said  to  date  from  the  earliest 
beginnings  of  State  life,  when  first  the  feeling  of  unity  began  to  be  felt 
by  the  people,  and  to  have  developed  pari  passu  as  the  feelings  of 
national  life  have  grown  and  found  expression  in  political  organization 
and  control. 

266.  Adoption  of  written  constitutions.  A  summary  of  the  lead- 
ing states  that  have  recently  adopted  written  constitutions  follows  :  ^ 

Within  the  last  century  and  a  half  most  of  the  great  states  have 
adopted  written  constitutions.  The  American  colonies,  in  converting 
themselves  into  states,  led  the  way.  Written  constitutions  were  adopted 
in  the  year  1776  by  New  Hampshire,  Virginia,  South  Carolina,  New 
Jersey,  Delaware,  Pennsylvania,  Maryland,  and  North  Carolina ;  in  the 
following  year  by  Georgia  and  New  York  ;  and  by  Massachusetts  in 
1780.  Connecticut  and  Rhode  Island  converted  their  royal  charters 
into  constitutions  by  putting  the  name  of  the  people  in  the  place  of  that 
of  the  king.  France,  at  the  commencement  of  the  Revolution,  framed 
and  adopted  (1791)  a  written  constitution  which,  although  soon  set 
aside  in  favor  of  others  equally  ephemeral  (1793,  179S)  1799))  estab- 
lished a  historic  precedent.  Each  of  the  successive  French  governments 
of  the  nineteenth  century  has  adopted  a  written  constitution  —  the 
Bourbon  government  of  the  Restoration  preferring,  however,  to  avoid 
the  word  "  constitution  "  and  to  substitute  for  it  the  term  "  charter," 
which  seemed  to  have  less  flavor  of  popular  sovereignty.  The  present 
government  in  France,  —  the  third  republic,  —  though  it  has  no  single 
document  called  a  constitution,  has,  nevertheless,  a  code  of  "  constitu- 
tional laws,"  with  a  special  method  of  revision.  In  the  Napoleonic  era 
a  number  of  written  constitutions  were  issued  under  French  influence 
to  the  tributary  Italian  states.  During  the  same  time  written  constitu- 
tions were  declared  in  Spain  both  by  the  Bonapartists,  recognizing  King 
Joseph  (1808),  and  by  the  partisans  of  the  Bourbon  Ferdinand  VII 
(18 1 2).    Neither  of  these  proved  permanent;  but  Spain  is  at  present 

1  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 


CONSTITUTIONS 


29; 


under  a  written  constitution  presented  by  the  government  to  a  conven- 
tion, vk'hich  ratified  it  in  1876.  During  the  European  rising  against 
Napoleon  (18 13,  18 14)  written  constitutions  were  promised  by  Prussia 
and  by  several  of  the  states  of  Germany ;  after  the  war  they  were 
actually  granted  by  Bavaria  (18 18)  and  by  Wiirttemberg  (18 19).  The 
great  revolution  of  1848  precipitated  a  shower  of  written  constitutions 
all  over  central  Europe.  Though  nearly  all  of  them  were  canceled  in 
the  ensuing  monarchial  reaction,  that  of  Sardinia  (the  "  Fundamental 
Statute"  of  1848)  has  remained  in  revised  form  as  the  constitution  of 
the  present  kingdom  of  Italy.  The  king  of  Prussia  issued  in  1850  a 
constitution  prepared  by  the  crown  and  accepted  by  a  legislative  body  of 
a  reactionary  character,  which  has  since,  in  theory  at  least,  served  as  the 
basis  of  the  Prussian  government.  Austria,  in  1867  (defeated  in  the 
war  with  Prussia  and  Italy,  and  fearing  a  disintegration  of  her  hetero- 
geneous provinces),  adopted  a  set  of  fundamental  laws  closely  analogous 
to  a  written  constitution.  At  the  present  time,  then,  with  the  exception 
of  England,  Hungary,  and  the  absolute  monarchies,  the  chief  European 
states  have  written  constitutions.  The  same  is  true  of  the  republics  of 
Central  and  South  America,  all  of  which  have  written  constitutions, 
serving  at  any  rate  as  the  nominal  basis  of  their  government. 

267.  English  written  constitutions.  During  the  Commonwealth 
several  attempts  were  made  to  draw  up  written  constitutions  for 
England.  Their  underlying  ideas  reappeared  in  colonial  charters  and 
governments  and,  later,  in  American  state  and  federal  constitutions. 

At  the  culminating  point  of  the  Puritan  Revolution,  when  Cromwell, 
swept  on  by  the  democratic  movement,  is  compelled  to  follow  it  if  he 
would  become  its  master,  a  curious  constitutional  project  is  seen  coming 
to  the  surface.  This  is  the  ''Agreement  of  the  People"  presented  by 
the  army  to  the  House  of  Commons,  for  its  approval  and  eventual 
submission  to  the  people.  The  idea  of  its  authors,  clearly  stated  in  the 
document  itself,  and  discussed  in  the  pamphlets  of  the  day,  was  the 
establishment  of  a  supreme  law,  placed  beyond  the  reach  of  Parliament, 
defining  the  powers  of  that  body  and  expressly  declaring  the  rights 
which  the  nation  reserved  to  itself  and  which  no  authority  might  touch 
with  impunity.  This  popular  compact  was  to  receive  the  personal 
adhesion  of  the  citizens,  according  to  a  special  procedure  therein  i^ro- 
vided.    Its  promulgation  depended  upon  its  acceptance  by  the  pct)ple.  .  .  . 

This  manifesto  contains  the  outline  of  a  complete  constitution.  When 
we  read  it  and  summarize  the  demands  it  contains,  we  are  astounded  to 
find  that  it  is  nearly  two  centuries  and  a  half  old.    The  i)rincii)les  which 


294  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

it  lays  down  are,  for  the  most  part,  the  very  principles  which  contem- 
porary democracy  has  first  succeeded  in  establishing,  or  is  still  de- 
manding. The  sovereignty  of  the  people :  supreme  power  vested  in  a 
single  representative  assembly ;  the  executive  intrusted  by  an  assembly 
to  a  council  of  state,  elected  for  the  term  of  one  legislature  ;  biennial  par- 
liaments ;  equitable  and  proportionate  distribution  of  seats :  extension  of 
the  right  of  voting  and  of  election  to  all  citizens  dwelling  in  the  electoral 
districts  who  are  of  full  age,  and  neither  hired  servants  nor  in  receipt  of 
relief :  the  toleration  of  all  forms  of  Christianity  :  the  suppression  of  state 
interference  in  church  government ;  the  limitation  of  the  powers  of  the 
representative  assembly,  by  fundamental  laws  embodied  in  the  consti- 
tution, especially  with  regard  to  the  civil  liberties  guaranteed  to  citizens 
—  these  are  the  principles  proclaimed  by  the  English  democrats  in 
January,  1648-49.  .  .  . 

The  Instrument  of  Government  which  was  elaborated  in  1653  by  the 
Council  of  Officers,  was  a  written  Constitution,  the  first,  and  down  to 
the  present  time  the  only  one  ever  possessed  by  modern  England. 

268.  Early  American  constitutions.  A  suggestive  analysis  of 
the  formation  of  constitutions  by  the  original  American  common- 
wealths follows : 

For  the  organization  of  state  governments  the  precedents  were  those 
of  the  existing  English  and  colonial  governments ;  but  they  took  care  to 
formulate  their  principles  of  government  in  written  documents,  very  brief 
at  first,  but  afterwards  extended  into  the  type  of  the  present  state  consti- 
tutionT"  First  in  time  was  the  vote  of  the  New  Hampshire  Convention : 
"In  Congress  at  Exeter,  January  5,  1776,  voted,  that  this  colony  take 
up  civil  government  in  this  colony  in  the  manner  and  form  following." 
Ten  other  states,  from  1776  to  1780,  framed  regular  constitutional 
documents.  The  charters  of  Connecticut  and  Rhode  Island  were  already 
so  liberal  that  with  very  slight  changes  they  answered  for  many  years  as 
state  constitutions. 

The  original  state  constitutions  usually  contained  two  parts:  (i)  A 
statement  of  the  rights  of  individuals,  which  practically  repeated,  and 
often  used  the  phrases  of,  the  English  documents  of  personal  liberty 
from  Magna  Charta  down,  and  of  the  American  Declarations  of  Rights 
of  1765  and  1774.  .  .  .  (2)  The  second  part  of  the  early  constitu- 
tions was  a  framework  of  government,  usually  expressed  in  very  brief 
phrases.  .  .  . 

Of  the  eleven  new  constitutions,  ten  were  put  into  force  by  the  congress 
or  convention  which  drew  them,  and  which  represented  the  sovereign 


CONSTITUTIONS  295 

authority  of  the  people ;  but  those  conventions  were  also  the  legislatures 
of  the  time.  Massachusetts  worked  out  a  different  system.  .  .  .  in  1780 
Massachusetts  called  a  convention  expressly  to  frame  a  constitution, 
which  took  effect  only  after  a  popular  majority ;  and  most  constitutions 
since  that  time  have  been  framed  in  the  same  manner.  .   .  . 

This  era  of  constitution  makin}^  deserves  analysis.  Its  significance 
was:  (i)  the  consciousness  that  the  constitutions  must  have  a  written 
basis  and  clearly  restrict  the  governing  authorities;  (2)  the  conception 
that  the  making  of  a  constitution  was  a  slow  affair  which  required 
special  attention,  and  eventually  that  a  constitution  ought  to  be  framed 
by  a  special  convention  and  then  ratified  by  popular  vote;  (3)  though 
the  suffrage  was  limited,  the  form  of  government  was  very  democratic, 
for  the  largest  governing  power  was  the  elective  legislatures,  balanced 
and  checked  by  an  executive  and  by  the  courts ;  (4)  the  constitutions 
included  elaborate  statements  of  the  rights  of  the  individual,  rights  pre- 
ceding and  independent  of  government;  (5)  the  written  constitution 
was  considered  to  be  a  law  of  a  Superior  and  more  permanent  character 
than  any  ordinary  statute. 

269.  The  sources  of  the  American  constitution.  The  following 
extract  emphasizes  the  fact  that  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  was  not  a  new  or  original  creation.^ 

By  a  process  of  adoption  and  adaptation,  rather  than  of  new  creation, 
the  Convention  at  Philadelphia  gave  the  highest  evidence  of  its  sagacity. 
"  The  American  Constitution,"  says  Mr.  Bryce,  "  is  no  exception  to  the 
rule  that  everything  which  has  power  to  win  the  obedience  and  respect 
of  men  must  have  its  roots  deep  in  the  past,  and  that  the  more  slowly 
every  institution  has  grown,  so  much  the  more  enduring  is  it  likely  to 
prove.  There  is  little  in  that  Constitution  that  is  ab.solutely  new.  There 
is  much  that  is  as  old  as  Magna  Charta."  The  delegates  of  the  Conven- 
tion "  had  neither  the  rashness  nor  the  capacity  for  constructing  a  con- 
stitution a  priori.  There  is  wonderfully  little  genuine  inventiveness  in 
the  world,  and  perhaps  least  of  all  has  been  shown  in  the  sphere  of 
political  institutions.  These  men,  practical  politicians,  who  knew  how 
infinitely  difficult  a  business  government  is,  desired  no  bold  experiments. 
They  preferred,  so  far  as  circumstances  permitted,  to  walk  in  the  old 
paths,  to  follow  methods  which  experience  had  tested."  Professor  John- 
son speaks  in  the  same  strain  :  "  If  the  brilliant  success  of  the  .American 
Constitution  proves  anything,  it  docs  not  prove  that  a  vialile  c<)nstituti»)n 
can  ever  be  struck  off  at  a  given  time  by  the  brain  and  puri>ose  of 
man.  Man  may  be  a  political  animal,  but  in  no  such  sense  as  this.  .  .  . 
'  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


296  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

To  accuse  the  members  of  having  deliberately  hazarded  the  destinies  of 
their  country  upon  the  outcome  of  an  entirely  new  and  untried  instru- 
ment of  government,  would  be  an  injustice  against  which  they  would 
have  been  the  first  to  protest ;  and  yet  the  intensity  of  posterity's  admi- 
ration for  their  success  is  continually  tempting  new  writers  into  what  is 
in  reality  just  such  an  accusation."  And  Mr.  James  Russell  Lowell  has 
observed,  with  his  usual  grace:  "They  had  a  profound  disbelief  in 
theory,  and  knew  better  than  to  commit  the  folly  of  breaking  with  the 
past.  They  were  not  seduced  by  the  French  fallacy,  that  a  new  system 
of  government  could  be  ordered  like  a  new  suit  of  clothes.  They  would 
as  soon  have  thought  of  ordering  a  suit  of  flesh  and  skin.  It  is  only  on 
the  roaring  loom  of  time  that  the  stuff  is  woven  for  such  a  vesture  of 
thought  and  expression  as  they  were  meditating." 

270.  Adoption  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.    The 

essentially  revolutionaiy  nature  of  the  adoption  of  the  American 
Constitution  is  brought  out  in  the  following  : 

In  the  new  constitution  framed  by  the  delegates  from  the  different 
states,  ...  it  was  provided  that  the  ratification  thereof  by  conventions 
in  nine  of  the  thirteen  states  should  be  sufficient  to  authorize  it  to  go 
into  effect  as  among  the  states  in  which  it  was  so  adopted.  As  the 
Articles  of  Confederation  provided  only  for  their  amendment  by  unani- 
mous consent  of  the  thirteen  states,  it  is  apparent  that  the  new  constitu- 
tion was  to  this  extent  a  revolutionary  measure,  not  authorized  by  the 
Articles  of  Confederation.  As  a  matter  of  fact  one  state  —  Rhode 
Island  —  sent  no  delegates  to  this  convention,  and  was  therefore  in  no 
way  bound  by  its  proceedings ;  and  neither  Rhode  Island  nor  North 
Carolina  ratified  until  after  the  federal  government  authorized  by  the 
constitution  was  actually  in  operation.  Moreover,  the  Articles  of  Con- 
■  federation  provided  for  their  change  or  amendment  by  the  action  of  the 
states,  —  meaning  the  state  legislatures,  —  whereas  the  constitution  was 
by  action  of  Congress  submitted  for  ratification  in  the  different  states 
by  conventions  chosen  by  the  voters,  as  the  legislatures  of  the  different 
states  might  provide  (C:onstitution,  Art.  VII).  The  federal  government 
under  the  constitution  was  not,  therefore,  the  legal  successor  to  the 
government  under  the  Articles  of  Confederation,  but  supplanted  it. 
So  far,  however,  as  the  new  government  was  recognized  by  the 
states,  eleven  of  whom  had  ratified  before  such  government  was 
organized,  it  was  as  to  them  legitimate  and  regular,  and  it  was  ac- 
quiesced in  by  the  remaining  two  states  when  they  finally  ratified  it 
in  the  prescribed  form. 


CONSTITUTIONS  297 

271.  The  creation  of  the  French  constitution.  A  recent  book 
states  the  peculiar  form  of  the  French  constitution  as  follows : 

Finally,  at  the  beginning  of  the  year  1875,  four  years  after  the  elec- 
tion of  the  Assembly,  it  at  last  took  up  seriously  the  consideration  of  a 
permanent  form  of  government,  and  on  January  29  a  motion  was  carried 
by  a  majority  of  one  providing  that  the  president  of  the  republic  should 
be  elected  by  the  Senate  and  Chamber  of  Deputies  meeting  together  in 
a  single  assembly.  Thus  the  republicans  at  last  carried  the  day  by  the 
narrowest  possible  margin. 

The  restoration  of  the  monarchy  having  now  become  impossible,  for 
the  time  being  at  least,  the  Assembly  proceeded  with  the  work  of  com- 
pleting a  form  of  government,  not  by  drafting  an  elaborate  constitution 
but  by  passing  a  series  of  laws.  These  separate  laws,  supplemented  by 
later  amendments,  form  the  constitution  of  the  Third  Republic,  which 
consequently  differs  in  many  fundamental  ways  from  all  the  previous 
French  constitutions.  It  contains  no  reference  to  the  sovereignty  of  the 
pecple ;  it  includes  no  bill  of  rights  enumerating  the  liberties  of  French 
citizens ;  and  it  makes  no  definite  provision  for  maintaining  a  republican 
form  of  government.  It  is,  in  fact,  by  no  means  a  logically  arranged 
and  finished  document ;  on  the  contrary,  it  bears  throughout  the  marks  of 
hasty  compilation,  designed  as  it  was  to  tide  the  nation  over  a  crisis  until 
one  of  the  contending  parties  in  the  Assembly  should  secure  a  trium- 
phant majority.  Nevertheless,  despite  the  expectations  of  many  who  took 
part  in  its  making,  it  has  lasted  longer  and  provided  a  more  stable  govern- 
ment than  any  of  the  numerous  constitutions  France  has  had  since  17S9. 

272.  Scope  and  character  of  French  constitutional  laws.  Wil- 
son points  out  the  legal  distinction  between  "constitutional  "  and 
"organic"  laws  in  France. 

In  framing  the  laws  which  were  to  give  shape  to  the  new  government 
the  Assembly  distinguished  between  those  which  were  to  be  "  consti- 
tutional" and  subject  to  change  only  by  special  processes  of  amend- 
ment, and  those  which,  though  "organic,"  were  to  be  left  subject  to 
change  by  the  ordinary  processes  of  statutory  enactment  by  the  two 
Houses  of  the  Legislature.  The  "  constitutional  "  laws,  passed  February 
24th  and  25th  and  July  i6th,  1875,  respectively,  dealt  in  the  simplest 
possible  manner  with  the  larger  features  of  the  new  government's  struc- 
ture and  operation :  the  election  and  general  powers  of  the  President ; 
the  division  of  the  National  Assembly  into  two  houses,  a  Senate  and 
Chamber  of  Deputies ;  the  general  powers  and  mutual  relations  of  tlie 


298  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

two  Houses,  the  President's  relation  to  them,  and  the  general  rules 
which  should  control  their  assembling  and  adjournment.  Two  "  organic  " 
statutes,  bearing  date  August  2nd  and  November  30th,  1875,  respec- 
tively, provided  for  the  election  of  Senators  and  Deputies.  The  only 
radical  amendment  of  the  "  constitutional "  laws  since  then  effected  was 
made  in  August,  1884,  when  almost  the  whole  of  the  constitutional  law 
regarding  the  composition  and  powers  of  the  Senate  was  repealed,  and 
replaced  by  an  "  organic  "  law  (that  is,  an  ordinary  statute)  which  intro- 
duced a  number  of  important  changes,  and  left  the  organization  and 
authority  of  the  Senate  henceforth  open  to  the  freest  legislative  altera- 
tion, likely  to  be  checked  only  by  the  circumstance  that  the  Senate  must 
itself  assent  to  the  changes  made.  The  "organic"  laws  of  1875  with 
regard  to  elections  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  have  been  several  times 
amended. 

273.  The  formation  of  the  German  constitution.  The  leading 
steps  in  the  accomplishment  of  German  unity  were  as  follows  : 

In  1848  most  of  the  German  states,  except  Prussia,  granted  to  their 
people  constitutional  government.  In  the  same  year  a  "  German  National 
Parliament "  met  at  Frankfort  .  .  .  and  attempted  to  formulate  a  plan 
for  more  perfect  union  under  the  leadership  of  Prussia ;  but  its  leaders 
proposed  much  more  than  was  possible,  the  time  was  not  yet  ripe,  and 
the  attempt  failed.  Still  earlier,  in  1833,  Prussia  had  led  in  the  formation 
of  a  "  Customs  Union  "  {Zollverein)  between  herself  and  all  the  states  of 
the  Confederation  except  Austria,  which  laid  a  free-trade  basis  for  those 
subsequent  political  arrangements  from  which  also  Austria  was  to  be 
excluded.  In  1850  Prussia  received  from  the  hands  of  her  king  the 
forms,  at  least,  of  a  liberal  government,  with  parliamentary  institutions ; 
and  these  concessions,  though  at  first  largely  make-believe,  served  even- 
tually as  the  basis  for  more  substantial  popular  liberties. 

Finally,  in  1866,  came  the  open  breach  between  Prussia  and  Austria. 
The  result  was  a  six  weeks'  war  in  which  Austria  was  completely  de- 
feated and  humiliated.  The  Confederation  of  1 8 1 5  fell  to  pieces  ;  Prussia 
drew  about  her  the  Protestant  states  of  Northern  Germany  in  a  "  North 
German  Confederation " ;  the  middle  states,  Bavaria,  Wiirttemberg, 
Baden,  etc.,  held  off  for  a  while  to  themselves ;  and  Austria  found  her- 
self finally  excluded  from  German  political  arrangements.   .   .  . 

The  finishing  impulse  was  given  to  the  new  processes  of  union  by  the 
Franco-Prussian  war  of  1870-187 1.  Prussia's  brilliant  successes  in  that 
contest,  won,  as  it  seemed,  in  the  interest  of  German  patriotism  against 
French  insolence,  broke  the  coldness  of  the  middle  states  toward  their 
great  northern  neighbor.   .  .  . 


CONSTITUTIONS  299 

The  first  step  toward  the  present  union  was  taken  in  1870,  when 
Baden,  Bavaria,  and  Wiirttemberg,  fearing  that  the  object  of  Napoleon 
III  was  to  conquer  the  central  German  states  or  renew  the  Confedera- 
tion of  the  Rhine,  decisively  espoused  the  side  of  Prussia  and  the  North 
German  Confederation.  While  the  siege  of  Paris  was  in  progress  these 
three  states  sent  delegates  to  King  William  at  Versailles  and  formally 
united  themselves  with  their  northern  compatriots:  the  North  German 
Confederation  became  the  German  Confederation,  with  King  William  as 
president.  Almost  immediately,  thereafter,  the  influences  of  the  time 
carried  the  Confederates  a  step  farther :  at  the  suggestion  of  the  king 
of  Bavaria,  the  president  king  was  crowned  Emperor,  and  the  German 
Confederation  became  the  German  Empire.  The  present  constitution 
of  the  Empire  bears  date  April  16,  187 1. 

274.  The  practical  nature  of  the  German  constitution.  T.owell 
points  out  the  chief  purposes  for  which  the  German  ICmpire  was 
formed. 1 

The  constitution  has  nothing  about  it  that  is  abstract  or  ideal.  It 
was  drawn  up  by  a  man  of  affairs  who  knew  precisely  what  he  wanted, 
and  understood  very  well  the  limitations  imposed  upon  him,  and  the 
concessions  he  was  obliged  to  make  to  the  existing  order  of  things. 
His  prime  object  was  to  create  a  powerful  military  state,  and  hence,  as 
has  been  pointed  out,  the  articles  on  most  subjects  are  comparatively 
meager,  but  those  on  the  army,  the  navy,  and  the  revenue  are  drawn  up 
with  a  minuteness  befitting  the  by-laws  of  a  commercial  company. 

IV.   Amendment  of  Constitutions 

275.  Methods  of  amendment.  The  constitutional  provisions  for 
amendment  in  some  of  the  leading  states  are  as  follows  : 

France:  Article  8.  The  chambers  shall  have  the  right  by  separate 
resolutions,  taken  in  each  by  an  absolute  majority  of  votes,  either  upon 
their  own  initiative  or  upon  the  request  of  the  President  of  the  Republic, 
to  declare  a  revision  of  the  constitutional  laws  necessary. 

After  each  of  the  two  chambers  shall  have  come  to  this  decisic.n.  they 
shall  meet  together  in  National  Assembly  to  proceed  with  the  revision. 

The  acts  effecting  revision  of  the  constitutional  laws,  in  whole  or  in 
part,  shall  be  passed  by  an  absolute  majority  of  the  members  composing 
the  National  Assembly. 

1  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 


300  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

Germany:  Article  78.  Amendments  of  the  constitution  shall  be 
made  by  legislative  enactment.  They  shall  be  considered  as  rejected 
when  fourteen  votes  are  cast  against  them  in  the  Bundesrath. 

The  provisions  of  the  constitution  of  the  Empire,  by  which  certain 
rights  are  secured  to  particular  states  of  the  Union  in  their  relation  to 
the  whole,  may  be  amended  only  with  the  consent  of  the  states  affected. 

Switzerland:  Article  118.  The  federal  constitution  may  at  any 
time  be  amended,  in  whole  or  in  part. 

Article  119.  Total  revision  shall  take  place  in  the  manner  provided 
for  passing  federal  laws. 

Article  120.  When  either  council  of  the  Federal  Assembly  resolves 
in  favor  of  a  total  revision  of  the  constitution  and  the  other  council  does 
not  consent  thereto,  or  when  fifty  thousand  Swiss  voters  demand  a  total 
revision,  the  question  whether  the  federal  constitution  ought  to  be  revised 
shall  be  in  either  case  submitted  to  a  vote  of  the  Swiss  people,  voting 
yes  or  no. 

If  in  either  case  the  majority  of  those  voting  pronounce  in  the  affirm- 
ative, there  shall  be  a  new  election  of  both  councils  for  the  purpose  of 
undertaking  the  revision. 

Article  121.  Partial  revision  may  take  place  either  by  popular  initia- 
tive or  in  the  manner  provided  for  the  passage  of  federal  laws. 

The  popular  initiative  shall  consist  of  a  petition  of  fifty  thousand  Swiss 
voters  for  the  adoption  of  a  new  article  or  for  the  abrogation  or  amend- 
ment of  specified  articles  of  the  constitution. 

When  several  different  subjects  are  proposed  by  popular  initiative  for 
revision  or  for  adoption  into  the  federal  constitution,  each  one  of  them 
must  be  demanded  by  a  separate  initiative  petition. 

The  initiative  petition  may  be  presented  in  general  terms  or  as  a 
completed  proposal  of  amendment. 

If  the  initiative  petition  is  presented  in  general  terms  and  the  federal 
legislative  bodies  are  in  agreement  with  it,  they  shall  draw  up  a  project 
of  partial  revision  in  accordance  with  the  sense  of  the  petitioners,  and 
shall  submit  it  to  the  people  and  the  cantons  for  acceptance  or  rejec- 
tion. If,  on  the  contrary,  the  Federal  Assembly  is  not  in  agreement 
with  the  petition,  the  question  of  partial  revision  shall  be  submitted  to  a 
vote  of  the  people,  and  if  a  majority  of  those  voting  pronounce  in  the 
affirmative,  the  Federal  Assembly  shall  proceed  with  the  revision  in 
conformity  with  the  popular  decision. 

If  the  petition  is  presented  in  the  form  of  a  completed  project  of 
amendment  and  the  Federal  Assembly  is  in  agreement  therewith,  the 
project  shall  be  submitted  to  the  people  and  the  cantons  for  acceptance  or 
rejection.    If  the  Federal  Assembly  is  not  in  agreement  with  the  project, 


CONSTITUTIONS 


301 


it  may  prepare  a  project  of  its  own,  or  recommend  the  rejection  of  the 
proposed  amendment,  and  it  may  submit  its  own  counter-project  or  its 
recommendation  for  rejection  at  the  same  time  that  the  initiative  pe- 
tition is  submitted  to  the  vote  of  the  people  and  cantons. 

Article  122.  The  details  of  procedure  in  cases  of  popular  initiative 
and  popular  votes  on  amendments  to  the  constitution  shall  be  determined 
by  federal  law. 

Article  123.  The  amended  federal  constitution  or  the  revised  por- 
tion of  it  shall  be  in  force  when  it  has  been  adopted  by  a  majority  of 
Swiss  citizens  voting  thereon  and  by  a  majority  of  the  cantons. 

In  making  up  the  majority  of  cantons  the  vote  of  a  half  canton  shall 
be  counted  as  half  a  vote. 

The  result  of  the  popular  vote  in  each  canton  shall  be  considered  as 
the  vote  of  the  canton. 

The  United  States :  Article  V.  The  Congress,  whenever  two  thirds  of 
both  houses  shall  deem  it  necessary,  shall  propose  amendments  to  this 
Constitution,  or,  on  the  application  of  the  Legislatures  of  two  thirds  of 
the  several  States,  shall  call  a  convention  for  proposing  amendments, 
which,  in  either  case,  shall  be  valid  to  all  intents  and  purposes,  as  part 
of  this  Constitution,  when  ratified  by  the  Legislatures  of  three  fourths 
of  the  several  States,  or  by  conventions  in  three  fourths  thereof,  as  the 
one  or  the  other  mode  of  ratification  may  be  proposed  by  the  Congress ; 
provided  that  no  amendment  which  may  be  made  prior  to  the  year  one 
thousand  eight  hundred  and  eight  shall  in  any  manner  affect  the  first  and 
fourth  clauses  in  the  ninth  section  of  the  first  article ;  and  that  no  State, 
without  its  consent,  shall  be  deprived  of  its  equal  suffrage  in  the  Senate. 

276.  The  difficulties  of  constitutional  amendment  in  the  United 
States.  Ames  points  out  the  evils  and  dangers  that  may  result 
from  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  legal  amendment  of  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States. 

Why,  it  may  be  asked,  have  so  few  of  the  more  than  eighteen  hun- 
dred propositions  looking  to  the  amendment  of  our  fundamental  law- 
been  successful?  In  part  because  some  were  suggested  as  cures  for 
temporary  evils,  others  were  trivial  or  impracticable,  still  others  found  a 
place  in  that  unwritten  constitution  which  has  grown  up  side  by  side  with 
the  written  document,  and  whose  provisions  are  often  as  effective  as 
those  contained  in  the  organic  law ;  but  the  real  reason  for  the  failure  of 
those  other  amendments  which  have  been  called  for  repeatedly  by  the 
general  public  has  been  due  to  the  insurmountable  constitutional  obstacles 
in  their  way.   "  It  would  seem,"  as  a  weU-known  American  writer  has 


-^02  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

truly  said,  "  that  no  impulse  short  of  the  impulse  of  self-preservation,  no 
force  less  than  the  force  of  revolution,  can  nowadays  be  expected  to 
move  the  cumbrous  machinery  in  Article  V." 

Fortunately,  the  Federal  Constitution,  owing  to  the  fact  that  it  deals 
only  with  the  most  general  elements  of  government,  has  proved  so  elastic 
as  to  adapt  itself  to  new  contingencies  and  circumstances,  and  thus  the 
necessity  of  amendment  has  been  reduced  to  a  minimum.  There  still 
remain,  however,  certain  desirable  reforms,  rendered  apparent  by  more 
than  a  century's  experience  and  the  changed  conditions  of  our  people  and 
age.  Although  constructive  statesmanship  did  not  end  with  the  adoption 
of  the  Constitution  as  some  would  have  us  believe,  and  although  there 
exists  to-day  more  wisdom  and  capacity  in  matters  pertaining  to  the 
science  of  government  than  at  the  time  the  Constitution  was  formed, 
still  it  has  proved  to  be  impossible  to  secure  these  reforms  because  they 
can  be  effected  only  by  a  formal  amendment. 

Nearly  all  Americans  will  agree  that  a  rigid  constitution  has  its  ex- 
cellencies, but  is  there  not  a  limit  to  the  degree  of  rigidity  desirable  ? 
Did  not  the  framers  of  our  Federal  Constitution,  while  seeking  "  to  avoid 
the  dangers  attending  a  too  frequent  change  of  their  fundamental  code," 
advert  "  to  an  opposite  danger  to  be  equally  shunned  —  that  of  making 
amendments  too  difficult "  ?  Has  not  the  mode  provided  proved  to  be 
of  such  a  character  that  in  some  instances  "discovered  faults"  have 
been  perpetuated  ?  While  continuing  to  follow  th'e  wise  injunction  of  the 
"  Father  of  the  Country  "  "  to  resist  with  care  the  spirit  of  innovation  upon 
the  principles  of  the  Constitution,"  may  we  not  do  well  to  make  such 
constitutional  modifications  as  "  experience  "  —  "the  surest  standard  by 
which  to  test  the  real  tendency  of  existing  constitutions  "  — has  shown 
desirable  ?  Certainly  the  facts  plainly  show  that  the  cause  of  the  difficulty 
is,  to  use  the  words  of  Chief  Justice  Marshall,  that  the  machinery  of 
procuring  an  amendment  i?  "  unwieldy  and  cumbrous."   .  .  . 

"When  in  a  democratic  political  society,"  says  Professor  Burgess, 
"  the  well-matured,  long  and  deliberately  formed  will  of  the  undoubted 
majority  can  be  persistently  and  successfully  thwarted,  in  the  amendment 
of  its  organic  law,  by  the  will  of  the  minority,  there  is  just  as  much 
danger  to  the  State  from  revolution  and  violence  as  there  is  from  the 
caprice  of  the  majority,  where  the  sovereignty  of  the  bare  majority  is 
acknowledged." 

277.  Interpretation  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States. 

The  important  part  played  by  the  courts  in  the  construction  and 
application  of  written  constitutions  in  the  United  States  is  brought 
out  in  the  following  : 


CONSTITUTIONS  -,n-> 

The  text  of  the  federal  constitution  is  legally  supreme  over  all  other 
forms  of  law  within  the  boundaries  of  the  United  States :  it  goes  beyond 
custom ;  it  supersedes  any  principle  of  international  law  which  collides 
with  it;  it  overrides  previous  and  subsequent  state  constitutions  and 
statutes ;  it  controls  local  and  municipal  ordinances,  and  the  acts  of  all 
corporations,  public  and  private.  Nevertheless,  few  subjects  are  habitually 
so  much  discussed  by  the  courts  as  the  meaning  of  the  federal  constitu- 
tion, and  in  like  manner  of  state  constitutions.  A  constitution,  like  a  stat- 
ute, is  phrased  in  words  drawn  up  by  human  and  often  fallible  men  ;  and 
there  may  even  be  two  clauses  of  a  constitution  which  do  not  agree  with 
each  other.  The  meaning  of  the  words  of  a  constitution,  and  especially 
of  the  federal  constitution,  becomes  of  great  importance :  for  instance, 
at  intervals  from  1787  to  1895,  the  courts  have  without  much  success 
endeavored  to  discover  what  our  ancestors  meant  by  "  direct  taxes." 

Yet  we  must  know  what  the  constitution  means  in  order  to  appreciate 
the  meaning  of  statutes  "  pursuant "  to  the  constitution.  Every  person 
who  is  called  upon  to  perform  a  public  act  must  conform  to  the  federal 
constitution,  but  in  order  to  do  so  he  must  make  up  his  mind  what  the 
constitution  means  :  the  president,  when  he  issues  an  order,  thereby 
assumes  that  he  is  acting  within  the  constitution ;  the  members  of  Con- 
gress in  passing  on  a  statute  must  act  within  the  restrictions  of  the  federal 
constitution.  The  courts,  and  especially  the  federal  courts,  are  oftencst 
called  upon  to  apply  the  constitution,  because  in  private  suits  their  atten- 
tion is  called  to  rivalries  in  meaning  between  that  instrument  and  national 
or  state  statutes.  Inasmuch  as  the  courts  deal  continually  with  vested 
rights,  they  must  know  the  traditional  use  of  language,  and  the  meaning 
of  phrases  in  a  legal  sense.  To  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
in  the  last  instance  belongs  the  mighty  office  of  expounding  the  federal 
constitution,  of  showing  the  adjustment  between  its  parts,  and  of  pointing 
out  in  all  varieties  of  law  any  lack  of  harmony  with  it. 

The  general  principles  of  the  construction  of  constitutions  and  statutes 
are  simple :  words  are  used  in  their  ordinary  sense,  if  it  can  be  ascer- 
tained ;  where  two  clauses  seem  to  conflict,  the  courts  will  usually  so 
construe  the  words  as  to  give  effect  and  vitality  to  the  whole ;  the  inten- 
tion of  the  framers  may  be  consulted.  The  courts,  however,  take  ex- 
traordinary precautions :  they  construe  constitutions  and  laws  only  when 
they  are  obliged  to  consider  them  in  order  to  decide  cases  actually  before 
them  ;  and  they  apply  previous  principles,  and  work  out  a  theory  of  the 
constitution  and  laws,  which  may  be  carried  forward  from  year  to  year. 
To  the  federal  and  state  courts,  therefore,  belongs  the  general  duty  of 
expounding  and  applying  the  various  constitutions.  In  the  course  of  a 
century  a  body  of  connected,  and  on  the  whole  coherent,  doctrine  has 


304 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


been  laid  down  in  court  decisions  with  regard  to  the  meaning  of  the 
federal  constitution.  The  state  constitutions  change  more  frequently, 
are  much  more  loosely  drawn,  and  each  new  one  requires  a  new  body 
of  decisions  to  establish  its  meaning. 

278.  The  doctrine  of  implied  powers.  The  theory  by  means  of 
which  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  has  been  expanded  is 
stated  in  the  following  decision  by  Chief  Justice  John  Marshall : 

A  constitution,  to  contain  an  accurate  detail  of  all  the  subdivisions  of 
which  its  great  powers  will  admit,  and  of  all  the  means  by  which  they 
may  be  carried  into  execution,  would  partake  of  the  prolixity  of  a  legal 
code,  and  could  scarcely  be  embraced  by  the  human  mind.  It  would 
probably  never  be  understood  by  the  public.  Its  nature,  therefore,  re- 
quires that  only  its  great  outlines  should  be  marked,  its  important  objects 
designated,  and  the  minor  ingredients  which  compose  those  objects  be 
deduced  from  the  nature  of  the  objects  themselves.  That  this  idea  was 
entertained  by  the  framers  of  the  American  constitution,  is  not  only  to 
be  inferred  from  the  nature  of  the  instrument,  but  from  the  language.  .  .  . 

We  admit,  as  all  must  admit,  that  the  powers  of  the  government  are 
limited,  and  that  its  limits  are  not  to  be  transcended.  But  we  think  the 
sound  construction  of  the  constitution  must  allow  to  the  national  legis- 
lature that  discretion,  with  respect  to  the  means  by  which  the  powers  it 
confers  are  to  be  carried  into  execution,  which  will  enable  that  body  to 
perform  the  high  duties  assigned  to  it,  in  the  manner  most  beneficial  to 
the  people.  Let  the  end  be  legitimate,  let  it  be  within  the  scope  of  the 
constitution,  and  all  means  which  are  appropriate,  which  are  plainly 
adapted  to  that  end,  which  are  not  prohibited,  but  consist  with  the  letter 
and  spirit  of  the  constitution,  are  constitutional. 


PART   II 

THE   ORGANIZATION   OF 
GOVERNMENT 

CHAPTER  XVI 

THE  ELECTORATE 

I.   The  Electorate 

279.  The  nature  of  democracy.    Sidgwick  considers  the  essential 

characteristics  of  democracy  and  the  necessary  hmits  to  its  extreme 
appUcation.i 

Persons  who  adopt  a  democratic  ideal  sometimes  put  forward  as  the 
principle  of  democracy  a  proposition  which  is  indistinguishable  from 
what  I  have  taken  as  the  principle  of  good  government :  viz.  that  all  laws 
and  political  institutions  should  be  framed  with  a  view  to  the  welfare 
of  the  people  at  large,  so  that  no  privileges  should  be  given  to  any 
particular  individual  or  class  except  on  grounds  of  public  utility.  I  con- 
ceive, however,  that  this  principle  not  only  might  but  would  be  univer- 
sally conceded  by  the  modern  advocates  of  every  form  of  civilized 
government :  so  that  to  treat  it  as  a  characteristic  principle  of  democracy 
introduces  fundamental  confusion.  .  .  . 

Limiting  ourselves  then  for  the  present  to  the  consideration  of  the 
structure  of  government,  let  us  ask  how,  in  this  department,  we  are  to 
define  the  fundamental  principle  of  democracy.  There  are,  I  think,  two 
competing  definitions ;  .  .  .  one  of  these  ...  is  "  that  government 
should  rest  on  the  active  consent  of  the  citizens  "  ;  the  other  is  "  that 
any  one  self-supporting  and  law-abiding  citizen  is,  on  the  average,  as  well 
qualified  as  another  for  the  work  of  government."  .   .   . 

However  this  may  be,  we  may  agree  that  the  princi|3le  of  democracy 
requires  the  constitution  of  government,  and  the  general  line  of  its 
action  in  reference  to  the  common  interests  of  the  whole,  to  have  the 
active  consent  of  at  least  a  majority  of  the  citizens.  .  .  .  Hence,  strictly 
taken,   the  principle  excludes  any  fundamental  laws  which  it   requires 

1  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 
305 


3o6  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

more  than  a  bare  majority  to  alter;  if  such  laws  are  establisned  —  as  in 
most  modern  constitutions  —  the  application  of  the  principle  of  democ- 
racy must  be  conceived  to  be  limited  in  the  interest  of  stability.  And  it 
is  to  be  observed  that  this  limitation  may  conceivably  be  so  stringent  as 
practically  to  nullify  the  operation  of  the  principle :  i.e.  the  majority 
required  for  changing  the  laws  of  the  constitutional  code  may  be  so  large 
that  change  is  practically  precluded. 

But  further,  when  we  say  that  a  democratic  government  must  be 
supported  by  the  consent  of  at  least  a  majority  of  the  citizens,  we  do 
not  ordinarily  mean  that  this  consent  should  be  necessary  to  the  validity 
of  every  governmental  decision.  ...  At  any  rate  we  may  take  it  as 
most  commonly  admitted  that  the  democratic  principle  must  practically 
be  limited  by  confining  the  authoritative  decisions  of  the  people  at  large 
to  certain  matters  and  certain  periodically  recurring  times ;  and  com- 
mitting the  great  majority  of  governmental  decisions  to  bodies  or  indi- 
viduals who  must  have  the  power  ...  of  deciding  without  the  active 
consent  of  the  majority  and  even  against  its  wish. 

The  question  then  arises  on  what  principle,  in  a  democracy,  the  par- 
ticular persons  should  be  selected  to  whom  this  large  part  of  the  work 
of  government  which  cannot  advantageously  be  undertaken  by  the 
people  at  large  is  to  be  intrusted. 

280.  Development  of  the  electorate.  A  brief  statement  of  the 
evolution  of  popular  suffrage  follows  : 

In  primitive  horde  life  there  was  a  sort  of  rude  democracy.  Though 
control  was  practically  in  the  hands  of  the  elders,  yet  these  did  not  form  an 
hereditary  class.  Each  had  attained  the  honor  through  merit  or  the  wisdom 
of  age.  .  .  .  The  same  idea  holds  in  the  tribal  democracy  of  pastoral 
life.  A  nomadic,  warring  stage  of  existence  is  not  suited  to  hereditary 
aristocratic  government.  Power  goes  to  the  one  who  best  can  wield  it. 
In  patriarchal  agricultural  life  the  situation  was  somewhat  different. 
Class  distinctions  based  on  birth  and  wealth  had  developed.  Hence 
arose  a  leisure  class  trained  in  a  more  generous  environment  than  that 
of  the  common  man.  They  were  keener  and  more  intelligent,  and  were 
dominating  in  personality.  Power  naturally  belonged  to  them.  Yet  after 
all  they  were  in  close  touch  with  the  freemen  of  the  community.  All 
were  akin  and  trod  the  routine  of  life  together ;  hence  the  leaders  truly 
represented  the  ideas  and  interests  of  the  entire  community  as  well  as 
though  they  had  been  elected  representatives.  But  when  the  era  of 
commerce  began,  and  the  population  of  the  community  multiplied 
through  the  influx  of  aliens  and  merchants,  the  hereditary  heads  of  the 
community  would  not  adequately  represent  the  differing  interests  of  the 


THE  ELECTORATE 


307 


growing  city  or  city  state.  Hence  a  demand  for  representation,  not  of 
persons  as  in  modern  democracy,  but  of  interests  and  localities.  Such 
demands  and  their  satisfaction  are  illustrated  by  the  reform  legislation  of 
Solon  and  of  Servius  Tullius,  who  arranged  that  wealth  and  occupation 
should  have  a  share  in  governmental  power.  The  culmination  of  this 
movement  in  classic  times  is  best  known  through  the  struggle  of  the 
plebeians  against  the  patricians  in  Rome,  which  finally  resulted  in  the 
bestowal  on  every  citizen  of  a  voice,  however  slight,  in  the  affairs  of 
government.  This  voice  was  expressed  by  formal  vote  cast  on  stated  days. 
When  citizens,  as  such,  meet  in  a  formal  way,  and  at  a  set  time,  and 
in  a  definite  place  and  manner,  express  their  choice  by  vote  for  repre- 
sentatives or  for  governmental  measures,  they  form  in  effect  an  electorate^ 
which  term  may  be  defined  as  that  body  of  citizens  legally  authorized  to 
participate  in  the  exercise  of  some  of  the  sovereign  powers  of  the  state. 
Feudalism  and  medievalism  minimized  the  necessity  for  this  democratic 
device,  except  in  the  commercial  centers  of  Italy  and  Germany,  but 
with  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries  the  rising  tide  of  democracy 
once  again  brought  the  notion  of  an  electorate  to  the  front.  Its  philo- 
sophic expression  was  in  the  famous  social-contract  theory.  In  religion  it 
voiced  itself  in  the  teaching  that  before  God  all  men  are  equal  and 
responsible.  Its  economic  equivalent  was  voiced  by  Adam  Smith  in  free 
competition  and  laissez  faire. 

281.  The  Reform  Act  of  1832.  The  following  extract  contains 
the  preamble  and  one  of  the  most  important  clauses  of  the  famous 
act  that  extended  the  franchise  and  reformed  the  representation  in 
the  British  House  of  Commons. 

Whereas  it  is  expedient  to  take  effectual  measures  for  correcting 
divers  abuses  that  have  long  prevailed  in  the  choice  of  members  to  serve 
in  the  commons  house  of  parliament,  to  deprive  many  inconsiderable 
places  of  the  right  of  returning  members,  to  grant  such  j^rivilege  to 
large,  populous,  and  wealthy  towns,  to  increase  the  number  of  knights 
of  the  shire,  to  extend  the  elective  franchise  to  many  of  His  Majesty's 
subjects  who  have  not  heretofore  enjoyed  the  same,  and  to  diminish  the 
expense  of  elections :  Be  it  therefore  enacted  .  .  . 

XIX.  That  every  male  person  of  full  age,  and  not  subject  to  any 
legal  incapacity,  who  shall  be  seised  at  law  or  in  equity  of  any  land  or 
tenements  of  copyhold  or  any  other  tenure  whatever  except  freehold, 
for  his  own  life,  or  for  the  life  of  another,  or  for  any  lives  whatsoever, 
or  for  any  larger  estate,  of  the  clear  yearly  value  of  not  less  than 
xo£   over   and   above   all   rents   and   charges  payable  out   of   or   m 


3o8  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

respect  of  the  same,  shall  be  entitled  to  vote  in  the  election  of  a  knight 
or  knights  of  the  shire  to  serve  in  any  future  parliament. 

282.  Arguments  for  woman  suffrage.  In  an  address  by  George 
W.  Curtis,  delivered  before  the  New  York  constitutional  conven- 
tion of  1 867,  the  following  arguments  for  woman  suffrage  were  used :  1 

I  wish  to  know,  sir,  and  I  ask  in  the  name  of  the  political  justice  and 
consistency  of  this  State,  why  it  is  that  half  of  the  adult  population,  as 
vitally  interested  in  good  government  as  the  other  half,  who  own  prop- 
erty, manage  estates,  and  pay  taxes,  who  discharge  all  the  duties  of 
good  citizens  and  are  perfectly  intelligent  and  capable,  are  absolutely 
deprived  of  political  power,  and  classed  with  lunatics  and  felons.  .  .  . 

Or  shall  I  be  told  that  women,  if  not  numerically  counted  at  the  polls, 
do  yet  exert  an  immense  influence  upon  politics,  and  do  not  really  need 
the  ballot  ?  If  this  argument  were  seriously  urged,  I  should  suffer  my 
eyes  to  rove  through  this  chamber  and  they  would  show  the  many  honor- 
able genriemen  of  reputed  political  influence.  May  they,  therefore,  be 
properly  and  justly  disfranchised  ?  .  .   . 

There  is  nothing  more  incompatible  with  political  duties  in  cooking 
and  taking  care  of  children  than  there  is  in  digging  ditches  or  making 
shoes  or  in  any  other  necessary  employment.  .  .  . 

When  the  committee  declare  that  voting  is  at  war  with  the  distribution 
of  functions  between  the  sexes,  what  do  they  mean  ?  Are  not  women 
as  much  interested  in  good  government  as  men  ?  Has  the  mother  less 
at  stake  in  equal  laws  honestly  administered  than  the  father?  .  .  . 
Are  they  lacking  in  the  necessary  intelligence?  But  the  moment  that 
you  erect  a  standard  of  intelligence  which  is  sufficient  to  exclude  women 
as  a  sex,  that  moment  most  of  their  amiable  fellow  citizens  in  trousers 
would  be  disfranchised.  .  .  . 

But  if  people  with  a  high  and  holy  mission  may  innocently  sit  bare- 
necked in  hot  theaters  to  be  studied  through  pocket  telescopes  until 
midnight  by  any  one  who  chooses,  how  can  their  high  and  holy  mission 
be  harmed  by  their  quietly  dropping  a  ballot  in  a  box  ? 

283.  Acquirement  and  loss  of  citizenship  in  the  United  States. 

The  methods  by  which  American  citizenship  may  be  secured  are 
as  follows  : 

Membership  in  the  community  is  acquired  either  by  birth,  by  naturali- 
zation, or  by  annexation.  In  the  practice  of  modern  nations,  one  of  two 
rules  is  usually  followed :  by  the  jus  sanguinis,  the  children  of  citizens 

1  Copyright,  1893,  by  Harper  &  Brothers. 


THE  ELECTORATE 


309 


born  abroad  arc  thereby  born  citizens  of  the  home  country  ;  b)-  tlie  jus 
soli,  all  persons  born  within  a  country  are  citizens,  no  matter  what  the 
nationality  of  the  parents. 

(i)  While  we  adhere  in  general  to  the  English  doctrine  of  i\\Q  Jus  so/i 
for  the  children  of  aliens  born  in  the  United  States,  we  claim  for  the 
children  of  Americans  born  abroad  the  Jus  sanguinis.  .  .  . 

(2)  .The  doubtful  cases  of  citizenship  almost  all  come  from  naturaliza- 
tion, which  is  the  process  of  transferring  personal  allegiance  and  political 
membership  from  one  nation  to  another.  .  .  .  The  federal  constitution 
of  1787  gave  to  the  federal  government  the  sole  right  to  fix  conditions 
of  naturalization,  and  successive  statutes  have  laid  down  the  method  and 
terms  of  citizenship.   .   .  . 

Naturalization  is  not  the  right  of  all  races :  no  alien  Mongolian, 
especially  no  Chinese,  can  be  naturalized  in  the  United  States ;  and  no 
member  of  our  own  Indian  tribes  can  get  citizenship  by  naturalization, 
though  he  may  by  leaving  the  tribe.  .  .  . 

A  curious  class  called  "  heimathlosen,"  or  "  homeless  ones,"  have  lost  the 
citizenship  of  one  country  without  acquiring  that  of  another  :  thus  the  (k-r- 
man  who  has  lived  in  the  United  States  five  years  without  being  naturalized 
loses  his  German  citizenship,  yet  does  not  become  an  American.  ... 

(3)  The  third  method  by  which  citizenship  may  be  acquired  is  the 
annexation  of  the  country  in  which  the  foreigner  resides :  thus,  when 
Louisiana  and  Florida  came  into  the  Union,  it  was  provided  by  treaty 
that  the  inhabitants  of  the  territory  should  be  admitted  as  soon  as  possi- 
ble to  all  the  rights  and  advantages  and  immunities  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States.   .   .   . 

In  some  foreign  countries  there  is  a  system  called  the  civil  death,  by 
which  a  person  convicted  of  a  serious  crime  loses  his  citizenship  and  thus 
can  no  longer  hold  property  or  act  as  a  member  of  the  community ;  and 
many  foreign  countries  banish  their  own  citizens.  Absolute  loss  of 
citizenship  as  a  penalty  for  crime  does  not  prevail  anywhere  in  the 
United  States,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  any  state  can  legally  expel  one 
of  its  citizens. 

284.  Results  of  the  restrictions  on  negro  suffrage  in  the  South. 
The  results  of  the  disfranchisement  of  the  negro  in  the  southern 
commonwealths  of  the  United  States  are  thus  stated  h\-  1 1  art  : 

In  the  first  place,  the  recent  statutes  and  constitutional  amendments 
are  not  perfectly  sincere,  their  end  is  clouded  and  concealed  for  the  sim- 
ple reason  that  to  avow  their  purpo.se  would  bring  them  into  collision 
with  the  Fifteenth  Amendment,  and  might  cause  a  diminution  of  the 
number  of  representatives  in  Congress  under  the  Fourteenth  Amendment. 


3IO  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

In  the  second  place,  this  entire  exclusion  of  a  large  number  of  negroes 
together  with  a  small  number  of  whites,  leaves  a  proletariat  of  people 
who  have  no  direct  way  of  relieving  their  discontent.  The  main  argu- 
ment for  universal  suffrage  is  that  everybody  has  his  "  day  in  court,"  his 
opportunity  to  express  his  opinion  by  his  ballot.  The  Southern  method 
is  the  reversal  of  a  process  which  has  been  going  on  for  a  century  in  the 
American  commonwealths. 

In  the  third  place,  it  is  an  attempt  to  set  up  a  privileged  class.  The 
"  grandfather  clause  "  creates  an  hereditary  right  to  vote,  which  exists 
nowhere  else  in  the  United  States.  If  the  restrictions  were  administered 
in  good  faith  all  but  this  discrimination  would  disappear,  for  both  negroes 
and  whites  would  find  their  way  into  the  electorate  through  education ; 
but  it  is  not  the  intention  of  the  South  to  permit  any  considerable  num- 
ber of  negro  voters  at  any  time  in  the  future.  The  basis  of  the  suffrage 
in  the  South  is,  "  This  is  a  white  man's  government." 

In  the  next  place  the  precedent  of  restricting  the  effective  suffrage  to 
the  whites  is  very  likely  to  develop  into  a  restriction  to  Anglo-Saxons. 
The  South  needs  foreign  laborers,  who  would  go  far  toward  settling  the 
labor  troubles  of  that  section.  Is  it  likely  that  a  community  which  admits 
only  a  few  of  the  most  intelligent  negroes  to  the  suffrage  will  open  it  to 
foreigners  as  ignorant  as  the  poor  whites  ?  If  the  Italians  are  allowed  to 
vote,  eventually  they  will  control  whole  communities ;  if  they  are  not 
allowed  to  vote,  they  will  go  elsewhere. 

285.  An  educational  test.  An  article  added  to  the  constitution 
of  Connecticut,  October,  1897,  provides  the  following  educational 
test  for  voters. 

Article  XXIX 

Every  person  shall  be  able  to  read  in  the  English  language  any  article 
of  the  Constitution  or  any  section  of  the  Statutes  of  this  State  before 
being  admitted  an  elector. 

286.  Restriction  on  the  suffrage  of  military  forces.  An  organic 
law  on  the  election  of  deputies  in  France  excludes  from  the  suf- 
frage soldiers  and  sailors  in  active  service. 

Art.  2.  The  soldiers  of  all  ranks  and  grades,  of  both  land  and  naval 
forces,  shall  not  vote  when  they  are  with  their  regiment,  at  their  post,  or 
on  duty.  Those  who,  on  election  day,  are  in  private  residence,  in  non- 
activity  or  in  possession  of  a  regular  leave  of  absence,  may  vote  in  the 
commune  on  the  lists  of  which  they  are  duly  registered. 


THE  ELECTORATE  311 

287.  The  exercise  of  the  suffrage.  Numerous  reasons  for  failure 
to  exercise  the  right  of  suffrage  are  given  by  Hart. 

,  .  .  these  are  the  stay-at-homes,  and  they  are  about  one  sixth  of  all 
the  voters.   .  .  . 

Yet  the  absence  of  one  sixth  is  a  serious  evil  if  it  can  be  avoided  : 
there  are  many  reasons  for  it.  .  .  .  Old  men  have  a  proverbial  dislike 
of  showers,  cold  air,  confusion,  and  fatigue.  .  .  .  Next  comes  the  army 
of  sick.  .  .  .  Another  very  large  body  is  made  up  of  those  away  from 
home  on  election  day.  A  chapter  of  pure  accidents  accounts  for  about 
one  per  cent.  more.  ...  At  least  one  man  in  a  hundred  who  means  in 
the  morning  to  vote  finds  that  the  polls  have  closed  without  his  vote.  .  .  . 

An  appreciable  number  of  votes  is  lost  through  technical  objections 
to  their  reception.  .  .   . 

Bad  weather  keeps  many  thousands  of  voters  at  home.  .  .  . 

Another  group  is  made  up  of  those  who  will  not  mix  in  "  dirty 
politics  "  ;  who  think  all  parties  "  packs  of  scoundrels,"  and  who  wish 
to  be  left  to  their  comfortable  private  life.  .  .  . 

Much  larger  numbers  neglect  to  vote  because  they  know  their  party 
to  be  in  a  hopeless  minority,  and  that  their  votes  can  make  no  possible 
difference.  .  .  . 

One  large  class  of  abstainers  ...  is  the  men  who  are  public-spirited 
and  who  know  that  they  ought  to  vote,  but  who  are  too  busy,  and  who 
think  that  their  duty  will  be  performed  by  some  one  else.  .  .  . 

Next  comes  the  class,  unhappily  too  large,  of  those  who  neither  know 
nor  care  anything  about  the  election,  the  candidates,  or  the  result,  but 
who  do  care  to  sell  their  votes.  .  .  . 

This  brings  us  to  the  last  and  most  important  class  of  absentees, 
those  who  deliberately  withhold  their  votes  because  thc\'  think  that  they 
can  exert  more  influence  on  public  affairs  in  that  way  than  by  casting 
them. 

288.  The  injustice  of  equal  voting.  The  following  represents 
the  point  of  view  that  considers  democracy  unnatural  and  unwise  : 

A  primary  lesson  of  physical  science  is  the  fact  of  the  natural  in- 
equality of  men,  of  races,  of  nations.  A  primary  principle  of  political 
science  is  the  inequality  of  right  resulting  from  this  fact.  If  men  are 
unequal  physically,  morally,  intellectually,  most  clearly  they  should  not 
be  equal  in  the  body  politic.  Mill  was  assuredly  well  founded  when  he 
wrote,  "  Equal  voting  is  in  principle  wrong  "  *  —  well  founded,  indeed,  in 
a  deeper  sense  than  the  words  bore  for  him.     By  "  wrong "'  he  meant 

1  "Considerations  on  Representative  Governmoni."  p.  i-;,. 


312  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

merely  inexpedient.  Sovereignly  inexpedient  equal  voting  certainly  is. 
But  that  is  not  the  only  or  the  chief  reason  why  it  is  wrong.  It  is  wrong 
because  it  is  contrary  to  the  nature  of  things,  which  is  ethical ;  because 
it  is  unjust.  It  is  unjust  to  the  classes,  for  it  infringes  their  right  as  to 
persons  to  count  in  the  community  for  what  they  are  really  worth ;  it  is 
"  tyrannously  repressive  of  the  better  sort."  It  is  unjust  to  the  masses, 
for  it  infringes  their  right  to  the  guidance  of  men  of  light  and  leading, 
and  subjects  them  to  a  base  oligarchy  of  vile  political  adventurers.  It  is 
unjust  to  the  State  which  it  derationalizes,  making  it  — to  borrow  cer- 
tain pregnant  words  of  Green  — "not  the  passionless  expression  of 
general  right,  but  the  engine  of  individual  caprice,  under  alternate  fits  of 
appetite  and  fear."  ^  Professor  von  Sybel  is  absolutely  well  warranted 
when  he  tells  us,  in  his  History  of  the  Revolutionary  Period,  that  the 
Rousseauan  theory,  which  is,  so  to  speak,  incarnate  in  False  Democracy, 
"  raises  to  the  throne,  not  the  reason  which  is  common  to  all  men,  but 
the  aggregate  of  universal  passions." 
t 

n.    Control  of  Electorate  over  Government 
289.  The  electorate  as  a  governmental  organ.    Dealey  empha- 
sizes the  fact  that,  in  modern  democracies,  the  electorate  is  a 
regular  and  important  organ  of  government. 

It  is  important  to  note  that  wherever  an  electorate  exists  it  becomes 
ipso  facto  as  truly  a  part  of  the  government  as  any  other  department 
exercising  political  powers.  The  powers  which  an  electorate  may  exert 
vary  considerably  in  extent  in  different  states,  but  the  tendency  in 
democracies  is  to  bestow  increasingly  larger  powers,  as  citizens  attain 
greater  intelligence  and  political  capacity.  The  powers  usually  assigned 
are  executive.  That  is,  the  electorate  may  be  authorized  to  appoint  can- 
didates to  certain  designated  offices  through  forms  of  election.  These 
offices  may  be  (i)  executive  or  administrative,  as  in  the  election  of  a 
president,  a  governor,  a  mayor  or  the  head  of  an  administrative  depart- 
ment; or  (2)  judicial,  as  in  the  case  of  judges  elected  by  popular  vote, 
the  prevailing  system  in  the  commonwealths  of  the  United  States  of 
America ;  or  (3)  legislative,  as  in  the  election  of  delegates  to  lawmaking 
bodies.  Occasionally  the  electorate  is  authorized  to  aid  directly  in  legis- 
lation through  the  initiative  and  the  referendum.  At  times,  also,  the 
electorate  secures  the  right  to  assist,  through  delegates  chosen  by  lot,  in 
judicial  decisions  by  the  performance  of  jury  service.  These  are  direct 
powers  and  are  important  in  proportion  to  their  extent.    If,  e.g.,  an 

1"  Works,"  Vol.  Ill,  p.  282. 


THE  ELECTORATE  313 

electorate  should  directly  appoint  by  election  all  important  officers  of  the 
three  historic  departments  of  government,  and  should  have  a  deciding 
voice  in  the  formulation  of  the  constitution,  its  power  would  be  enor- 
mous. If,  also,  the  electorate  were  composed  of  all  adults  in  the  nation, 
the  people  might  well  be  said  to  be  exercising  full  sovereign  p(jwcrs. 

290.  Evolution  of  elections.  Jenks  gives  the  following  interest- 
ing surmise  concerning  the  origin  of  election  methods  :^ 

We  cannot  suppose  that,  in  its  origin  as  we  have  seen  it,  political 
represetifafion  found  any  urgent  necessity  for  contested  elections.  .  .  . 
Apparently,  at  first,  the  royal  officials  laid  hold  of  those  whom  they  con- 
sidered to  be  suitable  persons,  and  packed  them  off  to  Parliament.  .  .  . 

But,  as  it  began  gradually  to  dawn  upon  people's  minds  that,  in  some 
countries  at  least.  Parliament  was  a  very  powerful  institution,  and 
membership  thereof  a  thing  to  be  coveted,  contested  elections  began  to 
make  their  appearance.  .  .  .  The  old  idea  of  the  unwilling  hostage  had 
died  out.  The  new  idea  of  agency,  introduced,  perhaps,  from  the  Roman 
Law  by  means  of  the  Church,  was  offering  a  more  satisfactory  explana- 
tion of  the  position  of  the  parliamentary  representative.  He  was  the 
ageiit  of  his  constituency,  therefore  his  constituents  had  a  right  to  choose 
him.  .  .  . 

Most  people,  probably,  have  noticed  that  the  language  of  elections 
is  somewhat  bloodthirsty.  We  speak  of  the  "party  war-chest,"  the 
"election  campaign,"  the  "enemy's  stronghold,"  "laying  siege  to  a 
constituency,"  "  leading  troops  to  victory,"  "  carr)^ing  the  war  into  an 
opponent's  territory,"  and  so  on.  Much  of  this  is,  no  doubt,  the  decora- 
tive language  of  the  New  Journalism  ;  but  it  is  interesting  to  find  that 
the  further  back  we  go  in  history,  the  more  nearly  does  it  tally  with  the 
actual  facts.  .  .  .  The  contested  election  was  no  exception.  The  vic- 
torious party  routed  its  opponents,  drove  them  from  the  hustings,  and 
carried  their  man.   .   .   . 

But  fighting,  though  it  has  its  charms,  has  also  its  drawbacks,  espe- 
cially when  a  royal  official  is  standing  by,  who  may  inflict  fines  for  breach 
of  the  peace.  And  so  it  would  appear  that  a  fiction  was  gradually 
adopted,  by  which  it  was  assumed  that  there  had  been  a  fight,  and  that 
one  party  had  gained  the  victory. 

But  which  party?  Well,  other  things  being  equal  in  any  fight  the 
more  niifnerous  party  will  win.  And  so  it  seems  to  have  gradually  be- 
come the  custom,  where  party  feeling  was  not  very  strong,  to  settle  the 
matter  by  counting  heads  instead  of  breaking  them.  Much  of  the 
1  Copyright,  1900,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


314 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


machinery  of  voting  recalls  its  origin.  The  first  test  is  a  shout.  If  one 
party  greatly  preponderates,  its  shouts  will  drown  the  other's,  and  there 
will  be  no  need  to  go  further.  But  the  shout  is  the  old  battle  cry.  If 
there  is  still  doubt,  the  next  step  is  Divide,  i.e.,  draw  up  in  battle  array.  .  .  . 
Thus  we  see  what  a  rough  test  the  verdict  of  the  majority  is.  It  is 
not  based,  historically,  on  any  ethical  considerations.  It  makes  no  allow- 
ance for  difference  of  merit  in  the  combatants,  or  for  generalship,  both  of 
which  tell  in  real  warfare.  But  it  is  a  very  simple  and  enormously  useful 
practical  way  of  settling  disputes,  and  it  has  had  a  world-wide  success. 

291.  Elections  under  the  Roman  Republic.  The  methods  used 
by  candidates  in  the  Roman  Republic  are  thus  stated  by  Pliny  : 

...  I  have  been  told  by  some  who  remember  those  times  that  the 
method  observed  in  their  assemblies  was  this  :  the  name  of  the  individual 
who  offered  himself  for  any  office  being  called  out,  a  profound  silence 
ensued,  when,  after  he  had  spoken  for  himself,  and  given  an  account  to 
the  senate  of  his  life  and  behavior  generally,  he  called  witnesses  in  sup- 
port of  his  character.  These  were  either  the  person  under  whom  he  had 
served  in  the  army,  or  to  whom  he  had  been  quaestor,  or  both  (if  the  case 
admitted  of  it),  to  whom  he  also  joined  some  of  those  friends  who 
espoused  his  interest.  They  said  what  they  had  to  say  in  his  favor,  in 
few  but  impressive  words ;  and  this  had  far  more  influence  than  the 
modern  method  of  humble  solicitation.  Sometimes  the  candidate  would 
object  either  to  the  birth,  or  age,  or  character  of  his  competitor;  to 
which  the  senate  would  listen  with  a  severe  and  impartial  attention  :  and 
thus  merit  was  generally  preferred  to  interest. 

292.  The  Ballot  Act.  In  1872  the  British  Parliament  passed 
the  following  act  for  a  secret  ballot  at  parliamentary  and  municipal 
elections  : 

2.  In  the  case  of  a  poll  at  an  election  the  votes  shall  be  given  by 
ballot.  The  ballot  of  each  voter  shall  consist  of  a  paper  .  .  .  showing 
the  names  and  description  of  the  candidates.  Each  ballot  paper  shall 
have  a  number  printed  on  the  back,  and  shall  have  attached  a  counter- 
foil with  the  same  number  printed  on  the  face.  At  the  time  of  voting, 
the  ballot  paper  shall  be  marked  on  both  sides  with  an  official  mark,  and 
delivered  to  the  voter  within  the  polling  station,  and  the  number  of  such 
voter  on  the  register  of  voters  shall  be  marked  on  the  counterfoil,  and 
the  voter  having  secretly  marked  his  vote  on  the  paper,  and  folded  it  up 
so  as  to  conceal  his  vote,  shall  place  it  in  a  closed  box  in  the  presence  of 
the  officer  presiding  at  the  polling  station.  .  .  . 


THE  ELECTORATE 


315 


After  the  close  of  the  poll  the  ballot  boxes  shall  be  sealed  up,  so  as  to 
prevent  the  introduction  of  additional  ballot  papers,  and  shall  be  taken 
charge  of  by  the  returning  officer,  and  that  officer  shall,  in  the  presence 
of  such  agent,  if  any,  of  the  candidates  as  may  be  in  attendance,  open 
the  ballot  boxes,  and  ascertain  the  result  of  the  poll  by  counting  the 
votes  given  to  each  candidate,  and  shall  forthwith  declare  to  be  elected  the 
candidates  or  candidate  to  whom  the  majority  of  votes  have  been  given. 

293.  Methods  of  influencing  voters  in  the  United  States.  Some 
of  the  devices  used  in  America  to  swell  the  party  vote  are  as 
follows  : 

(i)  The  most  ordinary  influence  on  voters  is  simple  persuasion.  In 
some  parts  of  the  country,  especially  in  the  South,  there  is  joint  discus- 
sion of  public  issues,  listened  to  by  both  sides.  In  the  Northern  states, 
political  meetings  are  usually  attended  only  by  members  of  the  party 
that  holds  them.  .  .  . 

(2)  The  newspaper  is  of  course  of  great  influence  over  voters.  .  .  . 
But,  again,  most  Americans  read  only  the  newspapers  of  their  own  party, 
and  hear  very  little  of  the  argument  of  the  other  side.  .  .  . 

(3)  Another  method  of  influencing  voters  is  by  intimidation,  —  some- 
times nothing  more  than  the  disapproval  of  a  man  who  votes  unlike  his 
neighbors,  sometimes  fierce  and  cruel  personal  abuse,  sometimes  threat 
of  dismissal  from  employment.  .  .  . 

(4)  Farther  down  still  is  the  brutal  violence  at  the  polls,  of  which  there 
have  been  many  examples  in  American  history.  .  .  . 

(5)  Another  too  frequent  method  is  the  corruption  of  voters.  .  .  . 
The  most  subtle  form  of  bribery  is  to  pay  a  man  on  election  day  for 
peddling  tickets,  for  getting  out  the  voters,  or  for  reporting  the  vote. 
Another  form  is  the  purchase  of  "  political  movements " ;  tcmpt)rar>- 
third  parties  are  set  up  for  the  express  purpose  of  being  bought  off  in  a 
block.    Another  method  is  to  hire  men  to  stay  away  from  the  polls.  .  .  . 

(6)  Perhaps  the  baldest  form  is  to  pay  money  outright  for  votes  ;  can- 
didates for  offices  are  often  assessed  thousands  of  dollars  for  campaign 
fund3;  and  cases  have  been  known  where  they  have  gone  from  polling 
place  to  polling  place,  actually  giving  out  rolls  of  bills  to  be  distributed 
among  the  voters. 

294.  Comparison  between  Greek  and  Swiss  democracy.  The 
difference  between  Greek  and  Swiss  methods  of  securing  popular 
control  of  government  is  thus  stated  by  Lowell  :  ^ 

1  V,y  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 


3i6  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

When  the  Greek  spoke  of  democracy,  he  had  in  his  mind  the  conduct  of 
the  administration.  He  meant  the  control  by  the  mass  of  citizens  of  the 
question  of  peace  and  war,  of  the  relations  with  the  allies  and  the  colo- 
nies, of  the  finances,  the  army,  and  the  fleet.  In  Athens  at  the  time  of 
Demosthenes  all  these  things  had  been  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  assem- 
bly of  the  people,  which  managed  them  as  far  as  possible  directly,  or  by 
means  of  committees  chosen  for  short  periods  by  lot.  But  the  same 
methods  were  not  applied  to  legislation.  To  the  Greek  mind  the  laws 
were  normally  permanent  and  unchangeable.  ...  In  Athens,  therefore, 
the  administration  was  conducted  directly  by  the  people,  but  the  power 
of  legislation  was  far  less  under  their  control.  Now  in  Switzerland  pre- 
cisely the  reverse  is  true.  It  is  hard  to  conceive  how  the  control  of  legis- 
lation by  the  people  could  be  rendered  more  absolute  than  it  is  made  by 
the  referendum  and  the  initiative ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  executive 
of  the  Confederation  is  removed  as  far  from  popular  influence  as  is 
possible  in  a  community  where  every  public  authority  is  ultimately  based 
on  universal  suffrage.  The  federal  councilors  virtually  hold  office  for  life, 
and  they  are  chosen,  not  by  the  people,  but  by  the  Assembly,  whose 
members  enjoy  in  their  turn  a  singularly  stable  tenure. 

295.  Representative  government.  The  necessity  of  representa- 
tion in  modern  large-sized  democracies  may  be  stated  as  follows  : 

Another  vital  question  is.  Through  what  medium  shall  the  popular 
will  be  expressed  ?  A  direct  democracy  in  which  all  the  participants  may 
meet  together  is  the  simplest,  and  comes  nearest  the  exercise  of  popular 
sovereignty.  Such  direct  governments  are  possible  only  in  small  com- 
munities. In  the  canton  of  Appenzell,  for  instance,  on  election  day  ten 
thousand  men  assemble,  each  girt  with  a  sword,  and  vote  for  their  offi- 
cers viva  voce.  The  New  England  town  meetings  in  colonial  times  and 
in  the  country  towns  to-day  are  the  best  examples  of  such  a  direct 
democracy. 

No  such  government  can  possibly  work  in  a  large  community,  and  the 
method  of  representation  has  been  devised  to  permit  the  expression  of 
the  popular  will.  Representation  by  voting  delegates  was  unknown  in 
the  ancient  world.  In  the  Middle  Ages  the  imperial  free  cities  sent  dele- 
gates to  the  Reichstag ;  but  they  were  instructed  ambassadors,  saying 
what  was  put  into  their  mouths  by  their  principals  at  home.  Perhaps  the 
first  germs  of  the  true  representative  system,  in  which  delegates  once 
chosen  act  upon  their  own  judgment,  are  to  be  found  in  the  thirteenth 
century  in  the  introduction  of  county  and  then  of  city  members  into  the 
English  Parliament.     Even  then,  for  a  long  time,  the  intention  was  to 


I 


THE  ELECTORATE 


317 


represent  interests  —  landholders,  the  trading  classes,  and  sf)  on  — 
rather  than  individuals.  Only  in  the  nineteenth  century  has  the  principle 
of  representation  been  pushed  to  its  farthest  logical  extent,  —  namely, 
that  every  aggregation  of  a  thousand  people  is  entitled  to  the  same 
representation  as  every  other  thousand  people,  in  local,  state,  and 
national  legislatures. 

296.  The  recall.  The  recent  Iowa  law  authorizing  commission 
government  in  cities  makes  the  following  provision  for  the  removal 
of  elective  officials  : 

The  holder  of  any  elective  office  may  be  removed  at  any  time  by  the 
electors  qualified  to  vote  for  a  successor  of  such  incumbent.  The  proce- 
dure to  effect  the  removal  of  an  incumbent  of  an  elective  office  shall  be  as 
follows :  A  petition  signed  by  electors  .  .  .  equal  in  number  to  at  least 
twenty-five  per  centum  of  the  entire  vote  .  .  .  shall  be  filed  with  the  city 
clerk,  which  petition  shall  contain  a  general  statement  of  the  grounds  for 
which  the  removal  is  sought.  ...  If  the  petition  shall  be  found  to  be  suffi- 
cient, the  council  shall  order  and  fix  a  date  for  holding  the  said  election,  not 
less  than  thirty  days  or  more  than  forty  days  from  the  date  of  the  clerk's 
certificate  to  the  council  that  a  sufficient  petition  is  filed.  .  .  .  Any  jjcr- 
son  sought  to  be  removed  may  be  a  candidate  to  succeed  himself,  and 
unless  he  requests  otherwise  in  writing,  the  clerk  shall  place  his  name  on 
the  official  ballot  without  nomination.  In  any  such  removal  election,  the 
candidate  receiving  the  highest  number  of  votes  shall  be  declared  elected. 
At  such  election  if  some  other  person  than  the  incumbent  receives  the 
highest  number  of  votes,  the  incumbent  shall  thereupon  be  deemed 
removed  from  the  office  upon  qualification  of  his  successor.  ...  If  the 
incumbent  receives  the  highest  number  of  votes,  he  shall  continue  in  ofiice. 

III.    Initiative  and  Referendum 

297.  The  origin  of  the  referendum  in  Switzerland.  Lowell  ex- 
plains as  follows  the  conditions  under  whicli  the  referendum 
developed  in  Switzerland  :  ^ 

It  is  curious  that  in  Switzerland,  almost  alone  among  the  countries 
north  of  the  Alps,  representative  government  did  not  arise  sjwntane- 
ously.  In  some  other  places  the  elected  assemblies  were  smothered  he- 
fore  they  attained  great  strength,  but  in  Switzeriand  they  never  devel- 
oped at  all.  The  fact  is  that  owing  to  the  absence  of  royal  power,  which 
1  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 


3i8  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

was  the  great  unifying  force  during  the  Middle  Ages,  the  country  did 
not  become  sufficiently  consolidated  to  have  a  central  legislature,  and  no 
one  of  the  separate  communities  that  made  up  the  Confederation  was 
large  enough  by  itself  to  need  a  representative  system.  .  .  .  Under 
these  conditions  there  was  no  place  for  a  true  representative  body  either 
in  the  Confederation  or  the  cantons,  and  the  ancient  referendum  grew 
up  in  its  stead. 

The  Confederation  being  a  mere  league  of  independent  states,  the 
delegates  to  its  diet  acted  like  ambassadors,  in  strict  accordance  with  the 
instructions  of  their  home  governments ;  and,  what  is  more,  they  were 
never  given  power  to  agree  to  a  final  settlement  of  matters  of  impor- 
tance, but  were  simply  directed  to  hear  what  was  proposed  and  report. 
They  were  said  to  be  commissioned  ad  aiidiauiiim  et  referendtim.  .  .  . 

The  modern  institution  is  quite  different  in  its  form  and  in  its  effects, 
and  is  based  upon  abstract  theories  of  popular  rights,  derived  mainly 
from  the  teachings  of  Rousseau.  This  writer  had  a  strong  aversion  to 
representative  government,  and  remarked  in  his  celebrated  "  Contrat 
Social,"  that  the  English  with  all  their  boasted  liberty  were  not  really 
free,  because  they  enjoyed  their  liberty  only  at  the  moment  of  choosing 
a  parliament,  and  were  absolutely  under  its  rule  until  the  next  election. 
He  declared  that  in  order  to  realize  true  liberty  the  laws  ought  to  be 
enacted  directly  by  the  people  themselves,  although  he  saw  no  method 
by  which  this  could  be  done  in  a  state  that  was  too  large  to  permit  of  a 
mass  meeting  of  all  the  citizens.  Rousseau's  ideas  of  popular  rights 
sank  deep  into  the  minds  of  his  countrymen ;  and  when  the  Swiss,  who 
as  a  rule  is  extremely  practical  in  politics,  becomes  fairly  enamored  of  an 
abstract  theory,  he  clings  to  it  with  a  tenacity  worthy  of  a  martyr.  .  .  . 

The  advocates  of  the  referendum  were  prompted  by  a  belief  that  it 
was  an  essential  part  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  rather  than  by  a 
conviction  of  its  utility,  and  in  many  of  the  debates  on  the  subject  its 
introduction  was  urged  to  a  great  extent  on  theoretical  principles  of 
abstract  right,  although  usually  opposed  on  purely  practical  grounds, 
the  debates  resembling  those  one  commonly  hears  on  the  question  of 
woman's  suffrage.  A  study  of  the  period  points,  however,  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  ultimate  basis  of  the  demand  for  the  referendum,  the 
real  foundation  of  the  belief  in  the  right  of  the  people  to  take  a  direct 
part  in  legislation,  lay  in  the  defective  condition  of  the  representative 
system. 

298.  Extension  of  the  principles  of  initiative  and  referendum. 

During  the  past  century,  especially  among  Anglo-Saxon  peoples, 
the  use  of  some  form  of  popular  legislation  has  become  widespread. 


THE  ELECTORATE  319 

Within  a  few  years  past  the  Swiss  institutions,  the  initiative  and  refer- 
endum, have  been  studied  in  many  lands  by  many  men  who  have  had 
many  different  interests  to  serve.  Wherever  in  Europe,  west  of  the  Ger- 
man Empire,  representative  government  has  already  established  itself  on 
substantial  foundations  the  next  step  seems  to  be  the  referendum  or  plebis- 
cite, advocated  either  as  a  corrective  of  evils  which  have  developed  in 
the  representative  system  or  as  a  means  of  helping  some  agitator  gain 
his  ends.  In  France  a  revolutionary  group  has  for  years  urged  a  plebis- 
cite on  the  republican  constitution  in  the  hope  that  the  people  would  vote 
against  it  and  the  way  would  then  be  opened  for  another  form  of  gov- 
ernment. The  name  plebiscite  in  French  and  Italian  history  is  at  once 
suggestive  of  the  plebiscites  of  the  Napoleons,  and  of  Victor  Emmanuel 
during  the  reconstruction  days  in  Italy.  ...  In  Belgium,  when  the 
constitution  of  that  kingdom  was  recently  revised,  the  subject  of  the 
referendum  was  generally  discussed  throughout  the  country.  .  .  . 

In  England  the  subject  has  received  not  a  little  attention.  .  .  .  The 
leaders  of  the  Socialist  and  Labor  party  in  England  have  expressed  an 
interest  in  the  referendum  also.  In  a  recent  parliamentary  campaign  the 
Liberal  party  put  forward  as  one  of  its  issues  a  "  Local  Veto  "  bill  which, 
had  it  been  passed,  would  have  introduced  into  England  the  principle  of 
allowing  the  people  to  vote  in  local  districts  on  the  question  of  prohibit- 
ing the  liquor  trade,  in  very  much  the  same  manner  as  in  the  American 
States.  ...  In  Canada  .  .  .  there  is  a  large  fund  of  material  for  a 
scientific  treatise  on  the  referendum.  ...  In  the  Anglo-Saxon  commu- 
nities in  Australia  and  New  Zealand  the  referendum  has  already  gained 
considerable  headway  and  it  seems  likely  to  enjoy  a  much  greater  de- 
velopment within  the  next  few  years.  .  .  . 

In  our  own  Republic  the  reform  has  recently  been  given  a  great  im- 
petus by  reason  of  the  admiration  which  has  been  expressed  for  Swit- 
zerland's example.  This  result  has  been  induced  in  some  degree  by  a 
study  of  the  subject  by  a  large  number  of  competent  writers  on  consti- 
tutional questions,  but  it  has  been  chiefly  encouraged  by  a  popular 
political  movement  in  the  West  of  far-reaching  proportions. 

299.  Initiative  and  referendum  in  the  United  States.  The  vari- 
ous steps  in  the  extension  of  popular  legislation  in  the  United 
States  are  thus  given  by  Beard  :  ^ 

The  participation  of  the  people  in  the  making  of  constitutional  law  is 
not  only  on  the  increase,  but  there  is  also  a  decided  tendency  to  extend 
the  power  of  the  voters  to  ordinary  legislation  as  well.  .  .  . 
1  Copyright,  19 10,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


320  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

As  we  have  seen,  the  practice  of  even  submitting  constitutions  to 
popular  ratification  was  not  one  of  the  original  devices  of  our  constitu- 
tional system,  only  three  of  the  eighteenth-century  constitutions  being 
submitted  to  the  electorate  for  approval  or  rejection.  Slowly,  however, 
the  idea  came  to  be  accepted  that  voters,  in  a  final  analysis,  had  the  right 
to  pass  upon  their  own  fundamental  laws.  .  .  . 

The  doctrine  of  popular  referendum  was  also  early  extended  to  sev- 
eral important  matters  besides  constitutions  and  amendments.  .  .  . 

It  was  not  such  a  long  step,  therefore,  from  these  and  similar  prac- 
tices, to  the  adoption  of  a  complete  system  of  initiative  and  referendum, 
whereby  the  voters  may  initiate  any  measure  or  require  the  referendum 
on  any  legislative  act.  Many  causes  are  responsible  for  this  extension 
of  older  practices.  In  some  instances,  legislators  were  only  too  glad  to 
shirk  their  responsibilities  by  leaving  certain  questions  to  the  decision 
of  popular  vote.  The  practice  of  enlarging  the  state  constitutions  so  as 
to  include  provisions  of  a  temporary  and  statutory,  rather  than  a  funda- 
mental, character  led  to  the  breaking  down  of  the  old  distinction  between 
the  solemn  formulation  of  constitutional  law  and  the  enactment  of  mere 
statutes.  Perhaps  the  most  important  reason,  however,  was  a  distrust  in 
the  legislature  —  a  distrust  that  filled  our  state  constitutions  with  long 
and  detailed  limitations  on  the  powers  of  legislatures  and  finally  ended, 
in  several  states,  in  the  assumption  of  ultimate  legislative  authority  by 
the  voters.  It  was  under  these  circumstances  that  the  initiative  and 
referendum  were  adopted  as  remedies  for  our  legislative  evils.  .  .  . 

The  system  of  initiative  and  referendum  is  being  extended  to  local  as 
well  as  to  state-wide  matters.  .  .  .  The  advocates  of  this  new  form  of 
government  have  carried  their  agitation  to  Washington,  as  well  as  to  the 
capital  of  nearly  every  state  in  the  Union,  and  in  1907  it  was  stated  on 
good  authority  that  no  less  than  1 1  o  members  of  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives were  at  that  time  pledged  to  vote  for  the  adoption  of  the 
referendum  for  acts  of  Congress  or  bills  passed  by  either  house,  and  for 
the  establishment  of  the  initiative  for  certain  topics,  including  popular 
election  of  United  States  Senators,  parcels  post,  immigration,  and  the 
regulation  of  interstate  commerce. 

300.  Arguments  for  the  referendum.  The  following  catechism 
sums  up  the  leading  arguments  in  favor  of  the  popular  referendum  : 

Q.  Is  the  Referendum  un-American  ? 

A.  The  Referendum  is  not  un-American  unless  the  principle  of 
majority  rule  or  rule  by  the  people  is  un-American.  ...  As  the  growth 
of  numbers  made  it  necessary  to  rely  more  and  more  on  representatives, 
the  direct  vote  of  the  people  was  lost,  because  no  one  thought  of  any 


THE  ELECTORATE  .^2r 

way  in  which  it  could  be  retained.  But  now  that  we  have  a  plan  whereby 
the  direct  vote  can  be  taken  without  an  assembly  of  the  people,  it  is 
possible  to  go  back  to  the  original  American  system  of  actual  popular 
sovereignty.  .  .   . 

Q.  Has  it  made  frecjuent  elections  necessary,  thus  greatly  increasing 
the  cost  ? 

A.  Instead  of  making  elections  more  frequent  and  thus  increasing 
taxation,  the  experience  of  the  Swiss  is  the  reverse.  It  is  not  worth 
while  for  politicians  to  attempt  to  squander  the  people's  resources  or 
for  private  interests  to  bribe  them  to  do  so  when  the  people  have  it  in 
their  power  upon  petition  of  a  small  minority,  to  submit  any  measure 
passed  by  a  legislature  to  a  direct  vote  of  the  people  and  veto  it  if  a 
majority  so  votes.   .  .  . 

Q.  Does  it  take  from  the  people's  representatives  any  just  rights  that 
belong  to  them,  or  in  any  way  limit  their  legitimate  exercise  of  power  ? 

A.  The  Referendum  takes  from  the  people's  representatives  no  power 
that  justly  belongs  to  them.  The  legislators  are  the  agents  and  servants 
of  the  people,  not  their  masters.  No  true  representative  has  a  right  or  a 
desire  to  do  anything  his  principal  does  not  wish  to  have  done,  or  to 
refuse  to  do  anything  his  principal  desires  to  have  done.  .  .  . 

Q.  Why  is  it  imperatively  demanded  to-day  ? 

A.  The  Referendum  is  imperatively  demanded  because  there  has 
arisen  in  our  midst  in  recent  years  a  powerful  plutocracy  composed  of 
the  great  public-service  magnates,  the  trust  chieftains  and  other  princes 
of  privilege  who  have  succeeded  in  placing  in  positions  of  leadership 
political  bosses  that  are  susceptible  to  the  influence  of  corrupt  wealth. 
.  .  .  Against  these  evils  the  Referendum  is  a  powerful  weapon.  It 
brings  the  government  back  to  the  people,  destroying  corruption  and 
the  mastership  of  the  many  by  the  few. 

301.  Arguments  against  the  initiative  and  referendum.  The 
leading  objections  to  the  system  of  popular  legislation  may  be 
summarized  as  follows  :  ^ 

It  is  not  at  all  surprising  that  a  system  which  proposes  to  vest  the 
legislative  power  in  the  mass  of  voters,  rather  than  in  the  representative 
branch  of  the  government  .  .  .  should  awaken  considerable  opposition 
and  criticism.  It  is  contended  by  the  opponents  of  the  initiative  and 
referendum  that  legislation,  being  a  difficult  and  technical  matter  de- 
manding the  attention  of  experts  and  careful  deliberation,  cannot  be 
done  effectively  by  the  mere  counting  of  heads.  .  .  . 

1  Copyright,  1910,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


322 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


The  second  leading  argument  against  the  initiative  and  referendum  is 
the  frequent  lack  of  interest  shown  in  propositions  submitted  to  popular 
vote.  .  .  . 

The  third  argument  advanced  against  the  referendum  is  based  on  the 
ground  that  it  is  very  easy  for  any  pernicious  interest  in  the  state, 
affected  adversely  by  a  good  law,  to  secure  signatures  to  a  petition  de- 
manding a  referendum  and  thus  postpone  the  date  of  the  law's  going 
into  effect  for  a  considerable  period  —  at  least  until  a  popular  vote  could 
be  taken  —  and,  perhaps,  through  the  indifference  of  the  majority  defeat 
it  with  a  solid  and  active  minority.  .  .  . 

Another  argument  against  the  initiative  and  referendum  is  the  con- 
tention that  responsibility  for  law-making  is  shifted  from  a  definite 
group,  known  as  the  legislature,  to  a  large  and  irresponsible  group  of 
persons  who  mark  their  ballots  within  the  secrecy  of  the  polling  place.  If 
the  legislature  makes  mistakes  or  fails  to  reflect  popular  will,  its  mem- 
bers can  be  punished,  if  the  electors  are  interested  enough  to  defeat 
those  who  seek  reelection ;  whereas  it  is  impossible  to  fix  any  respon- 
sibility or  to  punish  any  one  politically,  if  a  badly  drawn  or  unwise 
measure  is  passed  by  a  popular  vote. 

IV.    Minority  Representation 

302.  The  nature  and  conduct  of  political  majorities.  Giddings 
makes  the  following  analysis  of  majorities  in  modern  democracies :  ^ 

First  of  all,  then,  we  must  observe  that  a  political  majority  is  a  con- 
sciously formed  association  for  effecting  a  consciously  apprehended 
purpose ;  yet  it  never  is  an  unmixed  product  of  perfectly  independent, 
reasoned  action  on  the  part  of  all  its  members.  Multitudes  of  adherents 
have  ranged  themselves  by  personal  feeling  or  class  prejudice,  or  a 
social  instinct  that  prompts  them  to  act  in  political  matters  as  in  other 
things,  with  this  group  of  individuals  rather  than  with  that.  Thus  the 
membership  of  a  political  majority  exhibits  a  complete  gradation  of  men- 
tal development,  from  a  quick  and  sensitive  intelligence  at  the  margin, 
where  independent  voting  occurs,  to  stupid  bigotry  in  the  unstimulated 
interior  of  the  mass.  Consequently,  there  is  a  reasonable  presumption 
that  the  temper  of  the  whole  is  neither  extremely  radical  nor  ultracon- 
servative,  but  very  moderately  progressive.  .  .  . 

A  political  majority  of  the  voters  of  a  large  country,  with  diversified 
resources  and  occupations  and  a  heterogeneous  population,  will  be 
governed  mainly  by  a  conservative  instinct  and  will  be  modified  only 

1  Copyright,  1900,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


I 


THE  ELECTORATE 


323 


very  slowly  by  opinion.  It  will  carefully  respect  the  fundamental  political 
prejudices  of  "  slow  "  people.  Among  such  prejudices  are  those  in  favor 
of  personal  liberty  in  the  broad  sense  of  the  word,  against  the  increase 
of  direct  taxation,  against  certain  forms  of  sumptuary-  legislation,  and 
against  interference  with  such  traditional  political  habits  as  have  become 
a  second  nature.  .  .  . 

A  political  majority,  therefore,  has  a  nature  that  can  be  described  in 
terms  of  the  laws  of  social  psychology,  and  its  conduct  is  subject  to 
natural  limitations.  ...  As  social  structure  becomes  more  complex  the 
difficulties  of  holding  the  diverse  elements  of  a  majority  together  in  a 
working  coordination  rapidly  increase.  All  other  things  remaining  the 
same,  the  inertia  of  conservatism  would  increase,  and  political  stagna- 
tion would  bring  progress  to  an  end.  .  .  .  But  other  things  do  not  and 
cannot  remain  unchanged.  As  the  difficulties  of  maintaining  party  cohe- 
sion increase,  the  necessity  of  adhering  to  a  positive  policy  becomes  more 
imperative.  ...  As  voters  become  responsive  to  opinion,  they  become 
capable  of  independence. 

303.  Necessity  for  representing  minorities.  Mill  argues  that 
majority  rule,  regardless  of  minorities,  is  unjust  and  undemocratic. 

That  the  minority  must  yield  to  the  majority,  the  smaller  number  to 
the  greater,  is  a  familiar  idea ;  and  accordingly,  men  think  there  is  no 
necessity  for  using  their  minds  any  farther,  and  it  does  not  occur 
to  them  that  there  is  any  medium  between  allowing  the  smaller  number 
to  be  equally  powerful  with  the  greater,  and  blotting  out  the  smaller 
number  altogether.  In  a  representative  body  actually  deliberating,  the 
minority  must  of  course  be  overruled  ;  and  in  an  equal  democracy  (since 
the  opinions  of  the  constituents,  when  they  insist  on  them,  determine 
those  of  the  representative  body),  the  majority  of  the  people,  through 
their  representatives,  will  outvote  and  prevail  over  the  minority  and  their 
representatives.  But  does  it  follow  that  the  minority  should  have  no 
representatives  at  all  ?  Because  the  majority  ought  to  prevail  over  the 
minority,  must  the  majority  have  all  the  votes,  the  minority  none  .^  .  .  . 
In  a  really  equal  democracy,  every  or  any  section  would  be  repre- 
sented, not  disproportionately,  but  proportionately.  A  majority  of  the 
electors  would  always  have  a  majority  of  the  representatives,  but  a 
minority  of  the  electors  would  always  have  a  minority  of  the  repre- 
sentatives. Man  for  man,  they  would  be  as  fully  represented  as  the 
majority.  Unless  they  are,  there  is  not  equal  government,  but  a  govern- 
ment of  inequality  and  privilege :  one  part  of  the  people  rule  over  the 
rest :   there  is  a  part  whose  fair  and  equal  share  of  influence  m  the 


324  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

representation  is  withheld  from  them,  contrary  to  all  just  government, 
but,  above  all,  contrary  to  the  principle  of  democracy,  which  professes 
equality  as  its  very  root  and  foundation. 

304.  Objections  to  the  principle  of  proportional  representation. 

Some  writers  condemn  proportional  representation,  believing  that 
it  leads  toward  confusion  and  anarchy,  encourages  class  legislation, 
and  weakens  the  legislative  power. 

The  spread  of  the  system  of  proportional  representation  during  the 
last  ten  or  fifteen  years  has  been  very  encouraging  to  its  advocates,  but 
as  yet  it  has  not  made  good  its  claim  to  general  acceptance.  It  is 
advocated  by  some  visionary  persons  as  a  remedy  for  all  the  ills  of 
society ;  and  the  more  ultrademocratic  element  of  the  population  demand 
it  for  the  reason  that  it  is  a  step  in  the  direction  of  a  more  perfect 
democracy.  Many  able  writers,  however,  condemn  the  principle  of 
minority  representation  and  maintain  that  the  majority  system  is  the 
true  principle  and  is  liable  to  fewer  dangers.  Sidgwick,  for  example, 
points  out  two  "  serious  objections  "  to  the  system  of  minority  repre- 
sentation. In  the  first  place,  the  giving  of  representation  to  groups  as 
such  involves  the  loss  of  a  valuable  protection  against  demagogy  by 
removing  the  "  natural  inducements  which  local  divisions  give  for  the 
more  instructed  part  of  the  community  to  exercise  their  powers  of  per- 
suasion on  the  less  instructed."  In  the  second  place,  representation  of 
groups,  he  says,  "  will  inevitably  tend  to  encourage  pernicious  class 
legislation."  In  the  third  place,  it  will  tend  to  reduce  the  standard  of 
efficiency  in  the  legislature  by  securing  the  election  of  men  who  repre- 
sent one  set  of  interests  or  opinions  rather  than  all  of  them.  "  We  want 
for  legislators,"  says  Sidgwick,  "  men  of  some  breadth  of  view  and 
variety  of  ideas,  practiced  in  comparing  different  claims  and  judgments, 
and  endeavoring  to  find  some  compromise  that  will  harmonize  them  as 
far  as  possible,"  ^  which  can  hardly  be  secured  under  a  system  in  which 
the  community  is  not  locally  divided  for  electoral  purposes.  "  To  estab- 
lish the  system  of  proportional  representation,"  says  Esmein,  "  is  to 
convert  the  remedy  supplied  by  the  bicameral  system  into  a  veritable 
poison ;  it  is  to  organize  disorder  and  emasculate  the  legislative  power ; 
it  is  to  render  cabinets  unstable,  destroy  their  homogeneity  and  make 
parliamentary  government  impossible."  If  applied  to  parliamentary 
elections,  logic  and  consistency,  he  goes  on  to  say,  require  that  it  shall 
be  applied  to  the  election  of  executives  and  administrative  officers,  and 
this  is  but  the  entering  wedge  to  anarchy. 

^  "  Elements  of  Politics,"  p.  396. 


THE  ELECTORATK  325 

305.  Objection  to  representation  of  classes  or  interests.  The 
clangers  of  minority  representation  based  on  classes  or  interests 
may  be  stated  as  follows  : 

There  is  also  good  reason  for  believing  that  a  system  of  class  repre- 
sentation or  representation  of  interests  would  tend  to  lower  the  character 
of  the  legislature,  since  each  member  would  in  some  measure  be  the 
exclusive  representative  of  particular  interests  or  opinions  rather  than 
the  representative  of  the  interests  of  the  state  as  a  whole.  A  legislative 
assembly  composed  of  so  many  elements  would  tend  to  become  a  de- 
bating society  instead  of  a  lawmaking  body,  and  its  efficiency  would  be 
diminished  in  proportion  to  the  number  and  variety  of  interests  repre- 
sented. One  of  the  sources  of  strength  in  the  governments  of  Anglo- 
Saxon  countries  has  been  the  freedom  of  their  legislative  assemblies 
from  the  presence  of  numerous  unstable  and  dissolving  groups  with 
their  inevitable  dissensions  and  deadlocks.  Finally,  the  organization  of 
the  electorate  upon  the  basis  of  class  distinctions,  whether  economic, 
social,  or  professional,  would  inevitably  tend  to  muldply  artificial  dis- 
tinctions, divide  the  population  into  groups,  array  each  against  the 
others,  and  accentuate  class  antagonism  generally.  These  evils  in  Austria 
led  to  the  abolition  of  the  class  system  in  that  country  in  1907,  and  they 
are  the  source  of  widespread  and  increasing  popular  discontent  in 
Prussia  to-day. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

SEPARATION  AND  DIVISION  OF  POWERS 
I.   The  Ordinary  Government 

306.  A  broader  definition  of  government.  In  his  recent  sug- 
gestive book  Dealey  shows  that  the  government  proper  includes 
a  considerable  number  of  organs. 

If  one  were  to  define  the  term  government  more  exactly,  in  harmony 
with  this  explanation  of  governmental  organization  and  differentiation,  it 
might  be  said  to  be  the  sum  total  of  those  organizations  that  exercise  or 
may  exercise  the  sovereign  powers  of  the  state. 

Since  all  the  sovereign  powers  of  the  state  may  be  exercised  through 
the  following  departments,  singly  or  collectively,  the  government  may  be 
thus  tabulated : 

1.  The  executive,  from  which  is  differentiating 

2.  The  administrative. 

3.  The  lawmaking  department,  from  which  should  be  distinguished 

4.  The  legal  sovereign. 

5.  The  judicial  system,  from  which  is  separating  (in  the  United  States) 

6.  A  special  court  for  the  authoritative  interpretation  of  the  written 
constitution. 

7.  The  electorate,  which  is  steadily  increasing  its  powers  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  three  historic  departments  of  government. 

Doubtless  for  many  years  to  come  textbooks  and  theorists  will  con- 
tinue to  discuss  the  threefold  division  of  governmental  organization,  but 
in  this  age  of  governmental  differentiation  it  is  well-nigh  impossible  to 
get  a  clear  understanding  of  government,  unless  one  considers  the  elec- 
torate as  a  fourth  department.  Furthermore,  much  more  exactness  in 
theorizing  would  be  attained  by  separating,  mentally  at  least,  the  legal 
sovereign  from  the  other  departments  of  government.  The  differentiation 
of  administration  from  the  executive  is  almost  an  accomplished  fact  on 
the  continent  of  Europe.  The  remaining  specialization  is  peculiar  to  the 
United  States  of  America  and  deserves  special  attention  because  of  its 
political  importance,  for  if  the  supreme  court  of  the  federal  department 
ultimately  devotes  itself  only  to  final  interpretations  of  the  constitution,  the 
party  affiliations  of  its  bench  will  become  a  matter  of  increasing  concern. 

^26 


SEPARATION  AND  DIVISION  OF  POWERS 


327 


307.  Historical  evolution  of  the  separation  of  governmental 
powers.  As  the  functions  of  the  state  became  more  extensive,  its 
organization  became  more  complex  and  the  powers  of  government 
were  distributed  among  distinct  organs. 

In  every  state,  be  it  monarchic,  aristocratic,  or  democratic,  there  is  a 
tendency  to  distribute  the  principal  powers  of  government  among  distinct 
governmental  organizations. 

The  earliest  dawn  of  civilization  discloses,  as  the  most  primitive  form 
of  political  organization,  a  warfaring  society  grouped  about  a  victorious 
chief.  This  powerful  personage  is  supposed  to  represent  the  fittest 
product  of  the  period  of  barbaric  liberty  and  self-help,  which  immedi- 
ately preceded  the  period  of  governmental  organization.  The  chieftain's 
superiority  in  valor  convinces  his  superstitious  admirers,  as  well  as  him- 
self, that  he  is  of  divine  descent.  This  superstition  invests  him  with  a 
halo  of  glory  and  clothes  him  with  sovereign  power.  The  religious  sanc- 
tion secures  reverence  for  his  person  and  obedience  for  his  laws.  He 
experiences  no  opposition  in  immediately  exercising  all  governmental 
powers.    He  is  priest,  war  chief,  judge  and  legislator. 

As  war  begets  the  king,  so  peace  begets  the  judge  and  legislator. 
As  his  followers  become  peaceable  and  civilized,  the  king  is  appealed  to 
for  the  enforcement  of  internal  order  and  justice  rather  than  for  protec- 
tion against  external  force.  As  these  appeals  grow  numerous  and  the 
duty  of  satisfying  them  becomes  more  intricate,  the  sovereign,  either  as 
a  matter  of  convenience,  or  in  order  to  secure  greater  sanction  for  his 
acts  and  decisions,  calls  about  him  a  council  of  wise  and  powerful  men 
to  hear,  and  to  assist  in  determining,  the  questions  presented,  and  also 
to  advise  him  in  the  administration  of  his  government. 

This  royal  council,  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  functions  required  in 
determining  individual  appeals  differ  from  those  required  in  formulating 
rules  to  be  observed  in  the  administration  of  government,  soon  develops 
into  two  distinct  bodies,  the  legislature  and  the  judicial  court. 

Notwithstanding  the  existence  of  these  two  advisory  bodies,  the  king 
continues  to  execute  his  own  will,  which  is  still  the  supreme  law.  But 
the  intimacy  necessarily  arising  between  the  king  and  his  advisers  soon 
breeds  contempt.  The  shortcomings  of  the  sovereign  disclose  to  the  wise 
and  powerful  men  whom  he  has  invited  to  assist  him  the  pious  fraud 
which  he  has  been  exercising  upon  them.  As  they  assert  themselves,  the 
sovereignty  passes  from  the  king  to  the  lords ;  the  state  passes  from  the 
monarchic  to  the  aristocratic  form.  The  nobles,  possessed  of  the  sov- 
ereign power  of  the  state,  can  now  themselves  assume,  or  can  delegate  to 
such  authorities  as  they  deem  proper,  the  powers  which  the  government 


:) 


28  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


may  be  called  upon  to  exercise.  They  generally  satisfy  themselves 
by  exercising  or  participating  in  the  exercise  of  an  unlimited  legislative 
authority.  Self-interest,  if  not  convenience,  prevents  them  from  asserting 
with  impunity  all  governmental  authority.  They  dare  not  abolish  the 
courts  or  the  kingship,  lest  by  so  doing  they  may  reveal  to  the  masses 
their  own  discovery  of  the  humble  origin  of  their  king.  They  fear  lest  in 
the  absence  of  a  general  belief  in  the  divine  source  of  authority,  the 
people  may  be  led  to  consider  their  own  right  to  assume  sovereign 
powers.  The  barons,  therefore,  of  their  own  accord  now  employ  the 
king  as  their  agent  to  execute  their  laws,  and  they  likewise  employ  the 
courts  to  construe  them. 

When  at  last  enlightenment  and  education  have  sufficiently  spread 
state-consciousness  among  the  masses,  and  the  sovereign  power  in  fact 
has  passed  from  the  nobility  to  the  people,  the  latter  resent  the  power  of 
the  few  to  concentrate  or  distribute  at  their  pleasure  all  governmental 
authority.  They  know  that  where  executive,  legislative  and  judicial  power 
may  be  assumed  by  a  single  person,  or  body  of  persons,  there  can  be  no 
guarantee  against  the  exertion  of  dreaded  despotic  power.  Hence,  in 
delegating  and  distributing  governmental  power,  and  in  creating  and 
organizing  governmental  agencies,  they  endeavor  to  secure  themselves 
as  far  as  possible  against  the  exercise  of  despotic  power  by  the  govern- 
ment which  they  establish,  or  by  any  part  thereof. 

Whereas,  in  a  monarchic  form  of  state,  the  sovereign  power  is  gen- 
erally identified  in  some  manner  with  the  executive  department  of  its 
government,  and,  in  the  aristocratic  form  of  state,  in  some  manner  with 
the  legislative  department  of  its  government,  the  conditions  materially 
change  when  the  state  has  become  democratic,  that  is,  when  the  sovereign 
power  has  passed  from  the  nobility  to  the  masses.  Owing  to  the  great 
numbers  of  which  the  democratic  state  is  composed,  it  is  impracticable  in 
fact,  if  possible  in  theory,  for  such  state  to  exercise  governmental  authority 
immediately,  or  even  to  be  identified  in  any  manner  whatsoever  with  any 
of  the  departments  exercising  governmental  powers.  The  democratic 
state  accordingly  delegates  the  powers  of  government  to  organizations 
distinct  from  its  own  original  sovereign  organization.  It  generally  dele- 
gates the  principal  powers  of  government  to  the  already  naturally  and 
historically  developed  departments,  the  executive,  legislative  and  judicial 
departments  ;  and  it  organizes  and  employs  each  of  these  departments  as 
its  agent.  But,  since  neither  of  these  departments  any  longer  exercises 
sovereign  powers,  but  only  delegated  authority,  and  since  each  owes 
its  existence  to  the  will  of  the  state  only,  and  not  to  the  will  of  any  of 
the  other  departments,  each  is  now  independent  of  and  coordinate  with 
the  others. 


SEPARATION  AND  DIVISION  OF  POWERS  329 

II.    Theory  of  the  Separation  of  Powers 

308.  Development  of  the  theory  of  separation  of  powers.    The 

leading  writers  who  have  developed  the  theory  of  separation  of 
powers  are  as  follows  : 

The  idea  of  a  threefold  division  of  governmental  powers  was  recog- 
nized by  Aristotle,  Cicero,  Polybius,  and  other  ancient  political  writers. 
Aristotle,  for  example,  classified  the  powers  of  government  as :  first,  the 
deliberative,  or  those  concerned  with  great  questions  of  practical  policy, 
including  decisions  regarding  war  and  peace,  the  negotiation  of  treaties, 
the  making  of  laws,  etc.  ;  second,  the  itiagisterial,  or  those  corresponding 
roughly  to  the  executive  functions  of  a  modern  state ;  and,  third,  the 
judicial  power.  Although  the  ancient  writers  distinguished  between  three 
classes  of  governmental  powers,  corresponding  roughly  to  the  modern 
classification,  yet  in  practice  the  distinction  was  not  always  obser\-ed.  .  .  . 
Throughout  the  Middle  Ages  no  clear  distinction  between  legislative, 
executive,  and  judicial  functions  was  recognized,  though  in  a  rough  way 
the  functions,  especially  of  legislation  and  administration,  were  separated 
as  a  matter  of  convenience.  Generally,  the  same  magistrates  exercised 
both  executive  and  judicial  functions.  .  .  . 

Bodin,  in  the  sixteenth  century,  was  the  first  political  writer  to  call 
attention  to  the  danger  of  allowing  the  prince  to  administer  justice  in 
person  and  to  point  out  the  advantage  of  intrusting  the  judicial  power  to 
independent  magistrates.  ...  In  England,  at  the  time  of  the  Puritan 
Revolution,  in  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century,  the  division  of  gov- 
ernmental powers  and  their  exercise  by  separate  and  distinct  organs  be- 
came for  the  first  time  a  political  doctrine.  Cromwell,  in  the  constitution 
of  the  Protectorate,  went  to  the  length  of  separating  the  executive  and 
legislative  functions,  but  he  did  not  fully  recognize  the  independence  of 
the  judiciary,  John  Locke,  the  political  philosopher  of  the  English  Revo- 
lution, in  his  famous  "  Two  Treatises  of  Government,"  declared  that  the 
powers  of  government  naturally  divided  themselves  into  those  which 
were  legislative  in  character,  those  which  were  executive,  and  those 
which  were  federative.  By  the  latter  functions  he  seems  to  have  meant 
what  is  now  understood  as  the  diplomatic  power. 

The  first  modern  political  writer  to  dwell  at  length  upon  the  separa- 
tion of  the  powers  of  government  and  to  treat  it  as  a  fundamental 
principle  of  political  science  was  Montesquieu,  in  his  famous  work  en- 
titled "  L'Esprit  des  Lois,"  published  in  1 748.  "  In  every  government,"  he 
said,  "  there  are  three  sorts  of  power  "  :  the  legislative,  the  executive,  and 
the  judiciary.  ...  His  views  became  a  part  of  the  political  philosophy  of 


330  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

the  French  Revolution  and  were  fully  enunciated  in  the  constitutions  which 
were  framed  in  France  before  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century. 

In  England  essentially  the  same  doctrine  as  that  announced  in  France 
by  Montesquieu  was  laid  down  by  Blackstone  in  his  "  Commentaries  on 
the  Laws  of  England."  .  .  . 

In  America,  at  the  time  of  the  framing  of  the  national  constitution, 
the  influence  of  both  Blackstone  and  Montesquieu  was  powerful  and 
decisive,  and  their  doctrines  concerning  the  separation  of  powers  became 
a  part  of  the  political  creed  of  the  early  statesmen.  Madison,  in  almost 
the  very  language  of  Montesquieu,  whom  he  pronounced  "  the  oracle  who 
is  always  consulted  and  cited  on  the  subject,"  defended  the  doctrine  as 
essential  to  the  protection  of  individual  liberty.  .  .  .  George  Washington, 
John  Adams,  Thomas  Jefferson,  Alexander  Hamilton,  and  later  Kent, 
Story,  and  Webster,  all  expressed  similar  views. 

In  the  early  state  constitutions  franied  before  the  close  of  the  eight- 
eenth century  the  idea  that  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial  functions 
must  be  kept  separate,  and  intrusted  to  distinct  authorities,  was  expressed 
in  no  uncertain  language  ;  and  their  governments  were  organized  as 
nearly  in  accordance  with  the  theory  as  considerations  of  expediency  and 
efficiency  permitted.   .  .  . 

In  various  foreign  constitutions,  particularly  those  which  have  been 
framed  under  the  influence  of  American  ideas,  the  theory  is  embodied 
in  similar  form.  In  the  states  of  Europe,  where  the  cabinet  system  of 
government  prevails,  the  close  connection  between  the  legislative  and 
executive  organs  constitutes  an  important  exception  to  the  theory ;  yet, 
upon  careful  examination,  the  violation  of  the  principle  will  be  seen  to  be 
really  less  than  it  appears,  since  the  functions  of  legislation  and  execu- 
tion are  in  fact  intrusted  to  separate  organs,  even  though  one  is  con- 
trolled by  and  is  responsible  to  the  other  for  the  manner  in  which  it 
exercises  its  powers.  In  none  of  them  is  the  legislature  really  the  execu- 
tor of  the  law  or  the  judge  of  the  controversies  raised  in  the  course  of 
its  application ;  nor  does  the  judiciary  legislate  or  administer.  The  in- 
convenience and  the  danger,  however,  of  such  a  confusion  of  functions 
is  admitted  by  European  writers  as  well  as  by  those  in  America. 

309.  Montesquieu  on  separation  of  powers.  The  following  ex- 
tract from  the  "'  Spirit  of  the  Laws  "  indicates  Montesquieu's  idea 
of  liberty  as  depending  upon  the  separation  of  powers  : 

When  the  legislative  and  executive  powers  are  united  in  the  same 
person  or  body  there  can  be  no  liberty,  because  apprehensions  might 
arise  lest  the  same  monarch  or  senate  should  e?jact  tyrannical  laws,  to 
execute  them  in  a  tyrannical  manner.  .  .  . 


SEPARATION  AND  DIVISION  OF  POWERS  331 

There  is  no  liberty  if  the  judicial  power  be  not  separated  from  the 
legislative  and  executive.  Were  it  joined  with  the  legislative,  the  life  and 
liberty  of  the  subject  would  be  exposed  to  arbitrary  control,  for  theyW^v 
would  then  be  the  legislator.  Were  it  joined  to  the  executive  power,  the 
judge  might  behave  with  the  violence  of  an  oppressor.  There  could  be 
an  end  of  everything,  were  the  same  man  or  the  same  body,  whether  of 
nobles  or  of  the  people,  to  exercise  these  three  powers,  that  of  enacting 
laws,  that  of  executing  the  public  resolutions,  and  that  of  trying  the 
causes  of  individuals. 

310.  Blackstone  on  separation  of  powers.  Blackstone's  ideas 
were,  in  essence,  identical  with  those  of  Montesquieu. 

Wherever  the  right  of  making  and  enforcing  the  law  is  vested  in  the 
same  man  or  one  and  the  same  body  of  men,  there  can  be  no  public 
liberty.  The  magistrate  may  enact  tyrannical  laws  and  execute  them  in 
a  tyrannical  manner,  since  he  is  possessed,  in  his  quality  of  dispenser  of 
justice,  with  all  the  power  which  he  as  legislator  thinks  proper  to  give 
himself.   .   .   . 

Were  it  (the  judicial  power)  joined  with  the  legislative,  the  life,  liberty, 
and  property  of  the  subject  would  be  in  the  hands  of  arbitrary  judges  ' 
whose  decisions  would  be  regulated  only  by  their  opinions,  and  not  by 
any  fundamental  principles  of  law ;  which  though  legislators  may  depart 
from,  yet  judges  are  bound  to  observe.  Were  it  joined  with  the  execu- 
tive, this  union  might  soon  be  an  overbalance  of  the  legislative. 

311.  The  United  States  Supreme  Court  on  separation  of  powers. 

The  present  theory  and  practice  of  the  United   States  has  been 
expressed  recently  by  the  Supreme  Court  as  follows  : 

It  is  believed  to  be  one  of  the  chief  merits  of  the  American  system  of 
written  constitutional  law  that  all  powers  intrusted  to  the  government, 
whether  state  or  national,  are  divided  into  the  three  grand  departments, 
the  executive,  the  legislative  and  the  judicial ;  that  the  functions  appro- 
priate to  each  of  these  branches  of  government  shall  be  vested  in  a  sepa- 
rate body  of  public  servants,  and  that  the  perfection  of  the  system 
requires  that  the  lines  which  separate  and  divide  these  departments  shall 
be  broadly  and  clearly  defined.  It  is  also  essential  to  the  successful 
working  of  the  system,  that  the  persons  intrusted  with  power  in  any  one 
of  these  branches  shall  not  be  permitted  to  encroach  upon  the  powers  con- 
fided to  the  others,  but  that  each  shall  by  the  law  of  its  creation  be  lim- 
ited to  the  exercise  of  the  powers  appropriate  to  its  own  department,  and 
no  others. 


332  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

312.   Checks   and  balances  in  the  United  States  government. 

The  general  nature  of  the  relations  among  the  departments  and 
divisions  of  government  in  the  United  States  may  be  outlined 
as  follows  : 

The  division  of  the  powers  of  government  among  the  three  depart- 
ments rests  on  the  assumption  that  while  no  one  of  them  is  in  itself 
unlimited  in  authority,  yet  each  is  independent  of  the  others.  .  .  . 

It  is  often  said  that  our  governmental  system  is  one  of  checks  and 
balances  for  the  purpose  of  restraining  the  undue  exercise  of  power  by 
the  government  or  its  officers,  the  theory  being  that  unlimited  power  is 
not  vested  in  any  department ;  .  .  .  Each  department  of  government 
does,  in  a  sense,  serve  the  purpose  of  a  check  upon  the  others.  While 
the  legislative  department  cannot  directly  control  the  action  of  the  execu- 
tive or  judiciary,  it  can,  by  virtue  of  its  sole  power  to  provide  for  the 
raising  and  expenditure  of  money,  exercise  a  very  potent  influence  with 
reference  to  legislative  and  judicial  action  ;  and  the  judiciary  department, 
by  virtue  of  its  authority  in  a  proper  case  to  pass  upon  the  validity  of  the 
acts  of  the  legislature  or  the  executive,  can  restrain  those  departments 
within  the  scope  of  their  proper  functions.  Again,  the  division  of  sover- 
eignty between  the  federal  and  the  state  governments,  so  that  the  federal 
government  has  supreme  power  as  to  limited  subjects  of  a  federal  nature, 
while  the  state  governments  have  general  power  as  to  all  matters  not  placed 
in  the  control  of  the  federal  government,  makes  each,  to  some  extent,  a 
check  upon  the  other.  But  the  theory  of  checks  and  balances  must  not  be 
interpreted  as  meaning  that  either  the  state  or  federal  government  may  in- 
terfere with  the  other  in  the  proper  discharge  of  the  powers  conferred  upon 
it ;  nor  with  the  well-established  rule  that  in  case  of  an  apparent  conflict  of 
authority  between  a  state  and  the  federal  government,  the  latter  has  the 
ultimate  power  to  decide  upon  the  extent  of  its  own  authority.  This 
power  is  to  be  exercised,  it  is  true,  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  and 
limitations  of  the  constitution,  but  the  necessity  of  providing  some  tribu- 
nal where  such  conflicts  of  authority  may  be  authoritatively  decided  in 
accordance  with  the  constitution  and  the  law,  and  nc;t  by  force  or  revolu- 
tion, has  dictated  the  wise  provision  that  the  federal  judiciary  is  vested 
with  this  ultimate  authority.  In  other  words,  the  checks  which  federal 
and  state  governments  may  exercise  with  reference  to  each  other,  and 
likewise  those  which  are  vested  in  the  departments  of  government,  are, 
after  all,  merely  the  checks  which,  by  the  constitution,  are  imposed  on 
each ;  and  the  whole  matter  comes  to  this,  that  no  government,  or 
department  of  government,  can  constitutionally  exceed  the  authority 
given  to  it,  nor  act  otherwise  than  as  authorized  by  the  constitution. 


SEPARATION  AND  DIVISION  OF  POWERS  333 

III.    Criticism  of  tiii-:  Skpakation  of   Powkks 

313.  True  meaning  of  the  theory  of  separation  of  powers.    The 

limitations  that  must  be  placed  on  the  separation  of  powers,  and 
the  real  value  of  the  theory,  are  thus  stated  by  Garner : 

When  we  assert  it  to  be  a  fundamental  principle  of  political  science 
that  the  legislative,  executive,  and  judicial  functions  of  government 
should  be  intrusted  to  separate  and  independent  organs  or  departments, 
we  are  to  understand  the  proposition  as  being  true  only  in  a  limited 
sense.  Both  reason  and  experience  abundantly  show  that  no  govern- 
ment can  be  organized  on  the  principle  of  the  absolute  and  complete 
separation  of  the  departments  among  which  the  legislative,  executive, 
and  judicial  functions  arc  distributed.  There  is  not  now  and  never  has 
been  a  constitution  in  which  the  three  departments  were  not  more  or 
less  connected  and  dependent  one  upon  the  other,  and  in  which  each 
exercised  powers  that,  under  a  strict  application  of  the  theory,  did  not 
belong  more  properly  to  one  of  the  others.  In  short,  the  doctrine  of  the 
separation  of  powers  has  never  been  anything  more  than  a  theory  and 
an  ideal.  .  .  .  The  strict  separation  of  powers  is  not  only  impracticable 
as  a  working  principle  of  government,  but  it  is  one  not  to  be  desired 
in  practice.   .   .  . 

W'hile  no  department  exercises  all  the  power  which  upon  a  strict 
interpretation  belongs  to  it,  it  nevertheless  exercises  the  essential  part 
of  it.  Each  department  exercises  incidental  rights  of  a  nature  intrin- 
sically different  from  the  mass  of  powers  logically  belonging  to  it,  but 
they  are  such  only  as  are  necessary  to  enable  it  to  perform  efficiently 
its  functions  as  an  independent  branch  of  the  government  and  are  in 
reality  part  of  the  principal  power  itself.  In  practice,  therefore,  the 
theory  has  never  been  construed  to  mean  that  all  the  legisladve  power 
shall  be  exercised  by  the  legislative  department,  or  all  the  executive 
power  by  the  executive  department,  or  all  the  judicial  power  by  the 
judicial  department.  The  theory  otherwise  understood  would  be  impos- 
sible of  practical  application  in  any  governmental  system. 

It  is  impossible  to  draw  a  strict  line  of  demarcadon  between  the  sev- 
eral departments.  There  is  a  common  borderland  between  them,  within 
which  each  department  must  tolerate  the  others  if  government  is  to  be 
efficient.  No  legislature  can  discharge  entirely  all  those  functions  which 
under  a  strict  interpretation  of  the  theory  are  legislative.  Details  must 
be  filled  up  and  rules  issued  by  the  executive,  governing  the  application 
of  the  law,  if  the  government  is  to  be  conducted  on  practical  lines.  In 
short,  functions  may  be  separated,  but  not  the  departments  thcmsehes. 


334 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


314.  Modern  theory  of  separation  of  powers.  No  recent  writer 
has  more  clearly  distinguished  the  functions  of  the  various  depart- 
ments of  government  than  has  Goodnow. 

This  theory  may  be  stated  as  follows.  The  action  of  the  legislature, 
which  is  commonly  called  the  legislative  power,  but  which  is  in  reality 
merely  an  expression  of  the  governmental  power  by  the  legislature,  con- 
sists for  the  most  part  in  the  enactment  of  general  norms  of  conduct 
for  all  persons  and  authorities  within  the  state ;  the  action  of  the  execu- 
tive authority,  commonly  called  the  executive  power,  is  the  application 
of  these  norms  to  concrete  cases ;  and  finally  the  action  of  the  judges 
or  the  courts,  commonly  called  the  judicial  power,  is  the  settlement  of 
controversies  arising  between  individuals  or  between  individuals  and  the 
governmental  authorities  as  to  the  application  of  the  laws.  It  may  further 
be  added  that  experience  has  shown  that  in  general  it  is  best  that  these 
different  authorities  be  confined  to  the  exercise  of  the  powers  respec- 
tively assigned  to  them  by  this  theory.  There  must,  however,  be  impor- 
tant exceptions  to  any  such  rule ;  and  these  exceptions  are  not  the  same 
in  the  different  states,  nor  should  they  be  the  same,  since  the  political 
experience  and  needs  of  no  two  states  are  the  same. 

315.  The  two  functions  of  the  state.  In  contrast  to  the  former 
idea  of  a  separation  into  three  departments,  Goodnow  points  out 
that  the  functions  of  the  state  are  twofold,  —  the  formulation  and 
the  administration  of  its  will.^ 

Political  functions  group  themselves  naturally  under  two  heads,  which 
are  equally  applicable  to  the  mental  operations  and  the  actions  of  self- 
conscious  personalities.  That  is,  the  action  of  the  state  as  a  political 
entity  consists  either  in  operations  necessary  to  the  expression  of  its  will, 
or  in  operations  necessary  to  the  execution  of  that  will.  The  will  of  the 
state  or  sovereign  must  be  made  up  and  formulated  before  political 
action  can  be  had.  The  will  of  the  state  or  sovereign  must  be  executed, 
after  it  has  been  formulated,  if  that  will  is  to  result  in  governmental 
action.  All  the  actions  of  the  state  or  its  organs,  further,  are  undertaken 
with  the  object,  either  of  facilitating  the  expression  of  this  will  or  of 
aiding  in  its  execution.  This  would  seem  to  be  the  case  whatever  may  be 
the  formal  character  of  the  governmental  system.  .  .  . 

The  distinction  between  these  two  functions,  further,  is  made  neces- 
sary by  psychological  causes.  In  the  case  of  a  single  person,  who  natu- 
rally both  formulates  and  executes  his  will  himself,  it  is  necessary  that 

1  Copyright,  1900,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


i 


SEPARATION  AND  DIVISION  OF  POWERS 


335 


this  will  be  formulated  before  it  is  executed.  In  the  case  of  political 
action  it  is  necessary  not  only  that  the  will  of  the  sovereign  be  formulated 
or  expressed  before  it  can  be  executed,  but  also  that  the  execution  of 
that  will  be  intrusted  in  a  large  measure  to  a  different  organ  from  that 
which  expresses  it.  The  great  complexity  of  political  conditions  makes  it 
practically  impossible  for  the  same  governmental  organ  to  be  intrusted 
in  equal  degree  with  the  discharge  of  both  functions.  .  .  . 

There  are,  then,  in  all  governmental  systems  two  primary  or  ultimate 
functions  of  government,  viz.  the  expression  of  the  will  of  the  state  and 
the  execution  of  that  will.  There  are  also  in  all  states  separate  organs,  each 
of  which  is  mainly  busied  with  the  discharge  of  one  of  these  functions. 

IV.    Division  of  Powers 

316.  The  theory  of  division  of  powers.  The  necessit)^  of  sub- 
dividing governmental  work  according  to  the  area  of  jurisdiction 
and  the  nature  of  services  performed  is  well  stated  in  the  following  : 

Though  the  state  is  an  indivisible  union  of  persons  within  a  given 
territory,  still  the  people  forming  the  state  are,  in  all  countries  of  any 
size,  organized  in  a  number  of  local  communities  which  have  been  called 
into  being  through  the  simple  fact  that  the  people  living  within  a  defined 
district  have  common  needs  which  are  peculiar  to  themselves.  If  the 
ends  which  such  people  follow  in  their  local  organizations  are  recognized 
by  the  state  as  reaching  beyond  the  interests  of  the  individual  then  such 
ends  become  public  ends,  just  as  much  as  the  ends  which  the  state 
attempts  to  have  realized  through  the  central  governmental  organization. 
For  the  mere  fact  that  such  ends  may  be  regarded  by  the  state  as  i:)ublic 
ends  does  not  inake  it  necessary  that  the  government  shall  act  solely  or 
mainly  in  the  attainment  of  these  ends  through  its  central  organization. 
The  state  everywhere  grants,  directly  or  indirectly,  to  the  localities 
powers  to  act  in  the  attainment  of  this  class  of  public  ends  and  provides 
that  its  central  governmental  organization  shall  step  in  simiJJy  to  assist 
and  control  the  localities.  In  other  words  central  and  local  government 
work  together  in  the  attainment  of  the  ends  of  the  state.  ...  As  to 
what  shall  be  the  sphere  of  local  autonomy,  whether  it  be  fixed  by  the 
constitution  or  by  legislation,  it  is  impossible  to  lay  down  many  general 
principles  of  universal  application.  .  .  . 

Two  general  methods  of  providing  for  the  participation  of  the  localities 
in  the  work  of  administration  have  been  adopted.  By  the  one  all  the 
duties  to  be  performed  by  the  localities,  both  as  agents  of  the  central 
government  and  as  local  governmental  organizations,  are  fixed  in  detail 
by  the  legislature  of  the  central  government.  .  .  . 


336  READINGS   IX  POLITICAL  SCIENXE 

The  other  method  of  permitting  localities  to  participate  in  the  work  of 
administration  depends  upon  clearly  distinguishing  between  that  adminis- 
trative work  which  needs  central  regulation  and  that  which  can  with  ad- 
vantage be  intrusted  to  the  localities.  The  delimitation  of  a  sphere  of 
local  action  is  accomplished  by  the  determination  of  those  matters  which 
need  for  their  efficient  treatment  uniformity'  in  administrative  action,  and 
which  should  therefore  be  attended  to  by  the  central  administration. 
\\'hat  is  left  after  the  subtraction  of  these  matters  from  the  whole  sphere 
of  administration  constitutes  the  sphere  of  local  administrative  action.  .  .  . 

As  a  result  of  these  arrangements  which  we  find  in  all  countries,  the 
details  offering  considerable  variety,  we  conclude  that  not  only  is  the 
function  of  administration  largely  separated  from  the  functions  of  legis- 
lation and  the  rendering  of  judicial  decision,  and  intrusted  in  most  cases 
to  special  authorities,  but  also  that  these  special  administrative  authori- 
ties are  in  all  states  of  two  kinds,  viz.  central  and  local,  while  in  some 
states  the  local  authorities  may  further  be  subdivided  into  commonwealth 
and  local  authorities. 

317.  Division  of  powers  in  the  United  States.  Nowhere  has  the 
subdivision  of  governmental  powers  been  carried  further  than  in 
the  American  federal  system. 

The  second  great  American  principle  of  government  is  the  division  of 
powers  between  the  nation  and  the  commonwealths,  and  within  a  com- 
monwealth between  the  state  and  local  authorities.  The  fundamental 
principle  of  our  federal  government  is  that  the  inherent  sovereign  pow- 
ers in  the  community  are  normally  exercised  through  the  state  govern- 
ments, and  therefore  that  any  residuum  of  power  is  left  to  the  states  and 
not  to  the  Union.  Under  our  system  of  fixed  and  rigid  constitutions,  the 
division  of  powers  is  expressed,  first,  in  the  federal  constitution,  and  then 
in  the  state  constitutions ;  and  disputed  questions  must  usually  be  de- 
cided by  the  courts.  Therefore,  if  we  wish  to  know  what  in  practice  are 
the  limits  between  national  and  state  powers,  and  also  between  powers 
exercised  directly  by  the  states  and  indirectly  by  the  local  governments 
springing  from  the  states,  we  must  search  the  recorded  judicial  decisions. 

To  the  national  government,  and  hence  to  the  national  officials,  are 
committed  the  immense  powers  of  war  and  peace,  finances  for  national 
purposes,  foreign  relations,  control  over  all  territory  not  actually  organ- 
ized as  states  and  over  all  commerce  which  does  not  begin  and  end  within 
the  boundaries  of  a  single  commonwealth. 

The  larger  body  of  legislation  is  left  to  the  states,  which  regulate  most 
of  the  relations  of  individual  to  individual,  which  create  and  regulate 


SEPARATION  AND  DIVISION  Ol'  POWERS 


zn 


corporations,  which  have  control  of  property  rights,  land  tenure,  inheri- 
tances, education,  and  religion,  supervise  by  far  the  greater  volume  of  all 
business  and  commerce,  administer  almost  the  whole  of  criminal  law.  and 
care  for  the  weak  and  dependent,  in  most  respects  the  states  come  nearer 
to  the  individual  than  does  the  federal  government. 

Local  governments  are  less  separated  from  the  state  governments  than 
the  states  from  the  national  government,  because  their  form  is  entirely 
dependent  upon  easily  alterable  state  legislation  ;  but  the  habits  of  the 
people  are  such  that  all  the  states  practically  concede  to  the  localities  and 
to  the  cities  the  immediate  personal  care  of  the  population.  In  their  hands 
are  the  streets,  water,  lighting,  education  to  a  large  degree,  many  depend- 
ent classes,  local  transportation,  and  the  maintenance  of  public  order. 

To  sum  up,  questions  of  health,  cleanliness,  and  morality,  the  questions 
which  most  closely  and  most  frequently  touch  the  individual,  are  given 
to  the  local  governments ;  business  and  criminal  relations  to  the  states ; 
national  defense  and  foreign  relations  to  the  nation.  The  national  control 
of  foreign  and  interstate  commerce  makes  the  division  of  commercial 
powers  indefinite  and  disputed. 

318.  Expansion  of  federal  power  in  the  United  States.  The 
difference  between  the  theory  of  division  of  powers  in  the  United 
States  constitutional  system,  and  the  actual  expansion  of  the 
national  government  in  practice  is  brought  out  by  Wilson.^ 

For  all  practical  purposes  the  national  government  is  sujireme  over 
the  state  governments,  and  Congress  predominant  over  its  so-called  coor- 
dinate branches.  Whereas  Congress  at  first  overshadowed  neither  Presi- 
dent nor  federal  judiciary,  it  now  on  occasion  rules  both  with  easy 
mastery  and  with  a  high  hand  ;  and  whereas  each  State  once  guarded  its 
sovereign  prerogatives  with  jealous  pride,  and  able  men  not  a  few  pre- 
ferred political  advancement  under  the  governments  of  the  great  com- 
monwealths to  office  under  the  new  federal  Constitution,  scats  in  state 
legislatures  are  now  no  longer  coveted  except  as  possible  approaches  to 
seats  in  Congress;  and  even  governors  of  States  seek  election  to  the 
national  Senate  as  a  promotion,  a  reward  for  the  humbler  ser\'ices  they 
have  rendered  their  local  governments. 

What  makes  it  the  more  important  to  understand  the  present  mechan- 
ism of  national  government,  and  to  study  the  methods  of  congressional 
rule  in  a  light  unclouded  by  theory,  is  that  there  is  plain  evidence  that 
the  expansion  of  federal  power  is  to  continue,  and  that  there  exists,  con- 
sequently, an  evident  necessity  that  it  should  be  known  just  what  to  d«) 

1  Hy  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  fompany. 


338  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL.  SCIENCE 

and  how  to  do  it,  when  the  time  comes  for  public  opinion  to  take  con- 
trol of  the  forces  which  are  changing  the  character  of  our  Constitution. 
There  are  voices  in  the  air  which  cannot  be  misunderstood.  The  times 
seem  to  favor  a  centralization  of  governmental  functions  such  as  could 
not  have  suggested  itself  as  a  possibility  to  the  framers  of  the  Constitu- 
tion. Since  they  gave  their  work  to  the  world  the  whole  face  of  that 
world  has  changed.  The  Constitution  was  adopted  when  it  was  six  days' 
hard  traveling  from  New  York  to  Boston ;  when  to  cross  East  River 
was  to  venture  a  perilous  voyage ;  when  men  were  thankful  for  weekly 
mails ;  when  the  extent  of  the  country's  commerce  was  reckoned  not  in 
millions  but  in  thousands  of  dollars ;  when  the  country  knew  few  cities, 
and  had  but  begun  manufactures ;  when  Indians  were  pressing  upon 
near  frontiers ;  when  there  were  no  telegraph  lines,  and  no  monster 
corporations.  Unquestionably,  the  pressing  problems  of  the  present 
moment  regard  the  regulation  of  our  vast  systems  of  commerce  and 
manufacture,  the  control  of  giant  corporations,  the  restraint  of  monopo- 
lies, the  perfection  of  fiscal  arrangements,  the  facilitating  of  economic 
exchanges,  and  many  other  like  national  concerns,  amongst  which  may 
possibly  be  numbered  the  question  of  marriage  and  divorce ;  and  the 
greatest  of  these  problems  do  not  fall  within  even  the  enlarged  sphere 
of  the  federal  government ;  some  of  them  can  be  embraced  within  its 
jurisdiction  by  no  possible  stretch  of  construction,  and  the  majority  of 
them  only  by  wresting  the  Constitution  to  strange  and  as  yet  unimagined 
uses.  Still  there  is  a  distinct  movement  in  favor  of  national  control  of 
all  questions  of  policy  which  manifestly  demand  uniformity  of  treatment 
and  power  of  administration  such  as  cannot  be  realized  by  the  separate, 
unconcerted  action  of  the  States ;  and  it  seems  probable  to  many  that, 
whether  by  constitutional  amendment,  or  by  still  further  flights  of  con- 
struction, yet  broader  territory  will  at  no  very  distant  day  be  assigned 
to  the  federal  government. 

319.  Division  of  powers  in  the  German  Empire.  The  nature  of 
the  distribution  of  authority  between  imperial  and  commonwealth 
organs  in  Germany  is  as  follows  :  ^ 

The  German  Empire  is  not  a  league  of  princes.  It  is  a  State  con- 
structed out  of  States.  In  becoming  a  member  of  the  Bund  each  several 
State  gave  up  its  sovereignty,  receiving  therefor,  as  Bismarck  expressed  it, 
a  "  share  in  the  joint  sovereignty  of  the  Empire."  Since  there  can  be  no 
limitation  of  sovereignty  and  no  division  of  it,  these  States  are  not  sov- 
ereign "  in  their  own  sphere."    But  the  individual  State  takes  a  part  in 

1  Copyright,  1906,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


SEPARATION  AND  DIVISION  OF  POWERS  339 

forming  the  power  that  stands  over  it.  The  German  States  are  not  sub- 
jected to  the  domination  of  any  one  of  them,  nor  to  any  foreign  sover- 
eign, but  rather  to  a  corporate  State  builded  out  of  themselves.  "  The 
German  States  are  as  a  totality  sovereign."  Sovereignty,  according  to 
the  German  jurists,  is  not  an  essential  element  of  a  State.  It  mav  consti- 
tute the  basis  of  recognition  in  international  law,  but  from  the  standpoint 
of  constitutional  law  it  is  an  insufficient  test  of  statehood.  The  true  mark 
of  a  State  consists  in  its  possession  of  original  and  underived  power. 
This  mark  belongs  to  each  of  the  German  States.  There  is  a  large  field 
in  which  the  State  is  left  free  to  govern  itself.  The  powers  of  the  I-'.m- 
pire  are  specifically  defined.  It  may  enlarge  those  powers,  but  until  it 
does  the  State  enjoys  a  free  hand.  This  independence  is  not  granted  to 
it  by  the  Empire.  It  forms  no  part  of  the  imperial  powers.  It  is  State 
power,  pure  and  simple.  The  State  wields  it  as  of  right  and  not  by  con- 
cession. It  existed  before  the  founding  of  the  Empire.  It  survives  that 
act.  It  is  that  autonomous  area  of  power  belonging  to  the  State  which 
has  not  yet  been  invaded  by  the  Empire.   .   .   . 

By  Art.  4  of  the  Imperial  Constitution  the  Empire  is  given  the  power 
of  supervision  and  legislation  with  reference  to  a  number  of  matters 
which  affect  more  or  less  the  general  interests  of  the  countr)'.  In  all 
such  matters  the  action  of  the  States  is  excluded  and  their  power  is  re- 
nounced in  favor  of  the  Bund.  The  field  covered  by  imperial  legislation 
and  oversight  is  quite  extensive.  .  .  . 

What,  then,  remains  as  the  exclusive  field  of  State  legislation  .'  Even,' 
State  has  the  absolute  control  of  its  own  organization.  It  determines  the 
laws  of  succession  and  settles  questions  which  arise  over  its  internal 
administration  in  accordance  with  its  own  constitution.  It  has  the  right 
to  determine  what  that  constitution  shall  be,  subject  only  to  the  condition ' 
that  there  shall  be  nothing  in  its  organic  law  that  is  contrary  to  the  Im- 
perial Constitution.  It  makes  its  own  budget  and  its  legislative  bodies 
enact  laws  governing  a  large  part  of  its  internal  affairs.  Police  regula- 
tions touching  public  meetings ;  fire  and  building  regulations ;  water 
rights ;  road  laws,  so  far  as  these  do  not  fall  within  the  competence  of 
the  Empire ;  matters  of  ordinary  credit  not  represented  by  the  banks : 
the  regulation  of  the  domestic  agricultural  situation  ;  the  breeding  of 
cattle  ;  forestry  ;  mines  ;  hunting  and  fishing  ;  the  relation  of  church  and 
state  ;  the  control  of  public  instruction  —  all  these  matters  fall  within  the 
competence  of  the  individual  State,  and  are  provided  for  by  State 
legislation.   .  .  . 

Turning  to  the  executive  sphere,  we  find  a  wholly  different  principle 
at  work.  In  the  division  of  competence  between  the  Empire  and  the 
several  States,  a  strong  unitary  tendency  is  seen.    In  matters  of  military 


340 


READINGS   IN   POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


control,  naval  affairs,  and  of  justice,  the  legislative  authority  is  taken 
wholly  from  the  States  and  is  vested  in  the  Empire.  In  finance  about 
two  thirds,  and  in  affairs  touching  the  internal  administration  of  the 
country  about  one  half,  are  removed  from  State  legislation.   .  .  . 

In  matters  pertaining  to  foreign  affairs,  however,  as  well  as  in  regard 
to  the  navy  and  fortifications,  the  control  of  the  Empire  is  quite 
supreme.  Here  the  Empire  exercises  not  alone  the  legislative  authority, 
but  the  administrative  as  well.  The  ambassadors  to  foreign  lands  are 
imperial  officers,  while  the  consuls  and  officials  in  the  protectorates  are 
imperial  appointees.   .   .   . 

With  regard  to  the  army  there  is  a  dual  arrangement.  The  authority 
of.  the  Empire  goes  farther  than  the  mere  right  of  oversight.  It  regu- 
lates directly  all  the  activity  of  the  officers  in  command.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  subordinate  officers  are  under  the  control  of  the  several 
States  and  the  whole  system  of  military  organization,  instruction,  religious 
care,  and  justice  is  left  in  their  hands.   .   .   . 

So  far  as  the  execution  of  the  laws  is  concerned,  the  powers  of  the 
individual  States  exceed  that  of  the  Empire,  and  in  the  division  of  com- 
petence the  federal  principle  is  strongly  carried  out.  The  Empire  has 
but  a  fragment  of  the  general  executive  powers,  save  in  the  matter  of 
foreign  affairs.  It  is  practically  excluded  from  the  judicial,  financial,  and 
internal  administration.  In  the  German  Empire  we  have  a  strongly  uni- 
tarian power  to  legislate  joined  to  a  strongly  federal  power  to  execute. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 
THE  LEGISLATURE 

I,  Structure  of  Legislatures 

320.  Development  of  the  lawmaking  department.  The  general 
process  through  which  the  modern  reprcsenUiti\e  legislature  de- 
veloped has  been  summarized  as  follows  : 

As  the  wealth  and  population  of  a  state  increase,  it  becomes  more 
and  more  difficult  to  govern  along  autocratic  lines.  Numerous  interests 
arise  which  do  not  receive  adequate  attention  from  the  rulers ;  men 
whose  capacity  and  attainments  deserve  recognition  are  slighted,  and  the 
private  interests  of  ruling  classes  absorb  most  of  their  energy,  to  the 
neglect  of  public  interests.  Under  such  conditions  there  are  historically 
several  possibilities  of  action  : 

(i)  The  status  quo  may  be  maintained  and  discontent  suppressed  by 
force,  in  which  case  the  state  would  probably  slowly  decay  until  absorbed 
by  some  rival  after  defeat  in  war. 

(2)  A  system  of  decentralization  may  be  encouraged,  and  each 
important  province  be  allowed  to  regulate  its  own  affairs  subject  to 
general  supervision  and  tribute,  the  provinces  being  held  together  by 
mutual  interests. 

(3)  The  central  authority  may  retain  its  power  but  gradually  develop 
a  system  of  representation  whereby  important  interests  and  persons 
may  receive  due  recognition. 

This  last  possibility  involves  a  national  application  of  the  idea  con- 
tained in  the  organization  of  a  primitive  horde  or  \illage  community. 
All  interests  and  persons  of  importance  were  included  in  the  small 
gatherings  of  these  early  groups.  Even  in  confederate  tribal  life  the 
idea  had  survived  in  the  periodic  gatherings  of  heads  of  tribes  and  dis- 
tricts to  administer  general  business.  So  in  the  assemblies  of  the  city 
states  of  the  classic  period,  every  important  citizen  was  able  to  make 
his  influence  felt  in  the  assembly  if  he  were  so  inclined.  The  dinieulty 
yvas  to  apply  the  principle  to  a  great  national  system,  and  no  aneient 
:State  ever  proved  equal  to  the  emergency.    Local  representation  was 

3-11 


342  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

common  enough,  and  representation  of  privileged  classes  in  great 
councils  was  known,  but  no  system  was  devised  whereby  the  interests  of 
all.the  people  might  be  represented  in  government. 

Through  a  series  of  events  natural  enough  in  themselves,  there  de- 
veloped in  England  during  the  thirteenth  century  an  assembly  of  del- 
egates who  represented  the  common  people  and  petty  nobility,  as 
distinguished  from  the  usual  assembly  of  the  higher  nobility  and  clergy. 
Such  an  assembly  was  by  no  means  an  anomaly  at  that  time.  A  rude 
form  of  representation  existed  among  the  Scandinavian  people  as  early 
as  the  ninth  century.  About  the  tenth  century  the  Icelandic  Althing  and 
the  Tynwald  of  the  Isle  of  Man  (which  still  survives)  were  established. 
These  were  made  up  of  elected  delegates  who  prepared  laws,  which 
were  promulgated  as  the  law  of  the  land.  Similar  bodies  may  be  traced 
in  other  countries  of  Europe,  but  they  did  not  attain  political  impor- 
tance. The  English  assembly  came  when  that  country  was  breaking 
away  from  agriculture  and  developing  commerce  and  manufactures,  and 
when  kings,  ever  engaged  in  war  or  the  suppression  of  rebellion,  were 
forced  to  rely  more  and  more  upon  the  support  of  the  common  people 
and  on  taxes  raised  from  urban  centers.  So  constantly  was  the  king  in 
need  of  money  grants  and  military  support,  that  the  first  two  hundred 
years  of  the  history  of  the  assembly  of  the  commons  marked  an  almost 
steady  growth  in  its  power  and  prestige.  During  the  sixteenth  century 
the  historic  council  of  nobles  and  clergy,  who  formed  the  house  of  lords, 
was  relatively  weak.  This  was  due  to  its  depletion  in  numbers  owing  to 
the  civil  wars  and  to  the  nationalization  of  the  church,  which  deprived 
that  body  of  much  of  its  power  and  representation.  In  consequence  the 
two  houses  during  the  Tudor  period  were  fairly  equal,  and  were  firmly 
welded  together  into  a  parliament.  The  rapid  development  of  com- 
merce and  manufactures  under  the  Tudors  and  Stuarts  (i 485-1 688) 
gradually  transferred  the  balance  of  power  from  the  lords  to  the  com- 
mons as  the  representatives  of  these  interests,  and  the  rise  of  England 
to  world  supremacy  in  the  nineteenth  century  made  the  commons 
supreme  in  governmental  policy. 

The  political  importance  of  this  development  lies  in  the  fact  that  it 
revolutionized  men's  notions  of  governmental  machinery.  The  ancient 
principle  of  governing  through  privileged  classes,  basing  their  claims  on 
noble  birth  and  landed  wealth,  was  superseded  by  a  system  of  govern- 
ment through  persons  who  represented  all  the  important  interests  of  the 
state,  and  who  had  influence  in  proportion  to  the  weight  of  interests 
and  the  proportion  of  the  population  they  represented.  The  economic 
advantages  of  such  a  system  were  so  plainly  manifest  that  other  nations 
found  it  expedient  to  imitate  it,   modifying  the  English  system  to  suit 


THE  LEGISLATLRE 


343 


their  own  peculiar  needs.  In  tliis  way  developed  the  modern  bicameral 
legislative  body,  the  center  and '  pivot  of  the  modern  democratic 
movement. 

321.  General   principles   of  legislative   organization,    liurgess, 

analyzing  the  legislative  departments  of  h'rance,  (jermany,  Kng- 
land,  and  the  United  States,  finds  substantial  agreement  on  the 
following  points  : 

1.  We  may  say  that  modern  constitutional  law  has  settled  firmly 
upon  the  bicameral  system  in  the  legislature,  with  substantial  parity  of 
powers  in  the  two  houses,  except  in  dealing  with  the  budget ;  and  that, 
in  the  control  of  the  finances,  a  larger  privilege  is  regularly  c(jnfided  to 
the  more  popular  house ;  i.e.  the  house  least  removed  in  its  origin  from 
universal  suffrage  and  direct  election.  .   .  . 

2.  7'hese  four  typical  states  are  in  substantial  harmony  up(jn  the 
question  of  the  source  from  which  the  lower  hou.ses  of  their  legislatures 
proceed.  In  all  four,  the  source  is  universal  suffrage,  or  a  suffrage  very 
nearly  universal.   .  .  . 

The  four  systems  which  we  have  examined  agree  also  in  the  mode  of 
electing  the  members  of  the  lower  houses,  at  least  so  far  as  the  general 
principles  are  concerned.  These  general  principles  are  direct  ballot, 
district  ticket  and  relative  majority.  .   .  . 

In  the  construction  of  the  upper  houses,  however,  the  same  uni- 
formity does  not  exist.  No  two  of  them  proceed  from  the  same  imme- 
diate source.  It  may  be  said,  however,  that  they  all  proceed  from  the 
same  ultimate  source.  .  .  .  The  manner  of  their  choice  is,  in  all  cases, 
indirect.   .  .  . 

3.  In  regard  to  the  principles  of  representation,  there  is  more  har- 
mony in  these  four  systems  than  is  at  first  apparent.  In  all  four  legis- 
latures the  distribution  of  the  representation  in  the  lower  houses  is  made 
according  to  population.  Some  regard  is  paid  to  the  permanent  admin- 
istrative or  local  governmental  divisions ;  but  the  resultant  modifications 
are  concessions  to  convenience,  merely,  and  do  not  represent  any  com- 
promise of  the  principle  of  proportionality. 

In  all  four  legislatures  the  distribution  of  the  representation  in 
the  upper  houses  is  made  with  but  little  regard  to  the  census  of  the 
population.  In  England  and  in  the  United  States,  no  regard  at  all  is 
paid  to  the  principle  of  proportionality ;  in  Oermany,  not  much ;  in 
France,  considerable.  If  there  is  any  one  controlling  principle  appli- 
cable to  all  these  cases,  it  is  the  representation  of  local  govcmmenial 
organizations.  .  .  . 


344 


READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


Lastly,  all  four  of  these  typical  constitutions  agree  substantially 
upon  the  principle  of  uninstructed  representation.  The  contrary  prin- 
ciple is  adopted  in  but  a  single  case,  viz.\  in  that  of  the  German 
Federal  Council. 

322.  Advantages  of  the  bicameral  system.  The  idea  of  a  law- 
making body  composed  of  two  chambers  has  been  almost  univer- 
sally accepted.  The  following  extract  indicates  some  of  the  reasons 
for  its  success  : 

The  advantages  of  a  second  chamber  may  be  summarized  as  follows : 
First,  it  serves  as  a  check  upon  hasty,  rash,  and  ill-considered  legislation. 
Legislative  assemblies  are  often  subject  to  strong  passions  and  excite- 
ments and  are  sometimes  impatient,  impetuous,  and  careless.  The  func- 
tion of  a  second  chamber  is  to  restrain  such  tendencies  and  to  compel 
careful  consideration  of  legislative  projects.  It  interposes  delay  between 
the  introduction  and  final  adoption  of  a  measure  and  thus  permits  time 
for  reflection  and  deliberation.   .  .  . 

In  the  second  place,  the  bicameral  principle  not  only  serves  to  pro- 
tect the  legislature  against  its  own  errors  of  haste  and  impulse,  but  it 
also  affords  a  protection  to  the  individual  against  the  despotism  of  a 
single  chamber.  The  existence  of  a  second  chamber  is  thus  a  guarantee 
of  liberty  as  well  as  to  some  extent  a  safeguard  against  tyranny.  .   .  . 

A  third  advantage  of  the  bicameral  system  is  that  it  affords  a  con- 
venient means  of  giving  representation  to  special  interests  or  classes  in 
the  state  and  particularly  to  the  aristocratic  portion  of  society,  in  order 
to  counterbalance  the  undue  preponderance  of  the  popular  element  in 
one  of  the  chambers,  thus  introducing  into  the  legislature  a  conservative 
force  to  curb  the  radicalism  of  the  popular  chamber.   .  .  . 

The  bicameral  system  also  affords  a  means  of  giving  separate  repre- 
sentation to  the  somewhat  dissimilar  interests  of  capital  and  labor.  .  .  . 

Finally,  the  bicameral  system  affords  an  opportunity,  in  states  having 
the  federal  form  of  government,  of  giving  representation  to  the  political 
units  composing  the  federation. 

323.  Apportionment  of  representatives   in  the  United   States. 

After  the  census  of  1900  the  following  act  fixed  the  number  of 
members  in  the  House  of  Representatives  and  apportioned  them 
among  the  commonwealths  :  ^ 

An  Act  making  the  apportionment  of  Representatives  in  Congress 
among  the  several  States  under  the  Twelfth  Census. 

^  The  admission  of  Oklahoma  in  1907  added  five  members  to  the  House. 


LEGISLATURE 


345 


Be  it  enacted  .  .  .  That  after  the  third  day  of  March,  nineteen  hun- 
dred and  three,  the  House  of  Representatives  shall  be  composed  of  three 
hundred  and  eighty-six  members  to  be  apportioned  among  the  several 
States  as  follows : 

Alabama  9  ;  Arkansas  7  ;  California  8  ;  Colorado  3  ;  (etc.). 

Section  2.  That  whenever  a  Tiew  State  is  admitted  to  the  I'nion 
the  Representative  or  Representatives  assigned  to  it  shall  be  in  addition 
to  the  number  three  hundred  and  eighty-six. 

Section  3.  That  in  each  State  .  .  .  the  number  to  which  such  State 
may  be  entitled  in  the  Fifty-eighth  and  each  subsec|ucnt  Congress  shall 
be  elected  by  districts  composed  of  contiguous  and  compact  terriior)' 
containing  as  nearly  as  practicable  an  equal  number  of  inhabitants.  The 
said  districts  shall  be  equal  to  the  number  of  Representatives  to  which 
such  State  shall  be  entitled  in  Congress,  no  one  district  electing  more 
than  one  Representative. 

Section  4.  That  in  case  of  an  increase  in  the  number  of  Represen- 
tatives which  may  be  given  any  State  under  this  apportionment,  such 
additional  Representatives  shall  be  elected  by  the  State  at  large  and 
the  other  Representatives  by  the  districts  now  prescribed  by  law  until 
the  legislature  of  such  State  in  the  manner  herein  prescribed  shall  redis- 
trict  such  State ;  .  .  .  and  if  the  number  hereby  provided  for  shall  in 
any  State  be  less  than  it  was  before  .  .  .  then  the  whole  number  .  .  . 
shall  be  elected  at  large  unless  the  legislatures  of  said  States  have  pro- 
vided or  shall  otherwise  provide  before  the  time  fixed  by  law  for  the 
next  election  of  Representatives  therein. 

324.  Advantages  and  disadvantages  of  indirect  election.  In- 
direct election,  in  frequent  use  for  selecting  at  least  one  legislative 
chamber,  has  the  following  advantages  : 

The  principal  argument  in  favor  of  the  system  of  indirect  election  is 
that  it  eliminates  to  some  extent,  as  has  been  said,  the  evils  of  universal 
suffrage  by  confining  the  ultimate  choice  to  a  body  of  select  persons 
possessing  a  higher  average  of  ability  and  necessarily  feeling  a  keener 
sense  of  responsibility.  Moreover,  it  tends  to  diminish  the  evils  of  party 
passion  and  struggle  by  removing  the  object  of  the  popular  choice  one 
degree  and  confining  the  function  of  the  electorate  as  a  whole  to  the 
choice  of  those  upon  whom  the  ultimate  responsibility  must  rest.  "  This 
contrivance,"  says  John  Stuart  Mill,'  "  was  probably  intended  as  a  slight 
impediment  to  the  full  sweep  of  popular  feeling;  giving  the  suffrage 
and  with  it  the  complete  ultimate  power  to  the  many,  but  com|K-lling 
1  "  Representative  Government,"  chap,  ix,  p.  iSo. 


346  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

them  to  exercise  it  through  the  agency  of  a  comparatively  few,  who, 
it  was  supposed,  would  be  less  moved  than  the  Demos  by  the  gust 
of  popular  passion.  .  .  ."  But  experience  with  the  indirect  system  of 
election  has  never  worked  out  in  practice  satisfactorily.  .  .   . 

Where  the  party  system  is  well  developed,  the  indirect  scheme  is 
likely  to  degenerate  into  a  cumbrous  formality,  since  the  intermediate 
electors  will  be  chosen  under  party  pledges  to  vote  for  particular  can- 
didates. .  .  .  Manifestly,  whatever  may  be  the  advantages  of  indirect 
election,  a  suffrage  which  limits  the  power  of  the  voter  merely  to  the 
selection  of  those  who  are  to  choose  instead  of  those  who  are  to  repre- 
sent him  will  not  satisfy  the  masses  in  the  present  state  of  the  world's 
opinion  concerning  the  nature  of  representative  government.  The  idea 
is  out  of  harmony  with  the  spirit  of  modem  democracy.  One  of  the 
chief  merits  of  popular  government  comes  from  the  fact  that  it  stimulates 
interest  in  public  affairs  and  increases  the  political  intelligence  of  the 
masses.  If  a  middleman  is  interposed  between  the  voter  and  the  object 
of  his  choice,  his  interest  is  necessarily  diminished  and  his  opportunity 
for  political  education  weakened.  Finally,  the  indirect  system  tends  to 
increase  the  evils  of  bribery,  because  the  ultimate  electoral  body  is 
much  less  numerous  and  consequently  more  easily  reached  by  corrupt 
influences  than  the  whole  mass  of  voters. 

325.  Results  of  election  by  majority  in  France.  The  evil  results 
caused  by  the  French  law  requiring  an  absolute  majority  for  elec- 
tion to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  are  thus  stated  by  Wilson  : 

The  law  governing  the  election  of  Deputies  provides  against  choice 
by  plurality  on  the  first  ballot ;  and  the  result  is  unfortunate.  If  there 
are  more  than  two  candidates  in  an  electoral  district,  an  election  on  the 
first  ballot  is  possible  only  if  one  of  the  candidates  receives  an  absolute 
majority  of  all  the  votes  cast  not  only,  but  also  at  least  one  fourth  as 
many  votes  as  there  are  registered  voters  in  the  district.  If  no  one 
receives  such  a  majority,  another  vote  must  be  taken  two  weeks  later, 
and  at  this  a  plurality  is  sufficient  to  elect.  The  result  is,  that  the 
multiplication  of  parties,  or  rather  the  multiplication  of  groups  and 
factions  within  the  larger  party  lines,  from  which  France  naturally 
suffers  overmuch,  is  directly  encouraged.  Rival  groups  are  tempted  to 
show  their  strength  on  the  first  ballot  in  an  election,  for  the  purpose  of 
winning  a  place  or  exchanging  favor  for  favor  in  the  second.  They  lose 
nothing  by  failing  in  the  first ;  they  may  gain  concessions  or  be  more 
regarded  another  time  by  showing  a  little  strength  ;  and  rivalry  is  encour- 
aged, instead  of  consolidation.    France  cannot  afford  to  foster  factions. 


THE  LEGISLATURE  347 

II.   Comparative  Power  or  the  Two  Houses 

326.  Relations  of  the  two  Houses  in  the  United  States.    Brsce 

discusses  the  general  nature  of  the  two  American  Houses  and  their 
attitude  to  each  other  as  follows  :  ^ 

The  respective  characters  of  the  two  bodies  are  wholly  unlike  those  of 
the  so-called  upper  and  lower  chambers  of  Europe.  In  Europe  there  is 
always  a  difference  of  political  complexion,  generally  resting  on  a  differ- 
ence in  personal  composidon.  There  the  upper  chamber  represents  the 
aristocracy  of  the  country,  or  the  men  of  wealth,  or  the  high  officials,  or 
the  influence  of  the  Crown  and  Court ;  while  the  lower  chamber  repre- 
sents the  muldtude.  Between  the  Senate  and  the  House  there  is  no 
such  difference.  Both  equally  represent  the  people  .  .  .  both  have  been 
formed  by  the  same  social  influences :  and  the  social  pretensions  of  a 
senator  expire  with  his  term  of  office.  Both  are  possessed  by  the  same 
ideas,  governed  by  the  same  sentiments,  equally  conscious  of  their 
dependence  on  public  opinion.  The  one  has  never  been,  like  the  English 
House  of  Commons,  a  popular  pet,  the  other  never,  like  the  English 
House  of  Lords,  a  popular  bugbear.  .   .   . 

The  real  differences  between  the  two  bodies  have  been  indicated  in 
speaking  of  the  Senate.  They  are  due  to  the  smaller  size  of  the  latter, 
to  the  somewhat  superior  capacity  of  its  members,  to  the  habits  which 
its  executive  functions  form  in  individual  senators,  and  have  formed  in 
the  whole  body.  .  .  . 

Collisions  between  the  two  Houses  are  frequent.  Each  is  jealous  and 
combative.  Each  is  prone  to  alter  the  bills  that  come  from  the  other; 
and  the  Senate  in  particular  knocks  about  remorselessly  those  favorite 
children  of  the  House,  the  appropriation  bills.  The  fact  that  one  Hou.se 
has  passed  a  bill  goes  but  a  litUe  way  in  inducing  the  other  to  pass  it. 
The  Senate  would  reject  twenty  House  bills  as  readily  as  one.  Dead- 
locks, however,  disagreements  over  serious  issues  which  stop  the  ma- 
chinery of  administration,  are  not  common.   .   .   . 

When  each  chamber  persists  in  its  own  view,  the  regular  proceeding 
is  to  appoint  a  committee  of  conference,  consisting  of  three  members  of 
the  Senate  and  three  of  the  House.  These  six  meet  in  secret,  and 
generally  settle  matters  by  a  compromise,  which  enables  each  side  to 
retire  with  honor.  .  .  . 

In  a  contest  the  Senate  usually,  though  not  invariably,  gets  the  better 
of  the  House.  It  is  smaller,  and  can  therefore  more  easily  keep  its 
majority  together ;  its  members  are  more  experienced  ;  and  it  has  the 

1  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


1 


348  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

great  advantage  of  being  permanent,  whereas  the  House  is  a  transient 
body.  The  Senate  can  hold  out,  because  if  it  does  not  get  its  way  at 
once  against  the  House,  it  may  do  so  when  a  new  House  comes  up  to 
Washington.  The  House  cannot  afford  to  wait,  because  the  hour  of  its 
own  dissolution  is  at  hand.  Besides,  while  the  House  does  not  know 
the  Senate  from  inside,  the  Senate,  many  of  whose  members  have  sat 
in  the  House,  knows  all  the  "  ins  and  outs  "  of  its  rival,  can  gauge  its 
strength  and  play  upon  its  weaknesses. 

327.  The  House  of  Lords  and  money  bills.  The  following  discus- 
sion of  the  authority  of  the  House  of  Lords  over  finance  is  especially 
pertinent  in  view  of  the  recent  crisis  over  the  Budget  in  England ;! 

Since  the  House  of  Lords  is  a  coordinate  branch  of  the  legislature, 
eveiy  act  of  Parliament  requires  its  absent,  and  although  in  practice  it 
is  far  less  powerful  than  the  House  of  Commons,  the  only  subject  on 
which  the  limitations  of  its  authority  can  be  stated  with  precision  is  that 
of  finance.  As  far  back  as  1671  the  Commons  resolved  "That,  in  all 
aids  given  to  the  King,  by  the  Commons,  the  Rate  or  Tax  ought  not 
to  be  altered  by  the  Lords";  and  in  1678  they  adopted  another  resolu- 
tion that  all  bills  granting  supplies  "  ought  to  begin  with  the  Com- 
mons. And  that  it  is  the  undoubted  and  sole  right  of  the  Commons, 
to  direct,  limit,  and  appoint,  in  such  Bills,  the  Ends,  Purposes,  Consid- 
erations, Conditions,  Limitations,  and  Qualifications  of  such  Grants ; 
which  ought  not  to  be  changed,  or  altered  by  the  House  of  Lords." 
The  Commons  have  clung  to  this  principle  ever  since,  enforcing  it  by  a 
refusal  to  consider  bills  in  which  the  Lords  have  inserted  or  amended 
financial  provisions;  and  although  the  Lords  have  never  expressly 
admitted  the  claim,  they  have  in  fact  submitted  to  it.  .  .  . 

It  might  be  supposed  that  the  Commons  could  carry  any  piece  of 
legislation  by  tacking  it  to  a  money  bill.  This  was  formerly  done ;  but 
the  Lords  have  long  had  a  standing  order  forbidding  such  a  practice, 
and  no  attempt  has  been  made  of  late  years  to  revive  it.  Moreover  the 
rule  about  money  bills  is  not  strictly  enforced  where  the  financial  pro- 
vision is  merely  incidental  to  general  legislation.  The  Lords  are  free  to 
omit  such  a  clause  altogether,  or  if  it  is  so  interwoven  with  the  rest  of 
the  measure  that  it  cannot  be  treated  separately,  the  Commons  have 
often  waived  their  rights  and  taken  into  consideration  amendments  made 
by  the  Lords.  .   .  . 

The  rule  about  money  bills  applies  only  to  measures  actually  before 
Parliament.     It  does  not  prevent  the  House  of  Lords  from  expressing 

1  Copyright,  1908,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


THE  LEGISLA'ILRK  .  ,0 

an  opinion  upon  financial  matters  either  in  debate  or  by  resolution.  <>r 
from  inquiring  into  them  by  means  of  select  committees.' 

328.  Nature  of  the  German  "Bundesrath."  Lowell  describes 
as  follows  the  unique  position  of  the  German  upper  House  : ' 

The  Bundesrath  is  in  its  nature  unlike  any  other  body  in  the  world, 
and  its  peculiarities  can  be  explained  only  by  a  reference  to  the  Diet  of 
the  old  Germanic  Confederation.  It  is  not  an  international  conference, 
because  it  is  part  of  a  constitutional  system,  and  has  power  to  enact 
laws.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  not  a  deliberative  assembly,  because  the 
delegates  vote  according  to  instructions  from  home.  It  is  unlike  any 
other  legislative  chamber,  inasmuch  as  the  members  do  not  enjoy  a  fi.xed 
tenure  of  office,  and  are  not  free  to  vote  according  to  their  personal 
convictions.  Its  essential  characteristics  are  that  it  represents  the  gov- 
ernments of  the  States  and  not  their  people,  and  that  each  State  is  en- 
titled to  a  certain  number  of  votes  which  it  may  authorize  one  or  more 
persons  to  cast  in  its  name,  these  persons  being  its  agents,  whom  it  may 
appoint,  recall,  or  instruct  at  any  time.  The  true  concejjtion  of  the 
Bundesrath,  therefore,  is  that  of  an  assembly  of  the  sovereigns  of  the 
States,  who  are  not,  indeed,  actually  present,  but  appear  in  the  persons, 
of  their  representatives. 

III.    Internal  Organization  and  Prockduke 

329.  General  method  of  legislation.    In  comparing  legislative 

procedure  in  France,  Germany,  England,  and  the  United  States, 
Burgess  finds  the  following  general  similarities  and  differences : 

Upon  this  subject,  or  at  least  upon  its  main  features,  the  four  systems 
under  examination  are  in  substantial  harmony.  They  agree  in  confer- 
ring the  initiation  of  legislation  upon  each  house ;  in  requiring  the 
approval  of  both  houses  to  the  validity  of  a  project ;  in  making  the 
vote  of  a  majority  of  the  members  voting  upon  the  project,  a  quorum 
being  present,  necessary  and  sufficient ;  and  in  according  to  the  execu- 
tive certain  influence  and  power  upon  the  course  of  legislation.  'I'hese 
are  the  general  principles.  .  .  . 

The  exceptions  are  as  follows.  In  all  tlicse  systems,  except  the  Ger- 
man, the  initiation  of  financial  legislation  is  vested,  wholly  or  partly. 
exclusively  or  primarily,  in  the  lower  houses.  In  the  German  I-edenii 
Council  certain  bills  cannot  be  passed  without  the  consent  of  the  Prus- 
sian representatives,  and  certain  other  bills  cannot  be  passed  without 

1  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 


350 


READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


the  consent  of  the  commonwealth  particularly  affected.  In  the  French 
Senate  a  majority  of  the  whole  number  of  voices  to  which  the  body  is  legally 
entitled  must  vote  upon  the  project  in  order  to  effect  its  passage.  .  .  . 

Upon  the  general  principle  of  executive  participation  all  these  systems 
are  in  accord ;  but  they  differ  as  to  the  manner  of  the  participation.  The 
English  system  legally  vests  both  the  initiation  and  the  veto  of  legis- 
lation in  the  executive ;  in  practice  the  initiation  is  almost  exclusive,  but 
there  is  no  veto.  The  system  of  the  United  States  vests  in  the  execu- 
tive a  limited  veto,  but  no  initiation.  The  French  system  vests  in  the 
executive  a  right  of  initiation  and  power  to  require  reconsideration.  In 
Germany,  neither  initiation  or  veto  is  directly  vested  in  the  Emperor ; 
but  in  his  quality  of  Prussian  King,  he  exercises  both  powers  indirectly 
—  a  general  power  of  initiation  and  a  partial  veto. 

330.  Procedure  in  the  House  of  Lords.  Because  of  its  peculiar 
position  in  the  English  constitutional  system,  the  procedure  in  the 
House  of  Lords  is  less  rigid  than  in  most  legislative  bodies. ^ 

The  Lords  have  no  constituents  to  impress,  and  hence  there  are  not 
so  many  members  as  in  the  Commons  who  want  to  take  part  in  debate. 
Moreover,  they  are  not  obliged  to  devote  a  large  part  of  their  time  to 
supply  and  to  the  budget ;  and  as  their  chamber  is  not  the  place  where 
the  great  political  battles  are  fought,  the  Opposition  does  not  oppose 
at  every  possible  step.  They  can,  therefore,  get  through  their  work 
at  leisure.  They  make  use,  indeed,  of  select  and  sessional  committees 
in  much  the  same  way  as  the  Commons ;  but,  having  time  enough  to 
consider  every  bill  in  Committee  of  the  Whole,  they  do  not  need  time- 
saving  machinery  like  the  Standing  Committees  on  Law  and  Trade. 
For  the  same  reason,  and  because  there  is  no  disposition  to  willful 
obstruction,  they  do  not  require  and  do  not  have  a  closure  to  cut  off 
debate.  Their  sittings  also  are  short.  On  Wednesday  and  Saturday 
they  seldom  meet  at  all,  while  on  other  days  their  usual  hour  of  meet- 
ing is  half-past  four,  and  they  rarely  sit  after  dinner  time. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  very  fact  that  the  fate  of  ministers  does  not 
hang  upon  their  votes  renders  possible  a  much  larger  freedom  of  action 
than  in  the  Commons.  There  is  not  the  same  need  of  precaution 
against  hasty,  ill-considered  motions,  or  against  votes  that  might  em- 
barrass the  government  without  implying  a  real  lack  of  confidence. 
Hence  there  is  no  restriction  upon  the  motions  that  can  be  brought  for- 
ward, save  that  notice  must  be  given  beforehand  ;  and  any  question  to 
a  minister  may  be  followed  by  a  general  debate,  provided  again  that 
notice  of  the  question  has  been  given  in  the  orders  of  the  day. 
1  Copyright,  1908,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


THE  LEGISLATrRF  35  I 

331.  Seating  of  members  in  the  House  of  Commons.  The 
arrangement  in  the  House  of  Commons  lends  itself  to  the  con- 
tinuous existence  of  two  rival  party  groups. 

Down  the  center  of  the  hall  in  which  the  House  sits  runs  11  ver)' 
broad  aisle.  The  Speaker's  seat  stands,  upon  an  elevated  place,  at 
the  farther  end  of  this  aisle,  and  below  it  are  the  seats  and  tables  of  the 
clerks  and  a  great  table  stretching  some  distance  down  the  aisle,  for  the 
reception  of  the  Sergeant's  mace  and  various  books,  petition  boxes,  and 
papers.  The  benches  on  either  side  of  the  aisle  face  each  other.  Those 
which  rise,  in  tiers,  to  the  Speaker's  right  are  occupied  by  the  majority, 
the  Cabinet  ministers,  their  leaders,  sitting  on  the  front  bench  by  the 
great  table.  This  front  bench  is  accordingly  called  the  "  Treasury 
Bench,"  —  the  Treasury  being  the  leading  Cabinet  office.  On  the 
benches  which  rise  to  the  Speaker's  left  sit'the  minority,  their  leaders 
also  (the  "  leaders  of  the  Opposition,"  —  the  minority  being  expected, 
generally  with  reason,  to  be  opposed  to  all  ministerial  proposals)  on  the 
front  bench  by  the  table,  and  so  directly  facing  the  ministers,  only  the 
table  intervening. 

332.  The  French  Chamber  a  tumultuous  body.  The  l(»wcr 
House  in  France  has  acquired  a  reputation  for  disorder  and 
noisy  debate.^ 

Every  large  body  of  men,  not  under  strict  military  discipline,  has 
lurking  in  it  the  traits  of  a  mob,  and  is  liable  to  occasional  outbreaks 
when  the  spirit  of  disorder  becomes  epidemic ;  but  the  French  Chamber 
of  Deputies  is  especially  tumultuous,  and,  in  times  of  great  excitement, 
sometimes  breaks  into  a  veritable  uproar.  Even  the  method  of  pre- 
serving order  lacks  the  decorum  and  dignity  that  one  expects  in  a  legis- 
lative assembly.  The  President  has  power  to  call  a  refractory  member 
to  order  and  impose  a  penalty  in  case  he  persists;  but  instead  of  re- 
lying on  this  alone,  he  often  tries  to  enforce  silence  by  caustic  remarks. 
The  writer  remembers  being  in  the  Chamber  a  few  years  ago  when  M. 
Floquet  was  presiding,  — the  same  man  who  fought  a  duel  with  Ceneral 
Boulanger  and  wounded  him  in  tlie  throat.  A  deputy  who  had  just 
been  speaking  kept  interrupting  the  member  who  was  addressing  the 
Chamber,  and  when  called  to  order  made  scjme  remark  about  padia- 
mentary  practice.  The  President  cried  out,  "  It  is  not  according  to 
parliamentary  practice  for  one  man  to  speak  all  the  time."  "  I  am  not 
speaking  all  the  time,"  said  the  deputy.  "  At  this  moment  you  arc  over- 
bearing everybody,"  answered  the  President.  This  incident  is  related, 
1  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 


^52  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

not  as  being  unusual  or  humorous,  but  as  a  fair  sample  of  what  is 
constantly  occurring  in  the  Chamber.  Even  real  sarcasm  does  not  seem 
to  be  thought  improper.  Thus  in  a  recent  debate  a  deputy,  in  the 
midst  of  an  unusually  long  speech,  was  continually  interrupted,  when 
the  President,  Floquet,  exclaimed,  "  Pray  be  silent,  gentlemen.  The 
member  who  is  speaking  has  never  before  approached  so  near  to  the 
question."  These  sallies  from  the  chair  are  an  old  tradition  in  France, 
although,  of  course,  their  use  depends  on  the  personal  character  of  the 
President.  One  does  not,  for  example,  find  them  at  all  in  the  reports  of 
debates  during  the  time  Casimir-Perier  was  presiding  over  the  Chamber. 
When  the  confusion  gets  beyond  all  control,  and  the  President  is  at 
his  wits'  end,  he  puts  on  his  hat,  and  if  this  does  not  quell  the  disturb- 
ance, he  suspends  the  sitting  for  an  hour  in  order  to  give  time  for 
the  excitement  to  subside., 

333.  Interpellations  in  the  French  Chamber  of  Deputies.    The 

following  describes  a  form  of  procedure  of  grave  importance  in 
the  French  legislative  system  : 

.  .  .  questions  are  addressed  to  the  ministers  by  members  who  really 
want  information.  But  another  kind  of  question  has  also  developed, 
which  is  used  not  to  get  information,  but  to  call  the  cabinet  to  account, 
and  force  the  Chamber  to  pass  judgment  upon  its  conduct.  This  is  the 
interpellation.  In  form  it  is  similar  to  the  question,  but  the  procedure 
in  the  two  cases  is  quite  different.  A  question  can  be  addressed  to  a 
minister  only  with  his  consent,  whereas  the  interpellation  is  a  matter 
of  right,  which  any  deputy  may  exercise,  without  regard  to  the  wishes  of 
the  cabinet.  .  .  .  But  by  far  the  most  important  difference  consists  in 
the  fact  that  the  author  of  the  question  can  alone  reply  to  the  minister, 
no  further  discussion  being  permitted,  and  no  motion  being  in  order; 
while  the  interpellation  is  followed  both  by  a  general  debate  and  by 
motions.  These  are  in  the  form  of  motions  to  pass  to  the  order  of  the 
day,  and  may  be  orders  of  the  day  pure  and  simple,  as  they  are  called, 
which  contain  no  expression  of  opinion,  or  they  may  be  what  are  termed 
orders  of  the  day  with  a  motive,  such  as  "  the  Chamber,  approving 
the  declarations  of  the  Government,  passes  to  the  order  of  the  day." 
Several  orders  of  this  kind  are  often  moved,  and  they  are  put  to  the  vote 
in  succession.  The  ministers  select  one  of  them  (usually  one  proposed 
by  their  friends  for  the  purpose),  and  declare  that  they  will  accept  that. 
If  it  is  rejected  by  the  Chamber,  or  if  a  hostile  order  of  the  day  is 
adopted,  and  the  matter  is  thought  to  be  of  suffidient  importance,  the 
cabinet  resigns.     This  is  a  very  common  way  of  upsetting  a  ministry, 


THE  LEGISLATURE  -,r^ 

but  it  is  one  wliich  puts  the  cabinet  in  a  position  of  great  disadvantage,  for 
a  government  would  be  superhuman  that  never  made  mistakes,  and  yet 
here  is  a  method  by  which  any  of  its  acts  can  be  brought  before  the 
Chamber,  and  a  vote  forced  on  the  question  whether  it  made  a  mistake 
or  not.  Moreover,  members  of  the  opposition  are  given  a  chance  to 
employ  their  ingenuity  in  framing  orders  of  the  day  so  as  to  catch  the 
votes  of  those  deputies  who  are  in  sympathy  with  the  cabinet,  but 
cannot  approve  of  the  act  in  question.  .   .   . 

The  frequency  with  which  interpellations  are  used  to  upset  the 
cabinet  may  be  judged  by  the  fact  that  out  of  the  twenty-one  ministries 
that  have  resigned  in  consequence  of  a  vote  of  the  Chamber  of  I  )eputies 
since  the  cabinet  has  been  responsible,  ten  have  fallen  on  account  of 
orders  of  the  day  moved  after  an  interpellation,  or  in  the  course  of 
debate.   .   .  . 

The  large  part  that  interpellations  play  in  French  politics  is  shown 
by  the  fact  that  they  arouse  more  popular  interest  than  the  speeches  on 
great  measures ;  and,  indeed,  the  most  valuable  quality  for  a  minister  to 
possess  is  a  ready  tact  and  quick  wit  in  answering  them. 

334.  Organization  of  the  German  "  Reichstag."  The  (k-rman 
lower  House  chooses  its  officers  as  follows  : 

The  initial  constitution  of  a  newly  elected  Rcic/isfag  is  interesting.  It 
comes  to  order  under  the  presidency  of  the  oldest  member ;  it  then 
elects  its  president,  two  vice  presidents,  and  secretaries ;  the  president 
and  vice  presidents  for  a  term  of  only  four  weeks.  At  the  end  of  these 
four  weeks  a  president  and  vice  presidents  are  elected  for  the  rest  of 
the  session.  There  is  no  election  of  officers  for  the  whole  legislative  temi. 
as  in  England  and  the  United  States :  at  the  opening  of  each  annual 
session  a  new  election  takes  place.  It  is  only  at  the  first,  however,  that 
there  is  a,  so  to  say,  experimental  election  for  a  trial  term  of  four  weeks. 

335.  The  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives.  The  follow- 
ing extract  discusses  the  general  nature  of  this  office,  one  which  is 
at  present  the  source  of  much  controversy  in  the  United  States  : ' 

In  the  beginning  of  our  federal  government  the  Speaker  was  regarded 
as  a  mere  moderator,  but  as  the  House  grew  in  size  and  the  business  to 
be  transacted  increased  enormously,  it  became  impossible  for  him  to  sit 
passively  and  see  the  measures  of  his  party  delayed  or  defeated  by  the 
dilatory  tactics  of  the  minority.    Hence  it  has  come  about  that  the 

1  Copyright,  1910,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


;54 


READINGS   IN   POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


Speaker  is  now  a  party  leader  holding  the  minority  in  such  control  as 
will  enable  the  majority  to  carry  its  principal  measures.   .   .   . 

The  Speaker,  according  to  constitutional  law,  is  chosen  by  the  House 
of  Representatives,  but  in  fact  he  is  selected  at  a  caucus  of  the  majority 
party,  and  the  House  merely  ratifies  the  selection.  The  office  always 
falls  to  some  member  of  long  service  who  has  had  not  only  an  oppor- 
tunity to  master  the  intricate  details  of  parliamentary  procedure,  but  also 
has  learned  the  fine  art  of  political  manipulation  —  of  securing  support, 
skillfully  distributing  favors,  and  thwarting  opposition.  .  .  .  Neverthe- 
less, he  is  in  a  very  real  sense  a  party  leader  and  the  success  of  his 
party  at  elections  depends  in  a  considerable  measure  on  his  policy  and 
conduct  in  office. 

The  elements  of  control  in  the  hands  of  the  Speaker  are  undoubtedly 
powerful.  He  appoints,  as  we  have  seen,  the  committees  of  the  House 
and  names  the  chairman  of  each  (except  the  rules  committee,  which  was 
made  elective  on  March  19,  19 10,  and  authorized  to  choose  its  own 
chairman) ;  until  that  date  he  was  ex-officio  chairman  of  the  committee 
on  rules,  which  directs  a  considerable  portion  of  the  business  of  the 
House,  but  at  that  time  the  House  resolved  to  remove  the  Speaker 
from  that  committee ;  he  may  refuse  to  put  dilatory  motions ;  he  may 
recognize  whomsoever  he  pleases  on  the  floor  of  the  House ;  and  he 
decides  questions  of  parliamentary  procedure  subject  to  appeals  from 
his  decisions. 

336.  Committees  in  the  House  of  Representatives.  Probably  in 
no  legislative  body  are  committees  of  so  much  importance  as  in 
the  lower  chamber  in  the  United  States, 

The  House  has  so  many  standing  committees  that  every  representa- 
tive is  a  member  of  one  or  another  of  them,  —  but  many  of  the  commit- 
tees have  little  or  nothing  to  do.  Some  of  them,  though  still  regularly 
appointed,  have  no  duties  assigned  to  them  by  the  rules.  One  of  the 
most  important  committees  is  that  on  Appropriations,  which  has  charge 
of  the  general  money-spending  bills  introduced  every  year  to  meet  the 
expenses  of  the  government,  and  which,  by  virtue  of  its  power  under 
the  rules  to  bring  its  reports  to  the  consideration  of  the  House  at  any 
time,  to  the  thrusting  aside  of  whatever  matter,  virtually  dominates  the" 
House  by  controlling  its  use  of  its  time.  Special  appropriation  bills, 
which  propose  to  provide  moneys  for  the  expenses  of  single  departments, 
—  as,  for  example,  the  Navy  Department  or  the  War  Department,  — 
are,  by  a  recent  rule  of  the  House,  taken  out  of  the  hands  of  the  Com- 
mittee on  Appropriations  and  given  to  the  committees  on  the  special 
departments  concerned.    Scarcely  less  important  than  the  Committee  on 


THE  LEGISLATURE  355 

Appropriations,  though  scarcely  so  busy  as  it,  is  the  Committee  on  Ways 
and  Means,  which  has  charge  of  questions  of  taxation.  It  is,  of  course, 
to  the  appointment  of  such  committees  that  the  Speaker  jsays  most 
attention.    Through  them  his  influence  is  most  ix)tent. 

Some  members  of  the  House  are  considered  to  be  entitled,  because 
of  their  long  service  and  experience  in  Congress,  to  be  put  on  imjxjrtant 
committees,  and  on  every  committee  there  must,  by  imperative  custom, 
be  representatives  of  both  parties  in  the  House.  But  these  partial  limi- 
tations upon  the  Speaker's  choice  do  not  often  seriously  hamper  him  in 
exercising  his  preferences. 

337.  Results  of  the  committee  system  in  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives. Bryce  criticizes  the  power  of  committees  in  the 
American  system  as  follows  :  ^ 

It  destroys  the  unity  of  the  House  as  a  legislative  body.  Sincv  the 
practical  work  of  shaping  legislation  is  done  in  the  committees,  the  inter- 
est of  members  centers  there,  and  they  care  less  about  the  proceedings 
of  the  whole  body.  .  .  . 

It  prevents  the  capacity  of  the  best  members  from  being  bnnight  to 
bear  upon  any  one  piece  of  legislation,  however  important.   .   .   . 

It  cramps  debate.  .  .  . 

It  lessens  the  cohesion  and  harmony  of  legislation.  F^ch  committee 
goes  on  its  own  way  with  its  own  bills  just  as  though  it  were  legislating 
for  one  planet  and  the  other  committees  for  others.  .  .   . 

It  gives  facilities  for  the  exercise  of  underhand  and  even  corrupt  in- 
fluence. In  a  small  committee  the  voice  of  each  member  is  well  worth 
securing,  and  may  be  secured  with  little  danger  of  a  public  scandal.   .   .   . 

It  reduces  responsibility.   .   .   . 

It  lowers  the  interests  of  the  nation  in  the  proceedings  of  Congress. 
Except  in  exciting  times,  when  large  questions  have  to  be  settled,  tlie 
bulk  of  real  business  is  done  not  in  the  great  hall  of  the  House  but 
in  this  labyrinth  of  committee  rooms  and  the  lobbies  that  surround 
them.  .  .  . 

The  country  of  course  suffers  from  the  want  of  the  light  and  leading 
on  public  affairs  which  debates  in  Congress  ought  to  supply.  .  .  . 

It  throws  power  into  the  hands  of  the  chairmen  of  committees,  espe- 
cially, of  course,  of  those  which  deal  with  finance  and  with  great  material 
interests.  .   .  . 

It  enables  the  House  to  deal  with  a  far  greater  number  of  measures 
and  subjects  than  could  otherwise  be  overtaken;  and  has  the  adv:nii;i;'e 
1  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


356  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

of  enabling  evidence  to  be  taken  by  those  whose  duty  it  is  to  reshape 
or  amend  a  bill.   .   .  . 

It  sets  the  members  of  the  House  to  work  for  which  their  previous 
training  has  fitted  them  much  better  than  for  either  legislating  or  debat- 
ing "  in  the  grand  style."  They  are  shrewd,  keen  men  of  business, 
apt  for  talk  in  committee,  less  apt  for  wide  views  of  policy  and  elevated 
discourse  in  an  assembly.  .  .   . 

On  the  whole,  it  may  be  said  that  under  this  system  the  House  dis- 
patches a  vast  amount  of  work  and  does  the  negative  part  of  it,  the 
killing  off  of  worthless  bills,  in  a  thorough  way. 

338.  The  "previous  question"  in  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives. One  of  the  most  effective  rules  developed  for  the  purpose 
of  controlling  debate  is  described  in  the  following : 

The  great  remedy  against  prolix  or  obstructive  debate  is  the  so-called 
previous  question,  which  is  moved  in  the  form,  "  shall  the  main  question 
be  now  put  ? "  and  when  ordered  closes  forthwith  all  debate,  and  brings 
the  House  to  a  direct  vote  on  that  main  question.  On  the  motion  for 
the  putting  of  the  main  question  no  debate  is  allowed ;  but  it  does  not 
destroy  the  right  of  the  member  "  reporting  the  measure  under  consider- 
ation "  from  a  committee,  to  wind  up  the  discussion  by  his  reply.  This 
closure  of  the  debate  may  be  moved  by  any  member  without  the  need  of 
leave  from  the  Speaker,  and  requires  only  a  bare  majority  of  those  pres- 
ent. When  directed  by  the  House  to  be  applied  in  committee,  for  it  can- 
not be  moved  after  the  House  has  gone  into  committee,  it  has  the  effect 
of  securing  five  minutes  to  the  mover  of  any  amendment,  and  five  min- 
utes to  the  member  who  first  ''  obtains  the  floor  "  (gets  the  chance  of 
speaking)  in  opposition  to  it,  permitting  no  one  else  to  speak.  A  mem- 
ber in  proposing  a  resolution  or  motion  usually  asks  at  the  same  time  for 
the  previous  question  upon  it,  so  as  to  prevent  it  from  being  talked  out. 

Closure  by  previous  question  is  in  almost  daily  use,  and  is  consid- 
ered so  essential  to  the  progress  of  business  that  I  never  found  any 
member  or  official  who  thought  it  could  be  dispensed  with.  Even  the 
senators,  who  object  to  its  introduction  into  their  own  much  smaller 
chamber,  agree  that  it  must  exist  in  a  large  body  like  the  House.  To 
the  inquiry  whether  it  was  abused,  most  of  my  informants  answered  that 
this  rarely  happened.  This  is  attributed  to  the  fear  entertained  of  the 
disapproval  of  the  people,  and  to  the  sentiment  in  the  House  itself  in 
favor  of  full  discussion,  which  sometimes  induces  the  majority  to  refuse 
the  previous  question  when  demanded  by  one  of  their  own  party,  or  on 
behalf  of  a  motion  which  they  are  as  a  whole  supporting. 


THE  LlXnSLATURE  -r- 

IV.    Functions  oi'  T.eoisi.atl'rf.s 

339.  Proper  functions  of  lawmaking  bodies.  The  danger  of 
overlegislation  and  some  other  functions  which  lawmaking  bodies 
may  perform  to  advantage  are  indicated  in  the  following  :  ^ 

The  political  philosopher  of  these  days  of  self-government  has,  how- 
ever, something  more  than  a  douht  with  which  to  gainsay  the  usefulness 
of  a  sovereign  representative  body  which  confines  itself  to  legislation  to 
the  exclusion  of  all  other  functions.  Buckle  declared,  indeed,  that  the 
chief  use  and  value  of  legislation  nowadays  lay  in  its  opportunity  and 
power  to  remedy  the  mistakes  of  the  legislation  of  the  past ;  that  it  was 
beneficent  only  when  it  carried  healing  in  its  wings  ;  that  repeal  was  more 
blessed  than  enactment.  And  it  is  certainly  true  that  the  greater  part  of 
the  labor  of  legislation  consists  in  carrying  the  loads  recklessly  or  bravely 
shouldered  in  times  gone  by,  when  the  animal  which  is  now  a  bull  was 
only  a  calf,  and  in  completing,  if  they  may  be  completed,  the  tasks  once 
undertaken  in  the  shape  of  unambitious  schemes  which  at  the  outset 
looked  innocent  enough.  Having  got  his  foot  into  it,  the  legislator  finds 
it  difficult,  if  not  impossil)le,  to  get  it  out  again.  ,  .  . 

Legislation  unquestionably  generates  legislation.  Ever}^  statute  may  be 
said  to  have  a  long  lineage  of  statutes  behind  it ;  and  whether  that  lineage 
be  honorable  or  of  ill  repute  is  as  much  a  question  as  to  each  individual 
statute  as  it  can  be  with  regard  to  the  ancestry  of  each  individual  legislator. 
Every  statute  in  its  turn  has  a  numerous  progeny,  and  only  time  and 
opportunity  can  decide  whether  its  offspring  will  bring  it  honor  or  shame. 
Once  begin  the  dance  of  legislation,  and  you  must  struggle  through  its 
mazes  as  best  you  can  to  its  breathless  end,  —  if  any  end  there  be. 

It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  the  enacting,  revising,  tinkering, 
repealing  of  laws  should  engross  the  attention  and  engage  the  entire  en- 
ergy of  such  a  body  as  Congress.  It  is,  however,  easy  to  sec  how  it  might 
be  better  employed ;  or,  at  least,  how  it  might  add  others  to  this  over- 
shadowing function,  to  the  infinite  advantage  of  the  govcmment.  Quite 
as  important  as  legislation  is  vigilant  oversight  of  administration ;  and 
even  more  important  than  legislation  is  the  instruction  and  guidance  in 
political  affairs  which  the  people  might  receive  from  the  body  which  kept 
all  national  concerns  suffused  in  a  broad  daylight  of  discussion.  .  .  . 

An  effective  representative  body,  gifted  with  the  power  to  rule,  oujjht, 
it  would  seem,  not  only  to  speak  the  will  of  the  nation,  but  also  to  lead 
it  to  its  conclusions,  to  utter  the  voice  of  its  opinions,  and  to  senc  as  its 
eyes  in  superintending  all  matters  of  govcmment. 

1  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 


358  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

340.  Difficulties  preventing  intelligent  legislation.  Some  of  the 
obstacle*  preventing  wise  lawmaking  in  modern  large  representa- 
tive bodies  are  suggested  in  the  following  : 


*&to^ 


The  shortcomings  of  our  present  system  may  be  said  to  be  lack  of 
responsibility,  lack  of  expert  advice,  and  lack  of  principle. 

1.  Resp07isibility.  We  know  how  much  our  jurisprudence  has  gained 
through  the  system  of  written  opinions  published  in  reports,  through 
which  the  work  of  every  judge  of  an  appellate  court  is  subjected  to  the 
scrutiny  of  the  legal  profession.  But  how  can  the  responsibility  for  a  bad 
piece  of  legislation  be  brought  home  to  any  one  ? 

Any  member  of  the  legislature  may  introduce  any  bill  he  pleases,  and 
his  doing  so  does  not  even  necessarily  mean  that  he  assumes  any  respon- 
sibility for  its  form  or  contents.  In  the  German  reichstag  it  requires  the 
support  of  fifteen  members  to  introduce  a  bill  that  does  not  come  from 
the  government,  and  practically  all  privately  initiated  measures  are  backed 
by  some  political  party.  It  has  been  suggested  that  it  might  be  well  to 
limit  each  member  of  a  State  legislature  to  a  small  number  of  bills,  to 
induce  him  to  exercise  some  care  and  discrimination.  .  .  .  The  lobby  as 
a  recognized  and  regulated  institution  might  be  made  to  serve  the  same 
end.  All  this  could  be  accomplished  by  rules  of  the  legislature.  The 
publication  of  bills  in  advance  of  their  introduction  would  be  even  more 
desirable.  .  .  . 

2.  Expei-t  Advice.  There  are  two  distinct  kinds  of  advice  that  the 
legislature  stands  in  need  of,  the  first  as  to  the  content  of  legislation, 
the  second  as  to  its  legal  form. 

As  to  the  first,  the  theory  is  that  the  legislature  is  acquainted  with  the 
circumstances  and  needs  of  the  people,  just  as  the  old  jury  was  presumed 
to  know  of  all  open  and  public  occurrences  within  the  county.  But  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  most  of  the  information  necessary  for  intelligent  legisla- 
tion cannot  be  acquired  without  special  study  or  even  special  training. 
In  the  case  of  subjects  generally  recognized  as  technical  the  legislature 
naturally  relies  upon  experts.  .  .  .  Where  the  subject  to  be  legislated  on 
is  one  not  supposed  to  be  technical,  the  legislature  commonly  acts  upon  the 
vaguest  impressions,  reflecting  popular  beliefs  and  prejudices.  .  .  . 

As  regards  the  correct  legal  form  of  expressing  the  subject  matter  of 
legislative  proposals,  it  is  recognized  that  this  is  a  task  requiring  technical 
learning.  Giving  due  recognition  to  the  large  amount  of  painstaking  legal 
work  embodied  in  any  volume  of  our  session  laws,  and  without  magnify- 
ing the  blunders  that  occur  too  frequently,  it  is  obvious  that  a  systemadc 
plan  of  dealing  with  this  aspect  of  legislation  would  bring  a  much-needed 
improvement.  .  .  . 


THE  LEGISLATURE 


359 


3.  Intelligent  legislation  based  upon  expert  advice  may  be  expected  in 
course  of  time  to  bring  some  remedy  for  the  third  of  the  defects  that  1 
have  mentioned  :  lack  of  principle.  By  principle  I  understand  the  perma- 
nent and  nonpartisan  policy  of  justice  in  legislation,  the  observance  of 
the  limits  of  the  attainable,  the  due  proportion  of  means  to  ends,  and 
moderation  in  the  exercise  of  powers  which  by  long  experience  has  been 
shown  to  be  wise  and  prudent,  though  it  may  be  temporarily  inconvenient 
or  disappointing  in  the  production  of  immediate  results. 

341.  The  powers  of  Congress  in  the  United  States.  The  foll(jw- 
ing  specific  powers  are  granted  to  Congress  by  tlie  Constitution. 
Much  difference  of  opinion  has  existed  regarding  their  strict  or 
Hberal  construction. 

The  Congress  shall  have  power : 

1.  To  lay  and  collect  taxes,  duties,  imposts,  and  excises,  to  pay  the 
debts  and  provide  for  the  common  defense  and  general  welfare  of  the 
United  States ;  but  all  duties,  imposts,  and  excises  shall  be  uniform 
throughout  the  United  States  ; 

2.  To  borrow  money  on  the  credit  of  the  United  States; 

3.  To  regulate  commerce  with  foreign  nations,  and  among  the  several 
States,  and  with  the  Indian  tribes ; 

4.  To  establish  a  uniform  rule  of  naturalization,  and  uniform  laws  on 
the  subject  of  bankruptcies  throughout  the  United  States ; 

5.  To  coin  money,  regulate  the  value  thereof  and  of  foreign  coin,  and 
fix  the  standard  of  weights  and  measures ; 

6.  To  provide  for  the  punishment  of  counterfeiting  the  securities  and 
current  coin  of  the  United  States ; 

7.  To  establish  post  offices  and  post  roads; 

8.  To  promote  the  progress  of  science  and  useful  arts,  by  securing 
for  limited  times  to  authors  and  inventors  the  exclusive  right  to  their 
respective  writings  and  discoveries  ; 

9.  To  constitute  tribunals  inferior  to  the  Supreme  Court ; 

10.  To  define  and  punish  felonies  committed  on  the  high  seas,  and 
offenses  against  the  law  of  nations  ; 

11.  To  declare  war,  grant  letters  of  marque  and  reprisal,  and  make 
rules  concerning  captures  on  land  and  water ; 

12.  To  raise  and  support  armies;  but  no  appropriation  of  money  to 
that  use  shall  be  for  a  longer  term  than  two  years ; 

13.  To  provide  and  maintain  a  navy; 

14.  To  make  rules  for  the  government  and  regulation  of  land  and 
naval  forces ; 


36o  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

15.  To  provide  for  calling  forth  the  militia  to  execute  the  laws  of  the 
Union,  suppress  insurrections,  and  repel  invasions ; 

16.  To  provide  for  organizing,  arming,  and  disciplining  the  militia,  and 
for  governing  such  part  of  them  as  may  be  employed  in  the  service  of 
the  United  States,  reserving  to  the  States  respectively  the  appointment 
of  the  officers,  and  the  authority  of  training  the  militia  according  to  the 
discipline  prescribed  by  Congress ; 

17.  To  exercise  exclusive  legislation,  in  all  cases  whatsoever,  over  such 
district  (not  exceeding  ten  miles  square)  as  may,  by  cession  of  particular 
states  and  the  acceptance  of  Congress,  become  the  seat  of  government 
of  the  United  States,  and  to  exercise  like  authority  over  all  places  pur- 
chased, by  the  consent  of  the  Legislature  of  the  State  in  which  the  same 
shall  be,  for  the  erection  of  forts,  magazines,  arsenals,  dockyards,  and 
other  needful  buildings  ;  and, 

18.  To  make  all  laws  which  shall  be  necessary  and  proper  for  carry- 
ing into  execution  the  foregoing  powers,  and  all  other  powers  vested 
by  this  Constitution  in  the  government  of  the  United  States,  or  in 
any  department  or  office  thereof. 

342.  Functions  of  the  German  "  Bundesrath."  Wilson  outlines 
the  wide  range  of  services  performed  by  the  upper  House  in 
Germany. 

The  Bimdesrath  occupies  a  position  in  the  German  system  in  some 
respects  not  unlike  that  which  the  Roman  Senate  held  in  the  government 
of  Rome.  It  is,  so  to  say,  the  residuary  legatee  of  the  constitution.  All 
functions  not  specifically  intrusted  to  any  other  constitutional  authority 
remain  with  it,  and  no  power  is  in  principle  foreign  to  its  jurisdiction. 
It  has  a  composite  character,  and  is  the  presiding  organ  of  the  Empire. 
It  is  at  one  and  the  same  time  an  administrative,  a  legislative,  and  a 
judicial  body. 

In  its  legislative  capacity,  it  presides  over  the  whole  course  of  law- 
making. The  Reichstag  has  the  right  to  originate  measures,  but,  as  a 
matter  of  practice,  originates  very  few.  Most  bills  first  pass  the  Bim- 
desrath and  go  with  its  sanction  to  the  Reichstag.  If  passed  by  the 
people's  house,  they  are  returned  to  the  Bimdesrath  and  there  once 
more  adopted.  All  the  more  important  legislation,  moreover,  is  framed 
by  the  imperial  officials  and  presented  to  the  Bimdesrath  by  the  Chan- 
cellor, who  is  not  only  president  of  the  federal  chamber  but  also  chief 
of  the  Prussian  delegation.   .   .   . 

The  adttmiistrative  function  of  the  federal  chamber  may  be  summed 
up  in  the  word  oversight.    It  considers  all  defects  or  needs  which  discover 


THE  LEGISLATURE  361 

themselves  in  the  administrative  arrangements  of  the  Empire  in  the  course 
of  the  execution  of  the  laws,  and  may,  in  all  cases  where  that  duty  has 
not  been  otherwise  bestowed,  formulate  the  necessary  regulation  to  cure 
such  defects  and  meet  such  needs.  It  has,  moreover,  a  voice  in  the  choice 
of  some  of  the  most  important  officers  of  the  imperial  service.  .  .  . 

The  judicial  functions  of  the  Bundesrath  spring  in  part  out  of  its 
character  as  the  chief  administrative  council  of  the  Empire.  When  acting 
as  such  a  council,  many  of  its  conclusions  partake  of  the  nature  of 
decisions  of  a  supreme  administrative  court  of  appeal. 

343.  Danger  of  overlegislation  in  the  United  States.  The  fol- 
lowing extract  from  a  series  of  lectures  delivered  recently  at 
Columbia  University  suggests  an  important  jjroblem.  Many  causes 
tend  to  multiply  local  and  private  bills  in  the  United  States,  and 
an  enormous  amount  of  lawmaking  results. 

A  chief  danger  in  a  democratic  country  like  the  United  States  is  over- 
legislation.  Our  legislators  are  naturally  ambitious  to  make  a  record  be- 
fore their  constituents.  Many  individuals,  corporations,  or  localities  desire 
certain  special  privileges  which  may  appear  to  be  in  their  own  interest 
but  which  may  well  be  opposed  to  the  general  interest.  There  seems 
to  be  difficulty  in  placing  a  sufficient  check  upon  the  efforts  of  inter- 
ested parties.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  we  need  to  keep  in  mind 
the  danger  of  general  regulations,  which  tend  to  check  individual  initia- 
tive. Possibly  nowhere  else  in  the  world,  with  the  exception  of  some  of 
the  British  colonies,  are  the  conditions  so  favorable  for  securing  indi- 
vidual initiative,  for  encouraging  independent  thinking  and  action,  as  in 
the  United  States.  Indeed  this  may  be  looked  upon  as  one  of  the  chief 
excellencies,  if  not  even  the  chief  excellence  of  our  political  system. 
We  need,  therefore,  to  be  extremely  cautious  about  making  laws  which 
may  restrict  individual  activity  further  than  is  necessar)'  to  protect  the 
general  public. 

344.  Impeachment.  A  peculiar  function  of  legislatures,  devel- 
oped in  England  to  meet  conditions  there  and  imitated  later  m 
other  states,  is  that  of  impeachment. 

The  method  of  impeachment  seems  to  have  been  necessary  in  England 
because  the  English  law  did  not  allow  a  civil  or  criminal  suit  to  be  brought 
against  the  highest  officers  of  state  except  with  extreme  difficulty.  It  was 
thus  developed  mainly  to  fill  up  a  gap  in  the  judicial  control.  A  further 
reason  for  its  development  is  to  be  found  in  the  impossibility  of  obtaining 


362  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

a  conviction  of  the  great  nobles  before  the  ordinary  courts  and  in  the 
necessity  of  some  means  of  legislative  control  in  the  days  when  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  parliamentary  responsibility  of  the  ministers  had  not  been 
developed.  Since  its  development  in  England  it  has  been  adopted  to 
some  extent  in  almost  all  constitutional  countries,  and  in  some  cases 
is  made  use  of  against  not  only  the  ministers  but  also  all  civil  officers 
of  the  government. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

THE  EXECUTIVE 

I.    The  Executive  Head 

345.  Forms  of  executive  organization.  The  main  types  of 
executive  —  hereditary  and  elective,  actual  and  nominal  —  and 
the  basis  of  this  classification  are  concisely  described  in  the 
following :  ^ 

From  what  has  been  said  it  will  be  seen  that  the  divisions  of  execu- 
tive into  hereditary  and  elective,  nominal  and  actual,  lie  crosswise  of  each 
other.  A  hereditary  sovereign  may  be  nominal,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
Bridsh  king,  or  he  may  be  an  actual  ruler,  as  is  the  king  of  Prussia. 
Similarly  an  elected  executive  such  as  tlie  President  of  the  I'nitcd  States 
is  actual,  while  the  president  of  the  French  Republic  is  only  nominal. 
The  distinction  between  nominal  and  virtual  executives  leads  to  the 
consideration  of  the  most  fundamental  of  all  questions  in  regard  to  the 
executive,  namely,  its  connection  with  the  legislature.  .  .  .  The  govern- 
ments of  modem  states  are  divided  between  two  rival  systems  of  operation. 
Of  these  the  one  is  commonly  termed  "  parliamentary,"  "  responsible," 
or  "  cabinet "  government ;  the  other,  for  which  no  satisfactory  des- 
ignation can  be  found,  has  been  variously  styled  "  nonresponsible," 
"  presidential,"  or  "  congressional "  government.  In  a  parliamentar\- 
government  the  tenure  of  office  of  the  virtual  executive  is  dependent 
on  the  will  of  the  legislature  ;  in  a  presidential  government  the  tenure 
of  office  of  the  executive  is  independent  of  the  will  of  the  legislature. 
Parliamentary  government  is  always  found  in  connection  with  the 
presence  of  a  nominal  executive.  But  it  is  to  be  rcmcinl^ered  that 
this  nominal  executive  need  not  be  a  hereditary  titular  sovereign.  In 
France  the  government  is  parliamentary,  but  the  nominal  head  of 
the  state  is  an  elected  officer.  Similarly  the  presidential  system  is 
always  found  in  connection  with  a  real  or  virtual  executive ;  but  this 
real  executive  need  not  be  an  elected  president,  as  the  instance  of 
Prussia  clearly  shows. 

1  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 
363 


364  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

346.   Relation  of  the  executive  to  Congress  in  the  United  States. 

In  the  national  government  of  the  United  States  the  constitutional 
adjustment  of  executive  and  legislature  and  their  customary  rela- 
tions in  practice  may  be  stated  as  follows : 

The  only  provisions  contained  in  the  Constitution  concerning  the  rela- 
tion of  the  President  to  Congress  are  these :  that  "  he  shall,  from  time 
to  time,  give  to  the  Congress  information  of  the  state  of  the  union,  and 
recommend  to  their  consideration  such  measures  as  he  shall  judge  neces- 
sary and  expedient";  and  that  "he  may,  on  extraordinary  occasions, 
convene  both  houses,  or  either  of  them,"  in  extra  session,  "  and,  in  case 
of  disagreement  between  them,  with  respect  to  the  time  of  adjournment, 
he  may  adjourn  them  to  such  time  as  he  shall  think  proper.  .  .  ." 

Washington  and  John  Adams  interpreted  this  clause  to  mean  that 
they  might  address  Congress  in  person,  as  the  sovereign  in  England  may 
do  :  and  their  annual  communications  to  Congress  were  spoken  addresses. 
But  Jefferson,  the  third  President,  being  an  ineffective  speaker,  this  habit 
was  discontinued  and  the  fashion  of  written  messages  was  inaugurated 
and  firmly  established.  Possibly,  had  the  President  not  so  closed  the 
matter  against  new  adjustments,  this  clause  of  the  Constitution  might 
legitimately  have  been  made  the  foundation  for  a  much  more  habitual 
and  informal,  and  yet  at  the  same  time  much  more  public  and  responsi- 
ble, interchange  of  opinion  between  the  Executive  and  Congress.  Hav- 
ing been  interpreted,  however,  to  exclude  the  President  from  any  but  the 
most  formal  and  ineffectual  utterance  of  advice,  our  federal  executive 
and  legislature  have  been  shut  off  from  cooperation  and  mutual  confi- 
dence to  an  extent  to  which  no  other  modern  system  furnishes  a  parallel. 
In  all  other  modern  governments  the  heads  of  the  administrative  depart- 
ments are  given  the  right  to  sit  in  the  legislative  body  and  to  take  part  in 
its  proceedings.  The  legislature  and  executive  are  thus  associated  in  such 
a  way  that  the  ministers  of  state  can  lead  the  houses  without  dictating  to 
them,  and  the  ministers  themselves  be  controlled  without  being  misunder- 
stood, —  in  such  a  way  that  the  two  parts  of  the  government  which 
should  be  most  closely  coordinated,  the  part,  namely,  by  which  the  laws 
are  made  and  the  part  by  which  the  laws  are  executed,  may  be  kept  in 
close  harmony  and  intimate  cooperation,  with  the  result  of  giving  coher- 
ence to  the  action  of  the  one  and  energy  to  the  action  of  the  other. 

347.  Classes  of  presidential  candidates  in  the  United  States. 
Bryce  divides  the  candidates  for  the  American  presidency  into 
the  following  classes  :  ^ 

1  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


THE  EXECUTIVE  365 

Aspirants  hoping  to  obtain  tlie  party  nomination  from  a  national  ojn- 
vention  may  be  divided  into  three  classes,  the  two  last  of  which,  as  will 
appear  presently,  are  not  mutually  exclusive,  viz : 

Favorites  Dark  Horses  Favorite  Sons 

A  Favorite  is  always  a  politician  well  known  over  the  Union,  and 
drawing  support  from  all  or  most  of  its  sections.  He  is  a  man  who 
has  distinguished  himself  in  Congress,  or  in  the  war,  or  in  the  politics  of 
some  State  so  large  that  its  politics  are  matter  of  knowledge  and  inter- 
est to  the  whole  nation.  He  is  usually  a  person  of  conspicuous  gifts, 
whether  as  a  speaker,  or  a  party  manager,  or  an  administrator.  The 
drawback  to  him  is  that  in  making  friends  he  has  also  made  enemies. 

A  Dark  Horse  is  a  person  not  very  widely  known  in  the  country  at 
large,  but  known  rather  for  good  than  for  evil.  He  has  probably  sat  in 
Congress,  been  useful  on  committees  and  gained  some  credit  among 
those  who  dealt  with  him  in  Washington.  Or  he  has  approved  himself  a 
safe  and  assiduous  party  man  in  the  political  campaigns  of  his  own  and 
neighboring  States,  yet  without  reaching  national  prominence.  Some- 
times he  is  a  really  able  man,  but  without  the  special  talents  that  win 
popularity.  Still,  speaking  generally,  the  note  of  the  Dark  Horse  is 
respectability,  verging  on  colorlessness ;  and  he  is  therefore  a  good 
sort  of  person  to  fall  back  upon  when  able  but  dangerous  Favorites 
have  proved  impossible.  That  native  mediocrity  rather  than  adverse 
fortune  has  prevented  him  from  winning  fame  is  proved  by  the  fact 
that  the  Dark  Horses  who  have  reached  the  White  House,  if  they  have 
seldom  turned  out  bad  presidents,  have  even  more  seldom  turned  out 
distinguished  ones. 

A  Favorite  Son  is  a  politician  respected  or  admired  in  his  own  State, 
but  little  regarded  beyond  it.  He  may  not  be,  like  the  Dark  Horse,  little 
known  to  the  nation  at  large,  but  he  has  not  fixed  its  eye  or  filled  its  car. 
He  is  usually  a  man  who  has  sat  in  the  State  legislature  ;  filled  with  credit 
the  post  of  State  governor ;  perhaps  gone  as  senator  or  representative 
to  Washington,  and  there  approved  himself  an  active  promoter  of  Icx-al 
interests.  Probably  he  possesses  the  qualities  which  gain  local  popularity 
—  geniality,  activity,  sympathy  with  the  dominant  sentiment  and  habits 
of  his  State ;  or  while  endowed  with  gifts  excellent  in  their  way,  he  has 
lacked  the  audacity  and  tenacity  w^hich  push  a  man  to  the  front  through 
a  jostling  crowd.  More  rarely  he  is  a  demagogue  who  has  raised  himself 
by  flattering  the  masses  of  his  State  on  some  local  questions,  or  a  skillful 
handler  of  party  organizations  who  has  made  local  bosses  and  spoilsmen 
believe  that  their  interests  are  safe  in  his  hands.  Anyhow,  his  personality 
is  such  as  to  be  more  effective  with  neighbors  than  with  tlie  nation.  .  .  . 


-66  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


J 


A  Favorite  Son  may  be  also  a  Dark  Horse  ;  that  is  to  say,  he  may 
be  well  known  in  his  own  State,  but  so  little  known  out  of  it  as  to  be  an 
unlikely  candidate.  But  he  need  not  be.  The  types  are  different,  for  as 
there  are  Favorite  Sons  whom  the  nation  knows  but  does  not  care  for, 
so  there  are  Dark  Horses  whose  reputation,  such  as  it  is,  has  not  been 
made  in  State  affairs,  and  who  rely  very  little  on  State  favor. 

348.  Utility  of  the  crown  in  England.  Lowell  states  the  ad- 
vantages of  the  English  hereditary  monarchy  as  follows  :  ^ 

Bagehot's  views  upon  the  utility  of  the  monarchy  have  become  classic. 
Recognizing  the  small  chance  that  any  hereditary  sovereign  would  possess 
the  qualities  necessary  to  exert  any  great  influence  for  good  upon  political 
questions,  he  did  not  deem  the  Crown  of  great  value  as  a  part  of  the 
machinery  of  the  state ;  and  he  explained  at  some  length  how  a  parlia- 
mentary system  of  government  could  be  made  to  work  perfectly  well  in 
a  republic,  although  up  to  that  time  such  an  experiment  had  never  been 
tried.  But  he  thought  the  Crown  of  the  highest  importance  in  England 
as  the  dignified  part  of  the  government.  .  .  .  According  to  his  concep- 
tion of  English  polity  the  lower  classes  believed  that  the  government  was 
conducted  by  the  Queen,  whom  they  revered,  while  the  cabinet,  unseen 
and  unknown  by  the  ignorant  multitude,  was  thereby  enabled  to  carry 
on  a  system  which  would  be  in  danger  of  collapsing  if  the  public  thoroughly 
understood  its  real  nature.  .  .  .  To-day  the  social  and  ceremonial  func- 
tions of  the  Crown  attract  quite  as  much  interest  as  ever ;  but  as  a  politi- 
cal organ  it  has  receded  into  the  background,  and  occupies  less  public 
attention  than  it  did  formerly.  The  stranger  can  hardly  fail  to  note  how 
rarely  he  hears  the  name  of  the  sovereign  mentioned  in  connection  with 
political  matters ;  and  when  he  does  hear  it  the  reference  is  only  too  apt 
to  be  made  by  way  of  complaint.  ...  In  general  the  growth  of  the  doc- 
trine of  royal  irresponsibility  has  removed  the  Crown  farther  and  farther 
out  of  the  public  sight,  while  the  spread  of  democracy  has  made  the 
masses  more  and  more  familiar  with  the  actual  forces  in  public  life. 
One  may  dismiss,  therefore,  the  idea  that  the  Crown  has  any  percepti- 
ble effect  to-day  in  securing  the  loyalty  of  the  English  people,  or  their 
obedience  to  the  government. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  government  of  England  is  inconceivable  with- 

,  out  the  parliamentary  system,  and  no  one  has  yet  devised  a  method  of 

working  that  system  without  a  central  figure,  powerless,  no  doubt,  but 

beyond  the  reach  of  party  strife.    European  countries  that  had  no  kings 

have  felt  constrained  to  adopt  monarchs  who  might  hold  a  scepter  which 

1  Copyright,  1908,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


THE  EXECUTIVE 


;67 


I 


they  could  not  wield ;  and  one  nation,  disliking  kings,  has  been  forced 
to  set  up  a  president  with  most  of  the  attributes  of  royalty  except  the 
title.  If  the  English  Crown  is  no  longer  the  nKJtive  power  of  the  ship 
of  state,  it  is  the  spar  on  which  the  sail  is  bent,  and  as  such  it  is  not 
only  a  useful  but  an  essential  part  of  the  vessel. 

The  social  and  ceremonial  duties  of  the  Crown  are  now  its  most  con- 
spicuous, if  not  its  most  important,  functions.  There  can  be  no  question 
that  the  influence  of  the  Queen  and  her  court  was  a  powerful  element 
in  the  movement  that  raised  the  moral  tone  of  society  during  the  first 
half  of  the  last  century.   .  .  . 

In  its  relation  to  the  masses  royalty  may  be  considered  in  another 
aspect.  Within  a  generation  there  has  been  a  great  growth  of  interest 
in  ceremony  and  dress.  Antiquated  customs  and  costumes  have  been 
revived,  and  matters  of  jhis  kind  are  regarded  by  many  people  as  of 
prime  importance.  A  kindred  result  of  the  same  social  force  has  been  a 
marked  increase  in  what  Bagehot  called  the  spirit  of  deference,  and  what 
those  who  dislike  it  call  snobbishness  —  a  tendency  by  no  means  ccjnfined 
to  the  British  Isles.  All  this  has  exalted  the  regard  for  titles  and  offices, 
and  enhanced  the  attractiveness  of  those  who  bear  them.  .  .  . 

A  century  or  more  ago  people  who  had  learned  nothing  from  the 
history  of  Greece  or  Rome,  and  above  all  of  Venice,  were  wont  to  assert 
that  the  sentiment  of  loyalty  requires  a  person  for  its  object.  No  one 
pretends  that  the  English  would  be  less  patriotic  under  a  republic ;  and 
yet  with  the  strengthening  conception  of  the  British  Empire,  the  imptjr- 
tance  of  the  Crown  as  the  symbol  of  imperial  unity  has  been  more 
keenly  felt.  .  .  . 

Whatever  the  utility  of  the  Crown  may  be  at  the  present  time,  there 
is  no  doubt  of  its  universal  popularity. 

349.  Position  of  the  president  in  France.  The  following:  extract 
indicates  the  conditions  in  France  that  make  the  position  of  her 
president  difficult :  ^ 

Unlike  the  President  of  the  United  States,  the  French  President  is 
not  free  to  use  his  powers  according  to  his  own  judgment,  for  in  order 
to  make  him  independent  of  the  fate  of  cabinets,  and  at  the  same  time 
to  prevent  his  personal  power  from  becoming  too  great,  the  constitutional 
laws  declare  that  he  shall  not  be  responsible  for  his  official  conduct,  ex- 
cept in  case  of  high  treason,  and  that  all  his  acts  of  ever>'  kind,  to  be  vahd, 
must  be  countersigned  by  one  of  the  ministers ;  and  thus,  like  the  British 
monarch,  he  has  been  put  under  guardianship  and  can  do  no  wrong.  .  .  . 
1  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 


o 


68  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


Sir  Henry  Maine  makes  merry  over  the  exalted  office  and  lack  of 
power  of  the  President.  "  There  is,"  he  says,  "  no  living  functionary 
who  occupies  a  more  pitiable  position  than  a  French  President.  The 
old  kings  of  France  reigned  and  governed.  The  Constitutional  King, 
according  to  M.  Thiers,  reigns,  but  does  not  govern.  The  President  of 
the  United  States  governs,  but  he  does  not  reign.  It  has  been  reserved 
for  the  President  of  the  French  Republic  neither  to  reign  nor  yet  to 
govern."  At  first  sight  the  situation  does,  indeed,  appear  somewhat 
irrational.  When  the  head  of  the  state  is  designated  by  the  accident  of 
birth  it  is  not  unnatural  to  make  of  him  an  idol,  and  appoint  a  high 
priest  to  speak  in  his  name;  but  when  he  is  carefully  selected  as  the 
man  most  fit  for  the  place,  it  seems  a  trifle  illogical  to  intrust  the  duties 
of  the  office  to  some  one  else.  By  the  constitution  of  Sieyes  an  orna- 
mental post  of  a  similar  character  was  prepared  for  the  first  Consul,  but 
Napoleon  said  he  had  no  mind  to  play  the  part  of  a  pig  kept  to  fatten. 
In  government,  however,  the  most  logical  system  is  not  always  the  best, 
and  the  anomalous  position  of  the  President  has  saved  France  from  the 
danger  of  his  trying  to  make  himself  a  dictator,  while  the  fact  that  he  is 
independent  of  the  changing  moods  of  the  Chambers  has  given  to  the 
Republic  a  dignity  and  stability  it  had  never  enjoyed  before.  It  is  a 
curious  commentary  on  the  nature  of  human  ambition,  that  in  spite  of 
the  small  power  actually  wielded  by  the  President  in  France,  the  presi- 
dential fever  seems  to  have  nearly  as  strong  a  hold  on  public  men  as  in 
this  country. 

II.    Heads  of  Departments 

350.  Members  in  modern  cabinets.  The  cabinets  in  leading 
modern  states  are  composed  of  the  following  head's  of  depart- 
ments. The  general  similarity  in  administrative  organization  is 
at  once  evident. 

England 

1.  Prime  Minister  and  First  Lord  of  the  Treasury 

2.  Lord  President  of  the  Council 

3.  Lord  High  Chancellor 

4.  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs 

5.  Secretary  of  State  for  India 

6.  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home  Department 

7.  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer 

8.  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Colonies  and  Lord  Privy  Seal 

9.  Secretary  of  State  for  War 


'I'HE  EXECLTIVK 


569 


10. 
1 1. 
12. 

13- 
14. 

IS- 
16. 

17- 
18. 
19. 


First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty 

Chief  Secretary  to  the  Lord  Lieutenant  of  Ireland 

President  of  the  Board  of  Trade 

President  of  the  Local  Government  Ijoard 

President  of  the  Board  of  Education 

Secretary  for  Scotland 

President  of  the  Board  of  Agriculture  and  Fisheries 

Postmaster-General 

Chancellor  of  the  Duchy  of  Lancaster 

First  Commissioner  of  Works 


The  United  States 

1.  Secretary  of  State 

2.  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 

3.  Secretary  of  War 

4.  Secretary  of  the  Navy 

5.  Secretary  of  the  Interior 

France 

I.  President  of  the  Council, 
Minister  of  the  Interior, 
and  Public  Worship 

Minister  of  Finance 

Minister  of  War 

Minister  of  Justice 

Minister  of  Marine 

Minister  of  Colonies 


2. 

3- 

4- 

5- 
6. 


9- 

10. 

1 1. 


12. 


Postmaster-General 
Attorney-General 
Secretary  of  Agriculture 
Secretary   of    Commerce    and 
Labor 


Minister  of  Public  Instruction 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
Minister  of  Commerce 
Minister  of  Agriculture 
Minister    of     Public     Works. 
Posts,  Telegraphs,  and  Tele- 
phones 
Minister  of  Labor 


Imperial  Admiralty 
Imperial  Ministry  of  Justice 
Imperial  Treasury 
Imperial  Post  Office 
Secretary  for  the  Colonies 


Germany 

1.  Chancellor  of  the  Empire  4. 

2.  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs        5. 

3.  Imperial  Home  Office  and        6. 

"Representative  of  the        7. 
Chancellor "  8. 

And,  in  addition,  the  following  presidents  of  imperial  bureaus : 

9.  Railways 

10.  Imperial  Exchequer 

11.  Imperial  Invalid  Fund 

12.  Imperial  Bank 

13.  Imperial  Debt  Commission 

14.  Administration  of  Imperial  Railways 

15.  Imperial  Court-Martial 


370  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

351.  Responsible  and  irresponsible  ministries.  The  importance 
of  the  form  of  relation  existing  between  cabinet  and  legislature  is 
thus  stated  by  Burgess  : 

Responsibility  or  irresponsibility  of  the  ministry  to  the  legislature 
leads  to  very  essential  differences  in  the  working  of  government.  Minis- 
terial responsibility  will  inevitably  bring  party  government  and  the  sub- 
ordination of  the  executive  to  the  popular  branch  of  the  legislature. 
Party  government  may  occur  when  the  ministers  are  irresponsible ;  but 
it  is  not,  as  in  the  other  case,  inevitable ;  and  where  the  ministers  are 
not  responsible  to  the  legislature,  the  independence  of  the  executive  may 
be  far  more  easily  preserved.  There  is  no  doubt  that  there  are  periods 
in  the  life  of  a  state  when  it  is  most  advantageous  that  the  legislature 
and  executive  should  agree  in  political  views  and  policies.  The  active, 
creative  epochs  require,  we  might  almost  say,  this  relation.  There  are, 
however,  periods  in  the  life  of  the  state  when  such  agreement  would  not 
be  advantageous.  After  an  active,  creative  period,  a  season  of  compara- 
tive rest  is  natural,  in  order  that  new  institutions,  laws,  and  policies  may 
make  their  cycle  and  prove  their  qualities.  In  such  periods,  a  more  de- 
liberate movement  of  government  is  advantageous.  During  such  periods, 
difference  of  political  view  between  the  legislature  and  executive  is  more 
likely  to  prove  beneficial  than  sameness  of  view.  In  systems  where  both 
the  legislature  and  executive  are  elective,  we  may  fairly  expect  that  the 
same  party  will  possess  both  branches  of  the  government  in  active  and 
critical  periods  of  development ;  while  in  the  ordinary  periods  of  rest, 
there  is  some  likelihood,  at  least,  that  this  will  not  be  the  case.  .  .  . 

Ministerial  responsibility  to  the  legislature  will  be  advantageous  when 
the  electorate  and  the  legislature  are  of  so  high  character  intellectually 
and  morally  as  to  be  practically  incapable  of  forming  an  erroneous  opinion 
or  of  doing  an  unjust  thing.  The  checks  and  balances  of  double  or 
treble  deliberation  by  independent  bodies  will  then  be  no  longer  neces- 
sary, will  be  rather  hurtful  than  necessary.  The  natural  age  of  compro- 
mise will  have  been  passed.  Undl  something  like  this  condition  shall 
arrive,  however,  the  responsibility  of  the  ministry  to  the  legislature  for 
governmental  policy  tends  to  the  production  of  crude  measures,  and,  in 
general,  makes  government  radical. 

352.  Development  of  the  cabinet  in  England.  A  brief  summary 
of  the  leading  phases  in  the  evolution  of  the  British  cabinet  follows : 

(i)  First  we  find  the  Cabinet  appearing  in  the  shape  of  a  small,  in- 
formal, irregular  CamariUa,  selected  at  the  pleasure  of  the  Sovereign 
from  the  larger  body  of  the  Privy  Council,  consulted  by  and  privately 


THE  EXECUTIVE  3^-, 

advising  the  Crown,  but  witii  no  power  to  take  any  resolutions  of  State, 
or  perform  any  act  of  government  without  the  assent  of  the  Privy 
Council,  and  not  as  yet  even  commonly  known  by  its  present  name. 
This  was  its  condition  anterior  to  the  reign  of  Charles  I. 

(2)  Then  succeeds  a  second  period,  during  which  this  Council  of 
advice  obtained  its  distinctive  title  of  Cabinet,  but  without  acquiring 
any  recognized  status,  or  pi'rmancntly  displacing  the  Privy  Council 
from  its  position  of  de  facto  as  well  as  de  jure  the  only  authorita- 
tive body  of  advisers  of  the  Crown.  (Reign  of  Charles  I  and  Charles 
II,  the  latter  of  whom  governed  during  a  part  of  his  reign  by  means 
of  a  Cabinet,  and  towards  its  close  through  a  "  reconstructed  "  Privy 
Council.) 

(3)  A  third  period,  commencing  with  the  formation  by  \N'illiam  III  of 
a  ministry  representing,  not  several  parties,  as  often  before,  but  the  party 
predominant  in  the  state,  the  first  ministr)'  approaching  the  modem  type. 
The  Cabinet,  though  still  remaining,  as  it  remains  to  this  day,  unknown 
to  the  Constitution,  had  now  become  de  facto,  though  not  de  jure, 
the  real  and  sole  supreme  consultative  council  and  executive  authority 
in  the  state.  It  was  still,  however,  regarded  with  jealousy,  and  the 
full  realization  of  the  modem  theor)'  of  ministerial  responsibility,  by 
the  admission  of  its  members  to  a  seat  in  Pariiament,  was  only  by' 
degrees  effected. 

(4)  Finally,  towards  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  centun,-,  the  political 
conception  of  the  Cabinet  as  a  body,  —  necessarily  consisting  (a)  of  mem- 
bers of  the  Legislature ;  (j))  of  the  same  political  views,  and  chosen  from 
the  party  possessing  a  majorit)-  in  the  House  of  Commons ;  (c)  prose- 
cuting a  concerted  policy  ;  (//)  under  a  common  responsibilit)'  to  be  sig- 
nified by  collective  resignation  in  the  event  of  padiamentar>-  censure; 
and  {e)  acknowledging  a  common  subordination  to  one  chief  minister,  — 
took  definitive  shape  in  our  modern  theory  of  the  Constitution,  and  so 
remains  to  the  present  day. 

353.  Nature  and  functions  of  the  English  cabinet.  Lowell  de- 
scribes as  follows  the  actual  working  of  the  cabinet  in  England  : ' 

The  conventions  of  the  constitution  have  limited  and  regulated  the 
exercise  of  all  legal  powers  by  the  regular  organs  of  the  state  in  such  a 
way  as  to  vest  the  main  authorit)'  of  the  central  govemment  —  the  dnv- 
ing  and  the  steering  force  — in  the  hands  of  a  body  entirely  unknown  to 
the  law.  The  members  of  the  cabinet  are  now  always  the  holders  of 
public  offices  created  by  law ;  but  their  possession  of  those  ofTu  .-s  hv  no 
1  Copyright,  1908,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


372  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

means  determines  their  activity  as  members  of  the  cabinet.  They  have, 
indeed,  two  functions.  Individually,  as  officials,  they  do  the  executive 
work  of  the  state  and  administer  its  departments ;  collectively  they  direct 
the  general  policy  of  the  government,  and  this  they  do  irrespective  of 
their  individual  authority  as  officials.  Their  several  administrative  duties, 
and  their  collective  functions  are  quite  distinct ;  and  may,  in  the  case  of 
a  particular  person,  have  little  or  no  connection.   .  .  . 

The  essential  function  of  the  cabinet  is  to  coordinate  and  guide  the 
political  action  of  the  different  branches  of  the  government,  and  thus 
create  a  consistent  policy.  Bagehot  calls  it  a  hyphen  that  joins,  a  buckle 
that  fastens,  the  executive  and  legislative  together ;  and  in  another  place 
he  speaks  of  it  as  a  committee  of  Parliament  chosen  to  rule  the  nation. 
More  strictly,  it  is  a  committee  of  the  party  that  has  a  majority  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  The  minority  are  not  represented  upon  it ;  and  in 
this  it  differs  from  every  other  parliamentary  committee.   .   .   . 

The  cabinet  is  selected  by  the  part>s  not  directly,  but  indirectly,  yet 
for  that  very  reason  represents  it  the  better.  Direct  election  is  apt  to 
mean  strife  within  the  party,  resulting  in  a  choice  that  represents  the 
views  of  one  section  as  opposed  to  those  of  another,  or  else  in  a  com- 
promise on  colorless  persons ;  while  the  existing  indirect  selection  results 
practically  in  taking  the  men,  and  all  the  men,  who  have  forced  themselves 
into  the  front  rank  of  the  party  and  acquired  influence  in  Parliament. 
The  minority  of  the  House  of  Commons  is  not  represented  in  the  cabinet ; 
but  the  whole  of  the  majority  is  now  habitually  represented,  all  the  more 
prominent  leaders  from  every  section  of  the  party  being  admitted.  In  its 
essence,  therefore,  the  cabinet  is  an  informal  but  permanent  caucus  of  the 
parliamentary  chiefs  of  the  party  in  power  —  and  it  must  be  remembered 
that  the  chiefs  of  the  party  are  all  in  Parliament.  Its  object  is  to  secure 
the  cohesion  without  which  the  party  cannot  retain  a  majority  in  the 
House  of  Commons  and  remain  in  power.  The  machinery  is  one  of 
wheels  within  wheels ;  the  outside  ring  consisting  of  the  party  that  has  a 
majority  in  the  House  of  Commons ;  the  next  ring  being  the  ministry, 
which  contains  the  men  who  are  most  active  within  that  party ;  and  the 
smallest  of  all  being  the  cabinet,  containing  the  real  leaders  or  chiefs. 
By  this  means  is  secured  that  unity  of  party  action  which  depends  upon 
placing  the  directing  power  in  the  hands  of  a  body  small  enough  to  agree, 
and  influential  enough  to  control.  There  have,  of  course,  been  times 
when  the  majority  was  not  sufficiently  homogeneous  to  unite  in  a  cabinet ; 
when  a  ministry  of  one  party  has  depended  for  its  majority  upon  the 
support  of  a  detached  group  holding  the  balance  of  power  .  .  .  but  such 
a  condition  of  things  is  in  its  nature  temporary  and  transitional,  and  usu- 
ally gives  place  to  a  coalition  ministry,  followed  by  party  amalgamation. 


THE  EXECUTIVK  373 

354.  Power  of  the  ministers  in  France.  The  dangers  inherent 
in  the  French  system  of  cabinet  government  are  emphasized  in 
the  following :  ^ 

When  we  consider  the  paternal  character  of  the  government,  the  cen- 
tralization of  the  state,  and  the  large  share  of  authority  vested  in  the 
executive  department,  we  cannot  fail  to  see  that  the  ministers  in  whose 
hands  this  vast  power  is  lodged  must  be  either  very  strong  or  very  weak. 
If  they  are  able  to  wield  it  as  they  please,  and  are  really  free  to  carry 
out  their  own  policy,  they  must  be  far  stronger  than  any  officer  or  body 
in  Great  Britain,  and  immeasurably  stronger  than  any  in  our  federal 
republic.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  very  immensity  and  pervasiveness 
of  their  power,  the  fact  that  it  touches  closely  every  interest  in  the  coun- 
try, renders  them  liable  to  pressure  from  all  sides.  It  becomes  important 
for  every  one  to  influence  their  action,  provided  he  can  get  a  standpoint 
from  which  to  bring  a  pressure  to  bear.  This  standpoint  is  furnished  by 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  for  the  existence  of  the  ministr)'  depends  on  the 
votes  of  that  body.  The  greater,  therefore,  the  power  of  the  minister, 
and  the  more  numerous  the  favors  he  is  able  to  bestow,  the  fiercer  will 
be  the  struggle  for  them,  and  the  less  will  he  be  free  to  pursue  his  own 
policy,  untrammeled  by  deputies,  whose  votes  he  must  win  if  he  would . 
remain  in  office.  A  Frenchman,  who  is  eminent  as  a  student  of  political 
philosophy,  and  has  at  the  same  time  great  practical  experience  in  politics, 
once  remarked  to  the  author,  "  We  have  the  organization  of  an  empire 
with  the  forms  of  a  republic."  The  French  administrative  s\stcm  is, 
indeed,  designed  for  an  empire,  and  would  work  admiral:)l\-  in  the  liands 
of  a  wise  and  benevolent  autocrat  who  had  no  moti\e  but  the  common 
weal ;  but  when  arbitrary  power  falls  under  the  control  of  popular  leaders, 
it  can  hardly  fail  to  be  used  for  personal  and  party  ends ;  for,  as  a  keen 
observer  has  truly  said,  the  defect  of  democracy  lies  in  the  fact  that 
it  is  nobody's  business  to  look  after  the  interests  of  the  public. 

355.  The  imperial  chancellor  in  Germany.  The  extensive 
powers  of  the  German  chancellor  are  indicated  in  the  following : 

The  head  and  center  of  the  German  administration  is  the  Imperial 
Chancellor,  an  officer  who  has  no  counterpart  in  any  other  constitutional 
government. 

(i)  Looked  at  from  one  point  of  view,  the  Chancellor  may  be  said  to 

be  the  Emperor's  responsible  self.    If  one  could  clearly  grasp  the  idea 

of  a  responsible  constitutional  monarch  standing  beside  an  irresponsible 

constitutional  monarch  from  whom  his  authority  was  derived,  he  would 

1  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 


374  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

have  conceived  the  real,  though  not  the  theoretical,  character  of  the 
Imperial  Chancellor  of  Germany.  .  .  . 

(2)  Still  further  examined,  the  chancellorship  is  found  to  be  the  center, 
not  only,  but  also  the  source  of  all  departments  of  the  administration. 
Theoretically  at  least  the  chancellorship  is  the  Administration  :  the  various 
departments  now  existing  are  offshoots  from  it,  differentiations  within  its 
all-embracing  sphere.  .  .  . 

(3)  A  third  aspect  of  the  Chancellor's  abounding  authority  is  his 
superintendency  of  the  administration  of  the  laws  of  the  Empire  by  the 
states.  With  regard  to  the  large  number  of  imperial  laws  which  are  given 
into  the  hands  of  the  several  states  to  be  administered,  the  Empire  may 
not  only  command  what  is  to  be  done,  but  may  also  prescribe  the  way  in 
which  it  shall  be  done  :  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Chancellor  to  superintend 
the  states  in  their  performance  of  such  behests.  .  .  . 

(4)  When  acting  in  the  capacity  of  chairman  of  the  Bundesrath,  the 
Chancellor  is  simply  a  Prussian,  not  an  imperial,  official.  He  represents 
there,  not  the  Emperor,  for  the  Emperor  as  Emperor  has  no  place  in 
the  Bundesmth,  but  the  king  of  Prussia. 


III.    The  Civil  Service 

356.  Importance  of  subordinates  in  government  service.  The 
follovi^ing  example  illustrates  the  important  part  played  by  minor 
administrative  officials  in  every  governmental  system  : 

In  our  discussion  of  governmental  affairs  we  often  fail  to  realize  how 
much  work  must,  in  fact,  be  left  to  subordinates,  and  in  consequence 
how  careful  we  should  be  in  their  selection.  The  necessity  of  trusting 
subordinates  to  a  great  degree  is  one  of  the  weaknesses  of  any  executive 
work,  especially  of  government  service,  where  it  is  more  difficult  to  secure 
a  personal  check  than  in  the  case  of  a  private  business.  Take,  for  ex- 
ample, the  case  of  the  President  of  the  United  States.  He  receives  hun- 
dreds, even  thousands  of  letters  some  days.  It  is  utterly  impossible  that 
he  can  read  or  even  know  anything  about  a  very  large  percentage  of 
them.  They  must  be.  read  and  sorted  by  his  secretaries,  and  in  most 
cases  the  proper  action  must  be  taken  without  consulting  him.  Likewise, 
he  has  hundreds  of  callers  every  day  under  such  circumstances  that  he 
is  compelled  to  see  most  of  them  even  though  for  only  a  few  seconds. 
There  must  therefore  be  a  sifting  through  his  subordinates  of  the  people 
who  have  access  to  him,  as  well  as  a  sifting  of  the  material  that  comes 
before  him  for  decision.  .  .  .  Most  of  this  sifting  must  be  done  by 
subordinates ;  the  most  important  cases  he  will  decide  for  himself. 


THE  EXECUTIVE  375 

In  most  cases  also  the  subordinate  must  read  the  letters,  forecast  the 
decision,  prepare  the  reply,  and  present  it  to  the  chief  for  signature.  In 
all  routine  matters,  if  the  subordinates  are  faithful,  this  course  of  pro- 
cedure is  safe.  Often,  however,  the  chief  has  to  hear  a  case  and  deter- 
mine it  in  perhaps  a  minute  or  two.  The  whole  case  is  presented,  the 
important  argument  put  before  him  in  a  letter  written  by  his  subordinate  ; 
he  must  make  his  decision.  Under  these  circumstances,  mistakes  will  of 
course  be  made.  ...  In  any  event  the  subordinate  is  more  likely  to  be 
neglectful  and  to  do  the  wrong  thing  than  is  his  superior ;  nevertheless 
he  must  usually  be  trusted.  If  people  knew  how  much  had  to  be  left  to 
subordinates,  they  would  often  wonder  at  the  real  success  of  the  govern- 
ment of  any  great  country. 

357.  The  civil  service  in  England.  In  contrast  to  the  American 
"  spoils  system,"  the  organization  of  the  civil  service  in  England 
has  many  advantages.^ 

The  British  civil  service  comprises  a  staff  of  about  So, 000  officials. 
This  includes  the  officers  of  the  royal  household,  a  large  number  of 
officials  connected  with  the  foreign,  home,  and  colonial  offices,  the 
admiralty,  the  treasury,  etc.,  officials  serving  under  the  local  government 
board,  the  patent  office,  the  emigration  office,  the  diplomatic  and  consular 
corps,  collectors  of  customs  and  excise,  postmasters,  etc.  The  funda- 
mental principle  in  the  conduct  of  the  service  thus  constituted  is  perma- 
nence in  office,  and  the  dissociation  of  tenure  of  office  from  the  changes 
of  government  caused  by  the  cabinet  system.  The  only  officers  of  a 
political  complexion  are  the  heads  of  the  departments,  together  with 
certain  chief  secretaries  and  assistants  who  are  known  collectively  as  the 
ministry,  and  who  number  in  all  about  fifty  persons.  .  .  .  The  permanent 
tenure  of  office  contributes  greatly  to  the  efficiency  and  integrity  of  the 
British  civil  service.  Its  origin  is  to  be  traced  to  the  fact  that  in  earlier 
times  public  office  in  England  was  a  species  of  real  property  held  by  the 
incumbent  for  life  or  in  fee.  There  still  exist  in  the  British  civil  ser\-ice 
a  few  offices  which  are  held,  like  the  judicLil  positions,  for  life  or  good 
conduct.  In  the  case  of  the  great  majority  of  official  positions  in  the 
civil  service  the  crown  retains  the  right  of  dismissal.  This  right  is 
exercised,  however,  only  in  cases  of  incompetence  or  dereliction  of  duty, 
and  never  for  political  reasons  or  to  make  room  for  a  necessitous  oftice 
seeker.  For  entry  into  the  service  use  is  made,  in  most  of  the  British 
departments,  of  the  principle  of  open  competition. 

1  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 


376  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

358.  Patronage  of  office  in  France.  The  nature  of  the  French 
governmental  system  places  a  premium  upon  extensive  use  of 
appointment  for  party  purposes,  at  the  same  time  placing  a  check 
upon  wholesale  removals. 

The  patronage  of  ofifice,  indeed,  threatens  to  become  even  more  of  a 
menace  to  good  government  in  France  than  it  has  been  to  good  govern- 
ment in  our  own  country  under  the  federal  system  of  appointment.  The 
number  of  offices  in  the  gift  of  the  ministers  in  France  is  vastly  greater 
than  the  number  within  the  gift  of  the  President  of  the  United  States ; 
and  the  ministers'  need  to  please  the  Chambers  by  favors  of  any  and  all 
kinds  is  incomparably  greater  than  our  President's  need  to  please  Con- 
gress, since  they  are  dependent  upon  the  good  will  of  the  Chambers  for 
their  tenure  of  office,  while  he  is  not  dependent  on  Congress  for  his. 

There  have  never  yet  been  in  France,  however,  any  such  wholesale 
removals  from  office  upon  the  going  out  of  one  administration  and  the 
coming  in  of  another  as  we  have  seen  again  and  again  in  this  country ; 
because  there  has  really  been  no  radical  change  of  administration  in 
France  since  the  days  of  MacMahon.  In  this  country,  as  in  England, 
there  are  two  great  national  parties,  and  the  government  is  now  in  the 
hands  of  one  and  again  in  the  hands  of  the  other.  But  in  France  a 
change  of  cabinet  means  nothing  more  than  a  change  from  the  leader- 
ship of  one  group  of  Republicans  to  the  leadership  of  another,  —  or,  at 
most,  a  change  from  the  leadership  of  Republicans  to  the  leadership 
of  Radicals,  who  are  simply  extreme  republicans.  .  .  .  One  group  of 
Republicans,  therefore,  succeeds  another ;  one  faction  goes  out  of  office, 
another  comes  in.  Generally  a  new  cabinet,  just  come  in,  is  composed 
in  part  of  men  who  held  office  also  in  the  cabinet  just  thrust  out.  It  is  a 
change  only  of  chief  figures.  And  so  wholesale  removals  from  office  do 
not  take  place. 

359.  The  spoils  system  at  its  height.  The  following  scathing 
denunciation  of  the  spoils  system  indicates  its  chief  evils  in  the 
United  States  before  the  civil  service  reform  began  : 

It  has  come  to  pass  that  the  work  of  paying  political  debts  and  dis- 
charging political  obligations,  of  rewarding  personal  friends  and  punishing 
personal  foes,  is  the  first  to  confront  each  President  on  assuming  the 
duties  of  his  office,  and  is  ever  present  with  him  even  to  the  last  moment 
of  his  official  term,  giving  him  no  rest  and  little  time  for  the  transaction 
of  other  business,  or  for  the  study  of  any  higher  or  grander  problems  of 
statesmanship.  He  is  compelled  to  give  daily  audience  to  those  who 
personally  seek  place,  or  to  the  army  of  those  who  backed  them.  .  .  . 


THE  EXECUTIVE  377 

The  Executive  Mansion  is  besieged,  if  not  sacked,  and  its  corridors 
and  chambers  are  crowded  each  day  with  the  ever-changing,  but  never- 
ending  throng.  Every  Chief  Magistrate,  since  the  evil  has  grown  to  its 
present  proportions,  has  cried  out  for  deliverance.  Physical  endurance, 
even,  is  taxed  beyond  its  power.  More  than  one  President  is  believed  to 
have  lost  his  life  from  this  cause.  The  spectacle  exhibited  of  the  Chief 
Magistrate  of  this  great  nation,  feeding,  like  a  keeper,  his  flock,  the  hun- 
gry, clamorous,  crowding,  jostling  multitude  which  daily  gathers  around 
the  dispenser  of  patronage,  is  humiliating  to  the  patriotic  citizen  interested 
alone  in  national  progress  and  grandeur.  Each  President,  whatever  may 
be  his  political  associations,  however  strong  may  be  his  personal  char- 
acteristics, steps  into  a  current,  the  force  of  which  is  constantly  increasing. 
He  can  neither  stem  nor  control  it,  much  less  direct  his  own  course, 
as  he  is  buffeted  and  driven  hither  and  thither  by  its  uncertain  and 
unmanageable  forces. 

The  malign  influence  of  political  domination  in  appointments  to  office 
is  widespread,  and  reaches  out  from  the  President  himself  to  all  possible 
means  of  approach  to  the  appointing  power.  It  poisons  the  ver)'  air  we 
breathe.  No  Congressman  in  accord  with  th^  dispenser  of  power  can 
wholly  escape  it.  It  is  ever  present.  When  he  awakes  in  the  morning 
it  is  at  his  door,  and  when  he  retires  at  night  it  haunts  his  chamber.  It 
goes  before  him,  it  follows  after  him,  and  it  meets  him  on  the  way.  It 
levies  contributions  on  all  the  relationships  of  a  Congressman's  life, 
summons  kinship  and  friendship  and  interest  to  its  aid,  and  imposes 
upon  him  a  work  which  is  never  finished  and  from  which  there  is  no 
release.  Time  is  consumed,  strength  is  exhausted,  the  mind  is  absorbed, 
and  the  vital  forces  of  the  legislator,  mental,  as  well  as  physical,  are 
spent  in  the  never-ending  struggle  for  offices. 

360.  The  United  States  Civil  Service  Act.    The  act  of  Janu- 

aiy  16,  1883,  is  the  basis  of  the  present  federal  civil  ser\'ice  in  the 
United  States.  It  removed  from  partisan  control  a  large  number 
of  subordinate  and  clerical  offices.  The  leading  provisions  of  tlie 
act  follow : 

Be  it  enacted  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  L  'nited 
States  of  America  in  Congress  assembled,  That  the  President  is  authorized 
to  appoint,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  three 
persons,  not  more  than  two  of  whom  shall  be  adherents  of  the  same 
party,  as  Civil  Service  Commissioners,  and  said  three  Commissioners 
shall  constitute  the  United  States  Civil  Service  Commission.  .  .  . 

Sec.  2.  That  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  said  Commissioners: 


378  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

First.  To  aid  the  President,  as  he  may  request,  in  preparing  suitable 
rules  for  carrying  this  act  into  effect.  .  .  . 

Second.  And,  among  other  things,  said  rules  shall  provide  and  de- 
clare, as  nearly  as  the  conditions  of  good  administration  will  warrant, 
as  follows : 

First,  for  open,  competitive  examinations  for  testing  the  fitness  of 
applicants  for  the  public  service  now  classified  or  to  be  classified  here- 
under. Such  examinations  shall  be  practical  in  their  character,  and  so 
far  as  may  be  shall  relate  to  those  matters  which  will  fairly  test  the 
relative  capacity  and  fitness  of  the  persons  examined  to  discharge  the 
duties  of  the  service  into  which  they  seek  to  be  appointed. 

Second,  that  all  the  offices,  places,  and  employments  so  arranged 
or  to  be  arranged  in  classes  shall  be  filled  by  selections  according  to 
grade  from  among  those  graded  highest  as  the  results  of  such  com- 
petitive examinations. 

Third,  appointments  to  the  public  service  aforesaid  in  the  depart- 
ments at  Washington  shall  be  apportioned  among  the  several  States  and 
Territories  and  the  District  of  Columbia  upon  the  basis  of  population 
as  ascertained  at  the  last  preceding  census.  Every  application  for  an 
examination  shall  contain,  among  other  things,  a  statement,  under  oath, 
setting  forth  his  or  her  actual  bona  fide  residence  at  the  time  of  making 
the  application,  as  well  as  how  long  he  or  she  has  been  a  resident  of 
such  place. 

Fourth,  that  there  shall  be  a  period  of  probation  before  any  absolute 
appointment  or  employment  aforesaid. 

Fifth,  that  no  person  in  the  public  service  is  for  that  reason  under 
any  obligations  to  contribute  to  any  political  fund,  or  to  render  any 
political  service,  and  that  he  will  not  be  removed  or  otherwise  prejudiced 
for  refusing  to  do  so. 

Sixth,  that  no  person  in  said  service  has  any  right  to  use  his  official 
authority  or  influence  to  coerce  the  political  action  of  any  person  or  body. 

Seventh,  there  shall  be  noncompetitive  examinations  in  all  proper 
cases  before  the  Commission,  when  competent  persons  do  not  compete, 
after  notice  has  been  given  of  the  existence  of  the  vacancy,  under  such 
rules  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  Commissioners  as  to  the  manner  of 
giving  notice. 

Eighth,  that  notice  shall  be  given  in  writing  by  the  appointing  power 
to  said  Commission  of  the  persons  selected  for  appointment  or  employ- 
ment from  among  those  who  have  been  examined,  of  the  place  of 
residence  of  such  persons,  of  the  rejection  of  any  such  persons  after 
probation,  of  transfers,  resignations,  and  removals,  and  of  the  date 
thereof,  and  a  record  of  the  same  shall  be  kept  by  said  Commission. 


THE  EXFX:UTIVE 


379 


361.  Acceptance  of  office.  After  selection,  the  acceptance  of 
office  is  sometimes  optional,  sometimes  compulsory. 

While  as  a  general  thing  no  obligation  to  assume  a  professional  office 
is  imposed  upon  its  citizens  by  any  government,  it  is  not  unfrequently 
the  case  that  the  law  compels  the  citizen  to  take  an  honorary  office 
whose  duties  are  not  so  arduous  as  to  require  the  entire  time  of  the 
incumbent.  This  seems  to  have  been  the  original  rule  in  England,  where 
acceptance  of  a  municipal  office  might  be  compelled  by  means  of  the 
writ  of  mandamus,  and  where  failure  to  assume  office  might  generally 
be  punished  by  indictment.  The  strictness  of  this  rule  has  been  some- 
what relaxed  in  this  country,  where  the  rule  has  been  retained.   .  .  . 

Further  it  has  been  held  that  the  holding  of  one  office  will  relieve 
from  the  obligation  of  accepting  another.  Finally  where  acceptance  of 
the  office  is  not  obligatory  some  formality  indicative  of  the  intention  to 
assume  the  office  seems  to  be  necessary  in  order  that  the  office  may  be 
regarded  as  filled.  Qualifying  for  the  office  is  regarded  as  the  best  evi- 
dence of  acceptance.  Refusal,  and  neglect  to  qualify  will  be  regarded 
as  a  refusal,  will  operate  to  extinguish  any  right  which  the  officer  has  to 
the  office ;  although  mere  delay  will  not  have  this  effect. 

In  France  it  is  almost  never  the  case  that  the  acceptance  of  office 
is  obligatory.  In  Germany  the  rule  is  very  much  the  same  as  in  the 
United  States,  but  where  the  obligation  to  serve  does  exist,  the  pen- 
alty for  refusal  to  serve  is  much  more  severe.  In  England  the  old 
rule  of  obligatory  service  has  been  much  modified.  Much  more  reli- 
ance is  placed  on  voluntaryism  than  formerly. 


IV.    Functions  of  the  Exfxutive 

362.  The  nature  of  administration.  The  functions  included  in 
the  administration  of  modern  states  may  be  classified  as  follows : 

Administration  in  this  narrowest  of  senses,  which  is  the  proper  sense 
for  it  as  indicative  of  a  function  of  government,  is  tlie  activity  of  the 
executive  officers  of  the  government.  The  government  administers  when 
it  appoints  an  officer,  instructs  its  diplomatic  agents,  assesses  and  collects 
its  taxes,  drills  its  army,  investigates  a  case  of  the  commission  of  crime, 
and  executes  the  judgment  of  a  court.  Whenever  we  see  the  govern- 
ment in  action  as  opposed  to  deliberation  or  the  rendering  of  a  judicial 
decision,  there  we  say  is  administration.  .  .  .  The  directions  in  which 
this  action  manifests  itself  depend  upon  the  position  of  the  state  and 
the  duties  of  the  government. 


380  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

In  the  first  place,  the  state  occupies  a  position  among  other  states ; 
it  is  a  subject  of  international  law,  and  as  such  has  rights  and  duties 
over  against  other  states  and  must  enter  into  relations  with  them.  The 
management  of  these  relations  calls  for  certain  executive  action.  This 
action  constitutes  a  branch  of  the  general  function  of  administration, 
viz.,  the  Administration  of  Foreign  Relations. 

In  the  second  place,  the  state  must  have  means  at  its  command  to 
repel  any  attempts  which  may  be  made  against  its  existence  or  power  by 
other  states  or  against  its  peace  and  order  by  its  own  inhabitants.  In 
other  words,  it  must  have  an  army  and  in  most  cases  a  navy.  The 
executive  action  made  necessary  by  the  existence  of  a  military  force 
constitutes  another  branch  of  administration,  viz.,  the  Administration  of 
Military  Affairs. 

In  the  third  place,  every  government  must  do  something  to  decide 
the  conflicts  which  arise  between  its  inhabitants  relative  to  their  rights. 
This  duty  makes  the  existence  of  courts  necessary ;  and  they  in  turn 
require  executive  action,  which  forms  a  third  branch  of  administration, 
viz.,  the  Administration  of  Judicial  Affairs. 

In  the  fourth  place,  in  order  that  the  government  may  perform  all 
its  duties,  it  must  have  pecuniary  means.  The  management  of  its  finan- 
cial resources  forms  another  and  fourth  branch  of  administration,  viz., 
the  Financial  Administration  or  the  Administration  of  Financial  Affairs. 
The  theories  of  some  political  philosophers  would  almost  confine  the 
action  of  government  to  these  branches  of  administration ;  but  no  gov- 
ernment was  ever  so  confined  by  its  constitution ;  and  every  modem 
state  has  recognized  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  government  to  further 
directly  the  welfare,  both  physical  and  intellectual,  of  its  citizens.  This 
it  does  by  the  formation  and  maintenance  of  a  system  of  means  of  com- 
munication, of  an  educational  system,  of  a  system  of  public  charity,  etc. 
.  .  .  The  duties  performed  by  the  government  in  furthering  the  wel- 
fare of  its  citizens  may  be  classed  together  as  internal  affairs ;  and  the 
executive  action  of  the  government  necessitated  by  the  performance  of 
these  duties  forms  a  fifth  branch  of  administration,  viz.,  the  Adminis- 
tration of  Internal  Affairs. 

These  five  branches  of  administration  embrace  all  the  functions  which 
the  government  is  called  upon  to  discharge  whatever  may  be  its  forni  of 
organization. 

363.  The  executive  power.  The  executive  power  may  be  roughly 
classified  under  the  following  heads  : 

First,  that  which  relates  to  the  conduct  of  foreign  relations  and  which 
we  may  denominate  the  diplomatic  power. 


THE  EXECUTIVE  381 

Second,  that  which  has  to  do  with  the  execution  of  the  laws,  and  the 
administration  of  the  government ;  this  may  be  denominated  the  admin- 
istrative power. 

Third,  that  which  relates  to  the  conduct  of  war  and  which  may  be 
described  as  the  military  power. 

Fourth,  the  power  to  grant  pardons  to  persons  charged  with  or  con- 
victed of  crime ;  this  may  be  called  the  judicial  power  of  the  e.xecutive. 

Fifth,  that  which  relates  to  legislation,  or  the  legislative  power. 

364.  Functions  of  the  German  emperor.  The  interrelation  of 
the  powers  of  the  German  executive  as  king  of  Prussia  and  as 
emperor  are  well  brought  out  in  the  following :  ^ 

The  Emperor  has,  therefore,  very  little  power  as  such,  except  in  military 
and  foreign  matters.  His  authority  as  Emperor,  however,  is  vigf)n)usly 
supplemented  by  his  functions  as  King  of  Prussia.  Thus  as  Emperor 
he  has  no  initiative  in  legislation ;  and  indeed  he  is  not  represented  in 
the  Reichstag  at  all ;  for  the  Chancellor,  strictly  speaking,  appears  there 
only  as  a  member  of  the  Bundesrath.  But  as  King  of  Prussia  the  Em- 
peror has  a  complete  initiative  by  means  of  the  Prussian  delegates  to 
the  Bundesrath  whom  he  appoints.  As  Emperor  he  has  no  veto,  but  as 
King  he  has  a  very  extensive  veto,  —  for  it  will  be  remembered  that  the 
negative  vote  of  Prussia  in  the  Bundesrath  is  sufhcicnt  to  defeat  any 
amendment  to  the  constitution,  or  any  proposal  to  change  the  laws  re- 
lating to  the  army,  the  navy,  or  the  taxes.  His  functions  as  Emperor 
and  as  King  are,  indeed,  so  interwoven  that  it  is  very  difficult  to  dis- 
tinguish them.  As  Emperor  he  has  supreme  command  of  the  army  and 
appoints  the  highest  officers.  As  King  of  Prussia  he  appoints  the  lower 
officers,  and  has  the  general  management  of  the  troops  over  most  of 
Germany.  As  Emperor  he  instructs  the  Chancellor  to  prepare  a  bill. 
As  King  he  instructs  him  to  introduce  it  into  the  Bundesrath,  and  directs 
how  one  third  of  the  votes  of  that  body  shall  be  cast.  Then  the  bill  is 
laid  before  the  Reichstag  in  his  name  as  Emperor,  and  as  King  he 
directs  the  Chancellor  what  amendments  to  accept  on  behalf  of  the 
Bundesrath,  or  rather  in  behalf  of  the  Prussian  delegation  there.  After 
the  bill  has  been  passed  and  become  a  law,  he  promulgates  it  as  Em- 
peror, and  in  most  cases  administers  it  in  Prussia  as  King ;  and  finally 
as  Emperor  he  supervises  his  own  administration  as  King.  This  state 
of  things  is  by  no  means  so  confusing  to  the  Germans  as  might  be  sui> 
posed ;  for  it  is  not  really  a  case  of  one  man  holding  two  distinct  offices, 

1  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 


382  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

but  of  the  addition  of  certain  imperial  functions  to  the  prerogatives 
of  the  King  of  Prussia.  The  administration  of  the  country  is  vested 
in  the  sovereigns  of  the  States,  among  whom  the  King  of  Prussia  is  ex 
officio  president ;  and  until  one  has  thoroughly  mastered  this  idea,  it  is 
impossible  to  understand  the  government  of  Germany. 

365.  Powers  of  the  President  of  the  United  States.  In  addition 
to  granting  to  the  President  the  general  executive  pov^er  and  a 
limited  veto,  the  federal  Constitution  outlines  his  povi^ers  and  duties 
as  follows : 

The  President  shall  be  commander  in  chief  of  the  army  and  navy  of  the 
United  States,  and  of  the  militia  of  the  several  States  when  called  into 
the  actual  service  of  the  United  States ;  he  may  require  the  opinion  in 
writing  of  the  principal  officer  in  each  of  the  executive  departments  upon 
any  subject  relating  to  the  duties  of  their  respective  offices ;  and  he  shall 
have  power  to  grant  reprieves  and  pardons  for  offenses  against  the 
United  States,  except  in  cases  of  impeachment. 

He  shall  have  power,  by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
Senate,  to  make  treaties,  provided  two  thirds  of  the  senators  present 
concur ;  and  he  shall  nominate,  and  by  and  with  the  advice  and  con- 
sent of  the  Senate  shall  appoint  ambassadors,  other  public  ministers  and 
consuls,  judges  of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  all  other  officers  of  the 
United  States,  whose  appointments  are  not  herein  otherwise  provided 
for  and  which  shall  be  established  by  law ;  but  the  Congress  may  by 
law  vest  the  appointment  of  such  inferior  officers  as  they  think 
proper  in  the  President  alone,  in  the  courts  of  law,  or  in  the  heads 
of  departments. 

The  President  shall  have  power  to  fill  up  all  vacancies  that  may 
happen  during  the  recess  of  the  Senate,  by  granting  commissions, 
which  shall  expire  at  the  end  of  their  next  session. 

He  shall,  from  time  to  time,  give  to  the  Congress  information  of  the 
state  of  the  LTnion,  and  recommend  to  their  consideration  such  measures 
as  he  shall  judge  necessary  and  expedient ;  he  may,  on  extraordinary 
occasions,  convene  both  houses,  or  either  of  them ;  and  in  case  of  dis- 
agreement between  them,  with  respect  to  the  time  of  adjournment,  he 
may  adjourn  them  to  such  time  as  he  shall  think  proper;  he  shall  re- 
ceive ambassadors  and  other  public  ministers ;  he  shall  take  care  that 
the  laws  be  faithfully  executed,  and  shall  commission  all  the  officers  of 
the  United  States. 


THE  EXECUTIVE  3S3 

366.  The  veto  power.  The  reasons  for  vesting  the  power  of 
veto  in  the  executive  may  be  stated  as  follows  : 

The  principal  purposes  of  the  veto  are  to  prevent  hasty  and  ill-con- 
sidered action  by  the  legislature,  and  to  furnish  the  executive  with  a 
means  of  defense  against  the  encroachments  of  the  legislature.  .  .  . 
Without  the  power  of  negative  the  executive  might  be  gradually  stripped 
of  his  authority  and  even  annihilated  by  successive  resolutions  of  the 
legislature.  The  possibility  of  this  danger  is  all  the  greater  in  a  coun- 
try like  the  United  States,  where  the  executive  has  neither  the  right  of 
adjournment,  of  prorogation,  nor  of  dissolution.  .  .  . 

The  veto  power,  said  Alexander  Hamilton,  not  only  serves  as  a 
"  shield  to  the  executive,"  but  it  furnishes  an  additional  security  against 
the  enactment  of  unwise  legislation  and  establishes  a  salutar)-  check  ufx^n 
the  evil  effects  of  faction,  precipitancy,  and  want  of  consideratic^n.  .  .  . 

Replying  to  the  objection  sometimes  urged  against  the  veto  power, 
that  it  is  not  to  be  presumed  that  a  single  man  will  possess  more  virtue 
and  wisdom  than  the  entire  legislature,  Hamilton  said,  "  The  propriety 
of  the  thing  does  not  turn  upon  the  supposition  of  superior  wisdom  or 
virtue  in  the  executive  ;  but  upon  the  supposition  that  the  legislature 
will  not  be  infallible ;  that  the  love  of  power  may  sometimes  betray  it 
into  a  disposition  to  encroach  upon  the  rights  of  the  other  members 
of  the  government ;  that  a  spirit  of  faction  may  sometimes  pervert  its 
deliberations  ;  and  that  impressions  of  the  moment  may  sometimes  hurr>' 
it  into  measures  which  itself  would  condemn."  To  the  argument  some- 
times advanced  that  the  veto  power  of  the  executive  may  be  employed 
to  prevent  the  enactment  of  good  laws  as  well  as  bad  ones,  it  may  be 
replied  that  the  power  cannot  be  effectually  exercised  if  an  unusual 
majority  of  the  legislature  is  favorably  disposed  toward  the  law  vetoed. 


CHAPTER  XX 

THE  JUDICIARY 

I.    Evolution  of  the  Judicial  Department 

367.  The  evolution  of  state  justice.  The  transition  from  private 
vengeance  to  public  judicial  authority  has  taken  place  through 
several  fairly  well-defined  phases. 

The  earliest  notion  of  justice,  as  distinct  from  mere  indiscriminate 
revenge,  that  we  find  among  the  Teutonic  peoples  is,  undoubtedly,  the 
blood  feud.  Barbarous  as  such  an  institution  appears  to  us,  we  have 
but  to  think  for  a  moment,  to  realize  its  immense  importance,  as  a  step 
in  human  progress.  A  man  receives  a  wound  from  another,  is  perhaps 
killed.  Instantly  the  passion  for  slaughter  awakes.  All  who  are  in  any 
way  interested  in  the  dead  man  —  those  who  worshiped  his  gods  or 
fought  by  his  side,  are  eager  to  avenge  his  death  on  any  person  who 
may  be  supposed  to  be  connected  with  his  murderer.  General  carnage 
is  the  result ;  no  man's  life  is  safe.  But,  if  it  can  once  be  established, 
that  the  right  of  vengeance  belongs  only  to  a  limited  circle  of  the  dead 
man's  relatives,  and  may  be  exercised  only  against  the  immediate  rela- 
tives of  the  offender,  the  area  of  vengeance  is  substantially  narrowed, 
the  evil  of  the  deed  proportionately  decreased.  This  is  the  work  of  the 
blood  feud.  .  .  . 

To  the  blood  feud,  then,  succeeds  the  7cier  or  money  payment  as 
compensation  for  the  injury  inflicted.  Here  again  we  are  in  the  dark  as 
to  the  origin  of  the  change,  which  may,  possibly,  have  taken  place  be- 
fore the  introduction  of  coined  money  into  the  Teutonic  world,  but  was 
probably  almost  contemporary  with  that  event.  It  is,  of  course,  highly 
probable  that  Christianity,  with  its  hatred  of  bloodshedding,  may  have  had 
much  to  do  with  the  substitution  of  payment  for  corporal  revenge.  .  .  . 

But  two  points  in  connection  with  the  system  of  pecuniary  composi- 
tions require  careful  attention.  To  begin  with,  it  seems  to  have  been 
a  purely  voluntary  system.  It  is  difficult,  in  fact,  to  see  how  the  Clan, 
an  organ  destitute  of  anything  like  an  executive  machinery,  could  have 
enforced  the  acceptance  of  the  wer,  without  bringing  down  upon  itself 
that  state  of  general  disturbance  which  the  wer  was  designed  to  avoid.  .  .  . 

384 


THE  JUDICIARY  385 

In  the  second  place,  it  was  always  admitted  that  there  were  some 
offenses  for  which  the  money  payment  could  ntjt  atone.  .  .  .  l-'(jr  these 
the  offender  is  banished,  and  his  goods  forfeited. 

These  are  our  two  starting  points  for  the  histor)'  of  Slate  justice. 
The  king  comes  to  the  help  of  the  Clan  by  compelling  the  avenger  to 
accept  the  wer  and  by  compelling  the  offender  to  pay  it.  lie  likewise 
takes  upon  himself  the  punishment  of  bootless  crimes.  .  .  . 

But  the  cooperation  of  the  king  in  the  enforcement  of  the  ^oer  brings 
about  one  very  important  by-result.  The  king's  officer  does  not  work 
for  nothing.  .  .  .  And  so  we  get  the  beginning  of  that  double  element 
in  legal  proceedings  —  the  claim  of  the  Party  and  the  claim  of  the  State 
—  which  has  had  so  much  influence  on  legal  development. 

368.  Evolution  of  forms  of  punishment.  The  following  extract 
indicates  the  fundamental  changes  that  have  taken  place  in  the 
method  and  purpose  of  punishment : 

(i)  The  first  period  is  that  of  revenge.  Penalty  in  all  its  forms  was 
savage  and  cruel.  Man's  nervous  system  was  in  primiti\'e  times  less 
highly  organized  and  endured  pain  more  easily;  human  sympatliy  was- 
lacking  and  belief  in  the  sacredness  of  human  life  hardly  existed.  Pun- 
ishment was  ruthless,  often  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  crime,  and  fre- 
quently involved  the  innocent  with  the  guilty,  under  the  ancient  theor)- 
of  collective  responsibility  either  of  family,  clan,  or  fraternity. 

(2)  As  notions  of  justice  developed  in  men's  minds,  the  desire  for 
revenge  became  modified  into  the  principle  of  retaliation.  Every  offense 
was  to  be  atoned  for  by  a  similar  punishment.  It  was  the  period  of  hx 
talumis,  an  eye  for  an  eye,  a  tooth  for  a  tooth,  no  more,  no  less.  This 
system  also  was  cruel,  but  yet  in  its  attempt  to  secure  justice  it  was  an 
improvement  over  the  vindictive  system  of  the  earlier  stage. 

(3)  With  the  rise  of  personal  property  there  came  a  strong  tendency 
to  atone  by  the  payment  of  a  fine  for  all  but  the  worst  crimes,  blood 
penalty  being  exacted  only  from  the  worst  criminals  or  from  those 
who  were  unable  to  pay  fines.  Under  this  system  there  was  a  carefully 
graded  list  of  offenses,  each  valued  at  a  particular  fine,  var\ing  in 
amount  with  the  social  rank  of  the  injured  person.  The  fine  in  early 
times  was  paid  partly  to  the  injured  and  partly  to  the  state.  Confisca- 
tion of  property  is  simply  a  variation  of  this  form  of  punishment.  W  iih 
the  development  of  slavery,  punishment  for  crime  might  in  default  of  fine 
result  in  the  sale  of  the  criminal,  and  perhaps  of  his  family  also,  into 
slavery  for  a  term  of  years  or  for  life.  As  slavery  disapfx-arcd,  this 
form  of  punishment  survived  in  sentences  that  condemned  men  to  labor 


386  "READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

in  mines  or  on  governmental  works,  to  serve  in  the  army  or  navy,  or 
as  servants  to  private  citizens  who  employed  this  convict  labor  on  plan- 
tations or  in  various  industries. 

(4)  Another  stage  of  punishment  developed  when  the  courts  under- 
took to  deter  men  from  crime  by  the  infliction  of  cruel  punishments. 
This  was  effected  by  imprisonment  in  noisome  dungeons,  by  burning, 
mutilation,  whipping,  branding,  and  torture  developed  to  its  highest  pitch 
by  human  ingenuity.   .   .   . 

In  medieval  Europe,  as  well  as  throughout  the  Orient,  a  belief  in  the 
efficacy  of  torture  resulted  in  its  use  in  the  case  of  persons  strongly  sus- 
pected of  crime,  against  whom,  however,  there  was  insufficient  evidence 
to  convict,  or  whose  evidence  it  was  thought  might  inculpate  others. 
These  persons  were  put  to  the  torture  on  the  theory  that  persons  suffer- 
ing bodily  anguish  will  tell  the  truth.  ...  A  peculiar  form  of  punish- 
ment developed  in  many  parts  of  the  world  and  in  early  Europe  as  the 
result  of  religious  ideas.  When  men  desired  to  do  justice  and  yet  real- 
ized how  imperfect  judicial  machinery  was  in  the  detection  of  crime,  it 
occurred  to  them  that  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  accused  might  safely 
be  left  with  God.  In  consequence  there  developed  a  system  of  ordeals, 
oaths,  and  judicial  combats,  the  outcome  of  which  determined  the  punish- 
ment or  acquittal  of  the  accused.  .   .  . 

The  penal  systems  of  the  nineteenth  century  present  a  complex  of 
many  former  stages.  Hanging  for  murder  is  a  form  of  lex  talionis. 
Hanging  for  other  crimes  and  solitary  confinement  aim  to  deter  the 
commitment  of  such  crimes.  The  system  of  fines  carefully  graded  to 
fit  each  offense  is  still  in  vogue  but  reserved  for  minor  crimes.  More 
serious  offenses  are  usually  punished  by  imprisonment,  not  so  much  to 
deter  others  from  crime  as  to  segregate  criminals  from  social  life. 

369.  The  people  and  the  courts.  The  strong  support  of  public 
opinion  behind  the  courts,  especially  in  time  of  peace,  in  contrast 
to  the  frequent  fear  of  executive  or  legislative  power,  is  worth  noting. 

Usually  in  this  country  and  in  most  modern  states,  the  judges  have 
been  strongly  inclined  to  conserve  the  rights  and  privileges  of  the  com- 
mon people  as  opposed  to  the  executive  or  to  the  legislature,  which  at 
times  seem  inclined  to  encroach  upon  the  rights  of  the  people.  On  that 
account  the  judges  have  usually  in  both  ancient  and  modern  times  en- 
joyed special  honor  and  respect  from  the  citizens  as  upholders  of  right 
and  justice.  It  is,  therefore,  considering  these  facts,  —  and  I  think  the 
facts  are  undeniable,  —  natural  that  we  should  expect  that  in  times  of 
peace  our  judges  will  find  their  influence  strengthened  as  compared  with 


THE  JUDICIARY  ^S^ 

the  power  of  the  executive  and  of  the  legislature.  In  times  of  emergency, 
such  as  that  of  war,  the  executive  has  the  opportunity,  as  has  been  said, 
to  strengthen  his  power  at  the  expense  of  the  courts  and  of  the  legisla- 
ture. But  in  times  of  peace,  as  the  course  of  events  normally  move,  the 
courts  in  their  power  of  interpreting  the  law,  overruling  the  legislature, 
controlling  the  executive,  become  the  conservators  of  the  rights  of  the 
people,  and  the  people  seeing  that  their  power  is  strengthened  by  the 
judges,  often  make  it  evident  that  in  times  of  peace  they  hold  the  courts 
to  be  the  most  trusted  if  not  the  most  powerful  branch  of  government. 


II.    Functions  and  Requisites  of  the  Judiciary 

370.  The  judicial  function.  The  general  nature  of  the  judicial 
power  in  modern  states  may  be  indicated  as  follows : 

The  chief  function  of  the  judicial  department  is  to  interpret  the  law 
and  to  apply  its  penalties  and  remedies  in  all  cases  brought  before  the 
courts  for  their  decision.  This  power  is  fundamental  to  the  successful 
workings  of  government,  which  by  nature  is  coercive  and  must  have 
authority  to  enforce  by  penalty  its  decisions.  Such  a  power  is  essentially 
executive  and  was  originally  wielded  by  the  elders  or,  in  earlier  states,  by 
the  king.  In  modern  states  judicial  authority  has  differentiated  into  two 
great  branches,  one  exercised  chiefly  by  the  executive  department  and 
the  other  by  a  separate  department  devoted  to  judicial  functions  only. 
This  latter  department  is  concerned  chiefly  with  alleged  infractions  of 
the  law  by  private  persons  and  with  disputes  between  private  persons  in 
regard  to  property  rights.  That  part  of  the  judicial  function  residing 
in  the  executive  department  is  concerned  mainly  with  the  enforcement 
of  discipline  in  the  army  and  navy,  in  the  civil  service,  and  in  the  settle- 
ment of  disputes  arising  under  administrative  rules. 

371.  Jurisdiction  of  courts.  Courts  can  decide  questions  only 
when  cases  over  which  they  have  authority  are  properly  brought 
before  them. 

The  functions  of  the  judicial  department  are  discharged  by  courts 
created  by  law,  and  courts  can  only  decide  cases  which  are  properly 
brought  before  them.  A  case  brought  before  a  court  is  said  to  be 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  if  it  is  one  which  by  law  the  court 
is  authorized  to  try,  and  which,  in  the  particular  instance,  is  so  sub- 
mitted to  it  that  it  may  be  tried.  It  is  often  said  that,  to  authorize  the 
determination  of  a  case  in  a  court,  the  court  must  have  jurisdiction  of 


388  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

the  subject  matter  and  of  the  parties.  But  by  such  a  statement  is  simply 
meant  that  the  case  must  be  one  of  a  class  of  cases  which  by  law  the 
court  has  authority  to  determine ;  and  that  the  particular  case  is  brought 
by  one  having  the  right  to  sue  in  the  court,  and  that  the  party  against 
whom  a  decision  is  asked  is  served  with  notice  or  otherwise  brought  into 
court  in  such  way  that  he  is  bound  to  present  his  defense. 

372  Methods  of  choosing  judges  in  the  United  States  common- 
wealths. The  relative  advantages  of  the  different  methods  used 
in  choosing  judges  in  the  commonwealths  of  the  United  States 
are  thus  stated  in  a  recent  book  :  ^ 

There  has  been  considerable  controversy  as  to  which  of  the  three 
methods  of  choosing  —  namely,  selection  by  the  legislature,  the  governor, 
or  popular  vote  —  is  the  most  advantageous  to  the  cause  of  justice.  It 
is  generally  agreed  that  the  first  is  not  at  all  desirable;  the  choice  is 
only  too  often  made  by  log-rolling  tactics  when  it  is  intrusted  to  the 
legislature.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  much  to  be  said  on  the  merits 
of  the  other  two  methods  —  popular  election  and  appointment  by  the 
governor.  The  friends  of  the  former  practice  emphasize  the  fact  that 
choice  by  the  people  seems  to  be  the  only  democratic  way  of  selecting 
important  officials,  for  appointment  by  the  governor  renders  the  judges 
too  independent  of  the  popular  will  and  tends  to  make  them  arbitrary. 
They  point  out  also  that,  in  the  case  of  local  judges,  the  people  of  the 
district  are  likely  to  know  more  about  the  qualifications  of  the  candidates 
than  the  governor  who  is  obliged  to  depend  on  recommendations  of  third 
parties  —  that  is,  on  the  recommendations  of  a  local  political  machine. 
Rnally,  the  champions  of  the  elective  system  point  to  the  fact  that  on 
the  whole  it  has  worked  successfully  and  that  excellent  judges  have  been 
obtained  under  it.  .  .  .  Finally,  the  advocates  of  popular  election  point 
out  that  in  so  far  as  judges  have  the  power  to  declare  laws  void  their 
functions  are  political  and,  therefore,  they  should  not  be  removed  from 
popular  control. 

To  offset  these  arguments,  those  who  favor  appointive  judges  say  that 
where  good  judges  have  been  obtained,  they  have  been  secured  in  spite 
of  popular  election,  not  because  of  it.  Massachusetts,  whose  judges  have 
always  been  distinguished  for  their  high  character  and  legal  learning, 
is  always  cited  as  the  state  in  which  the  appointive  system  has  proved 
eminently  successful.  It  is  contended  that  the  people  do  not  have  the 
capacity  to  pass  upon  qualifications  required  for  a  successful  judge  and 
often  select  the  most  popular  man  rather  than  the  one  most  fit.    Making 

1  Copyright,  1910,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


THE  JUDICIARY  389 

the  judge  an  elective  officer,  the  advocates  of  the  appointive  system  con- 
tinue, renders  him  dependent  on  political  leaders ;  party  service  —  not 
fitness  —  is  made  a  test  for  the  office  ;  in  order  that  the  republican  form 
of  government  may  be  a  success  and  justice  done  between  man  and  man, 
the  judiciary  must  be  absolutely  independent ;  the  judge  must  feel  that 
he  need  not  come  up  for  a  renomination  before  the  leaders  of  his  party ; 
he  must  not  be  afraid  to  render  an  unpopular  decision  which  may  per- 
haps cause  his  defeat  if  he  is  candidate  for  reelection.  Therefore,  they 
conclude,  the  appointive  system  is  the  only  one  which  puts  the  judges 
in  such  a  position. 

373.  Barristers  and  solicitors  in  England.  Lowell  describes  as 
follows  the  distinction  between  two  branches  in  the  practice  of 
law  which,  although  uncommon  in  the  United  States,  is  usual  in 
England  and  the  continent :  ^ 

In  the  face  of  a  legal  education  until  recently  very  unsystematic,  the 
excellence  of  English  law  as  a  body  of  jurisprudence  has  been  promoted 
by  the  method  of  recruiting  both  the  bar  and  the  bench.  As  in  most 
European  countries,  the  practice  of  law  is  divided  into  two  branches,  that 
of  the  barristers,  and  that  of  the  solicitors  or  attorneys.  The  solicitor 
or  attorney  alone  comes  into  direct  relations  with  the  clients.  He  is  their 
confidential  adviser  and  friend ;  draws  up  their  legal  papers ;  carries  on 
for  them  business  of  all  sorts  that  may  have  only  an  incidental  connec- 
tion with  law ;  does  the  preliminary  work  of  preparing  a  case  for  trial ; 
and  can  himself  conduct  the  trial  before  inferior  courts.  A  man  is  ad- 
mitted by  the  court  to  practice  as  an  attorney  only  after  an  appren- 
ticeship and  a  series  of  examinations.  These  last  are  conducted  by  the 
Incorporated  Law  Society,  an  association  composed  of  solicitors,  which 
has  done  much  to  raise  the  standard  of  legal  education  in  the  profession. 
Other  forces  have,  indeed,  worked  in  the  same  direction  ;  for  in  England, 
as  elsewhere,  the  business  side  of  law  has  grown  in  importance,  and  the 
great  firms  of  solicitors  have  attained  a  position  lucrative  and  dignified 
to  a  degree  that  would  hardly  have  been  thought  possible  a  century  ago. 

The  barrister  gives  the  solicitor  opinions  on  doubtful  points  of  law ; 
and  has  the  exclusive  privilege  of  conducting  trials  and  making  argu- 
ments before  the  higher  courts.  Unlike  the  solicitors,  who  are  scattered 
over  the  country,  the  barristers  are  mainly  concentrated  in  London.  .  .  . 
The  barristers  have,  in  fact,  a  rigidly  aristocratic  organization.  Tlu-y  all 
belong  to  one  or  other  of  the  four  Inns  of  Court ;  the  Inner  Temple. 
The  Middle  Temple,  Lincoln's  Inn  and  Gray's  Inn,  each   Inn  being 

1  Copyright,  190S,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


390  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

governed  by  a  body  of  Benchers,  who  fill  their  own  vacancies  from  the 
leading  or  senior  men  at  the  bar.  Having  almost  uncontrolled  power  to 
admit  or  expel  members  of  the  Inns,  the  Benchers  hold  the  keys  to  the 
profession ;  although  in  fact  they  very  rarely  refuse  admission  to  any 
one  who  eats  the  dinners  and  passes  the  moderate  examination  required. 
An  organization  of  this  kind,  of  which,  by  the  way,  the  judges  continue 
to  be  members,  gives  to  the  bar  a  great  solidarity  and  capacity  to  main- 
tain its  traditions. 

The  late  Lord  Coleridge,  Chief  Justice  of  the  Queen's  Bench,  ex- 
pressed the  opinion  that  the  separation  of  the  two  branches  of  the  pro- 
fession was  better  for  the  development  of  law,  while  the  American  habit 
of  combining  them  was  probably  better  for  the  client.  From  the  stand- 
point of  perfecting  the  law  the  English  system  has  two  advantages. 
Instead  of  expending  much  of  their  time  on  business  affairs,  the  counsel 
who  assist  the  court  by  arguing  cases  have  their  minds  engrossed  by 
legal  principles,  and  by  the  practice  of  law  as  a  distinct  art;  and  they 
are  selected  and  retained  by  solicitors  who  are  themselves  lawyers  by 
profession,  instead  of  by  clients  with  whom  a  business  connection,  a 
cheap  notoriety,  or  engaging  manners  may  have  more  influence  than  a 
profound  knowledge  of  the  law. 

374.  Importance  of  lawyers  in  the  United  States.  Burgess 
emphasizes  the  part  which  lawyers  have  played  in  our  constitu- 
tional development  and  points  out  the  responsibilities  resting  upon 
the  profession. 

This  consciousness  has  been  awakened  and  developed  by  the  fact  that 
the  political  education  of  the  people  has  been  directed  by  the  jurists 
rather  than  by  the  warriors  or  the  priests ;  and  it  is  the  reflex  influence 
of  this  education  that  upholds  and  sustains,  in  the  United  States,  the 
aristocracy  of  the  robe.  I  do  not  hesitate  to  call  the  governmental  system 
of  the  United  States  the  aristocracy  of  the  robe ;  and  I  do  not  hesi- 
tate to  pronounce  this  the  truest  aristocracy  for  the  purposes  of  govern- 
ment which  the  world  has  yet  produced.  I  believe  that  the  secret  of  the 
peculiarities  and  the  excellencies  of  the  political  system  of  the  United 
States,  when  compared  with  those  systems  founded  and  developed  by 
priests,  warriors,  and  landlords,  is  the  predominant  influence  therein  of 
the  jurists  and  the  lawyers.  .  .  . 

But  government  by  lawyers  has  its  weak  points  and  its  dangers.  If  the 
lawyers  separate  law  from  history  and  jurisprudence,  and  jurisprudence 
from  ethics,  they  will  inevitably  and  speedily  lose  that  spiritual  influence 
over  the  consciousness  of  the  people,  which  is  the  sole  basis  of  their 


THE  JUDICIARY  .gi 

power.  Let  this  once  happen,  and  the  courts  will  be  unable  to  stand  be- 
tween the  constitution  and  the  legislature.  The  legislature  will  bccume 
almighty.  That  branch  of  the  government  in  which,  especially  under  uni- 
versal suffrage,  party  blindness  and  passion  are  most  sure  to  prevail,  and 
in  which  the  least  sense  of  personal  responsibility  exists,  will  have  at  its 
mercy  those  individual  rights  which  we  term  civil  liberty.  The  student 
of  political  history  knows  only  too  well  that  the  despotism  of  the  legis- 
lature is  more  to  be  dreaded  than  that  of  the  executive,  and  that  the 
escape  from  the  former  is  generally  accomplished  only  by  the  creation 
of  the  latter. 

I  think  there  is  reason  to  fear  that  the  legal  profession  of  to-day  in  the 
United  States  does  not  appreciate  its  position,  and  is  not  sufficiently  im- 
pressed with  its  duty  to  preserve  the  ideal  source  of  its  power.  There  is 
reason  to  fear  that  law  is  coming  to  be  regarded  by  the  mass  of  lawyers 
too  much  as  an  industry  ;  and  if  this  be  true  of  them,  it  will  surely  follow 
that  it  will  be  so  regarded  by  the  mass  of  the  people.  It  rests  with  the 
lawyers  and  the  teachers  of  law  to  determine  for  themselves  whether 
they  will  divest  themselves  of  their  great  spiritual  power  over  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  people ;  whether  they  will  give  up  the  commanding  in- 
fluence which  their  predecessors  have  held  in  the  making  of  this  great , 
republic,  and  which  those  predecessors  exercised  with  such  beneficent 
results  to  the  welfare  of  the  whole  people. 


III.    Relation  of  Judiciary  to  Exfxutive 

375.  Necessity  of  judicial  independence.  Judicial  independence 
of  executive  control  has  been  found  essential  to  individual  litx-ily.' 

First,  we  may  note  the  need  of  rules  reducing  within  the  narrowest 
possible  limits  the  power  of  the  executive  to  imprison  private  citizens  be- 
fore trial.  The  most  important  provisions  under  this  head  are  (a)  that 
no  one  shall  be  arrested  except  on  a  definite  charge  of  having  committed 
a  certain  offense  ;  (b)  that  the  person  arrested  shall  be  brought  as  soon 
as  possible  before  a  judicial  functionary  who  shall  decide  whether  the 
charge  is  made  on  grounds  prima  facie  reasonable,  and  whether  the 
offense  charged  is  sufficiently  grave  to  render  it  needful  to  keep  the  ac- 
cused in  confinement  until  the  trial ;  (c)  that  if  the  charge  is  of  this 
grave  kind  the  accused  shall  be  brought  to  trial  as  soon  as  possible,  and 
that  if  it  is  of  a  lighter  kind,  he  shall  be  set  at  liberty  on  bail.  In  order 
that  these  latter  provisions  may  be  effective,  it  is  clearly  desirable  that 

1  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  e'ompany. 


592 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


the  judicial  functionary  before  whom  the  accused  person  is  brought 
should  be  distinct  from  the  executive  and  independent  of  its  influence. 
This  independence  is  further  required  to  secure  an  impartial  trial  in  any 
case  in  which  the  conduct  of  private  persons  which  is  alleged  to  be  ille- 
gal is  certainly  inconvenient  to  the  executive.  It  is  also  required  to 
secure  the  effectiveness  of  another  of  the  constitutional  bulwarks  of  free- 
dom to  which  I  above  referred,  —  the  right  of  suing  or  prosecuting  gov- 
ernment officials  for  any  illegalities  committed  by  them  in  performance 
of  their  functions.  For  if  the  conduct  of  one  member  of  the  executive 
had  to  be  judged  by  another,  or  by  a  judge  practically  under  its  control, 
the  esprit  de  corps  which  may  be  presumed  to  exist  in  the  executive  as  a 
body,  and  its  natural  tendency  to  resist  any  restriction  on  its  powers, 
would  diminish  the  complainant's  chance  of  obtaining  an  impartial  hear- 
ing and  adequate  redress. 

376.  Advantages  and  disadvantages  of  separate  administrative 
courts.  The  European  method  of  a  distinct  system  of  courts  for 
officers  of  the  administration  has  certain  advantages  and  dis- 
advantages. 

The  chief  advantage  claimed  for  the  system  is  that  the  subjection  of 
the  public  authorities  to  the  continual  control  and  interference  of  the 
judicial  courts  is  detrimental  to  prompt  and  efficient  administration. 
Administrative  controversies  are  somewhat  peculiar  in  their  nature 
and  involve  questions  which  for  proper  consideration  require  a  special 
and  technical  knowledge  not  ordinarily  possessed  by  judges  whose 
training  and  experience  have  been  confined  to  the  field  of  private 
law,  and  whose  education  has  been  academic  rather  than  practical. 
Such  judges  are  likely  to  have  exaggerated  notions  of  the  rights  of 
private  individuals,  as  against  those  of  the  public ;  they  are  inclined 
to  a  natural  timidity  in  deciding  issues  between  individuals  and  the 
government  adversely  to  the  claims  of  the  individual ;  and  with  their 
disposition  to  adhere  strictly  to  legal  rules  and  traditions  they  some- 
times unnecessarily  hamper  and  obstruct  the  legitimate  operations  of 
the  government.  .  .  . 

The  chief  objection  that  has  been  urged  against  the  European  method 
of  relieving  the  public  authorities  from  the  control  of  the  regular  courts 
of  justice  and  intrusting  the  determination  of  so-called  administrative  con- 
troversies to  special  tribunals,  is  that  it  destroys  to  a  large  extent  the 
legal  protection  of  the  individual  against  the  acts  of  the  administrative 
authorities.  The  legal  remedies  which  are  allowed  by  these  courts  for  the 
infringement  of  individual  rights  by  the  authorities  are  quite  different 


THE  JUDICIARY  393 

from,  and,  it  is  asserted,  less  effective  than,  those  affcjrded  bv  the  regu- 
lar judicial  courts  in  other  cases.  Moreover,  their  responsibility  is  to  a 
class  of  tribunals  made  up  largely  of  administrative  officials  who,  being  a 
part  of  the  government  themselves,  are  apt  to  be  less  favorable  to  indi- 
vidual rights  than  are  judges  of  the  regular  judicial  courts.  This  may  be 
due  partly  to  their  natural  zeal  for  the  rights  of  the  administration,  or 
the  result  of  pressure  on  the  part  of  the  government  itself. 


IV.    Relation  of  Judiciary  to  Legislature 

377.  The  great  writs.  Courts  issue  certain  writs  which  affect 
fundamentally  the  rights  of  citizens. ^ 

1.  The  first  and  most  famous  of  these  writs  is  that  of  habeas  corpus. 
This  writ  is  designed  to  secure  to  any  imprisoned  person  the  right  to 
have  an  immediate  preliminary  hearing  for  the  purpose  of  discovering 
the  reason  for  his  detention.   .  .  . 

2.  The  second  writ  is  the  writ  of  mandamus  which  is  used  against 
public  oflficials,  private  persons,  and  corporations  for  the  purpose  of 
forcing  them  to  perform  some  duty  required  of  them  by  law.  The 
mandamus  is  properly  used  against  executive  officers  to  compel  them  to 
perform  some  ministerial  duty.  Where  the  duty  is  purely  discretionary* 
and  its  performance  depends  upon  the  pleasure  of  the  official  or  upon 
his  own  interpretation  of  the  law,  the  court  will  not  intervene.  .  .  .  The 
writ  of  mandamus  is  also  often  used  to  compel  an  inferior  court  to  pass 
upon  some  matter  within  its  jurisdiction  which  it  has  refused  to  hear  or 
act  upon. 

3.  The  third  great  writ  is  the  writ  (or  bill)  of  injunction.  This  writ 
may  be  used  for  many  purposes.  Sometimes  it  takes  the  form  of  a 
mandatory  writ  ordering  some  person  or  corporation  to  maintain  a 
status  quo  by  performing  certain  acts.  Thus,  for  example,  the  cmjiloyees 
of  a  railway  may  be  forbidden  to  refuse  to  handle  the  cars  of  some  com- 
pany which  they  wish  to  boycott ;  in  other  words,  may  be  ordered  to 
continue  to  perform  their  regular  and  customary  duties  while  remaining 
in  the  service  of  their  employer.  Sometimes  the  injunction  takes  the 
form  of  a  temporary  restraining  order  forbidding  a  i)arly  to  alter  the 
existing  condition  of  things  in  question  until  the  merits  of  the  case 
may  be  decided.  Sometimes  the  w^rit  is  in  the  form  of  a  permanent 
injunction  ordering  a  party  not  to  perform  some  act  the  results  of 
which  cannot  be  remedied  by  any  proceeding  in  law. 

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394  READINGS  IN   POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

378.  Judicial  power  over  legislative  acts.  The  various  ways  in 
which  the  judiciary  modifies  or  shares  in  lawmaking  may  be  stated 
as  follows : 

In  every  state  there  must  be  some  authority  empowered  to  declare 
what  the  law  is  when  its  meaning  in  a  particular  controversy  is  drawn  in 
question.  Thought  is  subtler  than  expression,  and  owing  to  the  deficien- 
cies and  ambiguities  of  language  it  is  difficult  to  reduce  rules  of  conduct 
to  written  form  so  as  to  convey  exactly  the  same  meaning  to  different 
minds.  The  meaning  of  the  written  law,  therefore,  is  frequently  a 
matter  of  dispute ;  and  when  parliamentary  draftsmen  are  careless  or 
incompetent  and  the  law  must  be  applied  under  conditions  and  circum- 
stances which  could  never  have  been  contemplated  by  even  the  most 
imaginative  legislator,  the  possibility  of  disputes  is  greatly  increased.  In 
such  circumstances  the  courts  are  accustomed  not  only  to  assume  the 
right  of  discovering  the  hidden  meaning  of  the  law  but,  if  possible,  of 
giving  effect  to  the  presumable  intention  of  the  lawmaker,  even  if  this 
does  involve  a  subordinate  power  of  lawmaking  and  is  in  conflict  with 
the  theory  of  the  separation  of  powers.   .  .  . 

In  all  systems  of  law  known  to  history  the  courts  by  interpretation 
and  instruction  have  worked  out  an  extensive  system  of  jurisprudence 
popularly  described  as  "  judge-made "  law.  Thus  the  Roman  jurists 
developed  an  immense  body  of  private  law  from  the  meager  fabric  of 
the  Twelve  Tables,  and  the  English  and  American  judges  have  done 
likewise  from  the  body  of  written  law,  statutory  and  constitutional. 
This  must  necessarily  happen  in  any  legal  system  which  grows  and 
expands  to  meet  the  changing  necessities  of  society.  .  .   . 

Whether  the  judiciary  in  the  exercise  of  its  undoubted  right  of 
interpretation,  that  is,  of  discovering  the  meaning  of  the  written 
statute  which  it  is  called  on  to  apply,  may,  if  in  its  opinion  the 
statute  is  inconsistent  with  some  superior  law,  refuse  to  apply  such 
a  statute  and  treat  it  as  null  and  void,  is  a  question  which  has  been 
much  mooted  by  jurists  and  political  writers.  Outside  the  United 
States  the  practice  and,  to  a  large  extent,  the  opinions  of  commen- 
tators have  been  adverse  to  the  assumption  of  such  a  power  on  the 
part  of  the  courts.  On  the  continent  of  Europe  the  general  principle 
prevails  that  the  lawmaking  body  itself  is  the  only  judge  of  the  validity 
of  its  acts.  .  .  . 

In  the  United  States  the  doctrine  of  the  right  of  the  judiciary  to  set 
aside  and  refuse  to  be  bound  by  legislative  acts  which  in  its  opinion 
contravene  the  supreme  law  has  been  acted  upon  from  colonial  times 
and  has  been  a  familiar  one  in  American  jurisprudence. 


THE  JUDICIARY  395 

379.  Disallowance  of  a  colonial  bill.  An  early  example  of  the 
annulment  of  a  legislative  statute  —  a  forerunner  of  the  American 
practice  of  declaring  laws  invalid  —  is  contained  in  the  following 
report  of  the  Lords  Commissioners  for  Trade  and  Plantations  for 
the  American  colonies  : 

The  Lords  of  the  Committee  of  your  Majesty's  most  honorable  Privy 
Council  for  Plantation  Affairs  having  by  their  Order  of  the  loth  of  Nov : 
last  directed  us  to  report  to  them  Our  opinion  upon  a  liill  passed  in  May 
1769  by  the  Council  and  House  of  Representatives  of  your  Majesty's 
Council  of  New  York  for  emitting  £  120,000  in  paper  notes  of  Credit 
upon  loan,  to  which  Bill  your  Majesty's  late  Governor  had  refused  his 
assent  without  having  first  received  your  Majest)''s  directions  for  that 
purpose.  .  .  . 

It  is  Our  duU',  however,  to  observe  to  your  Majesty  that  notwith- 
standing their  intimation  given  to  the  Lieutenant  Governor  a  new  bill  in 
no  material  points  differing  from  that  now  before  your  Majesty  has  been 
proposed  in  the  Assembly  of  this  Colony  &  having  passed  that  house 
and  been  concurred  in  by  the  Council  Your  Majesty's  said  Lieutenant 
Governor  did  think  fit  by  their  advice  to  give  his  assent  to  it  on  the  5 
day  of  January  last  and  therefore  it  becomes  necessary  for  us  to  lose  no 
time  in  humbly  laying  this  Act  which  was  received  at  Our  Office  yester- 
day before  Your  Majesty  to  the  end  that  if  Your  Majesty  shall  be  pleased 
to  signify  your  disallowance  of  it,  either  upon  the  ground  of  the  doubts 
in  point  of  law  which  occurred  to  the  former  Bill,  or  upon  a  considera- 
tion of  so  irregular  a  proceeding  as  that  of  entering  upon  a  proposition 
of  this  nature  &  passing  it  into  an  Act  pending  the  consideration  of  it 
before  Your  Majesty  in  Council  there  may  be  no  delay  in  having  Your 
Majesty's  Pleasure  thereupon  signified  to  the  Colony,  so  as  to  reach  it 
before  that  part  of  the  Act  which  authorizes  the  emission  of  die  Bills 
can  take  effect.  ... 

380.  Declaring  laws  unconstitutional.  What  really  happens 
when  a  law  is  declared  "  unconstitutional  "  is  strikingly  sUited  m 
the  following :  ^ 

If  it  were  the  duty  of  the  courts  to  give  effect  to  the  wishes  of  the 
people  upon  constitutional  quesdons,  our  government  would  be  a  truly 
absurd  one.  The  judicial  body  would  then  be  a  sort  of  additional  legis- 
lature extremely  ill-fitted  for  its  task.  .  .  .  But,  in  fact,  the  duty  of  the 
courts  is  almost  the  reverse  of  this,  because  the  popular  desire  icr  a  law 
1  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 


396  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

may  very  well  be  presumed  from  the  fact  that  it  has  been  passed  by  the 
legislature,  and  the  courts  are  given  power  to  treat  a  statute  as  invalid  in 
order  that  they  may  thwart  the  popular  will  in  cases  where  that  will  con- 
flicts with  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution.  Now,  the  Constitution  is 
always  older  than  the  law  in  question,  and  may  be  more  ancient  by  a 
century,  so  that  the  court,  in  deciding  that  a  law  is  unconstitutional,  de- 
clares, in  effect,  that  the  present  wishes  of  the  people  cannot  be  carried 
out,  because  opposed  to  their  previous  intention,  or  to  the  views  of  their 
remote  ancestors.  All  our  constitutions  have  a  safety  valve,  no  doubt,  in 
the  power  of  amendment,  so  that  any  of  them  can  be  changed  by  a  suf- 
ficient proportion  of  the  voters,  if  they  persist  long  enough  in  the  same 
opinion ;  but  this,  while  modifying,  does  not  do  away  with  the  fact  that 
it  is  often  the  duty  of  our  courts  to  defeat  the  immediate  wishes  of  a 
majority  of  the  people.  Stated  in  such  a  form,  the  power  of  our  judi- 
ciary is  certainly  very  startling. 


V.    Organization  of  the  Judiciary 

381.  Influence  of  the  justices  of  the  peace  in  England.    The 

historic  position  and  present  importance  of  the  English  "squire" 
is  brought  out  in  the  following  :  ^ 

One  might  almost  say  that  in  spite  of  a  democratic  electorate,  the 
counties  are  governed  by  common  consent,  or  rather  by  a  small  num- 
ber of  people  who  take  an  active  interest  in  the  subject. 

Apart  from  the  general  character  of  rural  populations,  there  is  a  special 
reason  why  this  should  be  true  in  England.  Until  1888  the  counties  were 
governed  by  the  justices  of  the  peace,  who  belonged  mainly  to  the  land- 
owning gentry,  and  although  these  men  were  not  free  from  the  prejudices 
and  interests  of  their  class,  their  administration  was  honest,  sound,  and 
not  unpopular,  while  their  possession  of  the  land  gave  them  a  strong 
economic  hold  upon  the  whole  countryside.  In  the  agricultural  portions 
of  the  kingdom,  that  is  in  the  greater  part  of  the  districts  that  elect  coun- 
cilors, men  of  this  kind  have  retained  their  influence,  and  they  are  still 
the  principal  figures  in  most  of  the  county  councils.  Occasionally  they 
form  a  large  majority  of  the  council,  and  other  people  are  considered  so 
extraneous  an  element  that  one  hears  them  referred  to  as  "  imported 
members."  In  other  counties  the  landed  gentry,  although  furnishing  a 
large  contingent,  are  a  minority  in  the  council,  but  in  these  cases  they 
usually  occupy  the  leading  positions. 

1  Copyright,  1908,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


THE  JUDICIARY  397 

382.  Organization  of  justice  in  Germany.  The  judicial  organi- 
zation in  the  German  federal  system  differs  markedly  from  that  of 
the  United  States. 

In  the  administration  of  justice,  as  in  so  many  other  undertakings  of 
government,  the  Empire  superintends,  merely,  and  systematizes.  The 
state  courts  are  also  courts  of  the  Empire :  imperial  law  prescribes  for 
them  a  uniform  organization  and  uniform  modes  of  procedure :  and  at 
the  head  of  the  system  stands  the  Imperial  Court  {Reuhsgeriiht )  at 
Leipzig,  created  in  1877  as  the  supreme  court  of  appeal.  The  state 
governments  appoint  the  judges  of  the  state  courts  and  determine  the 
judicial  districts ;  but  imperial  laws  fix  the  qualifications  to  be  required 
of  the  judges,  as  well  as  the  organization  that  the  courts  shall  have.  The 
decisions  of  the  court  at  Leipzig  give  uniformity  to  the  system  of  law. 

383.  Growing  distrust  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  United 
States.  The  following  extract  accuses  the  Supreme  Court  of  ultra- 
conservatism  and  undue  regard  for  the  rights  of  vested  interests  : ' 

This  comparative  freedom  from  criticism  which  the  Supreme  Court 
has  enjoyed  until  recent  years  does  not  indicate  that  its  decisions  have 
always  been  such  as  to  command  the  respect  and  approval  of  all  classes. 
It  has  from  the  beginning  had  the  full  confidence  of  the  wealthy  and 
conservative,  who  have  seen  in  it  the  means  of  protecting  vested  interests 
against  the  assaults  of  democracy.  That  the  Supreme  Court  has  largely 
justified  their  expectations  is  shown  by  the  character  of  its  decisions. 

During  the  first  one  hundred  years  of  its  history  two  hundred  and 
one  cases  were  decided  in  which  an  act  of  Congress,  a  provision  of  a 
state  constitution  or  a  state  statute,  was  held  to  be  repugnant  to  the 
Consdtution  or  the  laws  of  the  United  States,  in  whole  or  in  part.  .  .  . 
In  fifty-seven  instances  the  law  in  question  was  annulled  by  the  Supreme 
Court  on  the  ground  that  it  impaired  the  obligation  of  contracts.  In 
many  other  cases  the  judicial  veto  was  interposed  to  prevent  what  the 
court  considered  an  unconstitutional  exercise  of  the  power  to  regulate  or 
tax  the  business  or  property  of  corporations. 

These  decisions  have  been  almost  uniformly  advantageous  to  the 
capital-owning  class  in  preserving  property  rights  and  corporate  priv- 
ileges which  the  unhindered  progress  of  democracy  would  have  abridged 
or  abolished.  .  .  .  There  is  a  much  more  numerous  and  more  important 
class  of  cases  in  which  the  Supreme  Court,  while  not  claiming  to  exercise 
this  power,  has  virtually  annulled  laws  by  giving  them  an  interpretation 

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398  READINGS  IN   POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

which  has  defeated  the  purpose  for  which  they  were  enacted.  The 
decisions  affecting  the  powers  of  the  Inter-State  Commerce  Commis- 
sion may  be  cited  as  an  illustration.  This  body,  created  by  Congress 
for  the  purpose  of  regulating  the  railway  traffic  of  the  country,  has,  as 
Mr.  Justice  Harlan  observes,  "'  been  shorn  by  judicial  interpretation,  of 
authority  to  do  anything  of  an  effective  character."  .  .  . 

It  is  not,  however,  in  the  laws  which  have  been  annulled  or  modified 
by  interpretation  that  we  find  the  chief  protection  afforded  to  capital,  but 
rather  in  the  laws  which  have  not  been  enacted.  The  mere  existence  of 
this  power  and  the  certainty  that  it  would  be  used  in  defense  of  the 
existing  social  order  has  well-nigh  prevented  all  attacks  on  vested  rights 
by  making  their  failure  a  foregone  conclusion. 

It  is  but  natural  that  the  wealthy  and  influential  classes  who  have 
been  the  chief  beneficiaries  of  this  system  should  have  used  every  meanb- 
at  their  command  to  exalt  the  Supreme  Court  and  thereby  secure  gen- 
eral acquiescence  in  its  assumption  and  exercise  of  legislative  authority. 
To  the  influence  of  these  classes  in  our  political,  business,  and  social  life 
must  be  attributed  in  large  measure  that  widespread  and  profound  respect 
for  the  judicial  branch  of  our  government  which  has  thus  far  almost 
completely  shielded  it  from  public  criticism. 

There  are  many  indications,  however,  that  popular  faith  in  the  infalli- 
bility of  the  Supreme  Court  has  been  much  shaken  in  recent  years.  .  .  . 

With  the  progress  of  democracy  it  must  become  more  and  more  evi- 
dent that  a  system  which  places  this  far-reaching  power  in  the  hands  of 
a  body  not  amenable  to  popular  control,  is  a  constant  menace  to  liberty. 
It  may  not  only  be  made  to  serve  the  purpose  of  defeating  reform,  but 
may  even  accomplish  the  overthrow  of  popular  rights  which  the  Consti- 
tution expressly  guarantees. 

384.  Defense  of  the  Supreme  Court.  The  following  extract  from 
a  speech  made  in  the  House  of  Representatives  indicates  the  gen- 
eral American  attitude  of  pride  and  trust  in  our  federal  judiciary  : 

We  live  under  a  peculiar  government,  due  to  its  dual  character  and 
limited  power.  We  have  to  determine  in  this  country  not  only  what  we 
ought  to  do,  but  what  we  can  do,  because  we  have  a  government,  limited 
both  as  to  which  sovereignty  shall  exercise  the  power  and  limited  also  as 
to  what  matters  can  be  dealt  with  at  all.  The  one  important  original 
idea  contained  in  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  is  the  supremacy 
given  to  the  judiciary.  The  thing  that  makes  our  constitution  unique 
from  every  one  in  the  world  is  the  fact  that  the  Supreme  Court  of  the 
United  States  is  given  power  to  say  whether  the  other  branches  of  the 


THE  JUDICIARY  399 

government  have  exceeded  their  power ;  has  the  right  to  declare  null 
and  void  an  act  of  the  legislature  of  the  national  Government ;  has  the 
right  to  have  disregarded  the  action  of  the  executive  when  it  is  beyond 
his  power ;  and  has  the  further  right  to  say  when  the  states  have  ex- 
ceeded their  sovereign  powers.  That  is  the  greatest  power  ever  given 
to  a  tribunal  and  it  is  as  I  have  said  the  one  great  characteristic  of  the 
American  constitution,  and  to  it  we  owe  more  of  the  stability  and 
grandeur  of  this  country  than  to  any  other  provision  in  that  instrument. .  .  . 
There  have  been  times  when  the  decisions  of  this  court  in  the  per- 
formance of  its  great  functions  have  aroused  great  excitement  and  at 
times  great  indignation ;  but  with  the  exception  of  the  Dred  Scott  case 
nearly  every  decision  of  that  court  undertaking  to  lay  down  the  limits  of 
national  and  state  power  has  met  with  the  final  approval  of  the  Ameri- 
can people ;  and  to-day  it  may  not  be  inappropriate  when  it  has  become 
the  fashion  of  some  of  those  in  high  places  to  criticize  the  judiciary,  to 
call  attention  to  these  facts.  Certainly,  no  man  from  my  section  of  the 
country  should  ever  care  to  utter  a  condemnation  of  the  judiciar)',  for 
when  passion  ran  riot,  when  men  had  lost  their  judgment,  when  the  re- 
sults of  four  years  of  bitter  war  produced  legislation  aimed  not  at  jus- 
tice, but  frequently  at  punishment,  it  was  the  Supreme  Court  that  stood 
between  the  citizen  and  his  liberties  and  the  passion  of  the  hour  and  I 
trust  the  day  will  never  come  when  the  American  people  will  not  be  will- 
ing to  submit  respectfully  and  gladly  to  the  decrees  of  that  august  tri- 
bunal. Temporarily  they  may  seem  to  thwart  the  will  of  the  people  but 
in  their  final  analysis  they  will  make  as  they  have  made  for  orderly  gov- 
ernment, for  government  of  laws  and  not  of  men,  and  we  may  be  sure 
that  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  pure  atmosphere  of  judicial  inquiry  that 
has  always  surrounded  it  will  arrive  at  a  better  interpretation  of  the 
powers  of  both  state  and  national  governments  than  can  be  possibly 
hoped  for  in  a  forum  like  this  where  popular  prejudice  and  the  passions 
of  the  hour  affect  all  of  us  whether  we  will  or  no. 

385.  The  Supreme  Court  in  the  future.  Justice  Brewer  outlines 
the  following  as  the  most  important  questions  with  which  the 
Supreme  Court  must  deal  in  the  future  : 

As  admitted  by  all  careful  students  of  history,  the  Supreme  Court, 
whose  organization  and  powers  constitute  the  most  striking  and  distm- 
guishing  feature  of  the  Constitution,  has  been  a  most  potent  factor  m 
shaping  the  course  of  national  events.  It  stands  to-day  a  quiet  but  con- 
fessedly mighty  power,  whose  action  all  wait  for,  and  whose  decisions 
all  abide.    Turning  to  the  future,  every  thoughtful  man  wonders  what  is 


400  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

coming  to  the  republic,  and  many  inquire  what  the  Supreme  Court  will  do 
in  shaping  that  future,  and  how  its  decisions  may  affect  the  national  life. 
The  questions  which  now  seem  likely  to  arise  and  to  be  pressed  upon 
judicial  attention  may  be  grouped  in  four  classes :  First,  those  growing 
out  of  the  controversies  between  labor  and  capital ;  second,  those  that 
will  spring  from  the  manifest  efforts  to  increase  and  concentrate  the 
power  of  the  nation  and  to  lessen  the  powers  of  the  States ;  third,  those 
arising  out  of  our  new  possessions,  separate  from  us  by  so  long  dis- 
tances and  with  so  large  a  population,  not  merely  of  foreign  tongue,  but 
of  a  civilization  essentially  different  from  that  of  the  Anglo-Saxon ;  and, 
fourth,  those  which  will  come  because  our  relations  to  all  other  nations 
have  grown  to  be  so  close  and  will  surely  increase  in  intimacy. 


CHAITER  XXI 

POLITICAL  PARTIES 

I.    Functions  of  Political  Parties 

386.  Functions  of  political  parties.  Br)'ce  outlines  as  follows 
the  aims  of  party  organization  :  ^ 

The  aims  of  a  party  organization,  be  it  local  or  general,  seem  to  be 
four  in  number  — 

Union  —  to  keep  the  party  together  and  prevent  it  from  wasting  its 
strength  by  dissensions  and  schisms. 

Recruiting  —  to  bring  in  new  voters,  e.g.  immigrants  when  they  obtain 
citizenship,  young  men  as  they  reach  the  age  of  suffrage,  newcomers,  or 
residents  hitherto  indifferent  or  hostile. 

Enthusiasm  —  to  excite  the  voters  by  the  sympathy  of  numbers,  and 
the  sense  of  a  common  purpose,  rousing  them  by  speeches  or  literature. 

Instruction  —  to  give  the  voters  some  knowledge  of  the  political  issues 
they  have  to  decide,  to  inform  them  of  the  virtues  of  their  leaders  and 
the  crimes  of  their  opponents. 

These  aims,  or  at  least  the  first  three  of  them,  are  pursued  by  the 
party  organizations  of  America  with  eminent  success.  But  they  arc  less 
important  than  a  fifth  object  which  has  been  little  regarded  in  Europe, 
though  in  America  it  is  the  mainspring  of  the  whole  mechanism.  This  is 
the  selection  of  party  candidates  ;  and  it  is  important  not  onl\-  because  the 
elective  places  are  so  numerous,  far  more  numerous  than  in  any  European 
country,  but  because  they  are  tenable  for  short  terms,  so  that  elections 
frequently  recur.  Since  the  parties,  having  of  late  had  no  really  distinc- 
tive principles,  and  therefore  no  well-defined  aims  in  the  direction  of 
legislation  or  administration,  exist  practically  for  the  sake  of  filling  cer- 
tain offices,  and  carrying  on  the  machinery  of  government,  the  choice  of 
those  members  of  the  party  whom  the  party  is  to  reward,  and  who  are 
to  strengthen  it  by  the  winning  of  the  oflfices,  becomes  a  main  end  of 
its  being. 

387.  Relation  of  party  strength  to  governmental  organization. 
Goodnow  points  out  the  functions  performed  by  political  jxirties  in 

1  By  permission  of  Tlie  Macmillan  Company- 
401 


402  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

remedying  too  great  separation  or  division  of  governmental  powers, 
their  strength  depending  in  large  degree  upon  the  unity  or  lack  of 
unity  in  the  governmental  system :  ^ 

In  what  has  already  been  said,  the  attempt  has  been  made  to  show 
that  the  two  primary  functions  of  the  state  were  to  express  and  execute 
its  will,  and  that  if  the  expression  of  this  will  were  to  be  something  more 
than  a  philosophical  statement  of  belief,  a  counsel  of  perfection,  there 
must  be  a  coordinadon  of  these  funcdons,  i.e.  that  the  execution  of  the 
will  of  the  state  must  be  subjected  to  the  control  of  the  body  which 
expresses  it.  This  coordination,  it  has  been  shown,  may  be  brought 
about  in  the  governmental  system  by  subjecting  all  administrative  offices 
to  the  control  of  a  superior  governmental  authority  which  is  intrusted 
ultimately  with  the  expression  of  the  will  of  the  state.  In  order  that  this 
control  may  be  effective  and  may  be  found  in  the  governmental  system, 
the  administrative  system  must  be  considerably  centralized.  If  this  coor- 
dination of  the  expression  and  the  execution  of  the  will  of  the  state  is  not 
brought  about  in  the  governmental  system,  it  must  be  provided  for  out- 
side of  the  government.  Where  it  is  found  outside  of  the  government, 
it  is  to  be  found  in  the  political  party.  It  must  of  necessity  be  found 
there  if  the  administrative  system  is  not  considerably  centralized  and 
under  ultimate  and  effective  legislative  control. 

If  provision  is  not  made  for  this  coordination  in  the  governmental 
system,  the  work  of  the  party  is  much  greater  than  it  is  where  the  gov- 
ernmental organization  provides  for  this  coordination.  Inasmuch  as  the 
party  organization  is  in  all  cases  formed  in  order  to  do  the  work  which 
is  devolved  upon  it  by  the  governmental  system,  the  party  organization 
will  be  much  less  complicated  and  much  less  centralized  under  a  govern- 
mental system  which  is  so  formed  as  to  permit  the  body,  charged  ulti- 
mately with  the  expression  of  the  will  of  the  state,  to  exercise  an  effective 
control  over  the  agents  charged  with  its  execution.  .  .  . 

Further,  if  in  a  given  state  the  relations  of  central  and  local  govern- 
ment are  such  that  the  localities  have  largely  in  their  hands  the  execution 
of  state  laws,  the  state  parties  must,  if  they  are  to  discharge  their  neces- 
sary functions,  have  to  do  not  merely  with  the  expression  and  execution 
of  the  state  will  by  state  officers,  but  also  with  the  execution  of  that  will 
by  local  authorities.  State  pardes  must,  in  such  a  case,  concern  them- 
selves with  local  politics.  The  differentiation  of  state  and  local  parties, 
if  such  differendation  is  ever  possible,  is  conditioned  upon  a  differentia- 
tion of  state  and  local  politics.  Such  a  differentiation  is  possible  only 
where  local  bodies  cease  to  act  as  independent  state  agents.  .  .  . 

1  Copyright,  1900,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


POLITICAL  PARTIES 


403 


Party  organization  is  thus  based  on  the  character  and  amount  of  the 
work  the  party  has  to  do ;  and  the  work  the  party  has  to  do  depends 
very  largely  on  the  relations  existing  both  between  the  different  organs 
of  the  central  government  and  between  the  central  and  the  local  govern- 
ments. If  the  system  of  government  is  at  the  same  time  unconcentrated 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  relations  of  the  different  departments  of 
the  general  government,  and  decentralized  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
relations  of  the  central  and  the  local  governments,  the  work  of  the  party 
is  very  great,  and  to  do  this  work  the  party  organization  must  be  corre- 
spondingly strong  and  permanent. 

388.  The  function  of  third  parties.  While  usually  considered 
undesirable  and  dangerous,  third  parties  perform  services  of 
some  value. 

Much  has  been  said  with  reference  to  third  parties  and  their  desira- 
bility. In  the  great  democratic  countries,  —  England  and  the  United 
States,  —  two  chief  parties  exist.  If  a  special  issue  comes  up,  such  as 
slavery,  or  the  prohibition  of  the  liquor  traffic,  or  special  labor  legislation, 
and  neither  of  the  great  parties  finds  it  wise  or  convenient  to  take  up 
this. issue,  the  question  arises  as  to  whether  a  third  party  ought  to  be 
organized.  In  many  instances  the  best  way  to  promulgate  an  idea  is  to 
organize  a  third  party  and  to  work  as  vigorously  as  possible  to  get  into 
power.  If  the  issue  is  really  one  of  prime  importance,  as  was  the  ques- 
tion of  the  extension  of  slavery  into  the  territories  before  the  Civil  War, 
the  third  party  is  likely  to  secure  such  influence  that  either  the  question 
must  be  taken  up  by  one  of  the  existing  large  parties,  or  the  third  party 
becomes  the  dominant  one  as  did  the  Republican  party  after  the  outbreak 
of  the  Civil  War.  But  unless  the  third  party  within  a  comparatively  short 
time  becomes  itself  very  prominent  or  has  its  policies  adopted  by  one  of 
the  great  parties,  it  is  a  reasonable  assumption  that  its  issue  is  not  of 
prime  importance.  Under  those  circumstances  is  it  worth  while  to  devote 
one's  time  and  energies  and  money  to  further  discussion  of  the  question, 
or  would  it  be  better,  after  the  matter  has  been  fully  tested  for  a  few- 
years,  to  relinquish  one's  efforts  for  the  time  being  and  to  devote  one's 
energies  rather  to  carr>'ing  through  one  of  the  issues  of  the  day  which  is 
prominent  enough  so  that  one's  influence  may  count?  This  question 
ought  to  be  ver>'  seriously  considered  by  persons  of  unselfish,  devoted 
natures  who  try  year  after  year  to  carr>'  their  ideas  into  effect  and  f^nd 
that  they  are  making  practically  no  headway.  May  it  not  well  be  true 
that  energy  so  expended  is  thrown  away  and  that  a  person  by  following 
this  small  third  party  may  be  practically  wasting  his  time  instead  of  usmg 


404  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

it  wisely  ?  There  may  be  hope  fifty  years  hence  for  the  special  issue. 
This  suggestion  is  not  a  condemnation  of  a  third  party ;  that  is  perhaps 
the  best  way  in  which  to  get  a  new  problem  of  the  day  before  the  people. 
The  question  is  that  of  the  true  function  of  a  third  party  in  a  country 
like  the  United  States  as  a  means  to  bring  forward  and  urge  a  new  issue 
until  that  issue  has  been  thoughtfully  tested  before  the  country. 


II.    History  of  Political  Parties 

389.  Development  of  parties  in  England.  A  brief  outline  of 
party  history  in  England  follows : 

Parties  may  be  traced  as  far  back  as  the  reign  of  Elizabeth,  when  the 
Puritans  appear  as  a  body  of  men  holding  the  same  views  on  definite 
religious  and  political  questions,  and  trying  to  secure  their  establishment 
in  opposition  to  the  wishes  of  the  Queen  and  her  ministers.  Definite 
Farlia me ntaty  parties  date  from  the  Long  Parliament  of  1641,  which 
contained  men  "  opposed  to  one  another  in  the  House  of  Commons  .  .  . 
on  a  great  principle  of  action,  which  constituted  a  bond  between  those 
who  took  one  side  or  the  other."  The  opponents  of  arbitrary  govern- 
ment in  Church  and  State  became  known  as  Roundheads,  while,  the 
supporters  of  the  King  received  the  name  of  Cavaliers.  At  the  Restora- 
tion, the  Cavaliers  were  entirely  in  the  ascendant,  but  by  the  time  of  the 
dispute  on  the  Exclusion  Bill,  1679,  the  other  party  had  revived,  and  the 
two  opposing  factions  obtained  the  names  of  '^Petitioners"  i.e.  those 
who  petitioned  the  King  to  summon  a  new  Parliament  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible, and  ''Abhorrers''  who  were  the  supporters  of  the  Crown,  and  ex- 
pressed their  abhorrence  of  the  petitions,  as  calculated  to  coerce  the 
King.  Shortly  afterwards  these  two  parties  received  the  names  of  Whigs 
and  Tories.  .  .  .  Roughly  speaking,  the  Tories  were  the  upholders  of 
absolute  monarchy,  the  Whigs  desired  a  monarchy  limited  by  Parlia- 
ment. .  .  .  After  the  Revolution  of  1688,  the  more  extreme  Tories 
developed  into  Jacobites,  who  continued  to  disturb  the  country  until 
after  the  crushing  of  the  rebellion  in  1745.  After  that,  the  Tory  party 
became  the  supporters  of  the  King  of  England.  Party  government, 
however,  cannot  be  said  to  have  been  established  until  the  reign  of 
George  I;  although  William  III,  between  1693  and  1696,  chose  his 
ministers  from  the  Whigs,  the  ministry,  from  their  unity,  being  popu- 
larly known  as  "  the  Junto,"  yet,  on  the  loss  of  their  majority  at  the 
election  of  1698,  they  refused  to  resign.  By  degrees,  however,  the  pres- 
ent ministerial  system  became  established  by  which,  as  the  nation,  and 
consequently  the  Parliament,  is  divided  broadly  into  two  great  parties, 


POLITICAL  PARTIES 


405 


one  of  which  must  have  the  control  of  the  executive,  the  ministers  arc 
bound  to  be  of  the  same  party  as  the  majority  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, and  to  stand  or  fall  together. 

390.  Origin  of  parties  in  the  United  States.    The  following 

letter,  written  by  John  Adams,  shows  the  existence  of  fundamental 
differences  from  the  beginning  of  American  political  life  : 

You  say,  "  Our  administrations,  with  the  exception  of  Washington's, 
have  been  party  administrations."  On  what  ground  do  you  except 
Washington's  ?  If  by  party  you  mean  majority,  his  majority  was  the 
smallest  of  the  four  in  all  his  legislative  and  executive  acts,  though  not 
in  his  election. 

You  say,  "  our  divisions  began  with  federalism  and  antifederalism." 
Alas !  they  began  with  human  nature ;  they  have  existed  in  .\merica 
from  its  first  plantation.  In  every  colony,  divisions  always  prevailed. 
In  New  York,  Pennsylvania,  Virginia,  Massachusetts,  and  all  the  rest, 
a  court  and  country  party  have  always  contended.  Whig  and  Tor)'  dis- 
puted very  sharply  before  the  revolution,  and  in  every  step  during  the 
revolution.  Every  measure  of  Congress,  from  1774  to  1787  inclusively, 
was  disputed  with  acrimony,  and  decided  by  as  small  majorities  as  any 
question  is  decided  in  these  days.  We  lost  Canada  then,  as  we  are  like 
to  lose  it  now,  by  a  similar  opposition.  Away,  then,  with  yf)ur  false, 
though  popular  distinctions  in  favor  of  Washington. 

In  page  eleventh,  you  recommend  a  "  constitutional  rotation,  to  de- 
stroy the  snake  in  the  grass";  but  the  snake  will  elude  your  snare. 
Suppose  your  President  in  rotation  is  to  be  chosen  for  Rhode  Island. 
There  will  be  a  federal  and  a  republican  candidate  in  that  State.  Every 
federalist  in  the  nation  will  vote  for  the  former,  and  ever>'  rcjiublican 
for  the  latter.  The  light  troops  on  both  sides  will  skirmish ;  the  same 
northern  and  southern  distinctions  will  still  prevail ;  the  same  running 
and  riding,  the  same  railing  and  reviling,  the  same  lying  and  libeling, 
cursing  and  swearing,  will  still  continue.  The  same  caucusing,  assem- 
blaging,  and  conventioning. 

391.  Fundamental  oppositions  in  American  politics.  ]U\\'c  finds 
two  general  lines  of  cleavage  forming  party  divisions  throughout 
our  entire  national  histor)^^ 

Two    permanent   oppositions   may,   I   think,   be   discerned    running 
through  the  history  of  the  parties,  sometimes  openly  recognized,  some- 
times concealed  by  the  urgency  of  a  transitory  question.    ( )nc  of  these 
1  Ky  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Comp.iny. 


4o6  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

is  the  opposition  between  a  centralized  or  unified  and  a  federalized  gov- 
ernment. In  every  country  there  are  centrifugal  and  centripetal  forces 
at  work,  the  one  or  the  other  of  which  is  for  the  moment  the  stronger. 
There  has  seldom  been  a  country  in  which  something  might  not  have 
been  gained,  in  the  way  of  good  administration  and  defensive  strength, 
by  a  greater  concentration  of  power  in  the  hands  of  the  central  govern- 
ment, enabling  it  to  do  things  which  local  bodies,  or  a  more  restricted 
central  government,  could  not  do  equally  cheaply  or  well.  Against  this 
gain  there  is  always  to  be  set  the  danger  that  such  concentration  may 
weaken  the  vitality  of  local  communities  and  authorities,  and  may  enable 
the  central  power  to  stunt  their  development.  Sometimes  needs  of  the 
former  kind  are  more  urgent,  or  the  sentiment  of  the  people  tends  to 
magnify  them  ;  sometimes  again  the  centrifugal  forces  obtain  the  upper 
hand.  English  history  shows  several  such  alternations.  But  in  America 
the  Federal  form  of  government  ha,s  made  this  permanent  and  natural 
opposition  specially  conspicuous.  The  salient  feature  of  the  Constitution 
is  the  effort  it  makes  to  establish  an  equipoise  between  the  force  which 
would  carry  the  planet  States  off  into  space  and  the  force  which  would 
draw  them  into  the  sun  of  the  National  government.  There  have  always 
therefore  been  minds  inclined  to  take  sides  upon  this  fundamental  ques- 
tion, and  a  party  has  always  had  something  definite  and  weighty  to  ap- 
peal to  when  it  claims  to  represent  either  the  autonomy  of  communities 
on  the  one  hand,  or  the  majesty  and  beneficent  activity  of  the  National 
government  on  the  other.  The  former  has  been  the  watchword  of  the 
Democratic  party.  The  latter  was  seldom  distinctly  avowed,  but  was 
generally  in  fact  represented  by  the  Federalists  of  the  first  period,  the 
Whigs  of  the  second,  the  Republicans  of  the  third. 

The  other  opposition,  though  it  goes  deeper  and  is  more  pervasive, 
has  been  less  clearly  marked  in  America,  and  less  consciously  admitted 
by  the  Americans  themselves.  It  is  the  opposition  between  the  tendency 
which  makes  some  men  prize  the  freedom  of  the  individual  as  the  first 
of  social  goods,  and  that  which  disposes  others  to  insist  on  checking  and 
regulating  his  impulses.  The  opposition  of  these  two  tendencies,  the  love 
of  liberty  and  the  love  of  order,  is  permanent  and  necessary,  because  it 
springs  from  differences  in  the  intellect  and  feelings  of  men  which  one 
finds  in  all  countries  and  at  all  epochs.  There  are  always  persons  who 
are  struck  by  the  weakness  of  mankind,  by  their  folly,  their  passion,  their 
selfishness :  and  these  persons,  distrusting  the  action  of  average  mankind, 
will  always  wish  to  see  them  guided  by  wise  heads  and  restrained  by 
strong  hands.  Such  guidance  seems  the  best  means  of  progress,  such 
restraint  the  only  means  of  security.  Those  on  the  other  hand  who  think 
better  of  human  nature,  and  have  more  hope  in  their  own  tempers,  hold 


POLITICAL  PARTIES  407 

the  impulses  of  the  average  man  to  be  generally  towards  justice  and 
peace.  They  have  faith  in  the  power  of  reason  to  conquer  ignorance, 
and  of  generosity  to  overbear  selfishness.  They  are  therefore  disposed 
to  leave  the  individual  alone,  and  to  intrust  the  masses  with  power. 
Every  sensible  man  feels  in  himself  the  struggle  between  these  two 
tendencies,  and  is  on  his  guard  not  to  yield  wholly  to  either,  because 
the  one  degenerates  into  tyranny,  the  other  into  an  anarchy  out  of 
which  tyranny  will  eventually  spring.  The  wisest  statesman  is  he  who 
best  holds  the  balance  between  them. 


in.    Present  Political  Parties 

392.  Present  tendencies  in  English  politics.  In  his  recent  book 
on  the  government  of  England,  Lowell  indicates  the  position  of 
the  leading  English  parties  as  follows  :  ^ 

The  two  great  parties  are  separated  to-day  by  no  profound  differences 
in  general  principles  or  political  dogmas.  But  this  does  not  mean  that 
they  are  not  marked  by  distinct  tendencies,  and  still  more  by  a  tradition 
of  tendencies.  There  is  a  theory  held  by  the  Liberals  —  although  denied 
by  their  opponents  —  that  they  are  more  democratic,  that  they  have  more 
trust  in  the  people,  and  more  real  sympathy  with  the  workingmen.  After 
enfranchising  the  middle  class,  and  winning  its  support,  they  felt  that  any 
further  extension  of  the  suffrage  must  have  a  similar  result.  They  con- 
sidered the  lower  strata  of  society  as  their  protectorate,  or  at  least  within 
their  particular  sphere  of  influence,  and  they  still  regard  an  alliance  be- 
tween the  Conservatives  and  any  fraction  of  the  working  classes  as  un- 
natural. This  feeling  is  shared  by  the  Labor  leaders,  and  one  sometimes 
hears  them  say  that  the  Liberals  favor  labor  legislation  from  conviction, 
the  Conservatives  only  to  get  votes.  Nevertheless  that  belief  is  by  no 
means  universal  among  workmen,  many  of  whom  have  been  s;iid  to 
support  the  Conservatives  on  the  ground  that  owing  to  their  cDntrul  of 
the  House  of  Lords  they  are  really  the  most  effective  party  in  enacting 
laboi  laws. 

There  is  another  theory  to  the  effect  that  Liberals  believe  in  peace, 
retrenchment  and  reform,  and  are  less  inclined  than  the  c:onser\-atives 
to  an  aggressive  foreign  policy.  There  is  truth  in  all  this;  although 
foreign  policy  depends  to  a  great  extent  upon  the  personal  views  of  the 
minister  who  has  the  principal  charge  of  it.  .  .  .  In  regard  to  retrench- 
ment or  economy,  it  is  certain  that  national  expenditure  has  increased 

1  Copyright,  190S,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


4o8  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

very  rapidly,  and  if  the  Liberals  have  been  more  cautious  in  spending 
money,  they  have  followed  the  Tory  lead,  although  like  the  hind  legs  of 
the  stag,  at  some  distance. 

Again  there  is  a  theory  that  the  Liberals  give  greater  weight  to  local 
opinion,  that  they  have  more  regard  for  the  wishes  of  Scotland,  Ireland, 
and  Wales,  and  that  they  are  generally  more  favorably  disposed  toward 
local  control.  This  also  is  not  without  foundation,  but  it  is  hardly  a 
general  political  principle,  and  was  certainly  not  applied  in  the  case  of 
the  recent  Education  Bill. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  theory  that  the  Conservatives  have 
more  respect  for  existing  institutions,  and  dread  to  disturb  venerable 
things.  The  impression  is  partly  true,  partly  a  tradition,  and  to  some 
extent  exaggerated.  It  was,  in  fact,  the  Conservatives  who  swept  away, 
by  the  County  Councils  Act  of  1888,  the  local  government  of  the  counties 
by  justices  of  the  peace,  certainly  a  venerable  institution,  and  if  iiot  in 
harmony  with  the  spirit  of  the  age,  by  no  means  moribund  or  indefensible. 
It  was  they,  a  dozen  years  earlier,  who  recast  the  judicial  system,  mak- 
ing the  greatest  single  change  in  the  courts  that  had  been  made  for 
centuries.  The  Conservatives,  no  doubt,  talk  far  less  about  attacking 
institutions,  and  the  same  act  raises  less  of  a  storm  if  done  by  them 
than  if  done  by  the  Liberals.  The  vested  interests  of  the  country  are, 
indeed,  more  affected  by  a  dread  of  what  the  Liberals  may  do  than  by 
what  they  have  actually  done. 

All  these  tendencies  have  some  effect  in  shaping  the  policy  of  the 
parties,  and  in  determining  their  position  on  current  questions ;  but  the 
differences  are  in  degree  rather  than  in  kind,  and  are  liable  to  present 
strange  shapes  under  the  stress  of  party  warfare. 

The  most  marked  and  permanent  tendencies  in  which  the  parties 
differ  are  found  in  their  attitude  toward  certain  powerful  interests  in  the 
community.  The  Conservatives  tend  strongly  to  favor  the  claims  of  the 
Church  of  England,  of  the  landowners  and  now  of  the  publicans,  while 
the  Liberals  are  highly  sensitive  to  the  appeals  of  the  Nonconformist 
conscience.  These  again  are  tendencies,  and  must  not  be  stated  in  too 
absolute  a  form. 

393.  Political  parties  in  France.  The  general  nature  of  political 
parties  in  France  is  indicated  in  the  following : 

The  parties  and  factions  in  the  French  parliament  are  bewildering  in 
number.  The  election  of  1906  sent  to  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  repre- 
sentatives of  the  following  groups :  radicals,  socialist  radicals,  dissi- 
dent radicals,  independent  socialists,  unified  socialists,  republicans  of  the 
left,  progressivists,  nationalists,  monarchists,  and  Bonapartists,  and  a  few 


POLITICAL  PARTIES  409 

other  minor  groups.  With  the  exception,  of  course,  of  the  monarchists 
and  Bonapartists,  they  all  agree  that  the  republic  shall  be  maintained, 
and  they  have  been  able  to  unite  upon  many  important  measures,  such 
as  those  relating  to  education  and  the  relations  of  the  State  to  the 
Church,  but  they  differ  on  other  questions  of  reform  which  are  con- 
stantly coming  up.  Some  are  pretty  well  satisfied  with  things  as  they 
are,  while  others,  especially  the  various  socialist  groui)s,  would  like  to 
see  the  government  undertake  a  complete  social  and  economic  revolu- 
tion for  the  benefit  of  the  laboring  classes.  The  State  should,  they  be- 
lieve, take  possession  of  lands,  mines,  mills,  and  other  sources  of  wealth 
and  means  of  production,  and  see  that  they  are  used  for  the  benefit  of 
those  who  do  the  work  and  no  longer  serve  to  enrich  men  who  seem  to 
them  to  sit  idly  by  and  profit  by  the  labor  of  others.  .  .  , 

In  England  and  the  United  States  there  are  two  great  parties,  one  of 
which  is  ordinarily  in  unmistakable  control.  In  France  there  are  so  many 
parties  that  no  single  one  can  ever  long  command  a  majority  of  votes  in 
the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  As  a  result  measures  cannot  be  carried  simply 
because  the  leaders  of  one  party  agree  on  them,  but  they  must  appeal 
to  a  number  of  groups  on  their  own  merits.  Minorities,  consequently, 
have  an  opportunity  to  influence  legislation  in  France,  and  there  is  little 
chance  for  machine  politics  to  develop.  It  is  true  that  French  ministries 
rise  and  fall  at  very  short  intervals,  but  nevertheless  the  laws  which  do 
pass  receive  more  careful  attention,  perhaps,  than  they  would  if  pushed 
through  as  party  measures. 

394.  Political  parties  in  Germany.  A  brief  statement  of  party 
division  in  the  German  Empire  follows  : 

Of  the  ten  parties  in  the  German  Reichstag  besides  the  Socialist  and 
the  Catholic  Center,  four  stand  for  different  shades  of  liberalism,  three 
are  conservative,  one  is  anti-Semitic,  and  the  rest  represent  race  feeling. 
The  Polish  representatives  from  the  eastern  provinces  of  Prussia,  the 
one  Danish  representative  from  Schlcswig,  and  most  of  the  representa- 
tives from  Alsace-Lorraine  are  standing  protests  against  the  attemjns  to 
crush  their  respective  nationalities  by  the  compulsory  introduction  ot  the 
German  law  and  language.  Besides  these  there  are  two  or  three  distinct 
South  German  parties ;  and  indeed  the  great  "  Center  "  is  to  a  large  ex- 
tent a  sectional  South  German  delegation.  South  Germany  (Bavaria  and 
Wiirttemberg  in  particular)  has  opposed  bitterly  all  attempts  to  increase 
the  army  and  navy ;  and  the  feeling  of  the  vivacious  peojile  in  these  dis- 
tricts toward  the  severe,  stern  Prussian  is  one  of  the  most  serious  factors 
of  present  German  politics. 


4IO  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

395.  Political  parties  in  Hungary.  The  party  system  in  Hungary 
is  unusual.    Nowhere  else  is  one  party  constantly  in  power.i 

The  lack  of  a  division  into  two  great  parties,  such  as  ordinarily  pre- 
vails in  England,  will  explain  why  the  Hungarian  cabinet  is  never  upset 
by  an  opposition  whose  leaders  are  ready  to  form  a  new  ministry ;  but  it 
does  not  explain  why  the  cabinet  is  not  constantly  overthrown,  as  in 
France  and  Italy,  by  a  temporary  coalition  of  groups,  and  replaced  by 
another  as  feeble  and  ephemeral  as  itself.  To  account  for  this,  we  must 
revert  to  the  fact  already  noticed  that  the  majority  in  Hungary  is  not 
composed  of  a  number  of  different  groups,  but  of  one  solidly  united 
party,  which  furnishes  the  government  with  a  stable  support.  The  exist- 
ence of  a  single  great  party,  which  distinguishes  Hungary  from  all  the 
other  countries  we  have  considered,  may  be  attributed  to  three  causes : 
first,  to  the  long  political  experience  of  the  Magyars,  acquired  by  local 
self-government,  which  makes  them  understand  the  value  of  strong 
political  organizations  and  the  necessity  of  concerted  action ;  second,  to 
the  commanding  personal  influence  of  Deak  and  afterwards  of  Tisza ; 
third,  to  their  position  in  relation  to  the  other  races.  The  danger  to 
Hungary  from  this  source  is  far  greater  than  that  to  which  Italy  is  ex- 
posed at  the  hands  of  the  Clericals.  It  is  a  question  of  national  life  and 
death.  If  by  quarrels  among  themselves  the  Magyars  should  lose  con- 
trol of  the  state,  they  would  run  a  terrible  risk  of  being  engulfed  by  the 
flood  of  Slavs  by  which  they  are  surrounded.  It  is  not  surprising,  there- 
fore, that  a  majority  of  the  deputies  should  combine  to  support  the  gov- 
ernment, and  present  an  unbroken  front  to  the  Croats,  the  Serbs,  and 
the  Roumanians. 

396.  Danger  of  party  divisions  on  class  lines.  Lowell  points 
out  the  undesirable  results  of  party  grouping  in  accordance  with 
class  distinctions. 

The  conception  of  government  by  the  whole  people  in  any  large  nation 
is,  of  course,  a  chimera ;  for  wherever  the  suffrage  is  wide,  parties  are 
certain  to  exist,  and  the  control  must  really  be  in  the  hands  of  the  party 
that  comprises  a  majority,  or  a  rough  approximation  to  a  majority,  of  the 
people.  But  the  principle  has  nevertheless  an  important  application.  If 
the  line  of  division  is  vertical,  so  that  the  party  in  power  includes  a  con- 
siderable portion  of  each  class  in  the  community,  every  section  of  the 
people  has  a  direct  share  in  the  government ;  but  if  the  line  is  horizon- 
tal, so  that  the  party  is  substantially  composed  of  a  single  class,  then  the 

1  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 


POLITICAL  PARTI  KS  41I 

classes  not  represented  in  it  are  virtually  disfranchised  so  long  as  that 
party  maintains  its  ascendancy.  Instead  of  a  true  democrac\',  we  have 
government  by  a  single  class,  which  degenerates  easily  into  oppression. 
In  this  case,  indeed,  the  tyranny  is  likely  to  be  far  worse  than  it  would 
be  if  the  ruling  cjass  were  legally  the  sole  possessor  of  power,  because 
there  is  a  lack  of  all  sense  of  responsibility  toward  the  rest  of  the  people, 
and  because  the  alternation  in  power  of  different  classes,  which  must  in- 
evitably occur,  breeds  intense  bitterness  of  feeling.  So  long,  therefore, 
as  party  lines  are  vertical,  popular  government  is  on  a  sound  basis.  But 
if  all  the  rich  men,  or  all  the  educated  men,  are  grouped  together,  the 
state  is  in  peril ;  and  if  the  party  lines  become  really  horizontal,  democ- 
racy is  on  the  high  road  to  class  tyranny,  which  leads,  as  histor)'  proves, 
to  a  dictatorship.  This  is  the  meaning  of  the  classic  publicists  when  they 
speak  of  the  natural  rotation  from  monarchy  to  aristocrac)',  from  this 
to  democracy,  and  then  back  again  to  monarchy.  To  them,  democracy 
meant,  not  government  by  the  whole  people,  but  the  rule  of  the  lower 
classes.  A  territorial  division  of  parties,  indeed,  is  not  as  dangerous  as  a 
horizontal  division,  because,  although  the  former  may  lead  to  civil  war, 
the  latter  leads  to  social  anarchy  and  despotism. 

397.  The  "  Ins  "  and  the  "  Outs."  The  position  which  parties 
are  forced  to  take  depends  largely  upon  whether  they  are  in  control 
of  the  government  or  constitute  the  opposition. 

In  most  times  we  find  political  parties  divided  into  the  government 
party  and  the  opposition,  the  ins  and  the  outs.  It  is  a  good  thing  to  have 
parties  divided  along  that  line ;  it  tends  toward  a  critical  examination  of 
policies.  The  party  in  power  naturally  w^ants  the  government  strength- 
ened ;  it  is  inclined  to  favor  centralization.  The  opposition  party  normally 
tends  toward  particularism  and  wants  the  central  government  weakened. 
In  most  states  the  party  in  power  is  inclined  to  be  conservative  as  it  feels 
responsibility.  The  party  out  of  power  will  promise  almost  anything, 
even  along  most  radical  lines,  if  it  will  help  it  to  get  in. 

IV.    Party  Organization 

398.  Functions  of  party  organization.  The  purposes  for  which 
party  organization  exists  may  be  stated  as  follows  :  ^ 

In  a  nation  which  is  ruled  by  party  the  organization  might  conceivably 
extend  its  operation  as  far  as  those  of  the  part)'  itself.    It  might  m  its 
conventions,  or  by  its  committees,  frame  all  the  legislation,  direct  the 
1  Copyright,  1908,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


412 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


foreign  policy,  and  regulate  the  internal  administration,  controlling  it  even 
in  the  minutest  details.  If  we  regard  the  cabinet  as  an  organ  of  party, 
this  is  precisely  what  happens  in  England,  for  there  is  nothing  in  the 
whole  range  of  party  government  for  which  a  minister  is  not  responsible. 
But  when  we  speak  of  party  organizations  we  do  not  usually  mean  to  in- 
clude the  cabinet ;  we  are  thinking  of  the  machinery  of  party  outside  the 
organs  of  government.  Using  the  words  in  this  sense,  the  party  organi- 
zations are  limited  to  a  far  narrower  field.  Leaving  out  of  account  the 
details  of  administration,  and  the  appointment  of  subordinate  officials, 
which  do  not  fall  within  the  proper  sphere  of  parties,  and  with  which  in 
England  they  fortunately  do  not  interfere,  we  may  say  that  party  organ- 
izations have  in  general  three  normal  functions:  (i)  the  formulation  of 
party  policy  ;  (2)  the  selection  of  candidates  for  office  ;  and  (3)  the  effort 
to  bring  the  public  to  their  side  and  win  a  victory  at  the  polls.  In  the 
United  States,  where  the  form  of  the  institutions  has  caused  a  high 
development  of  party  machinery  outside  the  framework  of  government, 
the  organizations  exercise  all  three  functions ;  but  by  reason  of  the  na- 
ture of  the  parliamentary  system,  this  cannot  be  true  of  the  two  leading 
parties  in  England. 

399.  Primary  elections  and  party  organization.  The  probable 
influence  upon  party  organization  of  removing  from  party  con- 
trol the  selection  of  candidates  for  election  has  been  suggested 
by  Professor  Macy. 

We  are  now  in  the  midst  of  the  third  period  of  radical  party  readjust- 
ment to  new  governmental  conditions,  and  I  am  requested  to  forecast  the 
probable  effects  upon  party  organization.  .  .  . 

Even  the  legislative  caucus,  in  State  and  nation,  which  was  the  first 
form  of  organization  for  the  two  great  national  parties,  met  an  obvious 
need.  The  voters  were  already  divided  into  two  main  groups  of  oppos- 
ing opinions  and  party  names  had  been  assumed.  Some  means  were  re- 
quired to  give  effect  to  party  opinion.  The  voters  were  widely  distributed. 
Communication  was  slow  and  difficult.  At  each  State  capital,  and  at  the 
national  capital,  there  were  already  gathered  lawmakers  chosen  by  the 
people  of  each  locality.  It  was  in  entire  harmony  with  the  needs  of 
the  period  that  these  representatives  should  assume  and  exercise  the 
added  function  of  making  party  nominations.  .  .  . 

The  legislative  caucus  was  always  subject  to  criticism.  Its  action  was 
viewed  by  many  as  an  unauthorized  assumption  of  power.  Only  in  the 
absence  of  other  more  direct  organs  for  giving  effect  to  party  opinion 
was  it  acceptable.    Out  of  the  experience  of  towns,  cities,  and  counties 


POLITICAL  PARTIES 


413 


a  more  direct  nominating  process  was  gradually  developed  fur  the  wider 
areas.  It  was  customary  to  choose  delegates  in  local  party  caucus  to 
meet  in  party  convention,  to  formulate  party  policy,  and  to  nominate 
candidates.  .  .  .  With  the  advent  of  the  convention  there  has  cc^ne  into 
existence  a  vast  array  of  party  machinery,  in  the  form  of  permanent 
party  committees.  In  its  origin  this  machinery  answered  a  real  need. 
The  voters  were  still  widely  scattered  and  communication  was  still  slow 
and  difficult.  The  loosely  constructed  system  of  local.  State,  and  general 
government  tended  also  still  farther  to  separate  and  di\ide  the  people. 
In  the  beginning  the  party  conventions  and  the  party  committees  were 
effective  organs  for  resisting  disintegration  and  promoting  national  unity. 

While  the  system  of  party  machinery  has  grown,  there  has  come  into 
use  the  railway,  the  telegraph,  the  telephone,  and  rural  postal  delivery. 
By  means  of  the  daily  press  the  people  of  the  State,  of  the  entire  nation, 
are  brought  together.  There  is  thus  made  possible  a  sort  of  daily  ses- 
sion or  town  meeting  for  the  whole  body  politic.  Party  organs,  which 
in  their  origin  were  eminently  serviceable,  are  no  longer  needed  to  bring 
the  people  together.  As  the  newspaper  and  other  agencies  for  easy  and 
direct  communication  have  become  universal,  the  discarded  or  neglected 
party  machinery  has  fallen  into  the  hands  of  vested  interests,  whose  use . 
of  our  political  agencies  is  often  adverse  to  the  public  good".  This  con- 
dition has  given  rise  to  the  present  effort  for  the  readjustment  of  party 
machinery.  Direct  nominations  at  primary  elections  are  being  substituted 
for  the  nominating  conventions. 

The  first  and  most  obvious  change,  therefore,  is  the  tendency  to 
eliminate  the  nominating  convention.  How  far  this  will  go  is  as  yet  only 
a  matter  of  conjecture.  Thus  far  the  nomination  of  candidates  for  the 
presidency  by  popular  vote  has  not  been  seriously  considered,  but  pro- 
vision is  made  in  many  States  for  the  popular  election  of  delegates  to  the 
national  convention.  Since  the  general  government  has  no  machinery  for 
holding  elections,  the  national  nominating  convention  is  likely  to  endure 
so  long  as  distinctly  party  nominations  are  made. 

The  system  of  party  conventions  has  served  other  purposes  than  the 
nomination  of  candidates.  It  has  assisted  in  the  formation  and  e.xjjression 
of  party  issues.  The  convention  has  given  rise  to  the  party  platform.  It 
there  is  no  State  convention,  how  can  there  be  a  State  j^latform  ?  There 
exists  a  strong  tendency  to  retain  the  State  convention  even  though  its 
nominating  function  be  lost.  Yet,  as  voters  become  accustomed  to  the 
new  nominating  process,  the  party  platform  is  likely  to  emanate  more 
and  more  directly  from  the  utterances  of  the  successful  candidates.  .  .  . 

Our  system  of  permanent  party  committees  also  grew  out  of  the  con- 
vention.   With  the  passing  of  the  convention  many  of  the  functions  of 


414 


READINGS   IN   POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


the  committee  will  disappear.  The  party  may  still  maintain  agents  to 
look  after  registration  and  to  guard  party  interests  at  primary  elections. 
The  functions  of  the  campaign  committee  will  remain.  Yet  even  here 
the  new  method  is  likely  to  effect  important  changes.  As  the  party  plat- 
form passes  from  the  convention  to  the  candidate,  so  the  party  commit- 
tee is  likely  to  become  more  and  more  an  agency  of  the  candidate.  A 
more  important  change  to  be  effected  by  the  primary  election  is  found 
in  the  distinction  which  it  enforces  between  State  and  federal  politics. 
The  earlier  system  of  party  conventions  with  its  vast  array  of  party  ma- 
chinery tended  to  obliterate  the  distinction  between  State  and  nation. 
The  two  governments  which  the  constitution  makes  distinct  were,  in  the 
hands  of  party  committees,  fused  together  in  such  a  way  as  to  render 
intelligent  action  on  the  part  of  the  voter  difficult  or  impossible.  The 
new  system  enforces  a  separation  and  compels  a  distinction  between 
State  and  federal  politics.  .  .  . 

The  new  method  also  furnishes  the  means  for  partially  removing  the 
one  instance  of  capital  maladjustment  in  our  Federal  Constitution.  I 
refer  to  the  provision  for  the  election  of  United '  States  senators,  which 
has  resulted  in  compelling  the  voter,  in  a  single  act,  to  attempt  the  im- 
possible task  of  expressing  an  opinion  on  the  policies  of  two  govern- 
ments whidi  the  Constitution  makes  distinct.  When  he  votes  for  men  to 
make  laws  for  his  State,  it  is  a  mere  accident  if  these  men  represent  his 
views  in  national  politics.  Through  the  device  of  a  primary  election  it 
has  been  found  possible  virtually  to  relieve  the  State  legislature  of  the 
responsibility  of  selecting  United  States  senators.  This  makes  it  possible 
to  develop  and  maintain  distinct  and  independent  policies  in  the  States. 

V.    Party  Reform 

400.  Beginnings  of  the  spoils  system.  The  following  letter, 
written  to  Jefferson  by  his  postmaster-general,  indicates  the  sen- 
timent upon  which  was  originally  based  removal  from  office  for 
political  reasons  : 

Premising  that  I  am  fully  sensible  of  the  agitations  which  will  be 
produced  by  removals  from  office,  that  I  have  no  connections  for  whom 
I  wish  office,  and  that  I  sincerely  lament  the  existence  of  a  state  of 
things  which  require  acts  calculated  to  affect  individuals,  and  to  give  pain 
to  the  feelings  of  the  executive  —  I  proceed  to  state  the  reasons  upon 
which  I  have  founded  my  opinion. 

First,  The  principle  cannot  be  controverted,  that  it  is  just,  fair,  and 
honorable  that  the  friends  of  the  government  should  have  at  least  as 


POLITICAL  PARTIES  415 

great  a  proportion  of  the  honors  and  offices  of  the  Government  as  they 
are  of  the  whole  people.  ... 

Secondly,  The  general  depression  of  the  Republicans  in  this  State, 
who  have  suffered  everything,  combating  a  Phalanx  vastly  superior  to 
what  can  be  found  in  any  other  part  of  the  union  forms  a  strong  reason. 
Nothing  can  be  lost  here,  and  something  may  be  gained :  How  far  this 
applies  to  other  parts  of  the  union  is  not  for  me  to  judge.  A  knowledge 
that  we  had  the  real  confidence  of  the  Executive  I  think  would  have  a 
happy  effect,  for  already  it  is  used  as  an  argument  to  affect  our  elections 
that  the  President  used  the  Democrats  to  ride  into  office,  that  now  seated 
there  he  has  evinced  his  contempt  for  them,  and  will  rely  solely  on  the 
Federalists  for  support.   .   .  . 

Lastly,  The  sacred  rule  that  no  man  shall  be  persecuted  for  his  opin- 
ions decently  and  reasonably  maintained  will  not  apply  to  any  of  our 
official  Characters.  I  believe  without  a  single  exception  All,  and  I  know 
most  have  been  bitter  persecutors.  .  .  . 

401.  Evils  of  the  spoils  system.  The  following  extract  is  taken 
from  an  address  delivered  by  Carl  Schurz  at  the  annual  meeting  of 
the  National  Civil  Service  Reform  League : 

Looking  at  the  financial  side  of  the  matter  alone  —  it  is  certainly 
bad  enough ;  it  is  indeed  almost  incomprehensible  how  the  spoils  system 
would  be  permitted  through  scores  of  years  to  vitiate  our  business  meth- 
ods in  the  conduct  of  the  national  revenue  service,  the  postal  service, 
the  Indian  service,  the  public-land  service,  involving  us  in  indescribable 
administrative  blunders,  bringing  about  Indian  wars,  causing  immense 
losses  in  the  revenue,  breeding  extravagant  and  plundering  practices  in 
all  Departments,  costing  our  people  in  the  course  of  time  untold  hun- 
dreds of  millions  of  money,  and  making  our  Government  one  of  the 
most  wasteful  in  the  world.  All  this,  I  say,  is  bad  enough.  It  might  be 
called  discreditable  enough  to  move  any  self-respecting  people  to  shame. 
But  the  spoils  system  has  inflicted  upon  the  American  people  injuries  far 
greater  than  these. 

The  spoils  system,  that  practice  which  turns  public  offices,  high  and 
low,  from  public  trusts  into  objects  of  prey  and  booty  for  the  victorious 
party,  may  without  extravagance  of  language  be  called  one  of  the  great- 
est criminals  in  our  history,  if  not  the  greatest.  In  the  whole  catalogue 
of  our  ills  there  is  none  more  dangerous  to  the  vitality  of  our  free 

institutions. 

It  tends  to  divert  our  whole  political  life  from  its  tnie  aims.  It  teaches 
men  to  seek  something  else  in  politics  than  the  public  good.     It  puts 


4i6  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

mercenary  selfishness  as  the  motive  power  for  political  action  in  the  place 
of  public  spirit,  and  organizes  that  selfishness  into  a  dominant  political  force. 

It  attracts  to  active  party  politics  the  worst  elements  of  our  popula- 
lation,  and  with  them  crowds  out  the  best.  It  transforms  political  parties 
from  associations  of  patriotic  citizens,  formed  to  serve  a  public  cause,  into 
bands  of  mercenaries  using  a  cause  to  serve  them.  It  perverts  party  con- 
tests from  contentions  of  opinion  into  scrambles  for  plunder.  By  stimu- 
lating the  mercenary  spirit  it  promotes  the  corrupt  use  of  money  in  party 
contests  and  in  elections. 

It  takes  the  leadership  of  political  organizations  out  of  the  hands  of 
men  fit  to  be  leaders  of  opinion  and  workers  for  high  aims,  and  turns 
it  over  to  the  organizers  and  leaders  of  bands  of  political  marauders.  It 
creates  the  boss  and  the  machine,  putting  the  boss  into  the  place  of  the 
statesman,  and  the  despotism  of  the  machine  in  the  place  of  an  organized 
public  opinion. 

It  converts  the  public  officeholder,  who  should  be  the  servant  of  the 
people,  into  the  servant  of  a  party  or  of  an  influential  politician,  extorting 
from  him  time  and  work  which  should  belong  to  the  public,  and  money 
which  he  receives  from  the  public  for  public  service.  It  corrupts  his 
sense  of  duty  by  making  him  understand  that  his  obligation  to  his  party 
or  his  political  patron  is  equal  if  not  superior  to  his  obligation  to  the 
public  interest,  and  that  his  continuance  in  office  does  not  depend  on  his 
fidelity  to  duty.  It  debauches  his  honesty  by  seducing  him  to  use  the  op- 
portunities of  his  office  to  indemnify  himself  for  the  burdens  forced  upon 
him  as  a  party  slave.  It  undermines  in  all  directions  the  discipline  of  the 
public  service. 

It  falsifies  our  constitutional  system.  It  leads  to  the  usurpation,  in  a 
large  measure,  of  the  executive  power  of  appointment  by  members  of  the 
legislative  branch,  substituting  their  irresponsible  views  of  personal  or 
party  interest  for  the  judgment  as  to  the  public  good  and  the  sense  of 
responsibility  of  the  executive.  It  subjects  those  who  exercise  the  ap- 
pointing power,  from  the  President  of  the  United  States  down,  to  the 
intrusion  of  hordes  of  office  hunters  and  their  patrons,  who  rob  them  of 
the  time  and  strength  they  should  devote  to  the  public  interest.  It  has 
already  killed  two  of  our  presidents,  one,  the  first  Harrison,  by  worry, 
and  the  other,  Garfield,  by  murder ;  and  more  recently  it  has  killed  a 
mayor  in  Chicago  and  a  judge  in  Tennessee. 

It  degrades  our  Senators  and  Representatives  in  Congress  to  the  con- 
temptible position  of  office  brokers,  and  even  of  mere  agents  of  office 
brokers,  making  the  business  of  dickering  about  spoils  as  weighty  to  them 
as  their  duties  as  legislators.  It  introduces  the  patronage  as  an  agency 
of  corrupt  influence  between  the  executive  and  the  legislature.    It  serves 


POLITICAL  PARTIES  41; 

to  obscure  the  criminal  character  of  bribery  by  treating,'  briber)'  with  offices 
as  a  legitimate  practice.  It  thus  reconciles  the  popular  mind  to  practices 
essentially  corrupt,  and  thereby  debauches  the  popular  sense  of  right  and 
wrong  in  politics. 

It  keeps  in  high  political  places,  to  the  exclusion  of  better  men, 
persons  whose  only  ability  consists  in  holding  a  personal  following  by 
adroit  manipulation  of  the  patronage.  It  has  thus  sadly  lowered  the 
standard  of  statesmanship  in  public  position,  compared  with  the  high 
order  of  ability  displayed  in  all  other  walks  of  life. 

It  does  more  than  anything  else  to  turn  our  large  municipalities  into 
sinks  of  corruption,  to  render  Tammany  Halls  possible,  and  to  make  of 
the  police  force  here  and  there  a  protector  of  crime  and  a  terror  to 
those  whose  safety  it  is  to  guard.  It  exposes  us,  by  the  scandalous 
spectacle  of  its  periodical  spoils  carnivals,  to  the  ridicule  and  contcmjjt 
of  civilized  mankind,  promoting  among  our  own  people  the  growth  <>{ 
serious  doubts  as  to  the  practicability  of  democratic  institutions  on  a 
great  scale ;  and  in  an  endless  variety  of  ways  it  introduces  into  our 
political  life  more  elements  of  demoralization,  debasement,  and  deca- 
dence than  any  other  agency  of  evil  I  know  of,  aye,  perhaps  more  than 
all  other  agencies  of  evil  combined. 

402.  The  machine  and  the  boss.  The  process  by  which  the 
machine  and  the  boss  are  developed  is  well  described  in  the 
following : 

The  corrupt  political  machine  of  to-day,  controlled  by  a  boss,  is 
contrary  to  the  American  system  of  government,  and  were  it  not  a 
terrible  reality  its  creation  would  be  deemed  an  impossibility.  It  is,  in  its 
present  state  of  perfection,  rule  of  the  people  by  the  individual  for  the 
boss,  his  relatives,  and  friends.  It  is  the  most  complete  ])olitical  des- 
potism-ever  known,  and  yet  the  political  machine  on  which  the  boss 
rises  as  dictator  and  despot  is  based  on  the  fundamental  principle  of 
democracy  —  that  system  of  government  wherein  all  men  are  supposed 
to  be  equal  and  every  voter  a  sovereign.  It  is  the  multiplicity  of  voting 
sovereigns  that  makes  the  machine  a  necessity  for  concerted  [iolitical 
action ;  and  when  sovereignty  has  been  centralized  by  organization,  the 
great  majority  of  our  constitutional  rulers  go  about  their  private  affairs. 
careless  of  their  rights  and  powers  until  their  personal  or  property 
interests  are  affected  by  the  ukase  of  a  party  boss.  For  a  ccntur>-  the 
division  of  the  voters  into  political  parties  has  been  a  part  of  our  system 
of  being  governed  by  the  man  who  runs  the  machine  of  the  party  in 
office.    This  division  has  been  carried   up  or  down,   according  to  the 


4i8  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

point  of  view,  from  national  politics  to  the  election  of  township  con- 
stables. When  the  sovereigns  are  divided  on  party  lines  the  work  of 
partisan  organization  is  made  easy,  and  the  majority  need  not  think  or 
act  for  themselves ;  they  can  leave  all  such  details  to  the  committees. 
The  building  of  the  political  machine  begins  whenever  a  question  of 
policy  seems  to  demand  united  party  action.  The  frame  is  laid  in  the 
party  caucus  or  mass  meeting,  where  every  voter  may  be  heard.  There 
the  necessity  for  organization  is  made  apparent,  and  a  committee  is 
created.  That  is  the  work  of  the  voters  of  a  party  in  a  particular  locality, 
and  the  first  committee  is  the  creation  of  a  majority.  So  far  the  plan  of 
procedure  is  perfect.  It  is  essentially  democratic  —  majority  rule.  But 
the  committee  is  too  large,  and  a  subcommittee  is  detailed  to  carry  on 
the  work  of  the  organization.  From  a  subcommittee  the  task  passes 
to  individuals  —  one,  two,  or  three  —  and  behold,  in  a  day  a  political 
machine  stands  complete,  awaiting  the  guiding  hand  of  a  boss  ! 

The  committee  of  the  township,  county,  town,  or  city  mass  meetings 
develops  into  a  small  machine,  which  for  a  time  does  its  work  so  well 
that  the  people  are  pleased.  When  the  time  comes  for  holding  another 
mass  meeting  the  voters  do  not  turn  out.  They  are  busy  with  their 
own  affairs,  and  their  confidence  in  the  committee  is  unshaken.  Then 
the  machine  grows  stronger,  and  the  leader  of  the  first  meeting  is  the 
boss  of  the  second,  dictating  nominations  and  dividing  patronage.  The 
smaller  committees  are  represented  in  the  State  or  city  organization,  and 
along  the  same  lines  a  larger  machine  is  built.  It  is  merely  the  local 
and  political  interests  and  ambitions  merged  into  one  harmonious  whole 
—  the  machine  finished  and  ready  for  business.  .  .  . 

When  civic  pride  and  public  spirit  are  withdrawn  from  the  party 
organization,  the  modem  political  machine  remains.  It  stands  before 
the  public  disguised  as  a  committee ;  but  every  member  is  there  for 
business,  and  his  first  thought  is  to  get  all  he  can  out  of  the  party  be- 
fore he  is  succeeded  by  some  one  more  unscrupulous.  In  the  scramble 
for  spoils  that  follows  the  boss  is  developed.  He  is  a  man  with  enough 
force  of  character  to  bend  the  other  members  of  the  organization  to  his 
will  and  make  the  machine  a  weapon  of  offense  and  defense.  Once  a 
boss  is  firmly  established  in  his  place  his  first  thought  is  to  take  care 
of  the  machine,  to  keep  it  in  good  working  order,  for  without  it  he 
cannot  longer  retain  power. 

403.  The  nature  of  the  American  boss.  The  characteristics  of 
the  typical  boss  and  his  attitude  toward  politics  are  thus  described 
by  Bryce :  ^ 

1  By  permission  of  The  Macmillan  Company. 


POLITICAL  PARTIES  419 

European  readers  must  again  be  cautioned  against  drawing  for  them- 
selves too  dark  a  picture  of  the  Boss.  He  is  not  a  demon.  He  is  not 
regarded  with  horror  even  by  those  "  good  citizens "  who  strive  to 
shake  off  his  yoke.  He  is  not  necessarily  either  corrupt  or  mendacious, 
though  he  grasps  at  place,  power,  and  wealth.  He  is  a  leader  to  whom 
certain  peculiar  social  and  political  conditions  have  given  a  character 
dissimilar  from  the  party  leaders  whom  Europe  knows.  It  is  worth  while 
to  point  out  in  what  the  dissimilarity  consists. 

A  Boss  needs  fewer  showy  gifts  than  a  European  demagogue.  His 
special  theater  is  neither  the  halls  of  the  legislature  nor  the  platform,  but 
the  committee  room.  A  power  of  rough  and  ready  repartee,  or  a  turn 
for  florid  declamation,  will  help  him ;  but  he  can  dispense  with  both. 
What  he  needs  are  the  arts  of  intrigue  and  that  knowledge  of  men  which 
teaches  him  when  to  bully,  when  to  cajole,  whom  to  attract  by  the  hof>e 
of  gain,  whom  by  appeals  to  party  loyalty.  Nor  are  so-called  "  social 
gifts  "  unimportant.  The  lower  sort  of  city  politicians  congregate  in 
clubs  and  barrooms ;  and  as  much  of  the  cohesive  strength  of  the 
smaller  party  organizations  arises  from  their  being  also  social  bodies,  so 
also  much  of  the  power  which  liquor  dealers  exercise  is  due  to  the  fact 
that  "  heelers  "  and  "  workers  "  spend  their  evenings  in  drinking  places, 
and  that  meetings  for  political  purposes  are  held  there.  ...  A  Boss 
ought  therefore  to  be  hail  fellow  well  met  with  those  who  frequent  these 
places,  not  fastidious  in  his  tastes,  fond  of  a  drink  and  willing  to  stand 
one,  jovial  in  manners,  and  ready  to  oblige  even  a  humble  friend. 

The  aim  of  a  Boss  is  not  so  much  fame  as  power,  and  not  so  much 
power  over  the  conduct  of  affairs  as  over  persons.  Patronage  is  the 
sort  of  power  he  seeks,  patronage  understood  in  the  largest  sense  in 
which  it  covers  the  disposal  of  lucrative  contracts  and  other  modes  of 
enrichment  as  well  as  salaried  places.  The  dependents  who  surround 
him  desire  wealth,  or  at  least  a  livelihood  ;  his  business  is  to  find  this 
for  them,  and  in  doing  so  he  strengthens  his  own  position.  It  is  as 
the  bestower  of  riches  that  he  holds  his  position,  like  the  leader  of  a 
band  of  condottieri  in  the  fifteenth  century. 

The  interest  of  a  Boss  in  political  questions  is  usually  quite  second- 
ary. Here  and  there  one  may  be  found  who  is  a  politician  in  the  Euro- 
pean sense,  who,  whether  sincerely  or  not,  purports  and  professes  to  be 
interested  in  some  principle  or  measure  affecting  the  welfare  of  the  coun- 
try. But  the  attachment  of  the  ringster  is  usually  given  wholly  to  the 
concrete  party,  that  is  to  the  men  who  compose  it,  regarded  as  office- 
holders or  office  seekers  ;  and  there  is  often  not  even  a  profession  of  zeal 
for  any  party  doctrine.  .  .  .  Among  bosses,  therefore,  there  is  little 
warmth  of  party  spirit.    The  typical  boss  regards  the  boss  of  the  other 


420  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

party  much  as  counsel  for  the  plaintiff  regards  counsel  for  the  defend- 
ant. They  are  professionally  opposed,  but  not  necessarily  personally  hos- 
tile. Between  bosses  there  need  be  no  more  enmity  than  results  from  the 
fact  that  the  one  has  got  what  the  other  wishes  to  have.  Accordingly  it 
sometimes  happens  that  there  is  a  good  understanding  between  the 
chiefs  of  opposite  parties  in  cities;  they  will  even  go  the  length  of 
making  (of  course  secretly)  a  joint  "  deal,"  i.e.  of  arranging  for  a  dis- 
tribution of  offices  whereby  some  of  the  friends  of  one  shall  get  places, 
the  residue  being  left  for  the  friends  of  the  other.  A  well-organized  city 
party  has  usually  a  disposable  vote  which  can  be  so  cast  under  the 
directions  of  the  managers  as  to  effect  this,  or  any  other  desired  result. 
The  appearance  of  hostility  must,  of  course,  be  maintained  for  the 
benefit  of  the  public ;  but  as  it  is  for  the  interest  of  both  parties  to  make 
and  keep  these  private  bargains,  they  are  usually  kept  when  made, 
though  of  course  it  is  seldom  possible  to  prove  the  fact. 

The  real  hostility  of  the  Boss  is  not  to  the  opposite  party,  but  to 
other  factions  within  his  own  party.  Often  he  has  a  rival  leading  some 
other  organization,  and  demanding,  in  respect  of  the  votes  which  that 
organization  controls,  a  share  of  the  good  things  going.  ...  If  neither 
can  crush  the  other,  it  finds  itself  obliged  to  treat,  and  to  consent  to  lose 
part  of  the  spoils  to  its  rival.  Still  more  bitter,  however,  is  the  hatred  of 
Boss  and  Ring  toward  those  members  of  the  party  who  do  not  desire 
and  are  not  to  be  appeased  by  a  share  of  the  spoils,  but  who  agitate 
for  what  they  call  reform.  They  are  natural  and  permanent  enemies ; 
nothing  but  the  extinction  of  the  Boss  himself  and  of  bossdom  altogether 
will  satisfy  them.  They  are  moreover  the  common  enemies  of  both 
parties,  that  is,  of  bossdom  in  both  parties.  Hence  in  ring-governed 
cities  professionals  of  both  parties  will  sometimes  unite  against  the  re- 
formers, or  will  rather  let  their  opponents  secure  a  place  than  win  it 
for  themselves  by  the  help  of  the  "independent  vote."  Devotion  to 
"party  government,"  as  they  understand  it,  can  hardly  go  farther. 

404.  Necessity  for  party  responsibility  in  the  United  States. 

Goodnow  states  a  fundamental  principle  in  American  political 
organization  as  follows  :  ^ 

Our  formal  governmental  system  makes  no  provision  for  the  coordi- 
nation of  the  functions  of  expressing  and  executing  the  will  of  the  state 
through  the  instrumentalities  of  government.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  so 
formed  as  to  make  that  coordination  impossible.  That  is,  the  work  of  the 
party  is  not  completed  when  it  has  elected  a  legislature.    It  must  elect  a 

1  Copyright,  1900,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


It 


POLITICAL  PARTIES  421 

series  of  executive  officers  as  well,  not  only  for  the  nation  and  the  state, 
but  also  for  the  localities.  Further,  the  fact  that  the  terms  of  these 
executive  and  legislative  officers  are  not  coincident  makes  it  probable 
that  even  if  one  party  has  elected  all  the  officers  it  can  elect  at  a  given 
election,  such  party  does  not  have  complete  control  of  the  government. 
The  political  storm  center  in  the  United  States  is  therefore  not  in  the 
government,  but  in  the  party.  All  attempts  to  make  the  boss  responsible 
must  take  account  of  this  fact.  The  party  must  be  made  responsible  to 
the  people.  After  this  is  done,  the  boss  will  have  been  attacked  in  his 
stronghold,  and  will  be  forced  to  capitulate.  In  that  way,  and  in  that  way 
alone,  can  we  hope  to  see  our  government  conducted  by  party  leaders 
amenable  to  popular  control. 

405.  Legal  recognition  of  political  parties.  I'olitical  jxirtics 
originated  as  voluntary  associations,  outside  the  legal  framework 
of  the  governmental  system.  A  realization  of  the  fact  that  leg-al 
control  of  the  parties  is  necessary  if  they  are  to  be  responsible  to 
popular  will  is  indicated  in  the  following  preamble  to  a  recent 
Oregon  law : 

Under  our  form  of  government,  political  parties  are  useful  and  nec- 
essary at  the  present  time.  It  is  necessary'  for  the  public  welfare  and 
safety  that  every  practical  guaranty  shall  be  provided  by  law  to  assure 
the  people  generally,  as  well  as  the  members  of  the  several  parties,  that 
political  parties  shall  be  fairly,  freely,  and  honestly  conducted,  in  appear- 
ance as  well  as  in  fact.  The  method  of  naming  candidates  for  elective 
public  offices  by  political  parties  and  voluntary  political  organizations  is 
the  best  plan  yet  found  for  placing  before  the  people  the  names  of  quali- 
fied and  worthy  citizens  from  whom  the  electors  may  choose  the  officers 
of  our  government.  The  government  of  our  State  by  its  electors  and 
the  government  of  a  political  party  by  its  members  are  rightfully  based 
on  the  same  general  principles.  Ever}'  political  party  and  ever)'  volun- 
teer political  organization  has  the  same  right  to  be  protected  from  the 
interference  of  persons  who  are  not  identified  with  it  as  its  known  and 
publicly  avowed  members,  that  the  government  of  the  State  has  to  pro- 
tect itself  from  the  interference  of  persons  who  are  not  known  and 
registered  as  its  electors. 

It  is  as  great  a  wrong  to  the  people,  as  well  as  to  the  members  of  a 
political  party,  for  one  who  is  not  known  to  be  one  of  its  members  to 
vote  or  take  any  part  at  any  election  or  other  proceedings  of  such  politi- 
cal party,  as  it  is  for  one  who  is  not  a  qualified  and  registered  elector  to 
vote  at  any  State  election  or  take  any  part  in  the  business  of  the  State. 


42  2  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

Every  political  party  and  voluntary  political  association  is  rightfully  enti- 
tled to  the  sole  and  exclusive  use  of  every  word  of  its  official  name.  The 
people  of  the  State  and  the  members  of  every  political  party  and  volun- 
tary political  organization  are  rightfully  entitled  to  know  that  every  per- 
son who  offers  to  take  any  part  in  the  affairs  or  business  of  any  political 
party  or  voluntary  political  organization  in  the  State  is  in  good  faith  a 
member  of  such  party.  The  reason  for  the  law  which  requires  a  secret 
ballot  when  all  the  electors  choose  their  officers,  equally  requires  a  secret 
ballot  when  the  members  of  a  party  choose  their  candidates  for  public 
office.  It  is  as  necessary  for  the  preservation  of  the  public  welfare  and 
safety  that  there  shall  be  a  free  and  fair  vote  and  an  honest  count,  as 
well  as  a  secret  ballot  at  primary  elections,  as  it  is  that  there  shall  be  a 
free  and  fair  vote  and  an  honest  count  in  addition  to  the  secret  ballot  at 
all  elections  of  public  officers.  All  qualified  electors  who  wish  to  serve 
the  people  in  an  elective  public  office  are  rightfully  entitled  to  equal 
opportunities  under  the  law.  The  purpose  of  this  law  is  better  to  secure 
and  to  preserve  the  rights  of  political  parties  and  voluntary  political 
organizations,  and  their  members  and  candidates,  and  especially  of  the 
rights  above  stated. 

406.  Primary  election  reform.  The  essential  features  of  a  satig- 
factory  primary  election  law  may  be  stated  as  follows  : 

1.  The  primary  elections  of  all  parties  should  be  held  together  in 
every  election  precinct  on  the  same  day.  The  time  and  place  of  these 
elections  should  be  fixed  by  law  and  not  left  to  be  determined  by  party 
committees.  In  this  way  the  election  day  will  be  known,  the  polling 
places  will  be  fixed  and  not  precarious ;  machine  gerrymandering  and 
snap  primaries  will  be  prevented ;  and  the  voters  of  one  party  will  be 
prevented  from  packing  the  Primary  of  the  other  for  the  purpose  of 
nominating  weak  candidates  for  their  opponents. 

2.  A  good  registration  law.  The  party  voters  must  be  registered  a 
certain  number  of  days  before  the  Primary.  Careful  registration  always 
tends  to  promote  fair  elections. 

3.  The  right  to  vote  at  a  party  Primary  should  be  secured  against 
fraud  by  the  registration  of  the  party  affiliation,  or  preference  of  all 
voters  who  seek  to  vote  at  the  Primary.  No  opponent  of  a  party  has 
a  right  to  participate  in  its  Primary.   .   .   . 

4.  The  Australian  secret-ballot  system  of  voting  should  be  used  in 
the  Primary  as  in  the  regular  election  day.  .  .  . 

Other  minor  features  urged  by  primary  election  advocates  are : 
(i)  The  application  of  the  law  should  be  made  mandatory  and  not  left 


POLITICAL  PARTIES  423 

to  the  option  of  party  committees.  Primary  elections  should  be  under 
State  control,  not  under  party  control;  (2)  The  rotation  of  names  in 
the  printed  ballots.  Any  name  appearing  first  in  all  the  ballots  would 
have  a  manifest  advantage.  .  .  . 

Several  objections  are  urged  to  the  system  of  making  nominations  by 
direct  primaries : 

1.  It  tends  to  promote  rather  than  to  check  electoral  corruption.  A 
primary  election  is  merely  another  election,  and  as  elections  arc  now- 
conducted  we  have  enough  of  them.  .  .  . 

2.  It  promotes  plurality  nominations.  A  man  may  be  nominated  who 
represents  but  one  third  or  one  fourth  of  the  party  voters.  .  .  . 

3.  It  tends  to  a  multiplicity  of  candidates  and  the  consequent  con- 
fusion of  the  voters.  .  .  , 

4.  The  primary  system  tends  to  weaken  and  destroy  the  party.  It 
causes  jealousies  and  divisions  within  the  party  and  prevents  efficient 
party  organization. 


CHAPTER  XXII 

LOCAL  GOVERNMENT 

I,    Relation  of  Local  to  Central  Government 

407.  Local  and  central  government.  Local  and  central  govern- 
ment may  be  distinguished  in  several  fundamental  ways.^ 

The  difference  between  local  and  central  government  is  not  a  matter 
of  area  or  of  population.  The  distinction  lies  partly  in  their  relative  con- 
stitutional positions,  and  partly  in  the  respective  nature  of  the  public 
services  performed.  In  regard  to  the  first  point,  it  is  true  of  most  in- 
dependent states  that  the  local  government  derives  its  powers  from  the 
central  government,  and  holds  them  at  the  pleasure  of  the  latter.  .  .  . 

The  other  point  of  distinction  between  local  and  central  government 
consists  in  the  different  nature  of  the  services  accomplished.  This  re- 
quires some  further  explanation.  The  various  functions  performed  by 
the  agencies  of  the  state  for  the  benefit  of  the  citizens  will  roughly  fall 
into  two  classes.  Some  of  them  will  be  in  the  interest  of  the  community 
generally,  and  the  benefit  thereby  effected  will  not  be  assignable  to  any 
single  part  of  the  country.  .  .  .  The  whole  class  of  functions  thus  indi- 
cated will  properly  fall  within  the  province  of  the  central  government. 
But  in  addition  to  these,  there  are  other  state  activities  (for  it  must  be 
recollected  that  both  local  and  central  government  form  a  part  of  the 
organization  of  the  state)  of  quite  a  different  character.  Here  the  bene- 
fit to  be  conferred  only  affects  a  small  portion  of  the  community,  and  is 
obviously  assignable  to  a  particular  area.  .  .  .  Here  it  seems  reasonable 
that  the  advantage,  the  cost,  and  the  control  of  the  enterprise  should  be 
looked  upon  as  solely  the  concern  of  those  who  are  affected  by  it.  .  .  . 

In  spite,  however,  of  the  obvious  nature  of  the  general  distinction, 
the  functions  of  local  and  central  government  shade  and  blend  into 
one  another. 

408.  Degrees  of  centralization.  The  relation  existing  between 
central  and  local  organizations  falls  into  three  general  types. 

Naturally  and  historically  the  various  subdivisions  should  exercise  full 
local  powers,  subject  only  in  general  matters  to  the  larger  area.  .  .  .  As, 

1  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 
424 


i 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT  425 

however,  states  have  developed  policies  of  centralization,  they  have 
interpreted  their  general  powers  more  broadly,  and  have  pressed  their 
authority  more  and  more  vigorously  on  subordinate  administrative 
areas.  This  has  usually  been  under  plea  of  military  necessity  or  of 
needed  uniformity  or  of  general  welfare.  As  the  strength  of  this  tend- 
ency varies  with  conditions,  the  degree  of  centralization  varies  in  each 
particular  state  according  to  the  dominant  theories  of  militarism,  uniform- 
ity, and  general  welfare.  On  the  whole,  three  grades  of  centralization 
may  be  noted  : 

(i)  That  in  which  the  subordinate  areas  or  bodies  politic  are  clearly 
regulated  and  supervised  directly  by  the  national  administration  tlircjug'h 
its  own  officials,  as  in  France. 

(2)  That  in  which  the  subordinate  areas  are  regulated  and  su|)erviscd 
indirectly  by  the  national  administration,  as  in  England,  where  in  many 
matters  a  uniform  system  is  adopted,  but  the  administration  of  it  is  left 
to  the  local  administrative  bodies. 

(3)  That  in  which  the  subordinate  areas  practically  regulate  all  their 
local  affairs  without  much  interference  from  the  national  administration, 
as  in  the  relation  of  Great  Britain  to  its  autonomous  colonies,  and  in 
the  United  States  of  America. 

No  state  conforms  entirely  to  any  one  of  these  types ;  the  most  cen- 
tralized government  may  allow  large  local  powers  in  some  matters  and 
the  most  decentralized  may  employ  large  general  powers  in  such  affairs 
as  war,  diplomacy,  and  taxation.  The  test  is  made  by  the  theoretical 
principle  on  which  government  acts,  irrespective  of  whether  at  any  par- 
ticular time  it  seems  expedient  to  use  many  or  few  powers  of  regulation. 

IL    Commonwealth  Governments 

409.  The  Swiss  cantons  and  the  union.  The  Swiss  con.stitution 
contains  distinct  traces  of  confederation,  clearly  stating  the  doctrine 
of  divided  sovereignty. 

The  Constitution  of  Switzerland  rests  upon  federal  foundations  such 
as  our  own  government  had  during  the  first  half  centur>-  of  its  exist- 
ence rather  than  upon  national  conceptions  such  as  have  dominated  us 
since  the  war  between  the  States.  The  Swiss  Constitution  docs  indeed 
expressly  speak  of  the  Swiss  nation,  declaring  that  "  the  Swiss  Confed- 
eracy has  adopted  the  following  Constitution  with  a  view  to  establishing 
the  union  {Bund)  of  the  Confederates  and  to  maintaining  and  furthering 
the  unit}',  the  power,  and  the  honor  of  the  Swiss  nation  ";  and  not  even 
the  war  between  the  States  put  the  word  nation  into  our  Constitution. 


426  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

But  the  Constitution  of  Switzerland  also  contains  a  distinct  and  emphatic 
assertion  of  that  principle  of  divided  sovereignty  which  is  so  much  less 
familiar  to  us  now  than  it  was  before  1861.  It  speaks  of  the  Confedera- 
tion as  formed  by  "  the  people  of  the  twenty-two  sovereign  Cantons," 
and  it  explicitly  declares  that  "  the  Cantons  are  sovereign,  so  far  as  their 
sovereignty  is  not  limited  by  the  federal  Constitution,  and  exercise  as 
such  all  rights  which  are  not  conferred  upon  the  federal  power  "  ;  and 
its  most  competent  interpreters  are  constrained  to  say  that  such  a  con- 
stitution does  not  erect  a  single  and  compacted  state  of  which  the  Can- 
tons are  only  administrative  divisions,  but  a  federal  state,  the  units  of 
whose  membership  are  themselves  states,  possessed,  within  certain  limits, 
of  independent  and  supreme  power.  The  drift  both  of  Switzerland's  past 
history  and  present  purpose  is  unquestionably  towards  complete  nation- 
ality ;  but  her  present  Constitution  was  a  compromise  between  the  advo- 
cates and  the  opponents  of  nationalization  ;  and  it  does  not  yet  embody 
a  truly  national  organization  or  power. 

410.  The  German  Empire  and  the  individual  states.  The  nature 
of  the  German  Empire  and  the  constitutional  position  of  its  com- 
ponent commonwealths  are  indicated  in  the  following  :  ^ 

The  German  Empire  is  not  a  league  of  princes.  It  is  a  State  con- 
structed out  of  States.  In  becoming  a  member  of  the  Bund  each  several 
State  gave  up  its  sovereignty,  receiving  therefor,  as  Bismarck  expressed 
it,  a  "  share  in  the  joint  sovereignty  of  the  Empire."  Since  there  can  be 
no  limitation  of  sovereignty  and  no  division  of  it,  these  States  are  not 
sovereign  "  in  their  own  sphere."  But  the  individual  State  takes  a  part 
in  forming  the  power  that  stands  over  it.  The  German  States  are  not 
subjected  to  the  domination  of  any  one  of  them,  nor  to  any  foreign 
sovereign,  but  rather  to  a  corporate  State  builded  out  of  themselves. 
"  The  German  States  are  as  a  totality  sovereign."  Sovereignty,  accord- 
ing to  the  German  jurists,  is  not  an  essential  element  of  a  State.  It 
may  constitute  the  basis  of  recognition  in  international  law,  but  from  the 
standpoint  of  constitutional  law  it  is  an  insufficient  test  of  statehood. 
The  true  mark  of  a  State  consists  in  its  possession  of  original  and  un- 
derived  power.  This  mark  belongs  to  each  of  the  German  States. 
There  is  a  large  field  in  which  the  State  is  left  free  to  govern  itself.  The 
powers  of  the  Empire  are  specifically  defined.  It  may  enlarge  those 
powers,  but  until  it  does  the  State  enjoys  a  free  hand.  This  independ- 
ence is  not  granted  to  it  by  the  Empire.  It  forms  no  part  of  the  imperial 
powers.    It  is  State  power,  pure  and  simple.    The  State  wields  it  as  of 

1  Copyright,  1906,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


LOCAL- GOVERNMENT  427 

right  and  not  by  concession.  It  existed  before  the  founding  of  the 
Empire.  It  survives  that  act.  It  is  that  autonomous  area  of  ptiwcr  be- 
longing to  the  State  which  has  not  yet  been  invaded  by  the  Empire. 

411.  Variety  and  unity  of  commonwealth  organization  in  the 
United  States.  In  some  respects  the  American  commonwealths 
exhibit  striking  similarities  ;  in  other  respects,  marked  differences. 

The  cardinal  principle  of  the  present  Union  is  that,  except  in  matters 
distinctly  regulated  by  the  federal  constitution,  each  state  is  free  to  govern 
itself.  Hence  great  variety  in  the  form  and  the  functions  of  the  state 
governments.  .  .  . 

Such  differences  are  not  all  accidental ;  some  of  them  go  back  for 
centuries :  of  the  present  forty-five  states  eighteen  formed  parts  of  Eng- 
lish colonies  before  the  Revolution,  and  show  distinct  traces  of  colonial 
tradition  in  their  governments ;  another  group  of  states,  from  Louisiana 
to  California,  bears  the  impress  of  former  Spanish  and  French  law. 
Other  communities,  such  as  Arkansas  and  Michigan,  have  been  founded 
by  those  settlers  who  first  came  in  and  brought  with  them  familiar  law 
from  the  old  states. 

Local  conditions  also  account  for  and  require  a  great  variety  of  legis- 
lation :  lumber  states,  like  Maine  or  Wisconsin  or  Washington,  have  spe- 
cial laws  governing  forests  ;  stock-raising  states,  like  Colorado  and  Texas, 
legislate  on  wire  fences  and  branding  cattle ;  states  with  large  areas  of 
waterless  lands,  like  Nebraska  and  Utah,  provide  for  irrigation ;  commu- 
nities like  New  Jersey,  with  hundreds  of  thousands  of  foreign  immigrants 
engaged  in  manufactures,  need  different  legislation  from  a  community 
like  Vermont,  with  a  rural  American  population. 

On  the  other  hand,  throughout  the  Union  the  state  governments  are 
very  much  alike,  and  legislation  rests  more  on  a  common  basis  than 
appears  on  the  surface.  All  the  governments  have  three  departments, 
each  intended  to  act  independently  of  the  other  two.  In  all,  the  legisla- 
ture, of  two  houses,  is  the  repository  of  governing  power  not  other\vise 
granted  or  expressly  withheld.  Its  legislative  work  is  supplemented  by 
the  traditions  of  English  common  law.  Most  of  the  states  elect  the  chief 
financial  and  other  administrative  and  executive  officers.  All  have  a  series 
of  courts,  culminating  in  a  single  supreme  court.  In  cvcr>^  state  large 
areas  of  public  power  are  transferred  by  the  legislatures  to  cities  and 
localities.  The  legislation  of  the  states  is  freely  borrowed  one  from 
another ;  and  the  courts  quote  and  follow  decisions  of  their  neighbors. 
Nevertheless,  great  confusion  comes  from  the  variety  of  criminal  and 
civil  legislation.  ...    The  advantage  of  the  variety  of  state  legislation 


428  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

is  that  the  people  of  each  state  establish  the  system  and  make  the  laws 
which  they  think  best  adapted  for  themselves,  and  therefore  the  easiest 
to  execute. 

III.    Rural  Local  Government 

412.  Centralization  of  local  government  in  France.  The  reasons 
for  the  lack  of  local  self-government  in  France  may  be  stated  as 
follows  :  ^ 

An  explanation  of  the  centralization  of  the  state  entails  a  brief  survey 
of  local  government;  and  here  we  meet  with  a  deeply  rooted  French 
tradition,  for  centralization  was  already  great  under  the  old  re'gime,  and 
although  the  first  effect  of  the  Revolution  was  to  place  the  administration 
of  local  affairs  under  the  control  of  independent  elected  bodies,  the  pres- 
sure of  foreign  war,  and  the  necessity  of  maintaining  order  at  home,  soon 
threw  despotic  power  into  the  hands  of  the  national  government.  Under 
Napoleon  this  power  became  crystallized  in  a  permanent  form,  and  an 
administrative  system  was  established,  more  perfect,  more  effective,  and 
at  the  same  time  more  centralized  than  that  which  had  existed  under  the 
monarchy.  The  outward  form  of  the  Napoleonic  system  has  been  con- 
tinuously preserved  with  surprisingly  little  change,  but  since  1830  its 
spirit  has  been  modified  in  two  distinct  ways :  first,  by  means  of  what 
the  French  call  deconcentration,  that  is,  by  giving  to  the  local  agents 
of  the  central  government  a  greater  right  of  independent  action,  so  that 
they  are  more  free  from  the  direct  tutelage  of  the  ministers ;  second, 
by  a  process  of  true  decentralization,  or  the  introduction  of  the  elective 
principle  into  local  government,  and  the  extension  of  the  powers  of 
the  local  representative  bodies.  But  although  the  successive  rulers  of 
France  have  pursued  this  policy  pretty  steadily,  the  progress  of  local  self- 
government  has  been  far  from  rapid.  One  reason  for  this  is  the  habit 
of  looking  to  the  central  authorities  for  guidance  in  all  matters.  Another 
is  a  fear  on  the  part  of  the  government  of  furnishing  its  enemies  with 
rallying  points  which  might  be  used  to  organize  an  opposition,  —  a  fear 
that  takes  shape  to-day  in  provisions  forbidding  the  local  elected  councils 
to  express  any  opinions  on  general  politics,  or  to  communicate  with  each 
other  except  about  certain  matters  specified  by  law.  A  third  cause  of 
the  feeble  state  of  local  self-government  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that 
the  Revolution  of  1789  destroyed  all  the  existing  local  divisions  ex- 
cept the  commune,  and  replaced  them  by  artificial  districts  which  have 
never  developed  any  real  vitality,  so  that  the  commune  is  the  only  true 

1  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT  429 

center  of  local  life  in  the  republic*  A  fourth,  and  perhaps  the  most 
potent  cause  of  all,  is  the  dread  of  disorder  which  is  constantly  present 
in  the  minds  of  Frenchmen,  and  makes  them  crave  a  master  strong 
enough  to  cope  with  any  outbreak. 

413.  Complex  character  of  English  local  government.  In  strik- 
ing contrast  to  the  simple  multiple  system  of  subdividing  local 
areas  in  the  United  States  are  the  irregularity  and  overlapping 
of  English  local  units. 

The  subject  of  local  government  in  England  is  one  of  extreme  com- 
plexity. ...  So  perfectly  unsystematic,  indeed,  are  the  jjrovisions  of 
English  law  in  this  field  that  most  of  the  writers  who  have  undertaken 
to  expound  them,  —  even  to  English  readers,  —  have  seemed  to  derive  a 
certain  zest  from  the  despairful  nature  of  their  task,  —  a  sort  of  forlorn- 
hope  enthusiasm.  The  institutions  of  local  government  in  England  have 
grown  piece  by  piece  as  other  English  institutions  have,  and  not  accord- 
ing to  any  complete  or  logical  plan  of  statutory  construction.  They  are 
patchwork,  not  symmetrical  network,  and  the  patches  are  of  all  sizes, 
shapes,  and  materials. 

"  For  almost  every  new  administrative  function,"  complains  one  writer 
on  the  subject,  "  the  Legislature  has  provided  a  new  area  containing  a 
new  constituency,  who  by  a  new  method  of  election  choose  candidates 
who  satisfy  a  new  qualification,  to  sit  upon  a  new  board,  during  a  new 
term,  to  levy  a  new  rate  (tax),  and  to  spend  a  good  deal  of  the  new 
revenues  in  paying  new  officers  and  erecting  new  buildings." 

It  has  been  the  habit  of  English  legislators,  instead  of  perfecting, 
enlarging,  or  adapting  old  machinery,  to  create  all  sorts  of  new  pica's 
of  machinery  with  little  or  no  regard  to  their  fitness  to  be  combined  with 
the  old  or  with  each  other.   .  .  . 

In  general  terms,  then,  it  may  be  said,  that  throughout  almost  the 
whole  of  English  history,  only  the  very  earliest  periods  excepted,  coun- 
ties and  towns  have  been  the  principal  units  of  local  government ;  that 
the  parishes  into  which  the  counties  have  been  time  out  of  mind  divided, 
though  at  one  time  of  very  great  importance  as  administrative  centers, 
were  in  course  of  time  in  great  part  swallowed  up  by  feudal  jurisdictions, 
and  now  retain  only  a  certain  minor  part  in  the  function,  once  exclusively 
their  own,  of  caring  for  the  poor ;  and  that  this  ancient  framework  of 
counties,  towns,  and  parishes  has,  of  late  years,  been  extensively  overlaid 
and  in  large  part  obscured:  (a)  by  the  combination  (1834)  of  pari.shcs 
into  "Unions"  made  up  quite  irrespective  of  county  boundaries  and 
charged  not  only  with  the  immemorial  parish  duty  of  maintaining  the 


430 


READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


poor  but  often  with  sanitary  regulation  also  and  school  superintendence, 
and  generally  with  a  miscellany  of  other  functions  ;  {b)  by  the  creation  of 
new  districts  for  the  care  of  highways ;  {c)  by  new  varieties  of  town  and 
semi-town  government ;  and  {d)  by  the  subdivision  of  the  counties  (1889) 
into  new  administrative  "districts,"  charged  with  general  administrative 
functions.  The  only  distinction  persistent  enough  to  serve  as  a  basis  for 
any  classification  of  the  areas  and  functions  of  the  local  administration 
thus  constructed  is  the  distinction  between  Rural  Administration  and 
Urban  Administration. 

414.  Rural  local  government  in  the  United  States.  The  gen- 
eral nature  of  local  subdivision  in  the  United  States  is  well  stated 
in  the  following  :  ^ 

The  differences  in  local  institutions  throughout  the  LTnited  States 
have  been  so  often  emphasized  by  writers  on  American  government  that 
it  seems  well  at  the  outset  to  indicate  certain  fundamental  principles  com- 
mon to  them  all.  The  first  of  these  is  that  our  local  communities  enjoy 
large  powers  of  self-government  through  elective  officers,  and  in  the  exer- 
cise of  these  powers  are  only  slightly  subject  to  the  supervision  and  control 
of  the  state  administrative  officers.  In  the  second  place,  the  states, 
with  one  exception,  are  divided  into  counties,  and  counties  are  in  turn 
divided  into  towns,  townships,  or  districts  of  one  kind  or  another.  Every 
county,  and  generally  speaking  every  subdivision  of  a  county,  is  a  unit 
for  certain  financial,  judicial,  police,  and  local  improvement  purposes 
which  are  usually  carried  out  by  elective  officers  and  boards.  In  the 
third  place,  subject  to  the  few  general  provisions  in  the  commonwealth 
constitution,  the  county  and  its  subdivisions  are  under  the  absolute  con- 
trol of  the  state  legislature,  which  can  create  and  abolish  offices,  distrib- 
ute functions  among  the  various  authorities,  and  in  other  ways  regulate 
by  law  even  to  the  minutest  detail  the  conduct  of  local  government. 

The  divergences  that  occur  among  the  states  in  local  institutions  may 
be  ascribed  to  the  manner  in  which  local  functions  are  distributed  between 
the  authorities  of  the  county  and  of  the  town  or  township  and  to  the 
manner  in  which  the  inhabitants  of  the  county  subdivisions  participate  in 
the  conduct  of  their  local  matters.  On  this  basis  of  differentiation  our 
states  have  been  classified  into  the  three  famous  groups:  (i)  those  of 
the  New  England  type  in  which  the  town  and  its  open  meeting  over- 
shadow in  importance  the  county ;  (2)  those  of  the  South  in  which  the 
township  is  absent  or  appears  only  in  the  most  rudimentary  form ;  and 
(3)  those  of  the  middle  type,  like  New  York  and  Pennsylvania,  in  which 

^  Copyright,  1910,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT 


431 


the  town,  or  township,  as  it  is  sometimes  called,  has  a  large  and  impor- 
tant place,  but  is  subordinate  to  the  county  administration.  These  three 
types  of  local  government  .  .  .  have  been  carried  westward  roughly 
along  parallel  lines  and  have  formed,  with  varying  emphasis,  the  basis 
for  the  development  of  local  institutions  west  of  the  Alleghanies. 


IV.    Historical  Development  of  Cities 

415.  Definition  of  city.  Fairlic  stiites  as  follows  the  three 
essential  elements  of   a  city :  ^ 

There  are,  in  fact,  three  essential  elements  which  must  exist  to  form 
a  city,  and  all  of  these  must  be  represented  in  the  definition :  ( 1 )  the 
geographical  fact  of  a  definite  local  area  on  which  buildings  are  for  the 
most  part  compactly  erected ;  (2)  the  sociological  fact  of  a  large  com- 
munity of  people  densely  settled  on  the  given  area ;  and  (3)  the  political 
fact  of  an  organized  local  authority  or  authorities  controlling  the  public 
affairs  of  the  community.  Combining  these  elements,  a  city  may  be  de- 
fined as  "  A  populous  community,  inhabiting  a  definite,  compactly  built 
locality,  and  having  an  organized  public  authority." 

416.  Causes  of  cities.  The  reasons  for  the  recent  rapid  increase 
in  the  number  and  size  of  cities  follow  : 

The  only  conditions  where  these  permanent  congregations  of  people 
are  possible  are  those  which  both  permit  and  require  a  great  division  of 
labor.  No  city  can  exist  in  a  country  where  a  considerable  proportion  of 
the  population  cannot  live  without  direct  recourse  to  agriculture.  A  con- 
siderable urban  population  is  possible  only  in  two  cases :  first,  where  the 
cities  themselves  are  situated  in  a  country  of  great  fertility  upon  which 
they  may  rely;  or,  second,  where  the  means  of  transportation  are  so 
highly  developed  that  the  cities  may  obtain  with  reasonable  cheapness 
their  food  supply  from  a  distance.  ... 

Cities  are  then  possible  only  when  men  may  live  from  other  pursuits 
than  agriculture ;  only  when  from  the  agricultural  point  of  view  there  is 
a  large  surplus  population.  What  now  are  the  reasons  which  cause  this 
surplus  population  to  setrie  in  any  particular  spot  ?  .  .  .  They  are  :  first, 
commercial ;  second,  industrial ;  and  third,  political.  Facilities  for  trans- 
portation are  not  merely  some  of  the  most  important  causes  of  the  devel- 
opment of  cities  generally ;  they  are  as  well  the  causes  why  cities  grow 
1  Copyright,  1901,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


432 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


up  and  flourish  in  particular  places.  It  is  to  secure  such  facilities  that 
cities  are  founded  at  some  place  on  the  ocean,  or  other  great  body  of 
water,  where  there  is  a  favorable  situation  for  the  receipt  and  shipment 
of  merchandise.  The  mere  shipment  and  receipt  of  such  merchandise 
offer  employment  to  many  people.  But  further,  the  business  subsidiary 
to  commerce,  such  as  banking,  insurance,  etc.,  aids  in  attracting  to  such 
commercial  centers  those  who  are  looking  for  work. 

In  the  second  place,  the  use  of  machinery  has  been  and  now  is  of 
the  greatest  importance  in  attracting  an  urban  population.  For  this 
reason  all  places  which  are  favorably  situated  for  the  development 
of  the  power  necessary  to  drive  machinery  tend  to  become  centers 
of  population.  .  .  . 

Finally  it  must  be  admitted  that  cities  which  are  unfavorably  situated 
for  either  commerce  or  industry  still  have  been  founded  and  continue  to 
flourish.  At  the  time  of  their  origin  they  may  have  been  so  situated  as 
to  be  able  to  share  in  the  existing  commerce  and  industry.  Later  on  new 
commercial  and  industrial  conditions  may  have  sprung  up  to  which  they 
could  not  accommodate  themselves.  Yet  other  causes  may  have  enabled 
them  to  overcome  their  disadvantages.  This  is  particularly  true  of  po- 
litical centers  which  may  continue  to  exist  and  increase  in  population, 
although  situated  unfavorably  from  the  point  of  view  of  existing  indus- 
trial and  commercial  conditions. 

417.  Results  of  the  growth  of  cities.  Among  the  most  impor- 
tant consequences  of  the  recent  growth  of  cities  may  be  mentioned 
the  following : 

The  effects  of  this  great  concentration  of  population  are  numerous. 
Three  may  be  especially  mentioned.  First,  cities  are  naturally  the  centers 
of  active  intellectual  life.  It  is  in  them  that  the  newspapers  and  periodi- 
cals are  published,  and  their  inhabitants  are  generally  more  alive  to 
current  issues  than  the  people  in  the  country.  The  cities  consequently 
exercise  a  much  greater  influence  upon  the  policy  of  the  government 
than  the  country.  In  the  second  place,  the  crowding  of  people  into  cities 
has  raised  many  new  problems  ;  for  example,  protection  from  contagious 
diseases  and  from  the  horrors  of  overcrowding  in  habitations  unfit  for 
human  beings,  the  adequate  supply  of  pure  water,  of  gas  and  electricity, 
of  street-car  lines  and  telephones,  the  proper  paving,  lighting,  and  clean- 
ing of  the  streets,  and  the  disposal  of  garbage  and  sewage.  Thirdly,  the 
growth  of  the  cities,  and  the  problems  to  which  this  growth  has  given 
rise,  have  rendered  the  city  governments  in  many  ways  more  important 
to  the  individual  citizen  than  the  central  government. 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT  43:; 

418.  Political  consequences  of  city  growth.  Rowe  points  out 
the  changes  in  political  ideals  and  methods  due  to  the  predomi- 
nance of  city  life.^ 

With  increasing  density  of  population  new  standards  of  governmental 
action  are  forced  upon  the  community.  One  of  the  first  effects  is  to  make 
apparent  the  necessity  of  regulation  in  the  interest  of  the  public  health 
and  morals.  The  patent  facts  of  everyday  life  demonstrate  the  evils  (jf 
unrestrained  individual  liberty,  which  is  the  first  step  toward  a  broader 
interpretation  of  the  regulative  function  of  government.  The  closer 
interdependence  of  the  individuals  of  the  community,  the  fact  that  the 
activity  of  each  affects  the  welfare  of  the  whole  at  so  many  points,  must 
necessarily  influence  the  standards  of  individual  liberty.  This  is  the  first 
and  most  important  point  of  contact  between  the  political  ideas  and  the 
social  activity  of  the  community. 

The  next  step  in  the  development  of  a  new  concejJt  of  governmental 
action  begins  with  the  undermining  of  faith  in  the  effectiveness  of  free 
competition  as  a  guarantor  of  efficient  service  and  a  regulator  of  prog- 
ress. No  one  who  has  followed  the  trend  of  opinion  in  the  large  cities 
of  the  United  States  can  have  failed  to  observe  the  gradual  awakening 
to  the  limitations  of  free  competition.  The  facts  of  corporate  combina- 
tion and  consolidation,  particularly  in  such  quasi-public  services  as  the 
street  railway,  gas,  and  water  supply,  have  done  more  to  bring  about  a 
truer  appreciation  of  the  relation  of  the  community  to  industrial  action 
than  any  amount  of  discussion.  American  communities  at  first  dealt 
with  every  one  of  these  services  on  the  basis  of  free  competition.  Under 
this  plan,  short  periods  of  low  prices  and  indifferent  scr\Mce  soon  led  to 
combination  or  consolidation,  with  the  high  cost  incident  to  inflated  capi- 
talization. Lessons  such  as  these  have  profoundly  influenced  the  political 
thought  of  our  urban  communities.  There  is  no  longer  the  same  distrust 
of  all  positive  governmental  action  so  characteristic  of  the  early  decades 
of  the  last  century. 

A  further  step  in  the  development  of  political  thought  directl\-  trace- 
able to  the  influence  of  city  life  is  closely  connected  with  the  growing 
appreciation  of  the  nature  of  the  city  environment  upon  the  population. 
The  conditions  of  city  life  are  capable  of  indefinite  modification  through 
the  action  of  individuals  or  through  the  concerted  action  of  the  commu- 
nity. The  history  of  every  large  city  bears  testimony  to  the  possibilities 
of  radical  changes  in  environmental  conditions,  changes  which  have  pro- 
foundly affected  the  health,  morals,  and  welfare  of  the  community. 

1  Copyright,  1908,  by  D.  Applcton  and  Company. 


434 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


419.  The  spirit  of  modern  city  life.  The  modern  attitude 
toward  the  city  is  in  striking  contrast  to  that  of  the  ancient  or 
medieval  period. 

The  medieval  system  of  independent  town  units  was  succeeded  by 
a  period  of  political  development  in  which  the  city  was  given  a  position 
fundamentally  different  from  that  which  it  occupied  during  previous 
periods.  The  change  affected  not  merely  the  relation  between  city  and 
state,  but  also  profoundly  influenced  the  attitude  of  the  population 
toward  the  city  and  its  government.  .  .  . 

In  the  cities  of  the  ancient  and  medieval  world  the  individual  in  all 
his  personal  and  property  interests  was  subordinated  to  the  community. 
.  .  .  Every  relation  of  trade,  industry,  or  commerce  was  dependent  upon 
the  public  authority.  In  the  medieval  towns,  membership  in  the  political 
community  was  a  prerequisite  to  the  exercise  of  any  trade  or  calling.  In 
consequence  the  attention  and  interest  of  the  population  were  centered 
in  the  city. 

The  new  and  distinctly  modern  spirit  first  asserts  itself  in  an  intense 
individualism  which  completely  changes  the  concept  of  government.  .  .  . 
The  role  of  government,  which  in  the  medieval  cities  had  been  construed 
to  include  the  regulation  of  every  field  of  individual  activity,  receives  a 
new  and  distinctly  negative  interpretation.  Ideas  of  inherent  and  impre- 
scriptible individual  rights  obtain  general  acceptance,  while  government 
is  regarded  as  the  guarantor  and  protector  of  these  rights  rather  than 
as  a  positive  factor  in  industrial  activity.   .  .   . 

That  this  attitude  toward  government  has  strongly  influenced  the  civic 
life  of  our  cities  is  evident  to  every  observer  of  American  political  condi- 
tions. To  one  section  of  the  community  the  city  government  is  a  nec- 
essary evil  designed  to  avoid  the  greater  evil  which  would  result  from 
the  clash  of  individual  interests.  To  another  it  is  akin  to  a  great  business 
corporation,  justifying  the  use  of  the  ordinary  standards  of  commercial 
morality  in  obtaining  favors  and  privileges.  .  .  .  The  city's  interests  are 
rarely,  if  ever,  identified  with  those  of  the  public,  and  in  taking  advan- 
tage of  incompetent  or  corrupt  officials  there  is  no  thought  of  depriving 
the  public  of  rights  to  which  it  is  entitled.   .   .   . 

Another  important  influence  in  strengthening  this  negative  attitude 
toward  the  city  is  closely  connected  with  one  of  the  strongest  traits  of 
American  nadonal  character  —  the  high  development  of  the  domesdc 
virtues  and  the  resulting  intensity  of  home  life.  .  .  .  Administrative 
efficiency  has  been  attained  only  in  those  departments  —  such  as  the 
police  and  fire  services  —  which  direcdy  affect  the  safety  and  integrity 
of  the  home.     In  European  cities,  on  the  other  hand,  those  municipal 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT  435 

activities  which  contribute  most  to  the  inexclusive  and  social  pleasures 
are  more  highly  developed. 

V.  Municipal  Government 

420.  Character  of  urban  population.  Goodnow  draws  the  fol- 
lowing conclusions  from  an  analysis  of  city  populations  : 

First.  The  population  of  cities  is  actuated  by  commercial  and  indus- 
trial motives.  .  .  . 

Second.  This  population  is  perforce  heterogeneous  in  character,  and 
the  larger  the  city  the  greater  is  apt  to  be  the  heterogeneity.  .  .  . 

Third.  City  populations  have  as  compared  with  rural  populations  no 
historical  associations  with  the  cities  in  which  they  live.  Neighborhood 
feeling  is  not  liable  to  be  strong. 

Fourth.  Being  composed  in  large  measure  of  young  people  or  people 
of  middle  life,  city  populations  are  radical  rather  than  conservative  in 
their  tendencies;  they  are  impulsive  rather  than  reflective  and  are  con- 
siderably more  inclined  than  rural  populations  not  to  have  regard  for 
the  rights  of  private  property. 

Fifth.  City  populations  are  more  productive  than  rural  populations. 
They  can,  therefore,  endure  a  higher  rate  of  taxation.  With  the  greater 
productivity  they  also  contain  probably  a  smaller  proportion  of  the  de- 
pendent classes,  though  the  presence  in  cities  of  such  a  large  percentage 
of  widows  brings  it  about  that  there  will  be  a  large  dependent  class  due 
to  the  death  of  the  principal  breadwinner  of  the  family. 

^xth.  City  populations  contain  a  greater  proportion  of  criminals  than 
the  rural  districts,  but  there  are  reasons  for  believing  that  on  the  whole 
they  are  not  much  if  any  less  virtuous  than  rural  populations. 

Seventh.  City  populations  are  better  educated  than  rural  populations 
in  the  sense  that  a  greater  proportion  of  city  than  of  countr\'  people  can 
read  and  write  and  that  their,  distinctly  literary  educational  opportunities 
are  greater.  But  because  of  'their  industrial  character  they  are  probably 
less  capable  of  taking  broad  views  than  countrymen.  ... 

Eighth.  Property  is  much  more  unequally  distributed  in  the  cities 
than  in  the  rural  districts.  We  find  more  very  wealthy  and  more  very 
poor  than  in  the  country  districts. 

Ninth.  Family  life  is  different  in  the  cities  from  family  life  in  the 
rural  district.  In  large  cities  a  large  part  of  the  population  is  often 
crowded  together.  In  industrial  cities  where  a  large  proportion  of  mar- 
ried women  work  in  factories,  the  family  does  not  properly  discharge  its 
most  important  function,  viz.,  the  care  and  nurture  of  the  children,  and 
the  rate  of  infant  mortality  is  very  high. 


436  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

Tenth.  The  health  of  city  populations  is  on  the  whole  not  so  good  as 
is  that  of  rural  populations.  The  death  rate  is  almost  everywhere  higher 
in  urban  than  in  the  rural  districts,  although  the  cities  contain  more  than 
their  due  proportion  of  the  most  vigorous  part  of  the  population. 

421.  Democracy  and  city  life  in  America.  In  some  respects  city 
life  hinders,  in  other  respects  it  facilitates,  democratic  development.^ 

Two  or  three  things  seem  to  be  essential  to  the  success  of  democracy. 
In  the  first  place,  the  great  body  of  the  people  must  be  intelligent  and 
have  a  large  social  capacity,  which  means  that  they  must  be  able  to  see 
beyond  their  own  gardea  fences  and  be  able  to  cooperate  with  other  men 
of  considerably  different  habits  and  ideals.  Then  there  must  be  a  strong 
interest  in  local  institutions,  in  that  part  of  political  life  which  affects 
men  daily  in  and  near  their  homes.  And,  finally,  the  conditions  of  life 
must  be  such  that  men  can  give  a  considerable  amount  of  time  and 
thought  to  those  political  interests  in  regard  to  which  they  can  person- 
ally make  their  wills  felt.  .  .  . 

All  the  forces  here  described  as  affecting  the  conditions  of  life  in  a 
way  unfavorable  to  democracy  culminate  in  cities.  The  city  is,  indeed, 
the  visible  symbol  of  the  annihilation  of  distance,  and  the  multiplication 
of  interests. 

And  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  the  city  emphasizes  locality  and  gives 
opportunity  for  cooperation.  The  city  is  the  point  where  the  resistance 
of  space  to  men's  efforts  is  focused,  and,  consequently,  local  interests 
become  enormously  increased.  The  opportunities,  too,  for  formulating 
the  popular  will  are  greatly  enhanced  in  cities  by  proximity  of  residence. 
People  can  gather  in  mass  meetings  on  a  few  hours'  notice,  public  opinion 
can  find  immediate  expression  in  the  press,  the  citizen  can  bring  per- 
sonal pressure  to  bear  upon  the  official  without  delay.  The  danger  is 
that  democracy  will  be  paralyzed  by  its  opgortunities.  True  local  inter- 
ests, though  of  such  transcendent  importance  to  the  community,  tend 
to  go  by  default  so  far  as  the  individual  is  concerned.  The  home  and 
the  neighborhood,  the  natural  primary  units  of  local  organization,  are 
weakened,  and  in  many  cases  nearly  destroyed.  Home  life  is  little  more 
than  a  name  where  a  hundred  people,  often  of  different  nationalities, 
live  in  a  single  tenement  house ;  and  what  is  left  of  the  neighborhood 
where  there  is  a  density  of  five  hundred  to  the  acre  ?  Among  the  busi- 
ness and  professional  classes,  a  man's  friends  and  intimate  associates 
may  be  scattered  over  the  whole  city,  while  he  scarcely  knows  his  next- 
door  neighbor's  name.   It  is  among  working  people  and  the  poor  that 

1  Copyright,  1904,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT  437 

local  interests  retain  their  importance  to  the  individual,  and  partly  fur  this 
reason  democracy  appeals  most  directly  and  most  safely  to  the  masses. 

422.  The  position  of  the  modern  city.  The  position  of  the  city 
in  the  modern  stiite  may  be  described  as  follows  : 

The  development  of  the  past  three  or  four  centuries  has  brought  it 
about  that  almost  all  powers,  for  the  exercise  of  which  the  cities  have 
struggled  since  the  dawn  of  municipal  government  in  the  middle  ages, 
have  been  recognized  as  powers  of  state  rather  than  municipal  g(jvern- 
ment.  The  exercise  of  many  of  these  powers  has  been  assumed  by  the 
state  itself,  which  denies  to  the  city  any  participation  whatever  in  their 
exercise.  This  is  true  of  powers  relating  to  foreign  and  military  affairs  and 
of  most  powers  relating  to  judicial  affairs.  The  exercise  of  another  class 
of  powers,  including  within  them  some  judicial  powers  and  such  powers 
as  relate  to  the  preservation  of  the  peace,  the  public  health,  the  care  of 
the  poor  and  the  schools,  has  not,  however,  been  assumed  exclusively  by 
the  state.  The  state  on  the  contrary  permits  the  city  to  share  in  their 
exercise,  but  regards  the  city  as  not  acting  exclusively  or  mainly  in  its 
own  interest,  but  rather  as  an  agent  of  the  state  government. 

The  massing  of  population  in  cities  as  a  result  of  the  changes  in 
economic  and  social  conditions  which  began  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth 
century  have  made  it  necessary,  however,  to  regard  the  city  as  some- 
thing more  than  an  agent  of  the  state  government ;  and  the  legislation 
of  the  nineteenth  century  to  which  reference  has  been  made,  has  ever)-- 
where  granted  to  cities  large  powers  of  a  distinctly  local  significance. 
The  city  has,  as  a  result  of  this  legislation,  become  an  organization  for 
the  satisfaction  of  local  needs.  This  revival,  so  to  speak,  of  the  city, 
which  has  taken  place  during  the  nineteenth  century  has  been  due  thus, 
not  so  much  to  any  reversal  of  the  decision  as  to  the  position  of  the 
city  with  regard  to  the  powers  which  had  been  decided  to  be  powers  of 
state  government,  but  which  the  cities  had  claimed  the  right  to  exercise. 
as  to  the  belief  that  a  new  field  of  municipal  activity  had  been  opened 
which  the  city  must  occupy. 

423.  The  mayor  and  the  city  counciL  Dissatisfaction  in  the 
United  States  with  the  usual  working  of  city  executive  and  legis- 
lature demands  certain  fundamental  changes.^ 

If  we  wish  to  preserve  the  council,  we  must  be  prepared  to  make 
three  changes  :  First,  to  deprive  it  of  all  participation  in  the  appoint- 
ment of  executive  officials  ;  secondly,  to  transform  it  from  a  bicameral 

1  Copyright,  190S,  by  1).  Applcton  and  Company. 


438  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

organization  to  a  single  chamber,  and  thirdly,  to  reduce  its  membership. 
Unless  this  is  done,  it  is  safe  to  predict  that  we  shall  gradually  move 
toward  a  system  in  which  both  executive  and  legislative  powers  will  be 
vested  in  the  mayor  and  the  heads  of  executive  departments.  .  .  . 

The  traditional  fear  of  absolutism  need  not  deter  us  from  making  the 
mayor  the  real  executive  head  of  the  city  government.  Correctly  inter- 
preted, this  plan  offers  possibilities  of  popular  control  which  our  present 
system  lacks.  At  all  events,  it  is  well  for  us  to  understand  that  the  de- 
mand for  efficiency,  which  the  American  people  place  above  their  desire 
for  democratic  rule,  will  inevitably  lead  to  this  concentration  of  execu- 
tive power.  The  real  alternative  is,  therefore,  whether  this  concentration 
of  power  will  be  accompanied  by  the  destruction  of  the  city  council,  or 
whether  the  city  council  will  survive  as  an  organ  of  government  restricted 
to  purely  legislative  functions. 

424.  The  biirgermeister  in  Germany.  The  method  of  selection 
and  the  general  attributes  of  the  German  city  executive  are  in 
striking  contrast  to  the  corresponding  features  in  American  cities.^ 

In  this  respect  the  Prussian  Biirgermeister  may  be  clearly  differ- 
entiated from  the  administrative  heads  of  French,  English,  and  American 
cities.  In  all  these  places  the  mayor  is  almost  invariably  some  private 
citizen  who  leaves  his  ordinary  vocation  for  a  year  or  a  few  years,  and 
during  this  period  devotes  a  part  or  the  whole  of  his  time  to  the  service 
of  the  municipality,  expecting  not  to  make  a  life  work  of  local  administra- 
tion, but,  when  his  term  is  ended,  to  return  to  private  life  and  do  his 
private  business.  He  may  or  may  not  have  had  some  experience  in 
municipal  affairs.  .  .  .  The  Biirgermeister,  on  the  other  hand,  is  an  ex- 
pert, a  professional  administrator,  who  looks  upon  his  office  as  a  career, 
who  seeks  the  post  on  his  public  record,  and  who  expects  promotion 
upon  this  alone. 

The  Prussian  city  council  selects  the  Biirgermeister  in  very  much  the 
same  way  as  a  business  corporation  selects  its  general  manager  or  other 
executive  head.  It  casts  about  among  the  smaller  corporations  engaged 
in  the  same  sort  of  business,  and  proceeds  to  rob  one  of  these  of  its 
chief  official  by  offering  him  a  post  which  is  more  attractive.  The  smaller 
cities  sometimes  advertise  for  applicants,  but  the  larger  ones  usually  find 
a  field  of  choice  all  ready  for  them.  If  a  certain  city  like  Berlin  or  Frank- 
fort or  Breslau  desires  to  fill  its  chief  magisterial  post,  it  naturally  looks 
to  those  men  who  have  been  commanding  attention  by  their  success  as 
Biirgermeisters  or  paid  magistrates  in  cities  of  smaller  size.    It  examines 

1  Copyright,  1909,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


1 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT  430 

the  records  and  qualifications  of  such  officials,  and  soon  eliminates  all  but 
a  few  names,  the  choice  usually  lying  between  no  more  than  three  or 
four  candidates  by  the  time  the  question  comes  before  the  council. 

425.  The  mayor  in  England.  In  England  the  position  of  the 
mayor  is  largely  honorary,  his  governing  power  being  compar- 
atively small. 

The  selection  of  a  mayor  is  seldom  a  difficult  problem  in  English 
municipalities;  for  the  post  is  not,  as  it  is  in  the  cities  of  the  United 
States,  one  of  any  serious  administrative  importance.  Executive  ability 
and  experience  are  in  no  wise  essential  to  the  proper  performance  of 
mayoral  duties ;  for  these,  being  very  largely  of  a  social  nature,  make 
heavier  demands  upon  the  mayor's  purse  and  personality  than  upon  his 
skill  as  a  governing  authority.  He  must  entertain  distinguished  visitors 
to  the  borough,  must  assume  a  prominent  part  in  all  civic  ceremonies 
and  festivities,  and  must,  above  all  things,  be  a  leader  in  local  philan- 
thropic enterprises,  incidentally  contributing  with  generosity  to  their  ex- 
chequers. His  only  special  administrative  function  is  that  of  presiding  at 
meetings  of  the  council,  and  even  this  he  need  not  perform  if  it  be  not 
to  his  liking.  In  short,  to  the  end  that  he  may  fill  his  position  capably 
and  satisfactorily,  the  mayor  of  an  English  borough  must  ordinarily  be  a 
man  of  some  wealth,  preferably  with  leisure  and  social  attainments. 

Ordinarily  the  English  mayor  receives  no  stipend.  The  council  is  em- 
powered by  law  to  grant  him  from  the  borough  funds  "  such  remunera- 
tion as  it  may  think  reasonable  "  ;  but  many  boroughs  pay  nothing  at  all, 
and,  save  in  the  largest  boroughs,  those  which  grant  remuneration  rarely 
afford  anything  approaching  his  personal  outlay  in  the  performance  of 
his  civic  functions.  Tenure  of  the  office  even  for  a  single  year  thus  in- 
volves some  financial  sacrifice  ;  but  as  a  rule  the  post  is  satisfactorily 
filled  without  much  trouble,  for  wealth  and  social  aspirations  are  likely 
to  be  more  plentiful  than  administrative  energy  and  experience.  It  has 
sometimes  been  said  that  a  wealthy  peer  makes  an  ideal  English  mayor; 
at  any  rate,  if  any  such  happens  to  reside  within  the  fifteen-mile  limit  he 
is  pretty  certain  to  be  invited  to  the  post,  and,  if  necessary,  cajoled  or 
persuaded  into  accepting  it.  In  default  of  a  peer,  some  opulent  bour- 
geois who  is  willing  to  prove  his  liberality  may  have  an  opportunity  to 
do  so  as  the  chief  magistrate  of  the  borough. 

426.  Need  of  experts  in  city  administration.  One  of  the  crying 
needs  in  the  administration  of  American  cities  is  well  stated  in 
the  following : 


440  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

The  adoption  of  a  proper  city  plan,  well-constructed  sewers,  con- 
venient means  of  transportation,  an  ample  supply  of  potable  water, 
good  housing  conditions,  a  wise  administration  of  an  effective  health 
and  building  law,  and  well-managed  schools  which  teach  what  urban 
populations  really  need,  all  these  things  are  necessary  if  we  would  have 
a  healthy  and  happy  city  life.  All  these  things  require  the  organization 
of  a  permanent  and  intelligent  administrative  personnel,  who  shall  exer- 
cise the  wide  powers  necessarily  granted  to  them  in  the  interest  of  the 
city  people,  and  who  shall  rigorously  refrain  from  using  these  powers  in 
the  interest  of  particular  classes  or  of  favored  individuals. 

How  to  organize  such  a  force  is  one  of  the  great  problems  in  city 
government.  For  if  we  accord  an  administrative  force  a  position  which 
is  too  permanent  in  character,  i.e.,  too  much  relieved  from  popular  con- 
trol, it  is  apt  to  become  arbitrary  in  its  action  and  given  up  to  red  tape, 
and  may  easily  degenerate  into  an  engine  of  oppression,  which  is  used 
to  further  individual  interest.  If  we  may  judge  from  the  experience  of 
the  western  world  we  shall  probably  reach  the  conclusion  that  cities,  un- 
aided by  the  state,  find  it  exceedingly  difficult  to  establish  and  perma- 
nently retain  such  an  expert  administrative  force.  The  cities  of  Great 
Britain,  it  is  true,  have  succeeded  in  doing  so  without  such  aid,  but  in 
the  cities  of  Prussia,  where  the  administrative  force  is  probably  more 
efficient  than  elsewhere,  the  qualifications  of  city  officers  and  their 
methods  of  appointment  are  fixed  in  great  detail  by  state  law.  In  the 
United  States,  on  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  said  that  few  if  any  cities 
have,  even  with  the  aid  of  the  civil  service  laws  passed  by  the  state,  suc- 
ceeded in  rescuing  from  the  operation  of  the  spoils  system  by  which 
American  administrative  institutions  have  so  long  been  cursed,  any  but 
their  most  unimportant  employees.  Even  those  are  appointed  for  almost 
purely  political  reasons  in  most  cases  where  such  action  is  not  forbidden 
by  state  law. 

VI.    Municipal  Reform  in  the  United  States 

427.  Essential  defects  of  city  government  in  the  United  States. 

Some  of  the  defects  in  city  government  arise  from  the  nature  of 
city  populations  or  from  the  conditions  of  city  existence,  and  are 
practically  impossible  to  remedy.  Others  may  be  removed  by 
intelligent  public  spirit. 

Among  the  inherent  defects  is  the  rapid  change  in  the  make-up  of 
the  cities.  Where  population  is  increasing  with  leaps  and  bounds,  no 
city  government  makes  sufficient  provision  for  the  future.    For  instance. 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT  ^^i 

had  the  people  of  the  great  cities  fifty  years  ago  foreseen  the  present 
use  of  pipes,  they  would  have  prevented  the  intolerable  digging  up  of 
the  streets  by  providing  subways  into  which  new  pipes  could  be  intro- 
duced as  needed.  Hardly  a  city  in  the  country  makes  provision  in  ad- 
vance for  the  growth  of  the  school  population,  and  hence  the  pitiful 
spectacle  of  thousands  of  children  in  some  cities  turned  away  on  the 
day  of  the  opening  of  school,  because  there  is  not  room  for  them. 

The  shifting  of  population  to  and  fro,  the  rise  and  sometimes  the 
decay  of  suburbs,  necessarily  cause  wastefulness  in  the  expenditure  of 
public  money.  The  movement  of  people  from  country  to  town,  from 
town  to  city,  from  city  to  large  city,  from  large  city  to  another  large 
city,  prevents  the  formation  of  a  civic  pride,  which  must  be  the  basis  of 
good  government.  The  large  amount  of  city  business,  the  great  problem 
of  transporting  literally  hundreds  of  thousands  of  people  to  and  from 
their  avocations,  the  question  of  proper  terminal  facilities  for  steam- 
railroads,  —  these  are  difficulties  which  cannot  be  obviated.  Further- 
more, the  division  of  powers  between  the  nation,  state,  and  cities,  while 
salutary,  tends  to  sacrifice  the  interests  of  the  city  to  those  of  the  state. 

(i)  Of  the  non-inherent  difficulties,  first  in  importance  is  the  con- 
fusion of  the  fundamental  laws  for  the  cities.  Many  city  charters  are 
not  well  balanced  or  adjusted,  because  drafted  by  men  who  have  had 
small  experience  in  city  government.  .  .  . 

(2)  The  next  difficulty  is  the  constant  interference  of  the  states  in 
city  government,  not  only  by  the  altering  of  the  charters,  but  by  new 
legislation  throwing  additional  duties  upon  all  the  cities,  and  by  special 
acts  expressly  intended  to  aid  or  depress  the  political  leaders  of  the  city 
government  for  the  time  being.  Well-intentioned  legislation  produces 
confusion,  and  ill-intentioned  legislation  sometimes  paralyzes  a  good 
administration.  .  .  . 

(3)  Another  difficulty  is  adherence  to  bad  methods  of  government. 
In  most  cities,  both  the  mayor  and  the  council  have  too  little  jjower; 
they  are  both  too  much  tied  up  by  legislative  acts,  and  hence  both  work 
at  a  disadvantage ;  there  are  too  many  officers,  elective  and  appointive, 
and  their  terms  are  too  brief.  .  .  . 

(4)  Another  trouble  very  hard  to  prevent  is  occasional  corruption  in 
the  city  government.  This  may  also  occur  in  state  or  national  affairs, 
but  is  perhaps  more  common  in  cities  because  it  is  harder  to  fix  responsi- 
bility, and  because  there  is  so  much  detail  in  city  business  that  it  is  hard 
to  watch  it. 

428.  Needs  of  city  government  in  the  United  States.  The 
fundamental    changes    needed    in    the     political     position    and 


442  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

governmental    organization  of   cities    in   the    United   States   are 
indicated  in  the  following: 

The  attempt  has  also  been  made  to  show  that  the  remedy  for  the 
evils  of  American  city  life  is  to  be  found,  not  so  much  in  a  change  in 
the  governmental  organization  of  the  city  as  in  a  change  in  its  position 
in  both  the  legal  and  the  extra-legal  political  system.  What  is  needed  is 
a  recognition,  both  in  law  and  in  political  pracdce,  that  whatever  else  the 
city  may  be,  it  is  also  an  organization  for  the  satisfaction  of  local  needs, 
and  in  such  capacity  should  act  largely  free  from  state  control  —  both 
the  control  exercised  by  the  state  government,  and  the  control  exercised 
by  the  state  party.  .  .  . 

What  our  cities  need  then  are  large  powers  of  local  government,  the 
exercise  of  which,  where  necessary,  shall  be  subjected  to  an  administra- 
tive rather  than  a  legislative  control ;  separate  elections  for  municipal 
offices ;  fewer  elective  officers ;  a  more  compact  and  concentrated 
organization,  and  greater  freedom  than  at  present  is  usually  accorded 
to  municipal  citizens  to  nominate  candidates  for  municipal  offices.  If 
changes  in  these  directions  were  made,  it  would  certainly  be  easier  for 
the  urban  population  to  see  more  clearly  than  they  now  see  what  city 
government  means  to  them  and  to  free  themselves  in  their  municipal 
politics  from  the  domination  of  the  state  and  national  parties. 

429.  Merits  and  defects  of  the  commission  plan.  Professor 
Munro  makes  the  following  generalizations  based  upon  the  brief 
experience  of  American  cities  with  the  commission  plan  of  gov- 
ernment : 

The  cardinal  advantage  of  the  system  is  that  it  affords  definite  hope 
of  putting  an  end  to  the  intolerable  decentralization  of  responsibility 
which  now  characterizes  American  civic  administration.  By  concentrat- 
ing powers  and  focusing  public  attention  upon  a  narrow  area  it  will 
render  more  effective  the  scrutiny  which  the  voters  may  apply  to  the 
conduct  of  men  in  public  office.  ...  It  will  undoubtedly  facilitate  the 
election  of  a  higher  type  of  men,  for  American  municipal  experience  has 
plainly  demonstrated  that  small  bodies  with  large  powers  attract  a  better 
class  of  citizens  than  large  bodies  with  restricted  jurisdiction.  .  .  . 

Again,  it  is  well  known  that  municipal  corruption  nowadays  arises  as 
frequently  from  the  power  of  municipal  authorities  to  thwart  the  meritori- 
ous plans  of  public-service  corporations  as  from  their  power  to  forward 
reprehensible  projects.  ...  A  small  commission  would,  indeed,  simplify 
the  task  of  dealing  with  civic  franchises  on  a  business  basis.  .   .  . 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT 


443 


Still  again,  as  we  are  frequently  reminded,  the  work  of  administering 
the  affairs  of  a  city  is  in  every  essential  respect  akin  to  that  of  conduct- 
ing the  affairs  of  a  private  business  corporation.  Now,  the  salient  char- 
acteristic of  sound  corporate  management  is  the  centralization  of  p<jwers 
in  the  hands  of  a  small  board  of  directors.  .  .  . 

The  system  of  government  by  commission  will  serve  to  render  munic- 
ipal administration  more  prompt  and  more  effective  in  action.  ...  In 
local  administration  promptness  and  efficiency  are  imperative ;  and  it 
may  be  properly  urged  that,  in  order  to  secure  these  essential  qualities, 
a  municipality  is  justified  in  weakening  its  organs  of  deliberation  and  in 
assuming  a  reasonable  amount  of  risk  that  concentrated  power  will  be 
abused.  .  .  . 

The  most  common  objection  urged  in  the  public  press  and  by  the 
rank  and  file  of  municipal  politicians  is  that  the  plan  is  un-American 
and  undemocratic ;  that  it  involves  a  radical  departure  from  American 
traditions  of  local  self-government  and  proposes  a  step  in  the  direction 
of  municipal  dictatorships.  .  .  . 

Political  education,  it  has  been  observed,  consists  in  the  excrci.se  not 
only  of  the  right  to  choose  but  of  the  right  to  be  chosen  —  in  candidacy 
and  in  service  —  and  under  the  present  municipal  regime  such  education 
is  annually  afforded  to  a  large  number  of  citizens.  The  plan  of  govern- 
ment by  commission  proposes  greatly  to  reduce  this  number.  It  would 
cut  down  the  list  of  elective  officers  to  four  or  five,  all  other  posts  being 
filled  by  appointment  presumably  for  long  terms.  This  policy,  it  is  ob- 
jected, would  tend  to  vest  the  work  of  civic  administration  permanently 
in  the  hands  of  a  very  few  men,  and  might  very  well  assist  in  the  devel- 
opment, as  in  the  German  cities,  of  a  professional  city  bureaucracy.  .  .  . 

Again,  objection  is  made  that  the  system  will  ser\'e  to  strengthen 
rather  than  to  weaken  the  influence  of  the  regular  partisan  organizations 
in  civic  affairs.  The  concentration  of  power  and  patronage  in  the  hands 
of  a  few  commissioners  would,  it  is  claimed,  make  it  seem  im|x-rative  to 
the  party  leaders  that  the  commission  should  be  controlled ;  and  the 
party  energies,  now  spread  over  a  wider  area,  would  thus  be  concen- 
trated at  a  single  point.  .  .  . 

Without  a  change  of  personnel,  the  substitution  of  government  by 
commission  for  the  existing  system  would  assuredly  avail  but  little.  In- 
deed, a  corrupt  or  an  inefficient  commission  with  wide  powers  would  be 
much  more  capable  of  injuring  the  best  interests  of  a  city  than  an  equally 
corrupt  or  inefficient  set  of  administrative  organs  with  powers  and  pat- 
ronage decentralized  ;  for  the  very  complexity  and  cumbroiisness  of  the 
present  system  serves  in  some  degree  to  place  an  obstacle  in  tlu-  wav  of 
any  widespread  or  consistent  wrongdoing.  .  .  . 


444  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

Sponsors  of  the  commission  plan  have  sometimes  urged  that  its  adop- 
tion would  insure  administration  by  skilled  experts,  since  appointments 
made  by  a  small  body  would  probably  be  dictated  by  reasons  of  merit 
and  experience  alone.  It  may  be  noted,  however,  that  the  vesting  of  the 
right  of  appointment  in  the  hands  of  a  small  body,  or  even  in  the  hands 
of  a  single  officer,  would  not  necessarily  insure  this  result.  .  .  . 

An  important  feature  of  both  the  Galveston  and  Des  Moines  plans  of 
city  government  by  commission  is  that  the  "appropriating"  and  "spend- 
ing "  authorities  are  fused.  In  other  branches  of  American  government 
it  has  been  the  policy  to  keep  these  two  jurisdictions  distinct  and  in- 
dependent. .  .   . 

It  is  sometimes  urged  that  the  general  adoption  of  the  system  of  gov- 
ernment by  commission  would  encourage  state  intervention  in  municipal 
affairs.  ...  If  large  municipal  councils  are  eliminated  from  the  frame- 
work of  city  government  there  would  seem  to  be  a  danger  that  state 
legislatures  would  be  tempted  to  assume  for  themselves  some  of  the 
broader  legislative  functions  which  the  councils  have  been  accustomed 
to  exercise. 

VII.    Municipal  Activities 

430.  Municipal  functions.  The  complexity  of  municipal  functions 
and  their  dependence  upon  conditions  differing  from  city  to  city 
make  difficult  all  attempts  at  municipal  reform. 

Our  study  of  city  government  should  have  shown  us  that  the  functions 
which  must  be  discharged  within  a  city  are  dependent  upon  the  geograph- 
ical and  social  conditions  obtaining  therein  and  that  if  those  necessary 
for  the  highest  development  of  life  in  the  city  are  not  performed  satisfac- 
torily by  private  initiative  their  discharge  must  be  assumed  by  the  city 
itself.  No  general  rule  can,  therefore,  be  laid  down  as  to  the  sphere  of 
municipal  activity.  In  some  cities  geographical  conditions  may  make  it 
necessary  for  the  state  to  do  work  which  might  in  other  cities  be  left  to 
the  city  government.  In  some  cities  conditions  may  be  such  that  private 
initiadve  is  to  be  preferred  to  governmental  action  on  the  part  of  either 
the  state  or  the  city.  Again,  in  large  cities  the  problem  of  transportation 
assumes  an  importance  it  can  never  have  in  cities  of  smaller  size,  and  its 
solution  may  imperatively  demand  action  which  would  be  unnecessary 
elsewhere.  Finally,  the  industrial  character  of  a  city  may  make  it  neces- 
sary for  that  city  to  take  measures  for  the  protection  of  infant  life  which 
would  be  quite  unnecessary  and  even  inexpedient  in  cities  where  the 
prevailing  occupation  does  not  call  for  the  services  of  married  women. 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT 


445 


It  must  also  be  remembered  that  the  character  and  extent  of  the  sphere 
of  activity  of  a  given  city  will  have  a  most  important  effect  on  its  organi- 
zation which  must  expand  with  the  expansion  of  the  city's  sphere  of  activity 
and  will  undoubtedly  be  subject  in  other  respects  to  its  influence. 

In  other  words  there  is  only  in  a  ver)-  general  way  a  problem  of  city 
government.  For  each  city  is  peculiar  and  must  have  an  organization 
and  discharge  functions  suited  to  its  peculiar  position.  Its  ver)-  relations 
to  the  state  are  peculiar  and  its  position  in  the  state  system  must  depend 
on  the  capacity  it  has  for  self-government.  If  that  is  small  its  position 
will  rightly  be  one  of  considerable  dependence,  if  large,  it  may  be  in- 
trusted with  large  powers  of  municipal  home  rule.  What  that  capacity 
is,  is  for  the  state  and  not  for  the  city  concerned  to  decide.  A  city's 
relations  to  the  state,  however,  should  be  such  that  the  state  will  decide 
the  question  not  for  improper  reasons  but  in  view  of  the  most  nearly 
complete  satisfaction  of  the  best  interests  of  both  the  state  and  the  city. 

The  conditions  in  some  cities  are  such,  however,  as  to  cause  us  to  have 
grave  doubts  as  to  the  efficacy  of  any  change  in  the  legal  and  political 
relations  of  the  city.  We  can  hardly  help  believing  that  the  economic  and 
social  conditions  existing  in  many  of  the  cities  of  the  I'nited  Stales  are 
such  as  to  make  good  popular  city  government  extremely  difficult,  if  not 
impossible  of  attainment,  until  changes  in  those  conditions  have  been 
made.  On  that  account  attempts  to  reform  city  government  in  the 
United  States  should  not  be  confined  to  the  mere  structure  of  cit>'  gov- 
ernment nor  to  the  change  of  its  relation  to  the  state.  They  should  Ix* 
directed  as  well  to  the  improvement  of  the  economic  and  social  conditions 
of  the  urban  population. 

Almost  every  cause,  therefore,  which  is  dear  to  the  hearts  of  a  certain 
portion  of  the  people  has  an  important  influence  in  bettering  urban  life. 
Election  and  nomination  reform,  civil  service  reform,  financial  reform,  and 
administrative  reform  generally,  will,  if  the  concrete  measures  adoptc-d 
are  well  considered,  improve  the  political  conditions  of  American  cities. 
Charity  reform,  child  labor  and  labor  reform  generally,  and  reform  in 
housing  conditions,  the  work  of  neighborhood  settlements,  and  last  but 
not  least,  the  efforts  of  the  various  churches  and  ethical  societies,  will  do 
much  to  ameliorate  social  and  economic  conditions.  There  is  no  improve- 
ment in  political  conditions  which  does  not  aid  in  the  amelioration  of  .so- 
cial conditions  ;  for  improvement  in  social  conditions  is  in  many  instances 
possible  only  where  the  political  organization  is  reasonably  gcxxl.  On 
the  other  hand,  there  is  no  improvement  in  social  conditions  which  dtx-s 
not  make  easier  the  solution  of  the  political  problem  ;  for  the  difficulty 
of  the  political  problem  in  cities  is  in  large  measure  due  to  the  social 
and  economic  conditions  of  the  city  population. 


446  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

431.   Diflaculty  of  comparing  municipal  and  private  ownership. 

Partisans  of  both  public  and  private  ownership  of  pubhc  utihties 
frequently  overlook  the  varying  conditions  that  prevent  a  proper 
comparison  of  the  merits  of  the  two  systems. 

When  we  come  to  the  consideration  of  the  advantages  or  disadvantages 
of  municipal  as  compared  with  private  ownership  and  operation,  it  is 
difficult  if  not  impossible  to  give  a  general  answer,  which  is  based  on 
anything  more  than  a  priori  reasoning.  For  the  conditions  in  different 
countries  and  in  different  cities  in  the  same  country  are  so  different  that 
it  is  almost  impossible  to  compare  the  results  achieved.  In  countries 
which  have  made  no  provision  for  an  effective  supervision  of  private 
companies  we  may  find  private  ownership  and  operation  accompanied  in 
particular  instances  by  extremely  bad  conditions,  as  has  been  the  case 
with  the  street  railway  in  Chicago  and  New  York.  On  the  other  hand 
we  may  find  in  a  country  like  Greai  Britain,  which  for  a  long  time  has 
had  an  effective  system  of  control  over  private  corporations,  instances, 
as  in  the  Sheffield  Gas  Company  and  the  South  Metropolitan  Gas 
Company  of  London,  of  extremely  satisfactory  private  operation. 

Again,  we  may  find  in  a  country  like  the  United  States,  which  has 
not  developed  a  satisfactory  system  of  general  city  government,  examples 
of  extremely  ineflftcient  municipal  operation,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
Philadelphia  Gas  Works,  while  in  a  country  like  Great  Britain  which  has 
a  satisfactory  system  of  city  government,  we  may  find  examples  of  very 
satisfactory  municipal  operation,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Glasgow  tramways. 

Furthermore,  a  comparison  of  good  municipal  plants  on  the  one  hand 
and  good  private  plants  on  the  other,  which  are  found  in  the  same 
country,  is  difficult.  For  the  policy  of  different  cities  in  the  treatment 
of  either  private  or  municipal  plants  may  be  quite  different.  Thus  one 
city  may  endeavor  to  make  the  plant  a  source  of  profit  to  the  general 
treasury  of  the  city  corporation,  while  another  may  prefer  to  lower  the 
price  of  the  service  when  the  part  of  the  public  which  receives  the  service 
is  benefited.  .  .  . 

It  would  seem,  however,  that,  on  the  whole,  good  and  efficient  munici- 
pal ownership  and  operation  are  perfectly  possible  if  certain  general 
principles  of  administration  are  applied.  These  are  that  the  management 
of  the  utility,  particularly  in  its  financial  aspects,  is  kept  separate  after 
the  manner  of  the  Italian  law  from  that  of  any  other  utility  and  from 
the  general  financial  administration  of  the  city,  and  is  intrusted  to  expert 
officials  having  a  reasonably  permanent  tenure  and  large  powers  of  dis- 
cretion and  control  over  the  subordinate  force  of  employees,  who  are  not 
to  be  appointed  for  political  reasons. 


LOCAL  GOVERNMENT  .  .7 

On  the  other  hand,  it  would  seem  that  uncontrolled  private  operation 
is  not  much  to  be  preferred  to  indifferent  municipal  operation,  although 
it  must  be  recognized  that  too  stringent  control  of  private  operation  has 
frequently  led  in  the  past  to  municipal  operation  because  private  corpo- 
rations from  which  too  much  is  demanded  in  the  way  of  payments  to  the 
city  or  low  rates  for  service  rendered  cannot  give  satisfactory  service. 
This  is  particularly  true  where  the  franchise  period  is  a  short  one. 

If  the  question  were  merely  an  economic  one  it  would  doubtless  have 
to  be  answered  in  favor  of  private  operation.  But  the  question  is  not  an 
economic  but  a  social  one.  These  utilities  are  public  utilities,  the  opera- 
tion of  which  is  conducted  not  with  the  idea  of  producing  wealth  but 
of  rendering  social  service.  .   .  . 

Therefore,  the  admission  of  the  greater  efficiency  of  private  operation 
does  not  carry  with  it  the  conclusion  that  private  operation  is  always 
desirable.  "For  this  greater  efficiency  may  have  for  its  effect  the  increase 
of  private  wealth  rather  than  the  general  benefit  of  the  community. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  demands  on  the 
financial  resources  of  modem  cities  are  so  great  that  the  budget  of 
very  few  cities  can  stand  the  drain  of  many  inefficiently  and  wastefully 
managed  enterprises,  no  matter  what  may  be  the  advantages  in  the 
direction  of  greater  equality  of  distribution  or  greater  regard  for  general 
social  conditions  which  may  be  secured.  A  municipal  government  must 
be  a  very  good  one  and  private  companies  must  be  very  regardless  of 
general  social  needs  to  justify  a  city  in  undertaking  the  management  of 
many  of  these  public  utilities  at  the  same  time. 


CHAPTER  XXIII 

COLONIAL  GOVERNMENT 

I.    Importance  of  Colonial  Development 

432.  Importance  of  colonial  dependencies.  The  following  brief 
extract  suggests  the  extent  in  area  and  the  population  of  colonies, 
and  therefore  the  present  interest  in  colonial  affairs :  ^ 

Taking  the  word  colony  in  its  widest  sense  to  include  all  kinds  of 
dependencies,  we  are  met  by  the  fact  that  the  colonies  of  the  world 
occupy  two  fifths  of  the  land  surface  of  the  globe,  and  contain  a  popu- 
lation of  half  a  billion  people.  .  .  .  The  political  status  of  the  commu- 
nities thus  controlled  presents  the  greatest  diversity.  In  the  strict  theory 
of  the  law  each  of  them  is  under  the  absolute  dominion  of  the  sovereign 
state  to  which  it  "  belongs."  In  practice  they  vary,  from  the  virtual 
independence  enjoyed  by  Canada  and  Australia  to  the  total  dependence 
of  Gibraltar  or  Madagascar.  The  vast  extent  and  the  great  natural 
resources  of  the  modern  colonial  area  indicate  its  importance  in  the 
future  history  of  the  world.  The  realization  of  this  by  the  great  powers 
has  led,  during  the  past  twenty-five  years,  to  a  renewed  colonial  expansion, 
in  which  practically  all  the  "  unclaimed  "  territory  of  the  world  has  been 
partitioned  among  the  leading  states.  The  subject  of  colonial  adminis- 
tration, both  political  and  economic,  has  taken  on,  in  consequence,  an 
increased  interest,  and  attention  is  more  and  more  directed  to  the  study 
of  the  systematic  management  of  dependencies.  The  recent  expansion 
of  the  United  States  resulting  from  the  war  with  Spain  has  rendered 
this  portion  of  the  study  of  government  one  of  especial  consequence  to 
Americans. 

433.  Area  and  population  of  modern  colonies.  The  following 
table  may  serve  as  the  basis  for  a  comparative  study  of  the  area 
and  population  of  existing  dependencies  and  their  relative  impor- 
tance when  compared  with  the  homeland  :  ^ 

^  By  permission  of  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 
2  Copyright,  1900,  by  Henry  C.  Morris. 
448 


I 


COLONIAL  GOVERNMENT 


449 


No.  OF 
Colonies 

Area  (Square  Miles) 

Population 

Mother 
Country 

Colonies 

Mother 
Country 

Colonies 

United  Kingdom 
France     .     .     . 
Germany      .     . 
Netherlands 
Portugal  .     .     . 
Spain  .... 

50 

33 

13 

3 

9 

3 

2 

3 
3 
4 

5 
6 

120,979 
204,092 
208,830 
12,648 
36,038 
197,670 
110,646 
241,032 

15.289 
8,660,395 
1,111,741 
1,336,841 
3.557.000 

11,605,238 

3.740,756 

1,027,120 

782,862 

801,100 

243,877 

188,500 

23.570 

86,634 

255.550 

465,000 

2,881,560 

172,091 

40,559.954 

38,517.975 

52,279,901 

5.074,632 

5.049.729 
17,565,632 
31,856,675 
41,244,81 1 

2,185.335 
128,932,173 

23,834,500 
386,000.000 

77,000,000 

345,222,339 
56.401,860 
14,687,000 

35."5.7ii 

9,148,707 

136,000 

850,000 

1,568,092 

114,229 

15,684,000 

14.956,236 

16,680,000 

10,544.617 

Italy    .... 

Austria- Hungary 
Denmark      .-    . 
Russia      .     .     . 
Turkey    .     .     . 
China  .... 
United  States  . 

Total     .     . 

136 

15,813,201 

22,273,858 

850,103,317 

521,108,791 

434.  Importance  of  colonization.  The  part  played  by  colonization 
in  the  general  progress  of  civilization  is  suggested  in  the  following: 

If  elsewhere  it  may  have  seemed  that  colonization  is  sometimes 
regarded  as  a  permanent  condition  which  will  continue  in  the  coming 
ages,  it  is  simply  because  it  is  deemed  one  of  those  inherent  relation- 
ships arising  from  differences  among  individuals  which  must  endure 
until  the  happy  millennium  of  absolute  equality  in  capacity  and  intelli- 
gence shall  have  dawned.  Although  in  the  abstract  this  connection  may 
still  long  persist,  some  questions  must  ever  be  open.  Whether  any  one 
people  may  be  fitted  for  colonizers,  or  if  a  certain  region  be  jjroperly  the 
object  of  their  efforts,  as  well  as  whether  a  country  has  need  or  will  find 
profit  in  colonies,  and  if  it  can  confer  benefits  of  like  proportion  upon 
its  wards,  must  always  remain  within  the  scope  of  legitimate  discussion. 
Such  problems  must  sooner  or  later  be  presented  to  every  progressive 
nation  for  due  consideration  and  solution.  .  .  . 

Historically,  colonization  is  a  great  theme ;  for  'from  the  most  remote 
ages  colonial  enterprise  has  been  potent  in  both  the  moral  and  the  in- 
tellectual advancement  of  the  world.  If  at  the  time  the  results  attained 
have  been  barren  or  mischievous,  the  correction  of  their  evils  has  inevi- 
tably followed.  If  one  promoter  has  failed,  his  work  has  been  under- 
taken and  the  better  consummated  by  another  more  fortunate.  One  of 
the  most  pronounced  features  connected  with  all  systems  has  been  the 


450  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

rise  of  liberty.  Even  under  the  goad  of  tyranny  and  oppression  the 
aspiration  for  freedom  has  been  cherished,  until  ultimately  the  distaste- 
ful bonds  have  been  broken ;  indeed,  the  period  of  existence  as  a  colony 
has  generally  been  shortened  by  arbitrary  repression  on  the  part  of  the 
parent  state.  .  .  . 

If  the  facts  of  history  be  well  understood,  and  the  principles  of  colonial 
policy  be  accurately  appreciated  and  carefully  observed  by  the  statesmen 
of  the  future,  the  stronger,  better,  and  more  enlightened  doctrines  to  be 
developed  by  them  must  inevitably  inure  to  the  truer  welfare  of  the 
colony  not  less  than  to  the  more  substantial  advantage  of  the  nation; 
in  other  words,  this  activity  —  wherever  it  exists  and  under  whatever 
name  or  disguise  —  will  then  accrue  to  the  happiness  of  humanity.  For 
colonization  in  reality  is  only  the  expression  of  civilization. 

435.  Consequences  of  national  imperialism.  Reinsch  states  as 
follows  some  of  the  results  of  the  recent  colonial  expansion  of 
national  states  :  ^ 

The  phantom  of  world  empire  is  again  beginning  to  fill  men's  minds 
with  vague  fears  and  imaginings,  and  is  everywhere  a  most  potent 
agency  for  the  creation  of  international  animosities.  The  continental 
nations  ascribe  to  Great  Britain  the  desire  to  Anglicize  the  world,  while 
Russia  is  by  her  rivals  looked  upon  as  the  relentless  plotter  for  imperial 
power  over  all.  .  .  .  The  existence,  side  by  side,  of  a  group  of  virile 
and  powerful  nations  happily  renders  impossible,  for  the  present  at  least, 
the  consummation  of  such  schemes  of  despotic  imperialism  with  all  the 
dead  monotony  and  uniform  decadence  which  it  would  entail.  Still,  if 
every  act  of  a  foreign  nation,  by  which  it  desires  reasonably  to  strengthen 
its  vitality  and  to  extend  its  sphere  of  usefulness,  is  to  be  interpreted  as 
a  deliberate  attack  on  the  liberty  and  civilization  of  other  nations,  far 
too  much  mutual  suspicion  and  acrimony  will  be  engendered  in  interna- 
tional life.  This  idea  of  world  empire,  therefore,  though  still  a  mere 
phantom,  has  nevertheless  to  be  considered,  if  only  for  the  purpose  of 
showing  the  absurdity  of  the  thought  of  its  realization  at  the  present  time. 

Should  the  unreasonable  international  competition  which  is  favored 

by  many  extremists  carry  the  day,  it  would  ultimately  lead  to  a  world 

conflict.    To  counteract  this  danger  we  must  constantly  emphasize  the 

thought  that  there  is  sufficient  work  for  all  nations  in  developing  and 

civilizing  primitive  regions.    Each  one  of  the  leading  nationalities  can 

fully  develop  its  own  character  and  impress  its  best  elements  on  the 

civilization  of  the  world,  without  desiring  the  downfall  and  ruin  of  other 

powers. 

1  Copyright,  1900,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


J\ 


COLONIAL  GOVERNMENT  451 

436.  Influence  of  foreign  interests  on  home  affairs.  The  danger 
of  withdrawing  public  attention  from  home  affairs,  with  resultant 
internal  decay,  is  a  phase  of  the  colonial  problem  that  needs 
consideration. 

It  is  to  be  feared  that  the  present  tendency  of  popular  interest  to 
become  concentrated  on  imperial  questions  and  affairs  will  still  further 
weaken  the  public  interest  in  questions  of  home  politics,  which  arc  them- 
selves of  such  a  nature  as  to  be  little  attractive  to  the  general  public,  no 
matter  how  important  they  may  be.  This  danger  of  absorbing  political 
energies  in  outside  matters  to  the  damage  of  domestic  concerns  should  at 
least  be  noticed  and  guarded  against.  A  nation  that  is  rapidly  expanding 
and  is  directing  its  energies  to  territorial  acquisitions  beyond  its  borders, 
is  quite  likely  to  suffer  in  its  social  and  political  well-being  at  home.  We 
need  but  advert  to  the  example  of  Rome,  where,  with  the  successive 
stages  of  imperial  extension,  there  was  a  growth  of  social  antipathies 
and  general  disintegration  ;  a  concentration  of  wealth  with  a  correspond- 
ing increase  in  the  city  proletariat.  Similarly,  the  powerful  and  brilliant 
monarchy  of  Spain  was  ultimately  corrupted  and  ruined  by  territorial 
conquests  which  were  used  only  to  draw  sustenance  for  the  ever- 
increasing  luxuries  of  the  home  country. 

437.  Colonies  and  the  position  of  the  United  States.  In  a  paper 
delivered  before  the  American  Political  Science  Association,  the 
following  were  suggested  as  some  of  the  effects  of  outlying  de- 
pendencies upon  the  people  of  the  United  States  : 

The  United  States  has  advanced  with  giant  strides,  for  it  the  era  of 
isolation  is  closed ;  its  people  have  begun  to  take  a  lively  part  in  the 
wider  interests  of  humanity ;  its  opinion  on  a  vast  variety  of  subjects 
has  been  expressed,  welcomed  and  respected  by  the  great  powers  of 
which  it  has  suddenly  become  one.  With  the  acquisition  of  dependencies 
the  nation  has  not  only  been  brought  face  to  face  with  problems  purely 
incidental  to  them,  but  it  has  likewise  learned  that  the  assumption  of 
these  obligations  involves,  as  a  necessary  corollary,  manifold  duties  toward 
other  states.  While  its  fleets  operate  on  the  farther  waters  of  the  U'estern 
Sea,  its  statesmen  and  diplomats  do  not  forget  to  confer  and  debate  with 
their  contemporaries  to  the  East  of  the  Atlantic.  And  here  emphasis 
may  well  be  laid  upon  the  transition  of  which  we  have  lately  been  wit- 
nesses; the  step  which,  coincident  with  the  opening  of  the  twentieth 
century,  will  probably  mark  the  advent  of  a  new  age.  As  the  medieval 
era  was  finally  closed  with  the  frequent  navigation  of  the  AUanUc  by 


452  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

Europeans,  so  another  epoch  terminated  when  the  United  States  and 
Japan  began  to  compete  for  the  mastery  of  the  Pacific.  The  scepter  of 
power  then  passed  from  the  shores  of  the  Mediterranean  ;  so  now  the 
Eastern  fringe  of  the  Atlantic  is  apparently  destined  soon  to  lose  its 
supremacy;  for  the  United  States  at  least  the  outlook  is  toward  the 
Occident.  If  in  council  the  nations  of  Europe  still  rule,  the  field  of 
action  lies  in  Asia;  the  East  has  become  the  West. 

One  of  the  most  important  doctrines  of  American  policy,  it  is  felt 
by  many,  is  jeopardized  by  the  expansion  of  American  interests.  The 
Monroe  Doctrine  as  well  as  the  protective  tariff,  our  distinguished  fellow- 
citizen  Professor  John  W.  Burgess  considers  doomed  to  annihilation.  In 
his  address  at  the  University  of  Berlin  he  said : 

"  There  are,  for  instance,  two  tenets  which  have  almost  come  to  be 
looked  upon  as  sacred  as  articles  of  faith  in  American  politics,  the  aban- 
donment of  which  no  outside  power  could  even  dare  to  hint  at  without 
danger  of  arousing  the  enmity  of  the  Union.  I  refer  to  the  protective 
tariff  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

"  Our  politicians  seem  not  to  have  the  slightest  appreciation  of  the 
fact  that  both  these  political  tenets  have  almost  got  to  be  antiquated, 
that  the  political,  geographical,  and  constitutional  changes  among  the 
powers  of  Europe,  as  well  as  the  assumption  by  the  United  States  of  its 
place  as  a  world  power,  have  rendered  both  almost  meaningless." 


II.    Historical  Development  of  Colonies 

438.  Essential  conditions  for  colonization.  Successful  coloniza- 
tion is  possible  only  if  certain  requirements  are  more  or  less  com- 
pletely fulfilled.! 

To  render  any  effort  or  system  in  colonization  successful,  certain  well- 
defined  conditions  must  exist,  not  only  in  the  land  to  be  colonized,  but 
likewise  in  the  parent  state.  ...  In  the  first  instance,  the  connection 
implies  power  on  the  one  side  and  weakness  on  the  other ;  it  necessarily 
involves  superiority  and  inferiority.  This  principle  not  only  applies  to 
the  form  of  government  and  the  code  of  civil  conduct,  but  also  equally 
as  well  to  individuals.  The  colonizing  nation  must  be  strong,  possess  a 
well-developed  social  organism,  and  be  inhabited  by  men  of  intellect  and 
education.  The  region  to  be  brought  under  control  must,  on  the  con- 
trary, be  without  a  recognized  method  of  rule,  or  with  an  administration 
very  imperfectly  constituted ;  its  society  must  be  more  or  less  crude  and 

1  Copyright,  1900,  by  Henry  C.  Morris. 


COLONIAL  GOVERNMENT  ^^-y 

uncultured,  while  its  people  must,  as  a  race,  be  untrained  in  the  higher 
type  of  civilization  and  inexperienced  in  manufactures,  commerce,  and 
statecraft.  Just  as  soon  as  the  colonists  approach  a  degree  of  culture 
similar  to  that  of  the  mother  country,  the  association  between  the  two 
becomes  irksome  and  difficult  to  sustain,  unless,  indeed,  the  latter  prac- 
tically renounces  all  participation  and  intervention  in  colonial  affairs. 

While  power,  then,  is  a  prime  necessity  in  the  parent  state,  not  the 
less  is  density  of  population.  There  must  be  excessive  competition  in 
some  lines  of  occupation  and  trade ;  a  surplus  of  labor  and  a  want  of 
work ;  hence  a  certain  degree  of  discontent,  a  desire  for  new  fields  of 
exertion,  a  feeling  that  there  is  not  any  further  chance  at  home ;  the 
belief  must  prevail  that  the  avenues  of  advancement  are  there  closed 
before  many  individuals  will  be  found  ready  to  go  to  the  ends  of  the 
earth  to  gain  their  livelihood.  .  .   . 

The  essential  of  power  on  the  part  of  the  mother  country  likewise 
implies  the  element  of  wealth.  That  a  poor  nation  cannot  afford  the  lux- 
ury of  colonies  is  almost  an  economic  maxim.  Vast  expense  is  requi.site 
for  the  maintenance  of  an  army  and  navy,  and  without  adequate  military 
and  sea  forces  any  possessions  would  be  of  brief  duration.  Money  is 
also  necessary  to  the  utilization  of  colonial  resources ;  to  the  clearance 
of  forests,  to  the  tillage  of  fields,  to  the  operation  of  mines,  to  the  im- 
provement of  harbors,  rivers,  and  watercourses,  to  the  construction  of 
railways,  to  the  creation  of  manufactures,  to  the  marketing  of  products, 
to  the  proper  inauguration  of  government,  to  the  education  of  the  peo- 
ple, and  to  the  development  of  all  the  varied  material  and  intellectual 
forces  within  the  colony.  Not  riches  alone  suffice  to  support  a  colonial 
policy ;  something  more  is  demanded,  there  must  be  an  excess  of  capi- 
tal. Money  must  be  plentiful  and  cheap,  investments  difficult,  interest 
low ;  all  or  many  of  the  conditions  must  exist  which  would  cause  finan- 
ciers to  welcome  with  pleasure  new  opportunities  for  ample  returns. 
The  stress  of  affairs  should  be  even  more  pressing;  for  colonial  risks 
involve  exceptional  danger,  and  even  the  higher  rates  of  profit  always 
prevailing  will  not  attract  capitalists  unless  the  home  market  be  such  as 
to  preclude  safe,  steady,  and  at  least  slightly  remunerative  transactions ; 
only  then  can  the  colonies  secure  the  funds  necessary  to  their  progress. 

The  situation  of  trade  must  also  be  similar.  Warehouses  must  be 
overstocked  ;  there  must  be  overproduction ;  the  demands  of  domestic 
consumption  and  of  buyers  in  independent  foreign  lands  must  be  less 
than  the  supplies  of  national  industry.  Manufacturers  and  merchants 
must  feel  the  need  of  new  openings  for  their  goods  and  wares,  while 
they  must  find  in  the  colonies  an  outlet  for  them.  Karming,  on  the  other 
hand,  in  the  dominant  state  should  be  insufficiently  developed  to  satisfy 


454  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

the  daily  wants  of  its  people.  Colonists  are  naturally  tillers  of  the  soil, 
and  an  agricultural  community  cannot,  as  a  rule,  guarantee  them  the 
necessary  sales.  .  .  . 

Having  thus  discussed  the  material  requirements  essential  for  a  country 
engaged  in  colonial  enterprises,  it  is  now  proper  briefly  to  consider  two 
other  necessary  attributes.  A  race  without  the  military  and  naval  spirit 
is  ill  fitted  for  these  tasks.  The  possession  of  colonies  involves  the  con- 
trol and  protection  of  distant  lands  ;  it  implies  the  maintenance  of  order 
within  their  boundaries,  as  well  as  the  subjugation  of  the  native,  bar- 
barous, or  semi-civilized  tribes ;  it  means  the  management  of  many  half- 
explored  regions ;  and,  above  all,  it  requires  their  defense  against  the 
world.    Where  a  people  would  not  meet  one  enemy  on  its  own  borders 

or  shores,  it  will  encounter  many  foes  in  the  vicinity  of  its  dependencies 

The  inhabitants  of  the  mother  country  must  therefore  always  be  ready, 
at  command,  to  render  service  in  behalf  of  her  wards,  or,  as  frequently 
happens,  to  protect  their  own  land  against  the  foreign  aggressor  to  whom 
some  territorial  dispute  offers  the  desired  pretext.  On  the  other  hand, 
well-situated  possessions  may  thwart  blows  aimed  at  the  metropolis. 
Witness  the  Greek  colonies,  which  for  centuries  served  as  effective  bar- 
riers to  the  attempted  invasions  of  the  Asiatic  hordes  directed  against 
their  central  governments.  With  the  more  complex  interdependence  of 
races  the  probability  of  discord,  by  reason  of  distant  dominions,  has  in 
modern  ages  greatly  increased.  The  military  and  seafaring  disposition 
is  therefore  more  and  more  essential.  Such  are  briefly  the  requisites 
indispensable  to  any  nation  to  enable  it  successfully  to  pursue  a 
colonial  policy. 

439.  Phcenician  colonization.  The  earliest  colonization  of  im- 
portance was  that  of  the  Phoenician  merchants. 

The  Phoenician  establishments  throughout  the  Mediterranean  were 
not  only  important  as  commercial  stations,  but  even  the  more  as  out- 
posts of  Eastern  civilization,  diffusing  among  the  aborigines  of  the  West 
the  culture  and  education  of  the  most  enlightened  nations  of  that  age ; 
while  their  own  knowledge  of  the  world  and  conception  of  the  universe 
were  in  turn  vastly  developed.  As  the  first  colonizing  people,  the  Phoeni- 
cians conferred  unreckoned  and  incalculable  benefits  upon  future  gener- 
ations. In  extending  their  commerce  to  the  uttermost  ends  of  the  earth, 
they  unconsciously  bore  with  their  ships  a  cargo  immeasurably  more 
precious  than  that  of  merchandise  and  silver.  They  transported  the 
elementary  rudiments  of  learning  to  the  untutored  tribes  of  the  West, 
and  thence  they  received  not  less  valuable  information  of  the  breadth 
of  the  seas  and  of  the  uncounted  millions  of  mankind  who  were  not 


COLONIAL  GOVERNMENT  ,-- 

bounded  or  confined  by  any  false  or  imaginary  circle  of  limitation 
between  the  gods  and  men.  .  .  . 

The  greatest  bequest  of  the  Phoenicians  to  posterity  was  their  broad 
diffusion  of  the  elements  of  civilization.    Their  method  was  not  the  less 

remarkable.  They  stand  the  first  —  in  antiquity  perhaps  the  only  race 

who  by  peaceful  means  attained  world-wide  supremacy  ;  for,  not  only  by 
sea,  but  likewise  on  land,  they  were  the  acknowledged  sovereign  people 
of  their  times.  Even  to-day  in  daily  life,  their  activity,  their  skill,  their 
inventive  genius,  and  their  commercial  instinct  are  memorable ;  and  not 
the  least  of  the  lessons  which  they  taught  is  the  theory  of  colonization. 

440.  Bonds  uniting  Greece  and  her  colonies.  While  Greek 
colonies  became  in  many  respects  practically  independent  political 
units,  numerous  ties  united  them  to  the  homeland. 

The  principal  bond  between  the  mother  state  and  the  colonies  was 
perhaps  religion.  The  people  literally  carried  their  worship  with  them ; 
for,  before  departure,  they  took  a  light  from  the  sacred  fire  of  the  tute- 
lary deity,  and  this  they  transported  to  ignite  the  flame  in  some  other 
remote  temple  to  be  erected  by  their  hands 

The  public  games  likewise  aroused  a  strong  feeling  of  union.  Not 
only  did  neighboring  communities  there  contend  with  each  other,  but 
competitors  for  prizes  came  from  afar.  During  their  continuance,  war 
was  suspended  and  enemies  at  arms  met  as  rivals  in  athletic  sports.  .  .  . 

The  Greeks,  wherever  wandering,  preserved  their  own  language  and 
laws.  .  .  .  The  medium  of  common  speech  afforded  decided  advan- 
tages to  the  widely  scattered  colonists  ;  it  enabled  them  to  read  the  same 
literature  and  to  study  the  same  philosophy ;  the  great  number  of  re- 
nowned men,  born,  educated,  and  residing  in  the  various  dependencies, 
who  became  distinguished  in  letters,  morals,  history,  science,  and  art, 
bears  witness  to  this  community  of  thought. 

The  individual  Greek  cities  enjoyed  absolute  political  freedom  with 
complete  control  over  their  local  and  foreign  affairs.  Even  when  enter- 
ing an  alliance  created  among  themselves  in  certain  localities,  they  never 
yielded  the  doctrine  of  home  rule,  and  were  loath  to  surrender  to  any 
central  executive  the  direction  of  their  exterior  policy.  .  .  . 

The  leagues  were  outgrowths  of  necessity  ;  dread  of  conquest  was  the 
motive  for  their  foundation.  Wherever  the  federation  was  the  strongest, 
the  fear  of  invasion  was  the  greatest.  .  .  . 

Separated  from  the  fatherland  by  vast  distances  and  dangerous  seas, 
the  Greek  colonists  were  cast  upon  their  own  resources.  Their  innate 
sense  of  self-respect  and  resolute  will  incited  them  to  the  fullest  degree 
of  their  capacity  and  strength. 


456  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

441.  Colonies  in  the  Middle  Ages.  The  characteristic  features  of 
medieval  colonization  follow  : 

The  colonization  of  this  epoch,  it  should  be  at  once  stated,  is  in  its 
main  features  essentially  different  from  any  other.  In  the  first  instance, 
municipalities  originally  without  tributary  territories  were  its  promoters ; 
trade  was  its  sole  object ;  the  wars  waged  and  the  conquests  effected 
were  believed  to  be  its  necessary  accompaniment;  they  were  simply 
auxiliary.  The  emigrants,  leaving  the  metropolis,  were  absolutely  limited 
to  the  number  required  to  conduct  the  business  in  the  locality  whither 
they  were  bound ;  the  establishments  created  were  thus,  in  the  majority 
of  cases,  scattered  outposts,  and  exclusively  consisted  of  merchants  resid- 
ing in  a  distant  town.  The  political  or  social  influence  exerted  by  the 
colonists  in  the  region  of  their  abode  was  minimum  and  temporary. 
The  existence  of  these  dependencies  was  entirely  for  the  advantage  of 
the  parent  state,  which,  while  compelled  by  events  to  defend  them  inces- 
santly against  inveterate  foes,  expected  to  draw  from  them  a  profit  far 
greater  than  would  be  merely  commensurate  with  the  cost  of  their 
maintenance. 

442.  Periods  of  Spanish  colonization.  The  importance  of  Spanish 
colonization  and  the  main  periods  into  which  her  colonial  activity 
may  be  divided  are  indicated  in  the  following : 

The  history  of  Spanish  colonization  is  memorable  by  reason  of  repre- 
senting one  of  the  two  leading  types  of  colonial  enterprise.  Spain  and 
England  exemplify  in  this  field  distinct  methods  of  thought  and  action. 
Since  the  rise  of  Spanish  dominion  on  the  western  hemisphere  one  or 
the  other  of  these  powers  has  controlled  the  greater  number  of  depend- 
encies. While  in  truth  Holland  and  France  have,  by  their  respective 
policies,  exercised  potent  influences,  still,  for  design  and  execution, 
Spain,  first  in  time,  and  subsequently  England  stand  unrivaled.   .   .   . 

The  chronicles  of  Spanish  colonization  may  well  be  divided  into  four 
sections;  the  epoch  of  discovery  from  1492  to  1542  ;  the  era  of  mo- 
nopoly from  1542  to  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century;  the  season  of 
reform,  almost  measured  by  the  eighteenth  century ;  and  the  period  of 
decadence,  approximately  corresponding  to  the  nineteenth  century. 

443.  Independence  of  Spanish  colonies  in  America.  The  general 
conditions  leading  up  to  the  separation  of  the  colonies  in  America 
from  Spain  and  the  completeness  of  this  break  are  well  stated  in 
the  following : 


COLOxNIAL  GOVERNMENT  .-- 

Spain,  remaining  from  1500  to  1700  dormant,  almost  inanimate,  lan- 
guished by  reason  of  inactivity ;  not  until  a  foreign  prince  in  the  latter 
year  mounted  the  throne  was  this  decadence  perceived.  When  the  nation 
awoke,  it  found  its  slow-moving,  heavy  vessels  outdistanced  and  out- 
numbered by  the  lighter  and  swifter  craft  of  the  Dutch  and  the  English. 
Formidable  competition  was  then  to  be  met;  but  the  Spanish  people 
were  as  sluggish  as  their  fleets,  for  they  wrestled  first,  and  perhaps  the 
most,  with  themselves  to  grant  their  own  reforms.  The  merchants  of 
Seville,  enriched  by  the  ancient  system  and  consequently  wedded  to  it, 
were  the  stubborn  opponents  of  more  liberal  principles.  Likewise  the 
officeholders  were  corrupt;  any  measure  which  threatened  the  ill- 
gained  profits  of  this  class  encountered  strenuous  antagonism.  The 
Spaniards  were  therefore  nearly  a  century  in  adopting  those  methods 
of  progress  which,  if  promptly  and  generously  inaugurated,  might  have 
reassured  their  sovereignty.  Spain  indeed  showed  its  impotence  in  its 
inability  to  suppress  smuggling,  which,  during  a  hundred  years  at  least, 
was  carried  on  in  a  practically  open  and  unrestrained  manner.  Immense 
profits  and  undue  avarice,  resulting  in  the  idleness,  profligacy,  and 
corruption  of  all  grades  of  society,  were  the  rule. 

At  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  revolution  swept  over  North 
America  and  Western  Europe.  The  national  edifice  of  Spain  was  des- 
tined to  totter  before  Napoleon.  The  colonies  seized  the  opportunity 
which  they  had  evidently  been  long  and  expectantly  awaiting.  Spain  was 
placed  in  the  awkward  predicament  of  needing  luiglish  help  against  the 
usurper  of  the  crown,  while  England,  for  business  purposes,  was  secretly 
friendly  to  the  independence  of  these  possessions.  The  Spaniards  were 
obliged  to  seek  as  an  ally  one  of  the  worst  foes  of  their  colonial  policy. 
The  occasion,  so  propitiously  presented,  was  welcomed  by  their  American 
subjects,  who,  after  protracted  and  varied  struggles,  succeeded  in  throw- 
ing off  the  yoke. 

With  the  separation  of  the  colonies,  Spain  not  merely  lost  their  terri- 
tory, but  also  at  the  same  time  its  trade  and  influence  with  them.  I'nlike 
many  other  countries  which,  shorn  of  political  authority  over  depend- 
encies, still  retain  moral  and  mercantile  supremacy,  this  nation  was 
deprived  of  them  all. 

444.  General  nature  of  Dutch  colonization.  In  contrast  to  llie 
earlier  Spanish  and  Portuguese  colonial  methods,  the  1  )utch  .system 
exhibited  certain  striking  differences. 

Dutch  colonization,  not  less  in  its  rise  than  in  its  development,  presents 
many  peculiarities.  For  the  first  time  in  modern  histor>%  consideration 
must  be  given  to  the  efforts  of  a  republic  which,  though  passing  ihrovigh 


458  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

a  protracted  and  sanguinary  struggle,  had  scarcely  attained  its  own  free- 
dom before  it  won  by  its  prowess  a  distant  empire.  By  a  strange  anomaly 
this  commonwealth,  so  arduous  in  the  protection  of  the  privileges  of  its 
own  citizens,  deeded  away  in  absolutism,  to  a  private  association,  the 
rights  of  millions  of  its  vanquished  subjects.  A  commercial  organization 
—  frequently  imitated  on  a  smaller  scale  —  is  to  be  described,  to  which, 
by  its  charter,  the  arbitrary  dominion  over  vast  regions  was  granted ;  a 
state  was  erected  within  a  state.  A  further  circumstance  connected  with 
the  rapid  growth  of  the  Dutch  colonial  realm  is  in  the  fact  of  its  acquisi- 
tion by  the  expulsion  of  another  European  people,  rather  than  by  the 
direct  subjugation  of  native  races. 

445.  General  nature  of  French  colonization.  The  essential  fea- 
tures of  French  colonial  activity  may  be  stated  as  follows  : 

The  narrative  of  earlier  French  colonization  is  essentially  a  recital  of 
adventure ;  it  is  this  element,  indeed,  which  chiefly  prevented  enduring 
success  ;  many  other  reasons  may  be  cited  partially  to  explain  the  numer- 
ous misfortunes  experienced.  The  government  was  invariably  vast  in 
plans,  but  feeble  in  execution.  The  forces  allotted  for  tasks  were  nearly 
always  immeasurably  inadequate  for  their  achievement.  By  brilliancy  of 
action,  unity  of  purpose,  and  the  moderation  of  their  rule,  the  French 
succeeded  in  bringing  immense  and  widely  scattered  regions  under  their 
nominal  authority  ;  but,  for  the  most  part,  throughout  their  great  empire 
of  the  West  and  the  East  the  fabric  of  their  power  was  weak ;  when 
collision  came  with  a  more  sturdy  and  better-equipped  rival  its  frailty 
was  at  once  manifest.  Had  the  French  not  unreasonably  stretched  the 
frontiers  of  their  territories,  and  had  they  been  content  to  possess  more 
densely  settled,  but  smaller,  domains,  they  would  have  undoubtedly  stood 
against  the  shock  of  British  blows.  .  .  . 

By  far  the  greater  proportion  of  French  acquisitions  are  of  modem 
date ;  for  the  colonial  history  of  France  is  sharply  divided  into  two 
epochs,  the  one  from  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  to  the  close  of  the  eight- 
eenth century  .  .  .  ,  the  other  from  1830  to  the  present.  The  balance 
sheet  at  the  day  of  reckoning  for  the  earlier  period  showed  only  insignifi- 
cant returns,  and  even  these  were  engulfed  in  the  chasm  opened  by  the 
Revolution.  Of  all  the  leading  powers  France  suffered  the  most  com- 
plete loss  of  national  possessions.  After  the  seizure  of  Mauritius  by  the 
English,  in  December,  181  o,  not  a  single  outpost  remained  unconquered 
by  the  enemy.  As  in  former  ages  the  French  people  were  in  their  foreign 
enterprises  the  most  unlucky,  so  in  the  nineteenth  century  their  success 
has  not  been  more  than  mediocre  ;  but  very  recently  they  have  shown  an 
ardor,  energy,  and  resolution  which  promise  better  fortune  for  the  future. 


COLONIAL  GOVERNMENT  ^-g 

446.  Britons  as  colonizers.  An  English  writer  mentions  the 
qualities  requisite  for  successful  colonization,  and  bases  on  the 
possession  of  these  attributes  the  success  of  the  British  as  a 
colonial  people. 

There  are  seven  qualities  specially  useful  in  the  work  of  colonization. 
All  colonizing  nations  possess  some  of  these  qualities ;  British  success  is 
based  on  the  majority  of  them.    They  are  — 

(i)  Physical  Strejigth.  In  the  competition  for  colonies  all  parts  of 
the  earth  have  been  occupied,  and  that  nation  must  be  most  successful 
which  can  best  stand  all  varieties  of  climate  and  come  through  all  dangers 
with  least  permanent  harm.  .  .  . 

We  may  add  here  the  tendency  to  rapid  i/tcrease  in  population  which 
helps  to  occupy  rapidly,  and  so  rnaintain  a  hold  on,  the  comparatively 
waste  lands  where  colonies  are  formed. 

(2)  Adventurousness.  Nations  mainly  continental  are  slow  to  move ; 
it  is  the  maritime  powers  that  scatter  their  explorers  over  the  world. 
And  it  is  a  great  advantage  here  that  a  nation  should  be  composite,  not 
all  of  one  stock.  .  .  . 

(3)  Trading  Spirit.  It  is  not  enough  to  discover  new  lands ;  the 
colonizer  must  have  some  motive  for  holding  them.  .  .  . 

(4)  Settling  Spirit.  After  all,  a  trading  colony  like  the  Dutch  East 
Indies  is  not  our  idea  of  a  colony  at  all.  To  hold  one  or  two  towns  along 
the  coast  of  a  big  island  and  keep  some  order  among  the  native  chiefs  is 
not  work  that  can  build  up  new  states.  The  empire-making  races  must 
contain  men  who  will  open  up  new  countries  with  the  hope  of  living  in 
them.  .  .  . 

(5)  Fighting  Spirit.  This  does  not  mean  aggressiveness,  but  the 
determination  to  "  stand  no  nonsense."  It  is  the  carrying  out  of  the  old 
advice :  "  Beware  of  entrance  to  a  quarrel ;  but,  being  in,  bear  't  that 
the  opposed  may  beware  of  thee."  .  .  . 

(6)  Adaptability  to  the  Native  Element.  The  Red  Indians  in  North 
America,  the  Bantu  tribes  of  South  Africa,  the  Aztecs  of  Spanish 
America,  were  all  important  factors  in  the  setdemcnt  of  those  countries ; 
they  were  too  many  to  be  despised  and  too  warlike  to  be  cowed.  The 
nation  that  could  best  humor  them  gained  an  advantage  over  its 
competitors.   .  .  . 

(7)  Dominance.  You  can  utilize  native  tribes  by  humoring  them; 
but  to  establish  an  empire  among  them  you  must  be  able  also  to  master 
them,  and  to  do  it  in  such  a  way  that  they  will  own  the  mastership 
without  chafing  under  it. 


46o  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

447.  The  British  Empire  and  the  Roman  Empire.  In  several 
striking  points  a  similarity  may  be  observed  between  the  two  great- 
est empires  that  the  world  has  seen.  In  other  respects  they  are 
essentially  different.^ 

English  writers  are  fond  of  comparing  the  Roman  Empire  with  their 
own,  and  in  many  ways  the  resemblance  is  strilcing.  Beginning  with  a 
small  country,  each  expanded  over  a  huge  domain,  carrying  with  it  an 
enlightened  administration,  respect  for  justice,  more  gradually  its  own 
conception  of  law,  and  at  length  a  peace  and  order  which,  in  imitation  of 
the  Latin  term,  it  has  become  the  fashion  to  speak  of  in  England  as  the 
Pax  Britannica.  But  if  the  likeness  is  great,  the  differences  are  not  less 
marked.  The  possessions  of  Rome  were  continuous,  stretching  in  all 
directions  from  the  shores  of  the  Mediterranean.  Her  neighbors  were  at 
arm's  length  on  the  extreme  edge  of  her  frontier ;  no  powerful  state  was 
interposed  between  the  different  portions  of  her  empire.  Moreover,  the 
countries  under  her  rule  contained  all  the  people  most  nearly  akin  to  her 
in  blood  and  civilization,  and  they  formed  the  bulk  of  her  subjects,  for 
she  governed  no  vast  population  wholly  different  in  race  and  color.  She 
was  therefore  enabled  to  stamp  her  own  character  indelibly  upon  a  great 
part  of  her  dominions. 

To  all  this  the  British  Empire  presents  a  strong  contrast.  The  depend- 
encies of  England  are  scattered  over  the  whole  face  of  the  earth  in 
almost  every  habitable  latitude,  while  there  are  scarcely  ten  consecutive 
degrees  of  longitude  in  which  she  does  not  have  a  foothold.  Including 
Egypt,  her  six  most  important  possessions  lie  in  five  different  continents 
with  no  means  of  communication  between  them  but  a  long  sea  voyage. 
Outside  of  the  British  Isles  with  their  hundred  and  twenty  thousand 
square  miles,  she  holds  no  land  in  Europe  of  other  than  a  military  sig- 
nificance ;  but  she  has  nearly  four  millions  of  square  miles  in  North 
America,  as  much  more  in  Africa,  over  three  millions  in  Australasia,  and 
nearly  two  millions  in  Asia,  besides  innumerable  islands  and  small  bits 
of  coast  dotting  the  map  of  the  world. 

448.  Expansion  of  the  United  States.  While  only  recently 
become  a  colonial  power,  the  United  States  has  always  been  an 
expansionist  nation. 

Among  the  prime  factors  that  have  determined  the  character  and 
history  of  the  United  States  from  the  beginning  of  its  existence,  none 
has  been  of  greater  importance  than  the   possession  by  it  of  a  vast 

1  Copyright,  190S,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


COLONIAL  GOVERNMENT  46 1 

territory  abounding  in  resources  and  fertility  and  suitable  in  ever)-  way 
for  permanent  occupation  and  settlement.  As  the  nation  grew,  and  before 
the  pressure  of  increasing  population  scarcely  had  been  felt,  this  area 
was  constantly  added  to.  At  first,  taking  the  form  of  successive  push- 
ings-forward  of  the  boundaries,  until  there  had  been  included  all  of  the 
adjacent  territory,  wliich  either  was  but  partly  settled  or  the  ties  of  which 
to  another  country  were  not  of  sufficient  strength  to  maintain  it  in  its 
allegiance,  this  movement  of  expansion  has  at  length  leaped  all  barriers  of 
distance  and,  as  the  result  of  raj^idly  moving  events,  has  brought  under 
the  sovereignty  of  the  United  States,  first,  a  great  territory  lying  far  to 
the  north,  then  islands  lying  in  both  the  Adantic  and  Pacific  oceans,  and 
finally,  returning  to  the  mainland,  has  added  a  valuable  strip  of  land  to 
the  south,  where  the  two  American  continents  are  joined  together. 

Looking  back  over  the  course  of  these  events,  one  cannot  fail  to  be 
impressed  with  the  slight  extent  to  which  this  great  movement  has  been 
consciously  planned  or  directed  by  those  having  in  charge  the  destinies 
of  the  nation  ;  how  largely,  indeed,  it  has  practically  been  beyond  their 
powers  to  control.  The  United  States,  thus,  though  it  has  never  delib- 
erately or  consciously  pursued  an  imperialistic  policy,  yet  to-day  finds 
itself  in  fact  possessed  of  a  territory  truly  imperial  —  in  its  extent,  in  the 
variety  of  the  people  or  races  occupying  it,  and  in  the  wide  difference  of 
the  conditions  that  have  to  be  met  in  its  government  and  administration. 

III.    Colonial  Policy 

449.  The  French  as  colonizers.  The  difTiculties  preventing 
French  colonization  may  be  stated  as  follows  :  ^ 

The  colonies  of  France  cover  a  vast  territor)%  although  large  tracts  of 
it  are  practically  worthless.  For  various  reasons  the  French  are  not  good 
colonizers.  In  the  first  place,  it  may  be  noted  that  there  is  no  overjxjp- 
ulation  in  France  forcing  families  to  seek  sustenance  in  foreign  countries. 
Most  important  of  all,  perhaps,  as  a  cause  of  failure  in  colonization  is  the 
fact  that  to  Frenchmen  the  life  of  their  home  is  too  attractive  to  permit 
a  thought  of  permanent  residence  elsewhere.  As  recent  French  writers 
have  emphasized,  there  is  too  much  attachment  to  the  settled  conditions 
of  a  civilized  country,  too  little  spirit  of  enterprise.  Young  men  are  sat- 
isfied with  a  moderate  income  from  an  official  position  which  enables 
them  to  enjoy  the  advantages  of  social  life  in  the  mother  countr>'. 
Again,  the  equal  distribution  of  family  property  among  children  deprives 
France  of  the  large  class  of  penniless  but  venturesome  younger  sons 
1  Copyright,  1900,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


462  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

who  carry  on  so  much  of  the  imperial  work  of  Great  Britain.  It  is  there- 
fore remarked  by  all,  that  in  French  colonies  very  few  Frenchmen,  outside 
of  the  official  hierarchy,  are  to  be  found.  Indeed,  during  the  present  cen- 
tury there  has  been  very  litde  true  colonization  by  Frenchmen  in  foreign 
lands.  The  French  colonies  in  Canada,  Louisiana,  and  South  America 
have  not  been  reenforced  by  accessions  from  the  home  country.  Even  in 
Alo-eria.  which  by  its  geographical  situation  is  almost  a  province  of  France 
itself,  there  are  only  318,000  Frenchmen  against  446,300  subjects  of 
other  states.  .  .  . 

On  account  of  the  rigid  and  illiberal  colonial  system  introduced  by 
the  French  bureaucracy,  French  colonies  have  very  little  attraction  for 
foreigners,  who  wish  to  be  free  from  constant  irritation  and  interference 
by  the  administration.  The  French  colonies,  therefore,  have  been  an 
expensive  luxury,  and  they  have  not  become  a  field  for  investment  and 
industrial  exploration  to  the  same  extent  as  have  the  colonies  of  other 
nations.  By  discouraging  her  colonies  from  entering  into  commercial  and 
industrial  relations  with  any  but  the  mother  country,  France  is  really 
excluding  from  them  the  capital  and  men  that  alone  could  make  them 
profitable. 

450.  Criticism  of  the  French  colonial  system.  Some  of  the 
merits  and  defects  of  the  French  colonial  system*  are  indicated 
in  the  following : 

One  important  feature  which  marked  the  administration  of  the  French 
colonies  before  the  Revolution  was  the  vigorous  endeavor  to  secure 
absolute  uniformity  in  the  governance  of  all  the  dependencies,  with  little 
provision  for  differences  in  local  conditions.  .  .  .  On  the  contrary,  the 
present  system  exhibits  entire  flexibility  both  in  the  methods  of  super- 
vising colonial  affairs  from  home,  and  in  the  organizations  of  the  colonies 
themselves.  .  .  . 

There  is  now,  therefore,  a  decentralization  of  control  which  contrasts 
very  strongly  with  the  excessive  centralization  of  the  old  dominion,  and 
even  with  the  very  symmetrical  policy  which  characterizes  other  branches 
of  French  administration  at  the  present  day.  This  division  of  control  has, 
on  the  whole,  been  advantageous ;  for  it  has  helped  to  give  French 
colonial  policy  in  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries  an  elasticity  which 
it  utterly  lacked  in  the  eighteenth,  and  it  has  likewise  served  to  mitigate 
that  pernicious  faith  in  administrative  shibboleths  which  has  too  often 
been  the  curse  of  French  politics  both  at  home  and  abroad. 

One  feature  which  serves  to  distinguish  the  present  colonial  system  of 
France  from  that  of  Great  Britain,  Germany,  or  the  United  States,  is  the 


.  COLONIAL  GOVERNMENT 


463 


practice  of  giving  to  dependent  territories  a  certain  representation  in  the 
official  councils  of  the  mother  state.  Algeria,  being  regarded  as  part  of 
France,  has  of  course  its  quota  of  representatives.  .  .  .  The  protecto- 
rates, including  Tunis,  have  no  representation  at  all  in  the  French 
parliament  although  the  degree  of  control  exercised  over  them  is  fully 
as  great  as  in  several  other  territorial  dependencies.  Of  the  score  or 
more  of  "  colonies  proper,"  only  seven  have  the  right  to  send  represent- 
atives .  .  . ;  to  others  not  less  important  no  rights  of  representation 
are  given.  .  .  . 

Among  the  seven  colonies  now  holding  the  privilege,  no  rational  basis 
of  representation  is  established,  senators  and  deputies  being  allotted 
vi^ithout  any  due  regard  for  differences  in  population,  in  area,  in  wealth, 
or  in  contributions  to  the  national  exchequer.  .  .  . 

The  methods  by  which  the  various  dependencies  select  their  repre- 
sentatives afford  further  illustrations  of  the  elasticity  of  the  system.  In 
Algeria,  the  natives  do  not  vote  at  all.  In  Martinique,  Guadaloupe,  and 
Reunion  they  hold  the  franchise  on  equal  terms  with  Frenchmen,  and 
the  same  is  substantially  true  of  Senegal.  In  French  India  and  in 
French  Guiana  they  have  a  right  to  vote,  but  not  on  equal  terms  with 
the  French  inhabitants ;  yet  even  with  the  handicap  they  hold  a  domi- 
nant hand  in  the  elections.  In  Cochin  China  they  are  almost  entirely 
shut  out,  and  the  French  residents  are  in  control.  .  .  . 

Although  the  system  of  colonial  representation  has  not  been  without 
its  very  distinct  advantages,  particularly  in  affording  the  colonies  a  recog- 
nized official  channel  through  which  their  grievances  might  be  effectively 
set  forth,  it  has,  without  doubt,  fallen  far  short  of  expectations.  In  a 
senate  of  three  hundred  and  a  chamber  of  six  hundred  members,  the 
colonial  representatives  form  so  insignificant  an  element  that  their  voting 
strength  is  scarcely  sufficient  to  make  their  support  worth  the  interest 
of  any  of  the  leading  political  factions.  .  .  . 

Not  infrequently  the  colonies  select  as  their  representatives  men  who 
have  already  taken  an  active  part  in  French  politics  at  home ;  but  in  the 
main  this  practice  is  not  followed.  In  either  case,  the  objection  is  often 
made  that  the  colonial  deputies  interest  themselves  too  prominently  in 
the  purely  domestic  politics  of  the  republic,  and  too  frequently  lose  sight 
of  the  special  colonial  interests  which  they  are  supposed  to  guard.  .  .  . 

The  methods  by  which  senators  and  deputies  are  selected  in  the  col- 
onies have  also  been  rather  harshly  criticized.  There  are  those,  indeed. 
who  urge  vigorously  and  with  a  good  deal  of  circumstantial  evidence  to 
support  them,  that  the  colonial  representatives  do  not  in  many  cases 
faithfully  reflect  the  public  opinion  of  the  colonies  from  which  they  are 
accredited.  .  .  . 


464  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

In  view  of  the  small  percentage  of  native  votes  polled,  and  especially 
in  view  of  the  notorious  activity  of  French  officials  in  connection  with 
the  colonial  elections,  it  is  indeed  questionable  whether  the  colonial 
deputies  sometimes  represent  much  more  than  the  official  class  in  the 
colonies.   .   .  . 

In  all  the  represented  colonies  except  Cochin  China  the  native  ele- 
ment has  a  decisive  numerical  preponderance;  and  even  where  it  has 
not  equal  weight  with  the  French  it  is  nevertheless  strong  enough  to 
control  the  elections.  This  the  French  inhabitants  regard  as  a  substan- 
tial grievance ;  for  the  natives  contribute  only  insignificant  sums  to  the 
exchequer,  and,  with  a  few  unimportant  exceptions,  furnish  no  recruits 
to  the  military  establishment ;  whereas  the  colonial  Frenchmen  bear  the 
brunt  of  financial  and  military  burdens,  and  yet  are  allotted  only  a  minor 
share  in  the  choice  of  those  who  assume  to  represent  the  wishes  of  the 
colony  in  the  councils  of  the  nation.  .  .   . 

One  aspect  of  the  question  which  has  elicited  discussion  in  recent 
years  relates  to  the  bearing  which  the  system  of  colonial  representation 
has  upon  the  question  of  political  development  within  the  colonies 
themselves.  In  the  colonies  of  France  the  march  to  colonial  auton- 
omy, or  toward  anything  approaching  autonomy,  has  been  extremely 
slow ;  in  none  of  them  is  there  yet  the  faintest  recognition  of  this 
principle.  .  .  . 

The  French  government  of  the  present  day,  therefore,  aware  that  a 
half  century  of  experien(;e  has  not  served  to  stamp  with  marked  success 
its  ventures  along  the  path  of  political  assimilation,  finds  itself  in  the 
somewhat  awkward  predicament  of  not  being  ready  to  carry  the  prin- 
ciple of  colonial  representation  to  its  logical  conclusion.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  cannot  easily  withdraw  the  representative  privilege  from  those 
colonies  to  which  it  has  been  accorded ;  for  the  system  has  come  to  be 
regarded,  both  in  France  and  in  th*  colonies,  as  an  incident  of  republic- 
anism, since  it  was  established  by  the  first  republic,  revived  by  the  second, 
and  made  a  constitutional  fixture  by  the  third.  For  sentimental  reasons, 
then,  if  for  nothing  more,  the  elimination  of  the  colonial  representatives 
need  hardly  be  looked  for  in  the  very  near  future.  The  French  have 
halted,  accordingly,  between  the  Spanish  and  Portuguese  systems,  which 
accord  representation  to  all  dependent  territories,  and  the  British  system, 
which  grants  representation  to  none. 

451.  German  colonial  policy.  At  present  German  colonial 
ambition  is  awakening  and  German  commercial  interests  are 
widespread.^ 

1  Copyright,  1900,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


& 


COLONIAL  GOVERNMENT  ^65 

Germany,  though  a  great  colonizer,  has  not  thus  far  been  prominent 
in  the  establishment  of  political  dependencies,  as  up  tcj  the  present  decade 
most  of  her  colonists  have  been  lost  to  the  nation.  Going  chiefly  to  Nurih 
America,  they  have  rapidly  become  Americanized,  and  even  though  they 
may  continue  to  cherish  German  culture  and  literature,  they  have  changed 
their  political  allegiance  completely.  Like  the  Russians,  the  Germans  have 
been  very  successful  as  agricultural  colonists.  In  many  portions  of  the 
United  States,  they  have  replaced  the  Anglo-Americans  and  the  Irish  in 
the  farming  industry.  Like  the  Dutch  colonists  in  South  Africa,  the  (Ger- 
mans are  content  to  settle  in  a  wilderness  in  the  hope  of  turning  it  into 
an  inviting  abode  and  making  it  their  permanent  home.  They  shun  no 
hardships;  their  regularity  of  work  and  their  endurance  assure  them 
permanent  success  as  agriculturists. 

In  our  day,  Germany  is  making  great  efforts  to  retain  the  political 
allegiance  of  the  many  colonists  who  leave  her  borders;  she  now  en- 
deavors to  direct  immigration  to  her  own  colonies  and  to  Asia  Minor, 
parts  of  which  she  hopes  by  ultimate  political  occupation  to  save  for  the 
German  Empire.  German  agricultural  and  industrial  colonics  are  al.s<j 
common  in  Brazil,  in  the  Argentine  Republic,  and  in  Chile.  In  this  con- 
nection, too,  our  attention  may  well  be  turned  for  a  moment  to  the  fact 
that  the  Germans  have  within  the  last  decades  developed  remarkable 
ability  as  traders.  The  highly  trained  German  clerks  are  to-day  the  ad- 
miration of  the  commercial  world,  and  the  German  merchant  colonies 
in  places  like  Hongkong  and  Rio  de  Janeiro  are  rapidly  gaining  on  the 
supremacy  so  long  held  by  British  commerce. 

In  the  political  colonies  and  protectorates  which  Germany  has  estab- 
lished in  East  Africa  and  in  the  Cameroons,  as  well  as  in  the  Pacific 
Islands,  real  colonization  has  been  slow  to  take  root,  because,  in  addition 
to  the  disadvantageous  climate,  the  German  administrative  restrictions 
are  unfavorable.  The  governmental  bureaucracy  of  Ciermany.  not  being 
so  flexible  and  adaptive  in  its  modes  of  procedure  as  are  the  commercial 
classes,  tries  to  apply  to  new  settlements  in  the  wilderness  the  methods 
of  the  Prussian  police  sergeant,  with  the  result  of  so  hampering  the  move- 
ments and  activities  of  colonists  that  many  prefer  to  settle  in  non-CJernian 
territory. 

452.  The  Dutch  in  Java.  The  Dutch  colony  of  Java  ha.s  often 
been  considered  a  model  of  colonial  administration. 

It  may  be  well  in  this  place  to  call  attention  to  the  remarkable  success 
achieved  by  the  Dutch  in  their  government  of  Java.  In  the  prei^ent  jieriod 
of  great  territorial  expansion,  we  are  likely  to  overlook  the  more  mcxlest 
colonial  establishments  of  a  country  from  which  its  mightier  ncighlxirs 


466  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

might  learn  many  a  lesson  in  colonial  administration.  The  Dutch  are  free, 
on  the  one  hand,  from  the  rigid  officialism  and  the  formal  routine  which 
embarrasses  their  continental  neighbors  ;  and  on  the  other,  from  the  over- 
bearing behavior  that  characterizes  the  English  in  their  intercourse  with 
other  nations.  The  Dutch,  therefore,  win  the  affection  of  their  subject 
races,  although  by  no  means  indiscriminately  fraternizing  with  them.  Their 
flexible  methods  enable  them  to  take  account  and  make  use  of  all  the 
local  native  social  institutions  for  the  purposes  of  good  government.  By 
allowing  the  tribes  to  observe  their  traditional  customs  and  by  maintain- 
ing native  dignitaries,  the  Dutch  govern  with  very  little  friction,  retain 
the  confidence  and  love  of  their  subjects,  and  are  enabled  to  exert  far 
greater  influence  than  the  use  of  harsher  methods  would  permit.  For 
the  judicious  management  of  native  populations,  and  for  the  molding 
of  native  institutions  to  the  ends  of  a  more  enlightened  policy,  the  Dutch 
colonial  administration  may  serve  as  a  model. 

453.  Russia  as  a  colonizer.  Russia's  gradual  expansion  east- 
ward has  been  made  easy  by  her  ability  to  deal  successfully  with 
Oriental  peoples. 

Russian  colonization  has  been  almost  entirely  agricultural.  In  past 
centuries,  spreading  gradually  from  Little  Russia  over  the  plains  and 
steppes  to  the  north  and  east,  Russian  population  advanced  with  an 
avalanche-like  motion  which  continued  even  when  the  boundary  of  Asia 
was  reached.  And  to-day,  though  the  political  methods  of  Russia  have 
become  more  consciously  systematic,  agricultural  colonization  is  still  the 
keystone  of  her  expansion.  .  .  . 

In  its  latest  phases,  the  character  of  Russian  colonization  has  under- 
gone significant  changes.  The  original  occupation  of  Central  Asia  by 
Russia  was  largely  military  in  method,  a  fact  due  to  the  initiative  and 
ambition  of  military  officers  stationed  in  that  country.  Thus,  under  the 
veil  of  punitive  expeditions,  tribe  after  tribe  of  the  natives  was  conquered 
and  subdued,  and  a  firm  military  administration  introduced.  The  methods 
pursued  by  the  Russian  in  these  regions  were  at  first  harsh  and  relent- 
less. By  striking  memorable  blows,  they  terrified  the  population  and  de- 
prived the  people  of  their  leaders.  After  these  first  steps,  however,  they 
adopted  more  suave  methods.  The  surviving  leaders  they  endowed  with 
official  appointments,  and  took  them  to  the  West  to  admire  the  power 
and  splendor  of  the  Czar.  Russian  industry  and  commerce  were  gradually 
introduced  and  tracts  of  land  hitherto  unoccupied  were  settled  by  Russian 
colonists.  There  was  no  attempt  to  introduce  religious  uniformity  by  state 
action ;  in  Asia  the  empire  has  shown  itself  tolerant  toward  all  beliefs. 
The  natural  affability  of  Russian  character  was  given  an  opportunity  to 


COLONIAL  GOVERNMENT  467 

bear  fruit  in  the  establishment  of  closer  relations  and  a  bctti-r  under- 
standing with  the  natives. 

Of  all  European  powers,  Russia  is  in  some  respects  the  most  success- 
ful as  a  colonizer  in  Asia.  Herself  semi-Oriental,  she  is  not  so  far  abtjve 
the  various  tribes  of  the  Asiatic  plains  as  to  misunderstand  them.  The 
Russians  have  an  insinuating  manner  and  great  tact  in  diplomatic  inter- 
course, and  at  the  same  time  a  political  system  the  splendor  and  con- 
centrated majesty  of  which  impress  the  Oriental  mind  far  more  than  do 
the  simple  business  methods  of  the  Briton.  They  know  when  to  use- 
corruption,  when  to  use  force,  and  when  to  soothe  with  honors  and 
decorations.  Above  all,  their  military  and  administrative  officers  frater- 
nize with  the  leaders  of  the  conquered  peoples,  and  a  feeling  of  solidarity 
between  conquered  and  conquerors  is  the  result.  Indeed,  many  writers 
seriously  question  whether  any  other  power  can  be  permanently  suc- 
cessful as  a  colonizer  in  Asia,  when  opposed  by  the  craft  and  ability  of 
Russia.  Her  perfect  mastery  of  Oriental  diplomacy,  her  ability  to  man- 
age the  most  refractory  materials,  is  proved  by  her  recent  unforeseen 
successes  at  Peking.  It  is  by  combining  strength  of  purpose,  irresistible 
will,  and  the  show  of  great  force,  with  the  milder  methods  of  corruption 
and  official  blandishment,  that  Russia  is  so  successful  in  the  Orient. 

454.  Relation  of  England  to  colonial  enterprise.  A  recent  Kng- 
lish  writer  summarizes  as  follows  the  stages  in  the  development 
of  England's  colonial  attitude  : 

The  progressive  character  of  our  home  development  in  political  liberty 
and  order  has  been  reflected  in  our  imperial  history.  'J'he  following  brief 
summary  shows  how  the  place  of  the  State  in  our  colonial  enterprise  has 
varied  with  the  stage  of  growth  of  our  political  constitution  at  home :  — 

(i)  The  Adventure  period:  typified  by  Raleigh — the  State  favors 
and  assists  colonization. 

(2)  Beginning  of  Imperial  assertion:  Cromwell  —  the  State  directs 
colonization. 

(3)  The  Empire  a  basis  for  Trade :  Chatham  —  the  State  an  instru- 
ment for  extending  Trade  colonies. 

(4)  Exploration:  Cook  —  the  State  an  instrument  for  discovery  of 
new  lands.  ^ 

(5)  Trade  pure  and  simple:  Cobden  and  Bright  —  the  State  dis- 
pensed with  and  colonies  disregarded. 

(6)  Discharge  of  Duty :  Mill  —  the  State  again  found  necessary. 

(7)  Imperialism  recognized:  Beaconsfield  —  the  State  widened  and 
England's  imperial  position  reasserted. 


468  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

455.  Constitution  of  the  British  Empire  League.  The  growth  of 
common  interests  among  the  self-governing  portions  of  the  British 
Empire  has  led  to  the  imperial  federation  movement.  In  1895  the 
British  Empire  League  was  formed,  the  objects  of  which  are  set 
forth  in  its  constitution  as  follows  : 

1 .  The  Association  to  be  called  The  British  Empire  League. 

2.  It  shall  be  the  primary  object  of  the  League  to  secure  the 
permanent  unity  of  the  empire. 

3.  The  following  to  be  among  the  other  principal  objects  of  the 
League : 

(a)  To  promote  trade  between  the  United  Kingdom,  the  Colonies, 
and  India,  and  to  advocate  the  holding  of  periodical  meetings  of  repre- 
sentatives from  all  parts  of  the  empire  for  the  discussion  of  matters  of 
general  commercial  interest,  and  the  consideration  of  the  best  means  of 
expanding  the  national  trade. 

(/.»)  To  consider  how  far  it  may  be  possible  to  modify  any  laws  or 
treaties  which  impede  the  freedom  of  action  in  the  making  of  reciprocal 
trade  arrangements  between  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  colonies,  or 
between  two  or  more  British  colonies  or  possessions. 

(r)  To  promote  closer  intercourse  between  the  different  portions  of 
the  empire  by  the  establishment  of  cheaper  and,  where  required,  more 
direct  steam,  postal,  and  telegraphic  communication,  preference  being 
given  to  routes  not  traversing  foreign  territory. 

(d)  To  develop  the  principles  on  which  all  parts  of  the  empire  may 
best  share  in  its  general  defense ;  endeavoring  to  bring  into  harmony 
public  opinion  at  home  and  in  the  colonies  on  this  subject,  and  to  devise 
a  more  perfect  cooperation  of  the  military  and  naval  forces  of  the  empire 
with  a  special  view  to  the  due  protection  of  the  trade  routes. 

(/)  To  assimilate  as  far  as  local  circumstances  permit  the  laws  re- 
lating to  copyright,  patents,  legitimacy,  and  bankruptcy  throughout 
the  empire. 

4.  The  League  shall  use  every  constitutional  means  to  bring  about 
the  objects  for  which  it  is  established,  and  shall  invite  the  support  of 
men  of  all  shades  of  political  opinion  throughout  the  empire. 

5.  The  League  shall  advocate  the  establishment  of  periodical  con- 
ferences to  deal  with  such  questions  as  may  appear  ripe  for  considera- 
tion, on  the  lines  of  the  London  Conference  of  1887  and  the  Ottawa 
Conference  of  1894. 

456.   Imperialists  and  anti-imperialists  in  the  United  States. 

The  recent  colonial  expansion  of  the  United  States  created  a  wide 


COLONIAL  GOVERNMENT  ,50 

diversity  of  opinion,  and  threatened  for  a  time  to  become  a  leading 
issue  in  American  politics.  ^ 

While  the  public  as  a  whole  hesitated  between  respect  for  its  cherished 
traditions  and  the  allurements  of  the  new  prospects,  the  more  partisan 
on  both  sides  wrangled  fiercely  over  the  question  whether  the  countrv' 
should  or  should  not  retain  its  new  acquisitions.  'J'hc  two  points  of  view 
are  usually  called  the  Imperialist  and  the  Anti-imperialist. 

In  the  long  and  bitter  disputes  as  to  what  should  be  done  with  the 
new  insular  possessions,  argument  centered  on  the  retention  of  the 
Philippines.   .   .   . 

Amidst  the  multitude  of  conflicdng  statements  at  this  time,  we  can 
recognize  a  few  main  contentions  which  reappear  again  and  again.  In 
the  first  place,  the  Anti-imperialists  asserted  that  there  were  jjlenty  of 
unsolved  problems  at  home  to  which  the  nation  should  devote  all  its 
energies  instead  of  squandering  them  elsewhere,  especially  as  the 
Americans  had  no  experience  in  colonial  matters.  .  .  .  But  the  fiercest 
and  most  effective  attacks  of  the  Anti-imperialists  were  based  on  the 
charge  that  the  new  policy  was  an  abandonment,  not  only  of  the  wise 
traditions  of  the  fathers  of  the  republic,  but  of  the  noble'  ideals  which 
had  made  the  Union  honored  throughout  the  world.  .  .  . 

The  advocates  of  a  policy  of  expansion  met  the  assertion  that,  accord- 
ing to  American  ideals,  government  should  be  by  the  consent  of  the 
governed,  with  the  declaration  that  this  was  true  only  when  the  governed 
were  capable  of  taking  care  of  themselves ;  that,  when  they  were  not, 
the  progress  of  the  governed  —  which  meant  also  the  advancement  of 
civilization  —  w^as  more  important  than  their  con.sent.   ... 

The  charge  that  the  acquisition  of  colonial  possessions  was  contran- 
to  the  traditional  policy  of  the  United  States  was  met  in  one  of  two 
ways,  —  either  by  admitting  its  truth  but  declaring  that  the  time  had  now 
come  for  a  change,  or  by  denying  the  historical  accuracy  of  the  statement. 
According  to  the  writers  who  support  the  latter  view,  colonization  has 
been  the  dominant  characteristic  of  the  whole  growth  of  the  countr\-. 

457.  Instructions  to  the  Philippine  Commission.   The  following 

extract  is  taken  from  President  McKinley's  instructions  to  the 
Philippine  Commission,  and  illustrates  the  attitude  of  the  United 
States  to  its  dependencies  : 

Without  hampering  them  by  too  specific  instructions,  they  should  in 
general  be  enjoined,  after  making  themselves  familiar  with  the  conditions 
and  needs  of  the  country,  to  devote  their  attention  in  the  first  instance 
1  Copyright,  190S,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


470 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


to  the  establishment  of  municipal  governments,  in  which  the  natives  of 
the  islands,  both  in  the  cities  and  in  the  rural  communities,  shall  be 
afforded  the  opportunity  to  manage  their  own  local  affairs  to  the  fullest 
extent  of  which  they  are  capable.  .  .  . 

The  next  subject  in  order  of  importance  should  be  the  organization 
of  government  in  the  larger  administrative  divisions  corresponding  to 
counties,  departments,  or  provinces,  in  which  the  common  interests  of 
many  or  several  municipalities  falling  within  the  same  tribal  lines,  or  the 
same  natural  geographical  limits,  may  best  be  subserved  by  a  common 
administration.  .  .  . 

That  in  all  cases  the  municipal  officers,  who  administer  the  local  affairs 
of  the  people,  are  to  be  selected  by  the  people,  and  that  wherever  officers 
of  more  extended  jurisdiction  are  to  be  selected  in  any  way  natives  of 
the  islands  are  to  be  preferred,  and  if  they  can  be  found  competent  and 
willing  to  perform  the  duties,  they  are  to  receive  the  offices  in  preference 
to  any  others.  .  .  . 

In  all  the  forms  of  government  and  administrative  provisions  which 
they  are  authorized  to  prescribe,  the  commission  should  bear  in  mind  that 
the  government  which  they  are  establishing  is  designed  not  for  our  satis- 
faction, or  for  the  expression  of  our  theoretical  views,  but  for  the  happi- 
ness, peace,  and  prosperity  of  the  people  of  the  Philippine  Islands.  .  .  . 

The  people  of  the  islands  should  be  made  plainly  to  understand  that 
there  are  certain  great  principles  of  government  which  have  been  made 
the  basis  of  our  governmental  system,  which  we  deem  essential  to  the 
rule  of  law  and  the  maintenance  of  individual  freedom,  and  of  which 
they  have,  unfortunately,  been  denied  the  experience  possessed  by  us ; 
that  there  are  also  certain  practical  rules  of  government  which  we  have 
found  to  be  essential  to  the  preservation  of  these  great  principles  of 
liberty  and  law,  and  that  these  principles  and  these  rules  of  government 
must  be  established  and  maintained  in  their  islands  for  the  sake  of  their 
liberty  and  happiness,  however  much  they  may  conflict  with  the  customs 
or  laws  of  procedure  with  which  they  are  familiar.  .  .   . 

It  will  be  the  duty  of  the  commission  to  promote  and  extend,  and,  as 
they  find  occasion,  to  improve  the  system  of  education  already  inaugurated 
by  the  military  authorities.  In  doing  this  they  should  regard  as  of  first 
importance  the  extension  of  a  system  of  primary  education  which  shall 
be  free  to  all,  and  which  shall  tend  to  fit  the  people  for  the  duties  of 
citizenship  and  for  the  ordinary  avocations  of  a  civilized  community. 
This  instruction  should  be  given  in  the  first  instance  in  every  part  of 
the  islands  in  the  language  of  the  people.  .  .  . 

The  main  body  of  the  laws  which  regulate  the  rights  and  obligations 
of  the  people  should  be  maintained  with  as  little  interference  as  possible. 


COLONIAL  GOVERNMENT  47 1 

IV.    F.ORMS  OF  Colonial  Government 

458.  Classification  of  colonies.  Several  bases  for  the  classifica- 
tion of  colonies  are  suggested  in  the  following :  ^ 

Colonies  are  classified,  according  to  their  method  of  origin  and  acqui- 
sition, into  four  leading  groups :  i,  those  created  or  acquired  by  military 
force;  2,  those  engaged  in  agricultural  pursuits,  where  farming  is  the 
main  occupation  of  the  inhabitants ;  3,  those  employed  in  commerce  or 
trade,  consisting  chiefly  of  a  few  merchants,  sent  out  from  the  parent 
state  to  carry  on  the  barter  and  exchange  of  commodities  with  the  natives 
of  the  region  in  which  they  reside ;  and  4,  those  in  which  the  plantation 
system  prevails,  devoted  to  the  cultivation  of  such  products  of  the  soil  as 
cannot  for  climatic  reasons  be  grown  in  the  home  country.  .As  illustrations 
of  these  various  classes,  the  Roman  establishments  may  be  cited,  in 
antiquity,  as  colonies  by  conquest ;  in  modem  times  the  Spanish  posses- 
sions in  Central  and  South  America  belonged  to  the  same  type.  Among 
agricultural  colonies  the  United  States  —  while  a  British  dependency  — 
and  Australia  may  be  reckoned.  The  principal  commercial  colonies  are 
those  under  the  administration  of  trading  companies,  such  as  formerly 
the  Dutch  and  English  domains  in  East  India  and  in  that  vicinity;  of 
plantation  colonies  those  in  the  West  Indies  and  in  the  torrid  zones  of 
Africa  are  the  most  important. 

Nor  should  a  fifth  order  be  entirely  forgotten ;  reference  is  made 
to  penal  stations,  to  such  as  those  whither  England  used  to  deport 
her  criminals  and  to  which  France  still  to-day  sends  certain  of  her 
offenders.  .  .   . 

In  reality,  another  simpler,  but  much  broader,  classification  of  colonial 
origin  may  be  made  by  dividing  colonies  into  those  voluntarily  and  those 
involuntarily  founded  by  the  metropolis;  or  rather  those  intentionally 
established  by  the  government  and  those  unconsciously  created  by  the 
people.  Among  those  organized  under  ofiicial  direction  all  distant  nulitar)- 
strongholds  must  be  included  ;  likewise  commercial  stations,  at  least  in 
their  inception ;  plantation  and  penal  settlements  are  also  comprised  in 
this  same  group.  Agricultural  communities  and  a  certain  portion  of 
trading  establishments  alone  are  due  to  individual  initiative,  without  any 
material  assistance  from  the  mother  countrv',  and  frequently,  as  history 
shows,  without  her  cooperation.  As  belonging  to  the  class  of  colonies 
directly  inaugurated  by  the  state,  those  of  Rome  and  of  Spam  may  be 
mentioned ;  to  the  number  indirectly  erected  or  aided  by  its  authonty. 
those  of  Holland  and  England  in  and  around  the  Indian  Ocean;  while 
1  Copyright,  1900,  by  Henry  C.  Morris. 


472  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

to  the  division  constituted  by  personal  effort,  those  of  Greece  and  the 
North  American  and  the  Australian  territories,  past  and  present,  of  Great 
Britain  may  be  assigned. 

459.  Spheres  of  influence.  An  important  recent  method  of  in- 
direct colonial  expansion  is  described  in  the  following :  ^ 

In  recent  years  a  far-reaching  and  radical  change  has  come  over  the 
entire  field  of  colonial  enterprise.  The  economic  energies  of  the  western 
nations  have  been  stimulated  to  such  an  extent  that  the  more  restricted 
markets  of  the  old  commercial  world,  as  well  as  the  opportunities  it 
offers  for  capitalistic  investment,  are  no  longer  adequate.  Moreover, 
both  commerce  and  capital  have  become  nationalized,  have  been  taught 
to  look  to  the  state  for  assistance,  and  to  adjust  their  own  activities  and 
policies  to  the  upbuilding  of  national  power.  Far  more  than  was  ever 
before  conceivable,  the  national  state  has  become  the  exponent  of  the 
sum  of  energies  within  its  bounds.   .  .  . 

In  this  era  of  direct  political  expansion,  the  older  methods  of  colonial 
growth  have  come  to  be  considered  too  slow  and  uncertain.  The  gradual 
development  of  trade  and  industrial  enterprise,  the  civilizing  influence  of 
missionaries,  are  not  sure  enough  means  of  gaining  a  firm  foothold  in 
new  regions,  but  these  individual  forces  must  be  seconded,  and  even 
anticipated,  by  the  state.  As  each  nation  is  loath,  for  fear  of  the  others, 
to  trust  solely  to  the  natural  process  of  colonial  evolution,  they  have  all 
joined  in  an  artificial  division  of  the  unoccupied  world,  and  in  the  creation 
of  political  authority  over  territories  within  which  no  economic  activities 
have  as  yet  been  developed. 

460.  Colonial  protectorates.  The  essential  features  of  a  colonial 
protectorate  are  as  follows  : 

When  a  state  has  succeeded  in  excluding  other  nations  from  the 
opportunity  of  exerting  political  influence  within  a  certain  region,  it 
may  then  set  to  work  and  develop  its  own  authority  therein,  either  by 
occupation,  by  annexation,  or  by  the  establishment  of  protectorates. 
The  latter  is  the  favorite  mode  of  transition  from  the  negative  sphere 
of  influence  to  a  positive  direct  control.  .  .  . 

There  are  certain  essential  features  and  conditions  which  may  be 
found  wherever  the  colonial  protectorate  exists.  These  may  be  summa- 
rized as  follows :  first,  that  the  native  authorities  continue  to  reign,  and 
that  the  local  institutions  and  customs  shall  not  be  interfered  with ;  sec- 
ond, that  the  protected  state  has  political  relations  with  the  protecting 

^  Copyright,  1902,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


COLONIAL  GOVERNMENT  ,-. 

power  only,  and  that  it  relinquishes  the  right  of  declaring  war;  third, 
that  it  admits  a  political  resident  as  representative  of  the  protecting 
power,  and  thus  enables  the  latter  to  exercise  a  pers(jnal  influence  upon 
the  government  of  the  protected  state;  fourth,  that  while,  as  a  rule, 
native  laws  and  customs  are  permitted  to  continue  in  fcjrce,  they  shall 
yield  when  the  imperial  interests  absolutely  demand.  The  responsibility 
which  the  paramount  power  assumes  will  not  permit  it  to  tolerate  within 
the  protected  territory  gross  misrule,  hopeless  indebtedness,  (jr  barbarous 
practices  which  would  offend  the  elementary  ideas  of  humanity.  In 
general,  it  may  be  said  that  international  law  looks  upon  colonial  pro- 
tected territory  as  a  part  of  the  protecting  state,  and  hcjlds  the  latter 
responsible  for  conditions  within  it  and  for  acts  emanating  from  it ;  on 
the  other  hand,  with  respect  to  municipal  law,  colonial  protectorates  arc 
usually  treated  as  distinct  from  the  national  territory,  and  as  not  sharing 
the  legal  institutions  of  the  protecting  state,  nor  as  subjected  to  its  direct 
legislative  authority. 

461.  The  relation  of  the  United  States  and  Cuba.  'I'hc  follow- 
ing provisions,  known  as  the  Piatt  Amendment,  were  incorporated 
in  the  Army  Appropriation  Act  of  1901.  They  were  accepted  In' 
Cuba  as  an  appendix  to  its  constitution. 

That  the  government  of  Cuba  shall  never  enter  into  any  treaty  or 
other  compact  with  any  foreign  power  or  powers  which  will  impair  or 
tend  to  impair  the  independence  of  Cuba,  nor  in  any  manner  authorize 
or  permit  any  foreign  power  or  powers  to  obtain  b}'  colonization  or  for 
military  or  naval  purposes  or  otherwise,  lodgment  in  or  control  over  any 
portion  of  said  island. 

That  said  government  shall  not  assume  or  contract  any  public  debt, 
to  pay  the  interest  upon  which,  and  to  make  reasonable  sinking  fund 
provision  for  the  ultimate  discharge  of  which,  the  ordinary  revenues  of 
the  island,  after  defraying  the  current  expenses  of  government  shall  be 
inadequate. 

That  the  government  of  Cuba  consents  that  the  United  States  may 
exercise  the  right  to  intervene  for  the  preservation  of  Cuban  independ- 
ence, the  maintenance  of  a  government  adequate  for  the  protection  of 
life,  property,  and  individual  liberty,  and  for  discharging  the  obligations 
with  respect  to  Cuba  imposed  by  the  Treaty  of  Paris  on  the  I'nitcd 
States,  now  to  be  assumed  and  undertaken  by  the  government  of  Cuba. 

That  all  Acts  of  the  United  States  in  Cuba  during  its  military  occu- 
pancy thereof,  are  ratified  and  validated,  and  lawful  rights  ;ia.uired 
thereunder  shall  be  maintained  and  protected. 


474  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

That  the  government  of  Cuba  will  execute,  and  as  far  as  necessary 
extend,  the  plans  already  devised  or  other  plans  to  be  mutually  agreed 
upon  for  the  sanitation  of  the  cities  of  the  island,  to  the  end  that  a  recur- 
rence of  epidemic  and  infectious  diseases  may  be  prevented,  thereby 
assuring  protection  to  the  people  and  commerce  of  Cuba,  as  well  as  to 
the  commerce  of  the  southern  ports  of  the  United  States  and  the  people 
residing  therein. 

That  the  Isle  of  Pines  shall  be  omitted  from  the  proposed  constitu- 
tional boundaries  of  Cuba,  the  title  thereto  being  left  to  future  adjust- 
ment by  treaty. 

That  to  enable  the  United  States  to  maintain  the  independence  of 
Cuba,  and  to  protect  the  people  thereof,  as  well  as  for  its  own  defense, 
the  government  of  Cuba  will  sell  or  lease  to  the  United  States  lands 
necessary  for  coaling  or  naval  stations,  at  certain  specified  points,  to  be 
agreed  upon  with  the  President  of  the  United  States. 

That  by  way  of  further  assurance  the  government  of  Cuba  will  embody 
the  foregoing  provisions  in  a  permanent  treaty  with  the  United  States. 

462.  Establishment  of  crown  government  in  India.  The  inter- 
ests of  the  East  India  Company  in  India  were  resigned  to  the 
crown  in  1858.  The  following  proclamation,  issued  by  the  crovra 
in  the  same  year,  states  England's  poHcy  toward  the  colony  : 

Whereas,  for  divers  weighty  reasons,  we  have  resolved,  by  and  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Lords  Spiritual  and  Temporal,  and  Com- 
mons, in  Parliament  assembled,  to  take  upon  ourselves  the  government 
of  the  territories  in  India  heretofore  administered  in  trust  for  us  by  the 
Honorable  East  India  Company. 

Now,  therefore,  we  do  by  these  presents  notify  and  declare  that,  by 
the  advice  and  consent  aforesaid,  we  have  taken  upon  ourselves  the  said 
government ;  and  we  hereby  call  upon  all  our  subjects  within  the  said 
territories  to  be  faithful,  and  to  bear  true  allegiance  to  us,  our  heirs  and 
successors,  and  to  submit  themselves  to  the  authority  of  those  whom  we 
may  hereafter,  from  time  to  time,  see  fit  to  appoint  to  administer  the 
government  of  our  said  territories,  in  our  name  and  on  our  behalf.  .  .  . 

We  desire  no  extension  of  our  present  territorial  possessions ;  and, 
while  we  will  permit  no  aggression  upon  our  dominions  or  our  rights  to 
be  attempted  with  impunity,  we  shall  sanction  no  encroachment  on  those 
of  others.  We  shall  respect  the  rights,  dignity,  and  honor  of  native 
princes  as  our  own ;  and  we  desire  that  they,  as  well  as  our  own  sub- 
jects, should  enjoy  that  prosperity  and  that  social  advancement  which 
can  only  be  secured  by  internal  peace  and  good  government.  .  .  . 


COLONIAL  GOVERNMENT  475 

.  ,  .  We  declare  it  to  be  our  royal  will  and  pleasure  that  none  be  in 
any  wise  favored,  none  molested  or  disquieted,  by  reason  of  their  reli- 
gious faith  or  observances,  but  that  all  shall  alike  enjoy  the  equal  and 
impartial  protection  of  the  law.  .  .  . 

And  it  is  our  further  will  that,  so  far  as  may  be,  our  subjects,  of 
whatever  race  or  creed,  be  freely  and  impartially  admitted  to  offices  in 
our  service,  the  duties  of  which  they  be  qualified,  by  their  education, 
ability,  and  integrity,  duly  to  discharge. 

We  know,  and  respect,  the  feelings  of  attachment  with  which  the 
natives  of  India  regard  the  lands  inherited  by  them  from  their  ancestors, 
and  we  desire  to  protect  them  in  all  rights  connected  therewith,  subject 
to  the  equitable  demands  of  the  State;  and  we  will  that,  generally,  in 
framing  and  administering  the  law,  due  regard  be  paid  to  the  ancient 
rights,  usages,  and  customs  of  India.  .  .  . 

When,  by  the  blessing  of  Providence,  internal  tranquillity  shall  be  re- 
stored, it  is  our  earnest  desire  to  stimulate  the  peaceful  industry  of  India, 
to  promote  works  of  public  utility  and  improvement,  and  to  administer 
its  government  for  the  benefit  of  all  our  subjects  resident  therein.  In 
their  prosperity  will  be  our  strength,  in  their  contentment  our  security, 
and  in  their  gratitude  our  best  reward. 

463.  Self-governing  colonies.  The  following  extract  describes 
the  position  and  powers  of  England's  most  important  possessions, 
which  are  practically  self-governing  :  ^ 

All  the  great  English  settlement  colonies  have,  therefore,  attained  to 
self-government,  and  have  developed  an  almost  independent  political 
life  The  connection  with  the  mother  country  is  maintained,  not  by 
compulsion  or  the  fearef  superior  force  but  through  a  spirit  of  accommo- 
dation between  the  home  and  the  colonial  governments,  and  a  rational 
endeavor  to  respect  and  advance  their  mutual  interests.  Thus  the  colo- 
nies are  enabled  to  benefit  by  the  prestige  of  association  with  a  great  em- 
pire, without  being  called  upon  for  any  serious  sacrifices.  Ihe  internal 
affairs,  and  in  fact  almost  the  entire  polity  of  the  colonial  comnionwealths. 
are  left  free  from  interference  by  the  mother  country.  .  .  .  I  he  adminis- 
tration of  the  public  lands  has  been  turned  over  to  them  completely  ;  hey 
have  been  permitted  to  develop  their  own  tariff  policy  and  to  negotiate 
commercial  treaties  with  foreign  nations;  and  while.  «f J;""'"'^'  ^^.^  f;;". 
eral  political  relations  of  the  colonies  to  the  outside  world  are  determnud 
by  the  arrangements  of  the  mother  country,  the  ^«  «"'^\f  l^;'^"^";'-"^ 
are  always  consulted  before  any  important  step  involving  their  interests 

1  Copyright,  1902,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


476  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

The  self-governing  colonies  of  Great  Britain  have  often  been  compared 
to  international  protectorates,  and  it  admits  of  no  doubt  that  they  are  in 
some  respects  very  similar.  In  both,  the  foreign  relations  are  controlled 
by  the  paramount  state,  while  complete  autonomy  exists  as  to  internal 
affairs.  .  .  . 

Though  the  future  of  the  self-governing  colonies  is  uncertain,  it  is 
safe  to  predict  that  they  will  not  again  allow  the  mother  country  to  en- 
croach upon  their  internal  autonomy,  and  their  renewed  subjection  is 
not  to  be  thought  of.  Whether  they  will  continue  in  some  form  of  fed- 
eration with  the  mother  country,  or  whether  they  will  sooner  or  later 
claim  complete  sovereignty,  depends  entirely  upon  how  far  the  basis  of 
common  race  and  civilization  can  be  supplemented  by  lasting  economic 
interests. 


PART   III 
THE   ENDS  OF  THE  STATE 

CHAPTER   XXIV 

THE  PROVINCE  OF  GOVERNMENT 

I.    The  Aims  of  tiik  State 

464.  The  state  an  end  or  a  means,  iiluntschli  criticizes  the  onc- 
sidedness  of  viewing  the  state  as  either  a  means  or  an  end  and 
gives  his  conception  of  the  purpose  of  the  state  as  follows : 

The  question  is  often  raised  whether  the  State  is  an  end  or  a  means, 
i.e.  whether  the  State  has  an  end  in  itself,  or  simply  serves  as  a  means 
to  enable  individuals  to  attain  their  ends. 

The  ancient  theory  of  the  State,  especially  that  of  the  Greeks,  regarded 
the  state  as  the  highest  aim  of  human  life,  as  perfect  humanity,  and  was 
therefore  inclined  to  regard  the  State  as  an  end  in  itself.  As  compared 
with  the  State,  individual  men  appeared  only  as  parts,  not  as  beings  with 
separate  personal  rights.   .  .  . 

In  complete  opposition  to  this  fundamental  theor)'  of  the  ancients  is 
the  opinion,  which  has  been  often  maintained  by  iMiglish  and  American 
writers,  that  the  State  is  not  an  end  in  itself,  but  is  simj^ly  a  means  to 
secure  the  welfare  of  individuals.  .  .  . 

It  seems  to  me  that  both  the  ancient  and  the  modern  \iew  contain  a 
germ  of  truth ;  but  both  commit  the  error  of  regarding  only  one  side  of 
the  matter  and  of  overlooking  or  denying  the  other  side.  .  .  . 

But  all  these  objections  are  avoided  if  we  formulate  the  proj>cr  and 
direct  end  of  the  State  as  the  development  of  the  national  eapacities,  the 
perfecting  of  the  natio?ial  life,  and,  finally,  its  completion :  provided,  of 
course,  that  the  process  of  moral  and  political  develoiJment  shall  not  be 
opposed  to  the  destiny  of  humanit>'.  This  formula  includes  everything 
that  can  be  regarded  as  a  proper  funcdon  of  the  State,  and  exdudes 
everything  that  lies  outside  the  State's  range.  It  regards  the  idiosyn- 
crasies and  the  special  needs  of  different  nations,  and  thus,  while  it  firmly 
maintains  the  unity  of  the  end  of  the  State,  it  secures  the  variety  of  \\s 

477 


478  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

development.  The  life  task  of  every  individual  is  to  develop  his  capac- 
ities and  to  manifest  his  essence.  So,  too,  the  duty  of  the  State  person 
is  to  develop  the  latent  powers  of  the  nation,  and  to  manifest  its  capac- 
ities. Thus  the  State  has  a  double  function.  Firstly,  the  maintenance  of 
the  national  powers  ;  and,  secondly,  their  development.  It  must  secure 
the  conquests  of  the  past,  and  it  must  extend  them  in  the  future. 

465.  The  primary,  secondary,  and  ultimate  purposes  of  the 
state.  Burgess  attempts  to  separate  the  proximate  and  ultimate 
ends  of  the  state,  and  to  distinguish  state  and  government  in  the 
methods  used  in  attaining  these  ends. 

First,  then,  as  to  state  ends.  An  exhaustive  examination  of  this  subject 
will  reveal  the  fact  that  there  are  three  natural  points  of  division.  There  is 
a  primary,  a  secondary,  and  an  ultimate  purpose  of  the  state ;  and,  pro- 
ceeding from  the  primary  to  the  ultimate,  the  one  end  or  class  of  ends 
is  means  to  the  attainment  of  the  next  following.  Let  us  regard  the  ulti- 
mate end  first.  This  is  the  universal  human  purpose  of  the  state.  We 
may  call  it  the  perfection  of  humanity ;  the  civilization  of  the  world ;  the 
perfect  development  of  the  human  reason,  and  its  attainment  to  universal 
command  over  individualism  ;  the  apotheosis  of  man.   .   .  . 

The  state  cannot,  however,  be  organized  from  the  beginning  as  world 
state.  Mankind  cannot  yet  act  through  so  extended  and  ponderous  an 
organization,  and  many  must  be  the  centuries,  and  probably  cycles,  before 
it  can.  Mankind  must  first  be  organized  politically  by  portions,  before  it 
can  be  organized  as  a  whole.  I  have  already  pointed  out  the  natural  con- 
ditions and  forces  which  direct  the  political  apportionment  of  mankind. 
I  have  demonstrated  that  they  work  toward  the  establishment  of  the 
national  state.  The  national  state  is  the  most  perfect  organ  which  has  as 
yet  been  attained  in  the  civilization  of  the  world  for  the  interpretation  of 
the  human  consciousness  of  right.  It  furnishes  the  best  vantage  ground 
as  yet  reached  for  the  contemplation  of  the  purpose  of  the  sojourn  of 
mankind  upon  earth.  The  nadonal  state  must  be  developed  everywhere 
before  the  world  state  can  appear.  Therefore  I  would  say  that  the 
secondary  purpose  of  the  state  is  the  perfecting  of  its  nationality,  the 
development  of  the  peculiar  principle  of  its  nationality.  .   .  . 

But  now,  how  shall  the  state  accomplish  this  end  ?  The  answer  to  this 
question  gives  us  finally  the  proximate  ends  of  the  state.  These  are 
government  and  liberty.  The  primary  activity  of  the  state  must  be 
directed  to  the  creation  and  the  perfecting  of  these.  When  this  shall 
have  been  fairly  accomplished,  it  may  then,  through  these  as  means, 
work  out  the  national  civilization,  and  then  the  civilization  of  the  world. 


THE  PROVINCE  OF  GOVERNMENT  4-9 

First  of  all,  the  state  must  establish  the  reign  of  peace-  and  of  law  •  i.e. 
it  must  establish  government,  and  vest  it  with  sufficient  power  to  defend 
the  state  against  external  attack  or  internal  disorder.  This  is  the  first 
step  out  of  barbarism,  and  until  it  shall  have  been  substantially  taken 
every  other  consideration  must  remain  in  abeyance.  If  it  be  necessary 
that  the  whole  power  of  the  state  shall  be  exercised  by  the  government 
in  order  to  secure  this  result,  there  should  be  no  hesitation  in  authorizing 
or  approving  it.  This  latter  status  must  not,  however,  be  regarded  as 
permanent.  It  cannot  secure  the  development  of  the  national  genius.  If 
continued  beyond  the  period  of  strict  necessity,  it  will  rather  suppress 
and  smother  that  genius.  So  soon  as,  through  its  disciplinary  influence, 
the  disposition  to  obey  law  and  observe  order  shall  have  been  established, 
it  must,  therefore,  suffer  change.  The  state  must  then  address  itself  to 
the  establishment  of  its  system  of  individual  liberty.  It  must  mark  out, 
in  its  constitution,  a  sphere  of  individual  autonomy ;  and  it  must  com- 
mand the  government  both  to  refrain  from  encroachment  thereon  itself 
and  to  repel  encroachment  from  every  other  quarter.  At  first  this  domain 
must  necessarily  be  narrow,  and  the  subjects  of  the  state  be  permitted 
to  act  therein  only  as  separate  individuals.  As  the  people  of  the  state 
advance  in  civilization,  the  domain  of  liberty  must  be  widened,  and  indi- 
viduals permitted  to  form  private  combinations  and  associations  for  the 
accomplishment  of  purposes  which  are  beyond  the  powers  of  the  single 
individual  and  which  could  be  otherwise  fulfilled  only  by  the  power  of  the 
government.  ...  It  may,  also,  be  good  policy  for  the  state  to  aid  them 
in  the  accomplishment  of  work  which  they  could  not,  without  such  aid, 
perform,  instead  of  authorizing  the  government  itself  to  undertake  and 
execute  such  enterprises.  This  all  signifies,  however,  only  a  readjustment 
by  the  state,  from  time  to  time,  of  the  relation  of  government  to  liberty. 

466.  The  ends  of  the  state.  Garner,  agreeing  in  the  main  with 
Burgess,  adds  one  more  to  the  numerous  theories  as  to  the  proper 
function  of  the  state. 

If  one  more  attempt  to  formulate  a  general  statement  of  the  function 
of  the  state  may  be  permitted,  I  would  offer  the  following  :  The  original, 
primary,  and  immediate  end  of  the  state  is  the 'maintenance  of  peace, 
order,  security,  and  justice  among  the  individuals  who  compose  it.  This 
involves  the  establishment  of  a  regime  of  law  for  the  definition  and  pro- 
tection of  individual  rights  and  the  creation  of  a  domain  of  individual 
liberty,  free  from  encroachment  either  by  individuals,  or  by  associations, 
or  by  the  government  itself.  No  state  which  fails  to  secure  these  ends 
can  justify  its  existence.  Whatever  else  it  may  ignore,  it  cannot  neglect 
these  considerations  without  failing  in  its  greatest  and  most  essential 


48o  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

purpose.  Secondly,  the  state  must  look  beyond  the  needs  of  the  indi- 
vidual as  such  to  the  larger  collective  needs  of  society  —  the  welfare  of 
the  group.  It  must  care  for  the  common  welfare  and  promote  the 
national  progress  by  doing  for  society  the  things  which  the  common 
interests  require,  but  which  cannot  be  done  at  all  or  done  efficiently  by 
individuals  acting  singly  or  through  association.  .  .  .  This  may  be 
called  the  secondary  end  of  the  state.  The  services  embraced  under  this 
head  are  not  absolutely  essential  to  the  existence  of  society  but  they  are 
desirable  and  are  in  fact  performed  by  all  modern  states. 

Finally,  the  promotion  of  the  civilization  of  mankind  at  large  may  be 
considered  the  ultimate  and  highest  end  of  the  state.  .  .  .  Thus  the 
state  has  a  triple  end :  first,  its  mission  is  the  advancement  of  the  good 
of  the  individual ;  then  it  should  seek  to  promote  the  collective  interests 
of  individuals  in  their  associated  capacity ;  and,  finally,  it  should  aim  at 
the  furthering  of  the  civilization  and  progress  of  the  world,  and  thus  its 
ends  become  universal  in  character. 

467.  The  functions  of  the  state.  The  following  is  a  suggestive 
discussion  of  the  general  principles  that  determine  the  sphere  of 
state  action  : 

The  primary  right  of  the  State,  as  of  the  individual,  is,  to  be.  Now, 
war,  not  peace,  is  the  law  of  life  ;  and  the  struggle  for  existence  is  a  uni- 
versal fact.  Obviously,  the  first  function  of  the  State  is  to  maintain,  in 
a  condition  of  the  utmost  efficiency,  such  fleets  and  armies,  and  other 
preparations  for  war,  as  its  security  against  rival  States  demands.  .  .  . 
Equally  obvious  is  its  function  to  maintain  its  internal  tranquillity  by  its 
magistrates  and  police.  .   .  . 

Again.  The  right  of  the  State,  as  we  have  seen,  is  not  merely  to 
existence,  but  to  complete  existence,  noble  and  worthy  existence,  an 
existence  in  accordance  with  the  dignity  of  human  nature.  Hence, 
among  its  functions  must  be  reckoned  the  promotion  of  civilization.  It 
is  the  guardian  of  the  ideal  and  of  the  material  interests  of  the  people 
whose  personalities  it  incorporates.  .  .   . 

The  real  difficulty  is  to  determine  what  are  the  proper  limits  of  the 
State's  interference  with  individual  action. 

The  true  principle  would  appear  to  be  that  the  State  should  leave  free 
all  interests  and  faculties  of  its  subjects  ...  so  far  as  is  consistent  with 
the  maintenance  of  its  own  rights.  It  is  no  part  of  its  functions  to  do 
for  them  what  they  can  do  for  themselves  better,  or  even  as  well.  It 
is  a  part,  and  a  very  important  part,  of  its  functions  to  allow  them  to 
develop  their  own  personality,  to  become  more  and  more  men,  to  make 


THE  PROVINCE  OF  GOVERNMENT  481 

■^ 

the  most  and  the  best  of  themselves,  for  their  own  and  the  common  wel- 
fare. And  not  only  to  allow,  but  prudently  to  aid,  whether  by  direct 
encouragement  or  by  the  removal  of  hindrances.  This  is  the  just  mean  of 
State  action  in  respect  of  the  subject.  It  is  equally  removed  from  a  false 
paternalism  and  a  false  individualism. 

The  false  paternal  theory  of  the  State's  functions  makes  it  not  merely 
a  high,  but  the  only  factor  of  human  development,  as  the  creator  and 
arbiter  of  the  rights  of  its  subjects.  The  sufficient  condemnation  of  this 
doctrine  is  that  it  is  utterly  unethical :  that  it  is  altogether  fatal  to  that 
human  freedom  which  is  the  essence  of  pensonality.  It  is  expounded,  in 
different  forms,  by  two  very  different  schools.  The  one  is  what  we  may 
call  the  German  school  of  political  mysticism  :  a  philosophical  travesty  of 
the  old  very  unphilosophical  legitimism,  which  invests  the  State  —  the 
monarchical  State  —  with  theocratic  attributes,  and  imposes  on  the  sub- 
ject the  one  duty,  to  obey.  .  .  . 

The  other  —  a  far  more  influential  school  in  contemporar\'  Europe  — 
is  the  Jacobin  or  ultra-Radical  school  which,  consciously  or  unconsciously, 
represents  the  sophisms  of  Rousseau.  This  school  insists  that  man  be- 
longs wholly  to  the  State :  the  falsely  democratic  State  resting  up<jn  a 
fictitious  universal  suffrage.  .  .  . 

The  opposite  error  to  this  false  paternalism  is  the  false  individualism 
professing  the  doctrine  of  laissezfaire,  which  sees  in  civil  society  nothing 
more  than  a  struggle  for  existence  among  millions  of  human  atoms ; 
which  regards  the  function  of  the  State  as  nothing  more  than  to  keep 
the  ring  while  they  fight. 

II.    Individualism 

468.  Anarchism.  The  nature  of  anarchism,  the  extreme  form 
of  individualism,  is  stated  in  the  following : 

Anarchy  means,  in  its  ideal  sense,  the  perfect,  unfettered  self-govern- 
ment of  the  individual,  and,  consequently,  the  absence  of  any  kind  of 
external  government.  This  fundamental  formula,  which  in  its  essence 
is  common  to  all  actual  and  real  Theoretical  Anarchists,  contains  all  that 
is  necessary  as  a  guide  to  the  distinguishing  features  of  this  remarkable 
movement.  It  demands  the  unconditional  realization  of  freedom.  lx)th 
subjectively  and  objectively,  equally  in  political  and  in  economic  life.  In 
this.  Anarchism  is  distinct  from  Liberalism,  which,  even  in  its  most  radi- 
cal representatives,  only  allows  unlimited  freedom  in  economic  affairs, 
but  has  never  questioned  the  necessity  of  some  compulsor>'  organization 
in  the  social  relationships  of  individuals ;  whereas  .Anarchism  would  ex- 
tend the  Liberal  doctrine  of  laisscr  fairc  to  all  human  action,  and  would 


482  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

recognize  nothing  but  a  free  convention  or  agreement  as  the  only  permis- 
sible form  of  human  society.  But  the  formula  stated  above  distinguishes 
Anarchism  much  more  strongly  (because  the  distinction  is  fundamental) 
from  its  antithesis,  Socialism,  which,  out  of  the  celebrated  trinity  of  the 
French  Revolution,  has  placed  the  figure  of  Equality  upon  a  pedestal  as 
its  only  deity.  Anarchism  and  Socialism,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  they  are 
so  often  confused,  both  intentionally  and  unintentionally,  have  only  one 
thing  in  common,  namely,  that  both  are  forms  of  idolatry,  though  they 
have  different  idols  ;  both  are  religions  and  not  sciences,  dogmas  and  not 
speculations.  Each  of  them  is  a  kind  of  honestly  meant  social  mysticism, 
which,  partly  anticipating  the  possible  and  perhaps  even  probable  results 
of  yet  unborn  centuries,  urges  upon  mankind  the  establishment  of  a 
terrestrial  Eden,  of  a  land  of  the  absolute  Ideal,  whether  it  be  Freedom 
or  Equality.   .  .  . 

And  that  is  what  Anarchism  undoubtedly  is :  a  theory,  an  idea,  with 
all  the  failings  and  dangers,  but  also  with  all  the  advantages  which  a 
theory  always  possesses ;  with  just  as  much,  and  only  as  much,  validity 
as  a  theory  can  demand  as  its  due,  but  at  any  rate  a  theory  as  old  as 
human  civilization,  because  it  goes  back  to  the  most  powerful  civilizing 
factor  in  humanity. 

469.  The  individualistic  theory.  The  nature  of  individualism 
and  its  relation  to  anarchism  appear  in  the  following :  ^ 

According  to  the  individualistic  school,  the  importance  of  the  so-called 
private  rights  of  property,  life,  and  liberty  is  greatly  emphasized,  and  the 
proper  province  of  the  State  held  to  be  limited  solely  to  the  protection  of 
them.  The  coercive  power  of  the  State  according  to  this  view  is  regarded 
as  a  necessary  evil,  being  required  only  because  of  the  weakness  and  im- 
perfectness  of  man's  moral  nature.  Hence,  it  is  held  that,  with  a  devel- 
oping sense  of  order  and  morality,  the  State's  importance  will  diminish, 
until,  when  the  millennium  shall  arrive,  its  absolute  vanishing  point  will 
be  reached.  At  this  point  individualism  merges  into  anarchism  pure  and 
simple,  and  the  two  views  are  thus  distinguishable  only  by  the  fact  that, 
while  the  anarchist  would  depend  upon  such  occasional  coercion  as  vol- 
untary association  would  provide,  until  this  moral  perfection  of  man  is 
attained,  the  individualist  advocates  the  exercise,  until  then,  of  police 
powers  by  a  regularly  constituted  State. 

470.  Functions  of  government  according  to  individualism.  Sidg- 
wick  states  as  follows  the  proper  functions  of  government  according 
to  the  individualistic  theory  : 

^  Copyright,  1896,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


I. 


THE  PROVINCE  OF  GOVERNMENT  4.S3 

To  protect  the  interests  of  the  community  generally  and  individual 
citizens  so  far  as  may  be  necessary  from  the  attacks  of  foreign  states. 

2.  To  guard  individual  citizens  from  physical  injury,  constraint,  insult, 
or  damage  to  reputation,  caused  by  the  intentional  or  culpable  careless 
action  of  other  individuals. 

3.  To  guard  their  property  from  detriment  similarly  caused;  which 
involves  the  function  of  determining  doubtful  points  as  to  the  extent 
and  content  of 'the  right  of  property  and  the  modes  of  legally  acquir- 
ing it. 

4.  To  prevent  deception  leading  to  the  detriment  of  person  or 
property. 

5.  To  enforce  contracts  made  by  adults  in  full  possession  of  their 
reasoning  faculties,  and  not  obtained  by  coercion  or  misrepresentation 
nor  injurious  to  other  persons. 

6.  To  protect  in  a  special  degree  persons  unfit,  through  age  or  men- 
tal disorder,  to  take  care  of  their  own  interests. 

471.  Defense  of  the  individualistic  theory.  The  argument  in 
favor  of  the  laisscs-faire  theory  in  politics  rests  on  the  following 
grounds.  It  emphasizes  the  rights  of  the  individual  and  lays  stre.ss 
oh  the  value  of  competition  and  initiative. 

In  defense  of  the  individualistic  conception  of  the  sphere  of  state 
activity  it  is  argued,  in  the  first  place,  that  considerations  of  justice 
require  that  the  individual  shall  be  let  alone  by  the  state  in  order  that 
he  may  realize  fully  and  completely  the  ends  of  his  existence.  .  .  . 
According  to  their  views  it  is  necessary  to  the  harmonious  development 
of  all  the  powers  of  the  individual  that  he  should  be  interfered  with  as 
little  as  possible  by  the  state,  because  every  restriction  upon  his  freedom 
of  action  tends  to  destroy  his  sense  of  initiative  and  self-reliance,  weaken 
his  responsibility  as  a  free  agent,  impair  his  energies,  and  blunt  his 
character.  .  .  . 

Free  competition  develops  in  the  individual  the  highest  possibilities, 
sharpens  and  strengthens  his  powers  of  initiative,  and  increases  his  sense 
of  self-reliance ;  while  overgovernment  not  only  hampers  enterprise  and 
interferes  with  the  natural  development  of  trade,  but  it  strikes  at  the 
development  of  character,  tends  to  crush  out  individuality  and  originality 
by  interfering  with  the  natural  struggle  between  individuals,  and  leads 
to  a  general  lowering  of  the  social  level.  The  highest  civilization,  say 
the  laissez-faire  advocates,  has  been  developed  under  individualism,  a 
system  which  has  produced  more  material  and  educational  progress  than 
could  ever  have  been  produced  under  paternalism.  .  .  . 


484  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

The  laissez-faire  principle,  say  its  advocates,  rests  also  upon  sound 
considerations  of  a  scientific  character.  It  is  in  harmony  with  the  prin- 
ciple of  evolution,  since  it  is  the  only  system  that  will  lead  to  the  sur- 
vival of  the  fittest  in  the  economic  struggle.  It  assumes  that  self-interest 
is  a  universal  principle  in  human  nature,  that  each  individual  is  a  better 
judge  of  what  his  own  interests  are  than  any  government  can  possibly 
be,  and  that  if  left  alone  he  will  follow  them.^  ...  By  leaving  each  indi- 
vidual to  do  unaided  that  for  which  he  is  best  fitted,  the  strong  and  fit 
classes  survive,  the  unfit  elements  are  eliminated,  and  thus  the  good  of 
society  is  promoted. 

Again,  and  this  is  most  important  in  the  arguments  of  the  laissez- 
faire  theorists,  the  policy  of  noninterference  rests  upon  sound  economic 
principles.  Better  economic  results,  it  is  asserted,  are  obtained  for  society 
by  leaving  the  conduct  of  industry  as  far  as  possible  to  private  enter- 
prise. .  .  .  The  self-interest  of  the  consumer  will  lead  to  the  demand 
for  the  things  that  are  most  useful  to  society,  while  the  self-interest  of 
the  producer  will  lead  to  their  production  at  the  least  cost.  .  .  .  Un- 
restricted competition  stimulates  economic  production,  tends  to  keep 
wages  and  prices  at  a  normal  level,  to  prevent  usurious  rates  of  interest, 
to  secure  efficient  service  and  the  production  of  better  products  than 
can  be  obtained  by  state  regulation  or  state  management. 

The  experience  of  the  past,  say  the  laissez-faire  advocates,  abundantly 
establishes  the  wisdom  of  the  noninterference  principle.  History  is  full 
of  examples  of  attempts  to  fix  by  fiat  of  the  state  the  prices  of  food  and 
clothing  and  of  many  other  commodities  ;  of  laws  regulating  the  wages 
of  labor,  etc.  .  .  .  Most  of  such  legislation  was  mischievous  and  destruc- 
tive of  the  ends  which  it  was  intended  to  secure,  and  the  results  which 
were  sought  for  could  have  been  more  effectively  obtained  by  allowing  -. 
every  man  to  sell  his  labor  and  goods  whenever  and  wherever  he  M 
wished.   .   .   . 

Finally,  the  laissez-faire  theorists  argue  that  it  is  a  false  assumption 
which  attributes  omniscience  and  infallibility  to  the  state  and  which  re- 
gards it  as  better  fitted  to  judge  of  the  needs  of  the  individual,  and  to 
provide  for  them  than  he  is  himself.  There  is,  they  assert,  a  common 
belief  that  governments  are  capable  of  doing  anything  and  everything, 
and  of  doing  it  more  efficiently  than  it  can  be  done  by  private  initiative, 
when,  in  reality,  experience  and  reason  show  the  contrary  to  be  the 
fact.  .  .  .  The  great  majority  of  things  are  worse  done,  they  declare, 
when  done  by  government  than  when  done  by  individuals  who  are  most 
interested,  for  the  people  understand  their  own  business  better  and  care 
for  it  better  than  any  government  can. 

1  Cf.  Willoughby,  "  The  Nature  of  the  State,"  p.  326. 


THE  PROVINCE  OF  GOVERNMENT       4S5 

472.  Criticism  of  the  individualistic  theory.    The  weakness  of 

the    theory,   under    modern  conditions,   becomes   evident   in   the 
following : 

The  individualistic  theory  of  state  functions  has  been  criticized  upon 
various  grounds.  First  of  all,  the  assumption  that  the  state  is  an  evil 
has  not  been  borne  out  by  the  experience  of  mankind  under  the  regime 
of  state  organization.  History,  in  fact,  shows  unmistakably  that  the 
progress  of  civilization  in  the  past  has  been  promoted  to  a  very  large 
degree  by  wisely  directed  state  action.  .  .  .  The  function  of  the  state  in 
the  complex  civilization  of  to-day  is  not  merely  repressive ;  ...  it  has 
a  higher  mission  than  that  of  restraint  and  punishment. 

So  long  as  men  live  in  groups  they  will  have  collective  wants  which 
can  only  be  satisfied  through  state  organization,  and  hence  there  is  no 
reason  for  believing  that  the  necessity  for  the  stale  will  ever  disappear 
or  that  the  role  which  it  now  plays  in  the  life  of  human  societies  will 
ever  diminish.  On  the  contrary,  all  the  signs  indicate  that  with  the  in- 
creasing complexity  of  modern  civilization  the  need  for  state  action  will 
become  stronger  and  its  role  more  extensive.  .  .  . 

The  view  of  the  laissez-faire  advocates  that  state  intervention  in  the 
interest  of  the  common  good  necessarily  involves  a  curtailment  of  indi- 
vidual freedom  rests  on  an  assumption  that  is  true  only  within  ver)-  re- 
stricted limits.  It  is  a  very  narrow  view  indeed  which  sees  in  a  factor)' 
act,  a  pure-food  law,  or  a  quarantine  regulation  nothing  but  an  infringe- 
ment upon  the  domain  of  individual  liberty.  The  rights  of  all  are  en- 
larged and  secured  by  wise  restrictions  upon  the  actions  of  each.  .  .  . 
In  reality  wisely  organized  and  directed  state  action  not  only  enlarges 
the  moral,  physical,  and  intellectual  capacities  of  individuals,  but  increases 
their  liberty  of  action  by  removing  obstacles  placed  in  their  way  by  the 
strong  and  self-seeking,  and  thus  frees  them  from  the  necessity  of  a 
perpetual  struggle  with  those  who  would  take  advantage  of  their 
weakness.  .  ,  . 

The  chief  fault  of  the  individualists  is  that  they  exaggerate  the  evils 
of  state  regulation  and  minimize  the  advantages;  they  misunderstand 
the  true  nature  and  limits  of  liberty  and  have  a  mistaken  idea  of  the 
relation  of  the  individual  to  the  society  of  which  he  is  a  part.  .  .  . 
Their  doctrine  rests  on  the  assumption  that  the  individual  is  largely  a 
thing  apart  from  the  group  of  which  he  is  a  member,  that  he  can  he  sep- 
arated from  society  and  treated  as  though  his  interests  were  entirely 
distinct  from  the  interests  of  his  fellow  men.  ... 

The  laissez-faire  writers  never  tire  of  parading  and  exaggerating  the 
mistakes  which  governments  have  made  in  the  jxist,  and  when  they  are 


486  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

all  collected  and  put  on  exhibition,  they  constitute  what  to  some  is  a 
strong  indictment  against  state  interference.  ...  It  may  readily  be 
admitted,  observes  an  able  writer,  that  government  is  weak  and  inefficient 
at  times  and  obedient  to  private  interests,  but  it  does  not  follow  from 
such  an  admission  that  government  ought  to  be  made  "  weaker,  corrupter, 
and  more  inefficient  by  practicing  the  illogical  doctrine  of  laissez  faire." 

The  laissez-faire  assumption  that  each  individual  knows  his  own  inter- 
ests better  than  the  state  can  know  them,  and  is  therefore  the  best  judge 
of  what  is  good  for  him  and  if  left  to  himself  will  follow  those  interests, 
is  true  only  in  a  limited  sense,  and  is  still  less  true  of  classes.  .  .  . 

Not  only  is  the  individual  not  always  a  competent  judge  of  his  own 
interests  as  an  economic  consumer,  but  in  affairs  of  personal  conduct  he 
is  often  not  to  be  trusted,  particularly  in  matters  relating  to  his  health 
or  safety  or  moral  welfare.  The  truth  is  the  state  may  be  a  better  judge 
of  a  man's  intellectual,  moral,  or  physical  needs  than  he  is  himself,  and 
it  may  rightfully  protect  him  from  disease  and  danger  against  his  wishes 
and  compel  him  to  educate  his  children  and  to  live  a  decent  life. 

The  practice  of  all  modern  states  is  in  fact  in  harmony  with  this  view. 
Few,  if  any,  governments  leave  their  citizens  to  find  out  for  themselves 
what  is  healthy  food  ;  what  physicians,  surgeons,  and  druggists  are  quali- 
fied to  practice ;  or  what  conditions  of  work  are  safe  or  dangerous.  .  .  . 

Much  of  the  individualistic  distrust  of  government  is  due,  as  Sir 
Frederick  Pollock  has  pointed  out,  to  the  failure  to  distinguish  between 
centralized  government  and  local  self-government.  A  good  deal  of  the 
objection  which  the  individualists  urge  against  government  would  be 
justified  if  it  were  centralized  government  that  is  complained  of,  but  the 
objection  is  not  always  well  founded,  when  directed  against  local  gov- 
ernment, through  local  bodies  directly  under  the  eye  of  the  people 
concerned.  .  .  . 

Spencer's  doctrine  of  "  negative  regulation,"  which  would  limit  the 
function  of  the  state  to  redressing  rather  than  preventing  wrongs,  would 
in  many  instances  defeat  the  ends  of  the  state.  .  .  .  We  agree  with  Sir 
Frederick  Pollock  that  if  it  is  negative  and  proper  regulation  to  say  that 
a  man  shall  be  punished  for  building  his  house  in  a  city  so  that  it  falls 
into  the  street,  it  cannot  be  positive  and  improper  regulation  to  say  that 
he  shall  so  build  it  that  it  will  not  appear  to  competent  persons  likely 
to  fall  into  the  city  street.  .  .  .  The  freedom  of  contract  is  a  taking 
phrase,  as  has  been  aptly  remarked,  and  to  many  it  is  a  conclusive 
argument  against  state  intervention  in  industrial  matters ;  but  when  it 
refers  to  an  agreement  between  a  capitalist  and  an  ignorant  laborer  who 
is  at  the  mercy  of  his  employer,  there  is  no  equality.  The  doctrine  of 
freedom  has  no  sanctity  in  such  cases. 


I 


THE  PROVINCE  OF  GOVERNMENT  487 

III.    Socialism 

473.  Origin  of  socialism.  The  conditions  that  gave  rise  to  the 
modern  theory  of  socialism  are  described  as  follows  by  a  brilliant 
French  writer : 

In  the  nineteenth  century  there  has  been  a  complete  revolution  in  the 
organization  of  labor.  In  the  eighteenth  century  there  were  as  yet  few 
large  cities  and  almost  no  great  factories.  The  regulations  of  the  trades 
did  not  permit  an  employer  to  have  more  than  three  or  four  workmen. 
These  journeymen,  as  they  were  called,  worked  in  the  shop  with  their 
employer,  as  the  artisans  in  our  small  towns  still  do ;  after  a  few  years 
they  themselves  became  employers. 

In  our  day  the  great  industry  has  been  created.  In  order  to  utilise 
the  power  of  machines,  a  great  number  of  workmen  arc  gathered  in  the 
same  factory ;  in  order  to  furnish  fuel  to  those  machines,  mines  have 
been  opened  which  give  work  to  thousands  of  men.  The  absolute 
liberty  of  industry,  established  at  the  demand  of  the  economists,  has 
permitted  the  proprietors  of  factories  and  mines  to  employ  hundreds  of 
workmen  in  their  service  by  simply  pledging  them  .a  certain  sum  per 
day.  Then  began  the  separation  of  the  manufacturers,  who  possessed 
capital,  and  the  workmen,  who  rented  out  their  labor  for  a  certain  wage. 
This  was  called  the  conflict  of  capital  and  wages.  .  .  .  The  manu- 
facturers form  a  part  of  the  upper  classes,  the  wage  earners  find  them- 
selves in  a  condition  unknown  before  the  nineteenth  century.  They  live 
in  the  town  where  their  factory  is  situated,  but  nothing  holds  them 
there.  If  the  factory  should  have  no  need  of  them,  they  hope  to  find  a 
better  place  elsewhere ;  they  will  go  to  the  other  end  of  the  land  in 
order  to  find  work  in  another  town.  Therefore,  they  have  no  fi.xcd 
habitation.  They  live  like  nomads,  ever  ready  to  depart.  'I'hey  possess 
nothing,  having  only  their  wages  to  live  on.  The  wages  depend  on  the 
labor,  and  there  is  no  guarantee  that  they  will  always  have  labor,  for  their 
employer  engages  them  by  the  day  or  week,  and  does  not  agree  to  keep 
them  beyond  that  time. 

Thus,  beside  the  peasant  and  artisan  classes  already  established, 
there  arose  a  new  class  formed  of  workers  in  factories  and  of  miners. 
To  this  body  was  given  the  old  Roman  name  proletariat  (those  whose 
only  wealth  is  in  their  children).  .  .  .  The  members  of  the  mcxlem 
proletariat  are  assuredly  better  fed,  better  lodged,  and  the  object  of  less 
scorn  than  were  the  common  people  of  the  Middle  Ages.  However, 
they  are  much  more  discontented.  They  are  not  comfortable  becau.se 
they  have  no  abiding  place,  and  cannot  count  upon  the  future.    At  iJk* 


488  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

same  time,  since  society  has  become  so  democratic,  they  hear  con- 
tinually that  all  men  are  equal  before  the  law,  and  that  they  have  the 
same  political  rights  as  the  wealthy  class.  They  have  ceased  to  be 
resigned  to  their  fate,  and  have  set  about  demanding  a  change  in 
conditions. 

The  economists  of  the  eighteenth  century  taught  that  poverty  is  the 
result  of  natural  laws,  and  that  it  is  inevitable.  ...  In  the  nineteenth 
century  some  theorists  appeared  who  argued  from  a  contrary  principle. 
They  said  that  poverty  comes  from  the  unequal  division  of  wealth  — 
some  have  too  much,  others  too  litde ;  society  is  badly  organized,  the 
state  ought  to  make  it  over  in  such  a  way  as  to  diminish  this  inequality. 
A  social  revolution  is  necessary.  These  partisans  of  revolution  were 
called  Socialists,  and  their  doctrine  was  denominated  socialism.  The 
Socialists  all  agree  in  attacking  our  system  of  property  ownership,  and 
demand  the  intervention  of  the  state  for  the  purpose  of  establishing 
another  system.  But  they  do  not  agree  on  what  ought  to  take  the  place 
of  the  one  now  existing.    Therefore,  they  cannot  form  one  school. 

474.  Development  of  socialism.  A  leading  American  socialist 
outlines  the  various  phases  through  which  the  movement  has  passed. 

In  its  first  phases,  socialism  was  a  humanitarian  rather  than  a  political 
movement.  The  early  socialists  did  not  analyze  the  new  system  of 
production  and  did  not  penetrate  into  its  historical  significance  or 
tendencies.  The  evils  of  that  system  appeared  to  them  as  arbitrary 
deviations  from  the  "  eternal  principles  "  of  "  natural  law,"  justice,  and 
reason,  and  the  social  system  itself  as  a  clumsy  and  malicious  con- 
trivance of  the  dominant  powers  in  society. 

True  to  their  theory  that  social  systems  are  made  and  unmade  by  the 
deliberate  acts  of  men,  they  usually  invented  a  more  or  less  fantastic 
scheme  of  social  organization  supposed  to  be  free  from  the  abuses  of 
modern  civilization,  and  invited  humanity  at  large  to  adopt  it. 

The  scheme  was,  as  a  rule,  unfolded  by  its  author  by  means  of  a 
description  of  a  fictitious  country  with  a  mode  of  life  and  form  of 
government  to  suit  his  own  ideas  of  justice  and  reason,  and  the  favorite 
form  of  the  description  was  the  novel.  The  happy  country  thus  described 
was  the  Utopia,  hence  the  designation  of  the  author  as  "  Utopian." 

That  these  theories  should  have  frequently  led  in  practice  to  the 
organization  of  communistic  societies  as  a  social  experiment,  was  but 
natural  and  logical. 

The  Utopian  socialists  knew  of  no  reason  why  their  plans  of  social 
organization  should  not  work  in  a  more  limited  sphere  just  as  satis- 
factorily as  on  a  national  scale,  and  they  fondly  hoped  that  they  would 


THE  PROVINCE  OF  GOVERNMENT      489 

gradually  convert  the  entire  world  to  their  system  by  a  practical 
demonstration  of  its  feasibility  and  benefits  in  a  miniature  society. 

Utopian  socialism  was  quite  in  accord  with  the  idealistic  philosophy 
of  the  French  Encyclopedists,  and  lasted  as  long  as  that  philosophy 
retained  its  sway. 

The  middle  of  the  last  century,  however,  witnessed  a  great  change  in 
all  domains  of  human  thought ;  speculation  gave  way  to  research,  and 
positivism  invaded  all  fields  of  science,  ruthlessly  destroying  old  idealisms 
and  radically  revolutionizing  former  views  and  methods. 

At  the  same  time  the  mysteries  and  intricacies  of  the  capitalist  system 
of  production  were  gradually  unfolding  themselves,  and  the  adepts  of 
the  young  social  science  began  to  feel  that  their  theories  and  systems 
required  a  thorough  revision. 

This  great  task  was  accomplished  toward  the  end  of  tlie  forties  of 
the  last  century  chiefly  through  the  efforts  of  Karl  Manx,  the  founder 
of  modern  socialism.  Marx  did  for  sociology  what  Darwin  did  later  for 
biology ;  he  took  it  out  from  the  domain  of  vague  speculation  and 
placed  it  on  the  more  solid  basis  of  analysis.  .  .  . 

The  social  theories  of  Karl  Marx  and  the  movement  based  on  them 
are  styled  Modern  or  Scientific  socialism  in  contradistinction  to  i  'topian 
socialism. 

Modern  socialism  proceeds  from  the  theory  that  the  social  and  political 
structure  of  society  at  any  given  time  and  place  is  not  the  result  of  tlie 
free  and  arbitrary  choice  of  men,  but  the  legitimate  outcome  of  a  definite 
process  of  historical  development,  and  that  the  underlying  foundation  of 
such  structure  is  at  all  times  the  economic  basis  upon  which  society  is 
organized. 

As  a  logical  sequence  from  these  premises,  it  follows  that  a  fonn  of 
society  will  not  be  changed  at  any  given  time  unless  the  economic  devel- 
opment has  made  it  ripe  for  the  change,  and  that  the  future  of  human 
society  must  be  looked  for,  not  in  the  ingenious  schemes  or  inven- 
tions of  any  social  philosopher,  but  in  the  tendencies  of  the  economic 
development. 

Contemporary  socialism  thus  differs  from  the  early  utojMan  phase  of 
the  movement  in  all  substantial  points.  It  does  not  base  its  hopes  on 
the  good  will  or  intelligence  of  men,  but  on  the  modern  tendency  toward 
socialization  of  the  industries.  It  does  not  offer  a  fantastic  scheme  of  a 
perfect  social  structure,  but  advances  a  realistic  theory  of  gradual  social 
progress.  It  does  not  address  its  appeals  to  humanity  at  large,  but 
confines  itself  principally  to  the  working  class,  as  the  class  primarily 
interested  in  the  impending  social  change.  It  does  not  experiment  in 
miniature  social  communities,  but  directs  its  efforts  toward  the  industrial 


490 


READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


and  political  organization  of  the  working  class,  so  as  to  enable  that  class 
to  assume  the  control  of  the  economic  and  political  affairs  of  society 
when  the  time  will  be  ripe  for  the  change. 

475.  The  elements  of  socialism.  The  following  may  be  consid- 
ered the  essential  points  in  socialistic  theory  : 

Socialism,  when  analyzed,  is  found  to  embrace  four  main  elements. 
The  first  of  these  is  the  common  ownership  of  the  material  instruments 
of  production.  .  .  . 

Attention  must  be  called,  also,  to  the  statement  that  It  is  the  material 
instruments  of  pro  duetto  ?i  which  are  to  be  owned  in  common,  and  not  all 
wealth.  That  wealth  which  is  not  designed  for  further  production  can 
still  remain  private  property  under  socialism.  This  means  wealth  used 
for  enjoyment  rather  than  for  production.  .  .  . 

The  second  element  in  socialism  is  the  common  management  of  pro- 
duction. Not  only  are  the  material  instruments  of  production  to  be  owned 
in  common,  but  they  are  to  be  managed  by  the  collectivity,  in  order  that 
to  the  people  as  a  whole  may  accrue  all  the  benefits  of  management; 
that  is,  all  those  gains  of  enterprise  called  profits,  as  distinguished  from 
interest,  and  in  order  that  the  management  may  be  conducted  in  accord- 
ance with  the  public  need,  rather  than  in  accordance  with  the  advantage 
of  private  captains  of  industry.  .  .  . 

The  third  element  is  the  distribution  of  income  by  the  common  author- 
ity ;  that  is,  the  income  of  society,  or  the  national  dividend,  as  it  is  fre- 
quently called :  and  it  is  that  part  of  the  wealth  produced  by  society 
which  may  be  used  for  enjoyment,  after  the  material  instruments  of  pro- 
duction have  been  maintained  and  suitably  improved  and  extended.  .  .  . 

The  fourth  element  in  socialism  is  private  property  in  the  larger  pro- 
portion of  income.  It  thus  becomes  at  once  apparent  that  modern  social- 
ism does  not  propose  to  abolish  private  property.  Quite  the  contrary. 
Socialism  maintains  that  private  property  is  necessary  for  personal  free- 
dom and  the  full  development  of  our  faculties.  The  advantages  of  pri- 
vate property  are  claimed  by  the  advocates  of  the  existing  social  order  as 
arguments  for  its  maintenance ;  but  socialism  asserts  that  society,  as  at 
present  constituted,  is  unable  to  secure  to  each  one  the  private  property 
which  he  requires.  Socialism  proposes  to  extend  the  institution  of  private 
property  in  such  manner  as  to  secure  to  each  individual  in  society  property 
in  an  annual  income,  which  shall  be,  so  far  as  practicable,  sufficient  to 
satisfy  all  rational  wants.  .  .  . 

The  results  of  the  analysis  of  socialism  may  be  brought  together  in  a 
definition  which  would  read  somewhat  as  follows :  Socialism  is  that  con- 
templated systcTn  of  industrial  society  which  proposes  the  abolition  of  private 


THE  PROVINCE  OF  GOVERNMENT  491 

property  in  the  great  material  instruments  of  production,  and  the  substitu- 
tion therefor  of  collective  property ;  and  advocates  the  collective  management 
of  production,  together  imth  the  distnhution  of  social  income  by  society,  and 
private  property  in  the  larger  proportion  of  this  social  income. 

476.  The  strength  of  socialism.  The  principal  arguments  ad- 
vanced in  favor  of  the  sociahstic  state  are  the  following : 

Under  the  present  system  of  economic  organization,  the  laboring  man 
does  not  receive  the  fruits  of  his  toil.  A  large  part  goes  to  reward  capital 
or  to  pay  for  the  services  of  those  who  direct  and  supervise  the  employ- 
ment of  labor,  or  to  speculators  and  middJemcn,  and  too  little  to  those 
who  are  the  real  producers.  In  short,  society  under  the  present  system 
is  organized  in  the  interests  of  the  rich. and  leads  to  grave  inequalities 
of  wealth  and  of  opportunity.  .  .  .  The  state  should  therefore  take  con- 
trol of  all  the  land  and  capital  or  means  of  production  now  being  used 
for  the  exclusive  benefit  of  the  owning  class.  Under  the  individualistic 
re'gime  industrial  competition  has  become  so  fierce  that  the  industrially 
weak  have  no  chance  of  success  and  cannot  survive  in  competition  with 
the  rich ;  they  are  growing  relatively  poorer  and  becoming  more  depend- 
ent upon  the  employing  class,  while  the  rich  are  growing  richer  and 
becoming  more  independent.  The  theory  of  socialism,  it  is  argued,  is 
founded  on  principles  of  justice  and  right.  The  land  and  the  mineral 
wealth  contained  therein  should  belong  equally  to  all,  not  to  a  few.  .  .  . 

Competition  under  the  present  system  not  only  leads  to  injustice  and 
the  crushing  out  of  the  small  competitor,  but  it  involves  enormous  eco- 
nomic waste  and  extravagance  in  the  duplication  of  services.  The  system 
of  unrestricted  competition  leads  to  lower  wages,  overproduction,  cheap 
goods,  and  unemployed  workers.  The  only  remedy  for  such  a  condition, 
say  the  socialists,  is  the  abolition  of  competition  and  the  substitution 
of  the  cooperative  principle,  under  which  equality  of  opportunity  and 
equality  of  reward  and  economy  of  production  will  be  secured.  I'nder 
the  socialistic  re'gime,  it  is  asserted,  a  higher  type  of  individual  character 
will  also  be  produced  and  a  larger  degree  of  real  freedom.  Such  indus- 
trial competition  as  we  have  to-day  tends  to  beget  materialism,  unfair- 
ness, dishonesty,  and  a  general  lowering  of  the  standard  of  individual 
character.  Man  needs,  therefore,  to  be  guided  and  aided  by  tiic  state 
and  protected  against  his  own  inherent  frailties. 

The  doctrine  of  socialism,  moreover,  is  really  in  harmony  with  the 
organic  theory  of  the  nature  of  the  state,  which  teaches  that  society  is 
an  organism,  not  a  mere  aggregation  of  individuals,  that  the  good  of  all 
is  paramount  to  that  of  a  few,  and  that  in  order  to  secure  the  got)d  of 


492 


READINGS   IN   POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


the  greatest  number   the  welfare  of  the  individual  as  such   must   be 
subordinated  to  that  of  the  many. 

Finally,  it  is  argued  by  the  socialists  that  the  state  has  already  abolished 
competition-  in  certain  fields  and  introduced  in  its  place  the  cooperative 
principle  and  has  demonstrated  its  success  as  an  industrial  manager  to 
the  entire  satisfaction  of  all  candid  and  thoughtful  men.  Government 
management  and  control  of  the  postal  service,  government  coinage,  gov- 
ernment ownership  and  operation  of  railroads,  telegraphs,  mines,  and 
other  industries  of  a  public  nature  in  various  countries  have  all  estab- 
lished the  advantages  of  collective  management  over  private  manage- 
ment, and  thus  fully  justified  the  wisdom  of  the  principle  of  socialism. 
.  .  .  Collective  ownership  and  management,  it  is  maintained,  is  thoroughly 
democratic ;  indeed,  socialism  is  the  "  economic  complement  of  democ- 
racy"; it  rests  upon  both  ethical  and  altruistic  principles  and  is  the  only 
system  under  which  efBciency  and  justice  in  production  can  be  secured 
and  under  which  a  full  and  harmonious  development  of  individual  char- 
acter can  be  realized. 

477.  The  weakness  of  socialism.  Ely  outlines  the  objections  to  a 
practical  application  of  socialistic  tlieor\'  under  the  following  heads :  ^ 

(i)  Strong  as  may  be  the  indictment  of  the  existing  industrial  system, 
it  is  not  sufficient  to  indicate  that  socialism  is  to  be  the  necessary  or  the 
desirable  outcome.  The  modern  machine  age  is  little  more  than  a  cen- 
tury old,  and  some  of  its  most  important  phases  are  very  recent.  The 
dire  predictions  made  by  Karl  Marx  and  his  followers  on  the  strength 
of  some  of  the  earliest  phenomena  of  the  factory  system  have  not  been 
borne  out,  and  similarly  the  evils'  of  to-day  may  possibly  be  very  largely 
eliminated  without  departing  from  our  fundamental  institutions.  In  short, 
the  first  weak  point  in  the  socialist's  position  is  that  he  attempts  to  pre- 
dict the  course  of  economic  evolution  too  far  in  advance.  That  we  shall 
have  a  juster  distribution  of  wealth  in  the  future,  and  that  we  shall  elimi- 
nate many  of  the  present  wastes  of  production  seems  probable,  but 
whether  this  will  be  accomplished  by  a  socialistic  organization  or  not,  it 
would  be  hazardous  to  predict.  .  .  . 

(2)  The  socialist  underestimates  the  efficiency  of  the  present  system. 
To-day  there  is  a  premium  on  energy  and  thrift.  Much  may  be  wasted, 
but  much  is  also  produced.  That  socialism  would  result  in  a  larger  sum 
total  of  goods  for  consumption  has  never  been  proved.  But  on  the  other 
hand,  we  can  say  that  the  present  regime  is  continually  offering  more  and 
more  to  the  mass  of  the  people.   .   .  . 

^  Copyright,  1908,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


THE  PROVINCE  OF  GOVERNMENT  493 

(3)  The  socialist  is  also  in  other  respects  too  pessimistic  with  respect 
to  the  present.  He  sees  all  of  the  starvation,  misery,  luxury,  and  ex- 
travagance, but  he  passes  by  the  millions  of  happy  homes  scattered 
throughout  the  land.  He  does  not  see  that  the  world  is  full  of  oppor- 
tunity for  the  rising  generation,  that  even  if  the  chance  for  the  owner- 
ship of  an  independent  business  for  the  ordinary  man  is  smaller,  the 
things  which  he  can  enjoy,  if  he  is  of  average  intelligence  and  energy, 
are  much  greater  than  ever  before  in  the  world's  history-. 

(4)  The  socialist  underestimates  the  importance  of  individual  respon- 
sibility. To-day  a  man  is  confronted  by  the  stern  necessity  of  making 
his  own  way,  and  this  must  have  some  good  effect  upon  character.  On 
the  whole,  the  lazy  and  incompetent  are  sifted  out.  Bad  heredity  and 
a  lack  of  proper  training  are  the  cause  of  a  good  deal  of  economic  mis- 
fortune. It  is  well  to  distinguish  the  criticism  here  made  from  the 
common  error  of  supposing  that  socialism  would  necessarily  crush 
individuality,  that   we  must  all  dress   and   eat  alike,  etc. 

(5)  The  socialist  underestimates  the  importance  of  free  enterprise  in 
industry.  If  a  man  now  believes  that  he  can  develop  a  certain  industry 
that  will  satisfy  important  wants  of  the  people  in  the  future,  he  does  not 
need  to  secure  the  consent  of  some  government  official  to  make  the 
experiment.  .   .  . 

(6)  Perhaps  the  most  frequently  mentioned  objection  to  socialism  is 
the  danger  to  liberty,  lender  socialism  there  would  be  simply  the  public 
sphere  of  employment,  and  there  is  reason  to  fear  that  the  inability  to 
escape  from  the  public  sphere  would  compel  the  submission  to  onerous 
and  tyrannical  conditions  imposed  by  the  administrative  heads  of  the 
business  in  which  one  might  be  engaged.  .  .  .  Those  in  whose  hands 
centered  political  and  economic  control  would  have  tremendous  power, 
however  they  might  be  selected  or  appointed.  As  in  the  religious  sphere 
in  the  past,  so  in  the  economic  sphere  in  the  future,  we  may  find  that 
compulsory  cooperation  is  incompatible  with  human  nature. 

(7)  The  Marxian  socialists  may  be  criticized  for  the  importance  which 
they  attach  to  the  economic  interpretation  of  historj-,  for  the  validity  of 
that  proposition  does  not  establish  the  validity  of  the  socialist  contention. 
If  it  be  true  that  our  social  life  is  a  reflex  of  our  economic  activity,  it 
still  does  not  necessarily  follow  that  our  economic  development  is  going 
to  be  such  as  will  land  us  in  socialism.  Their  doctrine  of  the  class  strug- 
gle also  does  not  give  an  accurate  account  of  existing  conditions.  We 
have  a  laboring  class  and  a  capitalist  class,  it  is  true,  but  there  is  also  a 
considerable  class,  perhaps  large  enough  to  hold  the  balance  of  power 
between  the  other  two,  which  dyes  not  sympathize  exclusively  with  cither 
labor  or  capital. 


494 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


IV.    Socialism  in  Present  Politics 


478.  Growth  of  socialism  in  Germany.  The  following  extract 
indicates  the  growing  strength  of  socialism  in  Germany  and  its 
unjust  representation  in  the  Reichstag : 

There  is  no  large  liberal  party  in  Germany  to  advocate  the  more 
democratic  institutions  of  responsible  ministers,  equal  electoral  districts, 
and  retrenchment  in  military  expenditures;  consequently  the  principal 
opposition  to  the  methods  of  William  II  comes  from  the  socialist  party 
which  steadily  increases  in  numbers  and  in  the  effectiveness  of  its  organ- 
ization. It  stoutly  resists  any  increase  in  expenditure  for  colonial  pur- 
poses, favors  international  peace,  and  scorns  the  "  divine  right "  theories 
of  the  emperor.  .  .  . 

The  steady  increase  of  socialism  is  shown  by  the  following  table : 


Year  of 
election 

Socialist 
votes 

Members 
elected 

Year  of 
election 

Socialist 
votes 

Members 
elected 

1877 
1 88 1 
1887 

493,288 
311,961 
763,000 

12 
12 

11 

1890 

1903 
1907 

1,497,298 
3,008,000 
3,251,009 

36 
81 

43 

Furthermore,  the  Reichstag  can  scarcely  be  regarded  as  really  repre- 
senting the  views  of  the  nation.  The  government  has  refused  to  revise 
the  apportionment  of  representatives  as  it  was  arranged  in  187 1,  al- 
though great  changes  have  taken  place  since  that  year.  As  a  result 
Berlin,  for  instance,  has  only  six  members  in  the  Reichstag,  although  its 
population  of  two  million  inhabitants  would  entitle  it  to  twenty.  This 
accounts  for  the  relatively  small  number  of  socialists  and  the  large  num- 
ber of  conservatives  in  the  parliament,  for  in  1907  the  socialists,  although 
they  could  muster  3,250,000  voters,  returned  only  43  members,  whereas 
the  conservatives  secured  83  seats  with  less  than  1,500,000  supporters, 
mainly  in  the  country  districts. 

479.  Causes  for  socialist  losses  in  Germany  in  1907.  Some  of 
the  reasons  for  the  relative  decline  in  the  socialist  vote  in  the  latest 
parliamentary  election  in  Germany  are  given  by  a  leading  German 
socialist  as  follows  : 

There  are  many  causes  to  explain  this  retrogression.  Thus,  the  inti- 
mate connection  of  the  Social  Democracy  with  the  centralized  trade  unions 
has  in  some  places  led  such  workers  as  belonged  to  other  unions  to  vote 


THE  PROVINCE  OF  GOVERNMENT  495 

against  the  party.  This  has  been  the  case  particularly  with  members 
of  the  Christian  Catholic  trade  unions,  which  in  several  places  had  can- 
didates of  their  own,  half  a  dozen  of  whom  have  been  elected.  The  con- 
nection of  the  Social  Democracy  with  the  most  militant  trade  unions 
and  the  tremendous  growth  of  the  latter  have  also  induced  many  small 
masters  who  formerly  had  voted  for  social-democratic  candidates  to  vote 
against  them  this  time.  The  same  has  been  the  case  with  a  number  of 
small  traders  because  of  the  promotion  of  cooperative  societies  by  the 
Social  Democracy.  In  rural  districts  small  farmers  have  turned  against 
it  (as  well  as  against  advanced  Radicals)  because  of  the  movement  for 
the  repeal  of  the  duties  on  pigs  and  pork.  They  were  delighted  with  the 
rise  in  price  of  the  animal  they  fed,  and  would  not  hear  of  the  change. 
To  use  Prince  Billow's  words,  it  was  in  many  districts  the  brave  swine 
that  saved  the  State.  And  similar  examples  of  an  estrangement  of  sec- 
tions of  the  popular  classes  from  the  Social  Democracy  were  found 
elsewhere. 

But  the  main  reason  of  the  failure  is  to  be  found  in  the  strong  com- 
bined action  of  almost  all  non-social-democratic  parties  and  their  agencies 
against  the  party  of  socialism,  which  is  based  on  the  class-war  theory. 
Never  before  have  these  parties  displayed  such  activity  as  at  this  time, 
and  never  have  they  been  so  united  in  their  opposition.  It  was  indeed  a 
great  social  reaction.  Bismarck  at  his  best  succeeded  in  getting  a  political 
combination  formed  that  included  the  two  Conservative  parties  and  the 
National  Liberals.  The  National  Combine  of  1906  embraced  all  these 
and  advanced  liberalism,  besides  including  the  South  German  Radical 
Democracy.  It  was,  so  to  speak,  a  united  effort  of  all  the  upholders  of 
the  present  state  of  society  against  social  revolution.  With  a  zeal  never 
displayed  before,  all  these  parties  canvassed  the  electors  and  fetched  them 
up  in  conveyances  of  all  sorts  to  the  polling  places. 

480.  Program  of  the  French  socialists.  The  Paris  Regional 
Congress  of  1880  drew  up  the  following  program.  With  slight 
changes  it  has  been  sanctioned  by  various  national  congresses 
and  still  remains  the  orthodox  statement  of  general  principles  of 
the  socialist  party  in  France. 

The  French  socialisdc  workingmen,  in  giving  as  the  aim  of  their 
efforts  in  the  economic  domain  the  return  to  the  collective  form  of  all 
the  means  of  production,  have  decided  as  a  method  of  organization 
and  of  strife  to  enter  into  the  elections  with  the  following  minimum 
program : 


496  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

A,  Political  Program 

I  St.  Abolition  of  all  laws  upon  the  press,  meetings  and  associations, 
and  especially  of  the  law  against  the  International  Association  of  Labor- 
ingmen.  —  Suppression  of  the  pass  book,  that  mise  en  carte  of  the  work- 
ing class  and  of  the  articles  of  the  Code  establishing  the  inferiority  of 
the  workingman  as  against  the  employer ; 

2d.  Suppression  of  the  religious  budget  and  return  to  the  nation  "  of 
the  properties  called  mortmain,  both  movable  and  immovable,  belonging 
to  the  religious  corporations,"  including  therein  all  the  industrial  and 
commercial  annexes  of  these  corporations ; 

3d.    General  arming  of  the  people  ; 

4th.  The  commune  to  be  the  mistress  of  its  own  administration  and 
police. 

B.  Economic  Program 

I  St.  Cessation  of  labor  for  one  day  per  week  or  legal  prohibition  for 
employers  operating  more  than  six  days  out  of  seven.  —  Reduction  of 
the  working  day  to  eight  hours  for  adults.  —  Prohibition  of  the  working 
of  children  under  14  years  in  private  factories;  and,  from  14  to  18 
years,  reduction  of  the  working  day  to  six  hours ; 

2d.  Legal  minimum  of  wages,  determined  each  year  according  to  the 
local  price  of  the  commodities  ; 

3d.    Equality  of  wages  for  the  workers  of  the  two  sexes ; 

4th.  Scientific  and  professional  instruction  for  all  the  children  placed 
for  their  support  under  the  charge  of  society,  represented  by  the  State 
and  the  communes ; 

5  th.  Placing  under  the  charge  of  society  the  aged  and  infirm  work- 
ingmen ; 

6th.  Suppression  of  all  interference  of  employers  in  the  administra- 
tion of  workingmen's  funds  for  mutual  relief,  of  provision,  etc.,  restored 
to  the  exclusive  management  of  the  workingmen  ; 

7  th.  Responsibility  of  employers  in  the  matter  of  accidents  guaran- 
teed by  a  money  deposit  paid  in  by  the  employer  and  proportioned 
to  the  number  of  workingmen  employed  and  the  dangers  which  the 
industry  presents ; 

8th.  Participation  in  the  formation  of  the  special  rules  of  the  differ- 
ent factories ;  suppression  of  the  right  usurped  by  employers  to  impose 
any  penalty  whatever  upon  their  workingmen  under  the  form  of  fines  or 
of  retentions  out  of  their  wages ; 

9  th.  Revision  of  all  contracts  which  have  alienated  public  property 
(banks,  railroads,  mines,  etc.),  and  the  control  of  all  the  factories  of 
the  State  intrusted  to  the  workingmen  who  labor  in  them ; 


THE  PROVINCE  OF  GOVERNMENT  497 

loth.  Abolition  of  all  indirect  taxes  and  transformation  of  all  the  direct 
taxes  into  a  progressive  tax  upon  incomes  in  excess  of  3000  francs. 
Suppression  of  inheritance  in  the  collateral  line  and  of  all  inheritance  in 
the  direct  line  exceeding  2000  francs. 

481.  Program  of  the  Social-Democratic  Federation  in  England. 

The  following  is  the  program  of  the   English   Social-Democratic 
Federation,  as  revised  at  the  annual  conference  of  1893  : 

Objfxt 

The  socialization  of  the  rheans  of  production,  distribution,  and  exchange, 
to  be  controlled  by  a  democratic  state  in  the  interests  of  the  entire  com- 
munity, and  the  complete  emancipation  of  labor  from  the  domination  of 
capitalism  and  landlordism,  with  the  establishment  of  social  and  economic 
equality  between  the  sexes. 

Program 

1.  All  officers  or  administrators  to  be  elected  by  equal  direct  adult 
suffrage,  and  to  be  paid  by  the  community. 

2.  Legislation  by  the  people  in  such  wise  that  no  project  of  law  shall 
become  legally  binding  till  accepted  by  the  majority  of  the  people. 

3.  The  abolition  of  a  standing  army,  and  the  establishment  of  a 
national  citizen  force;   the  people  to  decide  on  peace  or  war. 

4.  All  education,  higher  no  less  than  elementary,  to  be  compulsory, 
secular,  industrial,  and  gratuitous  for  all  alike. 

5.  The  administration  of  justice  to  be  gratuitous  for  all  members  of 
society. 

6.  The  land,  with  all  the  mines,  railways,  and  other  means  of  transit, 
to  be  declared  and  treated  as  collective  or  common  property. 

7.  The  means  of  production,  distribution,  and  exchange  to  be  declared 
and  treated  as  collective  or  common  property. 

8.  The  production  and  the  distribution  of  wealth  to  be  regulated  by 
society  in  the  common  interests  of  all  its  members. 

Palliatives 

As  measures  called  for  to  palliate  the  evils  of  our  existing  society,  the 
Social-Democratic  Federation  urges  for  immediate  adoption  : 

The  compulsory  construction  of  healthy  dwellings  for  the  people,  such 
dwellings  to  be  let  at  rents  to  cover  the  cost  of  construction  and  main- 
tenance alone. 

Free  secular  and  technical  education,  compulsoiy  upon  all  classes, 
together  with  free  maintenance  for  the  children  in  all  board  schools. 


498  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

Eight  hours  or  less  to  be  the  normal  working  day  fixed  in  all  trades 
and  industries,  by  legislative  enactment,  or  not  more  than  forty-eight 
hours  per  week,  penalties  to  be  inflicted  for  any  infringement  of  this  law. 

Cumulative  taxation  upon  all  incomes  exceeding  ^^300  a  year. 

State  appropriation  of  railways ;  municipal  ownership  and  control  of 
gas,  electric  light,  and  water  supplies ;  the  organization  of  tramway  and 
omnibus  services,  and  similar  monopolies  in  the  interests  of  the  entire 
community. 

The  extension  of  the  post-office  savings  bank,  which  shall  absorb 
all  private  institutions  that  derive  a  profit  from  operations  in  money 
or  credit.  ♦ 

Repudiation  of  the  national  debt. 

Nationalization  of  the  land,  and  organization  of  agricultural  and  indus- 
trial armies  under  state  or  municipal  control  on  cooperative  principles. 

As  means  for  the  peaceable  attainment  of  these  objects  the  Social- 
Democratic  Federation  advocates : 

Payment  of  members  of  parliament  and  all  local  bodies  and  official 
expenses  of  election  out  of  the  public  funds.  Adult  suffrage.  Annual 
parliaments.  Proportional  representation.  Second  ballot.  Abolition  of 
the  monarchy  and  the  House  of  Lords.  Disestablishment  and  disen- 
dowment  of  all  state  churches.  Extension  of  the  powers  of  county 
councils.  The  establishment  of  district  councils.  Legislative  independ- 
ence for  all  parts  of  the  empire. 

482.  Periods  of   socialist   development  in  the   United   States. 

After  the  various  Utopian  communistic  experiments  that  marked 
the  early  history  of  socialism  in  the  United  States,  the  progress  of 
the  movement  proper  may  be  divided  into  the  following  periods : 

The  first  beginnings  of  modern  socialism  appeared  on  this  continent 
before  the  close  of  the  first  half  of  the  last  century,  but  it  took  another 
half  a  century  before  the  movement  could  be  said  to  have  become  accli- 
matized on  American  soil.  The  history  of  this  period  of  the  socialist 
movement  in  the  United  States  may,  for  the  sake  of  convenience, 
although  somewhat  arbitrarily,  be  divided  into  the  following  four  periods  : 

1.  The  Ante-bellum  Period^  from  about  1848  to  the  beginning  of  the 
civil  war.  The  movement  of  that  period  was  confined  almost  exclusively 
to  German  immigrants,  principally  of  the  working  class.  It  was  quite 
insignificant  in  breadth  as  well  as  in  depth,  and  was  almost  entirely  swept 
away  by  the  excitement  of  the  civil  war. 

2.  The  Period  of  Organizatioti,  covering  the  decade  between  1867  and 
1877,  ^'^d  marked  by  a  succession  of  socialist  societies  and  parties,  first 


THE  PROVINCE  OF  GOVERNMENT  499 

on  a  local  then  on  a  national  scale,  culminating  finally  in  the  formation 
of  the  Socialist  Labor  Party. 

3 .  The  Period  of  the  Socialist  Labor  Party,  extending  over  twenty  years, 
and  marked  by  a  series  of  internal  and  external  struggles  over  the  ques- 
tion of  the  policy  and  tactics  of  the  movement. 

4.  Present-Day  Socialism,  which  embraces  the  period  of  the  last  few 
years,  and  is  marked  by  the  acclimatization  of  the  movement  and  the 
advent  of  the  Socialist  Pafiy. 

483.  Platform  of  the  Socialist  party  in  the  United  States.  The 
following  demands  are  contained  in  the  platform  drawn  up  by  the 
national  convention  of  the  Socialist  party  in  the  United  States  : 

While  we  declare  that  the  development  of  economic  conditions  tends 
to  the  overthrow  of  the  capitalist  system,  we  recognize  that  the  time  and 
manner  of  the  transition  to  socialism  also  depend  upon  the  stage  of 
development  reached  by  the  proletariat.  We  therefore  consider  it  of  the 
utmost  importance  for  the  Socialist  Party  to  support  all  active  efforts  of 
the  working  class  to  better  its  condition  and  to  elect  socialists  to  politi- 
cal ofBces,  in  order  to  facilitate  the  attainment  of  this  end. 

As  such  means  we  advocate  : 

1.  The  public  ownership  of  all  means  of  transportation  and  communi- 
cation and  all  other  public  utilities,  as  well  as  of  all  industries,  controlled 
by  monopolies,  trusts,  and  combines.  No  part  of  the  revenue  of  such 
industries  to  be  applied  to  the  reduction  of  taxes  on  property  of  the  cap- 
italist class,  but  to  be  applied  wholly  to  the  increase  of  wages  and  short- 
ening of  the  hours  of  labor  of  the  employees,  to  the  improvement  of  the 
service  and  diminishing  the  rates  to  the  consumers. 

2.  The  progressive  reduction  of  the  hours  of  labor  and  the  increase 
of  wages  in  order  to  decrease  the  share  of  the  capitalist  and  increase  the 
share  of  the  worker  in  the  product  of  labor. 

3.  State  or  national  insurance  of  working  people  in  case  of  acci- 
dents, lack  of  employment,  sickness,  and  want  in  old  age ;  the  funds  for 
this  purpose  to  be  collected  from  the  revenue  of  the  capitalist  class,  and 
to  be  administered  under  the  control  of  the  working  class. 

4.  The  inauguration  of  a  system  of  public  industries,  public  credit  to 
be  used  for  that  purpose  in  order  that  the  workers  be  secured  the  full 
product  of  their  labor. 

5.  The  education  of  all;  state  and  municipal  aid  for  books,  clothing, 
and  food. 

6.  Equal  civil  and  political  rights  for  men  and  women. 

7.  The  initiative  and  referendum,  proportional  representation,  and 
the  right  of  recall  of  representatives  by  their  constituents. 


500  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

484.  Platform  of  the  "  International."  The  following  platform 
was  adopted  by  the  International  Workingmen's  Association  at  the 
height  of  its  power,  and  has  since  been  adopted  by  several  socialist 
parties  as  their  national  platform  : 

In  consideration  that  the  emancipation  of  the  working  class  must  be 
accomplished  by  the  working  class  itself,  that  the  struggle  for  the  emanci- 
pation of  the  working  class  does  not  signify  a  struggle  for  class  privileges 
and  monopolies,  but  for  equal  rights  and  duties,  and  the  abolition  of 
class  rule ; 

That  the  economic  dependence  of  the  workingman  upon  the  owner 
of  the  tools  of  production,  the  sources  of  life,  forms  the  basis  of  every 
kind  of  servitude,  of  social  misery,  of  spiritual  degradation,  and  political 
dependence ; 

That,  therefore,  the  economic  emancipation  of  the  working  class  is  the 
great  end  to  which  every  political  movement  must  be  subordinated  as  a 
simple  auxiliary ; 

That  all  exertions  which,  up  to  this  time,  have  been  directed  toward 
the  attainment  of  this  end  have  failed  on  account  of  the  want  of  soli- 
darity between  the  various  branches  of  labor  in  every  land,  and  by  reason 
of  the  absence  of  a  brotherly  bond  of  unity  between  the  working  classes 
of  different  countries ; 

That  the  emancipation  of  labor  is  neither  a  local  nor  a  national,  but  a 
social  problem,  which  embraces  all  countries  in  which  modern  society 
exists,  and  whose  solution  depends  upon  the  practical  and  theoretical 
cooperation  of  the  most  advanced  countries ; 

That  the  present  awakening  of  the  working  class  in  the  industrial 
countries  of  Europe  gives  occasion  for  a  new  hope,  but  at  the  same  time 
contains  a  solemn  warning  not  to  fall  back  into  old  errors,  and  demands 
an  immediate  union  of  the  movements  not  yet  united ; 

The  First  International  Labor  Congress  declares  that  the  International 
Working-Men's  Association,  and  all  societies  and  individuals  belonging 
to  it,  recognize  truth,  right,  and  morality  as  the  basis  of  their  conduct 
toward  one  another  and  their  fellow  men,  without  respect  to  color,  creed, 
or  nationality.  This  Congress  regards  it  as  the  duty  of  man  to  demand 
the  rights  of  a  man  and  citizen,  not  only  for  himself,  but  for  every  one 
who  does  his  duty.    No  rights  without  duties ;  no  duties  without  rights. 


CHAPTER   XXV 

THE  FUNCTIONS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

I,    Classification  of  G(jvek.\mi:ntal  1'"unctions 

485.  The  actual  working  of  government.  In  his  presidential 
address,  delivered  before  the  annual  meeting  of  the  American 
Political  Science  Association  in  1909,  President  Lowell  emphasized 
the  importance  of  a  study  of  the  physiology  of  politics,  —  the 
actual  functioning  of  political  institutions. 

To  advocate  in  this  twentieth  century  the  importance  of  studying  the 
actual  working  of  government  may  seem  like  watering  a  garden  in  the 
midst  of  rain.  But  that  this  is  not  the  case  every  one  must  be  aware 
who  is  familiar  with  current  political  literature  on  such  living  topics 
as  proportional  representation,  the  referendum  and  initiative,  and  the 
reform  of  municipal  government.  These  discussions  are  for  the  most 
part  conducted  in  the  air.  They  are  theoretical,  treating  mainly  of  what 
ought  to  happen  rather  than  what  actually  occurs ;  and  even  when  they 
condescend  to  deal  with  facts  it  is  usually  on  a  limited  scale  with  very 
superficial  attention  to  the  conditions  under  which  the  facts  took  place. 
The  waste  of  precious  efforts  at  reform,  from  a  failure  to  grasp  the 
actual  forces  at  work,  is  indeed  one  of  the  melancholy  chapters  in  our 
history.  .  .  .  Reformers  are  prone  to  imagine  that  a  new  device  will 
work  as  they  intend  it  to  work,  and  are  disappointed  that  it  does  not 
do  so.  They  are  far  too  apt  to  assume  that  if  their  panacea  be  adopted 
mankind  will  become  regenerate ;  whereas  the  only  fair  supposition  is 
that  men  will  remain  under  any  system  essentially  what  they  are  —  a 
few  good,  a  few  bad,  and  the  mass  indifferent  to  matters  that  do  not 
touch  their  personal  interests.   .   .   . 

We  arc  all  familiar  with  cases  where  forms  of  government  have  been 
imitated  without  the  corresponding  fimctions  ;  where  institutions  have 
been  copied  under  conditions  in  which  they  could  not  produce  the  same 
effects  as  at  home.  A  well-known  example  of  this  is  the  attempt  of 
other  European  countries  to  adopt  the  English  parliamentar)^  system. 
The  system  has  yielded  in  new  lands  results  of  varying  merit ;  but  it 
has  not  worked  as  it  does  in  England,  because  the  environment  which 

SOI 


502  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

determined  the  real  functions  of  the  organs  of  government  could  not  be 
reproduced.  Yet  this  was  not  at  first  perceived;  and  although  that 
particular  fact  has  since  become  so  well  known  as  to  be  a  common- 
place, there  is  no  good  reason  to  assume  that  we  have  outgrown  the 
blindness  of  those  days.  We  are  ever  hearing  men  extol  the  virtues  of 
some  foreign  political  contrivance,  without  observing,  often  without 
stopping  to  inquire,  what  its  actual  mode  of  operation  may  be,  or 
whether  the  functions  of  the  organs  at  work  may  not  in  reality  be  quite 
different  from  what  they  appear.   .  .  . 

Surely,  enough  has  been  said  to  point  out  the  need  at  the  present 
day  of  a  greater  study  of  the  physiology  of  politics.  If  scientific 
methods  are  to  have  any  considerable  influence  on  public  affairs  in  this 
country,  if  American  scholarship  is  to  achieve  any  marked  advance  in 
political  science;  it  would  seem  to  be  essential  that  our  Association 
should  encourage  more  extensive  research  in  political  phenomena  from 
this  point  of  view. 

486.  Analysis  of  governmental  functions.  Willoughby  classifies 
the  functions  of  government  under  three  general  heads.^ 

First,  those  concerned  with  the  Power  of  the  State.  Under  this  head 
are  included,  in  very  large  measure,  the  essential  functions,  namely, 
those  that  concern  the  maintenance  of  order  and  the  preservation  of 
the  State's  political  autonomy  in  the  family  of  nations.  In  earlier  times 
this  was  almost  the  sole  conscious  aim  of  the  State.  In  those  times 
when  not  only  were  its  own  citizens  unaccustomed  to  order  and  obedi- 
ence to  law,  but  when  between  the  States  themselves  there  existed  a 
pure  struggle  for  existence  unmitigated  by  principles  of  international 
morality,  such  was  necessarily  the  case.  It  was  therefore  quite  essential 
that  the  functions  of  the  State  for  the  maintenance  of  itself  as  a  military 
power  should  dwarf,  by  their  importance,  the  value  of  political  and  civic 
rights,  and  that  therefore  these  latter  should  have  been  deemed  of  im- 
portance only  in  so  far  as  they  served  to  strengthen  the  power  of  the 
State.  .  .  . 

At  the  present  day,  the  relative  importance  of  this  aim  in  the  State's 
life  varies  according  to  conditions  and  circumstances.  In  Europe  it  still 
plays  a  very  prominent  part,  as  seen  in  the  energy  expended  in  the 
maintenance  of  navies  and  enormous  standing  armies.  Geographical 
situation  and  a  law-abiding  spirit  of  its  citizens  make  it  possible  for  the 
United  States  government  to  subordinate  this  aim  to  other  and  higher 
purposes.    Nevertheless,  while  the  enormous  power  of  our  State  is  thus 

^  Copyright,  1896,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


THE  FUNCTIONS  OF  GOVERNMENT  503 

for  the  most  part  dormant,  and  is  fully  manifested  only  in  times  of 
imminent  danger,  it  is  none  the  less  its  most  essential  attribute. 

The  second  aim  of  the  State  is,  or  should  be,  that  of  creating  and 
maintaining  the  widest  possible  degree  of  Liberty.  As  already  explained, 
this  includes  not  only  the  perfection  of  its  governmental  machiner)-, 
whereby  political  liberty  in  the  largest  possible  degree  shall  be  secured, 
but  also  the  guaranteeing  to  the  individual  of  as  wide  a  field  as  possible 
in  which  he  shall  have  a  freedom  of  action,  protected  at  once  from 
arbitrary  governmental  interference  and  private  molestation.  At  the 
same  time,  as  a  corollary  from  this,  the  action  of  the  State  should  be  so 
directed  as  to  render  its  citizens  progressively  more  capable  of  exercis- 
ing this  freedom.  Under  this  head  are  included,  therefore,  all  possible 
efforts  to  improve  the  State's  method  of  organization  and  administration, 
to  remove  selfish  and  class  interests  from  the  administration  of  public 
affairs,  and  thus  to  render  possible  not  only  the  formulation  of  an  in- 
telligent public  opinion,  but  a  realization  of  those  aims  that  this  opinion 
discloses  when  so  formulated. 

Thirdly,  and  finally,  there  are  those  functions  of  the  State,  that,  apart 
from  any  considerations  of  power  or  maintenance  of  individual  liberty, 
tend  by  their  exercise  to  promote  the  General  Welfare^  either  econom- 
ically, intellectually,  or  morally. 

487.  Classification  of  state  functions.  Garner  makes  also  a 
threefold  classification  of  governmental  functions,  but  from  a  dif- 
ferent point  of  view. 

The  functions  of  the  state  have  been  classified  by  many  writers  as : 
first,  those  which  are  necessary  and  indispensable ;  and,  second,  those 
which  are  optional ;  or,  simply  those  which  are  essential  and  those  which 
are  nonessential ;  or,  again,  those  which  are  socialistic  and  those  which 
are  not.  They  may  be  classified  more  exactly  as :  first,  those  which  are 
necessary  ;  second,  those  which  are  natural  or  normal  but  not  necessary  ; 
and,  third,  those  which  are  neither  natural  nor  necessary,  but  which  in 
fact  are  often  performed  by  modern  states.  .  .  .  What  are  called  the 
essential,  normal,  or  constituent  functions  are  such  as  all  governments 
miist  perform  in  order  to  justify  their  existence.  They  include  the 
maintenance  of  internal  peace,  order,  and  safety,  the  protection  of 
persons  and  property,  and  the  preservation  of  external  security.  They 
are  the  original  primary  functions  of  the  state,  and  all  states,  however 
rudimentary  and  undeveloped,  attempt  to  perform  them.  They  embrace 
the  larger  part  of  the  activities  of  the  state  and  have  to  do  principally  with 
the  conservation  of  society  and  only  secondarily  with  social  progress. 


504 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


By  natural  but  unnecessary  functions  are  meant  those  which  the 
state  may  leave  unperformed  or  unregulated  without  abandoning  a 
primary  duty  or  exposing  itself  to  the  dangers  of  anarchy,  but  which 
would  be  neglected  or  at  least  not  so  well  performed  by  private  enter- 
prise. Among  such  functions  may  be  mentioned  ...  the  conduct  of 
various  undertakings  which  would  be  unprofitable  as  private  ventures 
but  which  are  required  by  the  common  interest. 

Among  the  activities  of  the  state  which  are  neither  essential  nor 
natural,  but  which  are  not  a  matter  of  indifference  to  the  public  and 
which  are  performed  by  some  states  as  well  as  by  private  enterprise 
and  at  less  cost,  are  a  great  variety  of  services  mainly  economic  and 
intellectual.  .  .  .  Under  this  head  also  may  be  included  a  great  volume 
of  regulatory  or  restrictive  legislation  dealing  with  the  conduct  of  certain 
trades  and  occupations  which  are  affected  with  a  public  interest. 

II.    Essential  Functions 

488.  Essential  functions  of  the  state.  Willoughby  introduces 
his  discussion  of  the  essential  functions  of  the  state  with  the 
following  paragraphs :  ^ 

The  fact  that  the  exercise  of  a  power  by  a  State  is,  pro  tanto,  a  limita- 
tion of  the  freedom  of  action  of  the  individual,  necessarily  brings  the 
interests  of  the  two  into  frequent  opposition,  and,  in  each  particular 
instance,  the  question  resolves  itself  into  the  proper  balancing  of  them. 

It  is  admitted  by  all  that  the  State  should  possess  powers  sufficiently 
extensive  for  the  maintenance  of  its  own  continued  existence  against 
foreign  interference,  to  provide  the  means  whereby  its  national  life  may 
be  preserved  and  developed,  and  to  maintain  internal  order,  including 
the  protection  of  life,  liberty,  and  property.  These  have  been  designated 
the  essential  functions  of  the  State,  and  are  such  as  must  be  possessed 
by  a  State,  whatever  its  form. 

The  particularity  with  which  it  is  necessary  that  the  control  of  the 
State  should  be  exercised  in  regard  to  these  essential  matters,  and  espe- 
cially in  regard  to  those  that  have  to  do  with  the  definition  and  protec- 
tion of  private  rights,  is  largely  determined  by  the  character  of  the  people 
governed,  and  by  their  state  of  civilization. 

489.  The  constituent  functions.  The  essential,  or,  as  Wilson 
calls  them,  the  constituent,  functions  of  the  state  may  be  itemized 
as  follows  : 

1  Copyright,  1896,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


THE  FUNCTIONS  OF  GOVERNMENT  505 

(i)  The  keeping  of  order  and  providing  for  the  protection  of  persons 
and  property  from  violence  and  robbery. 

(2)  The  fixing  of  the  legal  relations  between  man  and  wife  and  between 
parents  and  children. 

(3)  The  regulation  of  the  holding,  transmission,  and  interchange  of 
property,  and  the  determination  of  its  liabilities  for  debt  or  for  crime. 

(4)  The  determination  of  contract  rights  between  individuals. 

(5)  The  definition  and  punishment  of  crime. 

(6)  The  administration  of  justice  in  civil  causes. 

(7)  The  determination  of  the  political  duties,  privileges,  and  relations 
of  citizens. 

(8)  Dealings  of  the  state  with  foreign  powers :  the  preservation  of 
the  state  from  external  danger  or  encroachment  and  the  advancement 
of  its  international  interests. 

490.  Sovereignty  and  the  essential  powers.  Dealey  points  out 
that  certain  functions  of  the  state  follow  naturally  from  the  very 
nature  of  its  sovereignty. 

From  the  consideration  of  sovereignty  itself  we  may  now  pass  to 
the  application  of  it  in  the  various  aspects  of  national  life,  first  outlining 
in  a  general  way  the  relation  of  sovereignty  to  the  essential  powers  of 
the  state. 

The  authority  of  the  state  in  respect  to  the  protection  of  life  and 
property  is  often  discussed  under  several  terms,  such  as  the  war  power, 
the  police  power  or  the  power  to  preserve  the  peace  of  the  state.  But 
w^hatever  name  may  be  applied  to  such  manifestations  of  supremacy, 
whether  exerted  in  carrying  on  war,  in  suppressing  riots  and  rebellion  or 
in  checking  crime,  it  is  but  another  name  for  sovereignty,  which  is  the 
collective  term  for  whatever  power  is  possessed  by  the  state.  Certain 
aspects  of  sovereign  power,  however,  are  so  important  in  themselves 
that  it  is  customary  to  speak  of  sovereignty  as  though  made  up  of  three 
essential  powers,  namely,  the  police  power,  including  the  war  power,  the 
power  of  taxation,  and  the  power  of  eminent  domain.  By  police  power 
is  meant  the  power  of  the  state  to  do  anything  needful  for  the  safety  and 
welfare  of  the  nation.  The  power  of  taxation  implies  that  the  state  may 
take  from  its  subjects  the  services  and  property  necessary  for  its  support. 
The  power  of  eminent  domain  implies  that  the  state  has  the  right  to  take 
from  its  subjects  their  lands  or  property  for  public  use.  In  all  states  that 
have  developed  along  democratic  lines  these  powers  are  constitutionally 
safeguarded,  so  as  to  secure  the  people  against  governmental  tyranny ; 
but  in  practice  it  is  understood  that  such  restrictions  are  for  times  of 


5o6  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

peace.  When  necessity  arises,  the  riot  act  is  read  or  martial  law  pro- 
claimed, civil  and  constitutional  guaranties,  like  habeas  corpus,  are  sus- 
pended, and  the  government,  in  the  exercise  of  the  so-called  war  or  police 
power,  takes  into  its  hands  the  full  power  of  sovereignty  on  the  plea  that, 
inter  arma  leges  silent. 

491.  Theory  of  state  taxation.  The  general  nature  of  the 
reasons  for  taxation,  distinguishing  between  activities  conferring 
common  benefit  and  those  conferring  special  benefit,  may  be 
briefly  stated  as  follows  :  ^ 

The  various  activities  of  the  State  can  be  easily  classified,  according 
to  the  degree  of  common  or  special  benefit  they  are  supposed  to  confer 
upon  the  citizens,  or  taxpayers.  The  various  groups  shade  into  one 
another,  of  course.  But  the  extremes  are  perfectly  clear  and  funda- 
mentally different.  Thus,  it  is  universally  admitted  that  the  functions 
of  the  general  administrative  and  legislative  departments  are  of  such  a 
character  as  to  give  a  common  benefit,  for  which,  ideally,  every  one 
should  pay  according  to  some  scheme  of  supposed  equality.  But  at  the 
other  extreme  there  are  many  things  done  by  the  State  which  confer  so 
special  a  benefit  as  to  justify  a  special  charge.  For  example,  when  the 
State  carries  a  passenger  or  a  box  of  freight  over  its  railroad,  or  carries 
a  letter,  or  provides  the  citizens  with  china  or  tobacco,  it  confers  a 
special  benefit.  Between  these  two  extremes  there  are  any  number  of 
grades,  according  as  the  predominant  thought  is  that  of  common  or 
special  benefit,  when  both  ideas  are  present.  But  there  is  one  more 
consideration  that  must  be  introduced.  There  are  a  certain  number  of 
State  activities  which  it  is  in  the  interest  of  the  whole  to  have  performed, 
but  which  accrue  to  the  special  benefit  of  certain  classes,  who  on 
account  of  poverty  are  unable  to  pay  for  that  benefit ;  and  if  the  State 
is  to  perform  these  functions,  it  must  call  upon  the  other  classes  for 
assistance,  excusing  the  poorer.  Theoretically,  the  support  of  the  poor 
and  defective  classes  is  an  activity  conferring  a  common  benefit  upon  all 
the  other  members  of  society,  and  hence  they  are  called  upon  to  con- 
tribute accordingly.  If  we  consider  it  the  moral  duty  of  society  as  a 
whole  to  help  the  weak,  then  the  relief  of  the  poor  confers  a  common 
benefit.  It  is  the  same  if  we  look  upon  poor  relief  from  a  less  altruistic 
point  of  view,  and  consider  that  society  is  merely  protecting  its  own 
interest,  as,  for  example,  in  isolating  the  feeble-minded,  so  that  they 
shall  not  propagate  their  weakness. 

1  Copyright,  1896,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


THE  FUNCTIONS  OF  GOVERNMENT 


507 


492.  Modern  military  and  naval  armaments.  The  extcnsive- 
ness  of  modern  preparation  for  war  and  its  influence  on  universal 
peace  is  brought  out  in  the  following : 

In  winning  and  defending  world-wide  empires  the  countries  of  Europe 
have  been  compelled  to  maintain  large  military  and  naval  forces  in 
addition  to  those  necessary  for  actual  national  defense.  Colonies  and 
protectorates  inhabited  by  subject  races  require  the  presence  of  European 
soldiers ;  and  the  protection  of  merchant  vessels  on  th^  high  seas  and 
in  foreign  ports  demands  large  navies.  Consequently  imperial  ambitions 
and  patriotic  pride  have  led  to  a  steady  increase  in  the  armies  and 
navies  of  Europe. 

The  cost  of  maintaining  these  great  military  establishments  is  greatly 
enhanced  by  the  continued  invention  of  new  and  ever  more  formidable 
instruments  of  destruction  which  speedily  render  old  equipment  obsolete 
and  compel  every  country  to  keep  abreast  of  the  nation  most  advanced 
in  the  science  of  warfare.  The  old  flintlock  rifle  loaded  at  the  muzzle 
gave  way  to  the  Minie  rifle  charged  with  a  cartridge  and  fired  by  a 
percussion  cap ;  the  Minie'  rifle  was  in  turn  supplanted  by  the  breech- 
loader ;  then  came  the  rapid-fire  repeating  rifle,  with  a  range  of  a  mile. 
The  ancient  muzzle-loading  cannon,  with  its  short  and  uncertain  range, 
has  been  gradually  improved,  and  in  its  place  we  now  have  the  enor- 
mous breech-loading  Krupp  guns  carrying  balls  weighing  five  hundred 
pounds  for  ten  miles  or  more  with  wonderful  accuracy.  New  explosives 
of  terrible  power  —  nitroglycerin,  melinite,  and  lyddite  —  make  gun- 
powder seem  like  a  child's  plaything,  and  smokeless  powder,  by  keeping 
the  field  clear,  makes  range  finding  more  deadly  than  ever.  Moreover, 
new  instruments,  such  as  the  war  balloon,  armored  trains,  automobiles, 
wireless  telegraphy,  and  searchlights,  greatly  facilitate  militar)'  operations. 

Sea  fighting  has  undergone  a  revolution  no  less  complete  and  rapid. 
Within  fifty  years  the  wooden  man  of  war  has  disappeared  before 
armored  vessels,  which  are  rapidly  developing  in  speed,  tonnage,  and 
fighting  capacity.  Even  the  battleship  of  fifteen  years  ago  is  gi\'ing  way 
before  vessels  of  the  Dreadnought  type.  The  ineffecti\'eness  of  the  or- 
dinary cannon  against  the  steel  battleship  has  led  to  the  use  of  torpedoes 
of  terrible  explosive  power ;  and  these  in  turn  to  the  invention  of  torpedo 
destroyers.  The  new  and  dangerous  factor  of  the  submarine  mine  has 
been  added,  while  the  submarine  vessel  may  soon  considerably  modify 
the  present  mode  of  naval  warfare. 

Indeed,  there  seems  to  be  no  end  to  the  rivalr)'  of  nations  in  the  in- 
vention of  costly  instruments  of  war.  Millions  and  billions  have  been 
expended  in  ships  and  guns  which  have  become  obsolete  without  ever 


5o8  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

being  brought  into  action.  France  to-day,  in  time  of  peace,  has  an  army 
of  over  six  hundred  thousand  men  and  spends  nearly  two  hundred  mil- 
lion dollars  annually  for  war  purposes,  —  an  establishment  which  rivals 
that  maintained  by  Napoleon  when  at  war  with  all  Europe.  Germany 
also  supports  a  standing  army  of  over  six  hundred  thousand  men. 
England  spends  over  three  hundred  million  dollars  a  year  for  the  army 
and  navy,  —  five  times  as  much  as  for  education. 

Nevertheless  it  may  be  said  that  this  marvelous  military  development 
has  contributed  something  to  the  movement  toward  peace  in  Europe. 
The  enormous  number  of  men  that  would  speedily  be  called  into  action 
and  hurried  to  the  front  in  express  trains,  the  countless  millions  that 
a  general  European  war  with  these  costly  instruments  would  involve, 
the  terrible  loss  of  life  and  property  that  it  would  bring,  —  all  this  has 
tended  to  make  statesmen  shrink  from  risking  the  possibilities  of  war. 
Moreover,  the  cost  of  maintaining  armies  on  even  a  peace  footing  is  so 
great,  the  strong  protest  of  workingmen  and  socialists  against  warfare 
—  antimilitarism  as  it  is  called  —  is  so  determined,  the  financial  interests 
involved  are  so  influential,  and  the  effects  of  international  conflicts  on 
industry  and  trade  are  so  disastrous,  that  a  movement  for  the  peaceful 
settlement  of  international  disputes  and  the  reduction  of  armaments  has 
developed  in  every  civilized  nation. 

493.  The  preservation  of  internal  peace.  Besides  the  mainte- 
nance of  state  existence  against  foreign  aggression,  the  preser- 
vation of  internal  order  and  security  is  an  essential  governmental 
function. 

As  the  primary  function  of  the  state  is  the  protection  of  the  lives  and 
property  of  the  community  through  war,  it  is  not  strange  that  a  similar 
function  in  internal  affairs  should  develop.  State  authority  in  such  mat- 
ters, however,  grew  much  more  slowly.  Long  before  the  state  existed 
men  had  protected  themselves  and  still  felt  abundantly  able  to  do  so 
in  ordinary  emergencies.  In  all  civilizations,  groups  of  men  are  found 
united  in  bonds  of  real  or  fictitious  kinship  for  purposes  of  joint  protec- 
tion. How  instinctive  this  has  become  is  seen  at  a  glance  by  observing 
the  numerous  fraternal  orders  of  developed  civilization.  These  groups  in 
early  civilization  were  united  for  purposes  of  blood  revenge,  fine  pay- 
ments, and  mutual  responsibility.  The  patriarchal  family  at  a  later  stage 
answered  the  same  purpose.  The  loosening  of  patriarchal  family  ties 
through  commerce  and  industry  brought  about  in  city  life  the  develop- 
ment of  the  guild,  the  guild  for  social  and  religious  purposes,  the  trades 
guild,  the  merchant  guild,  and  akin  to  these  the  orders  of  knighthood  and 


I 


THE  FUNCTIONS  OF  GOVERNMENT  509 

the  brotherhoods  of  the  church.  Such  associations,  found  in  all  civiliza- 
tions and  in  all  times  and  places,  devoted  themselves  to  the  preservation 
of  the  peace  by  restraints  placed  on  individual  members,  by  discipline 
inflicted  on  disturbers  of  the  peace,  and  by  presenting  a  united  front 
against  aggressions  of  unruly  members  of  the  community. 

But  besides  associations  for  the  preservation  of  the  peace  there  were 
others  organized  for  opposite  purposes,  associations  composed  of  out- 
laws, robbers,  criminals  who  had  fled  from  home,  men  owning  no  master, 
worthless  fellows  for  whom  no  one  would  be  responsible.  Against  such 
the  united  strength  of  the  entire  community  was  necessary.  The  state 
therefore  developed  the  function  of  unifying  the  force  of  the  community 
against  armed  associations  of  lawless  men  within  its  own  borders.  Sim- 
ilarly, armed  resistance  to  the  laws  of  the  community  in  the  form  of 
rebellions,  insurrections,  and  riots,  was  suppressed  through  the  power 
and  strength  of  the  state.  In  this  way  developed  the  right  of  the  state  to 
suppress  such  disturbances  with  a  strong  hand,  if  necessary  suspending 
civil  law  for  the  time  and  exercising  arbitrary  war  powers. 

III.    Optional  Functions 

494.  Evolution  of  governmental  ownership  of  public  utilities. 

Certain  industries  are  to-day  of  ftmdamental  social  interest.  This 
public  importance  did  not  always  exist,  nor  is  it  of  equal  degree 
in  all  states  at  present.  A  general  process  of  development  may, 
however,  be  noted. 

With  wide  variations  in  detail,  we  can  trace  a  general  law  of  develop- 
ment, in  five  stages : 

1.  Everywhere  at  first  all  of  the  above  enterprises  are  in  private 
hands,  and  are  used  for  purposes  of  profit  and  sometimes  of  extortion, 
like  the  highways,  the  coinage,  and  the  post  offices  of  medieval  Europe, 
or  the  early  bridges,  canals,  and  markets. 

2.  In  the  next  stage  they  are  "  affected  with  a  public  interest  "  and  are 
turned  over  to  trustees  who  are  permitted  to  charge  fixed  tolls,  but  re- 
quired to  keep  the  service  up  to  a  certain  standard.  This  was  the  era  of 
the  canal  or  turnpike  trusts  and  companies. 

3.  In  the  subsequent  stage  the  government  assumes  the  business, 
but  manages  it  for  profit,  as  is  still  the  case  in  some  countries  with  the 
postal  and  railway  systems. 

4.  In  the  fourth  stage  the  government  charges  tolls  or  fees  to  cover 
expenses  only,  as  was  recently  true  of  canals  and  bridges,  and  as  is  the 
theory  of  the  postal  system  and  municipal  water  supply  in  America  to-day. 


5IO  READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

5.  In  the  final  stage  the  government  reduces  charges  until  finally 
the  service  is  free  and  the  expenses  are  defrayed  by  a  general  tax  on  the 
community.  This  is  the  stage  now  reached  in  the  common  roads,  in  the 
coinage,  in  most  of  the  canals  and  bridges,  and  which  has  been  seriously 
proposed  by  officials  of  several  American  cities  for  other  services,  like 
the  water  supply. 

495.  Forms  of  public  industries.  Ely  classifies  under  the  follow- 
ing heads  the  industries  undertaken  by  states  :  ^ 

In  the  beginning,  let  us  briefly  pass  in  review  the  principal  classes  of 
industrial  enterprise  in  which  the  modern  State  engages  for  the  satisfac- 
tion of  other  than  State  wants  ;  because,  obviously,  we  are  not  concerned 
with  enterprises  like  the  government  printing  office,  the  government 
navy  yards,  and  in  general,  those  incidental  industries  whose  products 
the  government  consumes  but  does  not  regularly  sell. 

I.  First,  we  find  States  like  Switzerland  monopolizing  the  manufacture 
of  alcohol  and  certain  alcoholic  beverages,  Japan  monopolizing  the  opium 
traffic  in  Formosa,  or  commonwealths  engaging  in  the  retail  distribution 
of  intoxicating  beverages.  The  purpose  of  the  State  in  engaging  in  such 
industries  is  primarily  sumptuary ;  it  is  desired  to  regulate  the  traffic  almost 
to  the  point  of  suppression,  perhaps.  Ordinarily  a  good  revenue  would 
be  secured,  but  revenue  is  a  very  secondary  consideration.  Prices  will  be 
placed  above  the  level  of  highest  net  profit,  and  not  improbably  the  ideal 
of  regulating  consumption  will  be  so  vigorously  pursued  that  profits  will 
disappear  altogether. 

II.  Secondly,  we  have  the  group  of  so-called  "  fiscal  monopolies." 
France,  for  instance,  monopolizes  the  manufacture  of  matches,  cigarettes, 
and  tobacco  in  general ;  Japan  has  recently  gone  farther  than  any  other 
country  in  the  creation  of  fiscal  monopolies  ;  while  Prussia,  Austria,  Italy, 
Spain,  and  other  European  countries  maintain  public  lotteries  —  as  did 
many  of  the  American  colonies  during  the  eighteenth  century.  The  pri- 
mary object  of  the  State  in  undertaking  these  enterprises  is  public  rev- 
enue, gain ;  and  naturally  a  monopoly  price  is  charged,  the  price  which 
will  yield  the  greatest  net  revenue. 

III.  Next,  we  have  a  group  of  enterprises  consisting  principally  of 
the  so-called  "  natural  monopolies,"  which  the  State  undertakes  not  for 
suppression,  not  for  profit,  but  primarily  for  regulation  —  to  regulate  the 
quality  of  the  product,  as  in  the  case  of  water;  to  maintain  effectively 
what  have  been  called  "  equitable  conditions  for  the  prosecution  of  pri- 
vate business,"  as  in  the  case  of  railways ;  to  prevent  monopolistic  ex- 
tortion and  corporate  abuse,  as  in  the  case  of  lighting  companies,  the 

^  Copyright,  1908,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


THE  FUNCTIONS  OF  GOVERNMENT 


511 


post  office,  the  telegraph,  and  the  telephone  ;  or  to  prevent  crime  and 
preserve  intact  the  foundations  of  commercial  prosperity,  as  in  the 
monopoly  of  coinage.  The  charges  here  are  ordinarily  adjusted  to  either 
the  "  revenue  "  or  the  "  cost "  principle,  that  is  to  say,  the  State  will 
either  aim  to  make  a  fair  business  profit  such  as  is  secured  in  competitive 
private  enterprises,  or  it  will  endeavor  approximately  to  meet  expenses 
by  adjusting  its  charges  to  the  cost  of  production.  .  .  . 

IV.  Finally  we  have  a  large  and  heterogeneous  group  of  industries 
which  are  maintained  principally  for  service,  for  their  educational  and 
developmental  influence,  not  primarily  for  regulation,  and  not  at  all  for 
profit,  but  "'  for  the  public  good."  We  include  here  not  only  schools  and 
educational  institutions  of  all  kinds,  but  roads  and  canals ;  the  savings 
banks  and  public  pawnshops  maintained  in  several  countries  of  conti- 
nental Europe ;  workingmen's  insurance  as  developed  by  Germany, 
Austria,  and  several  of  the  Australian  colonies ;  and  the  model  manufac- 
turing establishments  such  as  France  maintains  for  the  production  of 
tapestries  and  fine  porcelains.  In  this  group  charges  will  sink  to  a 
minimum,  and  in  some  lines  of  enterprise,  such  as  education,  practically 
disappear.  Revenue  here  is  not  only  a  minor,  but  is  almost  a  negligible, 
consideration. 

496.  The  United  States  governments  in  business.  While  the 
United  States  has  not,  like  some  states,  entered  extensively  into 
governmental  operation  of  business  enterprises,  its  various  govern- 
ments do  carry  on  a  number  of  public  industries. 

First  and  last,  the  national,  state,  and  municipal  governments  exercise 
a  considerable  number  of  industries  on  public  account. 

The  national  government  is  the  largest  publisher  in  the  world,  expend- 
ing every  year  over  $4,000,000  for  printing  and  issuing  documents  and 
books.  It  is  a  manufacturer,  as  in  the  government  arsenals  and  navy 
yards  where  ships  and  materials  of  war  are  made.  The  post  office  is  so 
nearly  self-supporting  that  it  may  fairly  be  considered  a  vast  business  for 
forwarding  intelligence  ;  and  it  is  much  better  conducted  than  the  private 
express  companies.  It  is  not  impossible  that  the  federal  government  will 
also  become  the  proprietor  of  telegraphs  and  telephones,  and  even  of  the 
railroads  of  the  country.  The  United  States  manufactures  at  its  own 
expense  bank  bills  for  all  the  national  banks.  During  the  Spanish  War 
it  organized  transport  steamers,  which  were  virtually  a  large  freight  and 
passenger  line. 

Some  of  the  states  are  engaging  in  public  forests  as  a  state  industr)'. 
Most  of  them  keep  up  some  kind  of  manufacturing  in  their  prisons  and 


512 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


workhouses ;  when  prohibited  by  law  from  making  standard  goods,  they 
often  make  furniture  and  other  supplies  for  state  institutions.  The 
Southern  states  go  into  the  business  of  leasing  out  convicts  to  private 
firms,  to  be  used  in  railroad  construction  and  like  hard  labor. 

In  the  municipalities  we  find  the  greatest  number  of  public  industries. 
No  American  city  goes  to  the  extent  of  the  French,  with  public  pawn- 
shops and  public  restaurants,  or  imitates  the  English  system  of  public 
tenement  houses ;  but  a  large  number  of  American  cities  engage  in  the 
business  of  supplying  water  and  gas  or  electricity  to  private  consumers, 
and  there  is  now  a  manifest  tendency  toward  the  business  of  public 
street  cars.  Wherever  the  town  system  prevails,  there  is  a  town  hall, 
which  is  often  let  for  private  entertainments.  The  city  of  New  York 
manages  a  large  system  of  public  docks  for  profit,  and  the  city  of  Boston 
has  a  public  printing  establishment. 

497.  Government  regulation  of  industry.  Governments  interfere 
with  private  business  enterprises  for  the  following  purposes  : 

The  chief  forms  of  modern  government  interference  with  private 
industry  may  be  put  under  the  four  heads  of  action  in  behalf  of  con- 
sumers,^of  producers,  of  investors,  and  of  the  community  in  general. 

1 .  In  the  middle  ages  the  government  interposed  in  behalf  of  the  con- 
sumers either  to  guarantee  good  work  or  to  insure  reasonable  price. 
Both  of  these  forms  of  interference  have  disappeared  in  general  industry 
to-day,  because  custom  has  been  replaced  by  competition.  ...  In  mod- 
ern times,  accordingly,  we  find  that  the  chief  form  of  interference  with 
competitive  industry  in  behalf  of  the  consumer  is  legislation  to  safeguard 
health,  as  in  the  case  of  food  inspection  and  quarantine  regulation. 

2.  On  the  other  hand,  the  interests  of  the  laborer  have  been  so  ma- 
terially affected  by  the  advent  of  the  factory  system  that  modern  inter- 
ference on  behalf  of  the  producers  is  well-nigh  exclusively  limited  to  them. 
As  we  have  learned,  there  are  five  classes  of  such  interference,  all  of 
which,  except  the  last,  are  rapidly  becoming  universal :  (a)  legislation  to 
safeguard  health,  through  the  so-called  factory  laws,  applicable  to  men, 
women,  and  children  alike  ;  (b)  legislation  to  insure  safety  through  employ- 
ers' liability  laws ;  (c)  legislation  fixing  maximum  hours  of  work,  as  in 
the  case  of  the  eight-hour  law  for  miners  and  public  employees ;  (d) 
compulsory  insurance  against  illness,  old  age,  or  lack  of  employment ; 
and  finally  (e)  legislation  fixing  minimum  wages,  as  in  Australia  and 
New  Zealand.  .  .  . 

3.  In  former  times  the  striking  example  of  interference  by  govern- 
ment in  case  of  investment  was  in  behalf  of  the  borrower.    The  usury 


THE  FUNCTIONS  OF  GOVERNMENT  513 

laws,  designed  to  protect  the  unfortunate  debtor,  have,  as  we  know,  been 
rendered  almost  completely  unnecessary  through  the  growth  of  competi- 
tion in  the  loan  of  capital.  This  same  development  has,  however,  brought 
about  the  need  of  intervention  of  the  opposite  kind.  To-day  it  is  the 
lender  or  investor  in  corporate  enterprise,  and  not  the  borrower,  who 
requires  protection.  ,  .  .  Here,  again,  there  are  dangers  on  both  sides, 
the  risk  of  over-rigidity  which  will  hamper  legitimate  enterprise,  and  the 
danger  of  lax  accountability  which  will  destroy  confidence.  That,  how- 
ever, some  solid  measure  of  regulation  is  requisite  can  no  longer  be 
successfully  disputed. 

4.  We  come,  finally,  to  the  case  of  government  interference  in  behalf 
of  the  general  interests  of  the  community.  This  takes  the  form  of  pro- 
tection, which  has  already  been  discussed  in  a  separate  chapter,  and  also 
of  bounties  and  subsidies. 

The  danger  of  such  intervention  is  that  particular  interests  may  foist 
themselves  upon  the  legislator  in  the  guise  of  general  interests.  Bounties 
may  be  classified  as  (a)  military  bounties,  (b)  forest  bounties,  (c)  agri- 
cultural and  industrial  bounties,  and  (d)  land  transport  and  shipping 
subsidies. 

498.  How  to  regulate  trusts.  Professor  John  B.  Clark  suggests 
the  following  as  possible  methods  of  trust  regulation  : 

First,  we  may  prosecute  with  more  intelligence  the  effort  to  break  up 
the  trusts  into  smaller  corporations.  It  has,  for  example,  been  suggested 
that  no  corporation  should  be  permitted  to  have  more  than  a  certain 
amount  of  capital.  But  if  a  maximum  of  capital  were  fixed  for  all  indus- 
tries, the  difficulty  would  be  that  an  amount  which  is'  too  small  for  prose- 
cuting one  type  of  business  would  be  sufficient  to  enable  a  company  to 
monopolize  another.  A  more  effective  policy  would  allow  capital  to  vary 
in  different  kinds  of  business,  but  would  so  restrict  the  output  of  each 
corporation  that  no  one  could  produce  more  than  a  certain  proportion 
of  the  whole  output  of  goods  of  the  kind  that  it  makes.  .  .  . 

Secondly,  we  might  abolish  customs  duties  on  all  articles  manufactured 
by  the  trusts.  We  might  in  this  way  appeal  to  the  foreign  producer  to 
become  the  protector  of  the  American  consumer.  There  is  no  denying 
the  efficacy  of  such  a  measure.  It  is  idle  to  say  that,  because  trusts 
exist  in  free-trade  countries,  our  present  tariff  is  not  effective  in  promot- 
ing them.    Trusts  have  very  little  power  in  free-trade  countries.  .   .  . 

Thirdly,  it  is  conceivable  that  we  might  introduce  an  elaborate  system 
of  price  regulation.  We  might  accept  monopoly  as  inevitable,  but  pre- 
scribe, in  a  minute  and  detailed  way,  at  what  rates  goods  should  be  sold. 
On  the  supposition  that  this  difficult  policy  were  carried  out  in  a  spirit 


SH 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


of  complete  honesty,  —  on  the  supposition  that  the  officials  of  the  law  re- 
mained incorruptible,  though  placed  in  positions  that  offered  the  maximum 
inducement  for  corruption, — there  would  still  remain  for  determination  the 
question  as  to  what  principle  they  should  follow  in  regulating  prices.  .  ,  . 

Fourthly,  we  may  put  all  monopolized  industries  into  the  hands  of  the 
state  and  thus,  within  a  very  extensive  field,  carry  out  the  program  of  the 
socialists.  To  a  casual  observer,  this  looks  easier  than  the  other  policy ; 
and  it  will  certainly  find  more  and  more  advocates,  as  the  powers  of 
trusts  increase.  There  is,  moreover,  no  doubt  that  this  measure  would 
abolish  certain  evils  that  are  inherent  in  private  monopolies.  Even  if  it 
did  not  succeed  in  giving  the  public  cheap  goods,  it  might  save  the 
people  from  the  necessity  of  buying  goods  that  were  made  dear  by 
private  producers'  grasping  policy.  But  this  measure  must  stand  or  fall 
with  the  general  cause  of  socialism  ;  and,  while  so  extensive  a  subject  as 
that  is  not  here  to  be  discussed,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  the  judgment  of 
the  people  is  against  it.  .   .  . 

Is  there  no  further  recourse }  There  is  one ;  and  it  has  the  advantage 
of  being  in  harmony  with  the  spirit  of  our  people,  with  the  principles  of 
common  law  and  also  with  the  economic  tendencies  that  have  made  our 
present  state  a  tolerable  one.  It  is  to  give  to  potential  competition 
greater  effectiveness  —  that  is,  to  give  a  fair  field  and  no  favor  to  the 
man  who  is  disposed  to  become  an  independent  producer,  leaving  him 
wholly  at  the  mercy  of  fair  competition  but  shielding  him  from  that 
which  is  unfair.  Let  the  trust  crush  him,  if  he  cannot  produce  goods  as 
cheaply  as  it  can ;  but  let  him  bring  the  trust  to  terms,  if  he  can  produce 
them  more  cheaply.  This  puts  the  trust  in  a  position  where  its  security 
will  depend,  not  on  Its  power  to  destroy  competitors  unfairly,  but  on  its 
power  to  meet  them  fairly. 

499.  The  problem  of  railway  regulation.  The  general  nature 
of  the  problem  of  governmental  regulation  of  railways  is  thus  stated 
by  a  leading  American  authority  :  ^ 

There  are  two  parts  to  the  permanent  problem  of  government  regula- 
tion of  railroad  transportation,  two  duties  devolving  on  the  state.  One 
is  to  adjust  the  relations  of  the  carriers  with  each  other;  the  other  is  to 
maintain  an  equitable  relationship  between  the  public  and  the  carriers. 
The  theory  concerning  the  interrelations  of  the  carriers  that  has  generally 
been  adhered  to  in  the  laws  of  the  United  States  and  the  several 
American  States  has  been  that  the  several  railroad  companies  should 
act  independently  and  should  actively  compete  with  each  other  as  re- 
gards traffic  and  rates.  Neither  pooling  arrangements  nor  agreements 
1  Copyright,  1908,  by  D.  Appleton  and  Company. 


THE  FUNCTIONS  OF  GOVERNMENT  515 

concerning  the  making  and  maintenance  of  reasonable  rates  have  been 
sanctioned  by  law.  .   .  . 

The  Government's  obligation  to  maintain  an  equitable  relationship 
between  the  carriers  and  the  public  is  as  great  to-day  as  it  ever  has  been. 
The  problem  has  a  different  form  than  it  has  had  in  the  past  or  may 
have  in  the  future,  but  in  essence  the  question  is  a  permanent  one,  and 
consists  in  harmonizing  as  far  as  possible  the  interests  of  the  private 
corporations  of  a  quasi-public  character  engaged  for  profit  in  the  per- 
formance of  a  service  of  a  public  nature,  with  the  interests  of  the 
individuals,  the  localities,  and  the  general  public  served  by  the  carriers. 
This  general  problem  is  a  continuing  one,  but  the  specific  reason  for 
Government  regulation  will  vary  from  time  to  time,  and  may  be,  as  it 
was  in  1870,  to  secure  cheaper  rates  to  the  seaboard  for  the  agricul- 
tural products  of  the  Central  States ;  or  may  be,  as  was  particularly  the 
case  during  the  period  from  1870  to  i8go,  to  adjust  the  rates  charged  at 
the  small  local  towns  and  at  the  large  cities ;  or  the  reasons  may  be,  as 
at  the  present  time,  to  secure  relatively  reasonable  rates  for  rival  areas 
of  production  and  for  rival  economic  interests  in  the  same  area  of 
production. 

500.  Real  value  of  a  protective  policy.  One  important  political 
point,  often  overlooked  in  economic  discussions  of  protection  and 
free  trade,  is  emphasized  in  the  following : 

On  the  other  hand,  the  free  traders  fail  to  make  allowance  for  an 
important  element  in  the  problem.  The  essence  of  free  trade  is  cosmo- 
politanism ;  the  essence  of  protection  is  nationalism.  Free  trade  holds 
up  to  our  contemplation  the  ultimate  economic  ideal,  but  fails  adequately 
to  reckon  with  actual  forces.  The  universal  republic  is  far  in  the  distance, 
and  the  separate  nations  still  have  an  important  function  to  subserve 
in  developing  their  own  individuality  and  thus  contributing  distinctive 
elements  to  the  common  whole.  Legitimate  competition  presupposes  a 
relative  equality  of  conditions ;  as  long  as  the  growing  nations  of  the 
world  are  in  a  state  of  economic  inequality,  we  must  expect  and  not 
entirely  disapprove  the  effort  on  the  part  of  each  to  attain  equality  by 
hastening  its  own  development.  Ultimately,  no  doubt,  patriotism  will  be 
as  much  of  an  evil  as  particularism  has  now  become ;  but  in  the  present 
stage  of  human  progress  patriotism  is  a  virtue.  Free  traders  often 
overlook  the  sound  kernel  in  what  seems  to  be  the  apple  of  discord. 

As  long  as  nations  continue  to  form  the  economic  units  it  is  not  com- 
petent to  argue  from  internal  free  trade  to  international  free  trade. 
The  cotton  mills  in  the  South  may  injure  their  competitors  in  New  Eng- 
land, but  the  nation  will  look  on  with  equanimity,  because  it  means  a 


5i6  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

surplus  production  of  wealth  within  the  country.  When,  however,  an 
industry  in  one  country  is  menaced  by  the  competition  of  another,  it  is 
no  solace  to  the  first  that  the  world's  wealth  is  being  augmented  at  the 
cost  of  its  own.  Nations  are  not  yet  so  unselfish.  They  calculate  that 
even  if  protection  carries  with  it  certain  incidental  disadvantages,  they 
Stand  to  gain  more  than  they  will  lose.  Even  as  an  engine  of  commer- 
cial diplomacy  a  protective  tariff  is  frequently  of  service. 

In  the  main,  then,  the  conclusion  would  seem  to  be  that  under  cer- 
tain conditions  a  protective  policy  is  relatively  defensible.  It  may  be 
conceded  that  in  countries  the  mass  of  whose  exports  are  of  an  indus- 
trial character  protection  is  unwise.  It  may  be  taken  for  granted  that 
when  nations  reach  a  state  of  comparative  economic  equality,  protection 
will  be  unnecessary  and  even  injurious,  because  if  left  alone  each  will 
then  develop  its  own  natural  advantages.  It  cannot  be  gainsaid  that  pro- 
tection sets  loose  the  selfish  passions  of  individuals  and  classes  and  that 
it  is  responsible  for  its  share  of  political  greed  and  unsavory  legislation. 
But  when  the  economic  resources  of  a  country  are  not  yet  fully  devel- 
oped, it  may  none  the  less  be  desirable  to  accelerate  the  pace,  in  the  in- 
terests of  its  own  immediate  national  progress,  with  the  idea  that  the 
contributions  of  fully  mature  and  economically  well-rounded  nations  to  the 
common  wealth  of  the  globe  will  in  the  long  run  exceed  the  gain  from 
an  uneven  and  one-sided  evolution. 

501.  Tariff  outlook  in  Europe.    Certain  tendencies  indicate  the 

further  extension  of  free-trade  principles  in  Europe. 

The  war  of  protective  tariffs  which  is  now  in  progress  in  Europe  is 
doing  more  than  could  any  amount  of  argument  to  discredit  that  policy. 
Statesmen  in  all  countries  are  beginning  to  appreciate  that  however 
advantageous  protection  might  be  if  one  country  could  practice  it  all  by 
itself,  it  is  suicidal  when  pursued  to  its  logical  limit,  that  is,  the  entire 
exclusion  of  all  products  that  may  be  produced  at  home,  by  all  countries 
together.  The  United  States,  with  its  varied  natural  resources,  may  pur- 
sue such  a  policy  and  prosper,  but  this  is  not  possible  for  one  of  the 
countries  of  Europe.  It  may  take  time  for  this  conviction  to  win  general 
assent,  but  that  it  is  gaining  ground  is  evinced  by  the  agitation  for  en- 
larging the  boundaries  of  the  protected  areas.  Tariff  unions  similar  to 
the  German  ZoUverein  are  now  being  considered  on  the  one  hand  for 
the  whole  continent  of  Europe,  and  on  the  other  for  the  whole  British 
empire.  That  such  unions  will  be  formed  is  highly  improbable,  but  that 
the  same  arguments  that  are  urged  in  their  favor  may  be  advanced  with 
even  more  cogency  in  support  of  a  policy  of  general  free  trade  must  be 
admitted  by  all  who  have  followed  the  tariff  controversy. 


THE  FUNCTIONS  OF  GOVERNMENT 


517 


502.  Difficulties  in  the  way  of  a  tariff  reduction  in  the  United 
States.  Even  if  it  were  agreed  that  a  reduction  in  our  protective 
tariff  would  be  beneficial,  certain  practical  difficulties  would  still 
have  to  be  met.^ 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  necessary  to  remember  that  the  federal  govern- 
ment must  secure  a  large  revenue  from  tariff  duties,  and  that  in  conse- 
quence the  question  which  we  are  discussing  is  not  one  of  protection 
versus  free  trade,  but  of  protection  versus  freer  trade.  In  the  second 
place,  the  economic  importance  of  the  whole  controversy  has  unquestion- 
ably been  exaggerated.  We  find  a  country  like  England  prosperous 
under  free  trade ;  we  find  countries  like  France  and  the  United  States 
prosperous  under  protection.  It  is  of  real  but  not  of  vital  importance. 
Our  internal  trade  vastly  exceeds  our  foreign  trade  in  every  way.  The 
domestic  trade  of  the  Mississippi  Valley  alone  is  far  greater  than  our 
entire  foreign  commerce.  In  the  third  place,  the  American  tariff  is  a 
historical  growth,  and  bad  as  it  may  be  in  many  respects  it  has  taken 
deep  root.  During  the  last  century  it  has  become  part  of  our  life,  and 
cannot  be  suddenly  eradicated  with  impunity.  If  it  is  true  that  Ameri- 
can labor  would  be  better  off  without  it,  it  does  not  follow  that  it  ought 
to  be  removed  suddenly  in  the  interests  of  American  labor.  If  the  in- 
dustrial growth  is  abnormal,  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  adjustment  to 
normal  conditions  is  a  painful  process  and  should  be  conducted  cautiously. 
Displacements  of  labor  and  capital  cause  suffering  and  loss,  and  it  is 
clear  that  any  reform  of  the  tariff  must  be  conservative  and  careful,  a 
movement  toward  freer  trade,  not  the  sudden  withdrawal  of  protection. 

503.  Reasons  for  the  legal  regulation  of  labor.  Some  of  the 
reasons  why  governmental  regulation  of  labor  has  replaced  the 
earlier  laissez-faire  policy  are  stated  in  the  following : 

Unorganized  workmen  do  not  bargain  on  terms  of  strict  equality  with 
employers.  That  this  is  the  case  when  the  workers  are  children  will 
scarcely  be  questioned  by  any  one.  Employers  of  such  labor  stand  to  it 
in  a  relation  half  paternal,  and  have  it  in  their  power  to  make  or  mar  the 
young  lives  that  are  devoted  to  their  service.  It  might  be  thought  that 
considerations  of  common  humanity  would  lead  employers  of  children  to 
fix  hours  and  other  conditions  of  employment  that  would  not  be  injuri- 
ous to  them.  Unfortunately  this  is  not  the  case.  In  every  country  labor 
laws  have  been  found  necessary  to  protect  children  from  the  rapacity 
and  cruelty  not  only  of  employers,  but  even  of  their  own  parents. 
1  Copyright,  1908,  by  The  Macmillan  Company. 


5i8  READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 

It  is  generally,  although  not  universally,  conceded  that  protective  labor 
laws  ought  to  extend  to  women  as  well  as  to  minors.  Such  extension  is 
defended  by  those  who  think  the  activity  of  women  should  be  confined 
as  far  as  possible  to  the  domestic  circle,  on  the  ground  that  women  are 
unfitted  for  the  rough  and  tumble  of  industrial  competition  and  if  per- 
mitted to  work  for  wages  at  all,  should  do  so  on  conditions  marked  out 
for  them  by  law,  A  reason  less  open  to  objection  is  the  simple  fact  that 
women  have  not  yet  learned  to  organize  unions  or  to  protect  themselves 
in  other  ways  and  are  therefore  the  prey  of  unscrupulous  employers  when 
the  law  fails  to  protect  them. 

If  the  second  of  the  above  reasons  is  accepted  as  a  justification  for 
laws  protecting  women  wage  earners,  there  seems  no  reason  why  such 
laws  should  not  be  extended  to  men  in  those  trades  in  which  they  do  not 
bargain  on  equal  terms  with  their  employers.  This  view  appears  to  be 
gaining  ground  and  has,  as  we  shall  see,  already  found  expression  in 
connection  with  legislation  affecting  the  so-called  sweating  trades. 

Another  reason  for  protective  labor  laws,  than  inequality  between  em- 
ployers and  employees,  is  the  ignorance  and  carelessness  of  the  latter. 
Ignorance  often  leads  workmen  to  assume  risks  and  undertake  tasks  on 
terms  that  they  would  not  with  full  knowledge  accept.  Once  committed, 
the  inertia  that  is  characteristic  of  all  men  prevents  them  from  repudi- 
ating their  bargains.  Carelessness  is  an  even  more  common  cause  of 
contracts  of  employment  that  are  socially  undesirable.  This  is  conspicu- 
ously the  case  in  dangerous  trades.  The  natural  optimism  of  workmen 
leads  them  to  feel  that  whatever  the  dangers  may  be,  they  themselves 
will  escape.  The  result  is  that  they  accept  risks,  even  certainties,  of 
disease  and  death  on  terms  that  compensate  neither  them,  their  families, 
nor  society  at  large  for  the  waste  of  life  which  such  employments  entail. 
It  is  on  this  account  that  special  legislation  in  reference  to  the  conditions 
of  employment  in  dangerous  trades  has  been  found  necessary,  and  on  it 
also  are  based  the  laws  in  reference  to  employers'  liability  for  injuries  to 
their  employees  and  industrial  insurance. 

504.  Public  education.  The  importance  of  public  education  in 
democratic  states  is  suggested  in  the  following : 

Governments  now  recognize  that  the  common  people  are  intelligent 
creatures  worthy  and  capable  of  indefinite  intellectual  improvement.  In 
past  centuries  rulers  regarded  their  subjects  principally  as  taxpayers, 
laborers,  and  soldiers ;  but  education  has  now  been  declared  an  indispen- 
sable part  of  the  advancement  of  public  welfare,  —  the  avowed  aim  of 
all  modern  governments.   The  success  of  democratic  experiments  depends 


THE  FUNCTIONS  OF  (iOVERXMKXT 


519 


upon  the  intelligence  of  the  average  citizen  ;  the  competition  for  markets 
requires  skilled  workmen  and  managers ;  and  the  widening  interests  of 
mankind  demand  the  means  of  acquiring  knowledge. 

The  recognition  of  these  facts  has  induced  almost  all  the  European 
governments  to  establish  elementary  schools,  technical  institutes,  and 
universities,  and  to  compel  even  the  poorest  child  to  acquire  at  least  the 
rudiments  of  knowledge.  In  England  the  government  aj^propriates  over 
seventy-five  million  dollars  a  year  for  elementary  education  alone,  and 
France  spends  almost  fifty  million  dollars.  Illiteracy,  once  regarded  as 
the  natural  and  inevitable  state  of  the  people,  has  now  become  a  national 
disgrace  which  all  countries  are  laboring  to  remove.  I'hcir  success  may 
be  measured  by  the  decline  of  illiteracy  in  the  armies.  It  was  the  excep- 
tional soldier,  in  the  eighteenth  century,  who  could  read  and  write ;  now 
it  is  the  exceptional  one  who  cannot.  Less  than  one  per  cent  of  the  re- 
cruits for  the  German  army  are  illiterate,  and  only  one  in  twenty  in  France 
cannot  read  and  write. 

The  work  of  the  schools  is  rcenforccd  by  the  newspapers  and  maga- 
zines. The  invention  of  the  steam  printing  machine  and  the  mechanical 
typesetter  has  reduced  the  cost  of  the  newspaper  from  ten  or  twenty 
cents  a  copy  to  from  one  to  three  cents.  Editions  of  ten  thousand  copies, 
considered  enormous  at  the  opening  of  the  nineteenth  century,  have 
grown  into  editions  of  hundreds  of  thousands  scattered  broadcast  through- 
out the  land  by  the  express  train.  The  telegraph  gathers  the  news  every 
moment  from  the  four  corners  of  the  earth  ;  the  conduct  of  rulers  and 
statesmen,  the  schemes  of  reformers,  the  current  political  issues  are  the 
subject  of  hourly  criticism  and  discussion,  and  public  opinion  can  thus 
be  aroused  as  never  before  in  the  history  of  mankind. 


INDEX 


Acceptance  of  office,  379 

Administration,  nature  of,  379-380 

Administrative  courts,  392-393 

Administrative  law,  189-191 

Admiralty  law,  210 

"  Agreement  of  the  People,"  293 

Aims  of  the  state,  477-481 

Alabama^  the,  240 

American  Political  Science  Associa- 
tion, work  of,  1-4 

Anarchism,  481-482 

Anti-imperialists,  in  the  United  States, 
468-469 

Applied  political  science,  5 

Apportionment,  of  representatives  in 
the  United  States,  344-345 

Argentine  Republic,  preamble  to  con- 
stitution of,  289 

Aristotle,  21,  25,  45  ;  political  theory  of, 

IIO-III 

Armaments,  military  and  naval,  507-508 
Aspects  of  nature,  42-44 
Austin,  J.,  23,  141-142 
Austria-Hungary,  race  elements  in,  54- 
55  ;  nature  of  union,  266-267 

Bagehot,  W.,  153 
Balance  of  power,  224 
Ballot  Act,  314-315 
Barristers,  in  P.ngland,  389-390 
Bicameral  system,  advantages  of,  344 
Blackstone,   Sir  W.,   on  separation  of 

powers,  330-331 
Blockade,  effective,  241  ;  kinds  of,  242 
Bodin,  J.,  25 
"  Boss,"  the,  417-420 
Bossuet,  political  theory  of,  119 
British  Empire  League,  468 
British  North  America  Act,  290 
Bryce,  J.,  9,  27,  48 
Buckle,  H.  T.,  11,  26,  29,  39,  47 
Bulgaria,  proclamation  of  independence 

of,  158-159 
Bundesrath,  nature  of,  349;  functions 

of,  360-361 
Biirgermeister,  438-439 
Burgess,  J.  W.,  8 


Cabinets,  members  of,  36S-3C9 ;  respon- 
sible and  irresponsible,  370 ;  devel- 
opment of,  in  England,  370-371; 
functions  of,  in  England,  371-372; 
powers  of,  in  France,  373 

Calvin,  J.,  political  theory  of,  1 17-118 

Canon  law,  210 

Cantons,  in  Switzerland,  425-426 

Carlyle,  T.,  47 

Celibacy,  influence  on  natural  ability  of 
nations,  64-65 

Centralized  government,  252  ;  degrees 
of,  424-425 

Chamber  of  Deputies,  disorder  in,  351- 
352  ;  interpellations  in,  352-353 

Chancellor,  in  Germany,  373-374 

Checks  and  balances,  in  government 
of  the  United  States,  332 

Christianity,  influence  on  individualism, 
95-96 

Church,  political  theory  of,  113 

Cicero,  political  theory  of,  112 

Cities,  influence  of  nature  on  location 
of,  30-33;  definition  of,  431  ;  causes 
of,  431-432;  results  of  growth  of, 
432 ;  political  results  of,  433  ;  spirit 
of  life  in,  434-435  ;  character  of  pop- 
ulation in,  435-436;  democracy  in, 
436-437  ;  legal  position  of,  437  ;  gov- 
ernment of,  437-440  ;  reform  in,  440- 
444  ;  activities  of,  444-447 

Citizenship,  acquirement  and  loss  of, 
308-309 

City  council,  437-438 

Civil  liberty,  meaning  of,  160-161  ;  rela- 
tion to  authority,  161-163;  in  the 
United  States,  163-164  ;  in  the  Amer- 
ican Constitution,  164-165;  in  Eng- 
land, 165-166;  in  Magna  Charta, 
166-167  ;  in  the  French  Revolution, 
167-168;  in  Russia,  168-169 

Civil  service,  the,  374-379 

Civil  Service  Act,  377-378 

Civilization,  agents  of,  49-51 

Classification,  of  law,  188-191  ;  of  states, 
244-246;  of  government,  247-253; 
of   modern   states,   259;   of   unions. 


522 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


263-266;  of  constitutions,  284-285; 
of  governmental  functions,  501-504 
Climate,  influence    on    economic    life, 

34-35 

Colonial  government,  471-476 

Colonial  policy,  French,  461-464;  Ger- 
man, 464-465  ;  Dutch,  465-466 ;  Rus- 
sian, 466-467  ;  English,  467-468 ; 
American,  468-470 

Colonies,  race  problems  in,  55-57  ;  area 
and  population  of,  448-449 ;  impor- 
tance of,  448,  449-452 ;  historical 
development  of,  452-461  ;  colonial 
policy,  461-470;  classification  of, 
471-472;  formsof  governing, 472-476 

Colonization,  essential  conditions  of, 
452-454  ;  Phoenician,  454-455  ;  Span- 
ish, 456-457 ;  Dutch,  457-458 ; 
French,  458 ;  English,  459-460 

Cotnttaius,  96 

Commerce,  influence  on  economic  life, 
36-37  ;  capture  of,  at  sea,  241 

Commission  government,  in  cities,  442- 

444 

Committees,  in  House  of  Represent- 
atives, 354-356 

Common  law,  210 

Commonwealth  governments,  in  Switz- 
erland, 425-426;  in  Germany,  426- 
427  ;  in  the  United  States,  427-428 

Commonwealth  of  Australia  Constitu- 
tion Act,  289-290 

Confederation,  252, 264-266  ;  relation  to 
federation,  268 ;  weakness  of  Amer- 
ican, 279-280 

Congress,  powers  of,  359-360;  relation 
to  executive,  364 

Constitutional  law,  sovereignty  in,  143- 
145;  as  a  division  of  jurisprudence, 
189;  relation  to  administrative  law, 
190;  contents  of,  288-289 

Constitutions,  meanings  of,  282-283 ; 
definitions  of,  283-2S4  ;  classification 
of,  284-285  ;  written  and  unwritten, 
285-286;  nature  of,  in  England,  286- 
287  ;  requisites  of,  287-289 ;  Amer- 
ican conception  of,  289 ;  preambles 
to,  289-291 ;  origin  of,  291-292;  adop- 
tion of,  292-293  ;  written,  in  England, 
293-294  ;  early  American,  294-295  ; 
sources  of  American,  295-296;  adop- 
tion of  American,  296;  French,  297- 
298;  German,  298-299 ;  amendment 
of,  299-302 ;  interpretation  of,  302-303 

Consuls,  influence  on  international  law, 
202 ;  immunities  of,  in  the  Orient, 
231-232 

Contraband,  242-243 


Corroborees,  74 

Criminal  law,  189;  relation  to  adminis- 
trative law,  191 

Crown,  utility  of,  in  England,  366-367 

Crusades,  influence  on  international 
law,  202 

Cuba,  recognition  by  the  United  States 
of  the  independence  of,  159-160; 
intervention  of  the  United  States 
in,  221-222;  relation  to  the  United 
States,  473-474 

Custom,  in  early  state,  83-84  ;  relation 
to  law,  175-176,  178-1S1 

Dante,  political  theory  of,  114-116 
"  Dark  Horses,"  365-366 
Day,  W.  R.,  policy  of,  concerning  in- 
tervention, 221 
Declaration  of  Independence,  148,  156- 

157 

Declaration  of  London,  242-243 

Declaration  of  Paris,  240-241 

Declaration  of  the  Rights  of  Man  and 
Citizen,  167-168 

Definitions,  necessity  for,  15-16;  of 
nation  and  nationality,  16,  17 ;  of 
state,  19;  of  sovereignty,  23,  127- 
128;  of  government,  23-24;  of  law, 
177-178;  of  constitution,  283-284; 
of  city,  431 

Democracy,  new  form  of,  103-104 ; 
weakness  of,  173;  forms  of  govern- 
ment in,  248-249;  modern,  259-260; 
nature  of,  305-306;  injustice  of,  311- 
312  ;  Greek  and  Swiss,  315-316 

Descriptive  political  science,  5 

Despotism,  in  forming  the  state,  68-69 

Die  fat  us  Papae,  1 1 3 

Diplomacy,  229-234 

Diplomatic  agents,  immunities  of,  229, 
importance  of,  229-230 ;  rank  of, 
230 ;  reception  of,  230-231  ;  refusal 
to  receive,  231 

Discovery,  as  a  mode  of  acquiring  ter- 
ritory, 226 

Divine-right  theory,  118-119 

Division  of  powers,  theory  of,  335-336  ; 
in  the  United  States,  336-338  ;  in  the 
German  Empire,  338-340 

Dominium,  21 1 

Drago  Doctrine,  223-224 

Draper,  J.  W.,  26,  27 

Dual  government,  252 

Duma,  manifesto  summoning  the,  172- 

173 

Economics,  relation  to  political  science, 
I1-13  ;  relation  to  jurisprudence,  12 


INDEX 


52, 


Education,  public,  518-519 

Election,  as  a  means  of  choosing  offi- 
cials, 253;  evolution  of,  313-314; 
under  the  Roman  Republic,  314  ;  in- 
direct, advantages  and  disadvantages 
of,  345-346 ;  by  majority  in  France, 
346 

Electorate,  development  of,  306-307  ; 
nature  of,  306-312;  as  a  govern- 
mental organ,  312-313;  control  of, 
over  government,  312-317;  direct 
governing  by,  317-322  ;  majority  and 
minority  in,  322-325 

Elite,  importance  of,  50 

Emperor,  German,  functions  of,  3S1- 
382 

England,  civil  liberty  in,  165-167;  law 
of,  182-185  ;  nature  of  constitution  in, 
286-287  ;  written  constitutions  in, 
293-294 ;  evolution  of  legislature  in, 
342  ;  utility  of  crown  in,  366-367  ;  cab- 
inet in,  368-37  2  ;  civil  service  in,  37  5  ; 
barristers  and  solicitors  in,  389-390  ; 
justices  of  the  peace  in,  396;  devel- 
opment of  parties  in,  404-405  ;  pres- 
ent political  tendencies  in,  407-408 ; 
local  government  in,  429-430;  the 
mayor  in,  439-440;  colonies  of,  459- 
460,  467-46S  ;  socialism  in,  497-49S 

Ethics,  relation  to  political  science, 
13-14;  relation  to  law,  192-194 

Ethnic  traits,  fixation  of,  51-53 

Ethnic  unity,  17-18 

Europe,  influence  of  nature  on,  27-28, 
29-30;  development  of  law  in,  iSi- 
183  . 

Evolution,  of  the  state,  87-106;  politi- 
cal, of  Greece,  89-91  ;  political,  of 
the  future,  104 ;  political,  summary 
of,  104-105;  of  the  electorate,  306- 
307  ;  of  elections,  313-314  ;  of  sepa- 
ration of  powers,  327-328 ;  of  law- 
making department,  341-343;  of 
judiciary,  384-3S6  ;  of  colonies,  452- 
460 

Executive,  governments  classified  ac- 
cording to,  250-251  ;  heads  of,  363- 
368  ;  heads  of  departments,  368-374; 
civil  service,  374-379 ;  functions  of, 
379-383;  relation  to  judiciary,  391- 

393 
Experts,   in    city  administration,   439- 

440 
Extradition,  22S 

Family,  relation  to  state,  77-78 ;  religion 
,  of,  78-79 
Fauna,  influence  on  economic  life,  36 


"  Favorite  Sons,"  365-366 

Federal  government,  252,  266;  nature 
of,  268-271;  distribution  of  powers 
in,  271-276;  advantages  and  disad- 
vantages of,  276-280 ;  probable  future 
of,  280-281 

Fertility,  of  soil,  advantages  and  disad- 
vantages of,  38-40 

Feudalism,  93-97  ;  influence  on  inter- 
national law,  202 ;  influence  on  terri- 
torial sovereignty,  203 

Filtim  aquae,  225 

Flags  of  truce,  237 

Flora,  influence  on  economic  life,  36 

P'rance,  constitutions  in,  297-29S ; 
amendment  of  constitution  in,  299 ; 
election  by  majority  in,  346;  position 
of  president  in,  367-368  ;  cabinet  in, 
3^9'  373;  civil  service  in,  376;  politi- 
cal parties  in,  408-409  ;  local  govern- 
ment in,  428-429;  colonies  of,  458; 
colonial  policy  of,  461-464  ;  socialism 
in,  495-497 

Freeman,  E.  A.,  92-93 

Functions,  of  the  legislature,  357-362  ; 
of  the  executive,  379-383;  of  the 
judiciary,  387-391;  of  political  par- 
ties, 401-404;  of  cities,  444-447;  of 
government,  501-519 

Geneva  award,  240 

Geneva  Convention,  236-237 

Genius,  causes  influencing,  64-66 

Gens,  76 

Geographic  unity,  17-18 

Germany,  powers  of  imperial  govern- 
ment in,  274-275  ;  preamble  to 
constitution  of,  290 ;  formation  of 
constitution  of,  298-299  ;  amendment 
of  constitution  of,  300 ;  division  of 
powers  in,  338-340  ;  cabinet  in,  369  ; 
functions  of  emperor  in,  381-382; 
courts  in,  397  ;  political  parties  in, 
409 ;  relation  of  Empire  to  states, 
426-427  ;  the  biirs^ermeister  in,  43S- 
439 ;  colonial  policy  of,  464-465 ; 
socialism  in,  494-495 

Government,  relation  to  state,  23-24  ; 
definition  of,  24  ;  forms  of,  247-253  ; 
of  the  future,  261-262  ;  federal,  263- 
281;  component  elements  of,  326; 
local,  424-447  ;  of  colonies,  449-476; 
province  of,  477-500;  functions  of, 
501-519 

Government  regulation,  of  industrj', 
512-513;  of  trusts,  513-514;  of  rail- 
ways, 514-5' 5;  of  labor,  517-518 

"  Grandfather  clause,"  310 


524 


READINGS   IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


Greece,  influence  of  nature  on,  29-30 ; 
political  development  of,  89-91  ; 
acknowledgment  of  independence  of, 
157-158;  influence  on  international 
law,  201  ;  intervention  of  powers  in, 
218-219;  democracy  in,  compared 
with  Swiss,  315-316;  relation  to  colo- 
nies, 455-456 

Grotius,  H.,  200-201,  203-205 

Habeas  corpus^  393 

Hague  conferences,  206,  233-234 

Hawaiian  Islands,  annexation  of,  to  the 
United  States,  226-227 

Heads  of  departments,  368-374 

Hebrews,  political  theory  of,  108-109 

Hereditary  government,  253 

Historical  political  science,  5 

History,  relation  to  political  science, 
9-1 1  ;  human  causes  in,  45-49;  of 
eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries, 
99-101 

Hobbes,  T.,  political  theory  of,  120 

Holland,  colonies  of,  457-458  ;  colonial 
policy  of,  465-466 

Holy  Roman  Empire,  94 

House  of  Commons,  seating  of  mem- 
bers in,  351 

House  of  Lords,  power  over  money 
bills,  348-349  ;  procedure  in,  350 

House  of  Representatives,  speaker  in, 
353-354;  committees  in,  354-356; 
"previous  question"  in,  356 

Humidity,  influence  on  social  life,  40- 

Hungary,  political  parties  in,  410 

Immunity,  of  diplomatic  agents,  229; 
of  consuls  in  the  Orient,  231-232 

Impeachment,  361-362 

Imperialists,  in  the  United  States,  468- 
469 

Implied  powers,  304 

Independence,  national,  156;  Amer- 
ican, 156-157;  Greek,  157-158;  Bul- 
garian, 158-159;  Cuban,  159-160 

India,  crown  government  in,  474-475 

Individualism,  in  feudalism,  95-96;  as 
an  ideal  of  government,  482-486 

Industrial  Revolution,  100 

Initiative,  in  Oklahoma,  171  ;  in  Switz- 
erland, 300-301  ;  extension  of,  318- 
319;  in  the  United  States,  319-320; 
arguments  against,  321-322 

Injunction,  393 

Innocent  use,  224 

"  Instrument  of  Government,"  294 

"  International,"  the,  platform  of,  500 


International  law,  sovereignty  in,  142- 
145;  scope  of,  199;  development  of 
theory  of,  200-201  ;  formation  of, 
201-203;  influence  of  Grotius  on, 
203-205;  since  1648,  205-206;  in- 
fluence of  United  States  on,  206- 
207  ;  sources  of,  208-210 ;  legal  bases 
of,  210;  influence  of  Roman  law  on, 
210-21 1  ;  nature  of,  211-217  ;  relation 
to  municipal  law,  213-214;  relation 
to  morality,  214-215;  as  law,  215- 
216;  sanction  of,  216-217;  content 
of,  218-243;  classification  of  states 
according  to,  246 

International  relations,  advantages  of, 
197-198  ;  scope  of,  198-199  ;  present 
tendencies  in,  207-208 

Interpellations,  in  French  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  352-353 

Interpretation,  of  American  Constitu- 
tion, 302-304 

Intervention,  nature  of,  218;  in  behalf 
of  Greece,  218-219;  in  affairs  of 
Japan  and  China,  219-220 ;  American 
statements  concerning,  220-221  ;  of 
the  United  States  in  Cuba,  221-222 

James  I,  of  England,  political  theory 
of,  1 18-1 19 

Japan,  reply  of,  to  foreign  intervention, 
219-220 

Jefferson,  T.,  policy  of,  concerning  in- 
tervention, 220 

Judges,  methods  of  choosing,  in  the 
United  States,  388-389 

Judiciary,  in  evolution  of  law,  1S3  ;  evo- 
lution of,  3S4-387  ;  functions  and 
requisites  of,  387-391  ;  relation  to 
executive,  391-393  ;  relation  to  legis- 
lature, 393-396;  organization  of,  396- 
400 

Jwre  sanguinis,  227 

Jure  soli,  227,  308-309 

Jurisdiction,  of  courts,  387-388 

Jurisprudence,  relation  to  economics, 
12 

Jus  gentium,  186,  205,  210-21 1 

Jus  sanguinis,  88,  308-309 

Justices  of  the  peace,  in  England,  396 

Kinship,  in  early  state,  72,  75-78 
Kompetenz- Kompctenz,  273-274 

Labor,  regulation  of,  517-518 
Laissez  faire,  35,  483-486 
Lavisse,  E.,  49,  97 

Law,  meaning  of,  174  ;  concept  of,  175- 
176;  nature  of,  176;  as  custom,  176; 


INDEX 


525 


positive,  176-177  ;  definitions  of,  177- 
178  ;  sources  of,  178-179  ;  beginnings 
of,  1 79-1 8 1  ;  development  of,  in 
Europe,  181-1S3;  Roman  and  Eng- 
lish, 183-185 ;  diffusion  of,  185 ; 
uniformity  of,  185-1S6;  scientific  cre- 
ation of,  1S6-187  ;  classification  of, 
188-189;  private  and  public,  188-189  > 
administrative,  189-191  ;  application 
of,  191-192  ;  relation  to  morality,  192- 
194;  relation  to  international  law, 
213-216;  international,  content  of, 
218-243;  of  prize  courts,  238 

Lawyers,  importance  of,  in  the  United 
States,  390-391 

Lecky,  W.  E.  II.,  107 

Legal  responsibility,  of  political  parties 
in  the  United  States,  420-422 

Legal  sovereignly,  135-137 

Legislature,  evolution  of,  34^-343  ! 
principles  of  organization  of,  343- 
344  ;  bicameral  system,  344 ;  struc- 
ture of,  344-346 ;  comparative  power 
of  Houses  in,  347-349;  internal  or- 
ganization and  procedure,  349-356; 
functions  of,  357-362 ;  relation  to 
judiciary,  393-39^ 

Liberty,  meanings  of,  1 50-1 51  ;  relation 
to  sovereignty,  151;  idea  of,  152; 
source  of,  152-153;  rise  of,  153-154; 
evolution  of,  154-156;  national,  156- 
160;  civil,  160-169;  political,  169-173 

Local  government,  relation  to  cen- 
tral government,  424-425 ;  common- 
wealth, 425-428;  rural,  428-431; 
municipal,  435-447 

Locke,  J.,  political  theory  of,  1 20-1 21  ; 
on  separation  of  powers,  329 

Louis  XIV,  of  P'rance,  political  theory 
of,  119 

Louis  XVI,  of  France,  decree  for  sus- 
pending, 149 

Machiavelli,  political  theory  of,  116- 
117 

"  Machine,"  the,  417-418 

Madison,  J.,  on  divisibility  of  sover- 
eignty,  139 

Magna  Charta,  civil  liberty  in,  166-167 

Maine,  Sir  II.,  141 

Majority,  nature  and  conduct  of,  322- 

323 
Mala  prohibita,  192 
Mandamus,  393 
Maritime  capture,  rules  of,  241 
Marsh,  G.  T.,  26 
Mayor,  in  the  United  States,  437-438 ; 

in  England,  439 


Metals,  influence  on  economic  life, 
35-36 

Middle  Ages,  evolution  of  state  during, 
92-97;  political  theory  during,  113- 
118;  influence  on  international  law, 
201-203;  colonies  in,  456 

Mill,  J.  S.,  17 

Ministries,  368-374 

Minority,  representation  of,  322-325 

Monarchy,  evolution  of,  in  modern 
times,  97-98 

Monroe,  J.,  policy  of,  concerning  inter- 
vention, 220,  222 

Monroe  Doctrine,  222 

Montesquieu,  C,  25;  on  separation  of 
powers,  329-331 

Morals,  relation  to  law,  192-194 ;  rela- 
tion to  international  law,  214-215 

Municipal  activities,  444-447 

Municipal  government,  435-440;  re"- 
form  of,  440-444  • 

Municipal  law,  relation  to  international 
law,  213-214 

Municipal  ownership,  446-447 

National  empires,  260-261,  450 

National  liberty,  156-160 

National  state,  nature  of,  101-102 ; 
future  of,   102-103 

Nationality,  essentials  of,  16-17;  •"" 
fluence  on  state  forming,  59-61  ;  in 
modern  politics,  61-62;  dangers  of 
overemphasis  on,  63  ;  determination 
of,  227-228 

Nations,  16-18;  influences  affecting 
ability  of,  64-66 ;  psychology  of,  66- 
67  ;  contributions  of,  to  political  civil- 
ization, 105-106 

Natural  environment,  influence  on  state, 
25-44 

Naturalization,  309 

Negroes,  in  the  United  States,  54 ; 
suffrage  of,  309-310 

Neutrality,  239-243 

Neutralized  states,  239 

Oklahoma,  political  liberty  in,  171 

Olney  Doctrine,  222-223 

"Open  door"  policy,  206,  221,  232-233 

"  Organic  "  laws,  in  France,  297-298 

Organic  theory,  122-124 

Organization,  varieties  of,  257-258;  of 
legislatures,  343-344;  of  the  judi- 
ciary, 396-400 ;  of  political  parties, 
411-414 

Origin  of  the  state,  68-72 

Ownership,  of  land  in  case  of  war,  235- 
236 


526 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


Panama  Canal,  239-240 

Papacy,  political  theory  of,  113-114 

Parliamentary  government,  253,  254- 
255;  in  times  of  crises,  256-257 

Patriarchal  family,  76 

Patriotism,  71 

Persona  no  11  grata,  231 

Persoiialunion,  246,  263-264,  265 

Peschel,  on  influence  of  natural  envi- 
ronment, 38 

Philippine  Commission,  instructions  to, 
469-470 

Plato,  political  theory  of,  109-110 

Piatt  Amendment,  473-474 

Plebiscite,  138 

Political  consciousness,  influence  on 
state  forming,  70-72 

Political  liberty,  nature  of,  169-170;  in 
Oklahoma,  171 

Political  offenses,  extradition  for,  228 

Political  parties,  functions  of,  401-404; 
history  of,  404-407  ;  in  modern  states, 
407-411;  organization  of,  411-414; 
reform  in,  414-423 

Political  science,  scope  of,  1-6;  divi- 
sions of,  4-5;  outline  of,  5-6;  rela- 
tion to  sociology,  7-8 ;  relation  to 
history,  9-1 1  ;  relation  to  economics, 
11-13;  relation  to  ethics,  13-14 

Political  sovereignty,  134-135 

Political  terms,  15-16 

Political  theory,  value  of,  107-10S;  of 
the  Hebrews,  108-109;  of  I^lato,  109- 
iio;  of  Aristotle,  iio-ii  i ;  of  Cicero, 
112  ;  of  the  early  Church,  113  ;  of  the 
papacy,  113-114;  of  Dante,  114-116; 
of  Machiavelli,  116-117;  of  Calvin, 
1 1 7-1 18;  of  James  I,  11 8-1 19;  of  Bos- 
suet,  1 19  ;  of  Hobbes,  120  ;  of  Locke, 
120-121;  of  Rousseau,  121-122;  of 
Spencer,  122-123;  of  Bluntschli, 
123-124;  English  and  continental, 
124-125  ;  changes  in  the  United 
States,  125-126;  of  sovereignty,  140- 
145 ;  of  international  law,  200-201  ; 
of  American  union,  271-272  ;  of  sep- 
aration of  powers,  329-331,  333-335  ; 
of  division  of  powers,  335-336 

Politics,  4-5 

Popular  sovereignty,  133-134 

Population,  importance  of,  in  history, 
45-49;  as  agents  of  civilization,  49- 
51;  of  cities,  435-436;  of  colonies, 

449 
Positive  law,  176-177 
Preambles,  to  constitutions,  289-291 
President,  of  France,  367-368 ;  of  the 

United  States,  364-366,  382 


Presidential  government,  253 ;  defects 
of,  255-256;  in  times  of  crises,  256- 
257 

Previous  question,  in  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, 356 

Primary  elections,  relation  to  party  or- 
ganization, 412-414;  reform  of,  422- 

423 

Prisoners  of  war,  treatment  of,  236 

Privateering,  241 

Private  international  law,  199 

Private  law,  188-189 

Prize  courts,  238 

Program,  of  French  socialists,  495- 
497 ;  of  Social-Democratic  Federa- 
tion in  England,  497-498;  of  socialist 
party  in  the  United  States,  499 ;  of 
the  "  International,"  500 

Progress,  relation  to  stagnation,  82- 
85 ;  social,  85-86 

Proportion^al  representation,  324 

Protectorates,  472-473 

Psychology,  of  nations,  66-67 

Public  industries,  forms  of,  510-51 1; 
in  the  United  States,  511-512 

Public  international  law,  199 

Public  law,  4,  188-189 

Public  utilities,  509-510 

Punishment,  forms  of,  385-386 

Puritans,  political  theory  of,  117-118 

Race,  fixation  of,  51-53  ;  in  the  United 
States,  53-54 ;  in  Austria-Hungary, 
54-55  ;  in  modern  colonial  empires, 
55-57;  destiny  of,  57-59;  struggle 
of,  in  state  forming,  80-81 

Railways,  regulation  of,  514-515 

Realunion,  263 

Recall,  the,  317 

Referendum,  138;  in  Oklahoma,  171; 
in  Switzerland,  300-301  ;  origin  of, 
•  317-318;  extension  of,  318-319;  in 
the  United  States,  319-320;  argu- 
ments for  and  against,  320-322 

Reform,  influence  of  science  on,  98- 
99;  of  political  parties,  414-423 

Reform  Act  of  1832,  307-308 

Reichstag,  organization  of,  353 

Religion,  influence  on  early  state,  68- 

69.  72-73'  78-79 

Religious  persecution,  influence  on 
natural  ability  of  nations,  65 

Renan,  J.  E.,  17 

Representation,  of  minorities,  323 ; 
proportional,  324 ;  of  classes  or  in- 
terests, 325 

Representative  government,  251,  316- 
317 


INDEX 


527 


Reprisals,  234 

Revolution,  moral  right  of,  146-147; 
types  of,  147-148;  right  of,  148;  ex- 
amples of,  148-149 

Rights,  political,  169-170 

River  boundaries,  225-226 

Roman  law,  spread  of,  in  Europe,  181- 
185;  influence  on  international  law, 
201,  205,  210-21 1 

Rome,  formation  of  Empire,  91-92 ; 
law  of,  182-185;  influence  on  inter- 
national law,  201  ;  elections  in,  314 

Roosevelt,  T.,  policy  of,  concerning 
intervention,  2^1 

Rousseau,  J.,  political  theory  of,  121- 
122,  130 

Rule  of  1756,  240 

Russia,  civil  liberty  in,  168-169;  First 
Duma  in,  172-173;  colonial  policy 
of,  466-467 

Science,  influence  on  reform,  98-99 ; 
in  lawmaking,  1S6-187 

Search,  method  of,  242 

Secession,  ordinance  of,  148 

Separation  of  powers,  evolution  of, 
327-328;  development  of  theory  of, 
329-330;  Montesquieu  on,  330-331  ; 
Blackstone  on,  331  ;  United  States 
Supreme  Court  on,  331  ;  criticism  of, 

333-33S 
Seward,  W.  II.,  policy  of,  concerning 

intervention,  221 
Sexual  preference,  51-53 
Social-contract  theory,  120-122 
Social- Democratic  Federation,  in  Eng- 
land, program  of,  497-49S 
Social  movement,  lines  of,  38 
Social  organization,  in  primitive  times, 

73-75'  S7-S9 

Socialism,  origin  of,  4S7-48S  ;  develop- 
ment of,  48S-490 ;  elements  of,  490- 
491;  strength  of,  491-492;  weak- 
ness of,  492-493  ;  in  present  politics, 
494-500 

Sociology,  relation  to  political  science, 
7-8  ;  sovereignty  from  standpoint  of, 
130-132 

Solicitors,  in  England,  389-390 

South  Carolina,  ordinance  of  secession 
of,  148 

Sovereignty,  definition  of,  23  ;  nature 
of,  23;  meanings  of,  127-128;  as 
unlimited  power,  12S-129;  character- 
istics of,  129;  as  supreme  will,  130; 
from  a  sociological  standpoint,  130- 
132;  limits  of,  132-133;  of  the 
people,  133-134;  political.  134-135; 
ultimate,    135;    legal,     135-136;    as 


total  lawmaking  power,  137-13S;  di- 
visibility of,  138-139;  delegation  of, 
139;  present  theory  of,  140-141; 
criticism  of,  141-142;  in  international 
law,  142-143;  in  constitutional  and 
international  law,  143-145;  relation 
to  liberty,  151  ;  territorial,  203;  rela- 
tion to  state  functions,  505-506 

Spain,  colonies  of,  456-457 

Speaker,  of  House  of  Representatives, 

353-354 
Spencer,  II.,  political  theory  of,   122- 

123 

.Spheres  of  influence,  472 

Spoils  .system,  376-377.  4 > 4-4 '7 

St,i(Usi,/i-c\  22 

.Stagnation,  relation  to  progress,  S2-S5 

State,  definitions  of,  19;  nature  of,  19- 
20;  essentials  of,  21  ;  idea  and  con- 
cept of,  22  ;  physical  basis  of,  25-44  ; 
population  of,  45-67  ;  origin  of,  68- 
86;  evolution  of,  87-106;  ancient, 
87-92 ;  medieval,  92-97  ;  modern,  97- 
104  ;  theories  of,  107-1  26 ;  relation  to 
other  states,  195-217  ;  independence 
and  equality  of,  218-224;  property 
and  jurisdiction  of,  224-229;  diplo- 
macy among,  229-234;  war  among, 
234-238;  neutrality  among,  239-243; 
neutralized,  239 ;  classification  of, 
244-247;  organization  of,  257-262; 
relationship  among,  263-267  ;  origin 
of  constitution  in,  291-292;  two 
functions  of,  334-335;  aims  of,  477- 
481 

State  building,  forces  in,  72-73 

State  papers,  as  a  source  of  interna- 
tional law,  209 

Statesmen,  types  of,  67 

Suez  Canal,  239-240 

Suffrage,  woman,  308 ;  restrictions  on 
negro,  309-310;  educational  test  for, 
310;  of  military  forces,  310-311; 
exercise  of,  311 

Supreme  Court,  on  divisibility  of  sover- 
eignty, 138  ;  in  interpreting  the  Con- 
stitution, 302-304  ;  on  separation  of 
powers,  331;  distrust  of,  397-398; 
defense  of,  398-399 ;  in  the  future, 
399-400 

Suzerainty,  246 

Switzerland,  powers  of  federal  govern- 
ment in,  275-276;  preamble  to  con- 
stitution of,  290 ;  amendment  of 
constitution  in.  300-301  ;  democracy 
in,  compared  to  Greece.  315-316; 
origin  of  referendum  in,  317-31S; 
government  of  cantons  in,  425-426 


528 


READINGS  IN  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 


Taboo,  75,  1 80-18 1 

Taine,  H.  A.,  26 

Tariff,  value  of,  515-516;    in  Europe, 

516;    difficulty   of   reduction   in  the 

United  States,   517 
Taxation,  theory  of,  506 
Territorial  waters,  224-225 
Territory,  essential  to  state,  19-21  ;  of 

a  state,   224-226;    acquisition  of,  by 

discovery,   226 
Third  parties,  function  of,  403-404 
Thirty  Years'  War,  influence  on  inter- 
national law,  204 
Three-mile  limit,  225 
Time  Spirit,  importance  of,  46 
Totem  group,  73-75 
Treasury  bench,  351 
Treaties,  as  a  source  of   international 

law,  209 ;  gifts  accompanying,  232 
Tribe,  as  a  form  of  social  organization, 

87-89 
Trusts,  regulation  of,  513-514 
Tyrannis,  89-90 

Unam  Sanctiitn,  114 
Unconstitutional  law,  394-396 
Unions,  classification  of,  263-266 
United  States,  race  elements  in,  53-54  ; 
political  theory  in,  125-126;  civil 
liberty  in,  163-165;  influence  of,  on 
international  law,  206-207 ;  state- 
ments of,  concerning  intervention, 
220-221  ;  intervention  of,  in  Cuba, 
221-222;  policy  of,  in  neutral  trade, 
241;  theory  of  union  in,  271-272; 
distribution  of  powers  in,  272-273; 
conception  of  Constitution  in,  289; 
preamble  to  Constitution  in,  291  ; 
sources  of  Constitution  in,  294-295  ; 
adoption  of  Constitution  in,  296; 
amendment  of  Constitution  in,  301- 
302  ;  interpretation  of  Constitution  in, 
302-304  ;  methods  of  influencing  vot- 
ers in,  315  ;  initiative  and  referendum 


in,  319-320;  checks  and  balances  in, 
332  ;  division  of  powers  in,  336-338  ; 
apportionment  of  representatives  in, 
344-345  ;  relation  of  Houses  of  Con- 
gress in,  347-348 ;  powers  of  Con- 
gress in,  359-360;  overlegislation  in, 
361 ;  relation  of  executive  to  Congress 
in,  364 ;  types  of  presidential  candi- 
dates in,  364-366  ;  cabinet  in,  369  ; 
civil  service  in,  376-378;  powers  of 
President  in,  382  ;  method  of  choos- 
ing judges  in,  388-3S9  ;  importance 
of  lawyers  in,  390-391  ;  history  of 
parties  in,  405-407  ;  legal  responsi- 
bility of  parties  in,  420-422 ;  com- 
monwealth government  in,  427-428; 
local  government  in,  430-431  ;  munic- 
ipal reform  in,  440-444  ;  influence  of 
colonies  on,  451-452  ;  expansion  of, 
460-461  ;  colonial  policy  of,  468-470; 
relation  to  Cuba,  473-474;  socialism 
in,  498-499;  public  industry  in,  511- 
512  ;  tariff  in,  517 

Veto,  382-383 

War,  influence  on  state  origin,  81-82; 
in  international  law,  234-238  ;  kinds 
of,  234-235  ;  residence  in,  235  ;  effect 
of,  on  ownership  of  land,  235-236; 
prisoners  in,  236  ;  methods  of  carry- 
ing on,  237-238 

Washington,  G.,  policy  of,  concernmg 
intervention,  220 

Webster,  D.,  policy  of,  concerning  in- 
tervention, 220 

Will,  of  the  State,  1-3  ;  sovereignty  as, 
130,  137-138 

Woman  suffrage,  arguments  for,  308 

World  powers,  195-197 

Writs,  393 

Zeitgeist,  47 
Zemstvos,  172 
Zollverein,  298 


ANNOUNCEMENTS 


REFERENCE   BOOKS   IN 
HISTORY 


Abbott:   History  and  Description  of  Roman  Political  Institu- 
tions      $1.50 

Andrews:  Droysen's  Outline  of  the  Principles  of  History  .  i.oo 
Brigham  :  Geographic  Influences  in  American  History  .  .  1.25 
Callender :  Selections    from  the    Economic    History   of    the 

United  States,  1 765-1 860 2.75 

Cannon :  Reading  References  for  English  History  .  .  .  .  2.50 
Channing  and  Hart :   Guide  to  the  Study  of  American  History     2.00 

Davidson  :   Reference  History  of  the  United  States 80 

Dyer:   Machiavelli  and  the  Modern  State net     i.oo 

Feilden  :  Short  Constitutional  History  of  England  ....  1.25 
Getchell :  Study  of  Mediaeval  History  by  the  Library  Method  .50 
Handbooks  on  the  History  of  Religions 

Hopkins  :  Religions  of  India 2.00 

Jastrov^r :   Religion  of  Babylonia  and  Assyria 3.00 

Saussaye  :  Religion  of  the  Teutons 2.50 

Keller:  Colonization 3.00 

Mace:  Method  in  History i.oo 

Reinsch  :  Readings  on  American  Federal  Government      .     .     2.75 
Richardson,  Ford,  and  Durfee  :  Syllabus  of  Continental  Euro- 
pean History 75 

Riggs  :   Studies  in  United  States  History 60 

Robinson  :   Readings  in  European  History 

Volume  I 1-50 

Volume  II J -50 

Abridged  Edition i-50 

Robinson  and  Beard:  Readings  in  Modern  European  History 

Volume  I 140 

Volume  II 1-50 

Rupert :  Guide  to  the  Study  of  the  History  and  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States 70 


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Selections  from  the  Economic 
History  of  the  United  States,  1765-1860 

With  Introductory  Essays 

By  GUY  STEVENS  CALLENDER,  Professor  of  Political  Economy 
in  the  Sheffield  Scientific  School,  Yale  University 

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